11/1/2015 EU source: European Commission Ref: EC15-008EN

Summary: 11 January 2015, Brussels – European Commission Memo on Fighting terrorism at EU level, an overview of Commission's actions, measures and initiatives

The fight against terrorism at EU level

What is Europe's role in the fight against terrorism, which is principally a national competence? What does the EU do to support Member States' efforts?

In 2010 the European Commission adopted an Internal Security Strategy for the period from 2010 to 2014. In the coming months, a European Agenda on Security will be adopted, as foreseen in the Commission working programme for 2015.

The fight against terrorism is principally a national competence. However, the European Union supports Member States' efforts in the following ways:

• Creating a legal environment and framework for cooperation;
• Developing common capabilities and systems such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) or the Civil Protection Mechanism;
• Supporting, notably financially, the establishment of concrete and operational cooperation between practitioners and front line actors via, for example, the Radicalisation Awareness Network, ATLAS (network of the rapid intervention forces), Airpol (network of airports' police) in the fight against terrorism and working together with Member States and stakeholders e.g. in Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and explosives expert groups or the standing committee on precursors;
• Ensuring that security and fundamental rights are built by design into all relevant EU level policies such as transport, energy, etc.
• The Internal Security fund also provides financing to Member States in the field of internal security, including fight against terrorism.

What is the EU doing to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism?

In 2011, the Commission set up the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) which brings together first line practitioners from very different areas and countries with different societal challenges and background, working in the health or social sector, associations of victims, local authorities, representatives from diasporas and local police, prison or probation officers, teachers, etc. The RAN enabled the establishment of a vibrant network of experts that identify best practices, work with people – for instance on campuses or in prisons – who are drifting into extremism and violence.

In January last year the Commission put forward a set of actions to strengthen the EU's response to radicalisation and violent extremism. While preventing radicalisation and violent extremism is mainly the responsibility of the Member States, the European Commission and the RAN can assist in several ways, including by helping member States to put in place de-radicalisation programmes and by fostering dialogue and cooperation with civil society in order to prevent radicalisation and extremist violence. The European Commission has also proposed the creation of a European Knowledge hub on radicalisation and extremism aiming at continuing and expanding the work for which the RAN has already laid the foundation.

What is the EU doing to prevent the financing of Terrorism?

We need to effectively cut networks that facilitate terrorist activities from financing. To this end, the Commission will continue to support implementation of important instruments such as the network of EU Financial Intelligence Units and anti-money laundering initiative.

The EU concluded with the U.S. an agreement on access to transfer of financial data in the framework of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program ('TFTP Agreement') which is in force since August 2010. The Terrorist Finance Tracking System enables identification and tracking of terrorists and their support networks through targeted searches run on the financial data provided by the Designated Provider (SWIFT).

The TFTP Agreement is equipped with a set of robust safeguards to protect EU citizens' fundamental rights. Europol is responsible for verifying that U.S. requests for data comply with the conditions stipulated in the Agreement including that they must be as narrowly tailored as possible in order to minimise the volume of data requested. Each search on the provided data must be narrowly tailored and based on information or evidence demonstrating a reason to believe that the suspect of the search has a link to terrorism or its financing. Searches are monitored by independent overseers, including by two persons appointed by the European Commission.

Reciprocity is a basic principle underlying the Agreement and two provisions (Articles 9 and 10) are the basis for Member States as well as, where appropriate, Europol and Eurojust to benefit from TFTP data. Under the EU rules, National Treasuries must ensure the availability to law enforcement, public security, or counter-terrorism authorities of concerned Member States, and, as appropriate, to Europol and Eurojust, of information obtained through the TFTP. Since the Agreement entered into force in 2010, more than 7300 investigative leads were generated by the TFTP for the EU.

There is a significantly growing number of requests related to the phenomenon of travelling fighters (Syria/Iraq/IS). In 2014, there were 35 TFTP (Article 10) requests generating 937 intelligence leads of relevance to 11 EU Member States. The TFTP is also used, through Europol, to support the investigations of the French authorities related to the Paris attacks.

What is the EU focus on the protection against terrorist attacks?

The European Commission encourages national law enforcement agencies to cooperate even more on concrete activities to protect our citizens. To protect public areas considered as soft-targets, such as museums, sport and cultural areas, we will further develop guidance material on soft target protection, similar to the manual produced by the airport police network (AIRPOL). The Commission will further pursue our efforts to detect and respond to threats before they materialise – addressing all public areas as well as critical infrastructures.

What is the EU policy on victims of terrorism?

We support and empower the survivors and victims of such atrocious attacks by strengthening support groups and projects that enable to victims to tell their stories – as part of their recovery and as part to create new counter-narratives.

Stepping up the fight against terrorism

The European Commissionwill adopt in the months to come a European Agenda on Security for 2015-2020, as announced by the Commission, which will reorient the EU's internal security to meet the challenges posed by current criminal and terrorist threats. Several important elements are already under consideration:

• continue to reinforce the efficiency of the Schengen Information System by even more stringent, targeted, informed and non-discriminating controls;
• consider if existing legal penal framework needs reinforcement;
• strengthen cooperation between Europol and other European agencies and threat assessment bodies, notably IntCen (Single Intelligence assessment Centre).
• reinforce work to make relevant information accessible to law enforcement for the purpose of better preventing and pursuing criminal activities across EU and international borders;
• reinforce the exchange of information at EU and international level on illegal firearms.

The European Commission will also continue to work with the European Parliament and the Council to adopt EU rules on a European Passenger Name Record system which will improve our capability to prevent and detect terrorism and serious crime in a world of unimpeded global travel.

What is PNR data and how can PNR databases help fight terrorism?

Passenger Name Record (PNR) data is unverified information provided by passengers and collected and held in the air carriers' reservation and departure control systems for their own commercial purposes. It contains several different types of information, such as travel dates, travel itinerary, ticket information, contact details, the travel agent at which the flight was booked, means of payment used, seat number and baggage information.

The processing of PNR data allows law enforcement authorities to identify previously unknown suspects whose travel patterns are unusual or fit those typically used by terrorists.

Analysis of PNR data also allows retrospective tracking of the travel routes and contacts of persons suspected to have been involved in terrorist acts, thus enabling law enforcement authorities to unveil criminal networks.

What is the state of play on an EU Passenger Name Record proposal?

In February 2011, the Commission presented a proposal for an EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive. The proposal would oblige Member States to set up PNR systems and establish strict data protection safeguards for the processing and collection of PNR data from flights to and from the EU.

The Commission is committed to ensuring the proposal, which should include high fundamental rights protection for EU citizens, gets adopted and is working closely with the European Parliament and the Council to this end.

How does the Commission intend to reinforce the efficiency of the Schengen Information System and of the Schengen area in general?

The existing Schengen legal and technical tools already ensure a high level of safety for European citizens. Member States need to use the existing instruments to the greatest extent so that all persons representing a threat to internal security are appropriately dealt with. The Schengen Information System (SIS II) has proven to be one of the most efficient tools in following the travel routes of foreign fighters through discreet or specific check alerts or to retain them at the external borders if their travel documents are invalidated and entered into SIS for seizure. The Commission is currently working together with Member States to develop a common approach on making the best use of the possibilities under EU law, both as regards checks on documents and checks on persons. The tools are there – it is up to Member States to use them.

What checks does the Schengen System allow for?

As far as the checks at the external borders are concerned, under the Schengen Borders Code the Member States must verify the travel documents of all persons – regardless of their nationality – at the external borders to establish the identity of the traveller. This includes verifying that the document is valid and not falsified or counterfeit. Member States can consult relevant databases (including the SIS database) for this purpose at each check. The Commission recommends that Member States carry out consultations of the databases more intensively, and is concerned that many Member States do not appear to be doing so.

At the same time, as regards checks on persons inside the Schengen area, Member States have the possibility, on a non-systematic basis, to consult national and EU databases to ensure that persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law do not represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the internal security and public policy of the Member States. Such verification is to be done on the basis of threat assessment, which can be quite wide-ranging and adapted to the threat represented by foreign fighters, and allows for checks on all persons covered by that threat assessment.  

As far as the checks within the Member States territories are concerned, the competent national authorities are entitled to carry out identity checks on persons present in their territory to verify for instance the legality of stay or for law enforcement purposes.

What are the rules to reintroduce internal border checks in the Schengen area?

According to Article 23 and following of the Schengen Borders Code, Member States may exceptionally reintroduce border control, where there is a serious threat to public order or internal security. For foreseeable events, a Member State must notify the other Member States and the Commission in advance. In cases requiring urgent action a Member State may immediately reintroduce border control at internal borders, while, at the same time, notifying the other Member States and the Commission accordingly. The reintroduction of border control is in principle limited to 30 days. In general, if a Member State decides to reintroduce border controls, the scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction cannot not exceed what is strictly necessary to address the serious threat.

How is the movement of illegal firearms currently regulated in the EU?

Even if the use of weapons in criminal attacks is not new, terrorists are using weapons more and more, in addition to the traditional strategy which was based on the use of explosives.

Movement of such weapons within the EU is regulated by a procedure laid down in Directive 2008/51/CE (so-called Firearms Directive) which establishes a system of authorisation for owners and traders of weapons for civilian use only. Military weapons cannot be traded to private persons. Under specific conditions only collectors can keep military weapons. Regulation 258/2012 on illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms establishes rules for export of weapons for civilian use. This system is based on an authorisation procedure following the provision of United Nations Protocol on firearms.

Last year the European Commission launched an evaluation aimed at improving current practices in the EU as regards marking, deactivation and destruction of firearms entering in the scope of EU rules on firearms and the legal requirement for purchasing alarm weapons and replicas within the EU. An additional evaluation was also finalised at the end of last year to examine possible policy options, including the approximation of various relevant offences, to better prevent, deter, detect, disrupt, investigate, prosecute and cooperate on illicit arm trafficking in the EU. Based on the results of the evaluation process carried out, the Commission decide on how to proceed to amend the Firearms Directive, which could lead to a proposal for stricter checks for some categories of weapons and by prohibiting the most dangerous weapons, which are already subject today to mandatory authorisation. A better exchange of information is also very important at EU and international level.

What the EU is doing to ensure that necessary funding is available to prevent organised crime and terrorism?

To promote the implementation of EU law enforcement cooperation, the management of risks and crises and the control of the Union's external borders, the Internal Security Fund (ISF) has been set up for the period 2014-2020 with a total budget of approximately EUR 3.8 billion (both components of the Fund).

The primary objectives of actions implemented in the upcoming period are fighting cross-border and organised crime including terrorism, preventing and combating radicalisation towards violent extremism and strengthening the capacity of Member States and the EU to assess risks to their societies and increase resilience to crises.

An important focus in spending the funds is placed on prevention. To achieve its objectives, the EU supports practical cooperation between Member States, the development of training schemes and knowledge platforms and the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities and Member States and EUROPOL. In terms of preventing crises, funding is provided to measures which enhance Member States' capacity to protect their critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and to develop comprehensive threat assessments, including early-warning mechanisms.

Finally, the EU supports actions geared towards alleviating consequences of terrorism and extremism. Support to victims is an important component for which EU funding is used.

How can the EU support Member States affected by a major crisis?

Crisis management as well as the fight against terrorism remain principally national competences. The EU has, however, developed tools to support Member States affected by crises, including major terrorist attacks, and established crisis coordination arrangements.

‘Response’ is indeed one of the 4 pillars of the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy. The Solidarity Clause which was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty covers situations of terrorist attacks as well. The EU institutions and agencies as well as Member States are thus organised to give assistance to the affected Member States, through the mobilisation of all available instruments (information exchange, support to the investigations, EU Civil Protection Mechanism, etc.).

In the event of a terrorist crisis, the European Commission can also activate its crisis response mechanisms, including the secure crisis room located in the Strategic Analysis and Response (STAR) centre, which closely cooperates with the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU agencies (Europol, Frontex).

The Commission also supports cooperation between Member States in the field of preparedness, through the organisation of crisis management exercises, in particular with police special intervention units (the ATLAS network’s ‘Common Challenge 2013’ exercise), as well as to enhance cooperation between these units and the civil protection community (‘ARETE 2014’ exercise) to respond to complex crisis scenarios.

What is the EU doing on the security of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and explosives?

The Commission will finalise the implementation of the Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) and Explosives Action Plans by the end of 2015. The basis for the Commission’s work on the security of CBRN substances and Explosives are two action plans: the EU CBRN Action Plan, which was adopted in 2009 and comprises a wide range of 124 actions from prevention and detection to preparedness and response, to be implemented by end of 2015, and the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, with 48 actions.

The Commission also monitors and facilitates the implementation of Regulation 98/2013 on explosives precursors by Member State authorities and economic operators.

For More Information

Homepage of the Directorate-General for Migration. Home Affairs:

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.htm

Homepage of European Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos:

http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/avramopoulos_en

27-03-2014 SEDE

13-03-2014 SEDE

Brussels - 06 February, 2014 EU Defence Agency

The Portuguese authority managing European Structural Funds has recently confirmed the acceptance of the “TURTLE” project, financing around 60% of the total project budget. TURTLE is the first of seven dual-use research initiatives supported by the European Defence Agency to access European Structural Funds (ESF). It aims at developing key enabling technologies for a sustainable and long term presence in the ocean. 

The European Defence Agency (EDA) and European Commission (EC) coordinate their research efforts in the areas of defence and security: the use of existing EU supporting tools and funds for dual-use research projects is a means to promote innovation in Europe while retaining key technological and industrial capabilities. EDA  facilitates and supports access to dual-use R&T projects. The TURTLE project was developed by a consortium of Portuguese SMEs, research institutes and universities. Its aim is to produce new robotic ascend and descent energy efficient technologies to be incorporated in robotic vehicles used by civil and military stakeholders for underwater operations. In the defence sector, the technology will allow underwater unmanned marine systems and robotics to operate at lower cost and added capabilities. The Portuguese authorities now decided to co-finance TURTLE with around €770.000 (around 60% of the total project costs) through the ESF. 
 

EDA Support to Projects

The main objectives of EDA’s work on ESF are to raise awareness among Ministries of Defence and defence industry, with special focus on defence related SMEs, as regards the use of ESF; so far a series of dedicated workshops in different countries have been organised; EDA also identifies  and supports eligible pilot projects in R&T priorities and industrial capabilities for the European Structural Funds; and is developing a methodology to be used by the Ministries of Defence and defence industry to increase eligibility for future projects.

In terms of concrete support to projects, twelve Member States submitted 72 project proposals for screening. The Agency provided free-of-charge guidance and support to 44 projects and selected seven pilot projects (from Bulgaria, Poland, Germany, Portugal, France, UK and Spain) which were actively assisted in the development of the application folders. Out of the selected projects, two applications have been successfully submitted by the project holders to the national managing authorities for co-funding, while the rest will be submitted during the new financial framework 2014-2020. The Portuguese project “TURTLE” is the first EDA supported project for which a decision on funding has been taken.
 

Stimulating Dual-Use Technologies

The European Council of 19 December 2013 underlined the importance of stimulating dual-use research and support to SMEs. Embedded in the Agency’s Action Plan on SMEs, the Agency’s support for dual-use research projects is of concrete benefit for initiators. EDA will continue working with stakeholders to access European Structural Funds in 2014 in proposing a systematic approach, taking advantage of the programming period 2014-2020. Moreover the Agency will organise seminars in Member States with the participation of government, industry and research centers to mobilise stakeholders to apply for ESF for dual use R&T projects. Upon a second call, EDA will select additional projects to support the development of application folders focusing on identified priority areas such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, space, energy efficiency, or cyber defence. 
 

TURTLE is developed by the following entities:

• Silva Matos Metalomecanica S.A (Small-Medium Enterprise): The main promoter, responsible for all mechanical and market introduction; 

• INESC PORTO (Technology & Science Laboratory): Responsible with ISEP for the robotization of the TURTLE project; 

• ISEP (School of Engineering, Porto Polytechnic Institute) and 

• CINAV (Portuguese Navy Research Center): responsible to develop acoustic detection adapted to the solution and demonstrate the use in security application. 

More information

• News "EDA Assists Dual-Use Projects to Access Funding" (18 Dec 2013)

• Factsheet "European Structural Funds for Dual-Use Research"

• European Commission SME Portal

• News: "Smart Specialisation & European Structural Funds: First Seminar in Portugal" (8 April 2013)

• News "Regional Smart Specialisation Workshop: Proceedings Available" (14 Feb 2013)

• News "Strengthening the Defence Industrial Sector" (28 Jan 2013)

05.11.2013 Jan Wind Director at WISER Consultancy

Call for improved “branding”, access to funding and an efficient market

Technology is everywhere. For the armed forces the availability of top class technology is often a matter of life and death. Technological knowledge, funding for technology and capability development, efficient procedures and market rules are crucial for engineers and industry to support the armed forces effectively.

From this perspective EDTA compiled comments to the Communication on the European Defence and Security Sector as has been adopted by the European Commission on 24 July 2013.

Read and download the full press release and all detailed comments

Faced with growing global volatility, strategic shifts, daunting fiscal realities and declining defence capabilities, Europeans must rethink the political, operational and economic facets of their security and defence commitments.

The Communication ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’, adopted by the European Commission on 24 July, provides an important contribution ahead of the European Council meeting in December which will discuss concrete proposals to bolster the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Download document

24 juillet 2013 creusot-infos.com

« La communication sur l'industrie de sécurité et de défense présentée aujourd'hui par la Commission Européenne est une contribution importante au débat qui doit s'engager à tous les niveaux en vue du sommet européen de décembre » a déclaré mercredi l’eurodéputé UMP-PPE Arnaud Danjean, président de la sous-commission Sécurité et défense du Parlement européen.

« Ce texte, préparé par les commissaires Barnier et Tajani,  que la sous-commission Défense du Parlement européen avait auditionnés récemment, met en évidence l'atout stratégique que constitue l'industrie de défense européenne, tant sur les plans économiques que technologiques et opérationnels » a indiqué Arnaud Danjean.

« Je suis particulièrement satisfait de voir figurer explicitement, à plusieurs reprises  dans la communication, la notion d'autonomie stratégique, à savoir la nécessité pour les Européens de pouvoir décider et agir sans dépendre des capacités de pays tiers.

Ceci suppose que l'Union européenne identifie des capacités et technologies-clefs dans lesquelles des investissements européens pourront intervenir, et pour lesquels le contrôle des chaines d'approvisionnement sera assuré. Voir ces priorités explicitement reconnues par la Commission est rassurant, tant il est important que les spécificités du secteur de la Défense soient reconnues et s'inscrivent dans la vision plus large d'une Europe acteur de sa propre sécurité » a-t-il poursuivi.  

« La possibilité d'acquisition, par l'UE, de certaines capacités civilo-militaires, ainsi que les investissements communautaires possibles dans la recherche et le développement de ces technologies duales, sont des pistes prometteuses ».

« La Commission européenne se fixe ainsi des objectifs légitimes dans la limite de ses compétences. Il reste à espérer que les Etats-Membres, qui conservent l'essentiel des responsabilités en matière de défense, prennent pleinement conscience de la menace de déclassement stratégique du continent européen et s'accordent sur les priorités politiques et capacitaires pour enrayer cette tendance dramatique » a conclu Arnaud Danjean.

3/7/2013 EU source: European Commission-  Ref: SP13-074EN

Summary: 3 July 2013, Strasbourg - Speech by Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Commissioner for Justice, on "U.S. and EU Member State surveillance programmes: National security does not mean that anything goes" at a Plenary Session of the European Parliament

MAIN MESSAGES

1/ On the NSA spying allegations:

It is a matter of mutual trust and good practices in relations between friends and allies. It is clear that for negotiations on the trade agreement with the US to succeed, there needs to be confidence, transparency and clarity among the negotiating partners. This excludes spying on EU institutions.

2/ On the US PRISM programme:

The purpose [of the transatlantic working group] is to establish the facts and for the Commission to be able to assess the proportionality of the programmes with regard to the data protection of EU citizens.

The US appears to take our concerns regarding PRISM seriously. Attorney General Eric Holder committed, in a letter to me yesterday, to set up the expert group. We spoke yesterday evening on the phone and we agreed that the group will have its first meeting this month, and a second one in Washington in September. The Commission will report about the findings of the group to Parliament and Council in October.

3/ On the UK's TEMPORA programme:

The message is clear: the fact that the programmes are said to relate to national security does not mean that anything goes. A balance needs to be struck between the policy objective pursued and the impact on fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy. It is a question of proportionality.

As regards next steps, we will continue the discussion with the UK on the Tempora project.

4/ On the EU's data protection reform:

PRISM and Tempora are a wake-up call for us to advance on our data protection reform for both the private and the public sector. A strong framework for data protection is neither a constraint nor a luxury but a necessity.

Various elements of the reform are of particular relevance. It will clarify the territorial application of the law, including to companies operating in the EU. It will have a broad definition of personal data. It will clarify regime for international transfers. It will impose obligations and responsibilities on processors as well as controllers of data.

[I]t has become urgent to proceed on a solid piece of legislation. Any delay in the data protection reform only plays in the hands of those who do not share the objective of a high level of data protection.

SPEECH

The news over the past weeks and days has been deeply disturbing. Revelations, claims and counter-claims have been made at a dizzying speed. This debate is a useful opportunity to explain the different strands of the issue and to make sense of what the EU can do to address the situation.

I believe that we should carefully distinguish between two aspects to the problem. The first concerns international diplomatic relations. The second concerns the rights of EU citizens.

As regards the first matter of alleged spying on EU and EU Member States' diplomatic premises, the Commission has raised its serious concerns with the US. Yesterday, the President made a statement to this House in the context of the debate on the European Council Conclusions. The issue was also discussed by Vice-President Ashton directly with State Secretary Kerry. It is a matter of mutual trust and good practices in relations between friends and allies.

It is clear that for negotiations on the trade agreement with the US to succeed, there needs to be confidence, transparency and clarity among the negotiating partners. This excludes spying on EU institutions.

The second issue, related to the right of EU citizens, was debated here one month ago. I am happy to update you on latest developments.

In relation to the revelations on the PRISM programme and the Verizon case, I asked a series of questions in a letter to my US counterpart, Attorney-General Eric Holder, on 10 June. I have also spoken with him at the EU-US Justice Ministerial on 14 June in Dublin.

I raised our concerns regarding the impact of Verizon and PRISM on the fundamental rights of EU citizens. I asked for clarifications on the different levels of protection that apply to US and EU citizens. And I asked about the conflict companies can find themselves in when they are faced with competing obligations under US and EU law.

Some explanations for which I am awaiting written confirmation were given. But all questions have not been answered so far. This is why after the Ministerial I have written again, together with my colleague Cecilia Malmström, to our US counterpart asking for answers in particular on the volume of the data collected, the scope of the programmes and the judicial oversight for Europeans.

At the Ministerial in Dublin, we agreed with the US to set up a transatlantic group of experts to establish the facts surrounding these programmes. The purpose is to establish the facts and for the Commission to be able to assess the proportionality of the programmes with regard to the data protection of EU citizens.

The US appears to take our concerns regarding PRISM seriously. Attorney General Eric Holder committed, in a letter to me yesterday, to set up the expert group. We spoke yesterday evening on the phone and we agreed that the group will have its first meeting this month, and a second one in Washington in September. The Commission will report about the findings of the group to Parliament and Council in October.

At the EU-US Ministerial, I called once again for the conclusion of the negotiations for an EU-US Umbrella Agreement on data transfer for law enforcement purposes. An agreement that would guarantee equal treatment of EU and US citizens when their data is processed for law enforcement purposes. I urged my US counterpart to take the necessary steps to ensure real progress.

In response to media reports about the UK Tempora Programme, I have addressed a letter to Foreign Secretary William Hague and asked to clarify the scope of the programme, its proportionality and the extent of judicial oversight that applies.

The message is clear: the fact that the programmes are said to relate to national security does not mean that anything goes. A balance needs to be struck between the policy objective pursued and the impact on fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy. It is a question of proportionality.

As many of you said in our last debate in June, programmes such as PRISM and Tempora are a wake-up call for us to advance on our data protection reform for both the private and the public sector.

A strong framework for data protection is neither a constraint nor a luxury but a necessity. It will help reverse the trend of falling trust in the way in which data is handled by companies to which it is entrusted.

That's why our proposed reform is an important part of the answer. It will maintain the current high level of data protection in the EU by updating citizens' rights, guaranteeing they know when their privacy has been violated and making sure that when their consent is required, the consent is real.

Various elements of the reform are of particular relevance. It will clarify the territorial application of the law, including to companies operating in the EU. It will have a broad definition of personal data. It will clarify regime for international transfers. It will impose obligations and responsibilities on processors as well as controllers of data.

Only a strong data protection regime can bring this trust both for EU citizens and for businesses and contribute to stability and growth of the digital economy. And trust is also the basis for EU-US cooperation in the field of law enforcement.

As many of you said in June, it has become urgent to proceed on a solid piece of legislation. Any delay in the data protection reform only plays in the hands of those who do not share the objective of a high level of data protection.

The whole world is watching us on this. And the debate on PRISM and similar programmes only reinforces that we have a chance to set a gold standard for data protection.

As regards next steps, we will continue the discussion with theUKon the Tempora project.

Together with the Presidency, we have started the discussion on the transatlantic expert group which will include experts from Member States. Based on the information gathered, the Commission will report back to the European Parliament and to the Council in October.

On 12 June 2012, the European Defence Agency together with the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports and the Austrian Defence and Security Industry Association was hosting a workshop on Doing Business with European Security and Defence Bodies in Vienna.

Co-organiser Karl-Heinz Dernoschegg from the Austrian Defence and Security Industry Association stated at the end of the event that this was a perfect way to bridge the gap between supply and demand in the area of defence and security. He continued by saying that his association would be happy to host events of this kind on a more regular basis and considers this a very good model for other countries and associations to follow.

7/2/2013 Ref: EU13-049EN

Summary: 7 February 2013, Brussels - A free and open Internet is at the heart of the new Cyber Security Strategy by the European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton and the European Commission. The new Communication is the first comprehensive policy document that the European Union has produced in this area. It comprises internal market, justice and home affairs and the foreign policy aspects of cyberspace issues.

The Strategy is accompanied by a legislative proposal (a Directive) from the European Commission to strengthen the security of information systems in the EU. This would encourage economic growth as people's confidence in buying goods online and using the Internet would be strengthened.

• Freedom and openness: The Strategy outlines the vision and principles on applying the EU core values and fundamental rights in cyberspace. Human Rights should also apply online and we will promote cyberspace as an area of freedom and fundamental rights. Expanding access to the Internet should promote democratic reform worldwide. The EU believes that increased global connectivity should not be accompanied by censorship or mass surveillance.
• The laws, norms and EU core values apply as much in the cyberspace as in the physical world: The responsibility for a more secure cyberspace lies with all players of the global information society, from citizens to governments.
  Developing cyber security capacity building: The EU will engage with international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society to support global capacity building in third countries. It will include improving access to information and to an open Internet and preventing cyber threats.
• Fostering international cooperation in cyberspace issues: To preserve open, free and secure cyberspace is a global challenge, which the EU will address together with the relevant international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society.

How can the core values be ensured in the worldwide web?

One example is human rights, which should also apply online as the European Union will promote cyberspace as an area of freedom and fundamental rights. Expanding access to the Internet should advance democratic reform worldwide. The EU believes that increased global connectivity should not be accompanied by censorship or mass surveillance.

What EU norms and laws should be used in cyberspace?

The responsibility for a more secure cyberspace lies with all players of the global information society, from people to governments. The EU supports the efforts to define norms of behaviour in cyberspace that all stakeholders should adhere to. Just as the EU expects citizens to respect civic duties, social responsibilities and laws online, so should states abide by norms and existing laws. An important pre-condition for free and open Internet that brings political and economic benefits to societies worldwide, is to maintain a multi-stakeholder governance model of the Internet.

Will there be new laws to address cyber threats?

No, the EU believes we have many international law instruments already that should be applied in cyberspace. However, some governments have proposed new treaties and conventions in cyber issues that the EU cannot support. We fear that the argument of cyber security will be used as a pretext to justify limiting the freedom of expression and access to information. For instance, the Budapest Convention includes all the important elements to assist in investigation, prosecution, and international cooperation to address cybercrime.

At present 49 countries have signed the Convention and many countries outside Europe have introduced its principles into their legislation. The EU has assisted the Council of Europe in disseminating the principles of this Convention worldwide, and we are currently financing new programs to promote the Budapest Convention and increase the rule of law in this area.

What does the EU intend to do on capacity building?

The EU will engage with international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society to support global capacity-building in third countries. It will include improving access to information and to an open Internet and preventing cyber threats. The EU will also actively participate in developing donor coordination for helping capacity-building efforts. These actions will focus on enhancing criminal justice capabilities in training prosecutors and judges, and introducing the Budapest Convention (Cybercrime Convention) principles in recipient countries' legal framework, building law enforcement capacity to advance cybercrime investigations and assisting countries to address cyber incidents.

How does the Strategy contribute to international cooperation in cyberspace?

To preserve an open, free and secure cyberspace is a global challenge, which the EU should address together with the relevant international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society. The EU will place a renewed emphasis on dialogue with third countries and international organisations, with a special focus on like-minded partners that share EU values. At bilateral level, cooperation with the United States is particularly important and will be further developed.

What the EU is doing on cyber defence issues?

Within the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Defence Agency (EDA) is developing cyber defence capabilities and technologies, improving cyber defence training & exercises. Given that threats are multifaceted, synergies between civilian and military approaches in protecting critical cyber assets should be enhanced. These efforts should be supported by research and development, and closer cooperation between governments, the private sector and academia in the EU.

The EU is also promoting early involvement of industry and academia in developing solutions and in strengthening Europe's defence industrial base and associated R&D innovations in both civilian and military organisations. The EDA will promote civil-military dialogue and contribute to the coordination between all actors at EU level - with particular emphasis on the exchange of good practices, information exchange and early warning, incident response, risk assessment and establishing a cyber-security culture.

Why does the Strategy address civilian and military issues?

Given that threats are multifaceted, synergies between civilian and military approaches in protecting critical cyber assets should be enhanced. These efforts should be supported by research and development, and closer cooperation between governments, the private sector and academia in the EU. To avoid duplication, the Union will explore possibilities on how the EU and NATO can complement their efforts to heighten the resilience of critical governmental, defence and other information infrastructures on which the members of both organisations depend.

Are the EU and NATO cooperating in cyber security?

There is a regular cooperation going on between the experts. After the Strategy is adopted, we intend to intensify cooperation with NATO in cyber security. Dialogue with NATO should ensure effective defence capabilities, identify areas for cooperation and avoid duplication of efforts.

The Directive must pass through the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament before adoption whilst the Cyber Security Strategy will remain as it is as it is not legislation.

DG Connect

http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/cyber-security

EU Justice and Home Affairs

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/index_en.htm