September 11, 2013 By  Zachary Keck - Flashpoints

India will conduct a second test of its longest range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile sometime around September 15, according to local media outlets.

On Monday, the Chennai-based The Hindu cited an unnamed official at the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India’s military technology agency, as saying that DRDO is currently preparing for the second test of the Agni-V missile at Wheeler Island. The official said the test would be conducted “around September 15,” presumably depending on how preparations go and weather conditions. The report went on to cite another Indian official as saying that two Indian naval ships were being positioned in the Indian Ocean near the target point of the test.

The Agni-V is a three-stage, solid-fueled missile that can travel 5,000 km while carrying a 1,000 km payload, making it India’s longest range missile. It is often referred to as India’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in local media. Although it demonstrates mastery of all the necessary technologies of ICBMs, technically it is only an intermediate ballistic missile as ICBMs have ranges of at least 5,500 km.  

India first tested the Agni-V in April 2012. The first test, which was also conducted at Wheeler Island, was successful and garnered a lot of excitement in India, both because of the scientific achievements involved in developing an ICBM-like missile, as well as because the Agni-V will allow India to deliver nuclear weapons to many of China’s major cities for the first time. In light of this, some in India have taken to calling the Agni-V the “China killer.”

Last month The Hindu reported Tessy Thomas, the director of the Agni Missile Project at DRDO, as saying there will be two or three more tests of the Agni-V before the missile is deemed operational in 2015. She also said that the Agni-V, like all of India’s missiles, is a “weapon of peace.”

Back in May, V.K. Saraswat, who at the time was DRDO’s Director-General, confirmed that his organization was modifying the Agni-V to enable it to carry Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). As The Diplomat explained at the time:

“MIRVs enable ICBMs to carry multiple nuclear warheads on a single missile, and strike multiple targets or a single target with greater efficiency. After the last stage of the ICBM boosts off, a MIRVed ICBM will dispense the warheads to their separate or singular targets. Both the Soviet Union and the United States MIRVed their ICBM forces during the 1970s, which complicated arms control agreements moving forward.”

In her comments last month, Ms. Thomas implied that the modifications to allow India to MIRV its Agni-Vs had been completed successfully. This raises the possibility that the upcoming test would use a MIRVed Agni-V, although The Hindu report did not give any indication to suggest that this is the case.

MOSCOU, 8 septembre - RIA Novosti

Les Etats-Unis et la Corée du Sud ont élaboré un programme conjoint pour contrer la menace nucléaire nord-coréenne, rapporte dimanche l'agence d'information Yonhap citant une source au sein du gouvernement sud-coréen.

"La mise au point d'un document détaillant les démarches prévues par les Etats-Unis en vue du déploiement d'un "parapluie nucléaire" témoigne de la détermination à résister à la menace nucléaire émanant de la Corée du Nord", a indiqué l'interlocuteur de l'agence.

Le programme en question a été élaboré au cours des dix derniers mois. Le document devrait être signé lors d'une réunion des ministres de la Défense des deux pays prévue le 2 octobre prochain.

D'après Yonhap, le document comprend la description des mesures politiques, diplomatiques et militaires destinées à mettre en place un "parapluie nucléaire" sur la péninsule coréenne.

La Corée du Nord s'est proclamée puissance nucléaire en 2005 avant de mener en 2006, en 2009 et en 2013 des essais nucléaires souterrains qui ont provoqué de vives protestations de la communauté internationale. Début juin, les médias ont fait savoir que le régime de Pyongyang envisageait de reprendre la production de plutonium à usage militaire dans une installation nucléaire de Yongbyon.

MOSCOU, 3 septembre - RIA Novosti

Une intervention militaire occidentale en Syrie constitue une menace pour la sécurité nucléaire de la région, a déclaré mercredi à Moscou le porte-parole du ministère russe des Affaires étrangères Alexandre Loukachevitch.

"Une opération militaire contre ce pays peut toucher des sites sensibles du point de vue de la sûreté nucléaire et de la non-prolifération nucléaire", a indiqué M.Loukachevitch.

"Si un engin frappe, exprès ou par hasard, le Réacteur miniature source de neutrons (MNSR) qui se trouve à Damas, cela peut avoir des conséquences catastrophiques, à savoir provoquer une pollution des territoires voisins à l'uranium hautement enrichi et aux produits de fission et rendre impossible le contrôle et la préservation des matières fissiles stockées dans ce site", a conclu le diplomate.

08/28/2013  Steve Coltman - defenceiq.com

Recently the MoD published its long-awaited Review of Alternatives to Trident, written at the behest of the Liberal Democrats. It says that cruise missiles might have been a viable alternative but for two things – the existing Trident warheads are not suitable for use in cruise missiles and that it would take 24 years to develop a new warhead.

This is such a long timescale that the Vanguard-class subs would have been retired before the new system was available, necessitating the purchase of two new Trident SSNBNs as a stop-gap and therefore wiping out any cost-savings. 

I find the point about it taking 24 years to develop a new warhead to be particularly astonishing, but reading between the lines of the report perhaps one might  wonder if the UK hasn’t lost the ability to design new warheads altogether.

So far as the suitability of existing warheads to go in cruise missiles is concerned, the case rests on two points.

1. In the case of horizontally-launched missiles, these would have to be stored in the torpedo room in close proximity to the crew, and this would necessitate the development of a low-radiation warhead. I don’t suppose we can argue with that point. Developing a low-radiation warhead would take even longer than 24 years.
2. The report also says that the existing Trident warheads are too delicate and would not stand up to the manhandling that cruise-missiles are subjected to. One can imagine that horizontally-launched cruise-missiles manhandled down into the torpedo room might be subject to a few knocks but in the case of vertically-launched cruise missiles, why should the handling of the warheads be any different to what they experience in vertically-launched Trident missiles?

What the report did not say was that the warheads are too big to fit inside a 21” diameter cruise missile. Considering 12 warheads plus decoys have to fit inside a Trident, I suppose it is reasonable to assume the warheads are not that large. Had the Trident warheads been too large for a cruise missile I am sure the report would have said so.

Comparing vertically-launched cruise-missiles with Trident, the only difference in what shocks the warhead would experience post-launch, when the cruise-missile cants over to follow a horizontal course to its target while the Trident missile continues onwards, upwards and then downwards on a ballistic trajectory. The report is quite adamant that the Trident warhead would not be suitable for cruise-missile use, but how do we know that? If Aldermaston has lost the people who can design warheads, they might also lack the people who can make an informed judgement on this issue too. It should be easy enough to put some sensors in a Tomahawk and measure the acceleration, g-forces and shocks that a cruise-missile warhead might be subject to in a real launch, then take an existing warhead and subject it to the same (or worse) shocks to see what, if anything, breaks? Has the MoD ever done this? If not, how can it be so sure the Trident warhead would not be suitable?

Let us suppose that Trident warheads are indeed suitable for use in vertically-launched cruise missiles – what then? The main capital cost of the like-for-like replacement of Trident is in the four big submarines, with a quoted coast of £11-14 billion. At an guesstimate, we would have to reserve around £2-3 billion to develop a new indigenous cruise missile, which would still leave us with £10 billion.

Here are some important points to consider:

• How many of the seven planned Astute-class boats can be fitted with vertical launch tubes, and why were they not part of the original design anyway? The keel has already been laid for the sixth boat so it may now be too late to change its design and incorporate vertical tubes. The worst case scenario is that only the seventh boat onwards could have vertical tubes fitted and I presume it is too much to contemplate chopping existing subs in two and inserting a new section – although the Spanish are contemplating something similar for their new subs.
• We will need more Astutes beyond the planned seven, which may need to be supplemented by cheaper conventional boats. Astutes currently cost £1.2 billion each, while the biggest and best conventional boats are about £500 million each. So, three extra Astutes, with the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth having vertical tubes, would be £3.6 billion.
• Half a dozen big conventional boats, which would also be fitted with vertical tubes, at £500 million each is £3 billion. We now have a submarine fleet of 16 boats, much better than at present.
• A dozen frigate-sized OPV / patrol frigates, like the French ‘Floreal’ class or the Dutch ‘Holland’ class – would be about £1.5 billion. This would quickly and dramatically ease the Navy’s surface ship numbers problem.
• And what about two more Type 45s? Six isn’t very many as only two are on operations at any given time. At £700 million each, that’s another £1.4 billion.
• With the remaining £500 million, perhaps we could buy another big amphibious ship? Or more MARS replenishment ships?

This is just the author’s preference of course. Many other shopping lists are possible but it is clear from this ‘fantasy navy’ exercise that the opportunity cost of Trident is pretty high. And the case for the like-for-like replacement of Trident rests on the assertion that Trident warheads are too delicate to be used in cruise missiles, and that it would take 24 years to develop a warhead suitable for cruise missiles (despite France and Israel already having such warheads). It is very difficult for politicians to argue with such assertions, however sceptical we may be.

Finally - do we really need a deterrent in this day and age anyway? A good question, but probably a redundant one, I doubt if anyone could get unilateral disarmament through parliament before 2016.

Aug. 23, 2013 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: House of Commons Library; published August 13, 2013)

Update on the Trident Successor Programme - Commons Library Standard Note

The programme to replace the UK’s nuclear deterrent from 2028 onwards continues apace. In December 2012 the Government published its first update report to Parliament on the progress of the Trident renewal programme and in July 2013 published the Trident Alternatives Review. That review was commissioned in 2011 in order to assist the Liberal Democrats in making a case for potential alternatives to the like-for-like replacement of Trident, as stipulated in the 2010 Coalition Agreement.

This note briefly examines the progress that has been made since Initial Gate on the programme was passed in May 2011, including the contracts that have been placed to date and the estimated costs of the replacement programme.

It also looks at wider issues such as the Trident Alternatives Review and the potential impact of the Scottish referendum on independence which is expected in autumn 2014.


Click here for the full report (20 PDF pages) on the UK Parliament website.

August 23, 2013: Strategy Page

It was recently revealed that for the past 17 years (until 2012) there had been a secret operation to deal with the nuclear material scattered around the Soviet era Semipalatinsk nuclear research and testing facility in Kazakhstan. Semipalatinsk was not included in the places that needed nuclear weapons grade radioactive material removed to keep it out of circulation. Soviet nuclear weapons officials had insisted that the nuclear material at Semipalatinsk had already been taken care of. American nuclear researchers aiding the official nuclear disarmament operation stumbled upon the Kazakhstan facility in the 1990s and found that it still contained lots of nuclear material, and that this was apparently not generally known because the abandoned facility was overrun by illegal scrap collectors. Semipalatinsk consisted of many kilometers of tunnels where underground nuclear tests, or other nuclear research was conducted. The tunnels were largely sealed along with other places containing bits of nuclear material. But the area had been discovered by poor Kazakhs who had, since the early 1990s been scouring the place for scrap metal or anything else that could be sold. The scavengers didn’t know about buried nuclear material, but their excavations and dismantling activities were bringing them closer to such dangerous stuff. The Kazakhstan government was not aware of the danger and had not bothered to try and keep the scavengers out. In order to keep this a secret, and to get the nuclear material removed or permanently sealed, a secret deal was made with the Kazakh government and in 17 years of largely clandestine work the deed was done. All this cost $150 million, paid for by the United States.

Kazakhstan had earlier, with the help of the United States, already completed the official removal of 13 tons of weapons grade uranium and plutonium (enough to make nearly 800 nuclear bombs) to a secure storage site (and eventual conversion into fuel for nuclear power plants). All this was accomplished by a post-Cold War agreement between the United States and Russia to account for all Soviet nuclear weapons, and dismantle most of them. The U.S. provided funding and technical assistance, but the hard work was carried out by Russian experts and diplomats. Semipalatinsk was not included because the Soviet bureaucracy thought it didn’t count even though there turned out to be some 200 kg (440 pounds) of plutonium in some of the 131 tunnels and 13 test shafts where 456 nuclear tests had taken place over four decades. The last test was in 1989 and the site was officially closed in 1991. Many of those tests were not successful, leaving behind buried plutonium. The Soviet engineers believed that whatever plutonium there remained at Semipalatinsk was so hard to get at that it was not worth mentioning. Later visits by American scientists found this was not true. There was a lot of plutonium and other nuclear material that was easily extracted. Most of the loose nuclear material was at the Degelen Mountain part of the 18,000 square kilometer Semipalatinsk complex.

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 (and everyone agreed that whatever Soviet assets were on the territory of the 14 new nations created from parts of the Soviet Union, were the property of the new country.) Russia, with the financial and diplomatic help of Western nations, bought and dismantled the nukes owned by those three nations.

Meanwhile, the Russians had other, uniquely Russian, problems, like the Kazakhstan site that was recently revealed. They had a lot (tons) of other highly radioactive material in circulation, much of it in powder form, and largely used for medical and industrial purposes. Particularly worrisome are the hundreds of Radiothermal Generators (RTGs) Russia set up in remote parts of the country during the Soviet era. The RTGs were similar to the power supplies found on some space satellites, using radioactive material to generate heat, and thus electricity, for radio beacons and signal repeaters in remote areas. In the early 1990s, the Russians weren't even sure where some of these RTGs were, and there were cases of civilians finding them, cracking them open and being injured, or killed, from the radiation. The Russians noted that there have been many attempts to steal radioactive material in Russia, but none, so far as is known, have succeeded. All of the RTGs were eventually found and destroyed. The Kazakhstan site was similar in that a lot of the radioactive material was deadly but not suitable for nuclear weapons. Terrorists could use this stuff for dirty bombs and the radioactive debris was spread all over the Kazakhstan site. That’s why the cleanup had to be secret, lest terrorists find out about it and offer large cash payments for whoever could sneak such dirty bomb material out of the site. That never happened. The Kazakhstan site also contained enough nuclear material for a dozen or more nuclear bombs, although this stuff was spread over a large area.

There was one last problem. Russian officials admitted that, during the 1990s, 5-10 pounds of enriched uranium and several ounces of weapons grade of plutonium had been stolen from their nuclear power facilities. What the Russians did not mention (perhaps because the Russian nuclear bureaucracy had never kept a record of it) was the stray material in places like the Kazakhstan site. Some of the officially missing radioactive material was later discovered, in small quantities, in Western Europe, Turkey and Russia as the thieves sought to sell it. The amount the Russians admit to losing is not enough to make a bomb, and much of the missing stuff could be accounting and handling errors (both common in the Russian bureaucracy.)

In the last two decades, the only radioactive material smuggled out of Russia was small quantities, and usually low-level stuff unsuitable for a bomb. Most Russian nukes have been disassembled and their nuclear material turned into power-plant fuel. The remaining nukes are under very tight security and most of their nuclear scientists were given financial and career incentives (paid for by the U.S.) to leave nuclear weapons work behind. Nevertheless, for two decades, breathless new stories of Russian "loose nukes" were a media staple on slow news days.

11 Jul 2013 By Simon Johnson, Scottish Political Editor, Faslane - telegraph.co.uk

The British Government denies reports it is examining plans to designate Faslane as sovereign UK territory in case Scots back independence next year.

David Cameron today strongly denied reports the Government is considering a plan to ensure that Britain’s nuclear deterrent would remain in Scotland after independence despite SNP promises to remove it.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was said to be considering designating the Faslane base that houses Trident nuclear submarines as sovereign UK territory, giving it the same legal status as British bases in foreign countries like Cyprus.

Alex Salmond would be presented with a choice of accepting this status, it was claimed, or a separate Scotland having to pay a substantial part of the multi-billion pound bill for removing Trident.

A deal over Faslane would ensure the Trident fleet would have access to the open seas via the Firth of Clyde and the continuation of Britain’s round-the-clock deterrent. At least one nuclear-armed submarine is on patrol at sea at any one time.

The Scottish Nationalists seized on the reports as evidence of the UK attempting to strong-arm Scotland into keeping nuclear weapons and said they would not agree to such an arrangement.

But Downing Street and the MoD attempted to head off a public backlash in Scotland by insisting they did not recognise the proposal, which was outlined in the Guardian, describing it as not “credible”.

They said they were not drawing up contingency plans for Trident in case Scots back independence next year despite expert warnings that there may be nowhere else suitable in the UK for the deterrent.

Mr Salmond has repeatedly insisted that nuclear weapons would be removed from the Clyde if Scots back independence, promising that a ban would be included in a written constitution.

He has claimed Faslane could be turned into a conventional naval base. But experts have warned it would cost many billions of pounds and take decades for Trident to be removed from the Clyde despite the SNP claiming it could be done very quickly.

Nicola Sturgeon, Mr Salmond’s deputy, told BBC Radio Scotland's Good Morning Scotland programme: "This seems to me to be an outrageous attempt at bullying by the UK Government.

"I can't see how they could do that without the agreement of the Scottish Government and speaking for my party that is not an agreement that would be forthcoming."

She said it was a "preposterous threat from the UK Government" and said that Coalition ministers should instead start talks now on how to remove Trident as quickly as possible in the event of a ‘yes’ vote next year.

But a Number 10 spokesman said: “This Government has not commissioned contingency plans over Faslane. No such ideas have come to the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister.

“They would not support them if they did. It’s not a credible or sensible idea.”

An MoD spokesman said: "No contingency plans are being made to move Trident out of Scotland. The scale and cost of any potential relocation away from Faslane would be enormous."

According to the Guardian report, MoD civil servants are starting to examine a two-stage process whereby the British Government would initially emphasise the huge expense and logistical difficulties of moving Trident.

These costs would be factored into the ‘divorce settlement’ between Scotland and the UK, reducing the sum to which the former is entitled.

However, it is claimed they are examining an alternative whereby Scotland would get a much better deal in return for allowing Faslane to become sovereign UK territory, along the lines of the Akrotiri and Dhekelia naval bases in Cyprus.

A defence source was quoted as stating: “The sovereign base area is an option. It is an interesting idea because the costs of moving out of Faslane are eye-wateringly high.”

Sir Menzies Campbell, the former Liberal Democrat leader, warned of a backlash. He said: “To seek to impose a financial penalty on an independent Scotland in relation to the decommissioning of Faslane might be seen as undue pressure and could easily play into the hands of the SNP.”

However, he pointed out that a separate Scotland might have to agree to keep Trident anyway under Mr Salmond’s plans to apply for Nato membership.

10 juillet 2013 Ouest-France

Une dizaine de chalutiers sont affrétés depuis lundi par la Marine nationale. Ils participent à une pêche sous haute surveillance : la récupération de débris de missile M51.

Ce [missile] de 50 t s’était autodétruit peu après un tir d’essai le 5 mai dernier au large de Penmarc’h. Déployés depuis des semaines, les moyens militaires ont déjà permis de remonter plusieurs éléments. Mais la Marine et les pêcheurs tiennent à sécuriser la zone. L’opération sera prolongée la semaine prochaine.

Le Vigilant pas en cause

27/06/2013 Armée de l'air

Ces trois dernières semaines, les Forces aériennes stratégiques ont mené deux exercices en France, un premier de montée en puissance des forces nucléaires appelé « Banco » et un second de raid aérien nucléaire avec armement inerte appelé « Poker ».

Après l’étape de planification exécutée par le centre opérationnel des FAS (COFAS), les équipages et le personnel mécanicien se sont déployés sur l’ensemble du territoire national. Une fois les Rafale et les Mirage 2000N armés de leur missile nucléaire air sol moyenne portée amélioré (ASMP A), et les C135 mis en configuration pour la mission, tous les équipages ont pris l’alerte à bord de leurs avions respectifs. Cet exercice Banco terminé, les armes nucléaires étaient rapportées dans leur zone de stockage car en France, en temps de paix, le vol avec une arme nucléaire réelle est interdit.

A l’issue, toujours sous la conduite permanente du général commandant les FAS, l’ensemble de la flotte a décollé pour un raid aérien de plusieurs heures au-dessus du territoire national dont les phases principales sont le ravitaillement en vol, la pénétration basse altitude et le tir fictif mais restitué du missile (dépourvu de la charge nucléaire).

 De nombreux moyens de l’armée de l’air ont participé à cette exercice aérien d’envergure appelé Poker pour endosser le rôle soit de protection du raid soit d’adversaire. Rafale, Mirage 2000D, Mirage 2000-5, Alphajet, E-3F, déploiement d’escadrons de défense sol-air, contrôleurs aériens, fusiliers-commandos pour protéger les zones d’alerte… Le général commandant les FAS dirigeait la manœuvre aérienne à partir du COFAS « Général Dubroca » situé à Taverny tandis que le centre national des opérations aériennes (CNOA) situé à Lyon-Mont-Verdun conduisait la manœuvre défensive.

Des moyens de la marine nationale (Rafale Marine, Hawkeye) ont aussi été engagés. Cette opération aérienne majeure est aussi l’occasion de tester toute la chaîne de transmission pour apporter l’assurance au président de la République qu’il pourrait, si les circonstances l’exigeaient, transmettre l’ordre d’engagement aux avions placés en alerte en vol.

Cet exercice s’est effectué sous les yeux du général Denis Mercier, chef d’état-major de l’armée de l’air (CEMAA) et de ses invités, madame Patricia Adam, présidente de la commission Défense à l’Assemblée nationale accompagnée de M. Jean-Jacques Bridey, rapporteur du budget équipement-dissuasion, de M. Carrère, président de la commission des Affaires étrangères et des forces armées au Sénat, de M. Delon, secrétaire général de la sécurité et de la Défense nationales, accompagné du général de division aérienne Steininger, et du général de division de Courrèges, chef du cabinet militaire du Premier ministre, accompagné de M. Verclytte.

MOSCOU, 22 juin - RIA Novosti

Washington comprend l'approche adoptée par Moscou en matière de réduction des armes stratégiques offensives, a déclaré samedi le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères Sergueï Lavrov dans une interview à la chaîne Russie 1.

Selon le chef de la diplomatie russe, en marge du sommet du G8 en Irlande du Nord, le président US Barack Obama a estimé qu'"il était encore possible de procéder à une nouvelle réduction des armes stratégiques offensives à condition d'être sûr que la Russie ferait de même".

"En réponse, le président russe Vladimir Poutine a réaffirmé notre position selon laquelle il est nécessaire de prendre en compte tous les facteurs relatifs à la stabilité stratégique, dont la défense antimissile, les armes dans l'espace et les armes stratégiques non-nucléaires. Il faut en outre prendre en considération le déséquilibre qui se maintient dans le domaine des armes classiques", a expliqué M.Lavrov.

"Le président Obama a annoncé qu'il comprenait qu'il était nécessaire de tenir compte de tous ces facteurs", a-t-il poursuivi.

Le 19 juin dernier, Barack Obama a déclaré que Washington était disposé à négocier avec Moscou une réduction d'un tiers de leurs arsenaux nucléaires respectifs et s'est prononcé en faveur d'une réduction d'armes tactiques russes et américaines en Europe.

13.06.2013 par P. CHAPLEAU Lignes de Défense

Patricia Adam, présidente de la commission de la Défense de l'Assemblée, s'est fendu, ce jeudi, d'une "Réaction aux rumeurs entourant la sécurité de la base des sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins":

"J’ai souhaité que la plus haute autorité militaire du pays, le chef d’état-major des armées, présente devant la commission de la défense l’ensemble des mesures caractérisant le dispositif de contrôle de l’accès au site militaire de l’Ile Longue, lequel abrite le port-base des sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins. Son exposé invalide nettement les informations sur la base desquelles le journal Le Télégramme s’est appuyé pour accréditer les rumeurs entourant la sécurité de la base de l’Ile Longue. Le chef d’état-major des armées a confirmé mercredi, devant les parlementaires, que le site « dispose du centre de protection le plus moderne de France, y compris par rapport aux autres installations sensibles ». Par ailleurs, depuis un an, deux enquêtes de sécurité ont été menées sur le site, « l’une par l’inspection des armées, l’autre par la direction de la protection et de la sécurité de la défense ». Des exercices visant à « éprouver le dispositif de sécurité » ont lieu « au moins une fois par an ». Ces derniers sont décidés « sans préavis », et sont conduits par des unités spécialisées du ministère de la défense" (c'est P. Chapleau qui souligne).

Ouf, nous voilà rassurés. Pas de quoi, donc, maintenir "l'enquête approfondie" annoncée par le ministère de la Défense... Sauf que "nettement" ne signifie pas "totalement".

11/06 LesEchos.fr

Selon le « Télégramme », la base qui est au coeur de la dissuasion nucléaire française, offre de « nombreuses failles de sécurité », notamment sur le contrôle d’accès au site. Le ministre de la Défense demande une enquête.

Badgeuses à bout de souffle, clôtures en mauvais état, absence de chicanes, de scanner pour véhicules et même de batterie de missiles sol-air, personnel inexpérimenté : ultrasensible, la base des sous-marins nucléaires de l’Ile-Longue (Finistère), en rade de Brest, compte pourtant de « nombreuses failles de sécurité », selon une enquête publiée mardi par le quotidien Le Télégramme .

La base abrite quatre sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins (SNLE). Ils sont entretenus, entre deux patrouilles, dans cette base où sont également assemblés les missiles intercontinentaux, pouvant emporter chacun six têtes nucléaires, qui arment ces sous-marins. « Sur la base, pas de système de contrôle biométrique, qui offre pourtant une incomparable garantie d’authentification grâce à la reconnaissance digitale et/ou de l’iris de l’oeil », note le quotidien, qui affirme que la base, coeur de la dissuasion nucléaire française, va renforcer ses mesures de sécurité.

Mais pour l’instant, l’identification des personnels autorisés à y pénétrer « s’effectue au moyen de badges nominatifs équipés d’une simple bande magnétique (très facilement copiable) et d’une photo », explique le journaliste qui signe l’enquête, Hervé Chambonnière, en ajoutant que « ces badges ne permettent pas non plus de tracer leurs porteurs, et notamment de savoir s’ils ont bien quitté la base en fin de journée ». Quant aux véhicules, le sésame consiste en « un vulgaire morceau de feuille de papier blanc, où figurent quelques informations basiques », selon le quotidien.

« Parfaitement accessible »

« Alors que le site est en travaux depuis 2006 (aménagements liés au nouveau missile M51), pourquoi les nombreux camions-bennes et toupies qui y pénètrent, et qui peuvent cacher de grandes quantités d’explosifs ou de nombreuses personnes, ne sont-ils pas systématiquement inspectés, comme nous l’avons constaté à plusieurs reprises à l’entrée de la base? », questionne le journaliste.

Son enquête souligne également d’autres failles, comme la vulnérabilité des « transrades » - des bateaux qui effectuent la navette entre Brest et l’Ile-Longue et transportent la moitié des effectifs (1.200 personnes) travaillant sur le site; ou la ligne électrique desservant l’Ile-Longue, « parfaitement accessible ». « Si les zones-clés du site sont censées être autonomes, quel serait l’impact sur le fonctionnement du site si un ou plusieurs pylônes étaient détruits? ».

Enquête approfondie

« À noter, également, l’absence de chicane devant l’entrée de la base et dans la base. Impossible d’empêcher un camion-suicide de parvenir jusqu’à la +cathédrale+, principal sas d’accès au coeur du site, où plusieurs centaines de personnes se pressent aux heures de pointe », affirme le quotidien, qui relève aussi qu’« une bonne partie des 115 gendarmes maritimes » affectés à la surveillance « sont gendarmes adjoints volontaires, donc débutants, très jeunes, peu formés (...) et peu payés ».

En réaction à ces informations, le ministre de la Défense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, a demandé une « enquête approfondie sur la sécurité » du site de l’Ile longue, a annoncé son entourage. M. Le Drian « confie à l’inspection générale des armées une enquête approfondie sur la sécurité terrestre, maritime et aérienne de l’Ile Longue », a-t-on précisé de même source.

« La sécurité de notre dissuasion » nucléaire « n’est pas en défaut », a assuré par ailleurs Pierre Bayle, porte-parole du ministère de la Défense. « Je tiens à rassurer tous ceux qui craindraient pour la sécurité de notre dissuasion, celle-ci n’est pas en défaut », a déclaré lors d’un point de presse M. Bayle.