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30 septembre 2015 3 30 /09 /septembre /2015 12:35
CARAT 2011 - photo US Navy

CARAT 2011 - photo US Navy


September 28, 2015 By Grant Newsham


The country needs a more robust capability. Here’s how it can achieve it.


As Indo-Pacific nations build up their naval power, submarines, cruise missiles, aircraft carriers, jets, and frigates get the most attention. However, an underreported but significant regional trend over the last five years is widespread interest in amphibious capabilities.

Japan and Australia have created rudimentary amphibious forces, and New Zealand is working to develop one. Malaysia has publicly stated it wants a Marine Corps and even the small, remote Maldives has established a Marine Corps.

Apart from this, Asia also already has a number of Marine Corps or amphibious-capable ground forces. The ROK Marine Corps is one of the oldest and most capable, though largely tied to the Korean peninsula. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a large Marine Corps, and as the PRC pursues its territorial expansion strategies it understands the value of amphibious forces and is rapidly building new amphibious ships.

The Indonesian Marine Corps is expanding, while the Philippine Marines are working to upgrade their force. India has amphibious-capable forces, even though they lack adequate funding and focus, and Singapore is looking to improve its amphibious capabilities. Bucking the trend, the competent Taiwan Marines have been pared down in recent years – to the point where they may eventually be ineffective.

The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) has a long history and can conduct amphibious operations. It has performed superbly in the south against separatist insurgents, and made important contributions to winning the nearly 30-year long Communist insurgency. However, the RTMC can make even greater contributions to Thailand’s national security and to regional security as well. The RTMC is indeed a neglected strategic asset, but to understand why, one first must understand why amphibious capabilities are important.


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31 août 2015 1 31 /08 /août /2015 11:50
Ship to Shore Logistics – Think Defence


August 29, 2015 by Think Defence


What started out as a post about Mexeflote’s in 2011 has turned into a 95,000 word Think Defence project on the subject of Ship to Shore Logistics.


This is the reason the post rate has dropped recently, sorry about that, but it is now complete.

The Ship to Shore Logistics Project picks up from the multi post series of the same name but this is a refresh and significant expansion, table of contents below.


Table of Contents




Case Studies

The Normandy Landings

The San Carlos Landings

Umm Qasr



Current Capabilities

UK amphibious Doctrine


Mine Countermeasures

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Amphibious Assault and Logistics

US Amphibious Logistics

Making a Case for Change


Increment 1


Survey and Initial Operations

Repairing and Augmenting the Port

A Summary and Final Thoughts on Increment 1


Increment 2


Existing Solutions and Studies



Shore Connector

Wave Attenuation

Closing Comments

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3 mars 2015 2 03 /03 /mars /2015 08:20
Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsman (SARC)

2 mars 2015 US Navy


This comprehensive course crams multiple years of Trauma instruction into just a little over 9 months, including the clinical rotation, a sought after skill not only in the civilian medical community but also in combat.

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10 juin 2014 2 10 /06 /juin /2014 06:55
Les débarquements amphibies,d'hier et d'aujourd'hui

6 juin 2014 ministeredeladefense


Explication d'un débarquement amphibie. Quels sont les facteurs conditionnant la réussite d'une opération amphibie?

Ce reportage est un extrait du magazine TV « Journal de la Défense » de juin 2014, intitulé «Les 70 ans du D Day, les événements clés».

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30 mars 2014 7 30 /03 /mars /2014 07:35
U.S. Commander Worried About Lack Of Amphibious Capability In The Pacific


March 26, 2014. David Pugliese - Defence Watch


The Stars and Stripes is reporting that the top U.S. commander in the Pacific region is claiming that the U.S. Navy and Marines do not have enough assets to carry out a contested amphibious operation in the Pacific if a crisis arises.


More from Stars and Stripes:

As the war in Afghanistan winds down, Marine Corps leaders want the service to return to its roots of being a force that can attack enemies from the sea, as the Marines did frequently during World War II. But Adm. Samuel Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the capability does not presently exist in his area of responsibility.

“We have had a good return of our Marines back to the Asia-Pacific, particularly as the activities in the Middle East wind down in Afghanistan … But the reality is, is that to get Marines around effectively, they require all types of lift. They require the big amphibious ships, but they also require connectors (meaning landing craft landing craft and other amphibious vehicles). The lift is the enabler that makes that happen, so we wouldn’t be able to [successfully carry out a contested amphibious assault without additional resources].”

His remarks come at a time when there are growing concerns in Japan and elsewhere that China might try occupy the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The islands are under Japanese administrative control, but China has claimed sovereignty over them.


Full story here


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29 janvier 2014 3 29 /01 /janvier /2014 12:35
India Will Buy 15 Amphibious Aircraft From Japan: So What?


January 29, 2014 By Ankit Panda - http://thediplomat.com


It is likely that Japan will sell India its indigenously developed US-2 amphibious aircraft in 2014.


Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to India as chief guest at its Republic Day celebrations yielded some important advances in India-Japan relations. Notably on the security front, the two resolved to consult on national security matters between their two national security apparatuses (Japan’s national security council having been formed recently). Additionally, the two will conduct a bilateral naval exercise in the Pacific Ocean in a move that is sure to draw China’s attention. The pending sale of the ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious patrol aircraft–a topic of interest for India since 2011–also inched forward. Abe and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed that India and Japan would follow up on the sale in March with a joint working group meeting. Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony is set to visit Japan at some point this year (presumably before May, due to the general elections in India) to finalize the deal.

The deal is significant for a variety of reasons. On the surface, it’s another indicator of burgeoning cooperation between India and Japan on security matters. The deal is doubly significant in the context of India’s relations with Japan because once India clinches the deal, it will become the first country to purchase defense equipment from Japan since the latter’s self-imposed ban on defense exports began in 1967. The deal is important for Abe as it would open up Japan’s defense industry for additional contracts with foreign partners and stimulate Japan’s defense industry. It should be noted that negotiations on the US-2 deal began in 2011 under the Democratic Party of Japan, first under Prime Minister Naoto Kan and then under Yoshihiko Noda.

According to Reuters, the US-2 deal could result in a $1.65 billion tab for India, which is looking at purchasing 15 of the amphibious patrol aircraft. The deal is essentially a fait accompli (cleared politically at the highest levels in both countries) and the joint working group will iron out certain details including important modifications that would allow Japan to export the aircraft to India without violating its self-imposed defense export restrictions. A Reuters report notes that the modifications will include the removal of a friend or foe identification system. Another point of discussion for the two sides is whether India will be permitted to assemble the aircraft indigenously, giving it access to Japanese military technology.

Strategically, the US-2 is important for India beyond its relationship with Japan. The US-2 has a more than modest range of 4,500 km and India’s 15 aircraft will be stationed in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in the Bay of Bengal. The US-2 is a versatile aircraft for search and rescue operations as well, partly owing to its short take-off ability. According to an anonymous Indian military source interviewed by Reuters, the US-2 will allow India to support military and civilian ships deep in Southeast Asian waters. The military source notes: ”You are sailing further and further away, and ships break down at sea. You can either wait for reinforcements to arrive by sea or bring in an amphibian right next to the stricken ship.” Procurement of the US-2 additionally directly counters Indian fears of China’s burgeoning “string of pearls” strategy in Southeast Asia.

Overall, expect a India-Japan US-2 deal in the near future–possibly before India’s general elections. The US-2 deal will serve as a gateway for India and Japan to explore additional cooperation on defense technology. The joint statement coming out of Abe’s visit to New Delhi last weekend noted that India and Japan are seeking to cooperate on advanced technologies more generally. Prospects for increased defense cooperation remain positive as long as Shinzo Abe remains at the helm in Tokyo; revising Japan’s guidelines on defense technology exports is a strategic priority for Abe and man happens to be quite the Indophile.

A looming consequence of the US-2 deal will be increased Chinese skepticism that the strategic convergence between India and Japan is anything other than a bulwark against China’s ambitions along the Asia-Pacific rimland. Additionally, the deal would in essence move Japan more in the direction of military normalization; allowing Japan to export its defense know-how and technology freely across Asia could prove deleterious to China’s interests.

For the moment, Indian and Japanese diplomats and leaders remain careful to omit any mention of China during their bilateral meetings. So far, all bilateral military exercises between India and Japan have occurred under the premise of promoting freedom of navigation in Asia’s crowded sea lanes and combating piracy. A day may come when New Delhi begins to back Tokyo in its disputes with Beijing and Tokyo returns the favor, but a variety of political factors still inhibit that sort of openness in this important bilateral relationship between Asia’s largest and richest democracy. A US-2 deal won’t supercharge the positive momentum in the India-Japan relationship, but it won’t hurt either.

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2 décembre 2013 1 02 /12 /décembre /2013 08:35
Canadian Army Learns Amphibious Warfare Exercises In New Zealand



December 1, 2013. David Pugliese - Defence Watch


This exercise has just wrapped up….here is what the Army put out shortly before it ended, plus photos:


South Canterbury Region, New Zealand — Completing an amphibious landing from a sealift vessel, securing a port and transferring 200 troops and 55 vehicles onto land is all in a day’s work for Major Patrick Chartrand, who is currently deployed in New Zealand on Exercise SOUTHERN KATIPO 2013 (Ex SK13).


Major Chartrand, Royal 22e Régiment is attached to the evaluation team as part of Exercise Control for SK13. His role is to assess how well the operations are carried out and identify any gaps ahead of Exercise SOUTHERN KATIPO 2015. This means he is participating in every aspect of the exercise, including the amphibious landing at Port Timaru that signalled the start of the exercise on November 9th.


“Being involved in executing a real-time amphibious landing is a great opportunity and the more practice we can get will definitely help us in the future.” Ex SK13 is the biggest international military exercise ever to be held in New Zealand, in terms of the number of countries participating.


The exercise aims to test the capability of the New Zealand’s Defence Force (NZDF) to mount a medium-scale amphibious operation that involves land, air and maritime assets. It also provides a unique opportunity for the NZDF to enhance its ability to work with its partners, particularly those in the Pacific region.

Exercise Director Colonel Paul Van Den Broek describes the exercise as modern and invaluable for the preparedness of the Pacific nations participating.


“I think the multinational nature of the exercise very much reflects the nature of contemporary military operations. Whether in Afghanistan or in conducting peacekeeping operations,” says Col Paul Van Den Broek.


“It’s proving very invaluable in actually finding the friction points within the combined and joint environment. And a lot of the lessons we are learning to date we could not have discovered if we had merely run a command post activity, as opposed to really running an exercise at this level.”


For Brigadier-General Jean-Marc Lanthier, Commander 2nd Canadian Division and Joint Task Force East, who visited the troops during the exercise, “it represents valuable collective training for our troops in an international setting. I was very impressed to witness first hand the level of professionalism and expertise displayed by our troops and our allies.”

Ex SK13 was held in the South Canterbury region in the South Island of New Zealand from November 4 to 29. It involved three war ships, and up to 18 aircraft and 2200 personnel from New Zealand and nine other countries: Australia, Tonga, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Canada, the United States, France, Malaysia and the United Kingdom.


The Canadian Armed Forces contingent of 32 troops arrived in New Zealand in October. They were assigned to Headquarters Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force for the exercise.

Maj Chartrand explains this is the first time Canadian Armed Forces personnel have been embedded with the NZDF.


“Our troops have had a chance to train with their counterparts; we had the reconnaissance and snipers with their counterparts from New Zealand, they went in the mountains. Obviously in Quebec City we don’t have the same kind of terrain, the guys were able to do training that they were not able to do back home – that was very beneficial.”

He added, “I know when I go back home I’ll be taking a lot of lessons learned and insights with me. It is all about working with other nations, learning and sharing our knowledge. This builds not only the expertise of my team but also those of other nations taking part.”


Article by Samantha Bayard, Canadian Army Public Affairs, and Natala Low, New Zealand Defence Force Communications

Canadian Army Learns Amphibious Warfare Exercises In New Zealand
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28 novembre 2013 4 28 /11 /novembre /2013 08:35
US-2i amphibious aircraft acquisition process underway


November 26, 2013 Saurabh Joshi - stratpost.com


The India-Japan Joint Working Group (JWG) have held preliminary meetings to initiate the process for acquisition of the ShinMaywa US-2i amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy.


The Indian Navy plan to acquire the Japanese ShinMaywa US-2i amphibious aircraft faces unique challenges in terms of the process being evolved to effect the purchase.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during his visit to Japan last May, had issued a joint statement along with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe which mandated the setting up of a Joint Working Group (JWG) between the two countries to explore the potential for cooperation between the defense and aviation industries between the two countries, as well as to figure out the mechanism and modalities for the acquisition of the aircraft by the Indian Navy.

The statement said, among other things:

The two Prime Ministers welcomed the expanding defense relations between the two countries based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction that the first bilateral exercise between the Indian Navy (IN)and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)was held in June 2012 off the coast of Japan and decided to conduct such exercises on a regular basis with increased frequency. They decided to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) to explore modality for the cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft.

The two sides have held preliminary meetings of the JWG recently, since the meeting between the two prime ministers – said to be the result of the priority accorded to the process by Abe.

The navy is understood to be keen on acquiring at least 15 of the aircraft. The last amphibious aircraft operated by the navy were the light transport Short SA.6 Sealand aircraft, which were inducted in the 1950s and phased out a decade later. Since then, the Indian Navy has never operated any amphibious aircraft.

A Beriev Be-200 at the Singapore Airshow in 2012 | Photo: StratPost

A Beriev Be-200 at the Singapore Airshow in 2012 | Photo: StratPost

The Indian Coast Guard, briefly, considered the acquisition of the Russian Beriev Be-200 amphibious aircraft as part of a process to acquire Medium Range Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft (MRMR), which was subsequently cancelled in 2011.

There are two reasons why this process is significant. First of all, it represents a change in Japanese policies, traditionally informed by its pacifist constitution, in place since the end of the Second World War, which barred the export of military technologies.

While Japan barred the export of military equipment to communist countries, countries subject to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) arms embargo and countries that could be involved in international conflicts since 1967, it extended the bar on export to all countries in 1976, with the United States being the only exception.

Japan continues to ban such exports and only allows the export of dual-use equipment, under which category the US-2i falls. Even then, the Japanese allowance remains a significant relaxation on its part.

Secondly, there is no close competitor to the aircraft in terms of features and performance, and the Indian Navy and defense ministry would have to evolve a process under the Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP) to make sure the single vendor bar does not apply to the acquisition process for the aircraft and/or put together a government-to-government purchase process with Japan, on the lines of the mechanism with Russia and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route with the United States.

While this process is getting underway, defense ministry sources expressed mild concern that, while the objectives of the JWG include ‘cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft’, this could end up with the long term objectives of potential industrial cooperation holding up the more immediate objective of aircraft acquisition. They pointed to the inclusion of India’s National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) as part of the JWG and said care should be taken that the objective of cooperation on civilian aircraft development should not delay the more immediate objective acquisition process.

That said, movement on this could be expected in December, with at least two meetings – a second preliminary meeting as well as defense minister-level talks on the issue.

US-2i potential

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who visited Japan earlier this year, expressed India’s interest in acquiring the aircraft as part of what was seen as a growing proximity between the two countries, both of whom have had territorial disputes with China.

India has been bolstering its airlift capabilities in the northern and north-eastern regions in a bid to provide better logistical support to the Indian Army, at a time when serial intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China by the Chine People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have created much controversy. The Indian Air Force (IAF) recently made the Daulat Beg Oldie Advanced Landing Ground (ALG), just southeast of the Karakoram Pass, operational for its C-130J Super Hercules aircraft.

Interestingly, the US-2i could also operate from Pangong Tso lake (and possibly other water bodies in the region), divided by the LAC between the two countries in the Chushul sector, should the need arise, if the Indian Navy were to acquire it.

Speaking at the first Naval and Maritime Expo (NAMEXPO) held in Kochi in September, Commodore Sujeet Samadar, retired from the Indian Navy, who heads the company in India, told StratPost that although the aircraft has never operated at such heights before, it is qualified for such operations. Specifically asked if the aircraft could operate from Pangong Tso lake, Commodore Samadar said he could see no reason why it could not

“The boundary layer control system has unique features and it’s been designed for a particular performance, mostly at sea level. But the extension of the systems onboard allows it to carry out high altitude operations. At the moment, I think, that is what I can say. It can carry out high altitude operations, certainly.”

The aircraft can operate in rough waters up to sea state 5 with three meter high waves. It can take off in 280 meters and land in 330 meters with a maximum take off weight of 43 tons. It has a range of 4,500 kilometers and a top speed of 560 kilometers per hour. The aircraft’s boundary layer control system generates additional lift to allow the aircraft to take off and land in short distances. Its spray strip and spray suppressor prevent splashed water from reaching its engines.

Sources in the defense ministry have also indicated a level of interest in the IAF in the capabilities of this aircraft and the possibilities it could offer for air support in the region.

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1 juin 2013 6 01 /06 /juin /2013 21:35
JS Shimokita (LST 4002) departs from Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam along with JS Atago (DDG 177) and JS Hyuga (DDH 181), May 20, en route to San Diego. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Johans Chavarro)

JS Shimokita (LST 4002) departs from Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam along with JS Atago (DDG 177) and JS Hyuga (DDH 181), May 20, en route to San Diego. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Johans Chavarro)

01 June 2013 Pacific Sentinel


SAN DIEGO - Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMDSF) ships, landing ship tank JS Shimokita (LST 4002); destroyer JS Atago (DDG 177) and helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga (DDH 181) arrived in San Diego May 31.
During the visit, the ships' crews will participate and engage in local community outreach and conduct office calls with local leaders. All three JMSDF ships will also participate in multilateral amphibious exercise Dawn Blitz June 11-28.
Dawn Blitz is a scenario-driven exercise that will test participants in the planning and execution of amphibious operations in a series of live training events to improve naval amphibious core competencies. It is designed to train the Navy and Marine Corps in operations expected of an amphibious exercise and will test staffs in the planning and execution of amphibious operations.
This exercise is one of a series of amphibious training events on both coasts of the U.S. that take place annually. Exercises like Dawn Blitz 2013 provide realistic, relevant training necessary for an effective global Navy and Marine Corps.
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11 janvier 2013 5 11 /01 /janvier /2013 12:20



Jan. 9, 2012 by Galrahn - informationdissemination.net


Normally when a defense budget is passed, I can't wait to dig through it and highlight all the important details. This time, with no associated appropriations bill (or plan) coming anytime soon, it would be a waste of time to suggest anything in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Act is worth discussing, because it is worthless until the elected folks in Washington, DC get their budget priorities sorted out.

There is one section in the bill that I do want to highlight though. This reads like something inserted by a lobbyist, and it doesn't belong in my opinion.


a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
  1. The Marine Corps is a combat force that leverages maneuver from the sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
  2. The Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon naval vessels, they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations and, operating ‘‘from the sea’’, they require no third-party host nation permission to conduct military operations.
  3. The Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet this full range of military operations.
  4. Due only to fiscal constraints, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels, which adds military risk to future operations.
  5. The Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30 operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to Congress that will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
  6. Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
  1. the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
  2. the Navy should carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements;
  3. the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships as a component of the balanced battle force;
  4. the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
  5. operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and acquisition cost; and
  6. maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the national security of the United States.

To me this looks a lot like some Marine Corps General and his industry buddies throwing their weight around via Congress to try an influence the Analysis of Alternatives taking place regarding the LSD(X). Congress should not be trying to influence the decision unless they are ready to pony up the big bucks for what they are basically calling for - which to me sounds like more LPD-17s.

From what I understand, LSD(X) will be a design to cost ship. The recurring cost (ship 3 and beyond) is pegged to be about $1.2 billion in the shipbuilding budget. That makes the LPD-17 hull a nonstarter without a significant increase in cash from Congress.

The Marines face several challenges in dealing with amphibious requirements, but two stand out as important challenges that must be addressed. The first challenge is that the lift footprint of the amphibious MEB is growing, and the second challenge is that the MPS squadron only carries about 70% of the MEB's equipment. With limited funding and only one platform in the shipbuilding plan able to address these issues - the LSD(X) - folks are either going to have to get creative to solve these challenges, or accept that the challenges will not be solved.

The LSD(X) is a choice between 4 alternatives.

The first choice is a new build, best possible lift vessel for $1.2 billion recurring. I have no idea what design that would be, but if we are being honest it almost certainly wouldn't be anything similar to a current LSD if it is going to meet the stated requirements.

The second choice is for a LPD-17 mod, best possible for $1.2 billion recurring. I do not believe that is possible, but I'm sure there is a shipbuilding guru who other Marines call "General" willing and ready to convince a gullible politician it is possible. Experts I have spoken to in NAVSEA say it's not possible, and I'll trust their expertise and opinion over any Marine General when it comes to shipbuilding.

The third choice is to use a foreign design brought up to NVR standard at a cost of no more than $1.2 billion recurring with the third ship. The design that is specifically highlighted with this option is the French Mistral class. The ships would be built at a US shipyard. There is not a consensus whether these ships can be built in a US shipyard for $1.2 billion recurring.

The fourth option is to build two ships - a MLP and an AFSB - and use the combination of both ships to replace the single LSD. The idea is for the AFSB vessel to cover both the lift for amphibious groups and carry residual lift for the MPS MEB while MLP serves as a well deck surrogate. What is important to understand here is that the AFSB design would actually be a non-mil spec LPH with a limited hanger capacity, but it gives the option for that vessel to carry forward the helicopters in an ARG while the LHA/LHD operates 20 JSFs. Neither the MLP or AFSB would be a gray hull though, which is a major reason why old school Marine Generals who have been doing amphibious assaults for 30 years (cough!) hate the idea.

When I read Section 131 of the 2013 National Defense Act, what I read as "Sense of Congress" actually represents the traditionalists mindset on amphibious capability and their Gulf coast lobby buddies.

But the bottom line is this. The fourth option is the only option that will actually meet the capacity requirements for amphibious lift and the MPS, but I fully expect the United States Marine Corps to outright reject the very suggestion of any option away from the traditional 3 ship ARG. The third option for a foreign design will be rejected solely because it is a foreign design, even though the logic of that escapes me completely when the ships are being built in US shipyards. A new design is possible but unlikely, and until we see more in-house design expertise in NAVSEA I can't say that is necessarily a bad thing.

So ultimately I fully expect the final choice for the LSD(X) to be a LPD-17 mod that the Navy budget cannot afford, and in the end I suspect the Marine Corps will end up with about 8 LSD(X) because that is all they can afford.

But if it was me, I would go for the MLP + AFSB concept. I believe it carries with it the highest risk, but I also believe it would give the Marine Corps the most flexibility when it comes to operations at sea. In my opinion it is much easier for the USMC to remain a relevant national defense asset when they are operating from more ships than when they are operating from fewer ships, and the MLP + AFSB option puts Marines on well over 40 vessels that deploy frequently, vs less than 30 possible vessels that deploy less frequently when one picks the quality LPD-17 mod option.

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13 novembre 2012 2 13 /11 /novembre /2012 22:15



21.10.2012 Photographer: PO(Phot) Sean Clee


British and French amphibious assault craft take part in Exercise Corsican Lion.


Elements of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines conducted a WADER training package on the French Island of Corsica. The exercise saw British servicemen, train alongside their French counterparts in amphibious landing techniques from British craft and French craft. The training took place off Solenzaro Beach in Corsica as part of Exercise Corsican Lion.

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