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24 mars 2014 1 24 /03 /mars /2014 19:30
Iran's 2 Navies Bring Mixture of Threats

 

 

Mar. 24, 2014 - By AWAD MUSTAFA – Defense News


 

DUBAI — Despite limited capabilities and lacking in modernization, Iran has always been seen as the major naval threat in the Arabian Gulf region.

Experts agree this is due to its ability for irregular warfare and to threaten, intimidate and conduct asymmetrical operations and wars of attrition.

According to the January “Gulf Military Balance” report by Anthony Cordesman, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran is sometimes described as the “Hegemon of the Gulf.” But it is a comparatively weak conventional military power with limited modernization since the Iran-Iraq War.

“It depends heavily on weapons acquired by the shah. Most key equipment in its Army, Navy and Air Force are obsolete or relatively low-quality imports,” he wrote.

Cordesman, however, highlighted that Iran is proficient at irregular warfare.

“It has built up a powerful mix of capabilities for both regular and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] forces to defend territory, intimidate neighbors, threaten the flow of oil and shipping through the gulf, and attack gulf targets,” he wrote.

“It has a dedicated force to train and equip non-state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas and Shiite extremists in Iraq — potential proxies that give Iran leverage over other states.”

Matthew Hedges, a military analyst based here with the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, added that the Iranian support of non-state actors such as Hezbollah and the Houthi rebels in Yemen are some of the leading threats in the region.

“The Iranian Revolutionary Guards [Corps] threaten every state in the region,” he said. “The IRGC possess mini-subs and are a constant menace to not only the UAE Navy, but to all naval trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz as they are particularly hard to trace. There have been numerous unconfirmed reports that Iranian midget subs have been spotted within a number of the regional ports, something which is particularly worrying for the entire [Gulf Cooperation Council] region.”

In November, gulf naval commanders stated that the IRGC mini-subs are a major danger in the gulf’s littorals.

“Anti-submarine operations are causing a real challenge to our units in the Arabian Gulf waters due to the small subs that are being used in shallow waters, which creates a challenge for sonar systems to detect them,” UAE Navy Chief Rear Adm. Ibrahim Musharrakh told the Gulf Naval Commanders Conference on Nov. 6.

“Furthermore, the merchant traffic creates clutter and noise that diminishes the capability of submersible devices to spot and helps the mini-subs to operate without being spotted,” he said.

The Iranian Navy and Revolutionary Guard Corps have launched three classes of submarines, two of which are small subs, since 2007. The programs, however, have been secretive, and limited information has been released by the Iranian naval command.

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a nonprofit nuclear watchdog, three Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines were commissioned from 1992 to 1996. They are called Tareq-class subs in Iran.

Iran reportedly paid US $600 million for each boat, and they are based at Bandar Abbas in the Strait of Hormuz. Two of the Kilo-class submarines are operational at any one time and are occasionally deployed in the eastern mouth of the strait, the Gulf of Oman or the Arabian Sea.

However, the real threat is from the smaller submarines deployed in 2007. According to the NTI, that’s when a wave of deployments began of small Ghadir-class and Nahang-class midget submarines for use in shallow coastal waters.

NTI reports that the number of operating Ghadir-class submarines ranges from 10 to 19.

The Ghadir class also is referred to as a subclass of the Yono class, suggesting that the submarines may be based on North Korean technology, although the level of North Korean involvement is unknown, the organization said.

The midget subs are operated by both the Iranian Navy and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). Their operational capabilities include firing torpedoes (both the Ghadir and the Nahang class have two, 533mm tubes), laying mines for anti-shipping operations, as well as insertion of special forces into enemy territory.

Iran also is experimenting with wet submersibles. The Sabehat-15 GPS-equipped two-seat submersible swimmer delivery vehicle (SDV), designed by the Esfahan Underwater Research Center, has undergone testing with both the Iranian Navy and the IRGCN.

NTI’s report on “Iranian Submarine Capabilities,” released in July, states the SDVs, due to their limited endurance and payload, are primarily used for mining, reconnaissance and special operations, and are restricted to operating in coastal waters.

Col. Yousif al-Mannaei, deputy commander of the Bahrain Naval Operations Center, explained the need for more intelligence collection.

“As we all know that the sea is very vital for our well-being and the world economy, the air supremacy and surface supremacy has been achieved,” he said. “However, we have no subsurface superiority in the Arabian Gulf waters.

“It is a real threat, and the [Gulf Cooperation Council] really understands that and are pursuing ways to counter that,” he said. “At this point, the exchange of information and intelligence sharing, as well as the formation of a database, is vital.”

According to Michael Connell, director of Iranian Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, Iran has two independent naval forces with parallel chains of command.

“The two navies have overlapping functions and areas of responsibility, but they are distinct in terms of how they are trained and equipped — and more importantly, also in how they fight,” he wrote in an article for the United States Institute of Peace. “The backbone of the regular Navy’s inventory consists of larger surface ships, including frigates and corvettes and submarines.”

The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy is generally considered to be a conventional “green water” Navy, he wrote, operating at a regional level, mainly in the Gulf of Oman but also as far out as the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

“The Revolutionary Guard’s naval force has a large inventory of small fast-attack craft, and specializes in asymmetrical, hit-and-run tactics; it is more akin to a guerrilla force at sea,” Connell wrote. “Both navies maintain large arsenals of coastal defense and anti-ship cruise missiles and mines.”

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29 janvier 2014 3 29 /01 /janvier /2014 12:20
Espionnage et terrorisme au menu du rapport 2011-2013 du renseignement canadien

 

28 janvier 2014 par Nicolas Laffont – 45eNord.ca

 

Le directeur du Service Canadien du Renseignement de Sécurité (SCRS), Michel Coulombe, a déclaré dans un rapport déposé au Parlement lundi être particulièrement préoccupé par l’espionnage sans cesse grandissant pour ceux qui manifestent un intérêt particulier dans les secteurs du nucléaire, de l’aérospatiale, du pétrole et du gaz du Canada.

 

Le SCRS estime aussi que «la radicalisation de Canadiens qui se tournent vers l’extrémisme violent constitue toujours une importante source de préoccupation sur le plan de la sécurité nationale».

Menaces au pays

En raison de ses «compétences industrielles et technologiques avancées» et de son savoir-faire dans un certain nombre de secteurs, le Canada «représente une cible attrayante pour des services de renseignement étrangers», estime le SCRS dans son rapport.

Plusieurs secteurs de l’économie canadienne intéresseraient particulièrement les espions: l’industrie aérospatiale, la biotechnologie, les produits chimiques, les communications, les technologies de l’information, l’exploitation minière et la métallurgie, l’énergie nucléaire, le pétrole et le gaz ainsi que l’environnement.

«Une puissance étrangère qui exploite secrètement ces secteurs dans le but de faire avancer ses intérêts stratégiques et économiques peut agir au détriment des intérêts et des objectifs du Canada. Ces activités ont des conséquences comme la perte d’emplois, de bénéfices et de recettes fiscales ainsi que l’affaiblissement de la compétitivité», est-il écrit dans le document.

Cela dit, le SCRS révèle que pour lui, l’incident de sécurité nationale le plus troublant en 2011-2013, a eu lieu en janvier 2012, lorsque l’enseigne de vaisseau de 1re classe Jeffrey Paul Delisle a été arrêté à Halifax et accusé d’espionnage pour le compte d’un gouvernement étranger. Il a par la suite plaidé coupable et a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de 20 ans.

Son cas est historique, car c’est la première fois qu’une personne est reconnue coupable d’une infraction à la Loi sur la protection de l’information. Ce cas nous rappelle également que le Canada représente une cible très attrayante pour des services de renseignement hostiles.

«De nos jours, par rapport à n’importe quelle autre période de notre histoire, autant, sinon plus, de tentatives sont faites pour dérober les secrets économiques, militaires et politiques du Canada», estime encore le SCRS.

Autre source de préoccupation du SCRS au pays: en avril 2013, deux hommes – un à Toronto et l’autre à Montréal ont été accusés de planifier un attentat contre un train de voyageurs Via Rail. Lorsqu’ils ont annoncé les arrestations, les représentants des forces policières ont fait allusion à des liens existants entre les accusés et des éléments d’al-Qaïda à l’étranger.

 

Canadiens à l’étranger

Le SCRS se dit également préoccupé – et il réitère ici ses inquiétudes – par le nombre croissant de ressortissants et de résidents Canadiens qui quittent le pays pour participer à des activités terroristes. Non sans un brin d’humour (d’espion), le SCRS demande pourquoi le Canada se «préoccupe autant de ce phénomène, en particulier lorsque les terroristes en puissance ont de bonnes chances de se faire tuer à l’étranger? Ne vaut-il pas mieux que les extrémistes violents quittent le Canada plutôt que d’y rester?»

Y répondant, quelques lignes plus bas, le service de renseignement canadien indique «qu’aucun pays ne peut devenir à son insu un exportateur du terrorisme sans que son image et ses relations à l’échelle internationale n’en souffrent. Le Canada est tenu sur le plan juridique de favoriser la sécurité mondiale, et cela veut dire assumer la responsabilité de ses ressortissants».

Selon l’agence, il y a également le risque que ceux qui sont partis un jour peuvent revenir au pays, encore plus radicalisés que lorsqu’ils sont partis. Le SCRS trouve tout aussi inquiétant, qu’il est «possible qu’après avoir pris part à un conflit à l’étranger ou s’être entraînés auprès d’un groupe terroriste, ils reviennent au pays dotés d’un savoir-faire opérationnel qu’ils peuvent mettre à profit ou enseigner à d’autres extrémistes canadiens».

Rappelons que début 2013, deux jeunes Canadiens ont participé à un attentat contre un complexe gazier en Algérie qui a fait jusqu’à 60 morts, sans compter le cas très médiatisé de deux autres jeunes Canadiens qui se seraient rendus en Afrique du Nord à des fins extrémistes.

Le rapport s’intéresse également aux différents groupes terroristes connus: Al-Qaïda, al-Chabaab, AQPA, API, le front Al-Nosra, AQMI, Boko Haram et Ansaru.

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11 juillet 2013 4 11 /07 /juillet /2013 07:20
What Next for Army Force Structure? (excerpt)

July 9, 2013 Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Two weeks ago, Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno announced significant Army force structure reductions. The impending reorganization helps meet an Army obligation and an Army desire. First, the obligation—it allows the Army to satisfy the fiscal demands required by 2011’s Budget Control Act (BCA). Second, the desire—as the Army eliminates brigade headquarters from its structure to meet budget requirements, it can at the same time increase the fighting potential of its brigade combat teams (BCTs). Specifically, the elimination of BCT headquarters frees up an additional maneuver battalion for each of the Army’s infantry and armored BCTs.

The reduction and reorganization of Army forces is not insignificant. As in the case of rebalancing all U.S. forces toward the Asia-Pacific region, Army force reductions are a visible acknowledgment that the Department of Defense (DoD) is entering a new postwar era. It roughly returns active Army force structure to its pre-9/11 configuration, leaving 33 deployable BCTs in the inventory, after having achieved a wartime high of 45 BCTs. There are clearly important, unanswered questions on the table with respect to the Army.

Q1: How should we look at the postwar Army and its contributions to joint operations?

A1: The U.S. Army remains the nation’s principal ground force. It makes two important contingency contributions to joint operations. First, Army forces—active and reserve—provide U.S. decision-makers with the capability for sustained ground operations abroad and potentially in U.S. homeland security contingencies. In reality, Army forces—often reinforced by the U.S. Marine Corps—are tangible demonstrations of American resolve. To paraphrase a senior Marine Corps officer interviewed during the course of a recent CSIS study, when the U.S. Army arrives on scene, it is an unmistakable indication that America means business.

Indeed, the United States’ continued ability to project large numbers of ground forces overseas for sustained operations is a key metric of its remaining the world’s dominant military power. Second and often less appreciated, Army enabling capabilities—logistics, communications, intelligence, engineers, air and missile defense, etc.—“set” foreign theaters and support deployed forces from the other services and foreign partners. This latter function provides a solid backbone for sustained military campaigns of all types under a variety of circumstances. (end of excerpt)


Click here for the full item (HTML format) on the CSIS website.

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5 juin 2012 2 05 /06 /juin /2012 17:25
The Evolving Maritime Security Environment in East Asia

 

June 5, 2012 By Michael McDevitt / Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) – defpro.com

 

Implications for the US-Japan Alliance

 

Honolulu, Hawaii | The big news from the recently concluded Annual Security Consultative Committee between Japan and the United States, the so-called “2+2 meeting,” was that movement of Marines stationed in Okinawa to Guam was delinked from relocating the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma to a less congested area.

 

This is a welcome development because it should permit senior officials in both Japan and the United States to focus alliance attention where it belongs: on the most significant security challenge facing the alliance – the ongoing change in the maritime strategic balance in East Asia.

 

For half a century, the military balance of power in East Asia was unchanged. The continental powers of East Asia, the Soviet Union and “Red” China, were effectively balanced by the offshore presence of the United States and its island and archipelagic allies. Neither side in this balance had the ability to project decisive conventional military power into the realm of the other – the continent was dominated by the continental powers, while the maritime littoral was the province of the maritime powers led by the United States.

 

This balance began to change about 16 years ago when China had the political motivation and the economic resources to begin to address what has been a historic strategic weakness – its vulnerability to military intervention from the sea. The political motivation for Beijing was provided by fears that newly democratic Taiwan was moving toward de jure independence and the PLA, short of nuclear escalation, was essentially powerless to prevent it, particularly if the United States elected to militarily support such a course of action.

 

WHY IS CHINA MOVING TO THE SEA?

 

Beijing also had plenty of historic motivation. China’s “Century of Humiliation” started in in the mid-19th century with its defeat in the Opium War by the British, who came from the sea. Over the decades China was repeatedly humiliated by foreign powers that exploited China’s weakness along its maritime approaches. A reading of US Seventh Fleet operations in the Taiwan Straits during the 1950s, when multicarrier Task Forces operated with impunity, overflying Chinese coastal cities, is a vivid reminder of Beijing’s incapacity regarding its seaward approaches.

 

A combination of factors related to security has combined to form the strategic motivation for a historically unique Chinese defense perimeter that extends hundreds of miles to sea. These factors include: the issue of Taiwan itself, the fact that the vast majority of China’s unresolved security issues are maritime in nature, the reality that its economic development depends upon imports and of raw materials and exports of finished goods that travel mainly by sea, and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that China’s economic center of gravity is located along its Eastern seaboard.

 

IF CHINA IS DEFENDING ITS INTERESTS, WHY IS THIS A PROBLEM?

 

By moving its defenses far to sea, China is effectively undermining the traditional maritime-continental balance that has provided the security and stability that have fueled the Asian economic miracle of the last 30 years. As China improves its defenses, it is making the security situation of the countries that live in the shadow of China worse. It is creating what academics call a “security dilemma” – one country’s defenses become so effective its neighbors fear for their own security.

 

In 2001, the US Department of Defense began to publicly fret about this situation, characterizing the military problem as “anti-access” and “area denial.” These terms make sense since they accurately describe the desired military objective. The Chinese have also coined a term to describe what they are trying to achieve militarily: PLA strategists refer to it as “counter intervention operations.” In practical terms, this refers to the knitting together of a large submarine force, land-based aircraft carrying anti-ship cruise missiles, and in the near future, ballistic missiles that have the ability to hit moving ships. These capabilities all depend on a very effective ocean surveillance system that can detect and accurately locate approaching naval forces.

 

Whether we call the PLA’s emerging capability anti-access/area denial (A2AD in the Pentagon’s lexicon) or the “counter invention operations,” the desired strategic outcome is the same – keep US naval and air forces as far away from China as possible. The strategic implication of this for China’s neighbors, many of who depend upon the US to underwrite their security as alliance or strategic partners, is obvious. If “we” get into a confrontation with China, we may not be able to depend upon the United States to be able to support us.

 

China says that it is only trying to defend itself and redress a historic weakness. Besides, Beijing argues its strategic intentions are clear: China is on a path of peaceful development and is not a threat to its neighbors. I believe that China’s leaders believe this. The trouble is that, as any strategist will argue, intentions can change in an instant; what really matters are the military capabilities that China will possess when its counter-intervention force is completed. Will China be able to defeat US forward deployed forces and prevent additional forces from the United States from reaching East Asia in case of conflict?

 

THE US HAS FACED THE A2AD PROBLEM BEFORE

 

This is the third time in the last 75 years that the United States has faced the problem of an Asian power attempting to keep US naval forces at bay. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s General Staff developed a plan for dealing with the US Pacific Fleet known as the “Gradual Attrition Strategy” (Zen Gen Saku Sen). This plan used long-range aircraft and submarines to locate the approaching US Pacific Fleet, and then attack it first with submarines and then land-based naval aviation based on various Japanese Mandate Pacific islands. The hope was that the US fleet would by sufficiently worn down that Japan’s main force could defeat it somewhere in the Philippine Sea. It took the United States 30 months (December 1941 – June 1944) to defeat this strategy.

 

The second time the US faced a similar A2AD problem was during the last two decades of the Cold War. The Soviets (in both the Atlantic and Pacific) foreshadowed the PLA’s “counter-invention operation” with a concept based on very good ocean surveillance to locate approaching US naval forces and then vector submarines and long range-land based bombers to the attack. Both submarines and bombers were armed with a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles that would be employed in massed raids. Happily, the US never had to face the Soviet anti-access capability in combat. The US Navy response to the massed cruise missile problem was the development of the AEGIS combat system, which remains the gold-standard for dealing with cruise missiles.

 

WHAT THE US IS DOING TODAY

 

The US response to the challenge posed by the PLA’s “counter-intervention operation,” was unveiled in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. It announced that the US Air Force and US Navy had combined to develop a new operational concept known as Air Sea Battle (ASB). ASB aims to counter any anti-access threat in the world, including that posed by China. Details of this concept have for understandable reasons remained highly classified, but recent statements by the heads of the Navy and Air Force have indicated that ASB will focus on three lines of effort: (1) defeating enemy surveillance systems as surveillance is the back-bone of any anti-access system. If you can’t locate an approaching naval force you can’t attack it; (2) destroying enemy launching systems so precision weapons cannot be launched (during the Cold War this was known as shooting at archers not at arrows); and, (3) defeating enemy missiles and other weapons. This means shooting them down, or decoying them away.

 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

 

It is unlikely that China will halt development of what it considers necessary for its defenses. It is also clear that the United States does not intend to sit idly by and permit the introduction of military capabilities that could deny it access to East Asia in a time of conflict. Thus, it seems likely that for the foreseeable future the region will witness a “military capabilities competition”: as China introduces capabilities that could deny access, the US, probably via the Air Sea Battle concept, will introduce capabilities that will assure access. It will be a period of competing strategic concepts – assured access vs. denied access, complemented by the introduction of military capabilities by both sides necessary to accomplish those ends.

 

For the US-Japan alliance, the prospect that any maritime operation in the western Pacific will soon be contested in times of conflict creates a new context for the division of roles and missions. Today’s division of labor, characterized as “shield and spear” responsibilities, where Japan is the “shield” defending Japanese home territories, while the US acts as the “spear” that attacks Japan’s attackers needs to be reconsidered. A successful “counter intervention operation” could blunt the US spear. What can Japan do to help prevent that from taking place? This is a serious topic for both strategic and operational discussion.

 

 

 

(Michael McDevitt is a retired US Navy Rear Admiral. For the last 15 years he has been at the Center for Naval Analyses, first as the vice president in charge of strategic studies, and more recently as a senior fellow. His most recent area of focus is maritime security along the Indo-Pacific littoral.)

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