June 7, 2015: Strategy Page

China recently offered (for export) another new variant in its line of ZBL 09 8x8 wheeled armored vehicle; the VN1 vehicle launched bridge. This is an old concept that goes back to World War II. What it amounts to is a 15-20 meter (46-66 foot) bridge than can quickly be deployed from the vehicle over obstacles allowing similar (in size and weight) vehicles to quickly cross.

China introduced the ZBL line of armored vehicles in 2006 after more than a decade of development. The first model was a personnel carrier but other variants quickly followed. For example the ZBL 09 ST1 is equipped as a tank-destroyer with a high velocity 105mm gun. This appears to be a variant on the 2007 version that had a lower velocity 105mm gun that was intended to give infantry front line artillery support. The Germans called this an “assault gun” when they invented the concept (as the “Sturmgeschütz” during World War II. These vehicles are particularly useful for infantry attacking as an assault gun could quickly take out enemy opposition with one or two shells.

The assault gun version of its ZBL 09 had a smaller turret than the ST1. The larger turret of the ST1 is apparently to hold the additional recoil and fire control equipment for the more powerful and longer range 105mm gun. In 2009 there was already an artillery version of the ZBL 09, carrying a 122mm howitzer in a larger turret similar to the one used by the ST1.

Since 2012 the Chinese Army has been using the ZBL 09 with the turret and 105mm gun as a wheeled light tank. That appeared to indicate that an anti-tank version was already in the works. The ZBL 09/105mm assault gun could, with some extra training, be capable of shooting up other armored vehicles. The 105mm gun carried is not powerful enough to destroy most modern tanks, but could knock out most other armored vehicles.

The basic ZBL 09 is a 21 ton vehicle that has a crew of three and carries seven passengers. The ST1 apparently has a crew of four and weighs over 25 tons. All ZBL 09s are 8 meters (25 feet) long, three meters (9.2 feet) wide, and 2.1 meters (6.5 feet, to the hull roof) high. It's amphibious and has a top water speed of 8 kilometers an hour. On roads, top speed is 100 kilometers an hour, and max road range on internal fuel is 800 kilometers. The infantry carrier version has a turret with a 30mm autocannon.

The infantry version of the ZBL 09 entered service in 2009, and a growing number of combat brigades are being equipped with it, to operate somewhat like the American Stryker brigades. China has been developing new wheeled armored vehicles for over a decade. Until recently, these were all based on Russian designs. The ZBL 09, however, borrows more ideas from the West. Still, some of the more recent (since 2009) Russian type designs were interesting and instructive.

The Chinese have observed NATO success in Iraq with the Stryker and LAV wheeled combat vehicles. Chinese designers eventually concluded that the roomier internal layout of Western vehicles did serve a useful purpose, and the ZBL 09, and all the electronics installed in it, are an example of what the Chinese learned.

June 3, 2015: Strategy Page

A Chinese manufacturer recently announced a 40mm grenade launcher with a computerized sight and computer controlled 40mm rounds that the weapon could program to explode over a specific target being aimed at. At one weapons sales expo this LG5 system was touted as an anti-sniper system for police. Closer examination of the system indicated that the LG5 was actually designed for long range (over 500 meters) targets, especially structures or vehicles that had to be hit on the first shot. There have been no reports of the reports of the LG5, which looks like a large (40mm) rifle with a round magazine allowing for multiple shots and an impressive looking computerized sight, complete with laser range finder. The LG5 may have been just some misdirected hype, but it shows you how far Chinese weapons development has come since the 1990s.

Chinese weapons manufacturers have been developing more and more 20mm-40mm grenade launchers for infantry and mechanized units since 2000. Many of these systems are offered for export, to military and police units as well as, unofficially, anyone with the money to pay for the weapons and extra for “special delivery.” There are multiple manufacturers of these weapons and for most weapons in China and the competition is pretty intense.

This began by producing cheaper versions of existing grenade launchers. One example of this was the QLB06. Introduced in 2006, by 2012 the Chinese QLB06 35mm semi-automatic grenade launcher had apparently become a standard weapon for many Chinese infantry units. It weighs 9.1 kg (20 pounds) empty and is 1046mm (41 inches) long. A drum magazine can hold 4-6 rounds, giving the weapon a maximum weight of 9.6 kg (27 pounds). It's semi-automatic and effective up to 1,000 meters.

The QLB06 is but the latest of a growing number of similar weapons. All these portable grenade launchers have an interesting past. While the U.S. developed (in the 1960s) a 40mm grenade, launched from a single shot (resembling a shotgun) hand held weapon and later a heavier vehicle mounted machine-gun type weapon, China developed something unique in its line of 35mm grenade launcher weapons. The earlier QLB87 has a magazine system that can hold 6, 9, or 12 35mm rounds. It weighs 12 kg (26.5 pounds). It looks, and is used like a light machine-gun. This weapon has not been used in combat yet and Western armies have stayed away from this design because it's easier to mount automatic 40mm machine-guns (weighing over a 50 kg/110 pounds) on armored vehicles or light trucks. The Chinese, however, have more light (few vehicles) infantry. So for them the W87 makes a lot of sense. But apparently Chinese troops, and weapons developers, thought better of the QLB87 and came up with the lighter QLB06.

Automatic grenade launchers, firing low speed 30-40mm shells, became popular in the 1960s when the usefulness of the American single shot M79 40mm grenade launcher was noted. Many troops today want the M79 back. But back then Russia and the United States proceeded to develop automatic grenade launchers. This was actually the second generation, as the Russians originally developed such weapons in the 1930s. By 1939 the Russian Navy was testing a 40.8mm weapon and the army followed a year later. The 21 ounce shells were based on the Djakonow rifle grenade and were fired at 129 meters (400 feet) per second (about 40 percent the speed of a pistol bullet) for a maximum range of 1,200 meters. The weapon weighed 24 kg (53 pounds) and was used in the 1940 Winter War with Finland. For political reasons (the weapons designer fell out of favor) the weapon was withdrawn from service before the Germans invaded in 1941 and was forgotten. This sort of thing happens a lot in military history.

In 1965, the U.S. developed and put into service the M18 40mm automatic grenade launcher. This weapon used the same 40mm round as the M79. The 8.6 kg (19 pound) M18 used a hand crank to load rounds (from a belt). Work on this weapon actually began in 1962, but it took the popularity of the M79 in Vietnam to spur production. Some 1,200 M18s were built through 1968, and it was a popular weapon on U.S. Navy river patrol boats, where ambushes were frequently encountered. Starting in 1966, the M18 was replaced by the heavier M19 that was truly automatic but weighed 34 kg (75 pounds). This was also developed by the U.S. Navy. Russia followed in 1974 with the AGS17, a 30mm grenade launcher weighing the same as the M19 but firing a 285 gram (ten ounce) shell instead of the 458 gm (16 ounce) 40mm shell used in American weapons.

The U.S. and other nations have since come out with lightweight grenade launchers that fit under the assault rifle barrel. But the appeal of a dedicated grenade launcher for a "grenadier" has always been popular. One skilled grenadier with a weapon like the QLB06 or LG5 can be very effective and the Chinese are determined to come up with more effective and cheaper weapons of this type.  

source military-today.com

May 28, 2015: Strategy Page

Chinese airborne and light infantry units are being equipped with a Chinese made amphibious ATV (All Terrain Vehicle). This is an 8x8 vehicle apparently based on the Canadian Argo design, which has been around since the 1960s and has been regularly upgraded, refined, improved and extensively used all over the world. The Chinese ATV can carry six people (including the driver), weighs 1.7 tons and has a max payload of about a ton. If used amphibiously the ATV can only carry about a third of a ton. Max road speed is 60 kilometers an hour. The ATV is 3.9 meters (12.7 feet) long and 1.8 meters (5.9 feet) wide. The Chinese military has several thousand of these vehicles, many (if not most) of them with non-combat units.

May 27, 2015: Strategy Page

Kurdish forces fighting in Iraq and Syria have been seen using the Chinese HJ-8 ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles). This is the Chinese version of the American TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided) system has been in service since 1970. Over 500,000 TOW missiles have been manufactured since its introduction and it remains in service with the United States and many other countries. All versions of TOW are shipped and fired from a sealed launch tube. That tube is placed on a MGS (Missile Guidance Set) that contains the gunner sight, with night vision, and operator guidance electronics. The MGS weighs 25 kg (55 pounds). The 1970 version of the missile weighed 19 kg (42 pounds) and had a 3.9 kg (8.6 pound) warhead. The latest version (TOW 2B or BGM-71F) weighs 22.7 kg (50 pounds) and has a 6.2 kg (13.5 pound) warhead that can defeat ERA (Explosive Reactive Armor) at targets up to 4,000 meters away.

The HJ-8 is nearly identical to TOW 2 in size, weight, range and, according to the Kurds, performance. Both TOW and HJ-8 use SACLOS (semi-automatic command line-of-sight) guidance. This system works by having the operator hold the target in the MGS sights and the missile will be guided to the target via wires that connect the missile to the launcher. The big problem is that the operator is often under fire and that sometimes makes it difficult to maintain aim. The next generations of anti-tank missiles were wireless and “fire-and-forget” which allows the operator to duck as soon as the target is identified by the MGS and the missile fired. Nearly all ATGMs use shaped-charge warheads that penetrate most tank armor and are also effective against structures and unarmored vehicles.

 The Kurds have a hard time getting weapons from the Iraqi government (because of disputes over control of oil and corruption in the Shia Arab dominated government) and have sought weapons from all available sources. Chinese weapons are widely available in the international black market for arms. If you have the money, there are groups that can get you all sorts of relatively cheap and pretty effective Chinese weapons, which are often pretty good copies of Western and Russian weapons.

19.05.2015 par Philippe Chapleau - Lignes de Défense
 

Les Américains l'appellent Fiery Cross Reef, les Vietnamiens Da Chu Thap, les Philippins Kagitingan. Pour les Chinois, c'est le Yongshu Reef, un bout de rocher qui se transforme résolument  en "porte-avions" ou en base avancée.

La Chine contrôle ce caillou depuis 1987 et est en désaccord avec le Vietnam depuis 1988. Faisant fi des tensions et des mises en garde, Pékin a entrepris des travaux titanesques pour faire de ce rocher une plate-forme militarisée.

Pour en savoir plus, découvrir l'avancement des travaux et mieux appréhender la stratégie chinoise, l'Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative propose un excellent diaporama interactif (à découvrir ici).

On notera aussi les pages "Island Tracker" qui listent les îles occupées et bétonnées par les Chinois.

7 Avril 2015 par Marine nationale

Du 30 mars au 3 avril l’amiral Rogel s’est rendu en Chine en visite officielle.

Il a tout d’abord été accueilli chaleureusement par son homologue chinois à Pékin, l’amiral Wu Shengli avant de se rendre à Qingdao, base de la flotte du Nord pour visiter plusieurs unités opérationnelles dont le porte-avions Liaoning.

De retour à Pékin, l’amiral Rogel a été reçu par le chef d’état- major général de l’armée de libération, le Général Fang Fenghui.

Les relations entre nos deux marines s’inscrivent dans un dialogue stratégique militaire basé sur des réunions d’état-major et portent sur des sujets d’intérêt commun comme la lutte contre la piraterie maritime.

La Chine est un acteur militaire majeur qui souhaite renforcer ses capacités navales. Elle assure la permanence d’un groupe naval en océan Indien et déploie régulièrement ses bâtiments jusqu’en Méditerranée ou en Atlantique.

April 1, 2015: Strategy Page

On March 9, 2015 Pakistan successfully launched its Shaheen 3 IRBM ballistic missile for the first time. This missile, now proven to work, has the longest range (2,700 kilometers) of any Pakistani missile and can reach all of India. Shaheen 3 is a solid fuel missile while most of Pakistan’s earlier long-range missiles were liquid fueled. Shaheen 3 was developed in secrecy, perhaps because Pakistan was unsure if they could perfect the technology for producing large solid fuel rocket motors. Pakistan had to obtain this tech from somewhere else because Pakistan does not have the industrial infrastructure to do it themselves. China was the most likely donor and China would do this largely because Pakistani ballistic missiles aimed at India make Indian anti-missile defenses less effective against Chinese ballistic missiles.

Meanwhile Pakistan has continued work on its liquid fuel missiles. In early 2012 Pakistan successfully tested a new version of its Shaheen 1 (Hatf IV) missile. The new one is being called Shaheen 1A and it has a range of 1,500 kilometers. The Shaheen 1 weighs 9.5 tons and carries a one ton warhead, to a maximum range of 700 kilometers. The 10 ton Shaheen 1A carries a smaller warhead and has more rocket fuel. The Shaheen 1A could cover most of northern India. The Shaheen 1A technology is considered more reliable than that used in the longer ranged Shaheen 2.

The Shaheen 1 entered service in 2003, and is apparently a variant of the Chinese M-9 missile. Pakistan is believed to have received the solid fuel M-9 in the 1990s, and since then modified it somewhat. Pakistan began producing the Hatf IV in the late 1990s, although it was not tested until 1999. The design appears to be well thought out, for the Hatf IV has had several successful tests. It's not known if Pakistan has a nuclear warhead of equal reliability. Such warheads are difficult to design, manufacture, and test. China has long been selling military technology to Pakistan but it appears that nuclear warhead technology has not been offered.

Until the successful test of the Shaheen 3 the largest Pakistani ballistic missile was the Shaheen 2, which is believed to be an upgraded Pakistani version of the Chinese M-18, which was originally shown at the 1987 Beijing air show as a two-stage missile with a 1,000 km range and carrying a half ton warhead. This M-18 missile has the longest range of any of the current M/DF-series missiles. There have been over half a dozen successful test launches of the Shaheen 2 since 2004. These missiles now have a range of 2,000 kilometers and can cover all but the southern tip of India. Satellite photos of a Pakistani factory 30 kilometers southwest of the capital show transporter erector launchers (TELs) being assembled for the Shaheen 2 ballistic missile. It appears that fifty or more of the 16.1 meter (fifty foot) long, six axle vehicles have been built there in the last five years. Shaheen 3 also uses a TEL.

Pakistan has a full range of solid fuel rockets. In addition to those mentioned above, there is the 1.5 ton Hatf I, which has a range of 80 kilometers, followed by larger and longer range models until Shaheen 3. In response to all this India has developed, and is about to deploy, an anti-missile system that can knock down some of the long range Pakistani ballistic missiles.

March 31, 2015: Strategy Page

After years of denying any involvement in Cyber War or having organized units for that sort of thing, China suddenly admitted that it was all true. This was all laid out in the latest (March 2015) issue of a Chinese military publication (The Science of Military Strategy). This unclassified journal comes out about once a year and makes it possible for all Chinese military and political leaders to freely discuss new military strategies. The March edition went into a lot of detail about Chinese Cyber War operations. Most of these details were already known for those who could read Western media. Many details of Chinese Cyber War activities are published in the West, if only to warn as many organizations as possible of the nature and seriousness of the threat. Apparently the Chinese leadership decided that the secrecy about their Cyber War activities was being stripped away by foreigners anyway so why bother continuing to deny. Publish and take a victory lap.

Since the 1990s China has continued to expand its enormous Internet Army (as it is called in China). Not all these programs are successful. For example since 2011 there has been an effort to force companies to organize their Internet savvy employees into a cyber-militia and inspire these geeks to find ways to protect the firm's networks. But by 2013 it was clear this project was not turning out exactly as expected, as many of the volunteers had become successful, but unpopular, censors. It’s now widely accepted that one of the most annoying things for the new Chinese middle class is the censorship (especially on the Internet). The most annoying censorship is the online version that is carried out by paid and volunteer censors at your company or in your neighborhood. This use of “local activists” to control discussions and inform on possible troublemakers (or worse, like spies or criminals) is an old Chinese custom and one that was highly refined by the 20th century communists (first the Russians, who passed it on to their Chinese comrades). The old-school informer network suffered a lot of desertions and other damage during three decades of economic freedom. But the government has been diligent about rebuilding the informer and censor network online, where it’s easier for the busybodies to remain anonymous and safe from retribution. The on-line informers are also useful for keeping an eye on foreign businesses.

Internal and external espionage is one of the main reasons the Chinese government took an interest in the Internet back in the 1990s. This resulted in nearly two decades of effort to mobilize the Chinese people as an Internet army. It was in the late 1990s that the Chinese Defense Ministry established the "NET Force." This was initially a research organization, which was to measure China's vulnerability to attacks via the Internet. Soon this led to examining the vulnerability of other countries, especially the United States, Japan, and South Korea (all nations that were heavy Internet users). NET Force has continued to grow, aided by plenty of volunteers.

In 1999, NET Force organized an irregular civilian militia, the "Red Hackers Union" (RHU). These are several hundred thousand patriotic Chinese programmers and Internet engineers who wished to assist the motherland and put the hurt, via the Internet, on those who threaten or insult China. The RHU began spontaneously (in response to American bombs accidentally hitting the Chinese embassy in Serbia), but the government gradually assumed some control, without turning the voluntary organization into another bureaucracy. Various ministries have liaison officers who basically keep in touch with what the RHU is up to (mostly the usual geek chatter) and intervene only to "suggest" that certain key RHU members back off from certain subjects or activities. Such "suggestions" carry great weight in China, where people who misbehave on the web are very publicly prosecuted and sent to jail. For those RHU opinion-leaders and ace hackers that cooperate, there are all manner of benefits for their careers, not to mention some leniency if they get into some trouble with the authorities. Many government officials fear the RHU, believing that it could easily turn into a "counter-revolutionary force." So far, the Defense Ministry and NET Force officials have convinced the senior politicians that they have the RHU under control. Meanwhile, the hackers (or “honkers” after the Chinese word for “visitor”) became folk heroes and the opportunity to join your company’s contingent of the “Online Red Army” appealed to many as a chance to be like the honkers.

NET Force was never meant to be just volunteers. Starting in the late 1990s, China assembled the first of what eventually grew to 40,000 Ministry of Public Security employees manning the Golden Shield Project (nicknamed as The Great Firewall of China). This was an effort to monitor and censor Internet use throughout the country and punish those who got out of line. In the last decade, over a billion dollars has been spent on this effort. While the Great Firewall cannot stop someone who is expert at how the Internet works but it does greatly restrict the other 99 percent of Internet users. And it provides a lot of information about what is going on inside all that Internet traffic. Foreign intelligence agencies are beginning to find the Great Firewall of China is going from nuisance to obstacle. This has put government intelligence organizations in a difficult position. In the U.S. the feds feel compelled to seek assistance from, and work with, hackers who are developing new ways to tunnel through the Golden Shield. There are several non-governmental outfits that are involved with this effort, and most are hostile to intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, some relationships have been formed, to deal with mutual problems.

It's not only the intel agencies who are keen to learn their way around, and through, the Great Firewall. Cyber War organizations see the Great Firewall as a major defensive weapon as well. The Chinese have a much better idea of what is coming into their country via the Internet, and that makes it easier to identify hostile traffic and deal with it. Some American Cyber War officials are broaching the idea of building something like Golden Shield, just for military purposes. But that would be difficult in most Western countries because of privacy issues. But with Golden Shield China could unleash worms and viruses on the Internet and use their Great Firewall to prevent Chinese systems from becoming as badly infected. China needs every advantage it can get because it has the worst protected, and most infected, PCs in the world. This is largely the result of so many computers using pirated software and poorly trained operators.  Meanwhile, the thousands of people running the Golden Shield are gaining valuable experience and becoming some of the most skillful Internet engineers on the planet.

The Chinese military also has a growing number of formal Cyber War units, as well as military sponsored college level Cyber War courses. Western Internet security companies, in the course of protecting their customers, have identified a growing number of Chinese hacking organizations. Some work directly for the military, secret police or other government agencies. These Cyber War units, plus the volunteer organizations and Golden Shield bureaucrats apparently work closely with each other and have provided China with a formidable Cyber War capability. NET Force, with only a few thousand personnel, appears to be the controlling organization for all this. With the help of RHU and Golden Shield, they can mobilize formidable attacks, as well as great defensive potential. No other nation has anything like it and now the Chinese are bragging about it.

March 26, 2015 Spacewar.com (AFP)

Beijing - China dismissed Japanese concerns about its defence spending as "ridiculous" on Thursday after Tokyo commissioned its biggest-ever helicopter carrier.

Both sides are boosting their military budgets as they grow increasingly wary of each other's ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, facing off over a maritime territorial dispute and how to interpret Japan's motivations and actions during World War II.

Japan is uneasy about what it sees as China's growing assertiveness, including through regular double-digit increases in its defence spending, and on Wednesday commissioned its biggest warship since World War II, the helicopter carrier Izumo.

The 248-metre (810-feet) Japanese-built vessel can carry nine helicopters and is aimed at beefing up Tokyo's maritime defences in the East China Sea.

In 2012, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and has said its plans more.

Tokyo has repeatedly called on Beijing to be more transparent about its military outlays but Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying hit back, saying that despite Japan's far smaller number of people it spends a hefty amount on defence.

"Japan's population accounts for only about one-tenth that of China," Hua told a regular briefing on Thursday.

"But its per capita national defence spending is about five times that of China," she added.

"Given this, Japan's criticism of China's national defence is quite ridiculous."

It was unclear on what figures Hua based her comparison.

Earlier this month China unveiled a military budget of 886.9 billion yuan ($142.9 billion) for 2015. With a population of 1.37 billion, that equates to about $104 per person.

Japan's defence spending for fiscal 2015 has been set at 4.98 trillion yen ($42.1 billion), or about $329 per capita, just over three times as much as China.

Kyodo news agency said the Izumo cost around 120 billion yen.

Beijing is suspicious of moves by Tokyo to increase its defence profile under nationalist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has called for his country to throw off the constraints of its "peace" constitution imposed by the United States after World War II, which ended 70 years ago this year.

Asked about the Izumo, Chinese defence ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng told a monthly briefing on Thursday: "Due to historical reasons, any move or actions by Japan in the military and security field is worth the vigilance of its Asian neighbours."

Separately, Geng criticised reported comments by the commander of the US Seventh Fleet suggesting it would back efforts by Southeast Asian nations to form a combined maritime force to patrol areas of the South China Sea.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea, a position that conflicts with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as with Taiwan.

US officials have called for a multilateral agreement to end all actions that risk further inflaming tensions in the region, which includes US allies.

"If ASEAN members were to take the lead in organising something along those lines, trust me, the US 7th Fleet would be ready to support," Bloomberg News quoted Vice Admiral Robert Thomas as saying.

"We urge the US side to stop making irresponsible remarks", Geng said, adding it should "respect the efforts made by the relevant countries in finding a peaceful solution" to the issue.

"We hope that the United States will stop their provocative remarks and actions."

25 mars 2015  par Daniel Ventre – 45eNord.ca

La Chine parle de l’existence de ses unités dédiées à la cyberdéfense (les médias anglo-saxons retiennent le vocable «cyberwarfare»). Selon McReynolds, chercheur au CSIS (Washington), la reconnaissance officielle de l’existence de ces unités serait contenue dans la dernière version de «The Science of Military Strategy » (décembre 2013).

On y apprendrait que les forces de cyberdéfense sont de trois types.

– les forces militaires spéciales de guerre sur les réseaux (specialized military network warfare forces) qui sont des unités militaires opérationnelles
– des équipes de spécialistes du monde civil (le ministère de la sécurité publique, le ministère de la sécurité d’Etat…) autorisées par l’armée à mener des opérations de cyberdéfense ;
– et des entités extérieures au gouvernement, qui peuvent être mobilisées, organisées pour de telles opérations.

Toujours du point de vue de McReynolds, cette reconnaissance officielle:

– vient conforter les Etats-Unis et nombre d’autres nations qui ont depuis plusieurs années mené des enquêtes sur les cyberattaques et concluant souvent à l’implication des acteurs étatiques chinois.
– vient mettre un terme à des années de déni de la part de la Chine, qui a toujours jusque-là refusé de reconnaître à la fois l’existence de structures de type cybercommandement ou le soutien des forces armées dans de quelconques cyberattaques, notamment à des fins d’espionnage industriel.
– Nécessite de repenser les coopérations engagées par la Chine en matière de lutte contre la cybercriminalité (on apprend au passage que la Chine aurait collaboré avec près de 50 pays dans le cadre d’enquêtes sur des milliers de cas de cybercriminalité au cours des 10 dernières années ; et conclu une trentaine d’accords bilatéraux, dont des accords avec les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni). On ne saurait en effet, selon lui, faire confiance à des institutions étatiques chinoises qui d’un côté prétendent lutter contre la cybercriminalité, mais de l’autre soutiennent des opérations de hacking contre les intérêts des États avec lesquels elles coopèrent…

Cette analyse appelle des commentaires. La «révélation» de l’existence d’unités de cyberdéfense chinoises n’est pas véritablement un scoop. Les Etats modernes se dotent de capacités cyber, et la Chine a fait du cyberespace, on le sait depuis longtemps, l’un de ses domaines stratégiques. Que cela soit écrit dans un document officiel est certes important. Mais reconnaître l’existence de structures de cyberdéfense n’est pas l’aveu des cyberattaques qu’on leur attribue.

De l’organisation décrite, il ressort que se multiplient, comme ailleurs, les acteurs de la cyberdéfense. Et même si le tout peut paraître parfaitement hiérarchisé, des tensions au sein même des institutions étatiques pourraient gripper la machine. McReynolds évoque ce risque lorsqu’il affirme que des signes de tensions sont apparus, pour savoir qui de l’armée ou des institutions sécuritaires civiles doit assurer le leadership sur les cyber-opérations.

20 March 2015 By David McDonough* – Pacific Sentinel

Recent reports talk about China’s possible establishment of a ‘fourth’ naval fleet with jurisdiction over the Indian Ocean region (IOR), joining the existing North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. This mysterious fourth fleet will supposedly be based on Hainan Island—even though the island falls under the jurisdiction of the South Sea Fleet and is some distance away from the IOR. For that reason, many see a prospective Chinese fleet covering the IOR to be either entirely speculative or, at best, a hollow force existing in name only.

One should certainly be wary of overstating China’s military capabilities or, indeed, ambitions. Taking a worst-case view of a Chinese naval fleet in the IOR could overshadow more modest but also more plausible concerns about other possible roles for a fourth fleet based out of Hainan Island.

The island faces the South China Sea (SCS), over which Beijing has proffered expansive historical claims, such as the famous nine-dash line which encompasses nearly all of this maritime zone. Maritime incidents between China and its neighbours, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, are increasingly frequent.

The People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) is undoubtedly moving to buttress its presence on the island. On Yalong Bay near the island’s southeastern tip, China’s recently constructed Longpo naval base is a deep-water port complete with submarine piers, an underground submarine facility with tunnel access, and a demagnetising facility to reduce the magnetic residuals on ship hulls. This new nuclear submarine base is expected to be serve as a home for the PLAN’s new Jin-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It also features long piers designed for surface combatants, making it a multi-purpose base. The PLAN has an existing base at Yulin, situated just west of Longpo and designed to service PLAN’s conventional submarines. Facilities for surface ships and construction of new piers have also been reported there.

The Hainan complex underpins the PLAN’s rapidly growing South Sea Fleet. Once the least important of China’s three fleets, the South Sea Fleet has since become the primary recipient of China’s more advanced naval warships, including the Shang-class nuclear attack submarine, conventional submarines (Kilo-, Song- and Yuan-class), the above-mentioned Jin-class SSBN, and a dozen of China’s more advanced guided-missile destroyers and frigates and three new amphibious warfare ships, bringing its total to 29 major surface combatants.

Moreover, according to John Patch (PDF), China’s fast-attack Houbei-class missile catamarans are also primarily based with the East Sea and South Sea Fleets. Those small, cheap vessels might have limited range and defensive capabilities but they have an impressive anti-surface warfare capability, each being armed with eight long-range anti-ship cruise missiles.

The South Sea Fleet may be based out of Zhanjiang on the Chinese mainland. But, given the new submarine and surface warship facilities on the Hainan naval complex, it’s clear the island plays an increasingly important role in its fleet operations. On one hand, it can be seen as a potential SSBN bastion for the undersea leg of China’s nuclear deterrent—in which attack submarines, fast attack ships, and a surface fleet heavy with both anti-ship and air-defence capabilities would be geared towards providing a protective cover for its Jin-class SSBNs against potential anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets.

On the other hand, this naval build-up could be construed in more offensive terms; less about protecting SSBNs and more about magnifying the country’s sea control. While allowing for greater power projection in the IOR, they’re more likely geared for operations in strategically vital locations like the dispute-laden SCS. Attack submarines provide a particularly formidable capability against both submarines and surface ships, while guided-missile destroyers/frigates could provide protection for China’s fleet of missile catamarans and amphibious warships.

Such a possibility puts a worrisome light to recent revelations about land reclamation and construction on numerous reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands. Reports indicate a possible airstrip and anti-aircraft tower being constructed, which could strengthen China’s capacity to operate around these disputed islands. That would be especially true if some of those facilities are capable of providing logistical support for the short-range Houbei catamarans, thereby eliminating one of the key weaknesses of this ‘thoroughbred ship-killer‘.

It’s difficult to determine which interpretation of China’s naval activities is correct, and it’s possible (and likely) that both approaches are being pursued simultaneously. China would, after all, need protective cover for its SSBNs for its bastion strategy to succeed, requiring a capacity for sea control equally usable against other maritime claimants in the South China Sea. Indeed, an SSBN bastion near Hainan Island logically places a premium on China’s capacity to control the surrounding ‘near sea’.

Rather than being distracted by an unsubstantiated red herring, like a putative fourth PLAN fleet over the Indian Ocean, attention needs to be rightly placed on these more immediate and concrete developments. To do otherwise wouldn’t only be detrimental from a security perspective, but strategically foolish as well.

March 22, 2015 asian-defence.net

According to Britain’s Jane’s Defense weekly, China may get through Pakistan the technology in Franch MICA air-to-air missile and RC-400 radar, which the EU bans sales to China. Such technology may constitute a threat to the Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets that Taiwan has got from France.

Pakistan is to get the above-mentioned missiles and radar from France for its JF-17 fighter jets. As JF-17 is jointly developed by Pakistan and China, when Pakistan has got the missile and radar, it is quite possible that China will get the technologies in the missile and radar.

MICA is as good as US advanced AMRAAM air-to-air missile. It is well-known for its accuracy and controllability. China may obtain its technology through reverse engineering from a MICA missile provided by Pakistan.

In developing its J-10 fighter jet, China has reference to the technologies in American F-16 fighter jet as it was able to study in details an F-16 provided by Pakistan.

To prevent China from obtaining French weapon technologies with similar approach, the US will strongly oppose French sales of the weapons to Pakistan. For the same reason India, a major buyer of French weapons, will also oppose.

To avoid such oppositions, MBDA spokesman denied what he previously told Associated Press about its competition with others to get an order for MICA. French defense ministry, however, told Associated Press, there were no reasons that France should not cooperate with Pakistan though it had not confirmed the existence of such transactions.

March 19, 2015 by asian-defence.net

Images have emerged on Chinese military web forums suggesting sensor upgrades to Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) J-11A combat aircraft, with reports noting that two regiments have received these modifications so far.

Upgraded J-11As appear to have four new missile approach warning systems (MAWS), two just aft the cockpit facing forward and two pointing aft on the vertical stabilisers. Similar systems have previously been fitted to the H-6M and H-6K strategic bombers.

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