08/12/2015 Sources : DCSCA

Le SCA est aujourd’hui engagé dans une transformation majeure qui vise à amener l’administration générale et le soutien commun au meilleur niveau pour accompagner nos soldats sur l’ensemble du spectre de leurs missions. L’aspect opérationnel, essentiel, exige en effet du soutien commissariat la  même excellence que celle qui anime les forces. Pour ce faire, les expérimentations conduites avec  l’ensemble des acteurs du soutien commissariat visent à concevoir un soutien rénové s’appuyant sur toutes les opportunités, en métropole, outre-mer mais aussi à l’étranger et en opération.

Présent dès le début d’un engagement, et sous l’autorité du centre de planification et de conduite des opérations (CPCO), le SCA met en œuvre une chaîne de soutien opérationnel qui permet de garantir la continuité du soutien ainsi que la simultanéité du soutien courant et du soutien des engagements opérationnels. Cette chaîne fait intervenir la direction centrale, l’état-major opérationnel (EMO), le centre interarmées d’administration des opérations (CIAO), les centres experts, les établissements logistiques (ELOCA), et les directions du commissariat en opération extérieure (DIRCOM).

Afin d’assurer, sous l’autorité de l’ASIA* de théâtre, nos missions tactiques sur les théâtres d’opérations, le fuseau Ouest de l’opération Barkhane va connaître dès le mois de février 2016 une expérimentation d’un nouveau concept d’emploi : le soutien « commissariat en opération ». Ainsi, s’il assure actuellement sur les théâtres d’opérations les fonctions d’administration générale au sein des DIRCOM (expertise administrative générale, finances, achats, solde, contentieux et aide juridique au commandement, état-civil, gestion du personnel civil de recrutement local et contrôle interne), il ne met pas en œuvre ses fonctions logistiques (soutien de l’homme, habillement, restauration-hôtellerie-loisirs, gestion base-vie). Il les anime au niveau stratégique mais c’est l’armée de terre, au sein des bataillons logistiques (BATLOG), qui les met en œuvre sur les théâtres. Par ailleurs, les fonctions « alimentation » et « gestion base-vie » manquent de coordination ou sont assurées par d’autres opérateurs.

L’expérimentation menée à Barkhane vise donc, pour le SCA, à assurer l’ensemble de ses fonctions logistiques pour assurer un soutien commissariat intégré sur les théâtres d’opérations.

Plusieurs axes sont définis :

- améliorer la coordination de la fonction « soutien de l’homme » ;

- identifier le périmètre d’un « soutien de base-vie » dont la mise en œuvre échoirait au SCA, en cohérence avec les autres acteurs du soutien et le commandement, en y intégrant les détachements

- mettre en place sur le théâtre un détachement de « soutien base-vie », en prenant en compte les attributions de l’ *adjoint soutien interarmées (ASIA), du centre de soutien des opérations et des acheminements (CSOA), du J4 de théâtre et de la DIRCOM, tout en définissant les prérogative respectives du SCA et du commandement de théâtre ;

- mettre en œuvre une préparation collective des modules de soutien « commissariat ».

Évolution significative du soutien des opérations par le SCA, l’expérimentation, qui s’étendra de février à septembre 2016, sera conduite sous l’autorité de l’ASIA* et verra un détachement «commissariat » s’occuper des domaines suivants :

- alimentation-loisirs : restauration, condition du personnel en opération, vivres opérationnels, boulangerie de campagne,

- gestion des sites : hébergement, entretien, gestion des déchets, prévention contre l’incendie, maintenance,

- gestion des équipements « commissariat » : tenues de combat, effets de protection balistique, matériels de vie en campagne, équipements de protection individuelle et tenues professionnelles, affaires mortuaires.

Expérimentation Barkhane : dispositif soutien de l’homme sur le fuseau ouest

L’opération Barkhane se déroule dans cinq pays de la bande sahélo-saharienne : Mauritanie, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nier, Tchad. Regroupant 3 000 militaires, une vingtaine d’hélicoptères, 200 véhicules de logistique, 200 blindés, 6 avions de chasse, 3 drones et une dizaine d’avions de transport, elle est séparée en deux fuseaux, est et ouest, permettant de prendre en compte l’immensité du théâtre.

L’expérimentation « soutien commissariat » aura lieu dans le fuseau ouest de février à septembre 2016.

1 800 militaires seront soutenus par un détachement commissariat de 83 personnes ( À noter : N’Djamena au Tchad Antenne Détachement commissariat : 4 militaires ).

July 26, 2013 by Jeffrey Payne - thediplomat.com

Both countries have an interest in Afghan stability post-2014. They should consider cooperation.

As NATO forces continue the process of withdrawing from Afghanistan, the People’s Republic of China finds itself in a conundrum. With tensions flaring throughout the Asia-Pacific, in part because of a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy, the last thing Beijing wants is to face a security risk along its western border. Regardless of Beijing’s wishes, it will need to become more involved in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. The United States and its international partners thus have an opportunity to provide incentive for China to become a more reliable international security participant. Unfortunately, China seems unable to escape the inertia of its own politics, while the United States is increasingly consumed by concerns involving Chinese activities in the Asia-Pacific.

The Afghan Element within US-China Relations

The U.S.-China relationship is certain to define 21st century international relations to a great degree. As such, the two countries, as well as the world, are scrambling to better understand the relationship. China’s complaints about bilateral ties stem from a view that the United States is unfair to rising powers and, in particular, disregards Chinese traditions and history. The U.S. position is framed as one where China is an irresponsible stakeholder within the international system. China is content to free-ride off the efforts of others, while exploiting the goodwill of surrounding countries and global powers.

These portrayals aren’t completely inaccurate in either case, but they do not sufficiently define this bilateral relationship. It is undeniable that trust between the U.S. and China is low and that many parties within both countries see each other as opponents. Yet, much of the tension in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship is linked to territory, commerce, and relationships throughout the Asia-Pacific region. If we move beyond the Asia-Pacific, then greater opportunity for cooperation exists.

As such, the future of Afghanistan offers an opportunity for these two major powers to work together in furthering Afghan national – as well as South and Central Asian regional – security. With the majority of NATO forces to leave Afghanistan in 2014, China is realizing that its investments in Afghanistan will be at risk, its Central Asian trade threatened, and its relations with Pakistan strained. In short, China needs to take steps to protect its interests.

The U.S., its population exhausted from war and its politics focused on domestic problems, is consumed with withdrawing its security forces from Afghanistan. However, Washington does not wish to watch Afghanistan fall into absolute chaos. Not only would it be negatively affected by the further loss of life, but it would also make the country’s years of investment meaningless and create a security vacuum that may once again require a major U.S. presence.

Thus, China wants to protect its Western border and the U.S. wishes to find a means to enhance Afghan security. This issue can be a basis for building cooperation between the two countries, while avoiding the tension stemming from the Asia-Pacific. Unfortunately, neither country is focused on the Afghan issue in respect to the other. That must change.

Bilateral Strategic Cooperation

Too many in the United States view China as an inevitable strategic opponent, ignoring counterevidence in favor of a quasi-Cold War worldview. Likewise, many analysts in China argue that the United States is a diminishing power intent on inhibiting China’s growth. Neither country should be so easily caricatured as such. Both countries’ foreign policy establishments constantly debate how to move forward bilateral relations. What both countries need to do is recognize mutual interests. Mutual interests, particularly outside the Asia-Pacific region, should be the source of U.S.-China international cooperation. In the security arena, Afghanistan’s stability is a major threat and a vital opportunity.

First, each country needs to figure out what costs it is willing to pay for Afghan security. Both countries publicly declare their desire for a prosperous and safe Afghanistan, but neither has made headway in exploring what international institutions it will need in order to reach the desired end stage. China, given its policies of peaceful development and respect to sovereignty, will resist pressure to step up its involvement in security matters. The U.S., for its part, will be intensely hesitant about China taking on a more robust role in Afghanistan. Yet the past ten years have proven that when it comes to Afghanistan, what works best is often not what any party favors.

Second, the U.S. and China should immediately initiate both formal and informal dialogues regarding Afghanistan post-2014. Experts can meet in a Track II setting to formulate policy options, while Track I meetings can follow. These meetings need to be candid and based on past arrangements that proved successful, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Southeast Asia and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Third, both countries should utilize international institutions in which they have influence in order to build a comprehensive Afghan security policy. For the U.S., this means working with its strategic allies to provide continued training for Afghan security forces, foreign aid and private investment. In China’s case, it means engaging the Shanghai Cooperative Organization to mobilize resources throughout Central Asia.

Fourth, and most importantly, both countries need to cooperate in their engagements with both Afghanistan’s leaders and South Asian leaders. The U.S. can leverage its relationship with Afghanistan’s government to further interaction between China’s leaders and their Afghan counterparts. Both countries can engage Pakistan’s new government to show a united will that encourages Pakistan to do more to inhibit destabilizing groups operating in Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Finally, India should be brought into talks with respect to its diplomatic operations in Afghanistan and its own investment in the country.

Difficult, But Not Impossible

It will be immensely difficult for the U.S. and China to cooperate on Afghanistan. Over the long term, however these two countries have parallel national interests when it comes to Afghanistan and that must be the basis of all forward movement. Added to the complexities of the bilateral relationship are the intricacies that will be required when working with the Afghan, Central Asian, Pakistani, and Indian governments. In short, this is no small task. The alternative, however, will certainly be a more chaotic Afghanistan and by extension, a more unstable Central and South Asia.

This effort will be more difficult for China, for it will require them to revise their stance on international security engagement. There is no chance that China will send security forces to Afghanistan, but it is equally unlikely that another international force will replace NATO. Thus, China must engage the security situation directly. As such, the U.S., given its experience in Afghanistan, will have an opportunity to encourage China to take on a more responsible international security role.

Again, this process will not be easy, but it allows an opportunity for the U.S. and China to engage in coordinated security policy. Both countries desire stability in Afghanistan and it is that, not external problems within the bilateral relationship, which must be the focus of both countries. There is no more pressing issue in Central and South Asia than Afghanistan.

Jeffrey Payne is the Senior Research Associate at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

12/06/2013 vietnamplus.vn

Une délégation vietnamienne, conduite par le général Nguyen Dinh Chien, chef de l'Institut de la stratégie de défense du ministère de la Défense, a participé au séminaire du Réseau des Instituts de défense et de sécurité de l'ASEAN (Network of ASEAN Defence and security Institutions-NADI) tenu mardi et mercredi à Kuala Lumpur (Malaisie).

Le général Nguyen Dinh Chine a présenté l'intervention "Le rôle central de l'ASEAN dans les relations avec les grands pays", où il a estimé que l'élargissement par l'ASEAN de sa coopération avec les grands pays dans la région l'avait aidé à maintenir un environnement de paix et de stabilité, à consolider la coopération et la confiance entre ses membres dans la politique et la sécurité, contribuant à promouvoir la tendance à la paix, à la stabilité, à la coopération et au développement dans la région, ainsi qu'à créer un nouveau lien entre l'ASEAN et ces pays.

Selon lui, l'ASEAN a valorisé et continue de valoriser le rôle d'une des forces majeures dans la promotion de la paix et de la stabilité dans la région par l'intensification de sa coopération avec ses partenaires via les cadres de coopération tels que l'ASEAN+1, l'ASEAN+3, l'EAS, l'ARF, l'ADMM+...

Ayant pour thème "Sécurité nationale et Développement : Base pour la Communauté de l'ASEAN", le séminaire s'est penché sur la sécurité et le développement, la sécurité et la stabilité, et la coopération dans la sécurité.

Une opportunité pour la cinquantaine de participants dont des spécialistes, chercheurs et analystes des pays membres de l'ASEAN de partager des informations et expériences, et de proposer des mesures et initiatives afin de faire face efficacement aux défis sécuritaires émergents dans la région. -VNA

Jun. 12, 2013 - By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI  - Defense News

NEW DELHI — Shortly after new Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited here, India has decided to proceed with a plan to add more than 40,000 troops in the form of a mountain corps to bolster its strength on the Chinese border.

The Ministry of Defence prepared the plan two years ago and has awaited consideration by the Ministry of Finance, which has given approval. Now, it must be cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security, an MoD source said.

About US $12 billion will be spent to raise the additional troops, and the new corps is expected to be functioning within 10 years, an Army official said. Additional weapons and equipment will be purchased.

“The elite mountain corps will be able to fill this gap in preparedness, thereby adding to the conventional stability in the medium to long term, though in the short term it may be perceived as destabilizing,” defense analyst Rahul Bhonsle said.

Last month, China’s Li visited New Delhi, his first foreign visit after taking office, amid reports that Chinese troops had intruded into Indian territory. The issue was discussed during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, though the point was passed off as “an incident,” an Indian External Affairs Ministry source said.

“The raising of additional troops to be deployed along the border with China is bound to raise tempers in Beijing,” the source said.

Analysts here, however, are unanimous that India and China can ill afford to go to war in the immediate future as both are building themselves economically.

“Given the track record of handling their military and diplomatic showdown ... China and India are not likely to go to war anytime soon,” said Swaran Singh, professor for diplomacy and disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru Univer­sity. “It’s not a strong possibility even in their medium-term trajectories. It is not in their interest and the interest of the international community, which will ensure it does not occur.

“The strongest incentive against war is their historic chance to achieve their peaceful rise followed by greater recognition and participation in world decision-making bodies.”

But Bhonsle said New Delhi must manage the issue carefully.

“India will certainly have to make extensive efforts to manage concerns that may be raised by China; [otherwise], the move will prove counterproductive and will only lead to increases in force levels on both the sides,” he said. “Confidence-building measures on the boundary and greater transparency in raising the force, including the fact that it is being positioned in the interior, should assuage Beijing.”

The Army official welcomed the new, because the service is operating at only 60 percent of its required capability level.

As the troops will be deployed in hilly terrain, new purchases will include light tanks, specialized vehicles, light artillery guns and advanced infantry equipment.

The Army also will buyammunition and small arms, hand-held thermal imagers, UAVs, aerostat-based radar, portable missiles, air-defense artillery and lightweight radar.

The service will establish network-centric warfare systems for the elite troops, including advanced C4ISR equip­ment, and information warfare systems, Army sources said.

On the composition of the weapons required, Bhonsle said, “the weapons and equipment will include the whole gamut from reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, firepower, tactical and logistics mobility including helicopters, communications and so on. Five years for forming up and almost eight to 10 years for full-spectrum effectiveness may be reasonable to assume.”

The 4,057-kilometer Line of Actual Control is India’s current border with China. The eastern sector, bordering the states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, is the most contentious, where China claims 90,000 square kilometers of territory that India occupies.

30/05/13 Par Paul Laubacher - obsession.nouvelobs.com

Les piratages d'hackers chinois contre le Pentagone et les entreprises américaines se multiplient. Pour les contrer, l'armée américaine planche sur un super-programme.

25 April 2013 Defense Studies

Eight of the SAF's Leopard 2SG MBTs and four of the Bundeswehr's Leopard 2A6 MBTs were involved in the joint live-firing exercise at the NATO-Bergen Training Area, Germany  (all photos : Sing Mindef)

Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen visited the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) troops participating in Exercise Panzer Strike at the NATO-Bergen Training Area, Germany, on 23 April 2013.

During his visit, Dr Ng was briefed on the conduct of the exercise and witnessed a successful bilateral live-firing involving the 2nd Company of the 48th Battalion of the Singapore Armoured Regiment and their German counterparts from the Bundeswehr's 33rd Panzer Battalion. Both armies had been engaged in rigorous training and exchange of pointers in the lead-up to the joint exercise, which involved the execution of tactical manoeuvres.
 

Speaking to the servicemen at the visit, Dr Ng emphasised the importance of overseas training in providing realistic and challenging training opportunities for the SAF to hone its operational readiness and extended his appreciation to them for their professionalism and dedication. Giving his thoughts on the exercise, Dr Ng said, "I think all servicemen recognise and realise that they have to optimise these very precious training resources. It makes a big difference for them, they know that that once they have done this, they are very confident that they can fire accurately on the move and they are confident as a crew. I think that is something they have achieved that cannot be taken away from them - that they feel very confident of themselves."

 

Exercise Panzer Strike is the fifth in the series and has included a bilateral live-firing component for the second consecutive year. It will involve more than 1300 armour personnel, 14 Leopard 2SG Main Battle Tanks and 11 Bionix I Infantry Fighting Vehicles. These training opportunities in Germany have helped build up the professionalism and capabilities of the SAF Armour. Due to a recent agreement, SAF Armour will now be able to double their training time in Germany.

(Sing Mindef)

24/04/2013 par Nicolas Laffont – 45eNord.ca

Le régime du leader nord-coréen Kim Jong-un a lancé la construction d’obstacles antichars à sa frontière avec le Sud, ont rapporté mercredi matin plusieurs médias chinois.

La chaîne Beijing TV a ainsi diffusé une vidéo montrant des militaires nord-coréens en train de mettre en place de grands blocs en béton à la frontière avec le Sud. Selon les informations de la télévision chinoise, ces obstacles sont destinés à empêcher le passage de chars et d’autres véhicules militaires sud-coréen en cas de conflit ouvert.

Des experts chinois estiment qu’il s’agit là d’une mesure «inhabituelle» pour le régime nord-coréen, ce qui laisserait supposer que Pyongyang se prépare bel et bien à la guerre.

La péninsule coréenne connaît un net regain de tension ces dernières semaines.

Depuis le succès du troisième essai nucléaire du pays, les sanctions des Nations Unies ont ravivé la colère du régime qui a menacé les États-Unis, la Corée du Sud et le Japon d’une guerre thermonucléaire. De son côté, la Corée du Sud a annoncé la mise au point d’un plan de frappe préventive en cas de menace directe pour sa sécurité.

Début mars, Pyongyang, en signe de protestation contre les exercices conjoints entre la Corée du Sud et les Etats-Unis, a résilié tous les accords de non-agression et de dénucléarisation conclus avec Séoul et a annoncé l’annulation de l’armistice conclu à l’issue de la guerre de Corée de 1950-1953.

23 avril 2013 Romandie.com (AFP)

VIENNE - Des traces de radioactivité ont été détectées pour la première fois depuis l'essai atomique réalisé par la Corée du Nord en février, a annoncé mardi l'agence de contrôle des essais nucléaires (CTBTO).

La proportion d'isotopes du xenon (xenon-131m et xenon-133) détectée est conforme à un cas de fission nucléaire ayant eu lieu il y a plus de 50 jours avant la découverte de ces gaz, a expliqué l'agence basée à Vienne en Autriche.

Cela coïncide très bien avec le test nucléaire annoncé par la Corée du Nord, qui s'est produit le 12 février 2013, 55 jours avant la mesure, ajoute l'Organisation du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires.

La découverte de ces gaz par une station de contrôle au Japon ne peut toutefois pas aider à répondre à la question clef concernant le matériau fissile utilisé, uranium enrichi ou plutonium.

Le pays avait employé du plutonium lors des deux précédents essais atomiques en 2006 et 2009. S'il avait recouru à l'uranium enrichi pour son troisième test, cela signifierait qu'il a franchi une étape technologique significative, de quoi inquiéter encore davantage la communauté internationale.

Toutefois, il est également possible que ces radionucléides découverts à Takasaki (Japon), à un millier de kilomètre du site d'essais de la Corée du Nord, proviennent d'un réacteur nucléaire ou d'une autre activité atomique, admet le CTBTO, ajoutant que des analyses plus poussées étaient actuellement en cours.

L'agence a exclu que les émanations détectées puissent provenir de la centrale nucléaire de Fukushima, sérieusement endommagée lors du tremblement de terre suivi d'un tsunami géant en mars 2011.

Apr. 22, 2013 Defense news (AFP)

BEIJING — The top U.S. military officer said Monday that Washington’s armed presence in the Asia-Pacific was meant to contribute to regional stability as he met his Chinese counterpart on a rare visit.

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in Beijing amid regional tensions over North Korea’s nuclear program, maritime disputes and China’s concerns that the U.S. wants to contain its growing military strength.

Relations between Washington and Beijing have also been strained over a U.S. “pivot” to Asia after years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan and accusations, denied by China, that its military has carried out large-scale cyber attacks on U.S. companies and institutions.

“We seek to be a stabilizing influence in the region,” Dempsey said at a joint news conference with Fang Fenghui, the chief of the People’s Liberation Army general staff.

“We are committed to building a better, deeper, more enduring relationship,” he said.

Fang said the two militaries needed to deepen cooperation and exchanges.

“The Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate us both,” he said. “We should be cooperating partners regardless of the circumstances.”

He reiterated China’s position that it opposed cyber attacks and was itself a victim.

“Cybersecurity, if it is uncontrolled, the effects can be, and I don’t exaggerate, at times no less than a nuclear bomb,” he said.

He said China was opposed to nuclear tests by North Korea and supported U.N. Security Council resolutions against Pyongyang, but reiterated Beijing’s position that dialogue was the key to solving the issue.

“North Korea has already conducted a third nuclear test, and it could conduct a fourth nuclear test,” he said, but did not elaborate.

Dempsey’s predecessor, Adm. Mike Mullen, visited China in 2011 in what was the first trip by a U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in four years.

The latest visit came as China appeared to single out the U.S. in a military white paper last week, saying that “certain efforts” to enhance military deployment in Asia “are not conducive to the upholding of peace and stability in the region.”

China and some of its neighbors, including the Philippines and Vietnam, have boosted their naval capacity amid smoldering spats over disputed regions of the South China Sea, and China put its first aircraft carrier into service last year.

Beijing is also locked in a bitter dispute with Tokyo over islands in the East China Sea.

The U.S. stations tens of thousands of troops in allies Japan and South Korea and has announced plans to deploy more forces in Australia.

China has repeatedly asserted that it does not have an expansionist foreign policy as it continues its “peaceful rise.”

17 Apr , 2013 Lt Gen Prakash Katoch; former Lt Gen Special Forces, Indian Army - indiandefencereview.com

A study released by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, USA on 14 Jan 2013 has totaled the direct spending by the US on the war in Afghanistan for the period FY2001 to FY2013 as $641.7 billion. Of this, $198.2 billion (over 30 per cent) will be spent in FY2012 and FY2013.Bulk of the total spending and aid has been allocated since FY2009 – after insurgency reached high levels – clear case of too much, too late.

More significantly, it states that vast majority of aid went to the ANSF and ‘not’ on development. This indicates a US priority weighted on military expenditure and not on economic development. The emerging overall US doctrine implies US will not take primary responsibility for events but allow regional crises to play out until a new regional balance is reached.

However, US will continue controlled engagement in accordance with its national interests. This is how the game will play out in Afghanistan, Syria and other conflict areas including Asia-Pacific. This matches Obama’s January 2013 speech of “a decade of war having ended and time having come for reviving economy”. Barry Cooper, Senior Fellow, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, wrote thus on 8th January 2013 in Calgary Herald…“Most important are our own interests: we are willing to let Pakistan (and even Iran) establish spheres of influence in Afghanistan because at the end of the day, we really don’t care how Afghans govern themselves”.

A run up to future instability and chaos in Afghanistan has already commenced. John M Gillete wrote in Small Wars Journal on 05 Feb, 2013, “ANSF has committed extraordinary assets to road clearing/ security… over large parts of the country offensive operations have ceased entirely and, in cases even resulted in a withdrawal of security forces from key terrain… without adequate supplies and effective communications large portions of the east, south and west are effectively isolated from Kabul… abandonment of key terrain have caused increasing numbers of security force personnel to become disillusioned and normally high attrition rates have swelled to epidemic levels that greatly exceed the rate at which new recruits are being added.”

Earlier, in December 2012, John Glaser writing in AntiWar.com had reported that   around 50,000 Afghan soldiers (about 26 per cent)  quit the army annually, so do eight per cent of Afghan police officers every year quite contrary to the “rosy picture” Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and top US military officials have been painting.

As per Chris Sands (Global Post, Kabul – 20 Feb 2013), parts of Afghanistan have already descended into ethnic violence and civil conflict. In the southern province of Urugzan, a militia headed by a Hazara (ostensibly backed by US) is accused of deliberately destroying houses, raping women and murdering dozens of civilians. Up north, Northern Alliance is remobilising in case internationally supported talks with the Taliban see them return to power. Then there also have been reports of extremists from CAR, particularly from Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The US will be content if Northern Afghanistan holds as a buffer between Taliban and CAR. The power vacuum in southern and eastern Afghanistan may not be addressed if the US decides to restrict itself to training role and the ANSF resorts to fortress defence in face of mounting Taliban pressure. SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) will likely have increased influence in Afghanistan but China will unlikely commit any troops unless Chinese interests are directly threatened.

However, there is possibility of increased NATO-CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) cooperation since China cannot provide security for her investments in the region and Russia understands the adverse effect of Taliban reaching Kabul. There has been some speculation of another international force like that from OIC countries but this remains speculative. A force under the UN flag too is unlikely as it comes into being only when both parties agree. So who is the other party besides Afghanistan; Taliban will not agree and Pakistan will say it was never involved. Can a UN force thus be deployed only on Afghanistan’s request to fight terror?

In the evolving situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan will continue to exert its influence to keep Afghanistan within its sphere of influence. Michael Hughes, geopolitical journalist spoke thus of Kayani in July 2010… “Kayani was brazen enough to try and inveigle Afghanistan to strike a power-sharing arrangement with the Haqqanis. And Kayani, apparently the spokesperson for the Haqqani group, said they’d be willing to split from and denounce Al Qaeda, which is President Obama’s primary rationale for the war. However, there is a higher probability of General Kayani converting to Hinduism than there is of the Haqqani Network ever being decoupled from Al Qaeda… Nine years, nearly $300 billion dollars and 1900 dead coalition soldiers later, the US has officially verified that the entire war effort has been focused on the wrong side of the mountains”.

Agha H Amin, a defence analyst and a former Pakistan army officer reinforces this by saying, “Utopians in India are jubilant that Pakistan has made peace with India. Nothing in reality can be farther from the truth… the real picture of true intentions of the Pakistani military will emerge when the US withdraws from Afghanistan. This will be the time when the Russians, Iranians and Indians will have no choice but to support the Northern Alliance against Pakistan sponsored Taliban who regard all Shias, Ismailis, non-Pashtuns, moderate Pashtuns as infidels who deserve to be massacred”.

Calls being raised for Indian military deployment in Afghanistan post 2014 are grossly unwise being out of sync with ground realities. In the first place, there has been no request from Afghanistan for the same. Secondly, supply lines would perforce have to pass through Pakistan which would make the move a non-starter.

In any event, sending Indian troops to Afghanistan when Karzai seeks the removal of all foreign troops is certainly not an option. India should however provide militarily assistance to Afghanistan. This could take the form of assisting Afghanistan in establishing country wide Industrial Security Force, reducing unemployment and providing security for mining, infrastructure and development projects to boost economy.

In addition, besides assisting in the training of Afghanistan’s young officers, India could assist ANSF set up Afghan National Army Officers Academy (ANOA) and provide instructors (as required by ANSF) to facilitate modulate US/NATO concepts of war fighting to Afghan requirements. India could also supply military equipment to Afghanistan consistent with envisaged Taliban/Al Qaeda threat – in conjunction/consultation with other countries. It could also look into having joint military exercises both in India and Afghanistan for counter terrorism,  operations under UN and special operations and regular exchange of intelligence teams as part of ‘Security Cooperation’ under the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement 2011.

20.04.2013, Vassili Kachine, Rédaction en ligne - La Voix de la Russie

Le représentant du constructeur d’avions américain Lockheed Martin a déclaré dans une interview que les forces navales du Vietnam pourraient commander six avions de patrouille P-3C Orion.

Ces avions devraient être livrés au Vietnam sans l’armement dans un premier temps. Cependant, avec le renforcement des relations américano-vietnamiennes, ces appareils pourraient être équipés d’armes. Le Vietnam recevra les avions P-3C qui proviennent de la réserve de la flotte américaine. Il s’agit des avions relativement récents qui pourront servir encore 20 ans après leur modernisation.

Le Vietnam, il ne peut pas vraiment choisir parmi les fournisseurs d’avions de patrouille. Ces appareils sont les principaux instruments de lutte contre les sous-marins. La Russie a depuis longtemps cessé la production des Il-38 etTu-142. Pour l’instant, elle procède à la modernisation de son parc existant. Ces avions ne sont pas très nombreux en Russie, c’est pourquoi il ne serait pas rationnel de les exporter. L’Europe a également arrêté de fabriquer ce type d’avions. Seuls les Etats-Unis ont lancé un programme de production d’avions de patrouille P-8 Poseidon. Les P-3C Orion qui n’ont pas encore entièrement exploité leur réserve, devraient donc être radiés de l’exploitation.

Le P-3C est un avion anti-sous-marin puissant et efficace. La livraison des avions de ce type au Vietnam, surtout s’ils sont armés, peut être une raison de préoccupation pour le commandement de la Marine chinoise.

La base pour les sous-marins nucléaires Yulin se trouve sur l’île de Hainan au Sud de la Chine. Cette base qui coûte des milliards de dollars renferme aussi des abris souterrains pour les bateaux, les entrepôts, des arsenaux, et un système complexe de protection. C’est ici que devraient se trouver des sous-marins de la classe 094 Jin dotés de missiles balistiques. Ensuite, ils devraient être remplacés par des sous-marins de la classe 096 Tan. La mer de Chine du Sud est la zone principale de patrouille pour les sous-marins nucléaires chinois. Et toute activité de renseignement de la marine américaine et de ses alliés dans cette zone provoque une réaction nerveuse de la part du gouvernement chinois. Par le passé, cela n’a déjà provoqué des incidents dangereux.

En comparaison avec les navires russes, les sous-marins chinois ont un certain retard technologique, considèrent les experts. Les avions P-3C étaient considérés comme un moyen très efficace pour faire face aux sous-marins soviétiques et russes, ce qui veut dire qu’ils représentent un danger encore plus important pour la Chine. En décollant des bases vietnamiennes, les aéronefs P-3C peuvent assurer la surveillance des réions de patrouille des sous-marins chinois.

La Chine devra prendre des mesures pour garantir la sécurité de ses sous-marins, notamment avec le porte-avions Liaoning. Ce dernier pourrait fermer une zone importante en mer de Chine méridionale pour les avions P-3C vietnamiens. Le premier porte-avions soviétique Amiral Kuznetsov, construit selon le même projet que Liaoning, était destiné à la même mission. Ce navire était destiné à protéger la zone de patrouille des sous-marins nucléaires et prendre sur soi les premiers tirs de l'ennemi, permettant ainsi de faire gagner du temps au gouvernement du pays afin que ce dernier puisse prendre une décision de riposte.