August 29, 2015 by Think Defence

What started out as a post about Mexeflote’s in 2011 has turned into a 95,000 word Think Defence project on the subject of Ship to Shore Logistics.

This is the reason the post rate has dropped recently, sorry about that, but it is now complete.

The Ship to Shore Logistics Project picks up from the multi post series of the same name but this is a refresh and significant expansion, table of contents below.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Case Studies

The Normandy Landings

The San Carlos Landings

Umm Qasr

Haiti

Current Capabilities

UK amphibious Doctrine

Survey

Mine Countermeasures

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Amphibious Assault and Logistics

US Amphibious Logistics

Making a Case for Change

Increment 1

Requirements

Survey and Initial Operations

Repairing and Augmenting the Port

A Summary and Final Thoughts on Increment 1

Increment 2

Requirements

Existing Solutions and Studies

Pierhead

Pier

Shore Connector

Wave Attenuation

Closing Comments

6 juin 2014 ministeredeladefense

January 29, 2014 By Ankit Panda - http://thediplomat.com

It is likely that Japan will sell India its indigenously developed US-2 amphibious aircraft in 2014.

November 26, 2013 Saurabh Joshi - stratpost.com

The India-Japan Joint Working Group (JWG) have held preliminary meetings to initiate the process for acquisition of the ShinMaywa US-2i amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy.

The Indian Navy plan to acquire the Japanese ShinMaywa US-2i amphibious aircraft faces unique challenges in terms of the process being evolved to effect the purchase.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during his visit to Japan last May, had issued a joint statement along with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe which mandated the setting up of a Joint Working Group (JWG) between the two countries to explore the potential for cooperation between the defense and aviation industries between the two countries, as well as to figure out the mechanism and modalities for the acquisition of the aircraft by the Indian Navy.

The statement said, among other things:

The two Prime Ministers welcomed the expanding defense relations between the two countries based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan. The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction that the first bilateral exercise between the Indian Navy (IN)and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)was held in June 2012 off the coast of Japan and decided to conduct such exercises on a regular basis with increased frequency. They decided to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) to explore modality for the cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft.

The two sides have held preliminary meetings of the JWG recently, since the meeting between the two prime ministers – said to be the result of the priority accorded to the process by Abe.

The navy is understood to be keen on acquiring at least 15 of the aircraft. The last amphibious aircraft operated by the navy were the light transport Short SA.6 Sealand aircraft, which were inducted in the 1950s and phased out a decade later. Since then, the Indian Navy has never operated any amphibious aircraft.

A Beriev Be-200 at the Singapore Airshow in 2012 | Photo: StratPost

The Indian Coast Guard, briefly, considered the acquisition of the Russian Beriev Be-200 amphibious aircraft as part of a process to acquire Medium Range Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft (MRMR), which was subsequently cancelled in 2011.

There are two reasons why this process is significant. First of all, it represents a change in Japanese policies, traditionally informed by its pacifist constitution, in place since the end of the Second World War, which barred the export of military technologies.

While Japan barred the export of military equipment to communist countries, countries subject to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) arms embargo and countries that could be involved in international conflicts since 1967, it extended the bar on export to all countries in 1976, with the United States being the only exception.

Japan continues to ban such exports and only allows the export of dual-use equipment, under which category the US-2i falls. Even then, the Japanese allowance remains a significant relaxation on its part.

Secondly, there is no close competitor to the aircraft in terms of features and performance, and the Indian Navy and defense ministry would have to evolve a process under the Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP) to make sure the single vendor bar does not apply to the acquisition process for the aircraft and/or put together a government-to-government purchase process with Japan, on the lines of the mechanism with Russia and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route with the United States.

While this process is getting underway, defense ministry sources expressed mild concern that, while the objectives of the JWG include ‘cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft’, this could end up with the long term objectives of potential industrial cooperation holding up the more immediate objective of aircraft acquisition. They pointed to the inclusion of India’s National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) as part of the JWG and said care should be taken that the objective of cooperation on civilian aircraft development should not delay the more immediate objective acquisition process.

That said, movement on this could be expected in December, with at least two meetings – a second preliminary meeting as well as defense minister-level talks on the issue.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who visited Japan earlier this year, expressed India’s interest in acquiring the aircraft as part of what was seen as a growing proximity between the two countries, both of whom have had territorial disputes with China.

India has been bolstering its airlift capabilities in the northern and north-eastern regions in a bid to provide better logistical support to the Indian Army, at a time when serial intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China by the Chine People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have created much controversy. The Indian Air Force (IAF) recently made the Daulat Beg Oldie Advanced Landing Ground (ALG), just southeast of the Karakoram Pass, operational for its C-130J Super Hercules aircraft.

Interestingly, the US-2i could also operate from Pangong Tso lake (and possibly other water bodies in the region), divided by the LAC between the two countries in the Chushul sector, should the need arise, if the Indian Navy were to acquire it.

Speaking at the first Naval and Maritime Expo (NAMEXPO) held in Kochi in September, Commodore Sujeet Samadar, retired from the Indian Navy, who heads the company in India, told StratPost that although the aircraft has never operated at such heights before, it is qualified for such operations. Specifically asked if the aircraft could operate from Pangong Tso lake, Commodore Samadar said he could see no reason why it could not

“The boundary layer control system has unique features and it’s been designed for a particular performance, mostly at sea level. But the extension of the systems onboard allows it to carry out high altitude operations. At the moment, I think, that is what I can say. It can carry out high altitude operations, certainly.”

The aircraft can operate in rough waters up to sea state 5 with three meter high waves. It can take off in 280 meters and land in 330 meters with a maximum take off weight of 43 tons. It has a range of 4,500 kilometers and a top speed of 560 kilometers per hour. The aircraft’s boundary layer control system generates additional lift to allow the aircraft to take off and land in short distances. Its spray strip and spray suppressor prevent splashed water from reaching its engines.

Sources in the defense ministry have also indicated a level of interest in the IAF in the capabilities of this aircraft and the possibilities it could offer for air support in the region.

Jan. 9, 2012 by Galrahn - informationdissemination.net

Normally when a defense budget is passed, I can't wait to dig through it and highlight all the important details. This time, with no associated appropriations bill (or plan) coming anytime soon, it would be a waste of time to suggest anything in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Act is worth discussing, because it is worthless until the elected folks in Washington, DC get their budget priorities sorted out.

There is one section in the bill that I do want to highlight though. This reads like something inserted by a lobbyist, and it doesn't belong in my opinion.

SEC. 131. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1. The Marine Corps is a combat force that leverages maneuver from the sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
2. The Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon naval vessels, they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations and, operating ‘‘from the sea’’, they require no third-party host nation permission to conduct military operations.
3. The Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet this full range of military operations.
4. Due only to fiscal constraints, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels, which adds military risk to future operations.
5. The Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30 operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to Congress that will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
6. Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1. the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
2. the Navy should carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements;
3. the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships as a component of the balanced battle force;
4. the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
5. operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and acquisition cost; and
6. maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the national security of the United States.

To me this looks a lot like some Marine Corps General and his industry buddies throwing their weight around via Congress to try an influence the Analysis of Alternatives taking place regarding the LSD(X). Congress should not be trying to influence the decision unless they are ready to pony up the big bucks for what they are basically calling for - which to me sounds like more LPD-17s.

From what I understand, LSD(X) will be a design to cost ship. The recurring cost (ship 3 and beyond) is pegged to be about $1.2 billion in the shipbuilding budget. That makes the LPD-17 hull a nonstarter without a significant increase in cash from Congress.

The Marines face several challenges in dealing with amphibious requirements, but two stand out as important challenges that must be addressed. The first challenge is that the lift footprint of the amphibious MEB is growing, and the second challenge is that the MPS squadron only carries about 70% of the MEB's equipment. With limited funding and only one platform in the shipbuilding plan able to address these issues - the LSD(X) - folks are either going to have to get creative to solve these challenges, or accept that the challenges will not be solved.

The LSD(X) is a choice between 4 alternatives.

The first choice is a new build, best possible lift vessel for $1.2 billion recurring. I have no idea what design that would be, but if we are being honest it almost certainly wouldn't be anything similar to a current LSD if it is going to meet the stated requirements.

The second choice is for a LPD-17 mod, best possible for $1.2 billion recurring. I do not believe that is possible, but I'm sure there is a shipbuilding guru who other Marines call "General" willing and ready to convince a gullible politician it is possible. Experts I have spoken to in NAVSEA say it's not possible, and I'll trust their expertise and opinion over any Marine General when it comes to shipbuilding.

The third choice is to use a foreign design brought up to NVR standard at a cost of no more than $1.2 billion recurring with the third ship. The design that is specifically highlighted with this option is the French Mistral class. The ships would be built at a US shipyard. There is not a consensus whether these ships can be built in a US shipyard for $1.2 billion recurring.

The fourth option is to build two ships - a MLP and an AFSB - and use the combination of both ships to replace the single LSD. The idea is for the AFSB vessel to cover both the lift for amphibious groups and carry residual lift for the MPS MEB while MLP serves as a well deck surrogate. What is important to understand here is that the AFSB design would actually be a non-mil spec LPH with a limited hanger capacity, but it gives the option for that vessel to carry forward the helicopters in an ARG while the LHA/LHD operates 20 JSFs. Neither the MLP or AFSB would be a gray hull though, which is a major reason why old school Marine Generals who have been doing amphibious assaults for 30 years (cough!) hate the idea.

When I read Section 131 of the 2013 National Defense Act, what I read as "Sense of Congress" actually represents the traditionalists mindset on amphibious capability and their Gulf coast lobby buddies.

But the bottom line is this. The fourth option is the only option that will actually meet the capacity requirements for amphibious lift and the MPS, but I fully expect the United States Marine Corps to outright reject the very suggestion of any option away from the traditional 3 ship ARG. The third option for a foreign design will be rejected solely because it is a foreign design, even though the logic of that escapes me completely when the ships are being built in US shipyards. A new design is possible but unlikely, and until we see more in-house design expertise in NAVSEA I can't say that is necessarily a bad thing.

So ultimately I fully expect the final choice for the LSD(X) to be a LPD-17 mod that the Navy budget cannot afford, and in the end I suspect the Marine Corps will end up with about 8 LSD(X) because that is all they can afford.

But if it was me, I would go for the MLP + AFSB concept. I believe it carries with it the highest risk, but I also believe it would give the Marine Corps the most flexibility when it comes to operations at sea. In my opinion it is much easier for the USMC to remain a relevant national defense asset when they are operating from more ships than when they are operating from fewer ships, and the MLP + AFSB option puts Marines on well over 40 vessels that deploy frequently, vs less than 30 possible vessels that deploy less frequently when one picks the quality LPD-17 mod option.