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1 juillet 2014 2 01 /07 /juillet /2014 16:30
photo DGA

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Jul 1, 2014 defense-update.com


Turkey was expected to announce the results of the long-awaited billion dollar long-range air and missile defense system tender yesterday. Instead, Ankara opted to delay its decision again, extending the deadline for the third time, expecting bids until August 30, 2104


Turkey’s Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM) was expected to make the final decision concerning the procurement of a multi-billion dollar long-range air and missile defense system tender, with European and Chinese firms in the running. Instead, Ankara opted to delay its decision again, extending the deadline for bids until August 30, Hürriyet Daily News reported. This is the third time Ankara has extended the deadline for revised offers.


Last September, the SSM executive committee chose China’s FD-2000 (HQ-9) long-range air and missile defense systems over Western competitors, including the Italian-French Eurosam’s SAMP/T Aster 30 systems. The Chinese manufacturer of the HQ-9 missile system, the state-run China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), offered a $3.4 billion high technology transfer. Turkish government officials announced they preferred the Chinese offer due to its competitiveness and potential for co-production in Turkey. the Turkish Daily Sabah reports.


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2 avril 2014 3 02 /04 /avril /2014 11:30
China’s Push for Turkish Missile Sale


April 2, 2014 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: The International Relations and Security Network; issued March 28, 2014)


Is The FD-2000 An Albatross Or A Raptor-Killer?


Why is China proposing to sell FD-2000 anti-aircraft missiles to Turkey? James Hasik thinks there are three possible reasons – Turkey is impressed with the system, China isn’t expecting a military confrontation with America any time soon, or internal disputes are clouding Beijing’s decision-making processes.


The Hurriyet Daily News reported [...] that enthusiasm has begun to wane amongst local subcontractors in CPMIEC’s proposed sale of FD-2000 anti-aircraft missile batteries to Turkey. CPMIEC has been blacklisted by the US government under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act, and Turkish firms are wary of winding up on the wrong side of the world’s biggest customer. As early as last October, Raytheon and Eurosam (MBDA and Thales’s joint venture) were asked to extend their pricing, and the bidding was again extended in January, so this deal is hardly done. Yet unexplained remains the motivation from the Chinese side. Why did Beijing allow CPMIEC to offer an important missile system to a NATO ally of the United States?


The actual quality of the product is hard to discern through public sources, and the heritage can be confusing. The FD-2000 is the export version of the HQ-9, itself originally a clone of the S-300 from Russia’s Almaz-Antey. Allied governments assuredly have better information. As I wrote earlier, the Slovak Air Force first brought its S-300s to a NATO exercise in 2005. The Hellenic Air Force has had 12 launchers since 2000, and test-fired some missiles back in December. The Bulgarians have the weapon too. Consider the Croatian battery that was actually sold to the US in 2003, and you can guarantee that the S-300 has been analyzed down to the smallest screw.


The Chinese missile is not quite the same, though it’s not clear whether it’s better or worse. Many Chinese companies are excellent contract manufacturers, and the industry may have tricked out the old Soviet technology. The record, however, is not good. Chinese efforts to copy Russian aircraft and engines have been thus far unimpressive, so one might wonder about the radars and missiles too. Indeed, in one second-hand report, I heard the FD-2000 described as the air defense equivalent "of a 1991 Hyundai.” Even at a Volkswagen price, that’s not a good deal.


But actual quality is not the issue: what matters in discerning motivation is Chinese perception of that quality. So suppose that the Chinese government actually would agree that the FD-2000 is effectively junk. Selling it to Turkey would put it into the NATO exercise cycle, and as many as 20 air forces could eventually fly against it to test its mettle. If CPMIEC had indeed sold the Turks a $3 billion albatross, word would get around, and the brand image of Chinese weapons would drop even lower than it is today. The Americans would be expected to grasp just how unimpressive China’s air defenses really were. So it’s unlikely that the export version could really be much less impressive than the domestic model.


On the other hand, over at Airpower Australia, Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon are much more impressed with the HQ-9, and it’s conceivable that their sources are Chinese and trustworthy. Suppose then that the Chinese government is quite proud of the quality of the FD-2000. Selling it to Turkey would put it into the NATO exercise cycle, and as many as 20 air forces could eventually fly against it. Then, if the FD-2000 were indeed a Raptor-killer, the Americans could be expected eventually to have a full understanding of just how impressive China’s air defenses really were. But they might not stay impressive for long, as the Americans would furiously work on countermeasures, and with the actual threat system in hand. So it’s unlikely that the Chinese expect to rely on a weapon like the FD-2000 for defense against the US.


This leaves at least three possibilities. The first is that the Chinese have advanced so far in air defense technology that the HD-2000 will be at least modestly impressive to the Turks and their allies, but still nothing compared to what the HQ-9 really is. That certainly would fit with the image that the most alarmed observers hold of China’s ballistic missile technology. But again, the track record in other areas in less impressive.


The second possibility is that the Chinese don’t care, as they consider the prospect of war with the United States quite remote. In that figuring, the posturing over shoals in the South China Sea, the bumper-car games with American ships, the Hainan Island incident, and every other “act of belligerent idiocy from Beijing," as Sydney Freedberg recently termed the histrionics, really are just a game. They’re all stage-managed Cold War antics, just like the Soviets used to enjoy. The bluster and the accompanying military modernization campaign is to show that China is not just the world’s outsourced manufacturing floor, but a modern state that should be taken seriously politically. They could do this with far more class and subtlety, but a variety of factors foreign and domestic keep them on the edge.


The third possibility is that the Chinese decision wasn’t all that strategically coherent. Perhaps this intended sale is not the result of a deep calculation by the Chinese government, but instead the outcome of a power-contest among Chinese elites, or the resultant of the military’s export sales regime just doing what it does.


Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence to support any of these scenarios. The first could be rather comforting around the Pacific Rim, depending on Chinese intentions. The second is quite unsettling for the US and its allies in that region. The third is intriguing, and would argue for a greater effort to understand Chinese interagency politics. Regardless, if the Chinese have badly misjudged their own product, we would know—assuming that the deal closes—when the Turks start howling. If they do know what they’re selling, we might never know—or just not know until the shooting starts.

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4 novembre 2013 1 04 /11 /novembre /2013 12:30
FD-2000 export variant of the HQ-9

FD-2000 export variant of the HQ-9



Nov. 3, 2013 - By BURAK EGE BEKDIL -Defense News


NATO's Consent Needed for Interoperability


ANKARA — NATO member Turkey’s stunning decision to select a Chinese contender to build the country’s first long-range air and missile-defense system does not mean that the game is over for US and European companies that bid for the prize, government officials said.


Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told reporters Oct. 25 that Ankara would be open to new offers if talks with China Precision Machinery Import Export Corp. (CPMIEC) fail. “Currently, I don’t know if there are different proposals from the other parties. If there are, they could be considered,” Erdogan said.


A senior procurement official said the decision to select CPMIEC may not be the end but rather the beginning of a fresh round of competition. “The game is certainly not over yet. We would enthusiastically assess rival bids if they make sense in terms of costs and the level of technology transfer we require,” he said.


Turkey announced Sept. 26 that it selected CPMIEC to build the country’s first long-range air defense architecture, sparking a major dispute over whether the Chinese-built system could be integrated with the NATO air defense assets stationed in Turkey.


The Chinese contender defeated a US partnership of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, offering the Patriot air defense system; Russia’s Rosoboronexport, marketing the S-300; and the Italian-French consortium Eurosam, maker of the Aster 30. Turkey has said Eurosam came second in the competition, Raytheon third and the Russian solution was eliminated.


Murad Bayar, Turkey’s top procurement official, said the Chinese offer was priced at US $3.44 billion. CPMIEC is under US sanctions for violations of the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.


Despite warnings from US and NATO officials over interoperability problems, Bayar said the Chinese system would be operable with the NATO assets stationed in Turkey.


According to Bayar, Turkey selected the Chinese solution because it was better than rival bids in terms of “price, technology, local work share, technology transfer and credit-financing terms. The Chinese bid is perfectly in compliance with our terms and conditions.”


But US Ambassador to Ankara Francis Ricciardone told reporters Oct. 24 that the United States was very concerned about the China missile defense deal. He said he understands the deal was a commercial decision and was within Turkey’s sovereign right, but that the United States shared NATO’s concerns, including what it means for allied air defense.


A US administration official in Washington said in a telephone interview that “the United States was much more concerned over the deal than it expressed.”


But Turkey’s Army chief remained defiant. “We have not been notified of any concern from the United States,” Chief of General Staff Army Gen. Necdet Ozel told reporters Oct. 29.


Reuters quoted sources as saying that Turkey had asked the US to extend the pricing on Raytheon’s proposal, a sign that Ankara is keeping its options open in case talks with CPMIEC fall through. Raytheon said Oct. 24 that it was still ready to sell its Patriot system to Turkey if Ankara changed its mind.


An official from Eurosam said Oct. 28 that the company was working hard to improve its offer, “especially in view of Turkish sensitivities about technology transfer.”


The Turkish program consists of radar, launcher and intercept missiles. It has been designed to counter both enemy aircraft and missiles. Turkey has no long-range air defense systems.


About half of Turkey’s network-based air defense radar picture has been paid for by NATO. They are part of the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment. Without NATO’s consent it will be impossible for Turkey to make the planned Chinese system interoperable with these assets, some analysts say.


To defend against missile threats, Turkey needs satellite and dedicated ballistic-missile detection and tracking radar, such as the NATO radar deployed last year in Kurecik, in southeastern Turkey.


For the anti-aircraft component, Turkey needs an overall picture for data fusion. The Patriot system, for instance, can detect threats with its own radar. So does the Chinese system. But without integrating into a full air picture, the Chinese system could not work efficiently, analysts said.

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