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5 mars 2014 3 05 /03 /mars /2014 18:30
Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky

Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky

 

2/3/2014 Or Heller - israeldefense.com

 

The reform in the IDF Armored Corps is taking shape. The IDF Chief Armor Officer, Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky, in an exclusive interview with Israel Defense

I am not sure where I would rather be with all of the threats we face today," begins the IDF Chief Armor Officer, Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky. "On foot behind a rock, or inside the Merkava Mark-IV tank fitted with the Aspro-A/Trophy system or on board the APC moving alongside that Merkava tank."

In view of the realization that wars have changed and reality has changed, the IDF Armored Corps is changing as well. Brig. Gen. Olansky is very clear and confident about the principles of the reform he is currently leading. "Alongside the tanks, which lead the battalion combat effort, we want to prepare the combat task force for the challenges facing it by empowering the armored/mechanized infantry within the armored (tank) battalions. In each armored battalion, we are assembling a combat support company that includes a mortar platoon, a surveillance element capable of calling in and directing fire support, and a reconnaissance platoon. All of these elements, along with the tanks that will continue to lead the maneuver, will make up a battalion-size combat task force that is relevant to today's battlefield. We have here a new world of content in the Armored Corps – combat reconnaissance."

What is the timetable for the implementation of the new plan?

"We intend to recruit the first company out of the November 2013 recruitment class. These recruits will take the complete training course, thirty weeks at the IDF Armored Corps School, where they will learn the Armored Corps occupational skill and then be divided into their respective specialized skills: scout, mortar operator and observer/surveillance operator. The graduates will make up the combat support companies within the armored battalions. We are currently reorganizing the entire tank OrBat of the IDF."

Will you be making adjustments in the Armored Corps training courses and seminars?

"Certainly. I am currently assembling armored/mechanized infantry companies just like those of the infantry brigades, possessing the same capabilities with the exception of extended operations on foot, as they will operate near the tanks. We have an opportunity here to empower the remaining elements. Today's armored/mechanized infantry warfighter looks exactly the same as an infantry warfighter, with the exception of the purpose-specific weapons, which they do not need."

The Aspro-A/Trophy system has, until now, operated effectively on the Gaza line in isolated and rare incidents of antitank fire. But how would this system operate during the third Lebanon war opposite a rainstorm of antitank missiles fired at each tank?

"That's just it. This system is excellent. The technology was considered fictional ten years ago. I suggest we refrain from terrorizing ourselves. Antitank fire does not come as a rainstorm. Even in antitank-saturated scenarios we have a range of capabilities for coping with the threats. As our maneuver becomes more substantial, the capabilities of the Aspro-A/Trophy system will come more significantly into play. Additionally, our range of capabilities will include a surveillance capability – for spotting the antitank threats; our surveillance elements will be able to call in and direct the fire of Keshet 120mm mortars; our reconnaissance platoon will possess the ability to recognize the antitank threats in advance, and our tanks will possess the ability of firing a round at the threat."

"Do Not Mourn the Syrian Army"

What do we know about the state of the Syrian armor after more than two and a half years of a bloody civil war? Is it still a significant player?

"Firstly, we know that it is much better trained now, as it has been fighting. It brushes with the opposition forces in the context of the civil war. At the same time, they have also experienced wear as a result of the on-going fighting, but it still exists. I do not know how many tanks the Syrian Army has lost in the civil war, they have been fighting for two and a half years. On the other hand you realize that people who fight become more proficient and stronger. The Syrian armor is definitely a significant player in the Middle East. I would not hasten to mourn the armored divisions and the land maneuvering capability of the Syrian Army."

But even in your presentations you focus on the fact that the fighting has shifted from the front line into the depth of the territory, namely – a war of rockets and missiles against the Israeli rear area, so how does the Armored Corps fit in?

"Even before the civil war in Syria broke out, we had observed those trends in the Syrian Army. The Syrian Army disbanded armored units and established commando units instead. They acquired antitank systems and demolition capabilities. The Syrians developed a substantial rocket layout. These were not just the trends within the paramilitary organizations. We observed the same trends in the Syrian Army, too. At the same time, they still have armored divisions and tank brigades that use T-72 tanks. They are there, and they are well-trained."

How would an encounter between a T-72 tank and a Merkava Mark-IV tank look in 2013? Is there any chance here for a fair fight?

"There is no fair fight here. The Merkava Mark-IV tank is a true masterpiece. It possesses capabilities that are superior to those of any other tank worldwide, and no one even comes close. This applies to crew protection, to trafficability and to fire control. In some aspects it is 'only' in first place. With regard to most aspects, however, it is far beyond anything else out there."

If the third Lebanon war should break out tomorrow morning, in what way will the maneuver executed by the Armored Corps be different in view of the lessons derived from the summer of 2006?

"The maneuver will be much stronger and faster, with a complete envelope of structured and precise intelligence gathering and fire employment activities. We will see combined operations of tanks with infantry and assault engineering elements, but a maneuver is still a maneuver. Its objective is to transfer strength from the contact line deep into the enemy territory. Just like in all of the wars that we had, that is what we will see in our future wars – a battalion-size combat task force with massive strength and firepower, which protects itself and reaches the point where its strength is utilized to maximum benefit – through firepower, through its scoring capabilities. In view of the threats we face today, I believe there's no escaping the need to maintain a strong and fully-prepared ground layout and to employ it when necessary in order to bring the campaign to an end as soon as possible.

"We would not be able, opposite Lebanon, to maintain a campaign of wearing out the opponent through the use of fire, like we did in Operation Pillar of Defense, for instance. Many people say 'here, we saw during Operation Pillar of Defense that a maneuver is no longer necessary.' But in Operation Pillar of Defense, the very fact that the maneuver was poised and ready to launch cut the duration of the fighting short. Secondly, Lebanon and Syria are not the same as the Hamas in Gaza. They will not be influenced by strategic players (like Egypt) as Hamas was. In Lebanon and Syria, if we want to bring about a prompt conclusion of the campaign, we will have no other choice but to maneuver into the enemy's centers of gravity, and the armored forces will execute and lead that maneuver, as they know how to do it quickly and forcefully."

How will a task force maneuver if it is made up, theoretically, of Merkava Mark-IV tanks fitted with the Aspro-A/Trophy antitank missile interception system on the one hand, while the infantry elements still ride in the outdated and vulnerable M113 APCs?

"I think that if you examine the land solution, you will realize that it is a good solution. Would I prefer something better? Of course I would. We do not live in a bubble and we realize that the defense budget is a derivative of the economic situation. It is a restriction that applies to us which I cannot ignore. Where I would have liked to invest the extra money is a question I ponder all the time. I think that as long as the M113 APC operates in the environment of a complete battalion system, I will have no doubts about committing to battle the battalion combat task force and all elements thereof."

What was your contribution as Chief Armor Officer to the staff work ordered by the decision of the Chief of Staff to disband six tank brigades using the old 'Patton' tanks?

"We are disbanding layouts that are outdated layouts that had reached the end of the road. The logic here is both conceptual and operational. It is not that we had called out a random number and then went on to look for what we could disband. Obviously, we would prefer that instead of the brigades we disband ten more Merkava Mark-IV brigades would have been established, but we live in a certain reality that we cannot ignore. The people at IDF GHQ sat down and thought and conducted discussions and carried out simulations and examinations, but eventually you realize that some layouts had reached the end of the road, like the 'Patton' and Merkava Mark-I tanks. But let's talk about the bright side – next year, the IDF 7th Armored Brigade will be converted to a Merkava Mark-IV brigade!"

Still, when there are voices at IDF GHQ who speak about the end of the armor-versus-armor battle era, what is the future you envision for the tank in the IDF?

"I think that precisely at the 40th anniversary of the Yom-Kippur War, we realized what our forefathers had understood since the days of the Bible: that the land maneuver has always been and will always be necessary in order to gain an overbalance in a war. The armored forces will be right there at the head of the land maneuver, with the tanks in front, surrounded by the envelope. We will reach the end of the maneuver era when we have reached the end of the era of wars. I still do not see an end to the era of wars. But if we do not train and practice, we will be less proficient – it's all very straightforward."

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13 novembre 2012 2 13 /11 /novembre /2012 12:45

The Guardium UGV (Photo Ziv Koren)

 

3/11/2012 Amir Rapaport - israeldefense.com

 

Col. Nir Halamish, Head of the IDF Ground Forces Command's Weapons Development Division, speaks about the programs the IDF is developing for cutting-edge robotics and new developments on the verge of significant technological breakthroughs

 

"I believe that 2013 will be the year in which a decade’s worth of processes will come to a conclusion,” declares Col. Nir Halamish in a special interview for IsraelDefense. As Head of the Weapons Department for the IDF’s Ground Forces, Halamish describes the direction in which the branch’s force buildup will focus, and notes the areas where major breakthroughs are expected to occur – including more efficient energy utilization by infantry and special forces and operating in distant locations across the battlefield.

 

Col. Halamish grew up in the Armored Corps, and has manned several positions in the Weapons Department for more than a decade. The interview with him took place near the time when the IDF General Staff approved a new multi-year plan (“Oz” – to be initiated in 2013-2017). The plan, which defines the strengthening directions of all the branches (including the Ground Forces), will be replacing the Tefen Multi-Year Plan which began in 2007 after the Second Lebanon War and was completed by the end of 2011.

 

The year 2012 was defined by the IDF as a “singular year”, The new plan was postponed by a year due to the dramatic changes in the Middle East, and after arguments between the Defense and Treasury Ministries concerning the parameters of the defense budget.

 

“The Tefen Multi-Year Plan is unique in two regards,” says Col. Halamish. “Firstly, it is one of the few plans in the history of the IDF that used all of its five years, and it was a very good and healthy process for the military. Secondly, it came immediately after the Second Lebanon War, and its planning stemmed from the lessons of that war. It essentially implemented all of the things that were understood from the war and was intended to allow for significant increases in crucial capabilities, as we understood were necessary in 2007.

 

“The plan itself brought some very significant capabilities, such as connectivity between all of the force elements on the ground, via the Digital Army Program (DAP), which has already become operational in half of the layout. In the coming years, we will expand it to the entire military, including reserves, and we will advance the ground connectivity to entities such as the Directorate of Military Intelligence, the IAF, and branches in the General Staff.”

 

Maneuver and Regional Defense

 

“One of the most significant lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War was the decision to renew the campaign’s maneuvering capabilities – in other words, carrying out a ‘quick and lethal maneuver’ as defined by the Commander of the Ground Forces, Maj. Gen. Sami Turgeman. The IDF decided to acquire hundreds of Merkava Mark IV tanks and Merkava Namer APCs produced on U.S. soil for the sake of improving maneuvering capabilities, as well as acquiring active defense systems against antitank missiles.”

 

Will the IDF continue to invest in tanks, APCs and active defense systems during the years of the Oz plan? The IDF General Staff recently discussed its intent to reduce the number of tanks and APCs.

 

“There were many discussions, but there’s already the Merkava Mark IV, which we are continuing to develop and to manufacture, as well as the Namer APC. The Namer started out as a heavy APC in 2007, with the global direction being that of less protected vehicles, as dictated by the US – speed at the expense of survivability. We decided towards a heavy maneuvering vehicle which prioritizes the team’s survivability at the expense of less weight. It has good maneuverability, yet it will not reach high speeds such as a light AFV. We presently have an entire operational Golani brigade with Merkava APCs, and we have transferred production to General Dynamics in the US to fund the rest of the acquisition with aid funds. We are advancing at full speed. The fact is, there are debates in the multi-year plan whether or not to continue producing Namers and how it has no effect on the things transpiring in the coming two to three years. Eventually there’s General Dynamics, which has a contract for the production of a considerable amount of Namers, and it is about to transfer several models of the new APC for testing.

 

“Upon the arrival of the APCs from the US, we will also renew the production line of the Namers in Israel (Israeli systems will be assembled onboard the hulls arriving from the US). There are thoughts about a second regular Namer brigade afterwards. We are examining the matter. On the one hand, it is important that the regular ORBAT be with the most advanced systems. On the other hand, these platforms have significant maintenance costs, and now there is the need to find the balance between the desire to be strong at the sharp tip and between the capability of carrying out this endeavor. This has not yet been decided – there are important considerations on how to expand the capabilities of the Namer, and also of the Merkava Mark IV, for a regular brigade. The issue will reach the branch commander within a few months, and it will then be brought up for General Staff approval.”

 

What about the active defense systems? Thus far, Trophy systems (by Rafael) were installed onboard only some Merkava Mark IV tanks. Will you continue installing Trophy on tanks, and will you equip the new Namers with this system?

 

“In general, we think we have reached a situation where this vehicle provides an excellent response to the existing challenges – both traditional challenges such as tanks that are operating in the environment, as well as the developing ones of antitank squadrons, of a small and low-signature enemy who is very difficult to locate.

“Today, the Merkava IV tank has a comprehensive capability for defending against antitank threats, as well as dealing with the enemy and closing the fire cycle at an impressive speed of a few seconds, on the same vehicle. I believe that in the next confrontation that takes place, we will have to test these capabilities in war, or in a more significant conflict than the one taking place today in Gaza. The more we succeed in operating these systems in a better manner, we will reach a situation where an antitank squad firing an RPG-29 or other antitank weapons will find itself in clear, immediate danger in a matter of seconds. We’ve done a very thorough effort with the tanks – the result of considerable development, but testing these capabilities was carried out after the Second Lebanon War.”

 

You mean that there are also soft-kill systems?

 

“What I can say is that other technologies are being examined beyond Trophy. Additional systems are being developed, and I think that in the operational field of dealing with the antitank threat, we have set a goal for ourselves under a program called ‘Green Page’, to improve the capabilities of the combat battalion team. We are not discussing more about the single instrument level or how any tank or Namer deals with the antitank threat. Rather it is about the integrated battalion – with infantry, tanks, engineering and collection – and how its fire handles a threat that we understand from the Second Lebanon War, which the enemy views as an endeavor he should invest in from his perspective. On our side, we invest in order to prepare the forces – force buildup for improved confrontation. I am discussing the field of weapons and strengthening, but there are, of course, other directions, such as training and doctrines. “

 

Does this mean that it is possible for one instrument to defend another?

 

“It means that I’ve said all that I can say. One of the significant things that we’ve tasked ourselves with is the issue of dealing with the capability of a force’s critical mass to handle the antitank threat. No more “boutique capabilities” of lone forces, but rather significant capabilities for a significant ORBAT, so that we will have the ability to deal with a significant challenge in times of war or large conflict, and defeat it. Regarding the tank itself, besides having the Trophy System, which greatly increases survivability, we also provided it with an antitank shell named Kalanit, which is unique and the first of its kind in the world, produced by Israel Military Industries (IMI).

 

Tactical UAV

 

Col. Halamish explains, “Six to seven years ago, we made a strategic decision – in IDF terms – to develop autonomous tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) layouts to work alongside the maneuvering force, battalion or brigade. All the decisions regarding them are accepted at the regiment or brigade commander level. Their availability is very high, their conditions are very low – take off and land in the field. Most importantly, they maintain performance, in day and night in a manner that approaches the IDF’s largest micro-remotely powered vehicles (MRPVs).

 

“The first is called Skylark 1 (according to the commercial name of the manufacturer, Elbit Systems). This is a layout which we are more or less in the middle of implementing, and there are already several dozens of teams using it. The system works in an intensive manner, deepening across all the current security sectors – Gaza, Egypt, the Lebanon border, Judea and Samaria, as well as in all the unit trainings. Every regiment commander who received the system and the team said that the first thing they want is to keep it.”

 

According to Halamish, the Ground Forces branch recently decided on a new UAV project for the brigade echelon, termed Sky Galloper. This UAV will be 1.5 times larger than the Skylark and will also be manufactured by Elbit Systems.

 

Precision Mortars

 

According to Col. Halamish, another significant and developing field within the ground forces in the coming five years involves mortars. After the IDF acquired the Soltam-produced “Keshet” (a rapid mortar fired from an APC), a decision was made to begin a new project for developing mortar shells with a precision of up to a few meters. The shells will be directed towards the target via a laser marker or other guidance measures. The IDF is presently considering a revolutionary step: providing precision shell fire capabilities to armored battalions as well, to offer them another means of quickly and efficiently dealing with antitank squads ambushing them in the maneuver areas. “This is something that is being examined,” says Halamish.

 

“My assessment is that we will introduce the mortars to the armored battalions at one stage, out of an understanding that the Keshet is truly a force multiplier, and we wish to add everything we define as a precision shell upon it. The Keshet does things automatically, reducing human error to a minimum. All that is left for us today is to take the mortar shell and make it precise.

 

“Today, the mortar is still 'dumb', statistically one that falls within a range of 100 meters. We want to take this range and make it more precise, at least to ten meters. The precision will turn this instrument into an ultimate asset – quick, precise, with a minimal amount of errors. This is the central step that we are working on.”

 

Precision Rockets

 

Beyond mortars, the Ground Forces also intend to establish battalions that world fire precise rockets to ranges of nearly 40 kilometers (as revealed by the head of the Ground Forces during the International Fire Conference organized by IsraelDefense and the Artillery Corps Association in May 2012). The precise rockets will be based on the Accular developed by IMI, which took old rockets and added guidance and navigation systems to them.

 

Have you already started to establish the first precision rocket battalion?

 

“Yes, we are working on it now. The layout has not yet been constructed, but is undergoing advanced approvals. The Ground Forces commander is outlining the direction for us. Today, the air force is needed in order to precisely hit a structure or another target. We want to reach a situation where the rocket or mortar will reach all targets in every scenario, during the day or at night, and in all weather conditions. This is a significant challenge in that we see ourselves fighting 24/7, in the winter and summer.”

 

Halamish adds that in addition to the rocket battalion, the IDF will start the conversion of its mobile gun layout to a new gun in the coming five-year period – an effort that will take nearly three decades, meaning four multi-year plans.

 

Easier, More Concealed

 

Regarding infantry forces, Halamish says, “If you take an infantry battalion from 2006 and compare it to today, you’ll see that we have made at least one, sometimes two jumps in every parameter – command and control, collection, lethality, ability to hit soft/hard targets, camouflage and personal gear. Since this is a very large layout, this was one of the most significant efforts in the Tefen Plan, and it provided improved, upgraded capabilities to every infantry battalion, in terms of both quality and quantity, compared to five years ago.

 

What is happening with the project that was referred to in the past decade as the “Future Infantry Soldier”?

 

“In the framework of the project, some of the things that made its way to the ground force battalions are the result of initiatives that were in the previous incarnation of the future infantry project (in 2003-2004). The mechanism says that you try numerous ideas – several of them will mature, while several of them slowly die. The best of them progress to the full development and acquisition stage, from which the gathering systems came. We were using systems such as Yuval – an expensive and heavy system weighing 11-12 kilograms.

 

“One of the things that came about during 2003 to 2005 was the capability to take the thermal world and pack it in two and a half kilograms while maintaining the same ranges. This was something that we thought about before then, but we did not see how we could turn it into a project. Now it’s a standard.

 

"In general, we took everything that the infantry soldiers were carrying, which was in the area of 40-50 kilograms, and reduced it to less than ten kilograms. Let’s say that an artillery cooperation officer had to carry observation systems and batteries for 48 hours. This is a weight that he could not carry on his own, alongside two soldiers who were carrying it as well. This was the operation – three persons walking with heavy gear. We took all of the artillery cooperation officer’s gear, and specified the equipment used to produce even better operational outputs (i.e. allows for seeing during day and night, and produces coordinates) – all of this in only ten kilograms. Today, an infantry artillery cooperation officer does not need a hauler.”

 

What breakthroughs are there in the energy field?

 

"I believe that the next head of the Weapons Development Division, in about five years, will have several issues that he will turn into projects, and one of them will be the energy issue. Looking ahead, you see there is more equipment that requires energy, including for command and control and gathering measures. We are approaching a situation where the different types and amount of energy requires many soldiers. We are presently examining several significant directions with MAFAT for more energy at less weight. The aspiration is to reach a ratio of 1:2 with portable infantry forces systems, meaning twice the energy for the same weight. There are several directions, starting with solar panels and up to composite materials whose energy is twice as high.

 

“MAFAT operates projects in several universities, as well as with the US. We are investing many resources in this field in order to reach a situation where a battery’s activation time will be 16 hours instead of eight. The goal is 1:3 with combat collection units, which collect materials and don’t have to be in motion all the time, and there are other directions, such as a small generator that could operate for days, while allowing for operating systems. We are working in this field with Ricor from Ein Harod. Sizable budgets need to be invested in this.”

 

So we are discussing energy generators in the field?

 

"For example, a liter of a certain type of benzene can allow for the production of 72 hours of energy. There is, of course, a trade-off – the generator weighs ten kilograms, not including the extra liter, but it's worth it if it provides you with energy for a week.”

 

What about liquid energy?

 

“There is the whole world of fuel cells. We are also examining this in UAVs, which are electric and have an endurance of two to three hours. We want this to stand at six hours – the longer the UAV can stay in the air, the better. This is a field that has great potential. Breakthroughs will happen in some of the things and not in others.

 

What other things are on the verge of breakthroughs?

 

“The cellular field. Our cellphones consume energy so much that they can’t finish a day's work without being recharged several times. Considerable amounts of money are being invested in this – whoever comes up with a solution will be a millionaire. We are riding on the backs of the civilian sector, and it is from there that things will be reached.

 

“Another issue is “friend-or-foe” identification, a subject that that comes up in every war or operation. The IDF enters built-up areas where everything is crowded and improvised, with tanks and infantry inside – everyone is mixed up with everything. We are now investing towards finding a solution to prevent friendly-fire. The attacker is less interested, so far as knowing if I am in a tank and signaling to an infantry force, whether it is one of our own, without requiring the infantry soldier’s cooperation. A breakthrough will happen here and while it will not provide 100% of what we need, it could improve decision-making. I am not assuming that a decision may or may not happen according to this, but it may allow for decisions to be made. You want to reach a situation where batteries are not needed for such a form of identification.

 

“Last year, we called on several companies to work on this. I believe that we will ultimately reach our goal. Today, you have systems that require cooperation with the force, such as a thermal flag. However, many times, someone could shoot you from behind because he can’t see the flag.

 

“There are all sorts of areas being developed regarding the future infantry soldier, such as better uniforms. Some of the officers examine potential uniforms that might aid the infantry fighter during combat.

 

“Another issue is to take what the infantry soldier carries, including uniform, measures, and protection – and turn it into a single system. For example, having energy be part of the protection layer. Energy is central, and it will provide you with the command and control. I presume that the combat configuration of the infantry – such as traversing on foot and reaching certain destinations – will be preserved, even in one or two decades from now. It will need assistance and organization for it to carry out such missions in a good manner.

 

“One of the other things is to transfer the world of autonomous vehicles from the air to the ground – this is the world we call UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicles). There are two main directions in this field, one of which is to take this capability and integrate it in ongoing security settings, as is done in Gaza. The only missionoperational UGV system in the world that is the one we operate in Gaza – the G-NIUS Guardium UGV. It still carries out missions today. There were initially problems with it, primarily in communications and the capability of operating near the fence. It has been carrying out activities nicely in the past year.

 

"One example is that there are complex situations near the fences, where instead of operating manned forces and becoming entangled in a dangerous situation, the forces can be allowed to close a wider circle and introduce the UGV, which transmits the image back. If there's a charge, it will explode, and if there is an incursion, then it transmits the information and allows us to get organized accordingly.

 

There is also a plan known as “Forward Guard” - what does it refer to?

 

“Forward guard refers to an unmanned force that will operate ahead of the main force, one which will track the enemy and another to encounter it in place of the main force.

 

Thus far, we have yet to solve the communication problem. I want to give this instrument commands, not just data, and this is where there is still a problem. Furthermore, you want to reach a situation where this instrument can make decisions independently in the field – what is called artificial intelligence (AI). This might be pretentious, but this is the appropriate word. If it reaches a place where there is an obstacle, and it needs to be overcome, then the robot will know how to figure it out, just like any sixyear old child. For the time being, this is something that they cannot do. If we solve this, we could provide unmanned forward guard capabilities with a manned force. This is something that we are advancing along with MAFAT.

 

Is there a goal to see to it that the robots could talk amongst themselves?

 

“Yes, but our current ambition is primarily that they will be able to operated on their own. The dream of taking a robotic force and having it fight behind enemy lines instead of soldiers exists in the movies, but we are not yet close to that. In any case, I say that we are the most advanced military in this field, and quite a few militaries come here to see what we are developing. Afghanistan, for example, presented very significant challenges to the various allied forces, similar to what he had in the security strip, such as the logistic convoys and movement to outposts. They eventually reached the same solutions that we did, such as supplies from the air and more, and then they also examined the UGV trucks.

 

I am a big believer in the notion that technological breakthroughs are accomplished step by step: isolate a problem, focus on what is desired, and thus reach a solution. It is very difficult to take a large step. Many times you do not have 10-15 years for a project to yield results. It is always easy is to say that the operational need is extensive and does not allow for compromise, and that the system is not needed without all of it. One of my challenges is to quantify the operational need so that it may be accomplished within a range of three to five years, and not to develop systems over many lengthy years that will not be needed by the time it is completed.”

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