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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:50
SME Showcase at DSEI 2015

 

16 September 2015, Centre for Defence Enterprise, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and Ministry of Defence

 

The Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE) will showcase some of the best research ideas it's funded, delivered by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

 

At DSEI 2015, 10 SMEs who have been successful through CDE funding competitions will present their work in 5-minute pitches. Time for networking will follow.

This session will take place on Thursday 17 September 2015, 12pm to 2pm in the West Theatre, Unmanned Zone. Find out more.

It will include an introduction to CDE opportunities, before hearing first hand from the 10 SMEs about their companies and their innovations.

The session will be very useful for those with an interest in innovative defence research and to meet up-and-coming SMEs who have been funded as part of the CDE supply chain.

The companies exhibiting for CDE are listed below. The innovation summaries link to a case study from each organisation.

 

Company

Innovation summary

Autonomous Devices

Improvised robotic devices

Folium Optics

Adaptive camouflage technology

IQHQ

High-resilience radio communication receivers

Kaon

Use of plasmonic meta materials in lenses

Metrarc

Deriving secure encryption keys from the properties of digital systems

Mobbu

Secure mobile communications software

The Technology Partnership (TTP)

Sensing solution for SONAR applications

Thinking Safe

Insider threat detection

Trauma Simulation

Realistic trauma simulation

Voicekey

On-device, voice biometric mobile identity management solution

Presentations from the companies will be also be published after the event via the links above.

 

About CDE

CDE funds novel, high-risk, high-potential-benefit research. We work with the broadest possible range of science and technology providers, including academia and small companies, to develop cost-effective capabilities for UK armed forces and national security.

CDE is part of Dstl.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:35
 PLA upgrades ELINT capability with Y-9JB reconnaissance plane

 

14.09.2015 Pacific Sentinel
 

The People's Liberation Army's new electronic intelligence (ELINT) gathering aircraft, the Y-9JB, is a major upgrade on its predecessors and reflects the emphasis China is placing on electronic reconnaissance capabilities, says the Beijing-based Sina Military Network.

 

The Y-9JB, also known as the GX-8 — which literally means the "High New 8" — is the ELINT variant of the Shaanxi Y-9 mid-sized transport aircraft. It is said to possess significant advancements over China's first-generation electronic reconnaissance planes, the Y-8DZ or GX-2 and the Y-8G or GX-3.

 

According to the report, China has been developing electronic warfare aircraft for decades with the aim of improving the PLA's ability to gather and analyze operational and tactical electronic intelligence, and therefore its strategic decision-making.

 

Read the full story at Want China Times

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:35
Mer de Chine méridionale: le Japon promet d’autres navires au Vietnam

 

15 septembre 2015 45eNord.cz (AFP)

 

Le Japon s’est engagé mardi à livrer des navires supplémentaires au Vietnam pour renforcer ses forces en mer de Chine méridionale où, ont averti les deux pays dans une allusion voilée à Pékin, la construction d’îles artificielles menace la stabilité.

 

Le Premier ministre japonais Shinzo Abe a également annoncé des prêts d’infrastructures de quelque 100 milliards de yen (740 millions d’euros) après s’être entretenu avec le secrétaire général du parti communiste au pouvoir au Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong, qui se rendait pour la première fois dans l’archipel.

 

Le Vietnam et le Japon renforcent leur coopération dans les eaux de l’Est asiatique où ils sont aux prises avec des disputes territoriales avec la Chine.

 

Dans un communiqué commun diffusé après leur réunion, les deux hommes politiques ont exprimé leur vive inquiétude face aux récents événements qui se poursuivent en mer de Chine méridionale.

 

Ces avancées de grande ampleur sur la mer et la construction d’avant-postes ont érodé la confiance et menacé la paix et la stabilité dans la région et dans le monde, ont-ils poursuivi.

 

Le Japon a décidé de donner au Vietnam des navires d’occasion supplémentaires, à sa demande, a déclaré le Premier ministre japonais au cours d’une conférence de presse, sans en préciser le nombre. Cette décision bénéficiera au Vietnam pour améliorer ses capacités de défense du droit maritime, a-t-il ajouté.

 

Le ministère japonais des Affaires étrangères avait indiqué l’an dernier que le Japon donnerait au Vietnam six bateaux usagés pour patrouiller la mer de Chine méridionale.

 

Les tensions et revendications concurrentes entre la Chine et ses voisins d’Asie du sud-est en mer de Chine méridionale avaient dominé les dernières réunions de l’Asean et des grandes puissances début août à Kuala Lumpur, où le secrétaire d’Etat américain John Kerry avait dénoncé la militarisation entreprise par Pékin. Les ministres des pays d’Asie du sud-est s’étaient alarmés des menaces sur la paix dans cette région.

 

D’après un rapport du Pentagone, ce sont près de 1.200 hectares de terrains artificiels qui ont été gagnés sur les eaux par la Chine grâce à de gigantesques travaux de remblaiement et de construction d’îles artificielles depuis une vingtaine de mois.

 

En juillet, le Japon avait promis à cinq pays riverains du Mékong – le Cambodge, le Laos, la Birmanie, la Thaïlande et le Vietnam – une aide de 6,1 milliards de dollars pour cette région où Tokyo cherche à étendre son influence face à la montée en puissance de la Chine.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:35
Un modèle de forteresse navale en chantier - CESM

Un modèle de forteresse navale en chantier - CESM

 

13 septembre 2015 Par Olivier Fourt - RFI

 

On les appelle les « forteresses navales ». La Chine en train d'équiper militairement plusieurs îles (dont certaines ont été annexées) pour construire un réseau de bases en haute mer, destiné à élargir son influence économique et militaire dans la région.

 

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:35
Z-19 at Third China Helicopter Expo

Z-19 at Third China Helicopter Expo

 

15.09.2015 Pacific Sentinel

 

China has begun to develop a fourth-generation attack helicopter which will have stealth capabilities and expects to deliver it to the People's Liberation Army by around 2020, according to a report by the English-language China Daily.

 

Aviation Industry Corp of China, an aircraft manufacturer and supplier to the PLA, has been given the responsibility of researching and developing the helicopter, Cankaoxiaoxi.com website reported Sunday, citing Deutsche Welle, Germany's international broadcaster.

 

The company disclosed the information in a media brochure distributed to domestic journalists taking part in the Third China Helicopter Expo, which opened on Wednesday in Tianjin, according to the China Daily report published Friday.

 

The company gave no further details but according to the report, it was the first time that China has confirmed it is developing a new-generation combat helicopter.

 

Read the full story at Want China Times

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:35
Haijing 2901 - China's heavily armed patrol boat may provoke escalation


15.09.2015 Pacific Sentinel
 

China is deploying its largest maritime patrol vessel, the Haijing 2901 to the eastern island of Zhoushan for a potential war of attrition with Japan over the disputed East China Sea, according to the Tokyo-based Sankei Shimbun on Sept. 13.

 

It has been Japan's policy to deploy its coast guard vessels instead of warships to prevent its territorial conflict with China over the Diaoyutai islands (Diaoyu to China, Senkaku to Japan, which controls them), from escalating into a full-scale war. The deployment of the Haijing 2901, which is also the world's largest maritime patrol vessel with a greater displacement than the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers of the United States, will eventually challenge this policy since Japan's coast guard has no vessel that can counter it.

 

Read the full story at Want China Times

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:30
ST Marine delivers second Al-Ofouq-class patrol vessel to Oman Navy

The second Al-Ofouq class of PVs, RNOV Shinas, measures 75m in length and displaces approximately 1,250t. Photo ST Marine

 

14 September 2015 naval-technology.com

 

Singapore Technologies Marine (ST Marine) has delivered the second of the four Al-Ofouq-class patrol vessels, RNOV Shinas, to the Royal Navy of Oman (RNO).

 

The new vessels are aimed to replace the RNO's current four Seeb-class patrol vessels commissioned in the early 1980s.

 

ST Marine president NG Sing Chan said: "ST Marine and the Royal Navy of Oman are again proud that we have achieved this 'Double Milestones, Double Happiness' together.

 

Based on ST Marine's Fearless-class patrol vessels, which are used by the Republic of Singapore Navy, each 246ft-long Al-Ofouq-class vessel will provide a maximum cruise speed of more than 23mph, while offering a 1,000m range at 17mph.

 

In addition, the vessels will be armed with a modern weapon and combat management system and will be suitable for maritime and homeland security missions such as undertaking extended surveillance patrols of the Sultanate Exclusive Economic Zone.

 

The new vessels will also feature Tacticos combat management system (CMS), the Variant surveillance radar and STIR 1.2 EO Mk2 radar E/O tracking system, as well as the ESM system.

 

In addition, ST Marine also christened the third patrol vessel, RNOV Sadh.

"Today is a day for us to celebrate and also a moment for us to reflect and thank our partners and colleagues."

 

The Ministry of Defence of the Sultanate of Oman awarded a $699.4m contract to ST Marine for the construction of these patrol vessels in 2012.

 

Currently, Austal Australia is constructing two 72m-long high-speed support vessels (HSSVs) for the Oman Navy.

 

The HSSV 72 vessel is intended for the transportation of military personnel and cargo, and can support helicopter operations. It can also be deployed in search and rescue, and humanitarian relief operations.

 

Delivery of the vessels is expected to take place in 2016.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:20
Les grands enjeux des débats sur le budget de défense américain 2016 - DGRIS


14/09/2015 DGRIS

 

La puissance militaire des États-Unis, premier budget de défense au monde, et leur capacité d’action globale les placent, de fait,  au premier rang de nos partenaires stratégiques. Quel que soit le cadre (bilatéral, multilatéral OTAN ou au sein de coalitions ad hoc), la France et les États-Unis agissent ensemble sur les principaux théâtres d’opération (Sahel et Moyen-Orient notamment). Cette coopération tend à se renforcer dans de nombreux autres domaines, dans lesquels la France constitue aujourd’hui l’un des partenaires les plus capables, susceptibles de "partager le fardeau".

Au regard de l’influence des choix stratégiques américains, la connaissance du fonctionnement de l’administration et de ses relations parfois complexes avec les autres acteurs institutionnels, notamment le Congrès, est essentielle. Dans ce contexte, l’Observatoire sur la politique de défense des États-Unis a pour objectif d’améliorer la connaissance des acteurs, structures et processus décisionnels américains. Il doit ainsi contribuer à l’analyse de l’évolution de la politique américaine de défense et ses implications éventuelles sur la politique et la stratégie françaises de défense et de sécurité.

 

Les grands enjeux des débats sur le budget de défense 2016 - Rapport n°2, août 2015

 

La posture de défense des États-Unis en 2015 - Rapport n°1, juin 2015

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:20
USS Halsey (DDG 97) - photo US Navy

USS Halsey (DDG 97) - photo US Navy


14.09.2015 Pacific Sentinel
 

The United States is upgrading its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to counter China's new DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile with their ability to sink medium-sized warships, Harry J Kazianis, the executive editor of National Interest magazine, writes in a piece published on Sept. 9.

 

At a press conference on Sept. 4, Lockheed Martin announced a new contract worth US$428 million to modernize the US Navy Aegis Combat System's hardware and software over the next 10 years. Just a day prior to the announcement, China used the military parade in Beijing to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II to display its DF-26 missiles to the public for the first time.

 

Read the full story at Want China Times

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 11:20
KC-46 Refueling Tanker to Make First Flight This Month

 

September 15, 2015 by Bryant Jordan - defensetech.org

 

The U.S. Air Force’s new KC-46A aerial refueling tanker made by Boeing Co. is scheduled to make its first flight on Sept. 25, a general said.

 

The date was announced Tuesday by Brig. Gen. Duke Richardson during the Air & Space Conference near Washington, D.C. The milestone for the eventual successor to the KC-135 and KC-10 was initially planned for the spring.

 

“Once that first flight occurs we’ll go into initial air worthiness,” he said. That means the second flight will begin testing the boom, hose and drogue systems, he said.

 

Richardson, the program executive officer for tankers with the Air Force Material Command at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, said the subsequent flights will involve a variety of aircraft flying with the KC-46 and culminate with actual refueling flights in January.

 

Sen. John McCain, a Republican from Arizona and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the recent cost overrun on the aircraft, known as the Pegasus and based on the 767 twin-engine commercial airliner, is “deeply unfortunate” and that he’s concerned about delays to the program.

 

McCain said he detailed the concerns in a recent letter to Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. He and Sen. Jack Reed, a Democrat from Rhode Island, sent a similar letter over issues with the Air Force’s new bomber program.

 

“While the recently announced cost overrun on the Air Force’s KC-46A tanker is deeply unfortunate, it is encouraging that the contractor, and not the taxpayer, will bear this expense,” McCain said.

 

“That said, the resulting delays to the program’s internal deadlines for completing key qualification and planned ground and flight testing activities are indicative of a program at risk of not meeting its planned delivery milestones,” he said.

 

Boeing plans to deliver the first 18 KC-46As to the Air Force by August 2017. The service estimates it will spend $49 billion to develop and build 149 of the planes to replace its aging fleet of KC-135s, according to Pentagon budget documents. Boeing forecasts an $80 billion global market for the new tankers, according to Trading Alpha.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 10:50
Building a British Military Fit for Future Challenges Rather then Past Conflicts

 

15 September 2015 by General Sir Nicholas Houghton - Ministry of Defence

 

General Sir Nicholas Houghton gives his personal views ahead of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)


 

Well it is a great pleasure to be here tonight. Chatham House enjoys international respect for the quality of its independent and critical thought. So it is, I believe, wholly appropriate that, as part of the Ministry of Defence’s public engagement on the Strategic Defence and Security Review I share some thoughts with you this evening.

It is also important to, I think, reflect that this talk falls on the formal 75th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain. I say this because I wholly revere, as I hope do we all, the remarkable contribution of the Royal Air Force to protecting our country from an undeniably existential threat 75 years ago.

But it is also somewhat ironic that in 2015, this SDSR year, we as a country are spending so much of our national time in emotional reflection on war. Agincourt, Waterloo, Gallipoli, the Battle of Britain, Iraq, Afghanistan. Next year we will commemorate Jutland. For various no doubt immaculate reasons wars or battles such as these have been branded on our national psyche.

As a result I sometimes worry that many have come to view our Armed Forces solely through the optic of war. Our utility has come to be assessed through individual and collective audits of war’s occasionally questionable benefits. This, I strongly believe, hugely misjudges the beneficial utility of military power.

So, if I have a more personal aspiration for this talk, and for the SDSR more generally, it is to bring about a re-imagining of the utility of the Nation’s Armed Forces. Rather than view them through the optic of fighting wars; view them through the optic of the wars we avoid having to fight; the stability we help assure; the prosperity we help achieve; and the liberty and open society we help ensure.

Because, as I will attempt to explain, many of the threats we face today are not existential to our survival as a nation in the classic physical sense. But they are existential to our way of life; to our prosperity, our national values, our individual liberty and to our sense of our nation’s place in the world. These threats will take a particular and bespoke strategy to defeat, or at least to ameliorate.

As I say this talk is part of our public engagement on the SDSR, so it is meant to be a catalyst for questions and inputs to a process that still has perhaps its most interesting and challenging phases ahead of it. For, although it has been underway for some time, there is much left to be decided. Specifically there are some important decisions to be made about our national ambition; our national risk appetite; some hard choices on capability options; and also on what we call security postures… or how we use and employ our national security capabilities.

One thing I would say at the outset is that, in very stark contrast to where we might have been, this Summer’s budget settlement for Defence has given us the opportunity to make choices in this SDSR which are about betterment rather than decline; about reviewing the scale and nature of the security risks to the country and reducing them. This is hugely welcome.

But this does not make this SDSR an easy ride. Far from it. As I will indicate, over the last five years the world has become a far more, not less, dangerous place. It has become ever more difficult to distinguish between transient threats of a non-existential nature and those threats which pose a more enduring danger to our national interest over time.

And although the financial settlement for Defence is real and welcome, its most significant benefits will only materialise in the later years of this parliament. The early benefits lay in a much better-founded ability to deliver the programme envisaged in SDSR 2010. Capability enhancements will rely heavily on new efficiencies which we are now incentivised to achieve and in our ability to compete successfully for the new £1.5 billion Joint Security Fund.

The SDSR will inevitably lead, by the end of the year, to a number of choices about capability. Those choices will, in the main, be made on the grounds of political judgements about national ambition, security risk tolerance and available resources.

In offering such choices to government, officials across Whitehall are trying to create the best possible informed judgements about the risks we must contend with, our national interests, the national security objectives that will deliver those interests, and the policy and capability choices which will best secure those objectives given the global security context which confronts us.

It is not my aim tonight to give you a comprehensive view of where we have progressed with this complex synthesis. Rather I want to give you my sense of the global security context; to draw some deductions from that context; and finally to describe some of the capability and posture choices that derive from those deductions and about which some very difficult decisions will have to be made.

So let me start with the global security context. This is a personal not departmental formulation, it is delivered from personal judgement, a military perspective and is devoid of the optimism bias that some can indulge in. I offer seven thematic observations. The context is one of uncertainty; of instability; of significant threat diversification; of an increasing complexity in inter-state relationships; of the advent of the power of the narrative; of ever greater constraint on the use of force; and of an ever more revealed mis-match between the capabilities we have and those that we need to meet the multiple demands of the current operating environment. I will just start by offering a few words on each.

The uncertainty which continues to endure is borne of the inevitability of change. That change is driven by at least two strategic factors. The first is the relative decline in economic and demographic terms of what you might call Old Europe and the seemingly inevitable rise of the Asia-Pacific region.

The second factor driving uncertainty is the first indications that America may be starting to realise the finite nature of her own power and particularly her ability, or societal willingness, to remain the external security guarantor of three regions of the world: Europe; the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. However premature such a judgement is, it is nevertheless a cause of uncertainty in the regions that may be affected.

My second observation of the global security context is the prevalence of instability. Instability defines the Middle East and both North and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is China’s greatest internal threat. It is increasingly the condition of Russia’s near abroad. It is not confined to land alone, but is a maritime phenomenon in the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean, the East and South China Seas and elsewhere.

The pervading condition of instability and the individual despair that it generates is one of the causes of mass migration. But, perhaps, the more important thing to recognise is that one of the strongest drivers of this instability is a sense, amongst several nations and at least one great religion, that the current world order denies them a sense of their historic entitlement and to the enjoyment of their rightful place in the world. In some ways we are inextricably a part of an upheaval in the balance of power between states over-time and in other ways we are seeing the state-based model of international order challenged by other views of how the world should be arranged.

My third observation is of the diversification of threats. It probably holds true that an existential threat to the United Kingdom in classic, symmetrical, force-on-force, terms is still remote. But Russia now presents a threat in more novel ways to several of our NATO Allies; and potentially, if not handled well, to the coherence of NATO as an Alliance. In some of our responses we must be careful not to assume that Russia’s rationality mirrors our own.

More widely the threats from in particular terrorism, but also from cyber attack, organised crime, mass migration, natural disaster, energy shortages and much else, all continue to increase. And the emerging outcome of the government review of national security risks, is that we confront a greater range of more serious threats than five years ago; and these threats could manifest themselves in compound form.

My next observation is that the nature of inter-state relationships grows ever more complex as global interdependencies increase. It is absolutely possible for two countries to be in a state of cooperation, competition, confrontation and conflict at one and the same time. Economic cooperation goes hand in hand with competition for trade and markets. Localised and regionalised confrontation over unresolved land disputes abound. Conflict dominates deniable activity in cyberspace. It no longer holds true that our enemy’s enemy is our friend. Reflect, if you will, on Syria, Iraq, Iran and Da’ish.

My fifth observation relates to the significant increase in the power of a potent narrative. This is but one element of Information Age Warfare. Through most of history the primary purpose of military operations has been achieved through physical activity. Physical activity, destruction and geographic advantage has been the means to influence the cognitive domain of war. But nowadays almost all acts of physical violence come with an on-line component, exploiting social networks to manipulate opinion and perception. The tactics employed by Russia in Ukraine, Estonia and Georgia, include combinations of information warfare, cyber activity, counter-intelligence, espionage, economic warfare and the sponsorship of proxies.

In Syria, Iraq and increasingly in our own homelands, Da’ish’s use of messaging and propaganda is more potent than its actual conventional military capability. Da’ish uses Facebook, Twitter and Instagram in 23 different languages. The information age, more widely, permits adversaries unconstrained by western policy, ethical and legal codes, to exploit and assault our vulnerabilities.

My final two observations are borne primarily of reflection on our own national condition, but they are shared in part or in full by many other western nations. The first is that we are experiencing ever greater constraints on our freedom to use force.

Some of these constraints relate to advances in the technological competence of potential enemies and their ability to generate anti-access and area denial capabilities. But the more worrying constraints on the use of force lay in the areas of societal support, parliamentary consent and ever greater legal challenge.

Such constraints are particularly significant when the desire to commit to the use of force is in support of operations which some may consider discretionary to the national interest. And such constraints may impact on our ability to generate deterrence, which wholly depends on the perceivable credibility of our willingness to use force if necessary. My point here is that if a nation’s assumed willingness to commit to the use of force is only in the face of national survival, then we encourage rather than deter revisionist states and their own ambitions.

My final observation is the growing potential mis-match between the current silhouette of Armed Forces capability and the growing demand for action in a contemporary environment constantly requiring effective responses to crisis. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of the intelligence and strike assets needed to counter terrorism at range. To some our Armed Forces remain stubbornly optimised for episodic combat at scale, whereas the contemporary environment demands multiple, concurrent responses of high readiness force packages optimised for a whole range of crises: from striking terrorists to eliminating Ebola.

What deductions should we draw from all of this? Well my first deduction is really drawn from the first two observations: the inevitability of change and the prevalence of instability brought about by the challenges to the current global order.

The simple fact is that, seen over time, the United Kingdom has done pretty well out of the post 1945, post Cold-War, international settlement and the rules based system which is part of that. Our remarkable retention of geo-political status, relative prosperity and our enviable open society rests significantly on our ability to retain that rules based system and the global stability that is needed to underpin it.

So we must be careful to balance our Defence and Security responses between those threats which demand immediate action and those threats which present as a more incremental but potentially more enduring danger to our national interest over time.

Personally I remain convinced that the Grand Strategic security challenge of the age for the United Kingdom, is how we manage to accommodate the change that is inevitable, whilst at the same time maintaining the stability of the global commons and the rules based international system on which our prosperity, status and open society absolutely depend.

My second deduction is that there is no longer a simple distinction between war and peace. We are in a state of permanent engagement in a global competition. To win or even survive in such a competition means that all the instruments of national power need constantly to be in play. In this context we do need to re-imagine the utility of the Armed Forces beyond the simple construct of fighting wars or preparing for the next one.

To an extent non-war fighting tasks such as deterrence, reassurance, capacity building, peace-keeping, stabilisation and Defence engagement have always been features of what our Armed Forces have done. But, most recently at least, they have not been organised as a strategic endeavour in the context of our most vital national interest.

My third deduction is that most of the threats we face cannot be resolved by decisive military action alone. Terrorism, Hybrid War, Compound threats and War in the Information Age need sophisticated all-of-government approaches. Economic sanctions may prove a more effective lever than military coercion. The importance of a convincing strategic narrative is vital against the dis-information of Russia or the powerful seduction of extremist ideology, magnified as it is through the power of social media. And, across government, we need to organise even better to provide a harmonised response to the threats we face.

My fourth deduction is that we cannot face these threats alone. The importance of achieving collective security through alliances is vital to any enterprise that needs to be conducted at scale. It is also vital to our ability to manage risk in a context in which we simply cannot afford a national inventory to face all threats. In this context an effective NATO is essential, not least because NATO is the only organisation which can credibly integrate conventional and nuclear deterrence. But our other bi-lateral and multi-lateral arrangements are also important, and many of these we only achieve by retaining the status of, what I call, reference Armed Forces, capable of leading coalitions as well as acting independently in our own right.

My final deduction, and one I absolutely share with my fellow chiefs, is the need to be completely honest about the capability start point for this SDSR. In SDSR 2010, the financial crisis forced government to make some difficult choices when setting Future Force 2020. Specific risks were taken, warfighting resilience reduced, certain capability gaps accepted. The choices we make in this SDSR must both start to put this right, and we’ve already done that, and address the new threats we face.

So, my final set of comments relate to those choices. In outlining such choices to you I am not going to list a catalogue of pet projects. Rather I will offer them as packages of capability that address our requirements in generic terms. And I will also say something about postures.

The first set of capability choices lay in the requirement to make good some of our deficiencies in warfighting resilience. This is a broad menu. It stretches from adequate spares provision, to ammunition and missile holdings, to better force protection, to maximising the advantage of the current sunk costs in expensive platforms such as the carriers.

The second set of choices is to regain or sustain the organisational status of our Armed Forces in structural terms. In simple terms this means to fully develop the power-projection capability of the Maritime Taskgroup; to reprioritise the deployable Divisional level of manoeuvre of the Army; and to increase the available Combat Air Mass of the Air Force.

A significant amount of these first two choices can in effect be achieved through changes to structure and productivity rather than simply by buying new things. But we need to make these choices to underwrite and contribute to conventional deterrence, strategic influence and national ambition. Our choices in this respect, particularly in respect of resilience, also need to include infrastructure, manpower and training, so we ensure that the force does not become hollow. Particularly we need to address some of our critical manpower challenges. The greatest risks which the Defence Board faces relate to our ability to recruit and retain skilled people. This is a national not just Defence issue.

In the context of retaining strategic authority we will have some choices to make about de-risking the nuclear enterprise in respect of both its protection and the seamless delivery of a successor deterrent. I say this because we cannot afford to take risk against a deterrent the effectiveness of which fundamentally relies on its invulnerability and continuous availability. So this is non-discretionary.

But, to me, the most interesting package of choices in this SDSR lay in what we call the Joint Forces Command Proposition. Five years ago in SDSR 2010 the Joint Forces Command did not exist and, in the context of a response to the strategic shock of austerity, few people championed the cause of Joint Enablement. The advent of Joint Forces Command has meant we have already started to invest in this vital area.

We now need to build on this investment and increase our capacity to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition. Our capacity for multiple deployed Command and Control must increase in number and reduce in bulk. In combination our C4ISR must make possible operations in the information age: exploiting mega data, social media, processing power and miniaturisation.

We must also continue to reset the capabilities of our Special Forces to both achieve strategic insight and to restore a capacity for strategic strike at range, at speed and with enhanced security in otherwise denied areas.

Separately the JFC is the champion of our Cyber Defence and offensive capabilities and I strongly believe that, in offensive capability terms, we are still in the foothills of understanding and exploiting the potency of this new domain of warfare and the degree to which it might replace or complement more conventional approaches to deterrence, coercion and, if necessary, warfighting.

There is much more in the Joint Forces Command package. But I highlight its priority in this SDSR because to me it pulls a three card trick. It meets much of the immediate demand for enhanced counter terrorist capability; it enables the better exploitation of the conventional force structure; and it moves us into a greater realisation of the way to conduct warfare in the information age.

The final set of choices I would offer may not generate the headlines they deserve. But if we are going to stay ahead of the game then we need to spend more, and more wisely on innovation. Only through technical innovation, which properly harnesses the potential of robotics, microprocessing, novel materials and unmanned flight, to name but the most obvious, will we be able to maintain technological advantage, resolve the challenges of anti-access and area denial capability and address some of the long term issue of manpower costs. And our approach to innovation must be more than technical, it must be intellectual, temperamental and doctrinal as well.

In respect of how we posture our Armed Forces, we should reflect on my comments on the need to significantly enhance the pro-active use of a far greater amount of our capability. For example, more of the force structure will need to be active in protection, deterrence and reassurance tasks, including the more active protection of home waters and air space; and a greater routine contribution to NATO’s deterrent posture. We have neglected some aspects of homeland security beyond our responses to terrorism and particularly in the context of Critical National Infrastructure.

A second change in how we posture the force will be in how we contribute to shaping a more stable world. This is an amalgam of tasks which include Defence Engagement, Capacity Building, supporting regional strategies, working with allies and partners to enhance effective security. This will involve additional resources in order to maintain deployed footprints and fund enhanced activity levels. But such activity will also be a key enabler of Defence’s contribution to our wider national prosperity agenda.

But the third, and perhaps most significant change to force posture, will be in our preparedness to manage crisis through agile response. So, a force structure which must ultimately be capable of force projection at scale, must nevertheless optimise its routine posture so it is able to respond to the multiple, small scale demands, which are the defining feature of today’s operating environment. And some of this, through the mechanism of the UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force Pool, will be multinational by design.

Now, it will be very evident to you that the combination of capability choices and force posture options which I have outlined will most definitely aggregate to a resource bill that we cannot meet instantaneously. The capability choices will, therefore, need to be prioritised and the criteria for prioritisation are still in the process of agreement. Clearly, a priority must go to those capabilities which offer the ability to mitigate the most serious and proximate threats. Countering terrorism will be high on this list. The regulator will be the requirement to accept risk elsewhere; and we must do this consciously. An SDSR cannot resolve all our security problems in a moment. Strategic patience will be a virtue.

I cannot yet judge how this SDSR will turn out in respect of the detailed outcomes. But I do have considerable faith that the intellectual framework to deliver a coherent outcome is in place. If I have one residual concern it is that, in our haste to realise efficiency in order to improve capability, we will inflict self-harm in respect of our manpower. We must guard against this, since a failure to attract and retain talent is the most serious risk to our overall capability and, therefore, our national security.

And, finally; I do worry that some people will aspire for an SDSR of falsely assumed perfection, one which delivers a single strategic outcome in which Ends, Ways and Means are locked in perfect harmony and which does not need to be worried about for another five years. I do not believe that the contemporary world allows for such an approach.

Strategy, to me, like helicopter flight, is inherently unstable and often very noisy. Our approach must be adaptive, constantly revisiting ends, ways and means to ensure that coherence is maintained; accepting risk when it is manageable, constantly seeking optimum ways of doing things and only ever compromising ambition when absolutely necessary.

If pressed, therefore, to describe a military fit for future challenges rather than past conflicts, it would be a military that embraces the need for continuous adaptation which I would favour: a military imbued with the spirit of innovation rather than preservation. A military, you might reflect, not a million miles, in human terms, from the Royal Air Force of 1940. It will be an interesting few weeks; and your input will be most welcome.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:56
photo DCSSA

photo DCSSA


13.09.2015 par Philippe Chapleau - Lignes de Défense

L'institut de recherche biomédicale des armées (IRBA) va bientôt inaugurer ses nouveaux locaux de Brétigny-sur-Orge (sur l'ex BA217). Le SSA travaille actuellement sur l'organisation de cette cérémonie à laquelle le ministre de la Défense pourrait participer.

Le regroupement, un temps discuté, de quatre unités de recherche biomédicale de défense (Toulon, Marseille, La Tronche et Brétigny-sur-Orge) sur le site unique de Brétigny-sur-Orge est presque achevé. On lira ici et ici deux de mes posts sur ce sujet et ici un sujet sur la pose de la première pierre, en avril 2013.

Certains équipements, dont ceux du  laboratoire de haut confinement dédié à l’étude des agents pathogènes de classe 4 – dit "P4" –, (qui voisinera avec le labo P4 de la DGA), ne sont pas encore entièrement installés. Mais le site accueille déjà plusieurs centaines de personnes. L'IRBA regroupe plus de 500 chercheurs, praticiens, techniciens et personnels de soutien administratif.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:50
Upgraded Spearfish Torpedo Successfully Completes in Water Trial

 

Sep 14, 2015 ASDNews Source : BAE Systems PLC

 

A prototype of the next-generation Spearfish Heavyweight Torpedo has successfully completed a first in-water trial at the Ministry of Defence operated British Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre, on the west coast of Scotland.

 

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:50
Marines: Preparing For A Baltic War

 

September 15, 2015: Strategy page

 

Fear of Russia is creating a new military alliance in northern Europe. Since 2014 Sweden and Finland, while not NATO members, have been training with other Baltic states (Denmark, Norway, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that are. This year Sweden and Finland participated (along with 15 other nations) in the BALTOPS naval exercise. The 5,600 troops involved were mainly concerned with confirming that everyone’s equipment, procedures and communications worked as needed for joint naval and amphibious operations.

 

One of the things the 2015 BALTOPS was concerned with was defending Gotland; a key Swedish island between Sweden and Latvia. Whoever controls Gotland dominates the eastern Baltic and access to most of the Swedish coastline. BALTOPS planners also examined retaking Gotland if Russia were to seize it, which Sweden sees as an increasing possibility. Sweden now plans to increase the Gotland garrison and build more fortifications.

 

BALTOPS also worked on amphibious operations in the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), which are now NATO members and threatened by Russia. Sweden and Finland have long been allies and are increasing their military cooperation and coordination.

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"European Guardian 2015" welcomes distinguished guests

 

Vienna - 15 September, 2015 European Defence Agency


Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) continue to cause significant casualties in operations as well as in civil surroundings. Therefore, countering them remains a priority for all participating Member States. There are situations where the use of normal explosives ordnance disposal procedures is inappropriate due to the operational situation, and Manual Neutralisation Techniques – a last resort of Commanders - might be required to counter the threat. On 8 September, Austria and the European Defence Agency organised the second Distinguished Visitors day during the margins of Exercise “European Guardian 2015” at the Austrian Logistics School facilities of Vienna, Austria.

 

Forty participants from Austria, Colombia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Republic of Serbia, Sweden, and UK, attended the Distinguished Visitors’ Day of the European Guardian 2015 Manual Neutralisation Techniques Courses & Exercises programme. Representatives from EUROPOL and the C-IED Centre of Excellence also took part in the event. 

The day was presided over by the Austrian Armed Forces Capabilities Director Brigadier General Peter Resch and the EDA Capability, Armament & Technology Director, Peter Round. Both recognised the relevance of the programme and insisted on the need to continue to develop it in the future. 

A live demonstration, executed by an MNT specialists team, was staged in the margins of the meeting. The demonstration consisted of the disposal of an IED which held a chemical payload and several complex initiation systems. Attendees not only had the opportunity to witness all MNT teams immersed in their tasks but also to discuss their activity and the latest innovations in MNT kits. 

Attendees discussed their expectations of the programme during their visit to the specific “urban” simulated training area. It was generally agreed that one of the most relevant take away points was that MNT operators are highly trained and few in number, and that given the high degree of specialisation needed, frequent refresher training of MNT operators was considered crucial. To that end, the Manual Neutralisation Techniques Courses & Exercises programme is extremely valuable. The next milestone within the programme will be the first one week MNT refresher course to be held in November 2015 at the Austrian Logistics School.

 

More information:

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photo BAE Systems

photo BAE Systems

 

15 Sep 2015 By Vin Shahrestani, and agencies

 

A new state-of-the-art fighter pilot helmet by BAE Systems is able to to see in the dark, as well as to 'see through' the aircraft

 

BAE Systems has unveiled the Striker II, its most advanced fighter pilot helmet which removes the need for external night-vision goggles. The helmet has a fully integrated digital night vision and can also track the pilot's head movement, a feature that allows the aircraft computer system to work in sync with its human operator.

 

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Hurricane Mark II, Avro Lancaster Mk 1 & Spitfire Mark Vb over Blackpool


Photographer: Images by Sgt Jack Pritchard, RA

 

Part of a series of images captured during a 2 day period spent with the Royal Air Forces Battle of Britain Memorial Flight which is based at RAF Coningsby, Lincolnshire.

 

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:45
Vice Admiral Matthew Quashie, Chief of Ghana’s Defence Staff

Vice Admiral Matthew Quashie, Chief of Ghana’s Defence Staff

 

15 September 2015 by Jonathan Katzenellenbogen - defenceWeb

 

The Chief of Ghana’s Defence Staff has appealed for additional international help in fighting mounting piracy off the West African coast.

 

Vice Admiral Matthew Quashie said the Gulf of Guinea had become the world’s “piracy hotspot” and that West Africa needed greater international help from the world’s larger navies to help secure the region’s waters. The South African Navy had made a number of visits to Ghana for joint exercises and their support in fighting piracy would be “most welcome,” he said.

The recent discovery of large deposits of oil and gas off the coast of Ghana have raised fears in Accra about the rise in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

Quashie also said he wanted to see greater cooperation on security matters from the oil companies. “They (the oil companies) must stop using the excuse that they are not supposed to do anything for the military,” he said.

 

 

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:40
Des inspecteurs militaires russes bientôt en Suisse et en Roumanie

 

14.09.2015 sputniknews.com

 

La visite se déroulera dans le cadre du Document de Vienne de 2011 sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité.

 

Des inspecteurs russes examineront l'activité militaire sur des terrains militaires suisses et roumains du 14 au 17 septembre, a fait savoir Sergueï Ryjkov, responsable du Centre national pour la diminution de la menace nucléaire.

 

"Du 14 au 17 septembre, le groupe d'inspecteurs russes réalisera une inspection dans une région suisse dans le cadre du Document de Vienne de 2011 sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité", a-t-il précisé.

 

Selon lui, cette inspection cherche à définir l'envergure de l'activité militaire déclarée dans la région en question de près de 15.000 kilomètres carrés ou à confirmer l'absence de toute activité militaire devant normalement être officiellement notifiée.

 

"Au cours de cette inspection, les inspecteurs russes se rendront sur des terrains militaires, assisteront à des points de presse sur l'activité militaire menée dans la région, obtiendront de l'information concernant les groupes et divisions militaires suisses déployés ainsi que les exercices militaires "CONEX 2015" prévus en Suisse pour les 14-18 septembre et visant à assurer la sécurité et la coopération en cas de situations d'urgence", a fait remarquer M.Ryjkov.

 

En outre, une inspection sera menée en Roumanie. Dans ce pays, les spécialistes russes obtiendront l'information sur l'activité militaire des divisions roumaines déployées et concernant les exercices militaires "HISTRIA-2015".

 

L'architecture européenne de sécurité comprend plusieurs accords sur le désarmement, le contrôle des armements et les mesures de la confiance dans le domaine militaire.

 

Ainsi, le Document de Vienne de 2011 prévoit un vaste échange d'information sur les forces armées, les projets de défense ou encore les budgets militaires. Les pays de l'OSCE partagent donc les données concernant certains types d'activité militaire, invitent des observateurs et organisent des inspections.

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Opération UNIFIER: la mission canadienne d’instruction en Ukraine commence pour de bon

Le Major Ben Rogerson, officier commandant de la Compagnie d’entraînement, se tient au Garde-à-vous avec ses troupes lors de la cérémonie marquant le début de l’entraînement des troupes Ukrainiennes par des soldats canadiens pendant l’opération UNIFIER au Centre international de maintien de la paix et de sécurité, à Starychi, Ukraine le 14 septembre, 2015. (MDN)

 

15 septembre 2015 par Jacques N. Godbout – 45eNord.ca

 

Après une longue période de préparation, la mission d’instruction opération UNIFIER, annoncée en avril dernier par le premier ministre Harper et le ministre de la Défense Jason Kenney, a finalement démarré officiellement cette semaine.

 

Le 14 septembre 2015, le personnel militaire ukrainien et canadien s’est tenu au garde-à-vous à deux endroits en Ukraine à l’occasion des cérémonies d’ouverture soulignant le début de la mission d’entraînement militaire du Canada en Ukraine, annonce le ministère canadien de la Défense.

Au Centre international de sécurité et de maintien de la paix à Starychi, en Ukraine, le commandant du centre international de sécurité et de maintien de la paix, le Colonel Ihor Slisarchuk a présidé la parade incluant près de 200 membres du personnel militaire ukrainien et canadien.

Entre temps, à Kamyanets-Podilsky, au Centre de déminage du ministère de la Défense ukrainien, le Major canadien Matt Littlechild s’est tenu côte à côte avec le commandant ukrainien Colonel Rodikov, à l’occasion d’une petite cérémonie soulignant le début de l’entraînement où les membres du personnel militaire canadien et ukrainien perfectionneront les compétences en génie allant des tâches de base du génie comme le dégagement des obstacles aux tâches complexes comme l’élimination des Dispositifs explosifs de circonstance (IED).

Le 14 avril 2015, le premier ministre Stephen Harper, entouré de son ministre de la Défense et du chef d’état-major de la Défense, avait annoncé que le Canada allait déployer près de 200 membres des FAC en Ukraine jusqu’au 31 mars 2017.

Mais, alors que les formateurs américains étaient déjà à l’oeuvre depuis longtemps, la mission canadienne tardait à commencer, faute d’avoir déjini le cadre juridique de l’opération canadienne avec les autorités ukrainiennes.

Le 27 juin, le ministre de la Défense, Jason Kenney, en visité en Ukraine le centre d’entraînement de Yavoriv, près de la frontière polonaise, avait salué le personnel des Forces armées canadiennes qui observait là-bas l’entraînement que reçoivent les forces armées ukrainiennes et avait annoncé que les obstacles juridiques et diplomatiques au déploiement des formateurs militaires canadiens en Ukraine avaient été pour la plupart levés, a déclaré le ministre..

Le 31 août le deuxième et dernier groupe de la Force opérationnelle interarmées en Ukraine avait atterri à l’aéroport international de Lviv (ouest ukrainien) le 31 août, lançant ainsi la mission d’instruction appelée Opération UNIFIER.

Durant la parade à Starychi le 14 septembre, le commandant de la Force opérationnelle du Canada, le Lieutenant-colonel Jason Guiney, a longuement parlé du partenariat militaire continu entre les deux pays et la façon dont les leçons seront communiquées entre le personnel militaire canadien et ukrainien dans les mois à venir.

«Au cours des derniers mois, les Forces armées canadiennes ont reçu un soutien exceptionnel et un accueil chaleureux de la part des militaires ukrainiens. Nous sommes impatients de commencer l’entraînement conjoint et de transmettre nos connaissances et notre expérience à nos frères d’armes ukrainiens,», a déclaré à cette occasion le Lieutenant-colonel Guiney.

En plus de l’entraînement tactique qu’offrira le Canada à Starychi et de l’expertise en génie qu’apportera le personnel des Forces armées canadiennes à Kamyanets-Podilsky, la mission d’entraînement militaire du Canada en Ukraine fournira une formation dans les domaines de la police militaire, de la sécurité aérienne, du secourisme militaire et de la logistique, indique la Défense canadienne dans son communiqué annonçant le démarrage de l’opération.

« Bien que l’Opération UNIFIER ne soit pas le premier partenariat militaire entre le Canada et l’Ukraine, elle demeure l’engagement militaire le plus long et le plus significatif entre les deux pays depuis que l’Ukraine a proclamé son indépendance », souligne aussi le ministère de la Défense du Canada.

Le Canada et l’Ukraine sont des alliés de longue date et, à la chute du bloc soviétique, Ottawa a été parmi les premières capitales à reconnaître l’indépendance de l’Ukraine. En outre, depuis le renversement du président pro-russe Ianoukovitch en février 2014 et le début de la crise ukrainienne, le Canada, qui compte une importante minorité ukrainienne forte de i,2 millions de personnes, a été un soutien indéfectible des nouvelles autorités pro-occidentales à Kiev.

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India Plans Joint Su-30 Aircraft Modernization with Russia

MOUNTAIN HOME AIR FORCE BASE, Idaho -- An Indian Air Force SU-30K jet touches down at Mountain Home Air Force Base, along with seven others, to train with Airmen here July 17. This is the first time in history the Indian Air Force has been on American soil to train with US fighters. They will be taking advantage of Mountain Home's vast air space and multiple ranges to better prepare their aircrews for future flying missions. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Airman 1st Class Ryan Crane) (Released by Staff Sgt. Brian Stives, 366th Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office)

 

September 14, 2015 By Sputnik

 

MOSCOW: India has expressed interest in carrying out a joint project to extensively modernize its SU-30MKI aircraft in collaboration with Russian companies, the Russian state technology corporation Rostec said in a statement Friday.

 

“In the long term, as recommended by the Russian Ministry of Defense, we plan a major upgrade of the SU-30SM [model] to increase its combat effectiveness. The Indian government has expressed interest in collaborating to modernize the SU-30MKI, which is an evolution of the SU-30SM,” the statement reads.

 

According to the statement, both aircraft models will be given upgraded avionics and radars, as well as an improved engine. The SU-30SM and the SU-30MKI will also be equipped with additional weapons.

 

The SU-30 MKI, NATO reporting name Flanker-H, is the Indian Air Force’s elite fighter-bomber. It was developed by Russia’s Sukhoi Aviation Corporation and built under license by India’s Hindustan Aeronautics.

 

Russia and India have been close partners in military and technical cooperation for decades. In 2014, the total value of weapons and military hardware delivered by Russia to India reached $4.7 billion, according to Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation estimates.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:35
Australia and India in first maritime exercise


14.09.2015 Pacific Sentinel
 

The inaugural bilateral maritime exercise between India and Australia, AUSINDEX15, has commenced, with an opening ceremony held in Visakhapatnam, India, over the weekend.

 

Building on the personal relationship of Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Abbott, the Minister for Defence, the Honourable Kevin Andrews MP, recently visited India to further develop, with his counterpart Minster Manohar Parrikar, the Framework for Security Cooperation.

 

“India is the emerging democratic super power of Asia. It is therefore sensible that the relationship between India and Australia be developed and strengthened,” Mr Andrews said.

 

The maritime exercise is a tangible sign that will strengthen defence co-operation between the two countries as envisaged in the Framework for Security Co-operation announced by the Australian and Indian Prime Ministers in 2014.

 

Head Navy Capability, Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead, AM, RAN, joined India’s Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet, Rear Admiral Ajendra Bahadur Singh,VSM, to mark the occasion.

 

“India is a key security partner in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific,” RADM Mead said.

 

“Both our navies have a mutual interest in promoting peace and prosperity in the Indian Ocean and this is a natural progression of our Navy-to-Navy relationship, given our shared maritime security interests.”

 

Three Royal Australian Navy ships and a Royal Australian Air Force AP-3C have made the passage to India for the inaugural biennial exercise.  HMA Ships Sirius, Arunta and Sheehan will train with Indian Navy Ships Shivalik, Ranvijayi and Shakti, along with P-8I Maritime Patrol Aircraft during the week-long activity.

 

The exercise will start with briefings and practical demonstrations ashore, before progressing to sea. 

 

“At sea, surface and anti-submarine warfare exercises will be conducted and there will also be the opportunity for aviation cross deck operations,” RADM Mead said.

 

“The Royal Australian Navy values the deepening engagement with the Indian Navy.

 

“This will strengthen our relationship and further our ability to undertake regional joint and/or combined operations such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,” he said.

 

AUSINDEX15 is being held in waters off Visakhapatnam, India until late September.

 

AUS DoD

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:35
Editorial: Chinese Admiral - South China Sea ‘Belongs to China’

 

16 September 2015 By Franz-Stefan Gady – Pacific Sentinel

 

At a recent naval conference a Chinese Vice Admiral did not mince words.

 

Speaking at this year’s First Sea Lord/RUSI International Sea Power Conference in London, Chinese Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai, commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) North Sea Fleet, did not shy away from controversy. He emphatically stated that the South China Sea belongs to China.

 

“The South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China. And the sea from the Han dynasty a long time ago where the Chinese people have been working and producing from the sea,” he said through an interpreter, according to Defense News.

 

Yubai was sitting on a panel with the U.S. Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Rear Adm. Jeff Harley and the President of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Command and Staff College, Vice Admiral Umio Otsuka, discussing the role of naval power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

 

Yubai’s statement came in response to Otsuka criticizing the land reclamation activities of “certain state actors” in the region. “Land reclamation conducted by some countries has been a problem in the South China Sea (and) we have to admit that the rule of law is at risk in this region. The JMSDF will secure the credibility of a deterrence capability and seek a multilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific region,” he said.

 

Read the full story at The Diplomat

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:35
source Alert5 blog

source Alert5 blog

 

Sept 14, 2015 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: Alert5 blog; posted Sept 13, 2015)

 

The Shenyang J-11BS fighter made its first public flying demonstration during the Air Force public day in Changchun, Jiling province on Sept. 11. The J-11BS is the two-seat indigenous copy of the Su-27. The aircraft is powered by the WS-10 engine.

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16 septembre 2015 3 16 /09 /septembre /2015 07:30
Cirit guided rocked system, here mounted on KMC remote weapon system (photo Victor M.S. Barreira)

Cirit guided rocked system, here mounted on KMC remote weapon system (photo Victor M.S. Barreira)

 

09/14/2015 Victor M. S. Barreira - defenceiq.com

 

Turkish state-owned missile and rocket house Roketsan signed two memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with Polish companies Zak?ady Metalowe Mesko and Wojskowe Zak?ady Lotnicze Nr 1 (WZL 1) covering future cooperation on a range of defence industry activities. Both Polish companies are owned by the local armaments group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ).

 

The scope of the signed MoU with ZM Mesko is to formalise the intent of collaboration on products and programmes involving capabilities and solutions including Cirit 70mm laser guided rocket and UMTAS (Uzun Menzilli Tanksavar Sistemi) long range air-to-surface anti-tank missile developed by Roketsan, air defence missile, guidance kits for conventional ammunition and other precision guided weapon systems.

The agreement with WZL 1 is to formalise the intent of collaboration on products and programmes involving the integration of Cirit and UMTAS weapon systems and other equipment on various types of platforms in the Polish Army inventory.

Both can be fired from helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems, armoured vehicles, light attack aircraft, surface vessels and stationary platforms. The T129 ATAK helicopter is being offered to Poland’s Kruk programme.

 

 

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