SEOUL, 6 mai - RIA Novosti

La Corée du Sud et les Etats-Unis ont entamé en mer Jaune, entre la Chine et la péninsule coréenne, des exercices militaires visant à lutter contre les sous-marins, a annoncé lundi l'agence Yonhap.

Organisés chaque année, les exercices visent à préparer la Marine à lutter contre une infiltration non autorisée de l'adversaire", a indiqué un porte-parole du ministère sud-coréen de la Défense.

Selon lui, un sous-marin nucléaire de classe Los-Angeles, des destroyers dotés de systèmes de missiles Aegis et des avions de patrouille maritime R-3C américains, ainsi que des navires de guerre sud-coréens prennent part aux exercices qui prendront fin vendredi prochain.

April 25, 2013: Strategy Page

Six weeks of aggressive threats to start a war have come to nothing for North Korea. None of this bluster has produced any needed aid (as in free food or fuel) or offers to reduce the sanctions. No one shows any sign of giving in to this latest barrage of threats. This is a major disappointment for the northern leadership. For over half a century you could always get something useful if you ranted and threatened long enough. The north cannot risk making good on these threats and starting an actual war, as they would lose big. North Korean military planners were taught the “correlation of forces” by their Russian mentors and have calculated the growing strength of the south and the decline of the north. All those smart bombs and combat-proven new tech the south and their allies have would make a mess of the north. But maybe another nuclear or long-range missile test will help.

In the last few days North Korean troops have been seen building fortifications near border crossings. This is unusual because for decades it was assumed any war between north and south would begin with a North Korean invasion of the south. The new fortifications indicate that the north is recognizing the power balance shift and that it is more likely South Korean troops will be moving north if it comes to war.

South Korea has offered to negotiate with North Korea over the recently closed (by North Korea) Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea. This put over 50,000 North Koreans out of work and is costing the South Korean companies millions of dollars. The South Korean government has said it will provide help with these losses and wants to see what the North Koreans have to say about putting 50,000 of their own people out of good jobs and making future investment from South Korea less likely because of this nonsense. South Korean who work at the Kaesong Industrial Complex have long been a good source of intel on the north and apparently these sources indicate that it’s not just unemployed workers in Kaesong who are unhappy with their government’s antics. By asking for talks the south is indicating it wants to make it easy for the north to back down and get the Kaesong Industrial Complex and its employees working again.

The out-of-work Kaesong employees say their complaints about their government are not unique to the well-off (relatively speaking) workers at the special economic zone, but are common throughout the north. People are tired of all the propaganda, which is another tool the government uses to get everyone to ignore all the hungry, ill-housed and underemployed people up north. Its bad enough northerners have to hear it all the time, but many are ordered out to perform in public demonstrations of “popular anger at the enemy”. This is annoying and time consuming. It used to be you got a little food for attending these “voluntary” exercises, but the food situation has gotten so bad that the government reserves have been depleted. Everyone was reminded of this during the recent evacuation exercises, when city dwellers moved to rural dispersal sites as they would in wartime to avoid bombing attacks on the cities. The evacuees found that there was no food available for them and as a result the evacuation exercise fell apart as people simply walked away to find food. Only the senior leadership, most of who live in the cities, always has enough food. In the capital (Pyongyang) the government gave most residents several days of food in early April (to celebrate the birthday of founder Kim Il Sung). A few other cities got such distributions but most of the population did not, which only increases the resentment against those pampered government lackeys in the cities (especially the capital). In most of the country, hunger, or the threat of it, is a constant worry. Many of the North Korean soldiers the propaganda declares are “ready for war” are actually, and quite visibly, out helping plant the new crops (as they do every year).

The last six weeks have made it clear to the North Korean leadership that they have lost control of information. News of how the outside world is reacting to all the threats, and how those threats look to the rest of the world, is quickly getting to most North Koreans. The secret police (who monitor public attitudes) are reporting that people have a low opinion of their government and the current threats of war have not changed that. The secret police also point out that a lot of North Korean propaganda, especially the stuff insisting that North Koreans have it better than people of other countries (like China, South Korea and Japan) is considered a bad joke by most North Koreans, and a growing number of them are openly mocking the mandatory lectures and demonstrations they must attend. This is ominous, the fact that the people are losing their fear of retaliation. This is what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989 when all the communist governments there collapsed in a few months. North Korean leaders studied that event carefully and concluded that they had their people under control, that the people still feared their leaders. The decline in fear is scary news indeed because North Korea is basically a police state and without lots of fear that sort of government does not work.

The north is buzzing with talk of the April 14th collapse of a large mosaic wall honoring Kim Il Sung in Musan. It was quickly deduced that the mosaic came down because someone had sold off some of the construction materials and the wall was not as strong as it was supposed to be. When a strong enough wind came along, the wall came down. This is the first time a monument to the two previous rulers of North Korea (Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il) was subject to obvious corruption. There are 35,000 statues and monuments like this in North Korea and these representations of the two deceased rulers are considered sacred. It is a big deal that these monuments are now considered fair game by corrupt officials. For true-believers in the North Korean leadership this is a shocking event. For most North Koreans it is kind of expected. The old value system, inculcated by decades of relentless Kim-worshipping propaganda, is collapsing. The government will take action over this. There was a similar collapse of a lesser monument (honoring a lesser hero) in 2005, apparently due to poor design, not corruption. Still, those responsible for that collapse were punished. That will happen this time as well and there will be an official story that does not mention corruption. Since Kim Jong Un came to power he has had over 400 monuments built to honor his father and grandfather. Most of these have been mosaics and there will be inspections to find out if others were built by corrupt officials and are in danger of collapse. Omens like this must be avoided at all costs.

The current crisis (not enough food, fuel or hard currency) has led North Korea to put more pressure on its diplomats to come up with scams to raise cash. North Korean diplomats in Pakistan have, for example, made quite a business selling liquor in a country where sale of alcoholic beverages is very restricted and highly taxed. The North Koreans import name brand stuff and bring it in via diplomatic pouch and sell it freely to anyone who will pay (a price lower than the official price). This is a highly profitable arrangement and the Pakistani government eventually found out. The North Korean diplomats deny everything and keep selling the booze.

The U.S. has told North Korea that it will only resume food aid if the north will allow American officials to monitor the distribution. Food aid was halted in 2009 when North Korea expelled these observers. North Korea had been increasingly selling food aid to raise cash for imports (of weapons and luxury goods for the leadership). The north cannot do this with observers present and refuses to back off on this policy.

April 24, 2013: South Korea and China have established a hot line to handle any crisis in North Korea that would require action by the two countries (war or collapse of the government up there). Despite the huge cost of unification to South Koreans (who have only become affluent in the last 30 years) the idea of uniting Korea is still popular in South Korea. China has reservations about this and the South Korean have been trying to work out an understanding to get China to approve unification. Such a deal is not unprecedented. In the 1950s Austria ended its post-World War II occupation and partition (into allies and Soviet zones) by promising the Russians that it would remain neutral forever (or, as it turned out, until the Soviet Union disappeared) if Soviet troops left. A similar deal is apparently attractive to the Chinese, or at least they are willing to quietly talk about it. South Korea is a major trading partner and any deal that solved the North Korean mess and got U.S. troops out of Korea appeals to many Chinese.

April 23, 2013: North Korea demanded that it receive official recognition as a country equipped with nuclear weapons. The U.S., and most of the rest of the world, dismissed that claim out of hand. As far as anyone can tell North Korean nuclear weapons are crude and, for all practical purposes have not completed development into real weapons. At the same time North Korea has denounced a treaty it signed in 2005 where it agreed to halt nuclear weapons development in return for economic aid. The North Koreans apparently never had any intention of abiding by that deal and now say they will never give up their nukes.

April 21, 2013: North Korea has appealed to Mongolia for food aid. Even before DNA analysis became possible Koreans knew they had links to Mongols and Turks and were quite proud of. The Korean language is related to those of Central Asia (the Ural-Altaic family of languages) not the Han family (Chinese, Tibetan and many others in East Asia). Subsequent DNA studies have confirmed these ethnic links and North Korea is hoping for a handout from Mongolia (which North Korea has long had good relations with).

Iran confirmed that it is in negotiations to sell North Korea oil. This may be just to grab some media attention but the North Koreans may also be looking for some potential alternative source if their only current oil supplier (China) cuts them off or reduces shipments. The Chinese are not happy with North Korea’s self-destructive policies, especially their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. This oil import deal would never be allowed (by the West) to go forward because the North Koreans are broke and the one thing they do have to sell is a workable atomic bomb design. That could pay for a lot of oil, if Iran could deliver it.  

April 19, 2013: The U.S. reminded everyone (especially North Korea) that support for its ally South Korea includes the use, if necessary, of nuclear weapons.

April 18, 2013: North Korea said that it will even start negotiations to defuse tensions in Korea until the world lifted all the sanctions imposed on them. The rest of the world told North Korea that the sanctions won’t be lifted until the north stops its nuclear weapons development program.

April 17, 2013: South Korea has ordered 36 American AH-64 helicopter gunships

April 16, 2013: North Korea threatened to retaliate militarily against South Korea if the South Korean government did not ban anti-North Korean demonstrations in the south. This threat led to more anti-North Korea demonstrations and no reaction from South Korean officials.

2013-04-25  xinhua

Le premier porte-avions chinois, baptisé Liaoning, est prêt à larguer les amarres pour un voyage en haute mer.

Quand et où partira le porte-avions sera décidé en fonction des conditions générales, a indiqué Yang Yujun, porte-parole du ministère chinois de la défense nationale, lors d'une conférence de presse.

Song Xue, chef d'état-major adjoint de la Marine de l'Armée populaire de Libération (APL, armée chinoise), a indiqué mardi que la Chine se doterait de plus d'un porte-avions.

Lors d'une cérémonie tenue à Beijing pour célébrer le 64e anniversaire de la fondation de la Marine de l'APL, M. Song a révélé que "le prochain porte-avions serait plus large et capable de transporter davantage d'avions de chasse".

M. Song a également réfuté certains reportages étrangers selon lesquels la Chine construisait de nouveaux porte-avions à Shanghai, déclarant que de tels reportages étaient inexacts.

April 26th, 2013 defencetalk.com (AFP)

Japan would respond with force if China attempts to land on the disputed Senkaku Islands, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said in Parliament.

Abe was responding to a question about what he was prepared to do if Chinese ships sailing close to the islands — called the Diaoyu Islands by the Chinese — tried to land, a BBC report said.

“We have made sure that if there is an instance where there is an intrusion into our territory or it seems that there could be landing on the islands then we will deal will it strongly,” Abe said.

China claims the Senkaku Islands, which lie about 100 miles north of Japan’s Ishigaki Island and about 115 miles northeast of Taiwan, as its territory under treaties signed in the late 1800s.

At the end of World War II the islands were under U.S. jurisdiction as part of the captured Japanese island of Okinawa. Japan has administered them since 1972 when Okinawa was returned to Japan.

Tensions flared between Beijing and Tokyo in September after the Japanese government bought three of the islands from a private Japanese owner, triggering protests in Chinese cities.

Since then China has stepped up patrols around the islands for which Japan has lodged formal diplomatic complaints.

Abe’s warning — the most explicit to China since he took power in December — came as eight Chinese ships sailed around the islands, the BBC said. A flotilla of 10 fishing boats carrying Japanese activists was also reported to be in the area, as well as the Japanese coast guard.

A report by Japan’s Kyodo news agency said China’s State Oceanic Administration saying its eight vessels were in the area but within what it claims is its territorial waters.

The vessels are monitoring the activity of a flotilla of boats reportedly carrying members of a Japanese nationalist group, the Kyodo report said.

Japanese coast guard officials have said it was the largest number of Chinese government ships to enter the disputed area since September when Tokyo purchased the islands.

In January China said it would carry out an oceanic survey of the islands as part of a larger island and reef mapping project started in 2009, Chinese state-run Xinhua news agency said.

“Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islets have been the inherent territory of China since ancient times,” a Chinese government said at the time.

China’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation has completed mapping of islands within 60 miles of China’s coastline and will start on territories further afield which include the Senkaku, also claimed by Taiwan.

Apr. 24, 2013 - By WENDELL MINNICK   - Defense News

TAIPEI — As the US pushes forward on the AirSea Battle doctrine and the so-called Asia Pivot, many in the Asia-Pacific are asking for clarification on a subject that could involve them in an unnecessary war with China.

Many frontline allies and partners are asking : Do we want to take a bullet from China for America, especially over policies that are still ambiguous?

Benjamin Schreer, a senior analyst for Defence Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, looks around Asia and finds a lack of consensus on who among America’s allies and friends are willing to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of a US policy formulated in far-off Washington.

Schreer’s paper, released this month, “Planning the Unthinkable War: ‘AirSea Battle’ and Its Implications for Australia,” does more than just look at Australia’s strategic position and whether it should support the new doctrine. It examines why America’s traditional allies in the region are less supportive than they might have been before the rise of China.

Schreer’s report voices cautious support for the Asia Pivot and the AirSea Battle concept, but also asks, from the perspective of a traditional ally, critical questions that have yet to be addressed by the US government.

These are questions that demand debate in Australia’s democratic society, with a healthy respect for rule of law and transparency.

“AirSea Battle presents allies and partners with the classical dilemma of being caught between ‘entrapment and abandonment.’”

Despite China’s growing ability to hold US forces at risk, the Pentagon is pushing forward on a military strategy for fighting and winning a potential war against China.

China does not need to reach strategic parity with US forces, he said.

Instead, its asymmetric strategy aims to prevent or complicate US intervention in territorial disputes by making the potential costs for American forces prohibitively high.

AirSea Battle debates in Australia center on two opposing arguments: “those who see it as a dangerous instrument to ‘contain’ China and potentially drag Australia into a nuclear escalation between two great powers, and those who embrace the concept’s logic and even argue that Australia should develop long-range strike capabilities to contribute to potential offensive operations against China.”

AirSea Battle aims at defeating anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies by withstanding an initial Chinese attack, followed by a blinding campaign against Chinese command and control networks, a missile suppression campaign against China’s land-based systems, and a distant blockade against Chinese merchant ships.

Deep strikes inside China appear limited in achieving political and military objectives due to China’s immense size, he said. Attacking China would be equivalent to 21st century medieval siege warfare. American air and naval strike forces would run out of precision-guided munitions long before they ran out of targets. China’s size and depth, its authoritarian culture, and supporting institutions of internal security make the impact of mainland strikes less likely to succeed.

Importantly, it’s based on the assumption the escalation can be kept below the nuclear threshold, and that Japan and Australia will be active allies throughout the campaign, he said.

Schreer looks around Asia and sees discrepancies in support among US allies and partners. What to do about South Korea, which has little interest in fighting anyone but North Korea? There is Taiwan with complex political and economic relationships with China. Japan lacks the capabilities and perhaps the constitutional mandate needed to engage China in a war.

The AirSea Battle is flawed in that it can only be activated during a major conflict. It is “optimized for high-intensity conventional war between China and the US and its allies” and “applies only in extreme cases,” such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Chinese missile strike on Japan or US bases in the region, or the sinking of a US aircraft carrier.

“However, Chinese coercive military actions in territorial disputes with its neighbors (short of high levels of escalation) are much more likely.”

Therefore, AirSea Battle is “not a ‘catch-all’ solution” to America’s conventional deterrence dilemma in the Western Pacific, he said.

It is not in Australia’s interest to fully embrace the logic behind AirSea Battle or develop specific military capabilities to underpin the concept’s implementation. “Openly signing up for the concept would send a strong political message to China that the ADF [Australian Defence Force] is now actively planning and equipping for a potential war with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army].”

“There is no need to do so,” he said. Australia’s decision to allow US Marines to base in Darwin has already displayed Australia’s political commitment to the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) alliance.

The development of long-range strike capabilities against China by Australia would be an “unnecessary provocation … let alone a very costly one.”

A serious Australian amphibious strike capability is a rather unrealistic one. A “distant blockade” of Chinese maritime shipping in Southeast Asian chokepoints, such as Malacca, Lombok and Sunda straits, is “much easier proposed than done,” Schreer said. In any event, China would consider such actions acts of war.

Australia does have an interest in making an active contribution to the US AirSea Battle plan, he said. Providing the US with greater strategic depth is one way, though rotational deployment of a US Marine Air-Ground Task Force at Darwin is “largely symbolic and not directly tied to America’s AirSea Battle planning.”

An area of possible assistance during a war would be upgrades of HMAS Sterling to host US carrier strike groups or the use of the Cocos Island airfields for US strike aircraft, in case the strategic environment deteriorates. Australia can also offer, as an option, niche capabilities, such as tanker aircraft, airborne early warning and control, and airborne electronic warfare assets.

He questions whether frontline states, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, would be willing to get involved in war between China and the US if their direct interests were not threatened. Would South Korea get involved in a Philippine scenario or a Taiwan Strait conflict involving the US?

On the one hand, they want to avoid becoming entrapped in Sino-US strategic rivalry. “Signing up for AirSea Battle at a time when there still seems ample opportunity to incorporate China into a peaceful Asian security order could be detrimental to their interests … AirSea Battle could thus have a disruptive effect in US alliance relationships.”

On the other hand, their suspicion of China’s strategic trajectory has only increased over the years as they experience a decline in military power relative to China. They want to avoid being abandoned by the US if China becomes a problem, he said.

Japan’s substantial air and naval forces could augment US forces in selected mission areas, including submarine, anti-submarine warfare, and ballistic missile defense.

However, Schreer asks whether Japan can live up to US hopes.

Constitutional restrictions hamper many opportunities to augment US forces in an attack on China.

For South Korea, AirSea Battle is far more problematic. Seoul’s core strategic concern has been North Korean military aggression, and it remains more “ambivalent about the Chinese threat.” Seoul also needs Beijing’s assistance to keep North Korea’s antics under control. South Korea has publicly stated that the new maritime base on the southern resort island of Jeju, between Japan and China, will not host US forces, despite the fact that the base could be the host of 20 South Korean warships.

There are also concerns about getting too involved in Northeast Asian AirSea Battle architecture that would include South Korea’s old enemy, Japan.

Questions should also be raised on whether South Korea would allow US forces to operate strike missions into China during a war, particularly a war involving Chinese aggression against Japan or Taiwan.

Schreer makes several recommendations to the Australian government that are in many ways revelations of how ambiguous and mysterious the US AirSea Battle doctrine has become.

The Australian government should seek a “detailed, classified briefing from its US ally about the specifics of AirSea Battle,” which Schreer said would “demystify the concept.”

The government should also ask the US to release a declassified version of the AirSea Battle strategy to end speculation among allies and partners.

He said Australia should not publicly endorse AirSea Battle, because the US “itself is still in the process of determining the specifics of implementing the concept.”

Australia should also consider implications for the possible integration of the ADF into a Southeast Asian AirSea Battle framework operating alongside US forces.

April 25, 2013 By Robbin F. Laird - thediplomat.com

To understand the real value of the F-35 one must consider its operation as a fleet, not simply as an individual aircraft.

CANBERRA, Australia, April 24 (UPI)

The Australian navy, in collaboration with BAE Systems, has opened a training facility for Landing Helicopter Dock ships.

The facility, in New South Wales, was officially opened by Minister for Defense Materiel Mike Kelly.

"The opening of this training facility is another example of the effective collaboration between the Defense Materiel Organization, Royal Australian Navy and BAE Systems Australia," he said.

"This facility will train over 700 ADF (Australian Defense Force) personnel to safely operate and maintain the LHDs in anticipation of acceptance by (the) navy of Australia's first LHD NUSHIP Canberra in early 2014 and the acceptance of NUSHIP Adelaide the following year."

The training facility will feature simulated training suites, LHD ship fitted equipment and classrooms.

Redevelopment of an existing government site for the training facility took six months and cost about $5.1 million.

"The facility has the potential for follow-on training and through-life support training and to manage and conduct other future training for the ADF," the Department of Defense said.

April 22, 2013 china-defense-mashup.com

2013-04-22 — (by M. Taylor Fravel and from thediplomat.com) — In a recent op-ed in the New York Times, nuclear expert James Acton suggests that China may be changing its nuclear doctrine. The principal basis for his argument is the absence of a specific repetition of China’s “no first-use” policy in the latest edition of Beijing’s bi-annual white paper on defense. Acton, however, misreads the recent white paper and draws the wrong conclusion about China’s approach to nuclear weapons.

First, no first use has been a core feature of Chinese defense policy for decades, having been decided by Mao himself in 1964. If China abandoned or altered this policy position, it would reflect a major change in China’s approach to nuclear weapons – and a major change in China’s international image. This would not be a casual decision by China’s top leaders but rather a radical change precipitated by a major shift in China’s security environment. Although China’s concerns about U.S. missile defense policies that Acton notes are real, these concerns have existed since the mid-1990s and shape China’s current efforts to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear forces.

To date, China has focused on building a small but potent nuclear force with the ability to launch a secure second strike if attacked with nuclear weapons – what I call “assured retaliation.” The relatively small size of China’s nuclear arsenal and the doctrinal emphasis on survivability and reliability are consistent with a pledge to not use nuclear weapons first. Moreover, if China were to abandon or alter the no first-use policy, it would surely want to reap a clear deterrent effect from such an action and likely do so clearly and publicly, not indirectly and quietly through an omission in a report.

Second, the absence of the no first-use policy in the 2012 white paper does not support Acton’s contention that China is changing its nuclear doctrine. Here, Acton overlooks that this edition of China’s bi-annual defense white papers is different from past volumes in one important respect.

According to Major General Chen Zhou, one of the white paper’s drafters and a researcher at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, the 2012 white paper uses a thematic model (zhuanti xing) and not a comprehensive one. In the past, the comprehensively-oriented white papers all had the same title, such China’s National Defense in 2010. The title of the 2012 edition, however, reflects the new thematic focus: Diversified Employment of China Armed Forces. By discussing in more detail the structure and missions of China’s armed forces, the 2012 white paper dropped a chapter found in all previous ones entitled “National Defense Policy.” In the past editions, this chapter contained the references to China’s no first-use policy (as well as many other defense policies). Applying Occam’s razor, the lack of a chapter on China’s national defense policies can account for the absence of a reference to the no first-use policy.

In addition, the white paper’s discussion of the use of nuclear weapons is consistent with the no first-use policy. The white paper refers to “the principle of building a lean and effective force,” repeating language from the 2006 white paper that officially detailed China’s nuclear strategy for the first time. Second, it states that China’s nuclear weapons will only be used under one condition: “If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the [Second Artillery] will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack (jianjue fanji).” Here, the 2012 white paper uses the exact same sentence as the 2008 white paper, which did contain a reference to the no first-use policy. More generally, a nuclear counterattack is the only campaign for China’s nuclear forces that has been described in authoritative Chinese doctrinal texts, starting with the 1987 edition of the Science of Strategy (Zhanlue Xue).

Acton also cites a speech that Xi Jinping gave to party delegates from the Second Artillery in December 2012. In public reporting of his speech, Xi stated that the Second Artillery provides “strategic support for our great power status.” Xi also did not mention the no first-use policy. But Xi did not mention any other elements of China’s nuclear policy, either, or anything related to when and how China’s nuclear forces would be used. Instead, the absence of the no-first use policy in this speech was likely another “false negative” regarding a change in China’s nuclear doctrine.

Furthermore, Xi in his remarks praised the Second Artillery for “resolutely carrying out the policies and instructions of the party center and Central Military Commission.” Given that Hu Jintao re-affirmed no first use at the April 2012 nuclear summit in Seoul, these “policies and instructions” would have included the no first-use policy.

To be clear, Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering its no first-use policy. The debate was especially intense during the mid to late 2000s. Some participants in the debate suggested that no first use might not apply in certain situations that would be seen as equivalent of a “first use,” including conventional strikes on China’s nuclear forces or facilities as well as strikes on strategic targets like the Three Gorges Dam or the top Chinese leadership. In the end, however, a high-level decision was made to maintain the no first-use policy and the internal debate concluded without any change to China’s position.

Nevertheless, although no first use remains a central part of China’s approach to nuclear weapons, a certain and perhaps growing ambiguity surrounds the policy. As the Chinese debate indicates, under some set of extreme but nevertheless not implausible conditions, the policy might not serve as a constraint on first use even if China overall postures its forces primarily to deter a nuclear attack. Likewise, in the heat of a crisis, actions taken to deter a nuclear strike against China, such has placing forces on high alert levels, might be seen as indicating a preparations to launch first and invite a pre-emptive strike.

Thus, I agree with Acton’s policy recommendation about the need for a U.S.-China dialogue on nuclear weapons even though I disagree with his argument about China’s nuclear doctrine. More dialogue on strategic issues is needed at the highest levels between the United States and China, an area is prone to misperception and miscalculation. The ambiguity and uncertainty about the no first-use policy should be discussed. Indeed, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should the issue of nuclear dialogue when he visits China this week.

20.04.2013 ( Xinhua )

Le premier porte-avions chinois, le Liaoning, commencera cette année un voyage en haute mer.

Le Liaoning et son équipage ont mené une série de tests et d'exercices d'entraînement depuis que le porte-avions est arrivé en février à son port d'attache de Qingdao, dans la province du Shandong (est), a-t-on appris jeudi d'informations diffusées par la Télévision centrale de Chine (CCTV).

Tous les tests réalisés jusqu'à présent se sont déroulés sans encombre, et le port de Qingdao a prouvé sa capacité à accueillir le porte-avions et à répondre aux besoins de celui-ci, selon ces informations.

Le Liaoning a réalisé plus de cent exercices et expérimentations depuis qu'il a été remis l'année dernière à la Marine de l'Armée populaire de libération et qu'il est entré en service.

Des tests supplémentaires sont prévus, notamment des essais de navigation et des exercices d'atterrissage, a précisé la CCTV.

La chaîne de télévision a ajouté que le port de Qingdao connaîtrait de nouvelles améliorations.

21.04.2013 Le Monde.fr (AFP)

La Corée du Nord a récemment installé deux lanceurs de missile supplémentaires sur sa côte est en prévision d'un tir qui préoccupe Washington et ses alliés, dans un contexte de vives tensions sur la péninsule coréenne. Deux tracteur-érecteur-lanceur (TEL) de missiles à courte portée Scud ont été déployés la semaine dernière dans la province du Hamgyong méridional (nord-est), a rapporté dimanche l'agence de presse Yonhap, qui cite un haut responsable sud-coréen. Le ministère sud-coréen de la défense sud-coréen n'a pas confirmé cette information.

Selon les services de renseignements de Corée du Sud, le Nord a récemment déployé sur sa côte orientale sept lanceurs, dont deux lanceurs de missiles Musudan, d'une portée théorique de 4 000 kilomètres, capables d'atteindre la Corée du Sud, le Japon et l'île américaine de Guam. Certains experts pensaient que la Corée du Nord effectuerait des tirs autour du 15 avril pour marquer le 101e anniversaire de la naissance du fondateur du régime, Kim Il-Sung. Leurs prédictions ne se sont pas vérifiées mais la menace demeure depuis que le Nord a annoncé le 26 mars avoir placé en état de préparation maximale toutes ses unités d'artillerie et ses unités balistiques.

Un ou plusieurs essais pourraient survenir autour du 25 avril, date anniversaire de la création de l'armée nord-coréenne, selon un autre responsable sud-coréen cité par Yonhap. Les tensions sur la péninsule coréenne se sont amplifiées depuis un nouveau train de sanctions pris par l'ONU après le troisième essai nucléaire conduit par Pyongyang le 12 février. Furieux de ces sanctions et de manoeuvres militaires américano-sud-coréennes en cours, le régime de Pyongyang a multiplié les invectives et menacé Séoul et Washington de "guerre thermonucléaire".

Le régime de Pyongyang a procédé à trois essais nucléaires depuis 2006. Il a par ailleurs réussi à mettre un satellite en orbite le 12 décembre mais ne dispose pas à ce stade des moyens de lancer un missile balistique intercontinental (ICBM), comme le Taepodong-2 qu'il s'efforce de mettre au point.

La seule capacité balistique avérée sur le plan opérationnel de la Corée du Nord est le missile No-Dong-1, d'une portée de 1 300 kilomètres, selon l'Arms Control Association.

15 avril 2013 Par Rédacteur en chef. PORTAIL DES SOUS-MARINS

La France et l’Inde organisent un exercice commun au large de Goa le 17 avril. Il est principalement destiné à aiguiser les compétences de la marine indienne dans la lutte contre la piraterie et les opérations sous-marines.

« Cet exercice de 30 heures commencera le 17 au matin, » a indiqué le capitaine de vaisseau Guillaume Fontarensky, commandant la frégate Montcalm, actuellement amarrée dans le port de Goa et qui participera aux exercices.

Il fait parti d’un exercice plus important qui se déroule chaque année entre les marines française et indienne.

« De tels exercices de faible ampleur sont organisés pour accroitre la compréhension entre les 2 marines en vue de l’exercice plus important, » explique Fontarensky.

« L’exercice prévu au large de Goa va aiguiser les compétences de la marine indienne dans les opérations de lutte anti-sous-marine et contre la piraterie, » a précisé le commandant, ajoutant qu’une procédure commune serait développée par les 2 marines pour lutter contre les sous-marins de pays hostiles.

Il a indiqué que les détails sur la participation de la marine indienne ne seraient connus qu’après la conférence d’organisation de lundi.

De son côté, l’ambassadeur de France, François Richier, a expliqué qu’un tel échange était très important pour assurer la sécurité en océan Indien.

« La menace peut venir de n’importe où, même de sous la mer. Il est très important d’assurer la sécurité de l’océan Indien, » a déclaré l’ambassadeur, ajoutant que la menace de la piraterie avait fortement diminué en océan Indien grâce à la présence de bâtiments militaires de plusieurs marines.

« Le nombre d’attaques a fortement diminué, comparé au passé, » a-t-il souligné.

Référence : Zee News (Inde)