September 29, 2015: Strategy Page

Since the 18 th the UN has arrested Ahmad al Mahdi al Faqi, accused him of war crimes while he was a leader of an Islamic terrorist group that ran Timbuktu in 2012 and sent him off to Europe for a trial. Specifically al Faqi is accused of ordering the destruction of numerous religious shrines in June and July 2012. Al Faqi was in charge of enforcing “Islamic manners” for Ansar Dine (a largely Malian Islamic terror group). In doing that he supervised the destruction of ancient tombs of Moslem clerics and scholars worshipped by Sufi Moslems. To some conservative Sunni Moslems, Sufis are heretics and their shrines are to be destroyed whenever possible. Ansar Dine was affiliated with al Qaeda which, along with ISIL, encourages this sort of righteous vandalism. The destruction of the tombs was condemned by many Moslem leaders worldwide, and the ICC (International Criminal Court) declared it a war crime. These Moslem shrines were big tourist attractions to visitors of all religions and important to the local economy. Since 2013 foreign donors have supported restoration efforts meant to address religious and economic concerns over this destruction.

The Islamic radicalism in the north has resonated in the south. In central Mali there are several pro-Islamic terrorism Islamic clerics who have been preaching support for Islamic terrorism. The government is under pressure to shut down these guys because they encourage young men to join radical groups and that has apparently worked. This problem is particularly acute among the Fulani people in central Mali. There are some twenty million Fulani living in the Sahel (the semi-desert area between the Sahara and the jungle) and some of those in northern Nigeria have become involved in Islamic terrorism via the local Boko Haram. There are over two million Fulani in Mali and the name of a new Islamic terror group in the south (FLM for Macina Liberation Front) openly identifies with the Fulani (Macina are the local Fulanis). This group became active in early 2015 and has claimed responsibility for several attacks since. It started out with calls for Fulani people to live according to strict Islamic rules. That in turn led to violence against tribal and village leaders who opposed this. That escalated to attacks on businesses and government facilities. FLM is composed mostly of young Fulani men and is associated with Ansar Dine (which is largely Tuareg). Although most Malians are Moslem, few want anything to do with Islamic terrorism and Boko Haram is seen as a major mistake and not welcome at all in Mali. But the Fulani have always seen themselves as a people apart, an attitude common with the nomadic peoples of the Sahel.

In the north the unrest is not just about the few remaining Islamic terrorists but about the changes caused by the 2012 rebellion. That was the fourth Tuareg uprising since 1962 and the most disruptive. Many of the Tuareg and Arab tribes up there gained or lost power because of the 2012 rebellion. The pro-government tribes feel entitled to more power. Many tribes found themselves facing economic problems because of the disruption to traditional smuggling activities. It is now much harder to sneak stuff into Algeria and the peacekeepers disrupted the lucrative drug smuggling operations. Most of the unrest in the north is about money and access to the means to obtain it. The government and the peacekeepers really can’t help much in disputes involving illegal activities. Not openly at least, but peacekeeper commanders and local officials do know what is really going on and have to work around it to reduce the violence and uncertainty. That is essential so that aid deliveries, rebuilding and economic growth can move forward. 

In the last two years the Mali peacekeeping force has suffered nearly 200 casualties, including 42 killed. There have been 18 non-combat deaths. Mali has turned out to be one of the more dangerous UN peacekeeping assignments. Even so the casualties are less than half the peak rate for foreign troops in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

September 21, 2015: The government agreed with northern leaders and postponed the scheduled October 25th local elections. In the north there is still a lot of unrest and many areas where voting workers cannot safely operate. Tuareg tribal leaders felt too many Tuareg would not be able to vote in October and thus Tuareg would be underrepresented and lose political power.

September 19, 2015: In the south gunmen fired on a police station in the town of Binh, near the Burkina Faso, killing four (two police and two civilians). This was the second such attack in the area within a week. Islamic terrorists are suspected. The police made three arrests in the wake of this latest attack and have dozens of FLM suspects under arrest or surveillance. 

September 17, 2015: In the north (near Kidal) a pro-government militia clashed with CMA (a local Tuareg separatist group). There were dozens of casualties. The peacekeepers have been working for months to settle all the disputes the CMA and pro-government militias have. These are basically old antagonisms between clans and local strongmen. Many power relationships were upset when the Tuareg rebels and Islamic terrorists took control of the north during 2012 and sorting out the aftereffects is taking a long time and a lot of diplomatic and military effort.  

September 27, 2015: Strategy Page

On September 7th a Pakistani UAV used laser guided missiles to kill three Islamic terrorists in North Waziristan. This was a first for Pakistan. While Pakistan has officially condemned and opposed similar strikes by American UAVs in North Waziristan, it never banned the American use of armed UAVs in certain parts of Pakistan. The U.S. refused to sell Pakistan UAVs that could carry laser guided missiles, mainly because the Americans don’t trust Pakistan. So Pakistan went looking for other suppliers and eventually bought a similar UAV (the CH-2) from China in 2009. Pakistan was soon producing a local version, Burraq. The earliest CH-2 models were unarmed, but the latest version (CH-3A) can carry a max payload of 180 kg for six hours. China supplies two missiles similar to the American Hellfire. One of these, the laser guided AR-1, weighs 45 kg and has a range of 8,000 meters. This is said to be the one Pakistan is using.

Pakistan apparently won’t stop with the Burraq. There is a more advanced armed UAV being offer by China. Called the Wing Loong (that's Chinese for Pterodactyl, a Jurassic period flying dinosaur) this UAV which can be equipped to carry two BA-7 laser guided missiles (similar to the Hellfire) or two 60 kg (110 pound) GPS guided bombs (similar to the U.S. SDB). This UAV has been around for a while but it has taken time to get it working reliably when used to hit targets with laser guided missiles.   Since 2008 Chinese aircraft manufacturer (AVIC) has been showing off photos and videos of a prototype for a clone of the American MQ-1 Predator UAV that tuned out to be Wing Loong. This in 2012 one was seen in flight, over the capital of Uzbekistan, which, along with UAE (United Arab Emirates) were the first export customers. It was later revealed that development on Wing Loong began in 2005, first flight was in 2007 and Chinese troops got the first ones in 2008 for testing under more realistic conditions.

While Wing Loong is similar in shape to the larger American MQ-9 Reaper, in size it's almost identical to the 1.2 ton Predator. Wing Loong weighs 1.1 tons, has a 14 meter (46 feet) wingspan, and is 9 meters (28 feet) long. It has max altitude of 5,300 meters (16,400 feet) and an endurance of over 20 hours. Payload is 200 kg. The base price of Wing Loong is about a million dollars. But additional sensors and fire control equipment for one able to use laser guided missiles increases that to several million dollars. That is still about half the price of a similarly equipped Predator. Unlike the United States, which restricts the sale of armed UAVS, China will sell to anyone who can pay, no questions asked. The only problem Pakistan has is a shortage of cash. That’s why Pakistan cooperates at all with the United States; billions of dollars in military aid.

For several decades a growing number of Chinese commercial firms have been developing military UAVs. China is quite proud of its thriving commercial UAV industry, which produced a wide range of models. For example in mid-2014 China announced that a civilian UAV, used for mapping and land use surveys, recently stayed in the air for 30 hours, setting a record for Chinese UAVs. The previous record for Chinese UAVs was 16 hours.  This long endurance UAV was developed by a government agency (CASM, or Chinese Academy of Surveying & Mapping) and has limited military use. CASM has developed several small UAVs for survey duties. These UAVs all feature lightweight materials and tend to be under 50 kg (110 pounds) with small payloads (usually 5 kg/11 pounds). These take advantage of new lightweight and powerful cameras to economically monitor Chinese farming and natural resources. Some of these UAVs are also believed to be used by the police and security services.  Export customers are welcome.

September 29, 2015: Strategy Page

South Korea recently confirmed that it is organizing six special operations teams that are being trained to attack and destroy key targets inside North Korea. Apparently the North Koreans had figured this out and there were a growing number of rumors in South Korea as well. This revelation represents a major change in special operations in Korea because since the 1950s it was North Korea constantly sending commandos and spies into South Korea where not all of them were quickly caught or caught at all. At the same times it has always proved nearly impossible to get foreign agents into North Korea, which had been turned into the ultimate police state after World War II. Since the 1990s the lack of Russian aid (which kept North Korea afloat since the 1950s) caused the North Korean military to gradually (and almost imperceptibly) fall apart. This was accelerated by growing and corruption, even within the secret police and other security agencies. As a result South Korea considers North Korea vulnerable and is preparing to take advantage of that during the next military emergency. If nothing else it causes the North Koreans to spend a lot more on protecting their nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile North Korea, which has long maintained elite commando forces, tries to keep up appearances. In North Korea special operations troops are still carefully selected, then paid, housed and fed better and given access to better equipment. About twelve percent of the million North Korean military personnel are in these elite units. But the benefits have eroded so much that even the elite troops are now suffering food and fuel shortages as well as aging equipment.

Since North Korean conscripts still serve for at least six years, there’s enough time to train even draftees to special operations levels of capabilities. Service in these units are sought after because not only do they mean better treatment while in the military but better career opportunities after military service. Most of these North Korea special operations troops are similar to U.S. rangers, marines, paratroopers or special reconnaissance troops (U.S. Marine Force Recon and army LURPS).

There are also some 30,000 snipers, organized into ten Sniper Brigades. This is a rather unique use of snipers, and given shortages of ammunition in the north, it's uncertain how well these troops, no matter how well selected, are at sniping. If you want to maintain your shooting skills, you have to fire thousands of rounds a year. The same applies for all elite troops, although a lot of the training just consists of physical conditioning and combat drills. For snipers, this consists practicing staying hidden. This can be accomplished, if you can keep the troops well fed and housed. This is no longer the case with many of the Special Forces, and morale is suffering.

At the apex of North Korean Special Forces there are about five thousand commando and U.S. Special Forces type troops. These are meant to get into South Korea and go after key targets and people. Again, the North Koreans have trained for half a century to do this, but have not been able to actually put these troops to the test much. There have been thousands of small operations in the south over the last half century. In the 1960s there was a low level war going on, as the North Koreans sent dozens of small teams south each year. Over a hundred American troops were killed or wounded, and many more South Korean soldiers and police. Yet, the North Koreans had little success.

While the top special operations units are still well cared for, more and more reports come out of the north about many less skilled special operations troops complaining about less, or at least lower quality, food and other problems (like less access to electricity year round, and heat during the Winter.) More of these troops are deserting and heading for China, where they can be more easily interviewed. Some have made it all the way to South Korea, where the extent of their numbers and preparations has pushed South Korean commanders to increase their security preparations, and train more troops to deal with all these commandos in war time.

While the North Korean special operations troops are grumbling about not getting all the training resources (ammo and fuel) they need, they remain a highly motivated and generally loyal force. The government uses these troops to insure the loyalty of the rest of the military, and more and more elite troops are being used to assist the secret police in going after dissidents and corrupt officials. This is probably hurting the North Korean special operations forces more than anything else. The troops are getting a close look at the corruption and contradictions in North Korea. The troops generally live in closed bases and don't get out much. But now that they do, they see a North Korea that is unpleasant, and not as swell as their commanders told them it was. It turns out those letters they were getting from home were not exaggerating how bad things were. And the trend has been down for so long, it's hard to assure the troops that there's any way up.

South Korea has fewer (about 20,000) special operations troops but they are trained and equipped to a higher (Western) standard. Meanwhile South Korea has improved its air defenses along the DMZ. For over half a century North Korea has prepared to fly small single engine transports into South Korea by coming in so low the radar could not pick it up. South Korea can now detect such low flying aircraft and has weapons on the DMZ to quickly shoot down intruders. The pilots of these aircraft are not as skilled as they used to be, especially for low altitude night flying, because fuel shortages have sharply cut training time in the air.

28.09.2015 by Livefist
 

It's a phrase thrown about often in this business, but in the compulsively bumpy world of Indian aviation procurement, there are few occasions when an item chosen for the armed forces is a certain, unequivocal game-changer. The Indian government's decision to clear a deal for 15 Boeing Ch-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters steps far from the slapdash, frequently fallible procurement paths the armed forces have taken all too often. For one thing, the Chinook won a competition. Two, the government's decision to close the deal comes nearly three years of negotiations later -- an indication, perhaps and hopefully, that India has closed the best deal it could for the product. But now that the decks are truly cleared for a direct commercial sale contract between the Indian MoD and Boeing Defense, it's useful to examine sentiments within the Indian Air Force, which will operate the Chinooks possibly from its Chandigarh base, but possible closer to the country's capital too. Here are five reasons why the CH-47F Chinook in IAF colours (as detailed for the first time by artist Saurav Chordia above) could be a true game-changer in Indian service:

1. The IAF has had a troubled run with its spare heavylift rotory wing capability. Of the four Mi-26 Halos it bought in the eighties, three remain (one was written off after a severe crash-landing five years ago). But even before the accident, the platform has had typically severe serviceability issues that have mostly seen only one in the air at any given time -- not the worst of scenarios for such a small fleet, but grossly less than what the IAF wanted from these machines. Replaced with a full-sized fleet of new generation helicopters will give IAF planners the kind of heavylift rotory wing flexibility they've never had before. Squadron-sized numbers (and, of course, newer circumstances) will shore up serviceability and put more numbers in pilots' hands. The last few years have demonstrated that the ability to have more than one of these helicopters in the air at any given time is the difference, quite literally, between life and death. More numbers of heavylift copters in aero-bridge operations during humanitarian relief or disaster reconstruction work will be crucial.

2. Trials in 2010-11 convinced the IAF in no small measure that the tandem rotor capability would enormously boost what they were already doing with the conventionally framed Mi-26, especially in high-altitude operations. A comparison of what the tandem rotored Chinook could do in terms of landing approach capability, centre of gravity envelope etc., as opposed to the aerodynamic, performance and safety constraints on the CH-53 Super Stallion/Mi-26 proved to be too substantive to ignore. In simple terms, the IAF was convinced the Chinook could get more done, cleaner and safer.

3. The Chinook is substantially smaller and with a lower payload capacity than the Mi-26, but a higher degree of loading/unloading flexibility (especially rear loading) coupled with  a significantly greater number of cargo/troops/equipment configurations convinced the IAF that switching to the tandem rotor machine made more sense than explore the very capable Mi-26T2, that sports better engines, avionics and safety features than the variant the IAF currently operates. The Chinook's performance with under-slung cargo also won the IAF over.

4. The Chinook's flying qualities, agility in the air, significantly lower rotor diameter and landing flexibility will allow the IAF to fly it where it couldn't have even thought of taking the Mi-26. High altitude border areas, along narrow ridges and valleys, to deliver equipment, humans or materials for construction, road-building/repair, communications infrastructure building, disaster relief, casualty evacuation or any of the several other mission profiles the Chinook is built for. Why is that a game-changer? Because the IAF cannot satisfactorily deliver heavy payloads to precise sites even now. If not fully in some areas, tandem rotor operations will close the gap significantly, allowing the IAF to deliver closer to sites of requirement than ever before.

5. The Chinook is only the second heavylift helicopter the IAF will have ever operated. Unlike the Mi-26  that has performed strictly a troop/cargo transport role, the Chinook will obviously have a special missions profile as well. While the IAF has been looking at the MH-47 special operations configuration, the CH-47F variant it has chosen will definitely be used for special operations training and exercises, and will necessarily integrated with the larger joint special forces orbat. The IAF, a master at finding innovative new uses for its kit, could throw up several surprises behind the stick of a Chinook.

September 16, 2015: Strategy Page

For intelligence experts cell phones and social networks are the best of assets and the also something of a curse. This was seen recently as more Russian troops and heavy weapons began showing up in Syria. At first the Russians tried to deny it, but they were done in by their own troops posting (on Russian social networks) photos of their presence in (and travel to) Syria. The Russian censors got most of those posts removed but not before they were seen by Western media and intelligence agencies and filed away. All this was good news for the Western intel people and bad news for their Russian counterparts. This sort of thing has been going on for over a decade and despite increasingly strenuous efforts to get the troops to be discreet there are always enough who disobey to give the real or potential enemy what they are looking for.

All this is yet another side effect of cellphone cameras, which have become a major source of military intelligence and this is especially true with counter-terrorism operations. For example in mid-2015 the United States revealed how a picture an Islamic terrorist took of himself with his cellphone (a selfie) revealed the location of an ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) headquarters, which was promptly bombed. Such incidents are more common with poorly trained irregulars, but even well trained troops have problems with “cellphone discipline”. This problem is a 21st century one and it has been getting worse.

Incorporating cameras into cell phones first showed up in 2000 and the practice quickly spread. This proved to be very popular and as such phones became cheaper, and their cameras more capable military intelligence agencies warned that troops were taking a lot of pictures, especially when in combat zones and making those photos public. This was leading to a lot of pictures going public that could reveal military secrets. Efforts to ban troop use of cellphones in combat zones or inside classified areas had some success, but that only reduced the flood of useful (to intelligence experts) cellphone photos. It has proved nearly impossible to eliminate the problem. This became a major problem because of improved technology. Thus because cellphone networks entered the 3rd generation (3G) about the same time cellphone cameras were introduced it became very easy to quickly distribute pictures. The 3G networks enabled cellphone users to take photos and immediately send them to someone else, or post them to a website. By 2010 social networks were growing in popularity and cellphone users competed to take and post photos of all sorts of things, often getting newsworthy photos into circulation well before the traditional media. Cellphones with 3G capabilities became so cheap that even many Islamic terrorists and most military personnel had them.

No country is immune to the problem. Israel, with the highest proportion of Internet savvy people in the world continues to have the problem because so many of their troops on active duty are actually reservists called up for the normal (but infrequent) bit of active duty. Changing cell phone and social network habits isn’t easy, despite the risk of getting caught and punished (often spending a week or two in jail, plus the bad publicity). China tried to ban all cell phones for troops on active duty outside their base. It worked for a bit and then it didn’t. Some troops knew better but found ways to post photos anonymously. Even the revelations that troops have been killed because of posting certain pictures to the web has not reduced the number of military people doing it.

Hors revente des BPC, l'État aurait dû supporter "une perte financière d'environ 1,1 milliard d'euros"

29/09/2015 Par Michel Cabirol – LaTribune.fr

La commission des finances du Sénat évalue le coût du dossier des deux Bâtiments de projection et de commandement non livrés à la Russie, entre 200 et 250 millions d'euros pour l'État français.

La commission des finances du Sénat évalue le coût du dossier des deux Bâtiments de projection et de commandement (BPC), de type Mistral, non livrés à la Russie, entre 200 et 250 millions d'euros pour l'État français. "Si l'accord de principe trouvé avec l'Égypte se concrétise, le reversement au budget général d'une fraction du produit de la vente des BPC pourrait finalement ramener le coût pour l'État à un montant compris entre 200 millions d'euros et 250 millions d'euros", a estimé la commission des finances du Sénat.

Hors revente des BPC, l'État aurait dû supporter "une perte financière d'environ 1,1 milliard d'euros", qui aurait pu se traduire en 2015 "par un effet négatif sur le solde budgétaire de 556,7 millions d'euros", a précisé le rapport sur avis de Dominique de Legge (Les Républicains).

Le montant final de cette perte est amoindri par le refus du gouvernement d'indemniser les industriels pour l'intégralité du préjudice subi, manque à gagner compris, a expliqué le rapport parlementaire. "La perte subie par les industriels français, principalement DCNS, pourrait s'établir, selon les modalités d'indemnisation pour l'instant proposées par Coface, à environ 150 millions d'euros", a estimé Dominique de Legge. Pourtant comme l'a expliqué début septembre à l'Assemblée nationale le PDG de DCNS, Hervé Guillou, "le Premier ministre a arbitré, moyennant la souscription d'une prime complémentaire, au mois de mai, le principe d'une indemnisation à 100 % de tous les industriels ayant contribué" au contrat russe..

"Pas une opération blanche"

Le rapport parlementaire conteste les déclarations du gouvernement estimant que le dossier Mistral était une opération blanche. Pour Dominique de Legge, "il est faux de soutenir, comme le fait le gouvernement, que la France et ses industriels ne subiront aucune perte du fait de ces accords grâce la revente des BPC à l'Égypte". Dans ce cadre, la commission des finances n'a pas souhaité donner un avis favorable au projet de loi autorisant la cessation de l'accord du 25 janvier 2011 relatif à la coopération dans le domaine de la construction de BPC.

Si l'accord avec l'Égypte se concrétise, l'État récupérera via Coface une fraction du produit de la vente des BPC "dont on peut provisoirement estimer qu'elle se situera entre 850 millions d'euro et 900millions d'euros, le prix de la formation des marins et des quatre années de soutien prévues au contrat revenant à DCNS". La perte totale pour l'État pourrait donc être comprise entre 200 millions et 250 millions d'euros.

Une conclusion raisonnable

La résiliation de l'accord avec la Russie puis la revente des deux BPC à Égypte est une conclusion plutôt raisonnable pour l'État français et ses finances à partir du moment où la France a décidé de ne pas livrer les deux navires de guerre à la Russie. C'est ce que confirme Dominique de Legge dans son rapport : "l'accord trouvé cet été avec la Russie présente le grand mérite de mettre fin, dans des conditions acceptables pour les deux parties, à une affaire au coût diplomatique certain et qui présentait des risques financiers très importants".

En outre, il a estimé qu'il ne pouvait "que se réjouir de cette vente rapide (à l'Egypte, ndlr), qui s'effectue à un prix raisonnable". "Il y aurait eu de grands inconvénients à conserver durablement ces bateaux à quai, en raison de frais d'entretien estimé à deux millions d'euros par mois et de la perte de valeur marchande liée à l'obsolescence progressive des matériels", a-t-il précisé.

30.09.2015 Romandie.com (ats)

Un raid aérien mené par l'aviation française a fait au moins 30 morts et de nombreux blessés dimanche dans un camp d'entraînement de l'Etat islamique (EI), rapporte mardi l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH). Le camp était situé dans l'est de la Syrie.

Parmi les victimes figurent des membres des Lionceaux du califat, formé par des adolescents de 14 à 18 ans, a précisé Rami Abdelrahman, directeur de l'ONG basée à Londres et qui dispose d'un large réseau de médecins et de militants à travers la Syrie.

François Hollande avait annoncé dimanche que six appareils avaient détruit un camp d'entraînement de l'EI près de Deïr az Zour. Il s'agissait des premières frappes françaises en Syrie.

Nouvelle donne

M. Hollande n'avait alors pas exclu d'autres frappes dans les prochaines semaines, assurant que le raid en question n'avait pas fait de victimes civiles. L'attaque avait été menée grâce aux renseignements recueillis au cours de vols de reconnaissance au-dessus du pays et aux "informations fournies par la coalition".

M. Hollande avait invoqué "la légitime défense" pour expliquer ces frappes. La France, qui participe aux opérations de la coalition anti-EI en Irak, s'était jusqu'ici interdite d'intervenir en Syrie, par crainte de conforter le président Bachar al-Assad. Mais la crise des réfugiés et les menaces terroristes ont changé la donne.

29/09/2015 Sources : État-major des armées

Le 22 septembre 2015 a eu lieu la cérémonie de transfert d’autorité de l’opération Damansur l’emprise de Deyr Kifa, au Sud du Liban. Le colonel Hardy, chef de corps du 3e Régiment de hussards (3e RH), a succédé au colonel Hasard.

Les militaires français de l’opération Daman arment la force de réaction rapide de la FINUL (FCR). Cela permet à la FINUL de disposer d’une capacité de réaction en mesure d’intervenir au profit de tous les contingents déployés dans la zone d’opérations de la FINUL au Sud Liban.

Au cours de ce mandat, le contingent français a mené près de 600 patrouilles dans l’ensemble de la zone d’opérations de la FINUL, ainsi que de nombreux entraînements conjoints avec les forces armées libanaises.

Après une période de relève, le mandat Daman  XXIV est désormais armé par les hussards du 3e RH, les soldats du 92erégiment d’infanterie, du 7e régiment du matériel et du 511erégiment du train.

Présente depuis 1978 au Liban, la France est l’un des principaux pays contributeurs de la FINUL avec près de 900 soldats déployés en permanence au Sud Liban. La grande majorité d’entre eux arme la FCR qui est directement placée sous les ordres du général commandant la FINUL et est en mesure d’agir au profit de tous les contingents déployés sur l’ensemble de la zone d’action de la FINUL, dans le cadre de la résolution 1701. Le volet naval de cette mission comporte en permanence plusieurs frégates déployées en force constituée (la Task Force 448). Leur mission : surveiller les approches maritimes du Liban et empêcher l’introduction d’armes par la mer.

29/09/2015 Sources : CEAM

Avec une quinzaine de nations et plus de 1500 militaires engagés, la campagne "Bold Quest" est un rendez-vous annuel unique au monde, permettant de valider les capacités opérationnelles interarmées et interalliées. Ces dernières mettent en œuvre des réseaux de données tactiques, dédiés notamment à la mission complexe de Digital Aided Close Air Support (DACAS - appui aérien numérisé). Pour l’occasion, la France a déployé à El Paso (Texas, États-Unis) deux Rafale, ainsi que plus de 135 spécialistes, dont 90 aviateurs et une quarantaine de militaires de l’armée de terre.

Des moyens complets déployés

Toute la chaîne de commandement est représentée. Celle-ci intègre tout d’abord cinq équipes JTAC (Joint Terminal Attack Controller - équipes spécialisées dans l’appui aérien rapproché) issues des forces spéciales et conventionnelles de l’armée de l’air et de l’armée de terre. Différents systèmes de remontée et de présentation des informations, tels qu’ALLIANCE, BULDOG et ATLAS, sont également mis en œuvre au sein de structures de commandement appelées TOC (Tactical Operations Center) et ASOC (Air Support Operations Center). Enfin, "Bold Quest" pousse le réalisme jusqu’à inclure la participation de vecteurs aériens réels, comme les Rafale français.

Pour les militaires français, le programme s’annonce chargé, avec un large panel de missions air-sol complexes à réaliser, de type SCAR (Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance – coordination de frappe et reconnaissance), DACAS, ainsi que des vols testant la chaîne Air Land Integration (coordination entre les forces aériennes et terrestres).

Une planification rigoureuse

La campagne "Bold Quest" représente plus d’une année de préparation, concrétisée par un premier vol Rafale effectué, lundi 28 septembre 2015. Pour participer à cette campagne, cet appareil a subi quelques modifications permettant d’augmenter ses capacités opérationnelles déjà bien complètes. Dès le convoyage vers les États-Unis, une capacité SATCOM a ainsi été mise en œuvre avec succès. L’évolution majeure réside toutefois tout particulièrement par l’implémentation au sein du Rafale d’une messagerie de type VMF (Variable Message Format). Des tests rigoureux menés par une équipe américaine ont confirmé une intégration parfaitement conforme à la norme. Ainsi, le Rafale a pu être autorisé à effectuer les missions DACAS dès le début de la phase «réelle» de "Bold Quest", appelée LIVEX. Ces tests itératifs doivent en effet être validés avant de pouvoir passer aux phases ultérieures.

Des enjeux opérationnels importants

"Bold Quest" doit permettre d’atteindre de nombreux objectifs opérationnels. Pour l’armée de terre, l’effort est porté sur la numérisation et l’acquisition des objectifs, au travers d’un programme appelé NUMACQ. L’interopérabilité des appuis feux est aussi testé via les systèmes ASCA (Artillery System Cooperation Activities) et MIP (Multilateral Interoperability Program).

Les forces spéciales travaillent, pour leur part, à valider le fonctionnement d’une chaîne «bout en bout», reliant ses équipes JTAC et les effecteurs, via une plateforme appelée «C2 C160».

Concernant l’armée de l’air, la cohérence de la gestion de la 3e dimension est à l’honneur, avec notamment l’échange des informations entre les commandos au sol et les avions de chasse, via le système ALLIANCE relié par liaison 16.

Au cœur de l’actualité, l’organisation terroriste a été évoquée de nombreuses fois par les intervenants, et a notamment fait l’objet d’un atelier thématique sur la cyberdéfense et la propagande de Daech. Photo Rym Senoussi - DICoD

25/09/2015 ASP Camille Martin  -  DICOD

Le premier colloque international #CyberDefense s’est déroulé, jeudi 24 septembre, à l’Ecole militaire à Paris. Jean-Yves Le Drian, ministre de la Défense, a ouvert cet évènement inédit qui a réuni près de 30 délégations étrangères. Occasion exceptionnelle pour les responsables de la Défense, des experts universitaires, des représentants d’organisations internationales et des entreprises du monde entier de se réunir pour débattre sur ce thème : « Le combat numérique au cœur des opérations ».

« Ce combat numérique est celui des guerres de demain », a assuré hier Jean-Yves Le Drian, ministre de la Défense, lors du premier colloque international #CyberDefense. Jean-Yves Le Drian et ses homologues britannique et belge, Michael Fallon et Steven Vandeput, ont ouvert à l’Ecole militaire cet évènement inédit, organisé par le ministère de la Défense et de nombreux industriels. Près de 30 délégations étrangères étaient également présentes pour cette rencontre intitulée : « Le combat numérique au cœur des opérations ».

Durant cette journée, conférences et ateliers thématiques se sont succédés, abordant divers sujets comme l’évolution des menaces dans l’espace numérique ou encore les retours d’expériences des exercices nationaux et interalliés. Ce colloque #CyberDefense a été l’occasion pour la Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) et l’EMA Cyber d’organiser, pour la première fois, deux challenges destinés aux étudiants des écoles d’ingénieurs civils et militaires. Enfin, s’est tenue en fin de journée une conférence conjointe des cyber commandeurs (avec à leur tête le vice-amiral Arnaud Coustillière, officier général cyberdéfense) sur la mise en œuvre des capacités offensives et défensives dans le cadre d’une coalition.

« La cyber n’est plus seulement un enjeu défensif », a souligné Jean-Yves Le Drian qui a évoqué l’importance de la lutte informatique offensive, en appui des opérations militaires. « Pour nos forces armées, le premier enjeu est désormais d’intégrer le combat numérique, de le combiner avec les autres formes de combat, a affirmé le ministre de la Défense. Ce nouveau milieu est devenu un domaine militaire à part entière. » Un enjeu qui s’inscrit dans un contexte international propre à une nouvelle génération : « Les conflits en cours illustrent parfaitement la progression de la menace cyber. Au Levant, mais aussi en Afrique ou au Maghreb, les groupes armés terroristes que nous affrontons rivalisent de méthodes barbares. Mais ils investissent également, et Daech le fait en particulier, de manière massive l’espace numérique. »

Au cœur de l’actualité, l’organisation terroriste a été évoquée de nombreuses fois par les intervenants, et a notamment fait l’objet d’un atelier thématique sur la cyberdéfense et la propagande de Daech. Recrutement massif à l’aide de campagnes de propagande et mise en scène d’actes d’une violence extrême, le savoir-faire informatique accompagne les forces de Daech. Pour y faire face, le gouvernement français a lancé, depuis 2012, des mesures contre les terroristes dans le cyberespace. Notamment avec un « contre-discours » qui vise à retourner l’action informationnelle contre le groupe terroriste lui-même en décrédibilisant le fantasme vendu par Daech dans sa stratégie de communication. Si aujourd’hui aucune attaque ciblée contre la France via le numérique n’a été entreprise par Daech, ses créations de logiciels démontre une capacité et une dangereuse volonté de nuire via le cyberespace.

Agir vite mais sans précipitation, prendre en compte toutes les implications du combat numérique au niveau planétaire, modeler les armées pour faire face à une nouvelle dimension des conflits, alimenter une communauté d’action et de réflexion. Le rendez-vous est pris pour un prochain colloque international en 2016, à Londres cette fois-ci.

Le Défi #CyberDefense

Ce colloque #CyberDefense a été l’occasion pour la Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) et l’EMA Cyber d’organiser, pour la première fois, deux challenges destinés aux étudiants des écoles d’ingénieurs civils et militaires.

Investigation numérique, cryptographie, stéganalyse, retroconception, cinquante élèves issus d’écoles d’ingénieurs civiles spécialisées en sécurité informatique se sont retrouvés, hier matin, pour une vingtaine de mini-challenges. « Nous avons compilé dans une interface web des exercices de nature et de niveaux différents, a expliqué l’ingénieur principal Romain Picart, adjoint responsable du pôle Sécurité des systèmes d’information (SSI) à la DGA. Les élèves travaillaient seuls et devaient réussir le maximum d’exercice.La Réserve opérationnelle est censée pouvoir puiser dans un pool d’experts en prévention d’une crise future. Le but de ces défis est de faire connaitre la Réserve opérationnelle et d’évaluer les potentiels de demain. »

25/09/2015 armée de Terre

Le 23 septembre, le chef d’état-major de l’armée de Terre, le général d’armée Jean-Pierre Bosser, a invité les auditeurs de l’Institut des hautes études de la Défense nationale (IHEDN) et les stagiaires de l’Ecole de guerre (EG) à une présentation des capacités de l’armée de Terre au centre d’entraînement aux actions en zone urbaine (CENZUB) de Sissonne (Aisne).

A travers une démonstration dynamique, le CEMAT a dévoilé son modèle « Au Contact », porteur d’une ambition nouvelle pour l’armée de Terre. Modernité, réactivité, réversibilité, adaptabilité… Autant de capacités qui participent à la sécurité des Français, tant en métropole qu’à l’étranger. 20 ans après la professionnalisation, l’armée de Terre peut aujourd’hui capitaliser sur une maturité qui lui permet d’adapter son organisation à un environnement nouveau.

source libertepolitique.com
 

La réalité de l'histoire et des origines du conflit qui déchire la Syrie et l'Irak depuis de nombreuses années est peu connue. François Billot de Lochner reçoit Marc Fromager*, président de l'Aide à l'Eglise en détresse-France (AED), qui vient de faire paraître "Guerre, pétrole et radicalisme" (Salvator), un livre précis et poignant qui décrypte le drame des chrétiens d'Orient pris en étau entre les intérêts inavoués des puissances régionales et internationales.

Parmi les multiples causes du conflit, les tensions autour du gaz, qui selon toute vraisemblance, sont l'arrière-plan essentiel de la guerre contre la Syrie et plus particulièrement dans la région de Homs. Un éclairage qui permet de mieux comprendre l'attitude de la France et des Etats-Unis, mais aussi de la Turquie, de l'Iran, de l'Arabie saoudite ou de la Russie.

* Marc Fromager est le président de l'AED en France. Né en 1968 à Nouméa, père de 6 enfants, il a vécu vingt ans à l'étranger et travaille depuis plus de vingt ans pour l'Eglise. Rédacteur en Chef de la revue  L'Eglise dans le monde, il a fait récemment plusieurs séjours au Moyen Orient. Connu pour sa grande et courageuse liberté de parole, il donne accès à des informations peu utilisées par la plupart des médias.