Suivre ce blog Administration + Créer mon blog
7 juin 2015 7 07 /06 /juin /2015 16:30
Kornet-E ATGM

Kornet-E ATGM


06/06/2015 lorientlejour.com


Les forces de sécurité irakiennes ont empêché samedi des attaques suicide au véhicule piégé du groupe Etat islamique (EI) dans la province d'Al-Anbar (ouest), grâce à des missiles antichars, a indiqué samedi un officier de l'armée.


Un colonel a expliqué que les forces gouvernementales avaient utilisé des missiles russes Kornet E pour détruire deux véhicules piégés en mouvement et qu'une frappe aérienne en avait détruit un troisième, dans le secteur de Nadhim al-Taqsim, à l'ouest de Bagdad.


Un porte-parole du ministère de l'Intérieur a assuré que les véhiculés piégés détruits étaient en fait au nombre de quatre et que le raid aérien avait été effectué par la coalition internationale conduite par les Etats-Unis.


Jeudi, les forces de sécurité avaient utilisé des missiles pour déjouer des attentats suicide au véhicule piégé contre deux bases de l'armée dans la province d'Al-Anbar, en majeure partie sous contrôle de l'EI notamment sa capitale Ramadi.


Le mois dernier, l'EI avait utilisé un nombre important de véhicules piégés pour prendre Ramadi le 17 mai. En réaction, les Etats-Unis ont annoncé l'envoi de 2.000 lance-roquettes anti-char AT4s pour aider les Irakiens à neutraliser ces camions piégés.


Mercredi, une frappe aérienne de la coalition a détruit un des plus gros sites d'assemblage de voitures piégées de l'EI en Irak, selon des responsables irakiens. En Irak et en Syrie, le groupe jihadiste utilise de plus en plus fréquemment ces "camions bombes" bourrés d'explosifs conduits par des kamikazes.


Note RP Defense : lire Kornet Clobbers Abrams

Partager cet article
3 mars 2015 2 03 /03 /mars /2015 18:40
The United States Will Fund Equipment Purchases And Training For The Ukrainian Army

The aid for Ukraine will not probably include lethal weapons, such as depicted Javelin ATGM. Photo: SOI-East Combat Camera/Lance Cpl. Andrew Kuppers/US DoD.


03 March, 2015 defence24.pl


The United States will allocate USD 120 million in order to realize a training programme for the Ukrainian soldiers, along with a programme purchases of armament for Ukraine.


Geoffrey Payatt, US Ambassador in Ukraine stated this fact in his interview for the Ukrainian “Inter” TV station. According to Payatt, the money will be allocated to train the soldiers and procure equipment for them – but not the lethal weapons.


Read more

Partager cet article
27 février 2015 5 27 /02 /février /2015 08:35
The MBDA Missile Moyenne Portée at Aero India 2015 photo StratPost

The MBDA Missile Moyenne Portée at Aero India 2015 photo StratPost


February 26, 2015 Saurabh Joshi – Stratpost.com


The four-km range MMP, which stands for Missile Moyenne Portée, or Medium Range Missile, is a new development for the French Army and has only been test-fired for the first time, earlier this month.


French arms company MBDA has offered it’s new MMP fifth generation Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) as a base platform for co-development to India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO).


MBDA already supplies the Milan wire-guided ATGM system to the Indian Army.


MMP, which stands for Missile Moyenne Portée, or Medium Range Missile, is a new development for the French Army and has only been test-fired for the first time, earlier this month.


The offer to co-develop MMP, which was displayed at Aero India 2105, appears to be in competition to a proposal on the US-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) table to co-develop an advanced version of the Javelin ATGM, manufactured by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.


India also placed on order for the Israeli Rafael Spike ATGM system last October.


In comparison to the Milan 2T operated by the Indian Army, of which 4,100 were ordered in 2009, the MMP anti-tank missile system has a longer range of four kilometers and differs significantly in that it is not a wire-guided system.


According to MBDA officials who spoke to StratPost, the MMP has an uncooled infra red seeker and three operating modes: fire-and-forget, man -in-the-loop with fibre optic data link and lock-on-after-launch, wherein a third party can designate the target.


MBDA’s other proposal for co-development to DRDO, for the Maitri Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SRSAM) system has been in a coma for several years now, especially with the development and orders for the indigenous Akash SRSAM system.


At the same time, India also has an ongoing tender being contested for SRSAM systems, for which trials are currently underway and the next stage of which will be held in Israel.

Partager cet article
11 décembre 2013 3 11 /12 /décembre /2013 08:35
upgraded BMP-2 Sarath during military exercise in Rajasthan - photo US DoD

upgraded BMP-2 Sarath during military exercise in Rajasthan - photo US DoD

Domestic Plans: Indian Army BMP-2 vehicles take part in a military exercise. India will proceed with plans to develop its own vehicle to replace Army BMP-2s and -1s. (US Defense Department)


Dec. 10, 2013 - By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI- Defense News


NEW DELHI — India will not shelve its homegrown $10 billion Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) program in favor of advanced Russian BMP-3 combat vehicles.


The decision was conveyed to the Russian side at the Nov. 18 meeting of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation held in Moscow, officials said.


During Russian President Vladmir Putin’s visit to India last December, the Russians offered to transfer technology for its BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles if India agreed to shelve its indigenous FICV program, which will see production of 2,600 vehicles to replace aging BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles.


The FICV program will now get rolling as debate over the Russian proposal had pushed the FICV project into the background, said an Indian Defence Ministry source.


An executive of Russia’s Rosoboronexport in New Delhi said the company made the BMP-3 proposal because the Indian Army sought the vehicles, but the Defence Ministry would not agree with the condition that the FICV program be shelved.


The FICV project will be in the “Make India” category, which means only domestic companies will be able to compete. The selected company or consortium will develop an FICV prototype on its own although the government will fund nearly 80 percent of the development costs. Thereafter, production will be done in India by the winner.


The FICV project was approved nearly five years ago. Since then, India’s Mahindra Defence Systems has tied up with BAE Systems, Larsen & Toubro is working on overseas tie ups, and Tata Motors is also working to connect with overseas companies after its tie up with Rheinmetall was stalled following the blacklisting of the German company. State-owned Ordnance Factories Board is also in the race.


MoD now will shortlist two competitors to develop their prototypes, which will be put to trial.


BMP-2 Upgrade


Meanwhile, the Indian Army plans to upgrade the existing 1,400 BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles with advanced weapons and night-fighting capabilities at a cost of $1.8 billion. However, the MoD canceled a tender floated last year to purchase 2,000 engines for the upgrade because none of the domestic vendors fulfilled the engine’s requirements. Now a global tender is likely to be issued for the engines, the MoD source said.


When procured, the engines will be assembled at the Ordnance Factories Board.


The Army requires engines that can generate 350 to 380 horsepower and are easy to maintain and operate in extreme weather conditions. The BMP-2’s existing engine has only 285 horsepower and is not suited for cross-country mobility.


The upgrade of the BMP-2 will include advanced observation and surveillance, night-fighting capability, an improved anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system and a 30mm automatic grenade launcher. The upgraded combat vehicles will have an advanced fire control system and have the capability of loading two missiles in ready-to-fire mode.


The BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles carry soldiers into battle zones and provide fire support, an Indian Army official said

Partager cet article
6 décembre 2013 5 06 /12 /décembre /2013 12:40
Armor: Ukraine Becomes A Player On The Low End



December 5, 2013: Strategy page


Ukraine is trying to interest buyers in its new Corsar ATGM (Anti-tank guided missile). The 105mm (diameter) missile and its storage/launch container weigh 18 kg (40 pounds). The missile is laser homing, with a range of 2,500 meters and its tandem warhead can penetrate 550mm of armor that is behind reactive (explosive panels) armor. Poland has expressed some interest, even though Poland has been using the Israeli Spike LR for several year. But Corsar is cheaper than Spike and uses laser guidance rather than the more expensive “fire and forget” system. The Spike LR, along with the sealed storage/launch canister, weighs 13 kg (28.6 pounds). The canister is mounted on a 13 kg fire control system (10 kg without the tripod) for aiming and firing. The missile in its canister has a shelf life of twenty years and a range of 4,000 meters. The Spike uses a fiber-optic cable so that the operator can literally drive the missile to the target, although the missile can also be used in "fire and forget" mode. Israel is apparently flexible on what they charge for the Spike LR, saying only that it's cheaper than similar the U.S. Javelin.


Before the Cold War ended in 1991 many Soviet weapons design and production operations were in Ukraine. These were inherited by the newly independent Ukraine after 1991. But most of these organizations went out of business because there was no more Soviet Armed Forces placing large orders each year. Most of the foreign sales disappeared as well. Ukraine salvaged some weapons and design capability by selling off its large Cold War stocks of Soviet weapons at low prices and developing a willingness to sell to anyone who could pay. Ukraine now has a lot of customers in Africa and Asia and noted a demand for ATGMs. These weapons are popular not just for ability to destroy or disable most tanks, but as highly portable and accurate artillery against all sorts of targets. Corsar is old technology but the Ukrainians still know how to produce it cheaply and reliably enough to attract some customers.

Partager cet article
30 août 2013 5 30 /08 /août /2013 07:35
Indian MoD, Contractor Faulted in Guided-missile Purchases

Aug. 29, 2013 - By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI  - Defense News


NEW DELHI — India’s Defence Ministry has been severely criticized for buying 10,000 Konkurs-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) from Russia despite having a licensed production facility for the missiles at state-owned Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL).


The latest report of the comptroller and auditor general of India (CAG), placed in the Indian Parliament recently, said, “Failure of BDL to supply the missiles intended by the Indian Army resulted in conclusion of a contract for import of 10,000 missiles at a cost of $188 million defeating the very objective of avoiding dependence on foreign supplier for the ammunition.”


A source in BDL said the Russians failed to transfer the technology to India, which kept BDL from absorbing the information on time and led to production delays. However, a Russian diplomat here said all promised technologies for the advanced Konkus-M missile have been transferred to BDL.


However, the CAG report said BDL was slow in enhancing the production base for the Konkurs-M missiles.


“The Hyderabad-based defense public sector unit BDL planned to increase its production capacity from 3,000 to 4,500 missiles per year by 2012, and up to 6,000 missiles by 2013. In reality, the capacity was augmented by only 500 missiles per annum until February 2013.


“The delay in supply created a capability gap in the Army to fight tanks fitted with [explosive reactive armor] panels, thereby impacting its operational preparedness,” the CAG report said.


“Production of missiles is a complex challenge for India, which includes transfer of technology, absorption, acceptance of the missiles by the services and finally serial manufacturing the same based on the demand by the armed forces,” said Rahul Bhonsle, retired Indian Army brigadier general and defense analyst. “The failure of the BDL, which has been touting Konkurs as one of its products for long, could be due to glitches in this entire cycle, thus its inability to deliver missiles to the Army has led to large deficiencies forcing the government to import the same.”


Another retired Indian Army officer said the delay by BDL led to a shortage of ATGMs, which finally led to purchases from Russia. “An inquiry should be held to find if the delays by BDL were intentional and meant to benefit the Russians,” he said.


On the delays in production, a BDL official who did not want to be identified said there were delays in transfer of technology, but added there was also a delay in giving orders to BDL from the service headquarters.


An Indian Army officer said the best option is to buy fully formed missiles from original equipment manufacturers, rather than from BDL, to meet operational requirements.


When asked about BDL’s performance, the Army official said BDL’s monopoly should be broken and the MoD should identify another agency, preferably in the private industry.


Former Indian Army Chief Gen. V.K. Singh had warned of the shortages of ammunition, including Konkurs-M missiles. The November purchase of the 10,000 Konkurs-M missiles was a desperate reaction to Singh’s warning, an Indian Army source said.


With the serious concerns raised by the CAG regarding BDL’s production capabilities, alternatives will have to be explored to meet the Army’s requirements. “India has to address the entire missile-production cycle in BDL on priority or look for alternate foreign sources until BDL provides assured delivery,” Bhonsle said. “The large requirement means that only the US or Russia will have production facilities to provide thousands of missiles that are required by the over 400 battalion foot and mechanized infantry and approximately 70 tank regiments.”


An MoD official said the Army’s initial requirement is about 24,000 ATGMs to arm its 356 infantry units, adding that this procurement will be completed by the end of the twelfth plan period in 2017.


India has also been negotiating with the United States for the purchase of Javelin ATGMs and with Israel for Spike ATGMs. MoD sources said the negotiations with the US have been stalled over technology transfer, while negotiations with Israel on the Spike are also on hold, but gave no reason.


The purchase of new generation of ATGMs worth $3 billion could be re-floated as a separate program by the end of the year, the source said.

Partager cet article
5 juin 2012 2 05 /06 /juin /2012 07:15
United States curbs on Javelin missile sale cloud Indo-US relationship


Jun 05, 2012 Ajai Shukla - business-standard.com


New Delhi - A dangerous flashpoint in United States-India relations faces visiting US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, who faces tough questions from Indian officials on Tuesday. The US State Department has slashed India’s request for Javelin anti-tank missiles, offering instead a smaller quantity that Washington sources say is “less than half of what India has requested for.”


Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials are furious that Washington, an avowed strategic partner, has pared down India’s requirement of Javelin missiles, even while arguing that defence sales are a cornerstone of the US-Indian strategic relationship.


“This (US reduced offer) is a deal killer. Washington will not dictate the quantity of weaponry we need. This will severely damage the prospects of US vendors in future arms contracts,” a South Block official told Business Standard.


This unexpected rebuff stems from the US Department of Political-Military Affairs, a State Department office that examines the political fallout of proposed US arms sales. Pol-Mil Affairs, as this department is called, often nixes or curtails arms sales because they might “destabilise the regional military balance.”


Neither the US Embassy in New Delhi, nor the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), is prepared to reveal the reason provided by Washington for slashing the Indian request. The Ministry of External Affairs and the MoD have not responded to requests for comments.


US Embassy spokesperson, Peter Vrooman, said, “We don’t discuss individual sales. Secretary Panetta looks forward to having an exchange with the Government of India on a broad range of issues.”


Andrew Shapiro, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, had told Business Standard, in an exclusive interaction during his visit to New Delhi on April 17, that Washington had cleared the transfer of technology for manufacturing the Javelin missile in India. Given that readiness to transfer high-end technology, the curbs placed by Washington on the missile numbers remain inexplicable.


The FGM-148 Javelin, built by US companies Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, is one of the two anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) that the Indian Army is evaluating for its 350-odd infantry battalions. The other is the Spike, built by Israeli company, Rafael. These are both shoulder-launched, “fire-and-forget” ATGMs, which means that they autonomously track their targets after they are fired by a two-man crew.


Both missiles are scheduled to come to India for user evaluation trials later this year. However, the Javelin has already impressed the Indian Army. During joint exercises with the US Army, Indian missile crews have fired ten Javelin missiles. All ten hit their targets.


The US industry, which has heavy stakes in a successful Javelin sale to India, is sharply critical of the State Department for curtailing the Indian request. “Offering a reduced number of missiles will almost certainly kill the Javelin deal; in fact it seems to almost be designed to be so. It seems as if Hillary Clinton herself remains unconvinced about the India relationship and is trying to set a different tone,” complains an industry member.


A key US frustration in the defence relationship has been New Delhi’s refusal to sign three defence cooperation agreements that Washington has pressed for: a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA); and a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). New Delhi believes that signing these agreements would put it overtly in the US camp, diluting its “multi-aligned” foreign policy that emphasises strong relations with multiple foreign powers.


There are also growing frustrations in Washington over India’s resistance to allow US “end-user” inspections of weaponry sold to Indian security forces. New Delhi regards end-user monitoring as a violation of sovereignty.

Partager cet article
11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 17:49
Small Arms Survey: Anti-tank Guided Weapons



11 May 2012 by Eric G. Berman and Jonah Leff/Small Arms Survey


Anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs) are small missile-launching systems. They differ from unguided rocket launchers, such as the RPG-7, because their missiles are designed to be steered, or ‘guided’, to a target after launch (i.e. during flight). These weapons are traditionally designed to disable armoured vehicles, but particularly over the last decade or so, producers have developed variants intended for use against other targets, such as hardened bunkers and buildings. The first ATGWs were created when advances in armour made traditional direct-fire anti-tank guns and rocket launchers less effective. Moreover, ATGWs offer soldiers the ability to engage targets from greater distances with increased accuracy than is possible with unguided anti-tank light weapons. ATGWs have an effective range of up to 8,000 m (five miles) and armour penetration of around 1,000 mm (3.3 feet). However, each generation of weapon varies greatly in terms of its guidance, lethality and portability.


Three distinct generations of ATGWs have been developed since the 1950s, with changes to the guidance system largely determining the generation. Broadly speaking, initially these weapons were wire-guided, but subsequent weapons first supplemented or replaced manual manipulation with radio waves and lasers, and later introduced infrared (IR) technologies that enhanced target acquisition. Concurrent with changes to these weapons’ navigation systems were improvements to their range and payload. Whereas first-generation ATGWs might effectively engage a target at 1,500 m and penetrate 500 mm of armour, third generation systems are effective at distances up to 8 km and can penetrate up to 1 m of armour.


First-generation ATGW missiles were guided to the target after launch by a wire in the rear of the missile that was connected to the firing unit. The operator often used a joystick to manually control the direction of the projectile. Early launchers were as simple as a disposable transport box that was either placed on the ground or mounted on a vehicle. This system was known as the manual command to line-of-sight (MCLOS) system. During the Second World War the Germans employed the X-7, the first MCLOS system. The French SS-10 and German Cobra, both modelled on the X-7, were the first ATGWs available for export, although they remained in production for only a short time. In 1963 the 9K11 Malyutka, also known as the AT-3 (US designation) or Sagger (NATO codename), became the first man-portable Soviet ATGW. The Malyutka/AT-3 was widely exported and subsequently widely copied. China, for example, developed a series of ‘Red Arrow’ missiles in the 1970s and 1980s based on this weapon (upgrading the guidance systems and payloads along the way). A drawback of first-generation models, independent of their relative effectiveness, was that the gunner had to remain in the same position while the warhead was in flight. If the target was not effectively neutralized or if there were other forces within range of attack, the ATGW operator was quite vulnerable.


Second-generation systems, known as semiautomatic command to line-of-sight systems (SACLOS), saw significant improvements in performance. After the missile is launched, the operator keeps the sight on the target, whereby automatic guidance commands are sent to the missile via wire, radio, or laserbeam-riding technology. SACLOS missiles outperform first-generation systems with accuracy rates exceeding 90 per cent. Moreover, SACLOS missiles reach effective ranges of between 2,500 and 5,500 m with warhead armour penetration of up to 900 mm, almost twice the range and payload of first-generation models. The United States introduced the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW) in 1968. By 2009 more than 660,000 TOW missiles and 15,000 launchers had been procured, making the system the most widely deployed of all ATGWs. France and Germany jointly began producing the Missile d’infanterie léger antichar (MILAN, infantry light anti-tank missile) shortly thereafter.


Despite advances made in SACLOS models, operators were still vulnerable to counter-attack due to their immobility. Third-generation guidance systems ameliorated this threat by having a passive IR seeker installed on the nose of the missile to lock on and reach the target automatically. The seeker functions by continuously comparing target data taken before launch to what the seeker sees using pattern recognition algorithms and manoeuvring the missile appropriately. In recently designed missiles it is most often a photographic-like image. Unlike wire-guided and laserbeam-riding missiles, IR technology enables the operator to reposition or reload immediately. First developed in the 1980s, these ‘fire-and-forget’ (FaF) guidance systems allow the operator to retreat immediately after firing. The most notable of these weapons is Israel’s Spike. The full series of Spike missiles consists of the Spike Medium Range (MR), Spike Long Range (LR), and Spike Extended Range (ER), with maximum ranges of 2,500, 4,000, and 8,000 m, respectively. Other IR ATGWs include the Indian Nag and the US- and British-manufactured Javelin. Maximum range varies considerably. Whereas maximum ranges are typically between 4,000 and 8,000 m, some models have shorter firing ranges to suit current environments of combat. Moreover, IR models tend to be lighter and collapsible (i.e. capable of being broken down into lighter and smaller component parts) for transportability. These developments allow soldiers increased versatility in urban spaces. For example, these systems have been employed in Afghanistan and Iraq, where manoeuvrability is limited due to fighting in buildings and at close quarters, in comparison to prior military engagements in Vietnam and Latin America.


The costs of ATGWs vary considerably. The basic TOW and MILAN, as well as other SACLOS missiles, are reportedly priced at around US$10,000 apiece. Third-generation systems that use IR guidance missiles cost many times this amount. While data on unit costs for some systems is available, little is known about the price of many ATGWs. Even when it is possible to obtain information on values for certain contracts, a missile’s or launcher’s specific price is hard to calculate. Licensing agreements under which unit costs will change over time add to the incertitude.


In 2007 more than 30 countries have fully or partially produced ATGWs. Seven of these countries were fully manufacturing ATGWs with FaF guidance systems. Many of the countries that produced MCLOS systems have chosen to cease production for a variety of reasons: an obsolete design with low hit probability, gunner vulnerability, a limited ability to penetrate modern armour, and sufficient stockpiles to satisfy demand. Roughly half of the systems produced are essentially copies of another country’s design such as the 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger), TOW, and Spike. As of 2007 roughly 14 countries produced ATGWs with technology acquired from six technology-owning countries, either with or without a formal licence. Most licensing agreements include offsets, which are supplementary arrangements to compensate the purchaser in some fashion—either directly in terms of the item in question, or indirectly involving some other good or service


As with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), ATGWs are to be found in the stocks of a great number of states. By one account, more than 100 countries have such weapons in their inventories. More than half of these states’ arsenals are believed to possess mostly the less sophisticated and less able MCLOS systems. The international community has expended more energy and greater resources on destroying MANPADS — both outside state control and state holdings — than it has ATGWs.


Non-state armed groups also possess ATGWs, but apparently not (yet) third-generation models. At least nine such actors reportedly possess (or have possessed) first-generation MCLOS systems. In recent years, several groups are understood to have obtained second-generation SACLOS models. Hezbollah, for instance, reportedly received, among other models, hundreds of 9K111 Fagots (AT-4 Spigots) and 9P133 Kornets (AT-14 Spriggans) from Iran and Syria. In October 2009 Somali militiamen fired a Russian model 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) at African Union forces in Mogadishu. In April 2011 Hamas fired a Russian model laser-beam-riding

9P133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) at a bus in Israel. Free Syrian Army rebels looted the same type of missiles from government stocks in early 2012. That said, whether the result of tighter controls or limited demand, research suggests that fewer of these groups own ATGWs than possess MANPADS.


ATGWs will continue to be developed to fulfil their initial anti-armour function, but comparatively greater emphasis will be laid on ways to engage other fortified targets. The focus primarily will be on increased portability (e.g. reduced weight and smaller sizes), technical sophistication (e.g. non-line-of-sight targeting), and cost effectiveness.


Republished with permission from the Small Arms Survey.


About the Small Arms Survey


The Small Arms Survey serves as the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence, and as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. The Survey distributes its findings through Occasional Papers, Issue Briefs, Working Papers, Special Reports, Books, and its annual flagship publication, the Small Arms Survey. The project has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, international public policy, law, economics, development studies, conflict resolution, sociology, and criminology, and works closely with a worldwide network of researchers and partners. The Small Arms Survey is a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.


For more information see www.smallarmssurvey.org.

Partager cet article


  • : RP Defense
  • : Web review defence industry - Revue du web industrie de défense - company information - news in France, Europe and elsewhere ...
  • Contact


Articles Récents