May. 6, 2013 - By MARCUS WEISGERBER  - Defense News

Experts: Move Could Protect Some Programs

WASHINGTON — For years, the Pentagon has been working to move funding from temporary war spending accounts into the base budget, particularly for brick-and-mortar efforts that were borne out of a decade of counterinsurgency fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq — and will likely live on long after the last soldier has left Bagram.

Heavily armored vehicles, unmanned aircraft and even Army end-strength increases have all been funded in part or wholly through the overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget. Under pressure from Congress, the US Defense Department has been shifting funding for these institutionalized efforts into the base budget, leaving the true downrange operational funding in OCO.

But that’s now being put on hold.

“We agreed that we would not try to move any further money from OCO to base, just because there is so much going on” with budget uncertainty, Pentagon Comptroller Robert Hale said during a May 2 interview.

Such a hold on shifting money to the base, coupled with the expectations that OCO funding will not decline apace with the troop drawdown in Afghanistan, could mean that some programs that were in danger of losing their funding could find a safe haven in the OCO budget, defense experts say.

The Obama administration, upon taking office in 2009, put strict guidelines on OCO spending requests.

“My sense is [those restrictions] have gotten looser every year as the Pentagon’s banged away at trying to use the OCO request to make up for shortfalls in the base,” said Gordon Adams, who oversaw defense budgets during the Clinton administration. “This is the environment that we’re in, and OCO now looks like an attractive pocket to put some stuff back in.”

The war budget has declined sharply since 2010, dropping from $162 billion that year to $115 billion in 2012.

DoD plans to continue requesting OCO funds for “several more years,” even as combat operations in Afghanistan draw down, Hale said. Those funds will go toward whatever force level remains after 2014 and the hefty equipment repair bill.

“Some of the money that’s in there probably is going to have to migrate back into the base,” he said. “How we’re going to do that in the light of [the] current budgetary situation, that will be a challenge.”

Since Afghanistan is landlocked, the cost of removing equipment and supplies is far higher than DoD experienced in Iraq. DoD officials are in the process of estimating the total Afghanistan drawdown cost.

The Pentagon has not submitted a 2014 OCO proposal to Congress, but is “getting close,” Hale said. The 2014 budget request included an $88.5 billion “placeholder” for the war budget.

“I don’t think we’ll be above that,” Hale said. “I don’t know yet how much we will be below it. But it is worth saying, as we move toward a responsible drawdown, the budget isn’t going to come down proportionately to the forces there because there are a lot of costs, some for forces that are involved in other things than Afghanistan. Some for supporting activities like intelligence, that just don’t come down proportionately to troop levels.”

In that request, equipment removal and retrograde is expected to be between $3 billion and $4 billion, Hale said.

DoD requested $88.5 billion in war funding in 2013; however, after sequestration, it will only receive about $81 billion. DoD is preparing a $7 billion reprogramming request that should shift funds to cover the balance. But at the same time, DoD has experienced higher than expected operating costs in Afghanistan, particularly due to a higher fighting tempo and the cost of removing equipment.

Sequestration Estimate Down

The total level of sequestration cuts was revised after Congress passed a full-year defense appropriation in late March.

“The 1980 Balanced Budget Emergency Deficit Control Act that governs sequestration has a provision that says if the budget goes down significantly, in fiscal ’12 and fiscal ’13 in this case, more than the sequestration level, then that particular account doesn’t have to be cut further by sequestration,” Hale said. “We had a number of accounts, mainly in ‘other procurement’ and ‘military construction,’ that were cut very sharply in ’12 and ’13.”

Since the cuts went down so sharply in consecutive years, they were not subject to sequestration.

While the total impact on 2013 defense spending through sequestration has fallen — the latest number is $37 billion for the rest of this fiscal year — the cuts are having an impact.

Training across the military services has come to a halt, civilian furloughs are expected, and weapons buyers anticipate purchasing fewer systems than planned.

“You’re going to see cuts in unit procurement,” Hale said. “They won’t be huge, but they’ll be noticeable.”

Program delays, particularly in research and development, test and evaluation are expected. Even if sequestration is lifted, it will have a far-reaching impact.

“I think, unfortunately, we are incurring future costs,” Hale said. “One of the things our managers are doing ... is putting off costs and assigning a 12-month contract that covers part of next fiscal year. It essentially pushes costs off until next year.

“So unfortunately, I think we are pushing off costs until ’14, which worries me because it’s not clear that things will be a lot better in fiscal ’14,” he said.

DoD’s 2014 budget proposal does not account for sequestration, and it would have to be cut by $52 billion if the cuts remain in place.

Two-Year Money

Separately, the Pentagon is seeking more flexibility within its personnel and operations and maintenance accounts.

Money appropriated by Congress in these accounts is only good for one year, whereas procurement funding is good for three years, and research and development for two years. If the money is not spent in that timeframe, it is returned to the treasury.

Because of this, program managers have a tendency to expend funds near the end of the fiscal year. Hale said making personnel and operations and maintenance money available for two years would help end the so-called use-it-or-lose-it mentality.

“I think that would help us change the culture, and we need to continue to emphasize to our people end-of-year spending binges are bad,” Hale said.

The funds also would be available for higher-priority items, Hale said.

Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s acquisition chief, recently released new guidance that he hopes changes the culture from a weapons buying system that punishes program managers who do not spend all of the funds.

“If somebody can return money to the department, or buy additional products in their own program, that’s a good thing,” Kendall said at an April 24 meeting with reporters at the Pentagon.

Projecting certain personnel costs in advance — such as moving expenses when troops are re-stationed — is a difficult task.

“You gotta guess at the end of the year how many of those moves, some of which occur or are paid after the end of the year, you have to estimate how many,” Hale said. “It’s hard to do.”

In the past, DoD violated the Antideficiency Act because its cost estimates were too low. Still, getting this type of spending authority is not likely, as Congress has quashed Pentagon attempts for this type of flexibility in the past.

In one instance, DoD asked Congress to allow 2 percent of the military personnel budget to be available for an additional six months. Lawmakers did not approve the request.

“I don’t have high hopes that they’re going to give me a two-year appropriation for all of [the] personnel,” Hale said

7 May 2013 army-technology.comGDC4S

General Dynamics C4 Systems () has been awarded a contract modification for the development of a next-generation radar system as part of the US Army's range radar replacement programme (RRRP).

Valued at $16m, the contract covers engineering, development and initial manufacture of a new high/medium power close-in radar system, designed to provide enhanced fidelity during tracking of munitions and other targets at a range of 37m or more.

General Dynamics C4 Systems president Chris Marzilli said: "The close-in radar system is the second in a new generation of range instrumentation radars that deliver cost-effective, digital technologies and systems needed to meet the army's goal of modernising test ranges in Alabama, Arizona, New Mexico and Maryland."

Capable of acquiring information about the launch and early stages of flight for munitions and other low-flying objects, the radar joins the fly-out radar, the first system ordered by the army from the company under the $385m RRRP contract in June 2012.

The close-in radar systems are also expected to reduce the cost and downtime associated with the maintenance and relocation of old and obsolete radar systems that are currently installed at army test ranges across the US.

Capable of tracking up to 40 test objects over a range of 60 miles, the fly-out radar system recently completed the requirements phase of development.

Based on STAR Dynamics' XSTAR family of instrumentation radar, GDC4S's RRRP solution is scheduled to replace obsolete tracking radars at White Sands Test Center in New Mexico, Yuma Test Center in Arizona, Aberdeen Test Center in Maryland, as well as at Redstone Test Center in Alabama, US.

Led by GDC4S, the RRRP team includes STAR Dynamics, Georgia Tech Research Institute, and EO Imaging.

The delivery schedule has not been disclosed.

May 7, 2013 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: US Department of Defense; issued May 6, 2013)

WASHINGTON --- NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned today that further cuts in defense spending by European nations risk reducing the continent’s defense and security to “hot air,” turning the alliance into what he called a “global spectator” rather than a real force on the world stage.

“The only way to avoid this is by holding the line on defense spending and to start reinvesting in security as soon as our economies recover,” he told a meeting in Brussels of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Rasmussen said European nations should not become absorbed by their own domestic issues, including sluggish economies that have contributed to defense cuts, and instead develop a “truly global perspective” to respond to crises further away from home.

“Having the right capabilities is important, but it is not enough,” he said. “We must also have the political will to use them, to deal with security challenges on Europe’s doorstep, to help manage crises further away that might affect us here at home, and to better share the security burden with our North American allies.”

Meanwhile, he said, European nations need to make better use of what they have – “to do more together as Europeans – within the European Union and within NATO - to deliver the critical defense capabilities that are too expensive for any individual country to deliver alone.”

It was the latest in a series of warnings over the past several years by Rasmussen that further cuts by European governments in defense spending could put NATO’s viability at risk. In 2011, Rasmussen said the trend suggested the continent was headed toward getting out of the security business entirely, pointing out that European nations had cut their defense budgets by $45 billion - the equivalent of Germany’s entire annual defense budget - while U.S contributions to NATO had increased from about half of total alliance spending to close to 75 percent.

Those comments were followed by a blunt warning from then-U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who said NATO risked “irrelevance” and a “dismal future” if alliance members were not seen as “serious and capable partners in their own defense.”

Today, Rasmussen said soft power alone really is no power at all.

“Without hard capabilities to back up its diplomacy, Europe will lack credibility and influence,” he added. “It will risk being a global spectator, rather than the powerful global actor that it can be and should be.” (ends)

May 7, 2013 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: Express News Service; published May 7, 2013)

Impossible to Set Time Frame for MMRCA Deal: Antony

NEW DELHI --- Union Defence Minister A K Antony on Monday said it was not possible to set a time frame for signing the much-awaited deal for the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) with French company Dassault Aviation.

The contract, said to be worth nearly Rs 1 lakh crore, is still at the negotiation stage, a year-and-a-half after the French firm emerged as the lowest bidder in the tender which was floated in August 2007.

“Given the complexity of the proposal, no definite time frame can be fixed at this stage (for signing the deal),” Antony said in a written reply in Parliament.

“The proposal for procurement of the 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft is currently at the stage of commercial discussions with the L1 vendor, Dassault Aviation and hence the terms and conditions for purchase including the delivery schedule are yet to be finalised,” he said.

However, the Defence Minister pointed out that the Request for Proposal–defence parlance for a commercial tender – stipulated that the delivery of the 18 flyaway aircraft should take place between the third and fourth years after the signing of the contract. The manufacturing of the remaining 108 fighters under licence from Dassault will take place here from the 4th to the 11th year after the signing of the contract.

Dassault has offered its Rafale combat planes to India under the Request for Proposal and it had beaten the European consortium EADS Cassidian, which had offered its Eurofighter Typhoon plane, in the last stage of the tendering process in January 2012. The two firms had been down-selected by the Indian Air Force after intense flight and weapons trials in which the US aircraft – Lockheed Martin’s F-16 and Boeing’s F/A-18 – Russian United Aircraft Corporation’s MiG-35 and Swedish Saab’s Gripen were eliminated from the competition in April 2011.

Meanwhile, the Army is planning to procure 100 self-propelled artillery howitzers and three Indian vendors, including two private companies, have been selected for trial of their equipment, A K Antony told the Lok Sabha on Monday.

In a written reply to the lower house of Parliament, the Defence Ministry also said the recent amendment to Defence Procurement Procedure-2011 aims at giving higher preference to indigenous capacity in the defence sector.

29/04/2013 Par Bénédicte GOUTTEBROZE

Denis Pinoteau est nommé directeur commercial export véhicules légers à roues de Nexter, groupe industriel spécialisé dans l'armement appartenant à l'État français. Il est sous la responsabilité directe de Jean-Christophe Bund, deputy director sales & marketing.

Diplômé de Saint-Cyr en 1991 et titulaire d'un executive MBA obtenu à HEC Paris en 2005, Denis Pinoteau était précédemment responsable commercial export Inde et Moyen-Orient chez Sagem, depuis 2006.

Nexter fabrique du matériel militaire pour le combat terrestre, aéroterrestre, aéronaval et naval.

May 7, 2013: Strategy Page

In Tunisia a group of fifty or more Islamic terrorists are operating in the Mount Chaambi region near the Algerian border (close to the Kasserine Pass through the Atlas Mountains that stretch across most of the North African coast ). Soldiers and police are searching a hundred square kilometers of sparsely populated forests and mountains without much success. The searchers have found evidence that there is someone up there, but the group has so far managed to avoid detection. This is the first time Tunisia has had to deal with armed Islamic terrorists since 2007.

These armed men have been active in the area for at least six months. Soldiers sent to the area have suffered about twenty casualties from booby-traps and handmade landmines left around by the terrorists. A camp found near the top of Mount Chaambi and it contained documents, weapons and equipment indicating the size and origin of the group. This group appears to be well supplied and seems to have enough cash to keep themselves going for a while. Some of these men have recently fled Mali and others are from Algeria. These were joined by a smaller group (a dozen or so) of Tunisian Islamic terrorists who had apparently not been active until joined by all these new men and a few local recruits. Eleven of the 32 terrorists killed nearby in an attack on an Algerian natural gas field in January were Tunisian which provided a hint that there were a lot more Islamic terrorists in Tunisia than the government wanted to admit.

There has been one gun battle near Mount Chaambi so far, in which no one was hurt. Police have arrested twenty suspects in the region, but none of these appear to have much knowledge of the Islamic terrorists in the mountains. There appear to be at least two separate armed groups and police are blocking the few roads in the area to try and prevent the terrorists from moving to another part of the country.

Tunisia was the first country to carry out an Arab Spring uprising and a new government was installed two years ago. Islamic radicals were released from jail and allowed to operate in the open as long as they did not turn to terrorism or anything illegal inside Tunisia. These radicals have tried, so far without success, to get the new government to establish a religious dictatorship that would enforce Islamic (Sharia) law.

May 7, 2013: Strategy page

The recent (April 15th) Chinese incursion inside Indian Kashmir has reminded Indian military leaders that despite over five years of brave talk and bold plans not much has actually been accomplished to rectify the shortage of access to the Indian side of the border. It was this lack of access that played a key role in the last border war with China (in 1962) which saw better prepared and supplied Chinese forces wearing down their brave but ill-supplied Indian opponents. Indians are waking up to the fact that a repeat of their 1962 defeat is in the making.

Over the last five years India has ordered roads built so that troops can reach the Chinese border in sufficient strength to stop a Chinese invasion. The roads have, for the most part, not been built. The problem is the Indian bureaucracy and its inability to get anything done quickly, or even on time. The military procurement bureaucracy is the best, or worst example of this. The military procurement bureaucracy takes decades to develop and produce locally made gear and often never delivers. Buying foreign equipment is almost as bad, with corruption and indecisiveness delaying, and sometimes halting selection and purchase of needed items.

Despite the bureaucracy some progress has been made. Three years ago India quietly built and put into service an airfield for transports in the north (Uttarakhand) near their border with China. While the airfield can also be used to bring in urgently needed supplies for local civilians during those months when snow blocks the few roads, it is mainly there for military purposes in case China invades again. Uttarakhand is near Kashmir and a 38,000 square kilometer chunk of land that China seized after a brief war with India in 1962. This airfield and several similar projects along the Chinese border are all about growing fears of continued Chinese claims on Indian territory. India is alarmed at increasing strident Chinese insistence that is owns northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This has led to an increased movement of Indian military forces to that remote area.

India has discovered that a buildup in these remote areas is easier said than done. Without new roads nothing else really makes much difference. Airfields require fuel and other supplies to be more than just another place where an aircraft can land (and not take off if it needs refueling). Moreover, the Indians found that they were far behind Chinese efforts. When they took a closer look three years ago, Indian staff officers discovered that China had improved its road network along most of their 4,000 kilometer common border. Indian military planners calculated that, as a result of this network, Chinese military units could move 400 kilometers a day on hard surfaced roads, while Indian units could only move half as fast, while suffering more vehicle damage because of the many unpaved roads. Moreover China had more roads right up to the border. Building more roads on the Indian side will take years, once the bureaucratic problems are overcome (which often takes a decade). The roads are essential to support Indian plans to build more airfields near the border and stationing modern fighters there. Military planners found, once the terrain was surveyed and calculations completed, that it would take a lot more time because of the need to build maintenance facilities, roads to move in fuel and supplies, and housing for military families.

All these border disputes have been around for centuries but became more immediate when India and China fought a short war, up in these mountains, in 1962. The Indians lost and are determined not to lose a rematch. But so far, the Indians have been falling farther behind China. This situation developed because India, decades ago, decided that one way to deal with a Chinese invasion was to make it difficult for them to move forward. Thus, for decades, the Indians built few roads on their side of the border. But that also made it more difficult for Indian forces to get into the disputed areas. This strategy suited the Indian inability to actually build roads in these sparsely inhabited areas.

The source of the current border tension goes back a century and heated up when China resumed its control over Tibet in the 1950s. From the end of the Chinese empire in 1912 up until 1949 Tibet had been independent. But when the communists took over China in 1949, they sought to reassert control over their "lost province" of Tibet. This began slowly, but once all of Tibet was under Chinese control in 1959, China once again had a border with India and there was immediately a disagreement about exactly where the border should be. That’s because, in 1914, the newly independent government of Tibet worked out a border (the McMahon line) with the British (who controlled India). China considers this border agreement illegal and wants 90,000 square kilometers back. India refused, especially since this would mean losing much of the state of Arunachal Pradesh in northeastern India and some bits elsewhere in the area.

Putting more roads into places like Arunachal Pradesh (83,000 square kilometers and only a million people) and Uttarakhand (53,566 square kilometers and ten million people) will improve the economy, as well as military capabilities. This will be true of most of the border area. For decades local civilians along these borders have been asking for more roads and economic development, but were turned down because of the now discredited Indian strategy.

All the roads won't change the fact that most of the border is mountains, the highest mountains (the Himalayas) in the world. So no matter how much you prepare for war, no one is going very far, very fast, when you have to deal with these mountains. As the Indians discovered, the Chinese persevered anyway and built roads and railroads anyway and now India has to quickly respond in kind or face a repeat of their 1962 defeat.

Despite the lack of roads India has moved several infantry divisions, several squadrons of Su-30 fighters, and six of the first eight squadrons of its new Akash air defense missile systems as close to the Chinese border as their existing road network will allow. Most of these initially went into Assam, just south of Arunachal Pradesh, until the road network is built up sufficiently to allow bases to be maintained closer to the border. It may be a decade or more before those roads are built, meaning China can seize Arunachal Pradesh anytime it wants and there’s not much India can do to stop it.

Undeterred by that the Indian Army has asked for $3.5 billion in order to create three more brigades (two infantry and one armored) to defend the Chinese border. Actually, this new force is in addition to the new mountain corps (of 80,000 troops) nearing approval (at a cost of $11.5 billion). The mountain corps is to be complete in four years. The three proposed brigades would be ready in 4-5 years. By the end of the decade India will have spent nearly five billion dollars on new roads, rail lines, and air fields near the 4,057 kilometer long Chinese border. Spending the money is not the same as actually getting the roads and railroads actually built.

All this is another example of the old saying that amateurs (and politicians) talk tactics, while professionals talk logistics. China realized this first and has built 58,000 kilometers of roads to the Indian border, along with five airbases and several rail lines. Thus China can move thirty divisions to the border, which is three times more than India can get to its side of the frontier.

07.05.2013 par P. CHAPLEAU Lignes de Défense

Le deuxième numéro de la série documentaires "Etranges Affaires" est en cours de post-production et sera diffusé sur France 3 en juillet. Il est consacré à l'affaire des Exocet français aux mains des Argentins, lors de la guerre des Malouines.

Le 4 mai 1982, un missile Exocet lancé par un Super Etendard de l’aéronavale argentine coule un destroyer de la Royal Navy venue reconquérir les îles Malouines. Le couple Super Etendard-Exocet, fabriqué par les Français, va être l'objet d'une guerre secrète entre Britanniques et Argentins.

Comme le précédent numéro de la série consacré à l'affaire des Vedettes de Cherbourg, le deuxième épisode d'"Etranges Affaires" est un documentaire hybride de 52 minutes qui associe archives, témoignages et animation. L'enquête est menée par Sasha Maréchal (interprétée par la comédienne Ina Mihalache) et Patrick Pesnot (dans son propre rôle). Les témoins clés en Argentine, au Royaume-Uni et en France décryptent le rôle des armes françaises pendant la guerre des Malouines. De l'attaque du destroyer Sheffield à l'opération Plum-Duff menée par les forces spéciales britanniques, le film propose un regard inédit sur cette affaire qui agita les relations entre Margaret Thatcher et François Mitterrand.

Ce deuxième opus d'"Etranges Affaires" est une coproduction Vivement Lundi !/Antoine Martin Productions avec la participation de l'unité documentaire de France 3, en association avec France 3 Nord-Ouest.

07 mai 2013 Romandie.com (AFP)

DUBAI - Un chef d'Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (Aqmi) a appelé à attaquer les intérêts français partout dans le monde, dans une vidéo mise en ligne mardi.

Dénonçant la croisade menée par la France contre les musulmans au Mali, Abou Obeida Youssef Al-Annabi exhorte les musulmans dans le monde entier à attaquer les intérêts français partout, car ce sont des cibles légitimes.

07/05/2013 Sources : EMA

Le 23 avril 2013, le vice-amiral Marin Gillier, commandant la zone maritime de l’Océan Indien (ALINDIEN), s’est rendu pour la deuxième fois sur le camp de Za’taari, en Jordanie, pour y rencontrer les militaires déployés dans le cadre de l’opération Tamour.

Lors de sa venue, l’amiral a rencontré les 80 militaires issus des trois armées et du  service de santé des armées (SSA) et visité les installations du groupement médical (GM), modifié pour pouvoir accueillir d’avantage de patients.

L’amiral Gillier s’est ensuite entretenu avec un certain nombre d’autorités sur place dont le général commandant la gendarmerie jordanienne de la zone Nord, le responsable du Haut-Commissariat des Réfugiés des Nations Unies (UNHCR) au camp de Za’taari, ainsi que les responsables de l’hôpital militaire marocain.

Enfin, il a effectué une visite du camp afin d’en apprécier les évolutions et  l’environnement.

En accord avec les autorités jordaniennes, la France a projeté en août 2012 un Groupement médico-chirurgical (GMC), aujourd’hui GM, sur le camp de Za’taari en Jordanie, afin d’apporter une aide médicale d’urgence aux victimes des combats en Syrie et un soutien sanitaire aux réfugiés. Au terme de sa mission, le GMC avait réalisé plus de 300 opérations chirurgicales.

Depuis mars 2013, avec l’évolution de la situation générale et des systèmes de coopération sur place, le groupement médical a adapté son offre de soins et se concentre sur le soutien médical dont les réfugiés présents sur le camp ont le plus besoin.

Parallèlement au GM, et depuis le 7 janvier 2013, une équipe mobile de vaccination a été mise en place, afin de s’adapter à la nouvelle situation générale du camp. Depuis août 2012, le personnel du SSA a procédé à près de 38 000 vaccinations et près de 9150 consultations médicales. Des médecins et infirmiers militaires arment le groupement médical tandis qu’un détachement de militaires français assure la force protection de nos installations.

07/05/2013 Par Laure Mandeville – Lefigaro.fr

Devant la crainte d'une contagion régionale, Washington résiste aux pressions pour intervenir dans le conflit.

Avec la stupéfiante affirmation de Carla Del Ponte, selon laquelle l'utilisation de gaz sarin en Syrie pourrait avoir été le fait des rebelles et non du régime d'Assad, la confusion redouble à Washington sur la marche à suivre, même si la Maison-Blanche s'est dite hier «hautement sceptique» sur l'hypothèse d'une utilisation d'armes chimiques par les insurgés, pointant du doigt le pouvoir. Dans le brouillard de la guerre syrienne, l'appel à la prudence d'Obama s'en trouve renforcé, lui permettant de gagner du temps.

Cette prudence apparaît comme un réflexe salutaire, au moment où le président semblait tenté de céder aux pressions de faucons du Congrès qui appellent à une immixtion américaine. «Clairement, la meilleure option est de ne rien faire du tout», juge l'ancien ambassadeur Chas Freeman, spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, consterné par «les fautes d'amateur» de l'Administration, qui a tracé une ligne rouge à propos des armes chimiques «sans même avoir réfléchi à ce que pourrait être une réponse américaine». «La situation est incertaine et exige la plus grande circonspection», confirme une source diplomatique occidentale. En même temps, l'inaction ne sera pas «acceptable bien longtemps», car le conflit menace de déborder, souligne Brian Katulis, expert au Center for American Progress.

Après deux longues guerres en Irak et en Afghanistan, l'idée que l'Amérique doive cesser de policer le monde est ancrée dans la tête du président américain et de ses concitoyens. Quelque 62% des Américains sont opposés à une action ­militaire en Syrie. Obama reste persuadé que la seule bataille à mener est celle de la reconstruction de l'Amérique. En août, il avait bloqué une initiative de la secrétaire d'État Hillary Clinton, du patron du Pentagone Leon Panetta et du chef de la CIA David Petraeus, qui prônaient la fourniture d'armes aux insurgés, craignant d'armer des djihadistes proches d'al-Qaida.

Accusé de faiblesse, en pleine campagne présidentielle

En même temps, parce qu'il était accusé de faiblesse en pleine campagne présidentielle, Obama avait cru bon d'adopter une position de fermeté sur les armes chimiques. Il avait averti le régime d'Assad qu'il s'agirait là d'une «ligne rouge», susceptible de déclencher une réponse des États-Unis. Ce week-end, le New York Times a rapporté que sa sortie avait été une improvisation personnelle, pas le fait d'une position mûrie par le Conseil de sécurité nationale. De fait, Obama a tenté d'en minimiser la portée.

Des consultations intenses entre alliés américains, français et britanniques ont été annoncées aux journalistes sur l'évaluation de différentes «options militaires» - de la fourniture d'armes aux rebelles à des frappes aériennes, en passant par une zone d'interdiction de vol. Au Congrès, les partisans d'une intervention se sont rués sur l'aubaine pour souligner que ne rien faire porterait un coup dur à la crédibilité des États-Unis et encouragerait d'éventuels États voyous à les défier.

Obama est en train de glisser vers une guerre dont il ne veut pas

Boosté par les raids israéliens en Syrie, le sénateur John McCain s'est demandé pourquoi l'Amérique restait si timorée. Un haut responsable de l'Administration a reconnu ce week-end qu'il faudrait sans doute se résoudre à armer les rebelles. «Nous devons travailler… à accélérer le départ d'Assad», a déclaré samedi William Burns, secrétaire d'État adjoint. C'était comme si Obama était en train de glisser vers une guerre dont il ne veut pas. La Maison-Blanche comme le Pentagone restent très réservés sur toute action militaire, contrairement au département d'État.

Les déclarations de Carla Del Ponte, même ramenées par l'ONU à des «allégations», représentent une aubaine pour le président. Elles sèment le doute sur «les bons et les méchants» du conflit, un flou dont le «logiciel» psychologique américain, plutôt binaire, a du mal à s'accommoder. Pour l'ancien ambassadeur Freeman, il n'y a aucune option satisfaisante. Les États-Unis, la France et la Grande-Bretagne ont, selon lui, fait une erreur en appelant au départ d'Assad en 2011, «tuant tout espoir de dialogue». Une autre faute a été commise sur les armes chimiques, car, en instaurant une ligne rouge rhétorique, on a ouvert la porte à «des manipulations, les Syriens étant des maîtres de la fabrication de preuves». Ainsi, la gestion du dossier est «prisonnière des débats internes» aux États-Unis et «déconnectée d'un conflit régional qui s'étend».

6 mai Aerobuzz.fr

Rolls-Royce a annoncé (2 mai 2013) le départ inattendu de Mark King, directeur de la branche aéronautique, quatre mois seulement après la fusion entre les activités civils et militaires de cette dernière. Mark King était directeur de l’unité aéronautique civile avant de prendre la tête de la nouvelle division regroupant les activités civiles et militaires en janvier 2013. Ce départ soudain serait la conséquence d’une décision personnelle. King a travaillé pendant 27 ans chez Rolls-Royce

06/05/2013 Nabil Bourassi et Michel Cabirol – LaTribune.fr

Difficile de chiffrer le coût unitaire du missile balistique M51, un programme top secret lié à la dissuasion nucléaire. Aussi le montant de 120 millions d'euros évoqués par certains médias ne semble pas être le bon. Il est probable que le coût soit en réalité un peu plus élevé...

Combien coûte un missile balistique mer-sol M51, tel que celui qui s'est auto-détruit dimanche au large du Finistère après son décollage dans une zone interdite pour la circonstance à la navigation maritime et à la circulation aérienne dans le cadre d'un tir d'essai lancé ? Un essai nécessaire pour la qualification du missile sur "Le Vigilant", le sous-marin nucléaire lanceur d'engins (SNLE) qui l'a mis à feu dans la baie d'Audierne (Finistère). Plusieurs médias avancent un montant de 120 millions d'euros mais, selon une source proche du dossier, ce chiffre, qui fait couler beaucoup d'encre depuis l'annonce par la Marine nationale de l'explosion du missile dépourvu de sa charge nucléaire, n'est pas le bon.

Difficile à chiffrer

Il est vraisemblable que le coût unitaire d'un M51 soit plus élevé que celui annoncé par la presse. Le coût du M51 dans sa version opérationnelle pourrait se situer autour du coût d'un lanceur Ariane 5 (environ 150 millions d'euros), assure-t-on à La Tribune. En réalité, le coût d'un essai d'un missile M51, qui peut surprendre au moment où la France est contrainte à faire des économies, est difficile à établir en raison des trop nombreuses incertitudes qui pèsent sur ce programme top secret touchant intimement à la souveraineté nationale de la France. Un programme qui s'élève dans sa globalité à plus de 11 milliards d'euros, développement compris, selon le ministère de la Défense. Soit trois lots de 16 missiles M51, qui équipent les quatre SNLE tricolores auxquels il faut rajouter quelques missiles supplémentaires. Impossible d'en connaître avec certitude le nombre d'exemplaires qui seront produits au total.

En outre, il faut ajouter le développement de la composante embarquée du système d'armes de dissuasion M51 (CESAD M51) avec notamment le moyen d'essai Cétacé (caisson d'essai de tir), la construction puis l'exploitation des moyens d'essais, l'approvisionnement et la mise en place de cette CESAD M51 à bord des trois premiers SNLE NG (Le Triomphant, Le Téméraire, Le Vigilant), la fourniture de la logistique initiale à terre et, enfin, l'adaptation au M51 du centre d'entraînement des forces sous-marines. Le SNLE "Le Vigilant", qui a lancé le M51 dimanche, a ainsi été immobilisé plusieurs mois pour pouvoir accueillir ce nouveau missile. Les sous-marins, à l'exception du SNLE « Le Terrible », qui a été construit directement en version M51, doivent être adaptés à ce missile, qui est d'une plus grande taille et plus lourd que le missile M45.

Un programme stratégique

L'enjeu stratégique du M51, lancé en 1992 et piloté par la filiale spatiale d'EADS, Astrium, a été confirmé par le nouveau Livre blanc de la Défense et de la sécurité nationale, un document publié lundi dernier qui renouvelle la doctrine de la France en matière de défense. Le président François Hollande avait demandé aux auteurs du Livre blanc de sanctuariser la dissuasion nucléaire (aéroportée et maritime). D'où la nécessité pour la France de disposer d'équipements modernes. Résultat de cette ambition, le M51, dont le permier vol est intervenu en nobembre 2006, est un bijou de technologies militaires et présente des "différences significatives par rapport à son prédécesseur", écrit Astrium sur son site internet.

Il mesure 12 mètres de haut et pèse 50 tonnes sur la balance, soit 15 tonnes de plus que son prédécesseur, le M45. Il est également capable de se projeter sur un rayon de 8.000 km contre 6.000 km auparavant, et ce, à la vitesse de Mach 15, soit plus de 18.000 km/h. Enfin, le M51 peut transporter jusqu'à 10 têtes nucléaires contre 6 pour la génération précédente. Le M51 dispose d'une capacité d'emport supérieure et adaptable, d'une meilleure portée, et bénéficiera d'une plus grande aptitude à pénétrer les défenses adverses grâce à la furtivité des têtes et aux nouvelles aides à la pénétration associées. Le M51.2, une version modernisée du M51 opérationnelle à partir de 2015, emportera la tête nucléaire TNO (tête nucléaire océanique au lieu des têtes nucléaires TN75 actuelles). Son niveau de sûreté nucléaire est accru.

Une enquête top secrète

Pour toutes ces raisons, la Marine nationale a engagé des prospections dans la baie d'Audierne afin de récupérer les débris du missile, qui gisent par une centaine de mètres de fond. Des robots sous-marins ont même été envoyés pour sonder le fond de la baie et récupérer la moindre trace de ce missile. Le capitaine de Corvette, Lionel Delort, a admis que l'essai balistique était un "échec" et qu'une enquête allait être conduite afin d'en déterminer les raisons. La Marine nationale ou l'industriel ne communiqueront pas les conclusions de cette enquête qui sera classée secret défense.

L'enquête va suivre un processus bien huilé. La direction générale de l'armement (DGA), les industriels, notamment Astrium, et la Marine vont dans un premier temps récupérer toutes les données de l'essai raté, puis les analyser. "Cela peut prendre quelques jours, voire quelques mois, on part sans a priori mais c'est sans doute un phénomène complexe à analyser", explique-t-on à La Tribune. Et cette équipe d'ingénieurs va soit éliminer, soit confirmer une à une les causes de cet échec.