January 9, 2013: Strategy Page

The Indian Air Force is facing yet another round of embarrassment over the mismanagement of its pilot training program. This time it was the news that a quarter of its Hawk jet trainers were out of action because of an avoidable spare parts shortage. This is not the first time the Indian Hawks have embarrassed the air force leadership. The Hawks were, in fact, meant to take care of an earlier leadership failure.

This came from the fact that India has long had problems with advanced trainers or, rather, the lack of them. For a long time new pilots went straight from propeller driven trainer aircraft to high performance jets like the MiG-21. This was fatal for many of those new pilots. The MiG-21 has always been a tricky aircraft to fly. Pilots normally get some time on a jet trainer aircraft before taking on a jet fighter. The Indian approach resulted in a high loss rate from peacetime accidents. The solution to this was obtaining a jet trainer but it took decades for this simple solution to make its way through the defense procurement bureaucracy.

Eight years ago, after two decades of effort, BAE Systems finally sold 66 Hawk jet trainers to India, at a cost of some $25 million each. The delays were caused by the Indian unwillingness to spend the money, plus the efforts of French, Russian, Czech, and American aircraft manufacturers to put forward their own candidates. Finally, the growing number of Indian MiG-21 aircraft lost forced the government to close the deal. The Hawk advanced jet trainers are the most successful Western aircraft of this type, at least in terms of sales (over 900 have been sold). The U.S. Navy uses the Hawk and India felt the Hawk was the most suitable for preparing MiG-21 pilots, as this nine ton aircraft was designed to train pilots who will eventually fly jet fighters. The Hawk can also be armed and used for ground attack. Four years ago India decided to buy another 40 British Hawk jet trainers.

India has also had problems with basic (propeller driven) trainers. This has recently been addressed as well. Last May the Indian government finally agreed to buy 75 Pilatus PC 7 trainer aircraft for the Indian Air Force. The aircraft cost $7.5 million each and begin to arrive this year. It took the air force several years to get approval. In the meantime, pilot training and flight safety suffered because of the shortage of basic trainers.

There are actually three different aircraft trainers Indian pilots use during their flight schooling. All of the current ones are elderly and overworked. The HPT-32 is used for primary (basic) flight training. Intermediate training uses the Kiran Mark II and then the Hawk Jet Trainer is used for advanced training for fighter pilots. After that the pilots are sent to combat units where they learn how to operate a specific type of aircraft.

Back in 2009, all 116 HPT 32 basic trainers had to be grounded because of age related problems. HPT reliability has gone down even more since then. The HPT 32 entered service three decades ago and there have been over a hundred serious accidents, killing 23 instructor and trainee pilots. Because of the HPT 32 problems the 96 Kiran Mk1 intermediate trainers had to increasingly be used for both basic and intermediate training. These aircraft are being worn out but even then most pilot trainees are only getting a third of the required hours before being moved along in their flight training. This leads to more accidents as pilots are pushed into the next phase of their training without adequate flight time.

For over three years the air force has been trying to get permission to buy 75 Pilatus PC 7 single engine turboprop trainers to replace the HPT 32s. While the HPT-32 was designed and manufactured in India, the Swiss built Pilatus was seen, by Indian pilot training experts, as a better choice. The PC 7 is a two seat, 2.7 ton aircraft. The instructor sits behind the trainee and both have an ejection seat. Nearly 500 PC 7s have been built in the last three decades and they are used by 24 nations. But because the Pilatus is a foreign aircraft, buying it has become a political issue and the actual purchase was continually delayed by politicians or Indian aircraft manufacturers. Indian pilots made it clear that they did not want another HPT 32.

Chinese made Z-9 helicopter. (photo : K.L. Yim)

 24.12.2012 Defense Studies

(PhnomPenhPost)

13 décembre 2012 Par Hassan Meddah -  L'Usine Nouvelle n° 3311

ENQUêTE  EN COUVERTURE  Le plan de vol est chargé pour le futur patron de Dassault Aviation, qui doit être nommé ce mardi 18 décembre. L'Usine Nouvelle, dans son édition du 13 décembre, consacrait son dossier de une aux défis qui attendent le successeur de Charles Edelstenne : il lui faut vendre 126 Rafale aux Indiens, sortir renforcé de la crise des jets d'affaires et assurer l'indépendance de son groupe.

Zone de turbulences en vue, veuillez attacher vos ceintures. » L'avertissement vaut pour la direction du groupe Dassault, le fabricant du Rafale et des jets d'affaires Falcon. Ses dirigeants opèrent une manoeuvre délicate : le changement de pilote alors que le plan de vol du groupe s'annonce chargé. À 75 ans, Charles Edelstenne, qui a solidement tenu le manche de Dassault Aviation comme PDG depuis les années 2000, a atteint la limite d'âge. Dans ce groupe qui a la culture du secret, l'identité du futur PDG ne devrait être dévoilée que le 18 décembre. Toutefois, son mode de désignation laisse entrevoir une forte continuité. « Il a été désigné par Serge Dassault et Charles Edelstenne. Il ne devrait pas y avoir de rupture avec la politique précédente », analyse un cadre en interne. Deux candidats se détachent : Éric Trappier, le directeur général international et « vendeur en chef » du Rafale, et Loïk Segalen, le directeur général des affaires économiques et sociales.

La tâche du successeur d'Edelstenne ne sera pas simple, car les prochains mois se révéleront cruciaux pour Dassault. En jeu, l'avenir du Rafale, le leadership du groupe sur le marché des jets d'affaires et, plus encore, son indépendance, questionnée depuis le projet de méga fusion entre ses concurrents EADS et le britannique BAE Systems. Le nouveau PDG devra tout de suite entrer dans le vif du sujet et sauver le Rafale, la fierté de la maison Dassault. Les négociations entrent dans leur dernière ligne droite avec les autorités indiennes, qui veulent conclure fin mars au plus tard. Le contrat porte sur l'achat de 126 appareils, pour un montant de plus de 10 milliards de dollars. Or rien n'est acquis comme l'a rappelé Charles Edelstenne lors de sa récente audition devant la commission de la Défense de l'Assemblée nationale. « Je suis relativement optimiste, mais pas définitivement tant qu'on n'a pas reçu le premier chèque », indiquait-il. Sans nouvelle commande de l'étranger, la chaîne d'assemblage des Rafale située à Mérignac (Gironde), qui tourne à un appareil par mois, pourrait s'arrêter. L'échec n'est pas permis.

Premier vol pour le SMS en 2014

Autre enjeu moins visible mais plus vital : tirer profit de la reprise des jets d'affaires, qui assurent au groupe l'essentiel de ses ventes et de ses bénéfices. Sur les 3,3 milliards d'euros de chiffre d'affaires réalisés en 2011, les trois quarts proviennent de la vente de Falcon (lire l'encadré ci-dessous). Un marché difficile sur lequel la crise de 2008 continue de peser. L'avionneur compte livrer 65 appareils cette année, soit à peine deux de plus que l'an dernier. Son carnet de commandes commence toutefois à reprendre des couleurs. En 2011, le groupe a engrangé 36 ventes contre un solde négatif net de 9 commandes l'année précédente. Sur les chaînes d'assemblage, la production a retrouvé un niveau intermédiaire entre les 12 appareils produits par mois quand le marché battait son plein et les trois avions par mois au plus fort de la crise. Aujourd'hui, avec des chaînes cadencées pour sortir 7 appareils, l'inquiétude des équipes reste de mise, d'autant plus que le recours à la sous-traitance s'est accéléré.

« Il y a un coup de frein sérieux sur les embauches dédiées à la production. En quatre ans, l'effectif de production a été réduit de 400 salariés pour tomber à environ 2 150 personnes », précise Raymond Ducrest, du syndicat CFDT chez Dassault. Le prochain PDG devra impérativement réussir le lancement du SMS, le futur jet d'affaires du groupe. Pour surprendre la concurrence, le plus grand secret a été imposé aux équipes et aux fournisseurs. Le groupe a même tenté de brouiller les pistes en laissant entendre que l'appareil se positionnerait en entrée de gamme. Seule certitude, l'importance du budget dédié. « En termes de développement de produits, jamais les investissements n'ont été aussi hauts », a assuré Charles Edelstenne.

Le projet SMS mobilise 1 500 ingénieurs chez Dassault et ses partenaires. « La conception détaillée de l'avion est désormais figée. Les premières pièces destinées aux tests de résistance sont entrées en production », précise le bureau d'études de l'avionneur à Saint-Cloud (Hauts-de-Seine). Si la phase de conception s'est déroulée comme prévu, reste à mener l'industrialisation de l'appareil dans un calendrier serré : une présentation aux clients en 2013, un premier vol en 2014... de façon à être prêt quand le marché aura rebondi. Le nouveau patron devra trancher sur la pertinence d'ouvrir une ligne d'assemblage de Falcon en Chine. Le pays, où les milliardaires sont de plus en plus nombreux, a contribué l'an passé à la moitié des ventes de l'avionneur. Le marché potentiel est de l'ordre de 1 000 appareils pour les dix années à venir. Le brésilien Embraer et l'américain Cessna assemblent déjà en Chine, évitant ainsi de lourds droits et taxes de douane à l'importation. Dassault s'est lui contenté d'une filiale et d'un centre de services.

Un risque de marginalisation

Ultime défi : assurer la sacro-sainte indépendance de Dassault Aviation, « dernier groupe d'aviation au monde encore détenu par la famille de son fondateur et portant son nom », aime-t-on à rappeler au siège parisien du holding familial. Le sujet est hautement sensible. Ainsi, quand l'un des héritiers de Serge Dassault, son deuxième fils Laurent, a évoqué la possibilité de fondre le groupe dans une entité avec Safran, Thales et Zodiac, il a été immédiatement désavoué et contraint de rentrer dans le rang. Le risque d'une marginalisation du groupe existe bel et bien, comme l'a révélé la méga fusion avortée entre BAE Systems et EADS en septembre. « Ce projet a montré que la grande majorité des industriels français et européens n'ont pas la taille critique pour porter les investissements nécessaires au cours des prochaines années. [...] Cette taille se situe aux alentours des 30 milliards de dollars de chiffre d'affaires pour prétendre jouer les premiers rôles sur des programmes majeurs dans l'aéronautique », analyse Philippe Plouvier, le directeur des activités aéronautique et défense chez Roland Berger.

Neuron, une double réussite

Le fabricant du Rafale est-il condamné à être un acteur de second rang ? Peut-être pas, si le nouveau PDG manoeuvre aussi habilement que son prédécesseur. Charles Edelstenne avait en effet, dès 2008, racheté 26% de Thales, devenant l'actionnaire industriel du principal électronicien de défense européen avec 13 milliards d'euros de chiffre d'affaires. Dassault joue depuis un rôle central dans le secteur de la défense en France, grâce notamment aux 35% de Thales dans le capital de DCNS (chantiers navals de défense) et le rapprochement opéré avec le fabricant de blindés Nexter. À défaut d'être le plus gros, Dassault démontre qu'il est l'un des plus agiles. Le groupe a marqué les esprits avec le pilotage du programme Neuron, ce démonstrateur de drone de combat qui a effectué son premier vol le 1er décembre depuis la base d'Istres (Bouches-du-Rhône). « Ce premier vol constitue une double réussite pour Dassault. Il devance BAE et prouve qu'il n'a pas raté le virage des drones. Et le groupe a aussi prouvé qu'il pouvait travailler en bonne intelligence avec les grands partenaires européens », analyse Damien Lasou, le responsable mondial de l'activité aéronautique et défense du cabinet Accenture.

Pour le démonstrateur Neuron, Dassault a travaillé conjointement avec l'italien Finmeccanica, le suédois Saab, le suisse RUAG, la branche espagnole d'EADS... Dassault Aviation a réussi à décrocher la maîtrise d'oeuvre industrielle parce que l'État français a financé à lui seul la moitié des 400 millions d'euros de ce programme européen. Le successeur de Charles Edelstenne pourra-t-il compter sur un tel appui ? À l'heure où l'État réfléchit à l'avenir de sa défense, c'est un paramètre, et non des moindres, que le futur pilote de Dassault Aviation ne maîtrise pas.

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7 décembre 2012 par Daniel Favre – INFO-AVIATION

L’Inde négocie actuellement avec la Russie une modernisation supplémentaire de 80 chasseurs Su-30MKI afin de les élever au niveau du Super-30. L’opération pourrait se chiffrer à 1 milliard de dollars (source : Russia & India Report).

Cette modernisation concernerait le lot de 80 chasseurs Su-30MKI* déjà achetés à la Russie (consortium Suhkoï/Irkout). Les avions Su-30MKI sont livrés à l’Indian Air Force (IAF) en quatre étapes. Selon le plan actuel, leur modernisation devrait être réalisée au cours des trois ou quatre prochaines années.

Au total, l’Inde possède 170 appareils Su-30MKI. L’IAF envisage aussi d’acheter 272 avions supplémentaires. Une commande pour 230 appareils a été déjà passée.

Ce contrat se cumulerait donc au contrat de modernisation Super-30 de 42 Su-30MK livrés à l’Inde entre 1997 et 2004, chiffré à 3,77 milliards de dollars et qui est susceptible d’être signé lors de la visite du président russe Vladimir Poutine à New Delhi le 24 décembre.

La modernisation Super-30 prévoit entre autres l’installation de nouveaux radars, d’ordinateurs de bord, de nouveaux systèmes électroniques et de missiles de croisière supersoniques BrahMos d’une portée de 300 km. Elle devrait commencer en 2015 et effectuée sous licence par la société publique Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).

L’Indian Air Force (IAF) devrait donc pouvoir créer son huitième escadron de Su-30MK en décembre 2012. Il sera basé à Sirsa d’Haryana, près de la frontière avec le Pakistan. Il s’agira du troisième escadron de Su-30MK à être déployé à proximité de la frontière avec le Pakistan depuis 14 mois. Les deux derniers escadrons sont situés à Jodhpur au Rajasthan et à Punjab Halwara.

* Le Su-30MKI est fabriqué en Inde sous la licence de HAL. Il est facilement reconnaissable des autres variantes Su-30 par l’ajout de plans canard et de tuyères à poussée vectorielle.

MOSCOU, 5 décembre - RIA Novosti

Les deux premiers chasseurs biplaces Sukhoi Su-30SM sont arrivés au Centre des essais en vol d'Akhtoubinsk, dans la région d'Astrakhan, a annoncé mercredi à Moscou le porte-parole de l'Armée de l'air russe Vladimir Deriabine.

"Deux chasseurs Su-30SM en provenance d'Irkoutsk se sont posés à Akhtoubinsk, après avoir fait deux escales de ravitaillement à Novossibirsk et à Tcheliabinsk", a indiqué le lieutenant-colonel Deriabine.

La remise prochaine à l'armée des chasseurs à haute manœuvrabilité Su-30SM augmentera considérablement le potentiel de combat de l'Armée de l'air russe.

Le chasseur polyvalent à haute manœuvrabilité Su-30SM est un appareil de la famille des Su-30MK, adapté aux exigences de l'Armée de l'air russe. L'avion possède de nouveaux radars à antenne à balayage électronique (AESA) et des systèmes de liaison radio et d'identification. Ses armements et autres systèmes ont aussi été modifiés par rapport à la version originale. Le groupe Irkout doit produire 30 chasseurs polyvalents Su-30SM d'ici 2015, conformément à un contrat signé avec le ministère russe de la Défense en mars 2012.

October 2012 - By Major Michael Wise, US Army - disamjournal.org

The European Union (EU) is an institution founded upon the precept of shared economic prosperity to prevent conflict. The idea of increasing interdependence in the coal and steel industries expanded into a trade union that eventually led to a common currency for seventeen of the EU’s twenty-seven members. The economic benefits of this regional trade liberalization scheme are apparent, but what are the effects of integration and coordination on industries that are undeniably strategic in nature? One might expect that the efficacy of EU and European Defense Agency (EDA) would not transcend into the aerospace and defense industry, but it turns out that the EU and EDA have a positive effect on exports in this arena. The consequences of this phenomenon reinforce the foundation upon which the European project set out to accomplish. There are lessons to draw from integration of the aerospace and defense industry as well as indicators that the US government and defense firms alike should consider.

The EU

European integration is an endeavor that has failed throughout the ages, often resulting in competition and bloody wars. As Adreas Staab puts it, “From the Roman Empire of Julius Caesar to Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin, European history is marked by many attempts to organize the multitude of nations and ethnicities into a more or less coherent political entity with competing views of how the different states should be related and the degree to which autonomy and sovereignty should be preserved.“¹ But something encouraging has transpired in Europe since the end of WWII. A few forward thinking elites gathered together to establish an economic union that would bind the war-making industries of coal and steel production among the usual states perpetrating war. Jean Monnet, a French entrepreneur and functionalist, presented a plan that would sow the seeds to what would develop into the EU. While there was always disagreement on the role and scope of institutions in integration, a constructive environment (owed largely to US security guarantees and fiscal support) allowed for a lasting peace and functional institutions to emerge. The debate between minimalism versus maximalism translated into proponents of intergovernmental models versus supranational bodies. This debate goes on even today, especially as the EU attempts to manage itself through a real challenge for the first time where the economic benefits are difficult to see amidst the current economic crisis.

Aside from the challenges of integration from nationalist tendencies and questions of sovereignty, the EU delivers massive benefits in the form of a common market with minimal barriers to trade among its members. The common currency is the obvious example of reducing trade costs whereby the drag of currency exchange is evaporated. Among members there are also customs agreements that essentially liberate any trade barriers within the EU and coordinate external economic policies resulting in a uniform arrangement. The EU tries to keep competition fair among its members and maximize industry potential by exploiting the benefits of comparative advantage and economies of scale. It also attempts to address the advantages of state aid among members. Article 87(1) of the European Community Treaty prohibits state aid in the form of subsidies, provided it affects trade between member states.² This distinction is important as will be pointed out in the pursuant discussion on World Trade Organization (WTO) cases involving US and European aerospace firms.

In sum, the EU facilitates European firm competitiveness by keeping trade barriers low and allowing for firms to maximize their productivity through specialization and market access through free trade areas. The implications are profound across a variety of industries. Surprisingly (or perhaps unsurprisingly, depending on one’s perspective), these advantages are translated even to the aerospace and defense industries. The ability of EU member states to generate war-fighting equipment is becoming increasingly interdependent.

The EDA

A regional cooperation of states, such as the members of the EU, will tend to view threats to their individual (and collective) national security differently. They will thus arm and equip themselves according to those different, sometimes divergent, assumptions. In theory, this doesn’t necessarily have to result in completely uncoordinated defense acquisitions. After all, maritime or land powers might simply adjust volumes and concentrations of the major categories of defense equipment. But in practice, European militaries developed a hodgepodge of equipment that is sometimes able to be integrated among (some) members and sometimes is only workable in an autonomous environment. Indeed, under Article 296 of the European Community Treaty, member states are permitted to make the bulk of their defense purchases on a national basis. With the view that European military forces must promote interoperability through tactics, techniques, and procedures, so must their equipment procurement be coordinated. In 2004, the Council of Ministers established the EDA to coordinate defense capabilities. In doing so, it implemented strategies to promote research, development, and armaments cooperation, and strengthen the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).³

The strategy to strengthen the EDTIB is grounded upon three underlying principles. The “three C’s,” serving as a guide in EDTIB enhancement, are capability driven, competence and globally competitive. The EDA endeavors to ensure Europe is equipped and capable to deal with security threats of the future by clarifying priorities with regard to military and industrial capabilities, consolidating demand, increasing investments, considering security of supply and increasing competition and cooperation within the industry.⁴ The EDA initiated efforts to improve Europe’s industrial capabilities in the aerospace sector with the Future Air Systems Project. Among other things, the main contribution of the EDA in this project is to examine the supply chain and to promote engagement with EU bureaucracies.

The idea of a coordinated strategy in European defense and procurement planning is not generally regarded in a positive way. This may be a reflection of an antipathy for real coordination among members’ national priorities. The EDA recognizes the apparent challenges of managing twenty-seven different views and has set its own top capabilities priorities appropriately. They include counter-IED, medical support, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), helicopters, cyber-defense, multinational logistics support, CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) information exchange, strategic and tactical airlift and finally fuel and energy.⁵ These priorities reflect a shift from territorial defense to a force projection capability. It happens that while conventional territorial defense warfare is more simplified for the warfighter, the limited intervention mindset involving projection of small forces is less industry intensive (think less tanks and more agile light units). This prioritization allows the European defense firms to focus on a more narrow market.

Analysis of institutional Effects on Performance

The EU seems to increase productivity by allowing its members to specialize in those areas where they enjoy a comparative advantage, and the EDA seems to allow its members to specialize within the global aerospace and defense market according to its strategy. The consequences of exploiting such advantages are extremely beneficial to the European aerospace and defense industry. This study analyzed export data from UN Comtrade of thirty-nine European countries from 1996 to 2010. The EU and EDA status is depicted in figure 1. It accounted for changes in membership status during the expansion years of 2004 and 2007. This analysis is limited to commodities related to aerospace and defense, in addition to components. These included ammunition, missiles, armored vehicles, warships and aircraft (civilian and military). Figure 2 is a graphical representation of total exports and depicts a steadily increasing trend. Other reports confirm this trend. The EU Observer cited SIPRI data indicating EU arms trade growth despite the economic crisis that embroils the rest of European industry.⁶
    

What could cause such an increase? The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a study indicating that while European defense spending cumulatively fell over the period covered here, expenditures on equipment remained constant (see figure 3). The increase is clearly not the result of domestic consumption. One might expect that integration would encourage specialization and dispersion of factor production; thereby supply chain effects might explain the increase in exports. This appears to be part of the story, but not all of it. Figure 4 shows the total exports separated by trading partners outside the EU and intra-EU trade. The intra-EU trade rises steadily as expected but exports to the rest of the world increase even more rapidly. These results indicate that European aerospace and defense firms are increasing their competitiveness abroad.

What is most interesting is that a regression analysis of exports on institutional membership makes a compelling case for the EU and EDA. This study included multivariate regressions where the independent variables included institutional membership status as well as a qualified and quantified variables depicting conflicts. These conflict variables normalized for an increase or decrease in global conflict that might have spurious effects on aerospace and defense export volume. These variables were generated from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program from the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. The analysis further considered fixed effects of trading partners of the exporting countries. Furthermore, the logs of the export volume served as the dependent variable so that data from low volume exporters could be compared to that of high volume exporters. The results showed that both EU and EDA membership serve as reliable predictors of export growth.

At the Firm Level

Using data from Defense News Top 100 firm rankings reported each year from 2000 to 2010, this study is able to depict individual firm trends during a similar period. Figure 5 displays defense revenue of every European defense firm that made the Defense News list from 2000 to 2010. Table 1 lists the top European defense firms for 2010. It is apparent that most firms enjoy the same trend of increasing revenue as was observed on European aerospace and defense exports. All this during an increasingly sparse domestic market for these defense-related products. This trend is confirmed by the EU Observer’s report on SIPRI’s 2010 analysis noting that most of the large firms saw measured growth while a few smaller firms witnessed contraction in revenue.⁷

The results and trends demonstrated in figure 5 beg more in depth investigation of some of the notable cases. The top performing firms vary in state involvement, product specialty and location, though all reside in the larger economic powers of the core of Europe. This study will examine BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica and Thales.

BAE Systems is a London-based defense firm that currently ranks second only to Lockheed Martin (US) in defense revenue. It is a multinational company with strong markets in the EU, US, Saudi Arabia, Australia, and India. Its products range from cutting-edge aerospace technology to conventional armored vehicle production. It is closely tied to US defense firms and has an integral part in the production of the multinational joint strike fighter, the F-35 Lightning. The firm plays an important role in the UK’s nuclear technology as well as high-end shipbuilding. BAE also develops cyber defense and information technology systems. Though primarily a UK based firm, it is also invested in several European aerospace and defense firms.

The European Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS) Company is a conglomerate of several consolidated defense firms in Europe. Headquartered in the Netherlands, its main subsidiaries are in France, Germany and Spain. These include Airbus and Eurocopter. It mainly produces aircraft and electronic systems and its primary markets are in the UK, North America, the Middle East, Russia, India, China, Brazil and Australia.

Finmeccanica is one of Italy’s largest industrial groups and is partially nationalized (30 percent). It also mainly produces aerospace technologies and develops components of Europe wide defense products like the Eurofighter (joint venture between BAE and EADS). 

The Thales Group is a French defense firm specializing in communication technology. It is also a somewhat nationalized firm, with state ownership at about 27 percent and is closely associated with Dassault Aviation.

The contrast and confluence of these competing firms is remarkable. BAE and EADS are publicly traded while Finmeccanica and Thales rely heavily on state support and investment. Finmeccanica, BAE and EADS work closely on the Eurofighter project among others.

EU and state programs give these firms even greater advantage, sometimes in a controversial manner. Airbus, the European civilian passenger aircraft manufacturer, and Boeing, the US aerospace firm, are engaged in a tit for tat legal battle citing improper subsidies on both sides. The US filed suit to the WTO that Airbus received an unfair advantage in government loans and launch aid. The EU countered with accusations of illegal tax breaks for production facilities in certain US cities. After nearly seven years of legal arguments, the WTO ruled in separate findings that both parties had cause to their accusations, though not as severe as initially brought forth. The competition and complaints are likely to continue for years to come. This case demonstrates two key advantages of the EU institutions. First, the very launch aid that the WTO declared illegal provided the necessary capital to get the industry up to a profitable level in Europe. Second, the EU was organized and large enough to bring great weight to the WTO in advocating the European industry’s case.

What About Externally Generated Competition?

This study has shown the advantages the European aerospace and defense industry enjoys due to its integrating and coordinating policies. The EU maintains regulations that protect firms from adverse effects of competition within the confines of its members, but firms also compete with each other in the external market. For instance, the top firms attribute their most important markets to the US, the Middle East, Australia, and India. Regulations on the conduct of member states in serving as an advocate for domestic industries do not appear to exist.

Competition for lucrative fighter aircraft contracts is generally fierce. In 2011, after years of deliberation, Switzerland announced that it would award Saab (Sweden) with the contract to furnish its military’s new aircraft. Saab had been in competition with Dassault Aviation (France) and Eurofighter (BAE/EADS/Finmeccanica). The evaluation was highly politicized, and leaked documents exacerbated speculation of unfair political pressure. Fast-forward a few months to January 2012 and the competition is eerily familiar, this time in India. The Indian military announced it would award its aircraft procurement contract to Dassault Aviation. This follows intense lobbying by the French government to woo buyers for its fighter. A foreign market is essential for France in particular because of the high priority it places on its strategic independence. Without a foreign buyer, its production lines would have to cease since it cannot afford to perpetuate production given its own budgetary constraints. Having been the lowest bidder in the Indian competition, it is entirely likely that the French government subsidized some of the costs in the agreement, thus undermining its competitors at Saab and Eurofighter. This kind of undercutting could also have taken place in bidding in the UAE and Brazil.

What are the Implications for the Future?
    
The characteristics of the EU institutions and proclivity to export could be defining a new type of military industrial complex. This European military industrial complex is one that enjoys the benefits of government advocacy but does not influence state fiscal policy. Instead, the European aerospace and defense industry maximizes profit and productivity by selling its war fighting equipment abroad. The trend of diminishing defense spending coupled with increased defense revenue points to the likelihood of such a scenario. The EU and EDA are likely to act as complementary institutions to facilitate and coordinate specialization in a way few countries will be willing to do. These firms will have all the aforementioned advantages but will not be constrained to a domestic market that will demand exclusivity. Instead, they will be allowed—and even encouraged—to pursue profit maximization while various member states exert political influence to secure contracts. The pursuit will not be uniform, as exemplified by nationalized firms in France and Italy. That said, European firms would most likely become even more integrated to reap economic benefits. The European aerospace and defense industry market penetration is also interesting to consider. These firms produce products that are not necessarily the most advanced (the US firms still clearly hold the advantage), but are very competitive in a cost to capability perspective. They court areas where there is a demand for their products at their price. Considering that these areas are places like the Middle East, India, Brazil, and the Pacific, these firms are likely to continue to do well. These areas are not only emerging markets with enormous potential, but also they are highly prone to armed conflict. With the influence the European aerospace and defense industry may exert upon the EU, it is not inconceivable that EU foreign policy (however uncoordinated) might seek to stabilize its market by accepting conflict abroad.    

On the other hand, the US military industrial complex must take note of these trends. It is fortunate the US firms are so integrated with European firms. The US leadership of the F-35 program is an important multinational production proof of concept. The problem is that the US commands a great amount of influence due to its own consumption capacity. The estimated US share of orders accounts for half of the demand. With more and more participants reevaluating their orders, that share is likely to increase. This actually perpetuates the status quo of the US military industrial complex generating a supply and forcing domestic consumption. It also reinforces the European firms’ practice of benefiting from an export surplus. The US is likely to seek to maintain its dominance on innovation and comfortable lead in technology. It must seek to exploit comparative advantage across the aerospace and defense industry. In doing so, it might be worth increased cooperation with the EDA or even to establish somewhat of a bilateral body to maximize efficiencies in the transatlantic defense industry. Such an arrangement would have limitations, of course. The Boeing and Airbus competition is not likely to subside, but then neither is competition among EU members abroad.    

Members of the defense cooperation community should take heed of these trends and seek to support cooperation with European firms and take advantage of internal EU competition where possible. The EDA’s priorities should serve as a guide to where the EU would like to head with respect to capacity development. The US has a lead in some of these areas. It might be worth engaging the EDA to narrow its list to further maximize comparative advantage vice duplicating efforts of US firms willing and able to sell products like ISR and strategic airlift equipment. The US has a lead in these sectors. Furthermore, US security and industry would profit from factor specialization, particularly in cyber defense, fuel and energy. Efforts in defense cooperation in key emerging markets such as Brazil and India will benefit greatly from understanding developing trends in the European defense industry. If the Dassault Aviation case serves as a guide, officers should pay attention to important contract competitions—not for the winners, but for those who lost out in recent battles who must secure a contract in order to maintain production. These firms may receive benefits from the state in the form of diplomatic persuasion or subsidies (or both) in the interest of maintaining domestic industry and employment. It is more probable that the nationalized firms would profit from such action compared to the consortium or public companies. Those firms might have their own method of lobbying through private means.

Conclusions

The results of this study indicate that not only do EU institutions and policies benefit European consumption but they also enhance their export capacity abroad. This is most likely attributable to the efficiency-promoting incentives of EU policies and coordinating efforts of the EDA. In doing so, industries across European borders are able to pursue their comparative advantages and reap the benefits of specialization. These benefits do come with a trade off. In specializing, the European military industrial complex becomes dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination. This is exactly what Jean Monet had in mind at inception of the European Coal and Steel community. As the EDA progresses and European defense products increase their global market share, the world will observe a new type of military industrial complex. This new model is one that does not influence its government to put its products to use (as in the US), but rather may encourage others to fight among themselves.

About the Author

MAJ Michael Wise, US Army, is a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) specializing in European Affairs. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy and is pursuing an MA from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His assignments in Europe include Germany and France.

Notes

1  Staab, (Kindle Locations 114-116).

2  Artis and Nixson, 137.

3  European Defense Agency.

4  Ibid.

5  Ibid.

6  Nielsen.

7  Ibid.

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28 novembre 2012 par info-aviation

Le groupe aéronautique Irkout a livré le 22 novembre aux forces aériennes russes deux premiers chasseurs Su-30SM.

Aux termes du contrat signé en mars 2012 avec le ministère de la Défense, le groupe fournira 30 chasseurs de ce type. Le commandement aérien espère utiliser ces appareils biplaces pour augmenter la puissance de frappe de l’aviation russe, mais aussi pour familiariser les pilotes avec les chasseurs de cinquième génération.

Interrogé sur les avantages offerts par le SU-30SM en matière de manœuvrabilité, le général Khartchevski a déclaré : « Grâce à sa manœuvrabilité extraordinaire, cet avion inaugure une nouvelle ère dans le pilotage ».

« Il est en mesure de supporter non seulement les facteurs de charge traditionnels – positif et négatif – mais aussi l’accélération latérale. Cela permet au pilote de concevoir sa manœuvre en trois dimensions, ce quoi est indispensable pour gagner un combat aérien. À son tour, l’apparition d’avions offrant une grande manœuvrabilité a fait naître une nouvelle tactique de combat »,  a indiqué le général russe.

Selon lui, la livraison de ces nouveaux chasseurs est une étape très importante du réarmement des forces aériennes russes.

« Les possibilités de ces appareils permettent d’améliorer le potentiel de frappe de notre aviation. Les forces aériennes russes ne disposaient pas jusqu’à présent d’avions permettant de remplir les missions à un niveau tellement élevé ».

Il a ajouté que ces chasseurs « ne seraient pas livrés en exemplaires limités, mais par escadrilles entières ».

« Le Su-30SM possède une plus grande capacité de détection et de destruction des cibles, ce qui le rend en mesure de neutraliser plusieurs cibles simultanément. Le potentiel de cet avion est comparable à celui de deux avions de génération précédente. Ce n’est pas sans raison que les pilotes indiens volant à bord de Su-30MKI ont remporté des combats d’entraînement contre les pilotes américains », a conclu le général Khartchevski.

Développé par le groupe Irkout, le Su-30SM a effectué son premier vol (2 heures) le 21 septembre 2012. Il est spécifiquement adapté aux exigences de l’Armée de l’air russe.

Dérivé du Su-30MK, il possède de nouveaux radars et systèmes de liaison radio et d’identification. Ses armements et autres systèmes ont aussi été modifiés par rapport à la version originale.

November 23, 2012. David Pugliese - Defence Watch

From JSC Irkut:

JSC Irkut Corporation (part of JSC United Aircraft Corporation) handed over the first 2 Su-30SM fighters to the Russian Air Force. The delivery-acceptance act was signed on November 22 at the Irkutsk aviation plant – branch of JSC IRKUT Corporation.

Oleg Demchenko, President of JSC IRKUT Corporation, at the signing ceremony said: “We’ve been working for export for many years, and now started to deliver aircraft to the Motherland. 9 of our new Yak-130s are flying at the Borisoglebsk training center to date, and now we are delivering the first 2 Su-30SM fighters to the Russian Air Force. This is a historic event for our team, for the Sukhoi company and for the whole United Aircraft Corporation”.

Alexander Harchevsky, Chief of the Military research and training center named after N. Zhukovski and Y. Gagarin said at the event: “Su-30SM will improve combat capabilities of the Russian Air Force”. The famous military pilot, who headed the Center of retraining pilots named after V. Chkalov for many years, having experience in piloting the type of fighters mentioned such capabilities of the Su-30SM as simultaneously engage and destroy multiple targets as well as super-maneuverability. “It’s very important that the aircraft is in serial production and will be supplied to the Air Force not by units, but squadrons” – stressed Maj. Gen Harchevsky.

Su-30SM multirole super-maneuverable fighter is the further development of the Su-30MK combat aircraft family. JSC Sukhoi Design Bureau’ specialists designed the fighter in accordance with the requirements of the Russian Air Force in terms of radar system, radio and recognition system, ejection seats and a number of support systems. The weaponry configuration was changed as well.

The contract on 30 multirole fighter delivery by 2015 was signed between the Russian Ministry of Defence and JSC IRKUT Corporation in March 2012.

November 21, 2012 china-defense-mashup.com

2012-11-21 — China’s locally made early-warning aircraft have proven their operational capabilities in drills and can now direct different forces to respond more effectively to aerial threats, the People’s Liberation Army Daily reported yesterday.

Analysts said the report could be seen as a response to Western reports that downplay the effectiveness of China’s military modernisation effort.

The PLA Daily report, which appeared in an inside page, did not identify the aircraft that took part in the drills, but it was accompanied by an illustration of a KJ-2000 early waring aircraft in flight. It said the plane had become an air operational centre to command land, air and naval forces in several drills this year.

The aircraft is larger than ordinary fighter jets and can detect threats such as enemy airplanes.

“It is a historic leap for our army’s combat ability on the modern battlefield … as the combat information transport system successfully connected with our advanced fighter jets during the drills,” the report said, adding that China had spent more than five decades developing its early-warning aircraft systems.

“The new achievement also indicates our army has overcome some critical bottlenecks in multi-unit command.”

In June, a report by Japan’s Kyodo news agency quoted American and Taiwanese sources as saying the PLA had only nine such aircraft, including five small KJ-200s and four large KJ-2000s, and that they were at least 20 years behind the planes operated by the United States and Japan in terms of operational capability.

Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the Canada-based Kanwa Asian Defence Monthly, said China’s options were limited because it “doesn’t have enough advanced, big aircraft” suitable for the installation of early-warning systems.

“But it’s difficult to estimate how many years the PLA’s early-warning operation lags behind the Western countries because Beijing is trying to narrow the gap,” Chang said.

Lin Chong-pin, a former deputy defence minister in Taiwan, said the PLA Daily report was not propaganda, but further evidence of Beijing’s breakthroughs in the field.

“[The mainland] faced a developing bottleneck of military technologies in the 1990s, but it has made many breakthroughs in the 21st century, including the debuts of the J-21 and J-31 [stealth fighters] and the batch production of 052-D guided missile destroyers early this year,” Lin said.

He credited the rapid development to former president Jiang Zemin’s efforts to accelerate the army’s modernisation, including a funding boost and the unprecedented promotion of many officers with engineering backgrounds to decision-making positions.

The KJ series of early-warning aircraft debuted in the 2009 National Day parade, but the PLA Daily said the army had set up its first early-warning force five years earlier.

26/10/2012 Mer et Marine

Les industriels impliqués dans le projet de modernisation des avions de patrouille maritime de la Marine nationale ont remis fin juillet leur dossier au ministère de la Défense. A l’issue d’ultimes négociations, celui-ci doit notifier le marché début 2013, afin que le premier appareil soit livré à l’aéronautique navale française en 2017. Alors que les marins craignaient que les contraintes budgétaires  menacent ce programme, son inscription au projet de loi de finances a été vécue comme un soulagement au sein de l’aéronautique navale, mais aussi de la force océanique stratégique, dont la sécurité repose notamment sur l’action des Atlantique 2.

Ces derniers mois, le projet initial, porté industriellement par Dassault Aviation, Thales, DCNS et le Service industriel de l’aéronautique (SIAé)  a évolué. A l’origine, la marine souhaitait une modernisation en trois étapes. D’abord le traitement des obsolescences, puis dans un second temps la mise en place d’un nouveau système de mission et de nouveaux équipements, et enfin l’ajout d’une capacité d’autoprotection.  Mais, finalement, les deux premières étapes ont été fusionnées.

Traitement des obsolescences et nouveaux équipements

Le chantier devrait donc directement intégrer, au-delà du traitement des obsolescences, l’installation d’un nouveau système central (calculateur de contrôle de mission) en lieu et place du Loti et le remplacement des principaux matériels. L’actuel radar Iguane pourrait, notamment, être remplacé par un radar à antenne active dérivé de la filière RB2A (AESA) développée par Thales pour équiper le Rafale.  Une nouvelle boule optronique sera également mise en place, ainsi qu’un système acoustique de dernière génération. Pour gérer ces équipements, les anciens pupitres feront place, dans la carlingue, à de nouvelles consoles de visualisation. Pour mener à bien ce chantier majeur, les appareils seront, in fine, totalement vidés. Toutefois, les ATL2 ne changeront pas extérieurement, aucune modification de structure n’étant prévue. Comme son prédécesseur, le nouveau radar sera, par exemple, logé dans l’appendice rétractable situé en position ventrale.

La refonte des Atlantique 2, livrés à 27 exemplaires à la marine française entre 1989 et 1997, permettra aux avions d’être mis aux standards les plus récents, tout en voyant leurs capacités nettement accrues en termes de détection, notamment sous-marine. Ils seront, ainsi, en mesure de traiter simultanément les signaux de plusieurs bouées acoustiques numériques, aux performances bien plus importantes que celles de leurs aînées. Le nouveau radar et la nouvelle boule optronique offriront, par ailleurs, de bien meilleures possibilités de détection et d’identification de cibles au dessus de l’eau.

Enjeu stratégique

Pour la France, la refonte de ces appareils constituent un enjeu stratégique puisque les ATL2 sont indispensables à la protection des sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins basés dans la rade de Brest. Ces appareils sont, aussi, des outils très précieux pour la sécurisation des approches maritimes, la lutte anti-sous-marine (au moment où on constate une prolifération des sous-marins dans le monde) et même les interventions au dessus de la terre. Leurs capacités de détection et d’écoute sont, de plus, mises à profit pour recueillir des renseignements, par exemple pour les besoins du contre-terrorisme et la localisation d’otages. De même, en océan Indien, ils rendent les plus grands services dans la lutte contre la piraterie.

Ces avions, que l’on considère souvent comme des « frégates aériennes », sont à même de remplir toutes ces missions grâce à leur grande autonomie (18 heures et 4300 milles), leurs importantes capacités d’emport en senseurs et armes (torpilles MU90, missiles antinavire Exocet AM39) et leurs puissants moyens de traitement et d’analyse des données recueillies. Un ensemble de capacités qui peut être exploité au mieux grâce à la présence, à bord, d’un véritable équipage de spécialistes, constitué de13 hommes, indispensable pour mener à bien des opérations aussi complexes que la chasse au sous-marin.

Maintenir les ATL2 jusqu’en 2030

Très attendu, le lancement du programme de modernisation des ATL2 ne concernera pas l’intégralité de la flotte. Mais les militaires espèrent qu’elle portera sur 22 appareils, ce qui permettra de maintenir la capacité de patrouille maritime de la Marine nationale jusqu’en 2030, date à laquelle un nouveau moyen de PATMAR devra entrer en service. Dans cette perspective, des études ont d’ailleurs été récemment lancées, notamment pour réfléchir à l’intégration de drones dans certaines missions.

En attendant, il n’est pas inutile de rappeler que la France est devenue le seul pays d’Europe à conserver, techniquement et opérationnellement, la maîtrise complète de son outil de patrouille maritime. Alors que l’Italie n’a pas prévu de remplacer ses vieux Atlantic par de nouveaux avions du même gabarit mais par des ATR 72 ASW, l’Allemagne et les Pays-Bas, notamment, s’appuient sur des P-3C Orion américains pour lesquels aucune grande mise à niveau n’est encore envisagée. Si l’Espagne a quand à elle décidé de moderniser ses P-3 avec un programme dans lequel est impliqué Airbus Military pour le système de mission, la Grande-Bretagne a, en revanche, fait une croix sur sa PATMAR avec l’abandon en 2010 de la modernisation des Nimrod, qui dépendaient de la Royal Air Force et non de la Royal Navy. Une décision considérée par tous les spécialistes comme très regrettable et dont la première conséquence est de fragiliser la dissuasion nucléaire britannique, en baissant le niveau de protection des SNLE de la Royal Navy, particulièrement lorsque ces bâtiments partent en patrouille ou rentrent de mission.

2012-10-24 LtCol Jacek Sońta  / Press spokesman for MOD

Minister of National Defence Tomasz Siemoniak declared Poland's participation in AGS - NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance system at NATO ministerial in Brussels in October.

Application dated October 19 on joining the system by Poland is a result of the decision of Minister of National Defence and an announcement of Polish President during NATO summit in Chicago this year, during which AGS program was included in Defence Package.

AGS is one of the flagship initiatives of NATO. It has a key meaning for transformation of the Alliance and for development of its defence capabilities up to 2020. Realisation of the Defence Package guarantees reaching the capabilities necessary for accomplishing tasks set in Strategic Concept from 2010 including task of collective defence (article 5 of Washington Treaty).

AGS Program is an example of multinational engagement of NATO member states in developed at present Smart Defence initiative.

From Poland's point of view joining AGS Program will be very significant for increasing its meaning and strengthening its position in NATO structures. We will be among 14 NATO states building capabilities within that system and at the same time we gain possibility to strengthen cooperation with countries leading in modern technologies.

Moreover, participation in AGS will enable Polish Armed Forces to complement military capabilities of conducting image reconnaissance and will allow to use it in the future for realisation of national needs or in allied cooperation e.g. during joint exercises.

* * *

The AGS Core will be an integrated system consisting of an air segment and a ground segment. Reaching operational readiness is initially planned for 2015. At the moment 13 countries participate in the program: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Germany, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, USA and Italy. Canada and Denmark submitted their declarations too.

October 9, 2012. David Pugliese - Defence Watch

This is written by U.S.A.F. public affairs Senior Airman Shawn Nickel:

Whether people recognize it by the Snoopy-like nose or by the flat black paint and red lettering on the tail, the U-2 has become an Air Force reconnaissance icon in its 50 years of military operations.

Since the first model was assembled in the 1950s, the aircraft’s original, shiny aluminum skin has evolved to the current flat black paint scheme, and its mission has broadened as intelligence imagery techniques have improved.

It was originally designed to fly high-altitude intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions during the Cold War to gather intelligence on opposition forces. Today the U-2S flies in support of a variety of missions from ground combat to disaster relief. The aircraft has been updated over the years with a 33 percent larger frame, fiber-optic wiring and an all glass cockpit. These improvements increase the aircraft’s payload and loiter time, making it easier to fly.

The U-2′s dynamic airframe can carry approximately 4,000 pounds of equipment, paving the way as a test platform for new technologies. With its immense and diverse payload capacity, it is capable of a multitude of missions. Some pilots describe it as the “Lego” airplane.

“It’s like Mr. Potato Head,” said Lt. Col. John, an instructor pilot with the 99th Reconnaissance Squadron. “You just take one part out and add a new one. There are so many new developments running through the works right now. New weapons systems are going to emerge and accelerate the curve of the U-2 even more.”

One of the aircraft’s primary missions is to capture imagery via the decades-old, wet-film camera, which is sharp enough to see roadside bombs from 70,000 feet and offers greater resolution than any digital sensors available.

“The U-2 started out only carrying a wet-film camera. Now, with today’s technology, I’m alone up there, but I may be carrying 40 to 50 Airmen via data link who are back at a (deployable ground station),” John said.

In addition to its other capabilities, the U-2 provides service members on the ground with the intelligence they need to effectively carry out their mission, said Capt. Michael, a 1st Reconnaissance Squadron instructor pilot. This could include acting as an antenna to troops on the ground in Afghanistan or providing detailed imagery during a natural disaster.

“We are up there to make a difference,” Michael said. “We are there to make an impact on the troops we support.”

For operational security reasons, many details about the U-2 and its mission are unknown to the public. When the airframe was in its infancy, even pilots coming into the program knew very little about it. One of those men is retired Lt. Col. Tony Bevacqua, one of the original Air Force U-2 pilots.

Since the jet was developed at the height of the Cold War, it was used extensively over the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other opposition countries. Bevacqua said every precaution was taken to keep the technology from leaking into enemy hands.

“I volunteered for an assignment I knew nothing about, and they wouldn’t tell me anything about the U-2,” Bevacqua said. “The aircraft was state-of-the-art back then; no one in the public knew about it.”

This first class of pilots had to learn everything about the aircraft from the ground up. They developed the first U-2 training program in a matter of weeks, much of which is still used today.

“Before I joined the Air Force, I’d never even built a model airplane, but we trained hard to learn everything about the U-2,” he said. “After weeks of being the first pilots in the U-2, we became the instructors for the second class of pilots.”

The program is considered an exclusive group, with less than 80 current U-2 pilots.

“There are more people who have Super Bowl rings than there are U-2 pilots,” said Lt. Col. Stephen Rodriguez, the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron commander. “There are less than 1,000 pilots in the history of this program. That’s less than some airframes train in one year.”

After flying for years in other military airframes, a pilot from any U.S. service can apply to fly the U-2, Rodriquez said. Following a strict interview process, he sends these prospective aviators on a series of training flights to test the pilot’s aptitude.

“We interview applicants to screen for airmanship, maturity and ability to adapt to the U-2′s unique landing characteristics,” he said. “Allowing inter-service transfers brings lessons from outside the Air Force, which helps us at operating in a joint environment.”

Although the pilots are the face of the U-2′s mission, hundreds of Airmen behind closed doors in windowless buildings exploit, disseminate and transmit the information the aircraft collects. These Airmen provide mission-essential assistance to commanders around the globe.

“To be able to support the warfighter from the U.S. is a great feeling,” said Master Sgt. Sean, the 9th Intelligence Squadron flight lead. “We contribute to the mission downrange whether we deploy and support the efforts with manpower and bullets or we support it through ‘intel’ from home station.”

The U-2 is at a high operational tempo and with the program schedule to endure through 2040, there are no signs of slowing down. U-2 pilots will continue to provide timely, relevant and persistent high altitude ISR to meet the needs of the nation’s leaders to support the current fight and any future challenges our nation may face.

MOSCOW, October 4 (RIA Novosti)

Russia’s Irkut aircraft-manufacturing plant delivered the first six Yakovlev Yak-130 Mitten combat trainers to the Russian Air Force on Thursday, a spokesman for the Western Military District said.

“On October 4, the first batch of Yak-130 combat trainers fly from the Irkut plant to the Borisoglebsk airfield [Voronezh region] after an extensive flight testing program,” Col. Andrei Bobrun said.

The Irkut aircraft maker and the Russian Defense Ministry signed in December 2011 a contract for the delivery of 55 Yak-130 jets by 2015.

The Yak-130 is a highly maneuverable subsonic jet with an extended range of about 1,250 miles (2,000 kilometers) and a maximum speed of 600 mp/h (1,060 km/h) in level flight. It can carry a combat payload of up to 6,600 pounds (3,000 kg), consisting of a variety of Russian and Western-developed weapons.

As an advanced jet trainer, Yak-130 is suitable for training or re-training pilots to fly fourth- and fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

It can also carry out a variety of light-attack and reconnaissance missions.