14.06.2011 MDAA

Researchers at the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) at Redstone, Arsenal, Ala., say they intend to award a potential $40 million five-year contract to QinetiQ North America in Huntsville, Ala., to develop and evaluate new ground-based missile- and air-defense systems architectures in the Architecture Characterization Program (A2CP).

AMRDEC officials announced their decision to award the indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to QinetiQ (LSE:QQ) Friday in a justification and approval declaration. The A2CP acquisition is a crucial component of AMRDEC Software Engineering Directorate (AMRDEC SED) support for Army air- and missile-defense programs, Army officials say.

Army officials are using the A2CP program to improve network-centric battle management command and control (BMC2) capability to manage sensor and shooter information processing and fast networking among U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and allied military forces. The A2CP program essentially is an extension of an Air, Space, and Missile Defense (ASMD) Architecture Analysis Program (A3P) contract, awarded in 2004 to Elmco Inc. in Huntsville, Ala.

Since the A3P contract was awarded, Elmco Corp. was acquired by Westar Aerospace & Defense Group Inc. in St. Louis, which subsequently was acquired by QinetiQ North America. The Army thus far has spent about $20 million on the A3P contract, and QinetiQ — through its acquisitions — has more than five years of experience on the program.

AMRDEC officials are hiring QinetiQ for engineering expertise to develop advanced warfighting concepts using integrated networking and fire-control.

Architectures to be involved in the current program include the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) and other air- and missile-defense technology to defend against cruise missiles; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft; rockets, mortars, and artillery shells; short-, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, and other ground-attack weapons.

Army researchers say QinetiQ is the only company qualified to provide these kinds of services, based on the company’s unique and immediately-available architecture expertise, as well as the company’s domain knowledge of air- and missile-defense system components such as SLAMRAAM, Army officials say.

AMRDEC SED wants to use existing knowledge and tools to analyze different air- and missile-defense systems designs. Among the QinetiQ’s relevant tools are the Distributed Integrated Air and Missile Defense Simulator, better-known as DIAMDS; Real-Time DIAMDS; the Intelligence Situational Awareness Tool (ISAT); Tactical Data Generator (TDG); Mission Rehearsal Tool (MRT); Trajectory Design Tool (TDT); the Route Planning Tool (RPT); Data Analysis and Reduction Tool (DART); and the ViewPoint animation and visualization tool.

Source: Military & Aerospace Electronics

Jun 14, 2011 ASDNews Source : GE Marine

Evendale, Ohio - GE Marine reports that it will provide Austal USA, Mobile, Alabama, with two LM2500 aeroderivative gas turbines to power the United States Navy's fourth LCS-Class-Independence variant. The new LCS will be named USS Montgomery, and will be powered by the LM2500s arranged in a COmbined Diesel and Gas turbine (CODAG) configuration with two diesel engines.

Austal USA plans to launch the second LCS-Class-Independence variant USS Coronado in the fourth quarter 2011. This vessel is also powered by two LM2500s in a CODAG configuration.

"This new LM2500 contract for the USS Montgomery comes on the heels of another order with Austal USA announced in May 2011, whereby GE will supply LM2500s for the third LCS-Class-Independence variant USS Jackson," said Brien Bolsinger, GE Marine general manager. "This most recent order brings the total to eight LM2500s GE will provide to Austal USA for LCS-Class-Independence variants, and is part of a contract for up to 10 ships over a five-year period."

On March 24, 2011 in Mobile the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy discussed how names were selected for the two recent LCS ships: "Jackson has never had a ship named after it, and so this will be the first that has ever been named the USS Jackson. There has been one USS Montgomery, named after the state capital here, but it sailed during the Spanish-American War - it was a cruiser. So it's been a few years since Montgomery has been similarly honored. These two ships will take forth the history and the pride of Alabama and Mississippi for decades to come as they sail around the world, as they do the business of the United States."

The 127-meter aluminum trimaran LCS is an agile surface combatant that can be deployed independently to overseas littoral regions, can remain on station for an extended period either with a battle group or through a forward-basing arrangement, and is capable of underway replenishment.

The LM2500 gas turbines for the USS Montgomery will be manufactured at GE's Evendale, Ohio, facility, and will be delivered to Austal USA in October 2012.

June 14, 2011 Donna Miles / American Forces Press Service – defpro.com

WASHINGTON | The U.S. Defense Department (DOD) is streamlining the way it administers the foreign military sales (FMS) program, including testing a concept to get pre-approvals for requests for high-demand technologies such as unmanned aerial systems, the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said June 10.

Navy Vice Adm. William E. Landay III oversees DOD’s execution of the State Department program that has delivered more than $96 billion in defense weapons systems, equipment and services to other countries and international organizations in the last five years.

Foreign military sales have averaged $30 billion for each of the last three years, up almost three-fold from the 2005-2008 timeframe, Landay said. In addition, many customers who once were willing to forego fast delivery to keep the bottom line as low as possible now want their goods and services as fast as possible, often to support current operations.

“This is a different environment,” Landay said. “What we need to do is make sure that the foreign military sales system we are operating is changing with that environment, and preferably, changing ahead of that environment so we can continue to support our customers.”

DSCA is giving its FMS processes a top-to-bottom review to make it improve processes and make it more flexible and responsive to customer needs, he said.

Among 11 core initiatives under way, one involves working with interagency partners and customers at the front end of the process to shape foreign military sales purchase requests before they’re made. Something as simple as getting customers to request technologies that already have been developed, rather than still in the pipeline, can go a long way toward speeding up delivery, Landay said.

Another DSCA initiative seeks to apply a more systematic approach to processing requests for the most sought-after technologies, including unmanned vehicles and unmanned aerial systems. Instead of processing countries’ requests in succession, Landay said, the idea is to make broader foreign military sales decisions early on, before the purchase requests ever come in.

“Can we, in advance of getting lots of technology requests, sit down and make a determination of what kinds of vehicles and capabilities we might be comfortable releasing before the countries even ask us for it so we know the answer?” he asked. “If we are going to release a capability to Country A, what other countries might we be willing to release it to? And why don’t we take all of them through the process at the same time, so that when those subsequent countries come in [with requests], we have already made a determination of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to that.”

Foreign military sales isn’t a one-size-fits-all program, Landay noted, as the United States sells different levels of technology to different countries. But by determining in advance what level of capability it is willing to sell to what specific countries, the entire process can be speeded up, he explained.

Another initiative DSCA is exploring involves buying some of the highest-demand foreign military sales items in advance so they’re available for delivery on request. “From our view, the fastest way to speed up the acquisition process is to already have [the equipment] in the warehouse,” Landay said.

Pre-stocking obviously won’t work for major sales involving aircraft and ships, he acknowledged, but could be the solution to expediting deliveries of sought-after equipment such as night-vision devices, body armor, vehicles and radios.

DOD already has the authorities needed to use foreign military sales funds to pre-stock this type of equipment. What’s lacking, but what the fiscal 2012 defense budget request could provide, is the funding mechanism to support the process, the admiral said.

“If Congress approves the authority to expend the funds, next year we will stand up the [special defense acquisition fund] and start to buy for that,” Landay said. “I think that will have a significant improvement in our ability to respond to requests.”

Landay said these and other improvements being pursued at DSCA show major promise for the foreign military sales program. “The idea is to get what the customers have asked us to do: to be not just faster, but more flexible and more responsible,” while continuing to maintain the controls built into the program, he said.

Ultimately, a successful foreign military sales program supports U.S. national interests, he explained.

“As a country continues to strengthen its ability to defend its borders, to protect itself and potentially, to operate with partners in the region or with the U.S., all of that strengthens the U.S. from a security perspective,” he said. “When there is security in a region, that benefits the entire world. And when and if we were to have to operate together, [and] countries … have the ability to operate well with the United States, that benefits both of us.”

Landay called the foreign military sales program key to U.S. relationship-building efforts around with world.

He pointed to the example of Egypt, a strong U.S. partner with a long history of buying U.S. military technology through the program. As Egypt underwent political turmoil earlier this year, military-to-military communications paths with the United States remained strong, he said.

“Part of that was built on a longstanding foreign military sales relationship and program between the Egyptians and the United States,” Landay said. “While built on foreign military sales, it also established those relationships [and] those partnerships so that when other things came up, we at least had the ability to pick up the phones and talk to each other.”

source defpro.com

June 14, 2011: STRATEGY PAGE

After eight years of exposure to IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices, mainly roadside bombs), the U.S. Army has developed an impressive array of training techniques to prepare troops for this weapon, and enable them to cope with it. The most obvious methods consist of computer simulations, much like video games, that enable troops to learn the techniques and practice. But the final phase of training is conducted on special "training lanes." This is a stretch of road containing typical (in appearance) IEDs and ambushes. Trainees drive vehicles they normally use (trucks for support troops, armored vehicles for combat troops) and apply what they learned on the computer simulations. This consists of how to spot IEDs and deal with them. This procedures for reporting IEDs, going around them, calling them in so engineers can dispose of them, or dealing with the devices themselves. There are different training scenarios for support troops, combat units and engineers. There are now 39 of these training lanes, 37 in U.S. bases, two in Germany and one in South Korea.

But there's more. Army intelligence has developed methods for predicting which routes will have more IEDs (and warning troops using those roads) and analyzing new types of IEDs and getting that information out to the troops quickly. The intel aspect of dealing with IEDs is often ignored, which is how the intel people prefer it. It's best that the enemy not know certain things.

IEDs quickly became the primary terrorist weapon in Iraq, and eventually in Afghanistan. Over 100,000 IEDs have been used so far, mostly against U.S. troops. IEDs have killed nearly 3,000 U.S. troops so far. That's about one American killed for every 35 IEDs used. Not particularly impressive, but as the only effective weapon the Iraqi and Afghan terrorists have, they have gotten behind the tactic in a big way.

IED use started off slow, with only about 3,000 used in the first year after Saddam was overthrown. Over 80 percent of IEDs were used in Iraq. This was because 600,000 tons of Saddams munitions that were scattered all over the country in early 2003, and these provided ample material for making these bombs. The most exposed U.S. troops are those moving supplies, and other stuff, around the country. There were 300-400 convoy operations a day (in 2007) in Iraq, most of them being supply runs. This involved over 3,000 vehicles, and some 6,000 troops. Casualties from attacks on convoys were relatively low, although soldiers who drove along dangerous routes regularly had about a five percent chance of getting killed or wounded during a 12 month tour. That's a very high casualty rate for non-combat troops.

The use of IEDs gave Saddams' experienced and well trained military and security personnel a chance to show off their skills. But the most effective countermeasures were equally clever American troops using whatever high, and low, tech solutions they could come up with. Again, new technology got the most media attention, but when you went into the details of why over 90 percent of IEDs are spotted and disabled, you found that it was brains, not gadgets, that was mainly responsible.

IEDs have been around for several generations. The only reason they got so much ink in Iraq was because the terrorists were unable to inflict many casualties on American troops any other way. The Sunni Arab fighters in Iraq were, historically, a pretty inept and pathetic bunch. This can be seen in the amazingly low casualty rate of American troops. By comparison, an American soldier serving in Vietnam was over twice as likely to be killed or wounded.

IEDs were used in Vietnam, but caused (with mines and booby traps in general) only 13 percent of the casualties, compared to over 60 percent in Iraq. The reason for this is one that few journalists want to discuss openly. But historians can tell you; Arabs are lousy fighters. Hasn't always been this way, but for the last century or so, it has. This has more to do with poor leadership, and a culture that simply does not encourage those traits that are needed to produce a superior soldier. In a word, the North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong guerillas were better, and more deadly, fighters. They got better results without having to fall back on IEDs. IEDs are mainly a matter of technology, planning and careful preparation for the attack. These are all things Iraqis were good at. You also suffer a lot fewer casualties by using IEDs, so the weapon is good for the morale of the users.

After 2003, IED use grew quickly. While only 5,607 IEDs were placed in 2004, there were 10,953 encountered in 2005 and over 40,000 in 2006. But American troops responded to the threat. In 2004, about a quarter of IEDs actually went off and hurt someone. In 2005, that rate declined to ten percent, and kept falling. This has been very frustrating for the terrorists and nerve wracking for the American troops on the receiving end. While billions of dollars has been put into developing new devices to counter IEDs, the best defensive tool is still alert troops, who have been briefed on the latest intel about what kind of IEDs are being planted.

The basic areas for IEDs remain intersections and roundabouts, on and under bridges and overpasses, on verges and breaks in the median strips, defiles, and any place where the IED planner believes the bomb will not be noticed by approaching Americans. In addition, IEDs are often planted in a daisy-chain fashion. Another tactic is using some gunmen to draw U.S. troops towards an IED. These "kill zones" often employ secondary IEDs, that are detonated after the initial devices have exploded.

In Afghanistan, most IEDs were used on rural, unpaved, roads. But American troops quickly adapted their Iraqi techniques to the new conditions. Troops are most vulnerable to IEDs when they are on combat operations. The supply and transportation troops had their regular routes (especially the MSR, or Main Supply Route highways), very well covered in Iraq. IEDs rarely get a chance to go off, or even get planted, on those roads. But for rural areas in Iraq or Afghanistan, there are more opportunities to place an IED that won't be discovered, and will get a chance to kill and wound Americans. In Afghanistan, there were more secondary routes, going out into the country. It was more difficult to keep a lot of these clear. Troops had to be more alert using these routes.

Actually, the biggest victims of IEDs civilians. The terrorists must go to great lengths to place IEDs in populated areas, where all the structures and clutter along the roads leaves more hiding places. But the locals not keen on having a large bomb go off in their neighborhood. The terrorists often don't give the locals much choice. After all, terrorists know how to terrorize, and they usually start with uncooperative civilians living around them. IEDs placed in rural areas are much easier to spot by the Americans, and all their UAVs, electronic gadgets and sharp eyed soldiers. The training lanes enable troops to practice these skills, and make mistakes that won't kill them.

The basic idea of IEDs is that, by causing a dozen or so American casualties a day, they will eventually cause the Americans to get discouraged and go home. This seemed to work in Vietnam, although it didn't work for the Japanese during World War II. So it's not a sure thing.

Jun 13, 2011 By Michael Fabey aviation week and space technology

Washington - Contractors vying for the U.S. Navy’s proposed Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) say they can deliver the system for much less than the government’s cost estimate because of their extensive experience building similar radar programs in recent years.

Such arguments are becoming increasingly important as Washington scrambles to find bill-payers while eyeing expensive defense programs.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates the AMDR would cost $15.7 billion—close to the Navy’s entire annual shipbuilding budget. The service says the estimate is based on data provided by AMDR program officials, but contractors say the GAO calculations rely mostly on historical data on building sophisticated radar systems largely from scratch. That fails to account for technology and production advancements made by other military projects that can be leveraged to develop and deliver AMDR, contractors say.

“Lockheed Martin’s development costs for the AMDR—based on what we understand from the data—is significantly less than the development costs cited by the GAO,” says Brad Hicks, Lockheed’s vice president of naval radar programs.

That Navy AMDR officials did not even flinch at such an estimate indicates their commitment to the program and acceptance of its high cost, as well as the rising importance of ballistic missile defense (BMD) as a Navy mission priority.

AMDR combines an S-band radar for BMD and air defense and an X-band radar for horizon search, with a controller to integrate simultaneous operation of the two. The Navy also is revamping its Aegis radar system to perform BMD missions—while opening up the network to more contractor competition.

The enhanced Aegis system is on its first deployment as part of the U.S.’s European Phased Adaptive Approach for BMD, aboard the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey CG-61 in the Mediterranean.

The Monterey’s commanding officer, Capt. Jim Kilby, says the enhanced BMD upgrades will lead ship and fleet commanders to rethink how they deploy the upgraded ships. “It’s like how the Tomahawk [missile] was when it first rolled out into the fleet,” he says.

The Navy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plan to nearly double the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships to 41 by the end of 2016. Some Pentagon and Navy officials have started to talk openly about possibly changing the U.S. nuclear posture, cutting back from the traditional nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers and ballistic-missile submarines to a dyad focused on the Navy and MDA efforts.

But developing the BMD focus takes time and money, as the Aegis system has shown. The February 2008 shoot-down of a defunct U.S. space satellite by the USS Lake Erie CG-70 proved the system’s capability, and an MDA test in April demonstrated its “launch-on-remote” system against an intermediate-range warhead separating from its booster missile. But it took nearly three decades for the Navy and industry to bring Aegis-like capability to the fleet.

“Aegis is a very large, integrated and complex system,” says Bill Bray, director of Integrated Combat Systems for the Navy’s Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems.

When Aegis baselines were developed in the 1970s, “combat systems were developed for a platform they were landing on and every platform ended up with its own combat system,” Bray says.

Cruisers and destroyers have their own Aegis systems—and certain groups of each ship would get their own baselines, depending on when they were delivered or available for an upgrade. They all have the basic Aegis core, but with different baseline capabilities, integrated systems and system architectures.

This means that when there is a problem, all the baselines have to be addressed; it is not possible to fix just the core software package and redeliver it.

Aegis development cost estimates range from $30 billion to $80 billion, including ship integration, according to some analysts. Even Lockheed Martin says it is not sure, but the latest Aegis system industry standard cost is about $1 billion per ship.

Some critics say an “Aegis Mafia” has started to grow in the Navy, steering the service along any course that benefits the radar system and away from anything that does not. “I don’t buy that ‘Mafia’ reference,” Hicks says. “Yes, we’re the incumbent, but we recognize the importance of the competition and welcome it.”

However, Navsea says it wants to end the “30-year monopolies” of Aegis and some other programs and develop systems that are designed more openly to increase the Navy’s acquisition options.

The Aegis Advanced Capability Build (ACB) upgrades are meant to do just that, starting with ACB 08 in 2008 and continuing next year with ACB 12.

The Navy expects to release a request for proposals by the end of this month for ACB 16, which should open Aegis to a full-fledged competition and move the Navy closer to AMDR development.

Lockheed touts its “Aegis culture” in attempting to capture AMDR work, citing its work on the transmit-receive module packages and digital beam-forming, a key AMDR technology.

The company says it demonstrated AMDR-like beam-forming with the Advanced Radar Technology Integrated System Testbed (Artist), which combines advanced, multifunction S-band active phased-array radars.

Leveraging its work and experience with active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars for aircraft, Northrop Grumman cites its own digital beam-forming project, the U.S. Marine Corps G/ATOR, which features a panel of AESA radars with distributed receiver and exciter modules for anti-air-warfare modes.

“We don’t see another way around this [AMDR] except with an AESA,” says Arun Palusamy, Northrop Grumman’s director of integrated air and missile defense and naval strategy.

Northrop Grumman also points to its participation in the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program, which initially was planned to mate X‑ and S- band radars in an AMDR-like suite, such as the one being developed for the CVN-78 Ford-class aircraft carrier.

Raytheon, the prime contractor for the DDG-1000 radar system, collaborated with Northrop on the Cobra Judy Replacement program that marries shipboard S- and X-band phased arrays to collect BMD data. Raytheon provides the Cobra Judy Replacement S-band system’s back-end signal processing.

“AMDR is similar to the work to Zumwalt, CVN-78 and Cobra Judy,” says Denis Donohue, Raytheon’s director of above-water sensors.

AMDR will be a magnitude better than anything the Navy has fielded or planned, says Capt. Doug Small, Navsea’s AMDR program official.

Already BMD is causing Navy officers to reexamine their missions. “We’re no longer defending just a ship,” Kilby says. “We’re defending cities. We’re defending whole populations.”

June 13, 2011 defense-aerospace.com

 (Source: Frost & Sullivan; issued June 9, 2011)

The recent Special Operations mission conducted by the U.S. Seal Team Six (ST6) to acquire and terminate a high-value target by a highly specialised task force involved the use of the Sikorsky MH60 (K/M version). The dust had yet to settle, and the industry experts were already discussing the use of "stealth" technologies for this mission.

Many experts consider this a promising note for the military helicopter market, which is just coming out of a very challenging period. The expeditionary nature of today's missions, the heavy wear and tear of the platforms that operate under extreme conditions, and the ageing helicopter fleets worldwide are driving the global demand for helicopters.

The global helicopter market across military and civil end-user segments is facing a growth in demand, reaching a potential market size of nearly 24,000 platforms over 2011-2020. The key factors contributing to this industry growth are upcoming replacement cycles in worldwide military and state-run fleets, growing disposable income in emerging markets and the structural growth of the global economy. However, it is the military that continues to be the main driver for helicopters.

According to Frost & Sullivan research, on the assumption that the market conditions are likely to remain favourable, the military will account for more than 60 percent of the global helicopter demand over the next 10 years (in terms of market value), generating revenues of nearly US$200 billion, and creating orders of nearly 9,000 platforms between 2011-2020.

This demand for military helicopters is driven not only by a desire to obtain new, modern helicopters but mostly by the need to replace/upgrade a large global fleet of ageing helicopters of all types and sizes, both in western countries and emerging markets.

Global Military Helicopter Demand, 2011-2020

Frost & Sullivan research indicates that the global market for support-in-services (SIS) represents a very lucrative market. However, end-users within the military segment still need to fully recognise the benefits of advanced service agreements, such as Performance Based Logistics (PBL) and Total Cost of Ownership (TCO). In a situation where the average life of a helicopter is about 40 years and growing (through a series of upgrades with life extensions and capability-enhancing upgrades), the SIS market represents a significant opportunity for the primes to create a diverse income stream, especially in times of budgetary austerity.

Despite the expected growth for military helicopters, the industry faces significant challenges, including the defence budget cuts in some of the traditionally strong western markets, but also in some emerging markets where the end-users may be exercising caution in terms of procurement, both operationally and financially. The impact of the global economic turmoil is visible across a majority of programmes in military helicopter segments, as they generally tend to be large procurements.

The exceptions are the countries that are engaged in deployments or recently withdrew, as well as countries that started the procurement process before the crises and find it difficult to cancel for financial and contracting reasons. Although they seem to be weathering the economic downturn much better than the western markets, the emerging markets such as Brazil and India are still somewhat vulnerable to budget volatilities, which has led to more diligent procurement processes for most major military assets.

Military forces across the globe, particularly in emerging markets, are currently undergoing major acquisition and upgrade programmes in their helicopter fleets. Overall modernisation also means that nations are considering filling capability gaps and procuring helicopters in different segments in order to cope with multiple operational requirements. Frost & Sullivan believes that the industry needs to be innovative, not only in developing new technologies and expanding portfolios, but also in introducing new business models and operational support such as through life contracts in order to support the end-user segments, and in turn drive new programmes and procurements.

Click here for the full report (7 pages in PDF format) on the Frost website.

June 13, 2011 SHEPARD GROUP Source: Navistar International

Navistar Defense, LLC today announced that it received a $357 million delivery order for an additional 471 International MaxxPro Dash vehicles with DXM independent suspension. The order from the US Marine Corps Systems Command follows last month's delivery order for 250 MaxxPro Dash Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) ambulances.

Navistar has quickly grown its fleet of MaxxPro vehicles to more than 8,700 units by leveraging its current commercial capabilities and assets, which includes the proven commercial International WorkStar platform. First, the company added the DXM independent suspension solution capability to new production vehicles. This was followed by orders for the new MaxxPro Recovery vehicle and most recently the MaxxPro Dash ambulance. The company has also developed a MaxxPro flatbed truck.

"We have nine major MaxxPro variants in or on their way to theater today thanks to the flexibility of our proven vehicle platforms," said Archie Massicotte, president, Navistar Defense. "The MaxxPro Dash was the first MRAP to be modified specifically for the Afghan terrain and we have continued to enhance its capabilities all along the way. Keeping our warfighters equipped is priority one."

While the MaxxPro family of vehicles has contributed to Navistar's growth into new markets, the company has fielded more than 32,000 vehicles since 2004. This includes sales of the MaxxPro, International MXT, as well as vehicles based on the International PayStar and WorkStar platforms.

Production of the new units will occur in Garland, Texas, and West Point, Miss. Deliveries will be completed by September 2011. MaxxPro Dash vehicles are powered by MaxxForce 9.3D engines.

13/06/11 By Craig Hoyle SOURCE:Flight International

Canada has suspended operations with its BAE Systems Hawk 115 advanced jet trainers while an investigation is conducted into a non-fatal accident at its Cold Lake air base in Alberta on 10 June.

The crew of the locally designated CT-155 ejected from their aircraft after reporting a problem with its Rolls-Royce Turbomeca Adour 871 engine. Both instructors with Cold Lake-based 419 Sqn, they had been attempting to return to the base, but were forced to abandon the trainer shortly before it came down around 4km (2.2nm) southeast of the airfield.

From the Canadian and Danish air forces, the pilots escaped with only minor burns caused during the ejection sequence.

"At this time, and as a precautionary measure, an operational pause on the CT-155 fleet has been ordered until such time that findings indicate no fleet-wide issues were likely cause factors in this accident," Canada's Department of National Defence said.

"The investigation will take as long as it needs to properly examine the incident and take whatever actions are necessary to ensure the safe operation of these aircraft."

Operated under the Bombardier-run NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC) scheme, the CT-155 fleet is used to deliver advanced and lead-in fighter training services to the Canadian Forces and several partner nations at Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan and Cold Lake.

Operational since 2000, the NFTC system also uses a fleet of Beechcraft T-6A Harvard II basic trainers. The 10 June incident represents its third loss of a Hawk since services began, and reduces its fleet of the type to 16, as listed in Flightglobal's MiliCAS database.

June 13th, 2011 DEFENCE TALK AFP

The US Navy intercepted a North Korean ship suspected of carrying missiles or other weapons to Myanmar and made it turn back, a senior US official said Monday.

The comments by Gary Samore, special assistant to President Barack Obama on weapons of mass destruction, confirmed reports of the incident, which happened last month, in The New York Times and South Korean media.

The New York Times said the ship was intercepted south of the Chinese city of Shanghai by a US destroyer on May 26.

In an interview with Yonhap news agency, Samore identified the cargo ship as the M/V Light and said it may have been bound for Myanmar with military-related contraband, such as small arms or missile-related items.

"We talked directly to the North Koreans. We talked directly to all the Southeast Asian countries including Myanmar, urging them to inspect the ship if it called into their port," he was quoted as saying.

"The US Navy also contacted the North Korean ship as it was sailing, to ask them where they were going and what cargo they were carrying."

North Korea is subject to international and United Nations sanctions designed to curb its missile and nuclear programmes.

UN Resolution 1874, adopted in June 2009, one month after the North's second nuclear test, toughened a weapons embargo and authorised member states to intercept such shipments.

Another North Korean ship, the Kang Nam I, was forced to reverse course in 2009 after being suspected of trying to deliver military-related supplies to Myanmar.

The New York Times said the Light was registered in Belize, whose authorities gave the United States permission to inspect the ship.

It said the US destroyer McCampbell caught up with the Light somewhere south of Shanghai and asked to board the vessel under the authority given by Belize.

The paper, quoting unidentified US officials, said the North Korean refused four times. But a few days later, it stopped dead in the water and turned back to its home port, tracked by US surveillance planes and satellites.

"Such pressure from the international community drove North Korea to withdraw the ship," Samore was quoted by Yonhap as saying.

"This is a good example that shows that international cooperation and coordination can block the North's weapon exports."

The United States has frequently expressed concern at military ties between Myanmar and North Korea.

Last month Deputy US Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Joseph Yun expressed concern directly to Myanmar's new army-backed government.

US diplomatic memos released last year by the website WikiLeaks said Washington has suspected for years that Myanmar ran a secret nuclear programme supported by Pyongyang.

A top Myanmar official told visiting US Senator John McCain this month that his country is not wealthy enough to acquire nuclear weapons.

MINNEAPOLIS, June 13 (UPI)

An experimental, U.S. demonstration tactical satellite designed for six months of operation has provided hyperspectral imaging for two years.

"TacSat-3's longevity and robustness shows that our innovative bus technology was a key factor in the success of this mission," said Tom Wilson, vice president and general manager, Spacecraft Systems and Services, a division of Minnesota's ATK Aerospace Systems. "We are already applying and enhancing our flexible, modular bus platforms for future small satellite missions that include the ORS-1 spacecraft.

"This technology is also well-suited for commercial and international missions where affordability, high performance and a short turnaround are necessary."

Launched in May 2009, TacSat-3's mission is to demonstrate capability to conduct hyperspectral imaging that is responsive to the needs the U.S. military. Since then, the spacecraft has delivered more than 2,100 images and demonstrated the ability to transmit processed data to a ground station within 10 minutes.

The spacecraft is a pioneer of the emerging Operationally Responsive Space program, which was designed to meet the growing need of U.S. forces for flexible, affordable and responsive satellite systems.

ATK, as the spacecraft bus prime contractor, provided the complete bus system, which included the onboard command and data handling system, solar arrays, spacecraft bus primary structure and interfaces to the launch vehicle and payload.

The spacecraft also featured first-generation modular bus technology designed to provide flexibility for future small satellite missions.

Like TacSat-3, the Operationally Responsive Space-1 mission focuses on the quick deployment of small satellites with innovative sensor technologies to provide operationally responsive ISR support to commanders in the battlefield. ORS-1 is to be launched this year.

The TacSat-3 program is managed by the U.S. Air Force Space Command with collaboration from the Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicles Directorate and the Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

Read more: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/06/13/Tactical-satellite-surpasses-expectations/UPI-63521307962980/#ixzz1PC2tAthi

June 13th, 2011 By USGovernment DEFENCE TALK

Unmanned aircraft systems have long held great promise for military operations, but technology has only recently matured enough to exploit that potential. The Department of Defense (DoD) has published detailed, unclassified plans to purchase over the next ten years about 730 new medium-sized and large unmanned aircraft systems that are designed for reconnaissance and light attack missions. CBO estimates that completing those investments would cost about $37 billion through 2020.

At the request of the House Budget Committee, today CBO released a study comparing the costs of DoD’s plans for those systems and the capabilities they might provide with the costs and capabilities of some alternative plans. The options are meant to illustrate the implications of different approaches to enhancing capabilities and are not designed to reach any specific goal or to counter any specific adversaries that might arise in the future.

CBO has analyzed eight alternatives—three for the Air Force and five for the Army—to the services’ near-term plans for expanding their fleets of medium-sized and large unmanned aircraft. The options would vary the mix of unmanned aircraft systems that are purchased, the way that unmanned systems are assigned to units and operated in geographic areas where units are deployed, or both. Through 2020, the costs of the options examined by CBO would range from $3.7 billion less than DoD’s plan to $2.9 billion more.

The study presents each alternative’s likely effect on force-wide capability and acquisition costs. To compare the capability that could be expected as a result of such changes, CBO calculated an aggregate measure—the payload-duration—that captures both the ability of an aircraft to carry sensors or weapons (payload) and its ability to remain orbiting over a given location (duration).

The Air Force’s Plans and Options

The Air Force currently operates at least four types of medium-sized or large unmanned aircraft: Global Hawks, Predators, Reapers, and Sentinels. The Air Force’s near-term goals are to increase the number of aircraft that can be continuously and simultaneously operated by purchasing 28 of the large Global Hawk aircraft through 2018 and 480 medium-sized aircraft (either Reapers or a follow-on design) through 2020. CBO estimates that those plans will cost about $20 billion. Plans for stealthy aircraft such as the Sentinel—whose mere existence was only recently acknowledged by the Air Force—remain classified.

CBO’s three options for the Air Force examine the implications of more quickly developing and fielding a new aircraft—notionally dubbed the MQ-SX—that would be intermediate in size between the Reaper and the Global Hawk. Specifically,

    Under Option 1, the Air Force would purchase 224 MQ-SXs in lieu of 336 Reapers, costing the same as DoD’s plan and providing improvement in payload-duration.

    Under Option 2, all 336 Reapers would be replaced with MQ-SXs, costing $2.9 billion more than DoD’s plan and providing up to 70 percent more payload-duration.

    Option 3 would have the largest cost savings of all of the options—$3.7 billion, CBO estimates—by buying 24 MQ-SXs in lieu of 24 Global Hawks. This option would result in decreased payload-duration, however, especially at long ranges.

The Army’s Plans and Options

The Army currently operates three types of medium-sized unmanned aircraft systems: Hunters, Shadows, and Predators (or aircraft closely based on the Predator). Over the next five years, the Army plans to continue upgrading the capabilities of its existing Shadows, and to purchase 107 more medium-altitude Grey Eagles (the Army’s name for its latest version of the Predator). CBO estimates that those plans will cost about $6 billion.

CBO examined five options for the Army involving purchasing aircraft other than the Grey Eagles and changing the way unmanned aircraft support would be provided to Army units in the field. Specifically:

    Options 4 and 5 would include buying Reaper aircraft, which are more capable than Grey Eagles. Under Option 4, the Army would purchase 69 Reapers and 78 fewer Grey Eagles, costing the same relative to DoD’s plan through 2020. Option 5 would increase costs by about $500 million, as the Army would replace all 78 Grey Eagles with Reapers. Both options would increase payload-duration.

    Option 6 examines the effects of buying a greater quantity of less capable systems. Under this option, the Army would purchase 350 Firescouts (unmanned helicopters being developed for basing aboard Navy ships) in lieu of 78 fewer Grey Eagles. This option would cost about the same as DoD’s plan, CBO estimates, and would increase payload-duration at short ranges but decrease payload-duration at longer ranges.

    Options 7 and 8 illustrate the effects of changing the way that unmanned systems are assigned to military units and are operated in the theater of combat: Instead of being equipped with their own aircraft, deployed divisions would be given operational control of aircraft from a central fleet. Using that approach under Option 7, the Army would purchase 42 fewer Grey Eagles and save $1.3 billion, CBO estimates. Option 8 would save $1.0 billion by using that approach and purchasing 36 Reapers and 78 fewer Grey Eagles. These options would result in less payload-duration for the overall fleet, but deployed forces would have the same or improved unmanned aircraft support (as measured by payload-duration) available to them.

This study was prepared by Bernard Kempinski of CBO’s National Security Division.

June 12, 2011: STRATEGY PAGE

While people are critical to the success of special operations (commandos and such), money helps a lot. Since 2001, SOCOM (the American Special Operations Command) has gotten a lot more money. Annual SOCOM spending has gone from $2.6 billion in 2001 to $9.8 billion this year), but not a lot more people have been added. Since September 11, 2001, SOCOM has nearly doubled its size, to a current strength of 60,000 troops. This includes many support specialists, as well as the Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs and Marine Corps and Air Force operators. Currently, 10,000 of these commando type troops are in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sounds good, doesn't it? But there's a major problem brewing; burnout. While most of the increased money has gone to buying better equipment, replacing worn out stuff and providing better training, getting new people has been much more difficult.

Not surprisingly, 60 percent of SOCOMs current troops signed up after September 11, 2001. But an increasing number are leaving the military, despite reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000. The problem here is overwork. While the number of SOCOM personnel has doubled, the number overseas at any time has quadrupled. Many SOCOM personnel are spending more than half their time overseas, usually in a combat zone. There, Special Forces troops take the lead in intelligence gathering and capturing or killing key terrorists. It's mentally and physically exhausting work. Unlike past wars, these troops can remain in touch with families back home, for better or worse. While it's been a long war, most SOCOM operators realize that it could easily go on for another decade. Thus SOCOM has learned to say "no" more often, otherwise the expansion will go into reverse as many more exhausted operators leave the service.

Trying to recruit replacements is a solution that won't work. The U.S. Army's effort to recruit another 2,300 operators (as members of the Special Forces are called) has been a hard slog. Qualified candidates are out there, but it's hard to convince them to endure the additional effort, stress and danger to become a Special Forces operator (or a SEAL, Ranger, Pararescue Jumper). Even with higher pay ($10,000 or more additional a year) and high reenlistment bonuses (adding about $10,000 more a year), it's hard to find the men who can meet the high standards, and are willing to put up with the large amount of time spent overseas.

Recruiting and training more operators is a time consuming process, as it takes about three years to get a Special Forces recruit up to a basic level of competence. It takes another few years in the field before such men are ready for anything serious. At least half of those recruited, are lost (quit, wash out) before they reach their full capability. Recruiting to expand the number of operators began right after September 11, 2001. Soon, SOCOM was told to increase its strength by 43 percent, and do it by 2013.

Casualties are less of an issue that you might think, for such dangerous work. SOCOM casualties have been lower than in infantry or marine units. The big issue has always been overwork. Combat operations wear troops out. Elite men like SOCOM operators can handle more than your average infantryman, but they have their limits as well. Moreover, most Special Forces operators are married and have families. Being away from the wife and kids for extended periods often causes more stress. Keep the operators out there for too long at a time and you'll lose them to resignations, retirement or, rarely, combat fatigue. It's not just the equipment that is being worn out.

Because the Special Forces troops are the product of an exacting screening and training process, they are in big demand by intelligence agencies as well. Special Forces operators who retired or quit in the last decade have been sought out and offered opportunities to get back in the business. If not with one of the five active duty groups, then with training operations, or to work with the intelligence agencies.

Most Americans tend to forget that the U.S. Special Forces are a unique organization in military, and intelligence, history. No other nation has anything like the Special Forces, and never has. While other nations have some operators skilled in understanding foreign cultures, the idea of training thousands of troops to very high standards, then having them study foreign languages and cultures, is unique to the Special Forces. The war on terror is the kind of war Special Forces are perfectly suited to dealing with. But now that this unique kind of war is under way, we find that those soldiers uniquely suited to fighting it are in short supply. This is largely because Special Forces set high standards, and has resisted all attempts to lower those standards. One hard lesson the Special Forces has learned in the past sixty years is that lowering standards just increases the chances of failure, and getting your people killed.

Meanwhile, the SOCOM program to expand its Special Forces units has slogged forward. By 2013, the Special Forces will have 300 ODAs (Operational Detachment A, or “A" Teams), compared to the 180 they had on September 11, 2001. The army would like to add more ODAs to the two reserve Special Forces Groups (the 19th and 20th), which would increase the number of A Teams to 420, but money has not yet been provided for that.

In the past two years, SOCOM has been shifting forces from Iraq (where it had 5,500 personnel three years ago) to Afghanistan (where it had 3,000 troops three years ago). The ratio is now being reversed, with 7,000 in Afghanistan and under 3,000 in Iraq. Most American allies have moved all their commando forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, where they not only do what they were trained for, but also train Afghans for special operations tasks. This has already been done in Iraq, where it worked quite well. The SOCOM troops in Iraq and Afghanistan account for about 80 percent of American special operations forces overseas. The rest are in places like Colombia, the Philippines and Djibouti (adjacent to Somalia).