Overblog
Suivre ce blog Administration + Créer mon blog
19 mars 2015 4 19 /03 /mars /2015 12:50
Place de la coopération régionale dans la démarche stratégique de la Lituanie


18/03/2015 Živilė KALIBATAITĖ -  IRSEM

 

En quelques pages seulement, les Fiches de l'IRSEM présentent l’état de l’art synthétique d’une question précise pour en indiquer les principaux débats, animateurs et enseignements.

 

La place de la coopération régionale dans la démarche stratégique d’un petit État européen. Le cas de la Lituanie.

 

Fiche de l'IRSEM n°37 - 2015

Partager cet article

Repost0
16 janvier 2015 5 16 /01 /janvier /2015 08:45
La stratégie américaine en Afrique

 

15.01.2015 Sous la direction de Maya Kandel * - IRSEM

 

Cette étude présente une analyse de la stratégie américaine en Afrique. À partir de contributions d’universitaires, experts et opérationnels français et américains, elle analyse les acteurs, processus et modalités de la présence militaire américaine en Afrique. Elle s’intéresse en particulier aux caractéristiques et aux coûts de l’approche indirecte privilégiée par les États-Unis. Le continent africain constitue en effet le laboratoire d’un aspect déterminant de la réorientation stratégique engagée par le président Barack Obama à travers le concept d’empreinte légère (light footprint). Plus récemment, il a même été érigé en modèle de la lutte contre-terroriste et source d’inspiration pour d’autres régions, notamment le Moyen-Orient. Enfin, la coopération franco-américaine resserrée et inédite dans certaines régions africaines justifie également que l’on étudie la stratégie américaine en Afrique, son évolution récente, sa mise en oeuvre et le bilan que l’on peut en tirer.

 

Les dogmes de la stratégie américaine en Afrique, sont constants depuis le début des années 2000, voire les années 1990 :

- l’Afrique n’est pas une priorité stratégique ;

- l’empreinte au sol doit rester minimale (d’où le rôle des forces spéciales) ;

- pas d’engagement direct pour les militaires américains, ou alors secret ;

- leadership en retrait et intervention par partenaire interposé ;

- même dans ce dernier cas, les États-Unis ne doivent pas apparaître comme un cobelligérant ;

- sur le long terme, le mot d’ordre est « solutions africaines aux problèmes africains ».

 

Les priorités américaines sont logiquement la protection des personnels et intérêts américains sur place, puis par ordre décroissant en termes régionaux, l’Est de l’Afrique, suivi par le Nord et le Sahel, enfin le reste du continent et les littoraux.

 

Les principales conclusions de l’étude illustrent les risques du light footprint, en particulier celui de traiter les symptômes et non les causes en privilégiant l’efficacité à court terme contre les objectifs à long terme, alors même que l’analyse de la menace s’est considérablement affinée du côté des militaires américains où l’on a beaucoup appris des expériences d’Irak et d’Afghanistan. L’une des problématiques essentielles de cette étude réside dans le dilemme, qui n’est pas propre aux États-Unis d’ailleurs, entre les intérêts à court terme de la lutte contre-terroriste et les intérêts à long terme – soit la résolution des causes du terrorisme.

 

Plusieurs articles s’intéressent aux réactions africaines à la politique américaine : à partir d’études de cas (Kenya, Éthiopie, Ouganda, Djibouti notamment), ces analyses mettent en évidence les « coûts cachés » du choix de combattre par procuration, en particulier le risque d’instrumentalisation par des pouvoirs locaux aux agendas différents, et la possibilité de conséquences négatives, voire contre-productives, à long terme. Ils illustrent également, dans certains cas, le chemin parcouru en quelques années par certains chefs d’Etat en Afrique, de la réticence à collaborer avec les États-Unis à l’enthousiasme, voire à la volonté d’une collaboration plus étroite encore. Enfin, l’étude explore à travers plusieurs exemples un autre aspect du light footprint, l’approche par les partenariats, ouvrant des pistes encore inexploitées de collaborations possibles.

 

Maya Kandel * est responsable du programme sur les États-Unis à l’IRSEM et chercheure associée à l’Université Paris III – Sorbonne Nouvelle (CREW/CRAN)

 

Etudes de l'IRSEM n°36 - 2014

 

Partager cet article

Repost0
21 novembre 2014 5 21 /11 /novembre /2014 17:50
Presentation of the Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan - SEDE

 

21-11-2014 SEDE

 

On 20 November the Subcommittee exchanged views on the forthcoming Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan with Paola Imperiale, Maritime Coordinator at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rudolf Roy, Head of Security Policy and Sanctions Division, EEAS and Beate Gminder, Head of Maritime Policy Mediterranean and Black Sea Unit, DG MARE, European Commission.
 

Partager cet article

Repost0
26 septembre 2014 5 26 /09 /septembre /2014 12:50
Call for Submissions: EDA-Egmont PhD Prize

 

Brussels - 24 September, 2014 European Defence Agency

 

The European Defence Agency (EDA) in partnership with Egmont Institute has the pleasure of inviting the best and the brightest European scholars to submit their candidacy for the EDA-Egmont PhD Prize in Defence, Security and Strategy.

 

If you have been awarded a PhD in the period between 1 January 2013 and 15 December 2014 and feel your findings stand out in terms of quality, innovation and impact on future EU policy, then you may have what we are looking for.

You need to be a citizen of an EDA Member State (all EU Member States except Denmark) and  you will need to have been awarded the PhD by an academic institution. You will also need to be available to deliver an intervention at EDA’s Annual Conference scheduled for 6 May 2015 in Brussels.

Does this sound interesting? If so, please consult the attached documents for full details on eligibility and award criteria as well as for the practicalities on how to submit your application.

Deadline for submissions is 16 December 2014. The Award notice will be published on 1 March 2015.

We look forward to receiving your submission!

 

More Information

Partager cet article

Repost0
3 septembre 2014 3 03 /09 /septembre /2014 11:50
Strategy matters – EU key documents

 

29 August 2014 EUISS

 

Earlier this year, the EUISS published a small compendium of official documents entitled Defence Matters. The aim was to make available in a single, pocket-sized publication the key documents recently produced by the EU on the subject.  Yet, whereas ‘defence’ became a focus of policy attention throughout 2013 (admittedly, after a long hiatus), ‘strategy’ covers a much broader domain, linked as it is to an approach to (rather than a specific area of) policy. Similarly, the spectrum of documents from which to select is much wider and more extensive – as is the relevant time frame.

Nevertheless, it seems appropriate here to offer the busy expert on the go a limited selection of the main types of ‘strategic’ documents released by the EU in order to highlight the developments that have occurred in this domain over the past few years while offering (in the annex) a comprehensive survey of other relevant EU ‘strategies’

 

Download document

Partager cet article

Repost0
24 juin 2014 2 24 /06 /juin /2014 16:50
Stratégie de Sûreté Maritime de l’Union Européenne adoptée par le Conseil des affaires générales le 24 juin 2014

 

24.06.2014 consilium.europa.eu

 

La mer a de l'importance.

 

La mer est une précieuse source de croissance et de prospérité pour l'Union européenne et ses citoyens. L'UE dépend de l'ouverture, de la protection et de la sûreté des mers et des océans pour son développement économique, ses transports, sa sécurité énergétique, ainsi que pour garantir le libre-échange, le tourisme et le bon état écologique de l'environnement marin.

La majeure partie du commerce tant extérieur qu'intérieur de l'UE se fait par voie maritime. L'UE est le troisième plus gros importateur et le cinquième plus grand producteur de denrées issues de la pêche et de l'aquaculture. Plus de 70 % des frontières extérieures de l'Union sont des frontières maritimes et des centaines de millions de passagers transitent chaque année par les ports européens. La sécurité énergétique de l'Europe est largement tributaire du transport et des infrastructures maritimes. Le développement important des flottes des États membres de l'UE et les infrastructures portuaires adaptées dont elle dispose (par exemple les installations pour le GNL) contribuent au bon fonctionnement du marché énergétique et à la sécurité de l'approvisionnement et donc au bien-être des citoyens européens et à la bonne santé de l'économie européenne dans son ensemble.

L'UE et ses États membres ont donc un intérêt stratégique à ce que les problèmes de sécurité liés à la mer et à la gestion des frontières maritimes soient recensés et traités, et ce dans l'ensemble du domaine maritime mondial. Les citoyens européens attendent des réponses efficaces, notamment au regard des coûts, pour la protection du domaine maritime, y compris les frontières, les ports et les installations offshore, afin de sécuriser le commerce maritime, de faire face aux éventuelles menaces découlant d'activités illégales ou illicites en mer, et d'utiliser au mieux les possibilités qu'offre la mer en termes de croissance et d'emploi, tout en protégeant le milieu marin.

La stratégie de sûreté maritime de l'Union européenne (SSMUE) couvre à la fois les aspects intérieurs et extérieurs de la sûreté maritime de l'Union. Elle constitue un cadre global, contribuant à un domaine maritime mondial stable et sûr, conformément à la stratégie européenne de sécurité (SES), tout en veillant à la cohérence avec d'autres domaines d'action de l'UE, notamment la politique maritime intégrée (PMI) et la stratégie de sécurité intérieure (SSI).

La stratégie a été adoptée au moyen d'un processus global coordonné, dont les principaux jalons sont les conclusions du Conseil du 26 avril 2010, les conclusions du Conseil sur la surveillance maritime intégrée du 23 mai 2011, la déclaration de Limassol du 7 octobre 2012, les conclusions du Conseil européen de décembre 2013 et la communication conjointe de la Commission européenne et de la Haute Représentante du 6 mars 2014.

 

Télécharger Stratégie de Sûreté Maritime de l’Union Européenne adoptée par le Conseil des affaires générales le 24 juin 2014

Partager cet article

Repost0
8 avril 2014 2 08 /04 /avril /2014 16:20
Canadian satellites "on target" to revolutionise maritime domain awareness

 

04/02/2014 Richard de Silva – Defence IQ

 

The Canadian government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper is prioritising sovereignty as the top focus for its Arctic strategy, according to a public statement made this year at the World Economic Forum. It is also looking to strengthen regulations of the oil-and-gas and mining sectors and ocean shippers in the region.

 

To achieve this, a robust surveillance and communications network is a must but, with budgets as tight as they are, there remains anxiety over the ability to meet full expectations. In efforts to lower long-term costs and provide the widest coverage available, Canadians are looking to the stars. The RADARSAT Constellation Mission, an initiative to cover surveillance requirements from national defence through to environmental protection, continues to receive strong backing ahead of its completion deadline of 2018.

 

RADARSAT-2

As one of Canada’s most sophisticated satellites, RADARSAT-2 offers a next-generation synthetic aperture radar (SAR) earth observation satellite. Launched in December 2007, it provides all-weather, day-and-night coverage of the entire globe to support fishing, shipping, oil and gas exploration, offshore drilling, mapping and ocean research. To date, it has become an essential resource for protecting Canada’s territories, including its interests in the Arctic, a region that has a notorious lack of surveillance infrastructure compared to much of the other corners of the world.

There are some recent concerns that the success of RADARSAT-2 is proving to be a headache for the Canadian government. According to a November 2012 admission by the Department of National Defence (DND), estimates by the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) have indicated that the government’s “data allocation will expire by August 2017” due to the exponential growth of the demand for information in maritime domain awareness, a statement that has since been contradicted by sources at the CSA.

Federal departments had initially agreed to an allotment of $445 million worth of data in exchange for financial contribution to building the satellite, which is owned and operated by MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. of British Columbia. The company is open to selling more credits but budget approval is always an uphill struggle and other international organisations are also demanding a share.

 

Canada’s case for space

Canadian space assets are already used extensively in support of both domestic and expeditionary maritime domain awareness operations. Space-derived data, especially RADARSAT-2 and space-based collection from the automatic identification system (AIS) – including its integration into the terrestrial AIS and the occasional use of commercial electro-optical imagery – are all key components of Canada’s maritime domain awareness programme. It is therefore an undeniably integrated approach.

In essence, radars detect the majority of the targets within the country’s area of interest and the AIS is a key to identifying the targets detected. As an example, there are approximately 7,000 ships criss-crossing between Gibraltar and Halifax. If those trying to view the big picture were to use radar exclusively, they would not be able to discern which of those 7,000 targets are actually of a security concern. By overlaying the AIS on top of that, analysts are able to identify vessels. The problematic targets then can be the subject of additional scrutiny through the input of intelligence sources or civil agencies.

Of course, a ship may have a technical issue with its AIS which would prevent identification, so near real-time vessel detection is achieved through strategically placed satellite ground infrastructure and special radar processors that allow for the very rapid generation of ship detection reports.

While the Armed Forces are naturally concerned most with sovereignty issues, the same capabilities can be used to support whole of government missions, including safety and navigation resource monitoring, pollution control and so on. In particular, ice monitoring is a critical necessity for the safety of navigation.

 

Enhancing satellite value

Next to demand, the amount of SAR data that RADARSAT-2 collects per orbit has increased in recent years. Since the surveillance satellite programme first began, programme managers have anticipated this trend and have focussed efforts on automation. Analysts working in the maritime domain awareness area can collect and download within the Canadian AOR in an almost real-time fashion. The SAR processor and the software that it runs through to automatically detect ships first determines the characteristics of that ship and then converts it into an OTH-Gold track message that can be sent on to a recognised maritime picture command and control system. From the beginning of that process to the end, the system can guarantee to its end users, the Canadian Navy, that they will receive data within 30 minutes. On the vast majority of occasions, the time is less than 15 minutes and even running as little as 8 minutes.

The process is as efficient and as quick as one can get to using a common radar to see a ship in the ocean and then populating it on a radar plot. The upside of the OTH-Gold messages is that with each track, instead of being a 150 megabit image, offers a 30 kilobit OTH-Gold track, which includes an image chip so the Navy has some idea of what the ship looks like. This track can be easily moved through normal communications or even emailed to ships not connected to the command and control system, as demonstrated during a recent RIMPAC exercise. The dissemination of data can therefore be done in a flexible way, but the key remains in an automation process that boasts a very low error rate. Currently, the Canadian system has an error rate far less than 10 per cent.

 

Meeting the launch date

According to the CSA and DND, the RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM) “remains on target for a 2018 launch”. The paradigm shift compared to earlier methods lies in the deployment of three satellites, but with a constellation designed to be scalable up to six, should future requirements demand. In this way, the capabilities of the system are distributed across several satellites, increasing revisit, and introducing a more robust, flexible system that can be maintained at lower cost and launched into orbit using smaller, less expensive launch vehicles. RCM will provide complete coverage of Canada's land and oceans at least once a day, as well as daily access to 95 per cent of the world to Canadian and International users.

“In the majority of our area of interest, we will get ship reports at least every 12 hours and, in the strategically important Arctic, we will get the ship reports every eight hours,” says Colonel Andre Dupuis, Director of Space Requirements at the DND.

“That's all the way out to 2,000 nautical miles and that is, frankly, unheard of in the maritime domain awareness world, where your entire AOR can get a refresh to provide commanders and decision-makers with a real understanding of what the maritime environment looks like from a security and defence perspective.

“It will completely revolutionise how allied navies look at monitoring the open ocean.”

RCM developments will mean that 50 per cent of radar coverage is available to support expeditionary operations, be they in the Arctic or in the South China Sea, which will monitor ship traffic for both cooperative vessels using AIS or uncooperative targets. Everything that Canada is undertaking in the field of maritime domain awareness, particularly in its use of space assets, can be enacted at the unclassified side. Thus, a huge capability will emerge to allow for easily consumable information sharing between partners, allies, governments and private organisations.

Partager cet article

Repost0
4 avril 2014 5 04 /04 /avril /2014 20:40
RUSI Briefing Examines Possible Russian Military Strategies Against Ukraine

 

RUSI News, 4 Apr 2014 By Dr Igor Sutyagin, Research Fellow, Russian Studies; Professor Michael Clarke, Director General

 

With elections set to be held in Ukraine in May, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is about to enter a critical, and perhaps more dangerous period. Russian military planners may take the opportunity to intervene before further erosion of the combat effectiveness of their troops.

Based on current knowledge, expert insight and research, RUSI has published a briefing setting out four military scenarios that now have to be factored into the political calculations for both sides.

They are not predictions nor are they a complete picture of a complex and dynamic situation. Nevertheless, the military dispositions of Ukrainian and Russian forces are becoming more relevant to the political equation, and for a range of reasons they may reduce the time in which politics and negotiation can mitigate the effects of this crisis.

 

Download paper

 

For media inquiries call: +44 7958 780 306

Partager cet article

Repost0
25 mars 2014 2 25 /03 /mars /2014 12:50

Partager cet article

Repost0
17 mars 2014 1 17 /03 /mars /2014 12:50
Le Sahel Africain - source Sénat r12-7201

Le Sahel Africain - source Sénat r12-7201

 

Brussels, 17 March 2014 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

 

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

 

"1 The European Union (EU) remains deeply concerned by the crisis in the Sahel region. It reiterates its determination to support partners in addressing the region's key security and development challenges.

 

2. The Council welcomes the progress made in implementing the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and encourages its enhanced implementation in coordination with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel. The objectives of the EU Strategy in the fields of security, peace-building, conflict prevention, countering radicalisation and development remain valid and the link between security and development will remain at the heart of EU policies and operations in the region. Responding in a dynamic manner to the evolution of the situation in the region is key to ensure the efficacy of the EU comprehensive approach. In this context, the Council invites the EEAS, the EUSR for the Sahel and the Commission to develop a new regional action plan covering the next steps of implementation of the Sahel Strategy.

 

3. The Council invites the EEAS, the EUSR for the Sahel and the Commission to extend the implementation of the Strategy to Burkina Faso and Chad while intensifying relevant activities in Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Political dialogue on conflict prevention and security issues in the Sahel region will be stepped up also in relevant West Africa n and neighbouring countries including Senegal, Nigeria and Cameroon as well as countries of the Maghreb.

 

4. International support to the Sahel region needs to be accompanied by sustained efforts to find a lasting solution to the roots of the ongoing crises in the north of Mali and the wider region. Security and development in the Sahel region is also strongly linked to stability in Libya. In Mali, the EU fully supports the work of the United Nations stabilisation mission MINUSMA to help create conditions conducive to the full restoration of State authority, order and security in the north of Mali. The EU strongly urges all Malian parties to begin credible and inclusive consultations open to all communities and to all non-terrorist armed groups of northern Mali with the aim of achieving broadly founded and lasting peace through a sustainable political solution. The EU will also continue to support the implementation of the plan for the sustainable recovery of Mali.

 

5. In line with the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, impartiality and humanity, the EU will also continue to provide humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable people, on the basis of needs, especially this coming months to ensure a coordinated and effective response to the current food crisis in the Sahel region and to link relief, rehabilitation, and development wherever conditions allow it. In that perspective, the EU will continue to foster resilience building and relevant coordination efforts by Western Africa regional organisations and partners in the framework of the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR).

 

6. With regard to development in the Sahel, the EU will continue to support sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development and regional integration, drawing lessons from the past. The Council commends the progress made towards the implementation of an Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and West Africa. The EU will provide specific support to regional infrastructures that bring the periphery closer to the centre, sustainable social services especially health and education, and sustainable agriculture, food and nutrition security. The EU will encourage in particular local and national development policies addressing the specific socioeconomic and human security needs of border areas as a way to improve territorial control and state authority throughout territories. Due attention will be paid to trading, trafficking and migratory flows including return and readmission and the synergies between migration and development. The EU will continue to promote democracy, human rights, decentralisation policies, good governance including an independent and fair justice system at local and regional levels, and it will encourage the fight against corruption as well as counter-radicalisation projects as a means of conflict prevention, building on local and national initiatives where possible. The EU will continue to implement joint programming within the Sahel countries in order to further increase the effectiveness of EU development cooperation.

 

7. In the field of security, the EU will continue to provide support to national and regional endeavours related to security sector reform and integrated border management and to national efforts in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings, notably through the ongoing CSDP missions in Libya, Mali and Niger as well as the future civilian mission in Mali. The EU will promote synergies between those missions while integrating lessons learnt from previous missions. The EU welcomes the efforts of the African Union and other regional actors to promote enhanced coordination in the field of intelligence and counter-terrorism as well as optimal allocation of national assets and capacities.

 

8. The primary responsibility and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments of the Sahelian region. Regional and international coordination is key to ensure the effectiveness of international efforts in support to local and regional endeavours and the EU will work in close cooperation with regional organisations and national governments in the Sahel to ensure a broadly rooted implementation of the EU Sahel Strategy. The EU welcomes the decision taken by the Heads of States of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso in Nouakchott on 16 February 2014 to establish a permanent framework for their own regional coordination efforts. The EU also welcomes the conclusions of the international high level meeting on the Sahel held in Brussels on 6 February 2014, in particular the recognition that the international coordination platform for the Sahel should constitute the overall coordination mechanism for all existing strategies in the region, including the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel. The EU reaffirms its will to contribute actively together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and others to the work of the United Nations and the African Union Commission in support to this platform."

Partager cet article

Repost0
16 mars 2014 7 16 /03 /mars /2014 12:20
U.S. Navy Details Its Arctic Strategy

 

 

February 25, 2014. David Pugliese - Defence Watch

 

News release from the U.S. Navy:

 

WASHINGTON (NNS) — The U.S. Navy released an updated Arctic Roadmap Feb. 24 to prepare naval forces over the next 15 years for operations in the Arctic Ocean.

 

“This updated Navy Arctic Roadmap prepares the U.S. Navy to respond effectively to future contingencies, delineates the Navy’s Arctic leadership role within the Defense Department, and articulates the Navy’s support to achieve national priorities,” wrote Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert in the Roadmap introduction.

 

In the coming decades, as multi-year sea ice in the Arctic Ocean recedes, previously unreachable areas may open for maritime use for a few weeks each year. This opening maritime frontier has important national security implications and impact required future Navy capabilities.

 

“Our goal is to have the Arctic continue to unfold peaceably,” said Vice Adm. Michelle Howard, Deputy CNO for Operations, Plans and Policy. “Working with our maritime and inter-agency partners, and by investing smartly in future capabilities, we can contribute to a secure and stable Arctic region.”

 

The Arctic Roadmap, updated from its original 2009 version, includes an implementation plan that outlines the Navy’s strategic approach to developing capabilities to operate in the Arctic Ocean, and the ways and means to support the desired Department of Defense and National Strategy end states.

 

To plan for the changing Arctic environment, Greenert directed the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change (TFCC) to produce an assessment of how ice coverage will change in the Arctic, and its impacts on the Navy.

 

The task force assembled an interagency team of Arctic experts from various Navy offices, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Ice Center, the U.S. Coast Guard, and academia to develop a consensus assessment based on available predictions by climate scientists. The task force identified key missions the Navy should be expected to perform, such as maritime security (including support to the Coast Guard for search and rescue), sea control, freedom of navigation, and disaster response/defense support of civil authorities.

 

“As the perennial ice melts and open water is available for longer periods of time, we are committed to expanding our Arctic capabilities,” said Rear Adm. Jonathan White, Oceanographer of the Navy and TFCC director.

 

Given the vast distances and virtually no supporting infrastructure there, naval forces without specialized equipment and operational experience face substantial impediments. Naval operations in the Arctic Ocean require special training, extreme cold-weather modifications for systems and equipment, and complex logistics support.

 

The roadmap provides direction to the Navy for the near-term (present-2020), mid-term (2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030), placing particular emphasis on near-term actions.

 

Recognizing the inherent risks and challenges of operating in such a harsh environment, the Arctic Road Map implementation plan emphasizes: increased investment in research and development to better understand long-term climate processes and improve near-term weather predictions; a national effort towards ocean bottom mapping in support of accurate nautical charts; development of requirements for standard aids to navigation in Arctic waters; evaluation of future shore infrastructure requirements; and evaluation of requirements for logistics support capabilities for Arctic operations.

 

The implementation plan does not alter any current funding or budget processes but reinforces ongoing activities and provides guidance for future year budget deliberations.

 

“Our challenge over the coming decades is to balance the demands of current requirements with investment in the development of future capabilities,” wrote Greenert. “This roadmap will ensure our investments are informed, focused, and deliberate as the Navy approaches a new maritime frontier.”

Partager cet article

Repost0
14 mars 2014 5 14 /03 /mars /2014 19:50
source Frontex

source Frontex


13.03.2014 euractiv.com
 

As tragedies at sea involving African and Arab refugees continue to shock Europeans, Frontex defended its coordination role in EU external border protection at a Berlin event, amid accusations from all sides. EurActiv.de reports.

 

Since the Lampedusa crisis, failed migration attempts have gained media coverage and sent shockwaves throughout Europe.

"This is one of the biggest tragedies in Europe's history, caused by the member states and tolerated by the EU and its agencies,” said Left MEP Cornelia Ernst, one of the panelists at an event jointly hosted by Frontex and EurActiv Germany last week in Berlin.

“Only after the terrible accident at Lampedusa, with roughly 360 deaths, it was noticed that 19,000 people had already lost their lives," she pointed out.

The event addressed the dangers at the EU's maritime borders, the fate of refugees, the complicated multi-level regulatory structure, and the tasks of Frontex. Defined by the agency’s deputy executive director Gil Arias, Frontex is the "European body responsible for the coordination of operational cooperation at external borders".

But “this definition,” Arias admitted, “does not explain how we work in practice”. The Mediterranean Sea spans 2.5 million square kilometres, he explained, and cannot be monitored by normal border controls.

As a matter of principle, border security is a matter of the individual member states, he said, explaining that when these become overwhelmed and need support, they turn to Frontex. The EU agency cannot act of its own accord, he emphasised. Rather it is dependent on the individual EU member states.

"Frontex does not possess aircraft, nor border guards, nor vessels to perform the actual border control at external borders", Arias pointed out. Frontex must use boats and aircraft from national authorities – for which it must also pay a borrowing fee, he said.

 

Border control becomes search and rescue

In reality, Frontex was designed as an instrument for border control, not migration policy. Its mandate is to support EU member states in protecting their external borders from illegal activities. This may include anything from illegal migration and human trafficking to smuggling of illegal drugs and much more.

To fulfill these tasks, the EU currently allocates roughly €90 million annually to Frontex. During difficult years, (for example, during the Arab Spring), the budget had to be substantially increased.

Like other bodies of water, the Mediterranean is divided into national search and rescue areas, Arias said. "All vessels - whether military, coast guard, fishing, private - and other assets in the area are included in the rescue operation, including those coordinated by Frontex," the agency's deputy executive director explained.

Often the monitoring and controlling missions suddenly turn into search and rescue operations, Arias pointed out, saying this went beyond Frontex's mandate, which often leads to misunderstandings about its role. "I must stress that we are well aware that the border control is not a proper tool for migration management,” he said, admitting limitations in the agency's role.

In Italy alone last year, 280 search and rescue operations were coordinated by Frontex, saving more than 30,000 people. "In all Frontex operations in 2013, there were 683 search and rescue cases with a total of 37,000 migrants in distress that were saved. This means that last year, on average, Frontex coordinated assets were able to save over 100 persons per day," Arias pointed out.

 

Would it be different without Frontex?

Europe's southern maritime border, the Mediterranean, remains one of the most important gateways for those attempting to cross into Europe. Roughly 45,000 migrants made it to Italy alone by that route in 2013.

Added to the sheer number of migrants, not a single member state on the Mediterranean is capable of monitoring the vast stretches of the Mediterranean Sea, especially at the high seas. "Even when a boat is spotted in distress, in favourable weather conditions it takes a coastal patrol vessel four hours to reach a boat which is 50 nautical miles away - which is less than 100 kilometres," Arias said.

Speaking at the event, Anna Mrozek, a legal expert from the University of Leipzig, sought to outline the legal complications caused by overlap in this subject area, but she also posed a simple question to the protesters: "Do you think it would be different without Frontex? It would probably be even worse!"

It is not just a moral and political problem, Mrozek said, but is legally also quite complex due to the high amount of overlap.

 

EU has ‘abandoned’ communities

Achim Barchmann, a Social Democrat MP from the German Bundestag, described his latest impressions of Jordan, a country which has accepted 600,000 refugees from Syria. "That is 10% of the Jordanian population,” he said, adding that “in Germany that would be 8 million refugees!"

The 5,000 refugees Germany has accepted from Syria are too few, Barchmann said, adding that the community has been abandoned by their national and regional supporters, but also by the EU.

>> Read: Germany refuses to take in more refugees

Barchmann described a possible scenario regarding youth unemployment on Europe's Southern border: unemployment in Greece is at 62%, in Spain over 50%, "but if I look at North Africa - Tunisia, Egypt - 80 to 100% can be observed!"

 

‘Push-back operations are particularly dangerous’

Cornelia Ernst, a member of the European Parliament from Germany's Left Party (Die Linke), criticised the EU's asylum policy, saying it only leads to partitioning, and has failed completely. It is unacceptable, she said, that €2 billion will have been spent by 2020 to protect the "Fortress of Europe" rather than aiding the refugees.

"To weigh the costs against the benefits, … we have 19,000 dead on the EU's borders, and many are not even found. Even the 474 illegal detention centres at the EU's external borders are not given enough funding,” she said. “Political and moral costs should be added to this.”

Furthermore, Ernst considered the push-back operations particularly dangerous, as they are often combined with human rights violations, torture and abuse.

In addition, she said, the prohibition of collective deportation – especially in Greece – is being trampled upon and “the EU is silent on this". The Left Group in the European Parliament is calling on the German government, and the European Council, to make rescuing refugees the main purpose of the EU's border agencies.

EurActiv.de

Partager cet article

Repost0
11 mars 2014 2 11 /03 /mars /2014 20:50
Germany and War : Understanding Strategic Culture under the Merkel Government

 

11/03/2014 Sophia Becker - IRSEM

 

Synthèse

 

L’objectif de cette étude est d’analyser les attitudes de l’Allemagne vis-à-vis de l’usage de la force pendant la période du gouvernement de Merkel entre 2005 et 2012. Ont-elles connu un changement notable? Afin d’examiner le comportement allemand en matière de sécurité et de défense, le concept de culture stratégique sera utilisé comme cadre théorique. Ce concept permet de refléter la politique de sécurité et de défense en incluant des spécificités historiques, institutionnelles, normatives et idéologiques concernant la menace, l’usage et la perception de la puissance militaire. L’auteur avance que la culture stratégique de l’Allemagne est constituée de deux éléments fondamentaux, l’antimilitarisme et le multilatéralisme, ces derniers continuant d’influencer la politique étrangère allemande. Ces deux éléments sont, cependant, entrés en conflit, et par conséquent, la politique de securité allemande fait face à un dilemme inhérent à sa culture stratégique. Les décideurs allemands sont alors dans une situation délicate, puisqu’ils doivent réconcilier deux éléments contradictoires de leur culture stratégique. Les changements récents de la situation internationale ont augmenté les pressions extérieures sur l’Allemagne afin qu’elle s’engage davantage sur la scène internationale; alors qu’au même moment, des expériences telles que la guerre en Afghanistan ont terni l’image de la Bundeswehr considérée auparavant comme une force œuvrant pour le bien et ont accru le scepticisme vis-à-vis des inverventions militaires. Ces changements ont intensifié le conflit inhérent à la culture stratégique de l’Allemagne et ont ainsi complexifié davantage la politique de sécurité de l’Allemagne.

 

Abstract

 

The aim of this study is to analyse whether German attitudes towards the use of military force have undergone significant change during the time of the Merkel government between 2005 and 2012. In order to shed light on recent German security behaviour, the concept of strategic culture will be used as the theoretical framework. This concept enables to reflect on security and defence policy by including specific historical, institutional, normative, and ideational predispositions with regard to the threat, use, and perception of military force. The author suggests that German strategic culture is made up of two fundamental elements, antimilitarism and multilateralism, which continue to inform Germany's foreign policy. The two elements have, however, entered into a conflict, so that Germany faces a security policy dilemma inherent to its strategic culture. This fact puts German foreign policy makers in a delicate situation of having to reconcile two contradictory elements of their own strategic culture. Recent developments of the international environment have increased the external pressure for more German responsibility while experiences like the war in Afghanistan tarnished the Bundeswehr's image as a "force for good" and caused the scepticism towards military interventions to grow. These developments intensified the inherent conflict of German strategic culture and made the formulation of German security policy all the more complicated.

Partager cet article

Repost0
10 mars 2014 1 10 /03 /mars /2014 12:50
Ukraine: the charge of the diplomatic brigade

 

 

6th March 2014  – by Sven Biscop* - europeangeostrategy.org

 

Rather than its adroitness, the Ukrainian crisis highlights the failure of Russian strategy.

 

Russian long-term strategy failed, for the model of society and the type of relationship on offer were evidently not appealing at all to the mass of demonstrators who forced Yanukovich to come to terms. By contrast, the social model associated with the European Union (EU) – though in austerity times it is in fact not always applied within the Union – clearly appeals much more to many Ukrainians. They feel that European governments protect and provide for their citizens and expect their government to do the same.

 

Once Yanukovich fled the country, immediately after three EU Member States had brokered an agreement, Russian short-term strategy failed as well. Either Yanukovich decided to leave the scene without giving prior warning to Moscow, which means Russia lost control, or his great escape was part of the Russian plan, in which case it was faulty, for the resulting vacuum was immediately filled by the opposition.

 

Subsequent Russian military action in the Crimea is an over-reaction attempting to mask the weakness of Moscow’s position. That does not render it less of a crisis, which does threaten the peace in Europe. But it does mean that a solution can be found, as long as the Russian government is permitted to save face.

 

Not all of its objectives are necessarily unreasonable. But having built its domestic power base on the image of external power, it cannot allow that image to be pierced. Especially not in what it persists in presenting to its own public as its sphere of influence. To that end it prefers to grab what actually it could receive by asking politely.

 

Europe and the United States (US) have their own concerns with their image and legitimacy though, so they too want to appear resolute in the face of the crisis. Targeted sanctions such as travel restrictions and freezing of assets can serve that purpose, signaling at the same time resolve in addressing the crisis and prudence in wishing to avoid escalation. Energy need not now come into play. Moscow and Brussels know that they are so dependent upon each other that both would be unduly hurt by a freezing of energy deliveries. Europe more in the short term, but Russia more in the long term, for Europe represents a far greater share of its exports than Russia of Europe’s imports.

 

A military solution there certainly is not. Too much posturing through NATO can only be counter-productive, making it more difficult for Russia to back out. Precisely because Russia must maintain the image – or mirage – of its sphere of influence, NATO is not the right conduit to manage the crisis in Ukraine (as it was not in Georgia in 2008).

 

Crisis diplomacy at the highest level by the EU, unequivocally backed by the most relevant Member States, and the US, is the only option to broker a deal. An agreement certainly seems possible. Russia’s lease on the naval base in Sevastopol can be guaranteed by the Ukrainian interim government. Elections in Ukraine as a whole and a referendum on independence or increased autonomy in the Crimea can both be pushed back and held on the same day, under international observation. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where Russia, the EU and the US are all represented, could organise this. Future governments can enact strong guarantees of minority rights (another area in which the OSCE has great expertise).

 

In this ‘Crimean war’, the only brigade that has to charge therefore is the diplomatic brigade.

 

 

* Prof. Sven Biscop is a Senior Editor of European Geostrategy. He is also Director of the ‘Europe in the World Programme’ at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels. He writes here in a personal capacity.

Partager cet article

Repost0
7 mars 2014 5 07 /03 /mars /2014 16:50
European Commission Memo on the EU's Maritime Security Strategy

 

6/3/2014 EU source: European Commission Ref: EC14-061EN

 

Summary: 6 March 2014, Brussels - European Commission Memo on the EU's Maritime Security Strategy

 

Q: Why is the Commission and the High Representative proposing only elements for a strategy?

A: One of the objectives of this process is to ensure that the Member States are fully involved in the development of this strategy. A European Union maritime security strategy cannot be developed without the involvement of Member States since many operational activities are carried out by national authorities. The Commission and the High Representative are therefore looking forward to working closely with Member States in order to deliver a full-fledged strategy. We are confident that the strategy once adopted will represent the views and interests of all stakeholders.

 

Q: How have Member States been involved so far?

A: The Member States already have provided substantial input through events organised at EU level and through various written contributions. Additionally, the Commission and the European External Action Service organised a stakeholder consultation in June 2013, where Member States expressed their support to the general approach. The intention is that the Joint Communication will serve as a basis for further work on shaping the strategy together with the Member States in the EU Council under the leadership of the Hellenic Presidency.

 

Q: What would be the purpose of such a strategy?

A: The purpose of an EU Maritime Security Strategy would be to provide a common framework for relevant authorities at national and European levels to develop further their specific policies. The aim of such a strategy would be to protect EU's strategic maritime interests and identify options to do so. Such a framework would provide the context and ensure coherence amongst different sector specific maritime policies and strategies. Most importantly it would significantly strengthen the link between internal and external security aspects of the maritime policy of the EU and civil and military cooperation.

 

Q: What are the main aims?

A: The main aims of an EU Maritime Security Strategy should be: (1) to identify and articulate the main strategic maritime interests of the EU; (2) to identify and articulate the maritime threats, challenges and risks to the strategic maritime interests of the EU; and (3) to organise the response, i.e. provide the common policy objectives, common principles and areas of common support as the backbone of the joint strategic framework in order to create coherence for the diverse and wide array of sector specific maritime policies and strategies.

 

Q: Does the EU only have maritime interests or does it also have a maritime responsibility?

A: It is crucial to identify the strategic maritime interests of the European Union. The global maritime domain is of vital importance to the EU and it is multi-layered. It is a crucial domain for free commerce and trade. In addition, seas and oceans are interrelated eco-systems; it is a source of resources; open seas and coastal areas are zones for tourism etc. The EU is a global actor therefore it does not only have interests, it also has to take adequate responsibility. This global responsibility has to be transformed into concrete and specific actions and to promote the respect for international law, human rights and democracy, and rules-based good governance at sea.

 

Q: What does the term "cross-sectoral" mean?

A: The term 'cross-sectoral' refers to actions or cooperation between different marine or maritime functions. They are still largely organised in isolation of each other and often along national lines. Modern maritime risks and threats are multifaceted and can have implications for all of these sectors involving different policies and instruments. The responses therefore should be adequately integrated and cross-sectoral in their nature. It means finding a common maritime security interest among different functions and aspects concerned.

 

Q: What are the sectors addressed?

A: Some of the most evident sectors are maritime safety, maritime transport, marine environment protection, fisheries control, customs, border control, law enforcement, defence, research and development and others. A 'joined up' approach to maritime policy, making these sectors work better together, can make the security policy more coherent, effective and cost efficient.

 

Q: What is the added value of this strategy - what will change compared to the current situation?

A: The added value of a shared strategic framework is that it provides the necessary basis to ensure coherent actions and policy development. It also facilitates the coordination of all efforts and ensures that different policies are 'joined up'. The ambition is that the EU can become more resilient in addressing threats and risks in the maritime domain and as such it would be more capable at safeguarding its values, strategic maritime interests and promoting multilateral cooperation and maritime governance. In essence, the result of the strategy would be that maritime security activities would be much more coordinated than today.

Different policy frameworks have resulted in the European Security Strategy (ESS - 2003) and the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP - 2007), which have been developing separately. Also sector specific legislation is already in place like the maritime transport security legislation - Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security and Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) improving the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States and of the EU Border Agency Frontex at the external borders - Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013), SafeSeaNet, a Union maritime traffic monitoring and information system for EU waters, managed by EU Maritime Transport agency EMSA, or the 3rd Maritime Safety Package.

 

Q: How will the actions, identified in this strategy, be put in practice?

This depends to a large extent on the opinion of the Member States since many of them would fall under their competence, but already existing examples with joint deployment plans and enhanced information exchange systems can eventually lead to the use of common platforms for surveillance operations. This aspect will however need to be discussed in detail with Member States.

 

Q: Will such a strategy promote deployment of more naval missions similar to EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA?

A: The use of all possible tools and instruments should be considered when addressing a maritime insecurity situation. Each case requires a full evaluation of the situation in order to identify the best action. In the case of the piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, which gravely endanger shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, the deployment of international naval forces was deemed necessary as local capacities to ensure maritime security were not available.

 

Q: Why is such an initiative taken now?

A: Already on 26 April 2010 the Council invited the High Representative, together with the Commission and Member States 'to undertake work with a view to preparing options for the possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain'. More recently in December, 2013, the European Council called for "an EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014, on the basis of a Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative, taking into account the opinions of the Member States". This is the direct response to these requests.

 

Q: What are the next steps?

A: Based on the elements proposed be the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative, an EU Maritime Security Strategy should be elaborated within the appropriate EU Council bodies and be adopted not later than in June 2014.

European Commission Memo on the EU's Maritime Security Strategy

Note RP Defense : on EDA website : Further step taken in the MARSUR network development

Partager cet article

Repost0
27 janvier 2014 1 27 /01 /janvier /2014 17:35
La pensée stratégique des deux Corées

21/01/2014 Antoine BONDAZ -   IRSEM

 

La pensée stratégique coréenne s’est dédoublée depuis la division de la péninsule. La dimension nucléaire est aujourd’hui au cœur de la pensée nord-coréenne, comme élément principal de dissuasion et de survie du régime. La Corée du Sud a fait évoluer sa pensée stratégique en partie en réponse aux deux attaques nord-coréennes de 2010 (Cheonan et Yeonpyeong). Une dissuasion active et sur mesure, mettant l’accent sur la défense de l’espace maritime et un renforcement de l’alliance militaire avec les États-Unis, demeure au cœur de cette pensée stratégique, faisant de la nucléarisation du pays un faux-débat. L’impuissance des grandes puissances, leur incapacité à coopérer du fait d’intérêts divergents fait de la dénucléarisation de la Corée du Nord ou de l’effondrement du régime, un scénario peu probable. Alors que les acteurs régionaux traitent ce problème de façon régionale et non globale, la France et l’Union européenne sont marginalisées.

  Lire la suite (pdf - 613 ko)

Partager cet article

Repost0
25 novembre 2013 1 25 /11 /novembre /2013 08:20
L'Arctique, "nouvelle frontière" selon un Chuck Hagel très Kennedien


23.11.2013 par P. CHAPLEAU - Lignes de Défense
 

Sous Kennedy, la "nouvelle frontière", c'était (géographiquement) l'espace. Sous Obama, c'est l'Arctique.

 

Le secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense américain, Chuck Hagel, a confirmé vendredi que les Etats-Unis comptaient affirmer leur présence en Arctique, où le Pentagone dispose déjà de 22 000 soldats et 5 000 gardes nationaux. Il a toutefois appelé les pays (Canada, Danemark, Finlande, Islande, Norvège, Russie et Suède) qui se partagent ce territoire, que l'on dit victime du réchauffement climatique, à éviter tout conflit et à "travailler ensemble à construire une région sûre et pacifique".

En dévoilant depuis le Canada la première stratégie américaine pour l'Arctique, le secrétaire à la Défense a expliqué que l'armée avait commencé à s'adapter au réchauffement climatique dans la région. Ce court document recommande que les Etats-Unis n'accentuent pas leur présence militaire pour éviter de pousser les autres pays à l'escalade. Au contraire, le Pentagone doit continuer "son approche collaborative en matière de sécurité" dans le but d'empêcher des tensions potentielles.

On lira le discours du secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense ici.

On lira le texte du document de 16 pages "Arctic Strategy" ici. Ce texte ne diverge en rien du texte de mai 2013 sur la stratégie nationale US en Arctique (cliquer ici); il constitue une déclinaison militaire de cette stratégie présidentielle.

Pour prolonger la réflexion et l'information, on peut consulter le site de l'Arctic Research Consortium of the U.S. (ARCUS) en cliquant ici.

Partager cet article

Repost0
22 novembre 2013 5 22 /11 /novembre /2013 13:50
Brief: What EU citizens think about European defence

Briefs - No43 - 22 November 2013 - by Olivier de France

 

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the ‘end of history’ was nigh – and Europe stood squarely on the right side of it. The times have changed, alas. Today policymakers in the EU expend much of their energy on parrying short-term economic shocks, which have rocked the European boat in ways that seemed unthinkable before. There is a lingering sense that a narrative has unravelled, yet to be convincingly replaced.

 

Countries face a strategic landscape that shifts faster than their perception of it perhaps allows. There are no tangible conventional threats and no enemies at Europe’s gates, but an array of risks and threats that are harder to predict and increasingly more complex. The changing environment requires the ability to bring a panoply of instruments to bear on a range of different problems. Europe prides itself on its ability to do this. Since the European Security Strategy called for a ‘comprehensive approach’ in 2003, the EU has endeavoured to conduct its external action in a flexible, integrated and multilateral way.

 

Download document

Partager cet article

Repost0
8 octobre 2013 2 08 /10 /octobre /2013 12:20
Game changers: disruptive technology and US defence strategy

The X-51 hypersonic test vehicle beneath a B-52

 

07 October 2013 by ADIT - defenceWeb

 

This month, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a report focusing on the attractive although elusive concept of game changing technologies. The report is part of a larger project called NeXTech, led by the U.S Department of Defense’s (DoD) Rapid Reaction Technology Office.

 

The project has consisted of interviews with leading experts on leading edge technologies, as well as in war games involving the US Army War College, the US Naval Postgraduate School and the US Naval Academy. The simulations involved people from the US DoD as well as foreign militaries and civilians.

 

In this report, Ben FitzGerald and Shawn Brimley point out several key issues concerning disruptive technologies. To begin with, let’s have a look at the author’s definition of a “disruptive” or “game changing” technology. According to them, it is “a technology or a set of technologies applied to a relevant problem in a manner that radically alters the symmetry of military power between competitors. The use of this technology immediately outdates the policies, doctrines and organization of all actors.”

 

As we understand it, it is a shift from the prevailing paradigm. Such development gives headaches to strategist and military officers. The pace of technological innovations appears to have increased with the emergence of semiconductors. In this area, the “Moore’s law” states that the number of transistors on integrated circuits doubles every two years. The authors note that “if Moore’s Law hold true the way it has for the past 40 years, it presents immense complexity. For instance, between the current review of the US defense strategy and the moment when the Quadrennial Defense Report will be published, we will see a doubling of the technological power and complexity of our processing chips, computer and all that is powered with them.” In that respect, let’s just notice that the DARPA regularly awards contracts as part of the Technology Advanced Research Network (STARnet), a “nationwide network of multi-university research centers “focused on discovering solutions to the intractable problems that are forecast to lie in the future of integrated circuit progress and to lay the foundations for microsystems innovations once the improvements associated with Moore's Law are exhausted” (sic).

 

A good example of disruptive technology was the proliferation of unmanned vehicles, ten years ago. With time they became “random” with 8,000 unmanned aerial vehicles and 12,000 unmanned ground vehicle present in the US armed forces.

 

However, CNAS’ experts insist on the fact that technological dominance “is a strategic choice.” During the cold war, it underlines that “the choice to optimize investments in fewer, better platforms eventually generated game changing capabilities.” The author warns that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, such strategic choice is now “a matter of presumption.” Without any serious rivals, the unmatched technological edge and military superiority is now perceived as being in the nature of the US armed forces.

 

Over the past decades, many countries have “emerged” as military technology players, including China. Globalization is also a factor in the proliferation of advanced technologies. The NeXTech project identified several technologies that could be game changers.

 

Additive manufacturing (AM), which is an industrial way of production consisting of creating items layer by layer using lasers, is one of them. AM dramatically cuts the time between prototyping and serial production. It is also more flexible, since production lines can be adapted more rapidly.

 

The second type of disruptive technologies is autonomous systems. According to the report, it could be used in a broader range of military operation as well as intelligence activities. Directed energy weapons are also envisioned as revolutionary. These consist of weapon systems based on millimetre waves, high power microwaves, lasers, and electromagnetic pulses. The main advantage of lasers is that there is no flight time between the shot and the target since the beam basically travels at the speed of light. Some serious limits exist though: bad weather (or humidity) considerably diminish the use of such technology, and it requires a considerable source of energy. It could be a powerful defensive tool against missiles.

 

The cyberspace was not forgotten since “as with most fame changing tech, cyber technology has blurred previously well understood boundaries, exposed vulnerabilities and created new threats and industry.” The last game changer could be HPM, an acronym standing for Human Performance Modification. It consists of using drugs, techniques, machines or genes to enhance or degrade human performance. Concrete applications could be improving IQs or developing natural night vision. It is to be noted that several technological fields, which appeared to many A&D sector analysts as “disruptive” are not mentioned in the CNAS report. Indeed, no mention is made of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, or about the possible implications of Boeing’s X-37 unmanned reusable spacecraft. In addition to those weapons of “outer space,” it appears that hypersonic missiles or aircraft would have deserved to be included in the report.

 

Those technological gaps will face various challenges: the decreasing level of R&D spending, the resistance of the military to new, unproven, revolutionary technologies. To be certain that the US will keep its No.1 seat, the authors recommend that the Secretary of Defense issues an annual report on the state of defense R&D coupled with temporary or permanent subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees tasked with overseeing the defense R&D spending. To conclude they insist, once again, one the fact that “America’s privileged position in military technology is not an inherent right.”

Partager cet article

Repost0
10 juillet 2013 3 10 /07 /juillet /2013 11:55
Quand la stratégie militaire dessine l'entreprise de demain

10/07 de Charles-Edouard Bouée - Les Echos

 

Comme nos Etats modernes, les entreprises vivent dans un monde volatil, incertain, complexe et ambigu. Qui les oblige à diminuer leur « empreinte industrielle » et à se montrer toujours plus réactives.

 

Partout des signes indiquent que les années 2020 vont apporter des changements considérables dans la façon dont agissent, s'organisent et se gèrent les entreprises. C'est un gigantesque glissement de terrain qui se prépare, alimenté par les « cybereconomics ». La déferlante à venir de l'automatisation et de la robotisation, la transformation progressive des grandes entreprises en de vastes réseaux, en partie fondés sur des alliances industrielles et technologiques (comme le montre le récent accord entre EADS et Siemens sur la propulsion électrique dans l'aviation civile), ne sont encore que des signes avant-coureurs. Mais ils indiquent bien que nous allons nous projeter dans les années qui viennent dans un monde nouveau.

 

Comment le caractériser et surtout comment l'aborder ? Les stratèges américains (l'histoire montre que les militaires ont souvent compris avant tout le monde les évolutions du monde) ont trouvé un acronyme pour qualifier le monde dans lequel nous entrons : Vica, pour « volatil, incertain, complexe et ambigu ». Pour répondre à ce nouvel environnement, la première armée du monde par la puissance de feu et les technologies déployées a mis au point un concept tout à fait nouveau, adapté aux guerres asymétriques auxquelles elle est confrontée, et qui repose sur la notion de « light footprint strategy », qui a été largement documentée par les experts militaires. Cette nouvelle doctrine de défense se base sur l'utilisation de trois armes essentielles : les drones, les forces spéciales et les cyberattaques. La stratégie du « light footprint » permet d'augmenter l'agilité, la rapidité de mouvement, la capacité de réaction grâce à la « légèreté », à la réactivité et à la rapidité des moyens mis en oeuvre ; tout le contraire de la guerre d'hier, reposant sur l'utilisation de moyens lourds (chars d'assaut, bombardiers…) et de nombreuses troupes au sol. En y réfléchissant, ce concept peut fort bien s'adapter aux entreprises qui, elles aussi, vivent dans un monde volatil, incertain, complexe et ambigu…

 

Les drones. Les robots sont les drones de l'industrie. Jack Welch, l'ancien patron de General Electric, avait coutume de dire, dans les années 1980, que les entreprises devaient choisir entre « s'automatiser, émigrer ou disparaître » (« automate, emigrate or evaporate »). Nous sommes aujourd'hui à un tournant, dans lequel la délocalisation, qui a été l'un des sujets essentiels de la globalisation de l'économie, va progressivement faire place à l'automatisation et à la robotisation, ce qui réduit le choix de l'entreprise à une seule alternative : « automate or evaporate ». Les entreprises chinoises l'ont fort bien compris, qui commencent à se robotiser, à l'exemple de Foxconn, sous-traitant d'Apple, qui va équiper ses usines de 1 million de robots. Les entreprises qui mettront en oeuvre cette robotisation de façon intelligente gagneront en flexibilité, offriront à leurs salariés des tâches plus élaborées et diminueront leur « empreinte industrielle ».

 

Le cyberespace. Il n'est évidemment pas question de conseiller aux entreprises de se faire la guerre par virus informatiques interposés. Mais le cyberespace est désormais un acteur essentiel de la performance. L'enjeu est l'utilisation de l'information, ou plutôt sa transformation en une arme de guerre. Qu'il s'agisse de « big data-analytics » ou de « smart data », la capacité de l'entreprise à extraire de l'intelligence à partir de ces données lui permettra d'anticiper, de « prévoir » le comportement des consommateurs et de leur apporter le produit, le service, le conseil le plus approprié. 99 % des informations sont disponibles dans le cyberespace…

 

Les forces spéciales. Les forces spéciales sont l'expression de ce que peut produire sur le terrain un petit groupe d'individus excellemment entraînés, motivés, solidaires, autonomes, connaissant avec précision la tâche qui incombe à chacun d'eux. Demain, l'entreprise fortement robotisée dépendra davantage de petites équipes, disposant des savoir-faire nécessaires, autonomes dans leurs décisions, motivées collectivement et engagées dans un processus permanent d'amélioration de leurs compétences. L'ère des grands bataillons de salariés organisés en matrices arrive à son terme et sera progressivement remplacée par des petites équipes bien formées, bien équipées, agiles et flexibles, bénéficiant d'une large autonomie d'action et de décision, et en interaction constante les unes avec les autres et avec l'organisation centrale. Le pendant du recours aux forces spéciales est la centralisation de la décision stratégique. C'est Barack Obama lui-même qui était en relation constante avec le commando qui attaquait la résidence de Ben Laden au Pakistan…

 

Charles-Edouard Bouée est membre du comité exécutif du cabinet Roland Berger.

Partager cet article

Repost0
13 juin 2013 4 13 /06 /juin /2013 10:50
Cybersecurity Strategy and Defence Industrial Base debates in SEDE - Subcommittee on Security and Defence
13-06-2013 Source : © European Union, 2013 - EP

 

The SEDE subcommittee will exchange views on the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base with its rapporteur Michael Gahler (EPP) and on the EU Cybersecurity Strategy.
 
When : 19 June 2013, 15:15-18:30

Further information
meeting documents

Partager cet article

Repost0
24 avril 2013 3 24 /04 /avril /2013 07:35
China Has Not Changed Nuclear Strategy, Yet

April 22, 2013 china-defense-mashup.com

 

2013-04-22 — (by M. Taylor Fravel and from thediplomat.com) — In a recent op-ed in the New York Times, nuclear expert James Acton suggests that China may be changing its nuclear doctrine. The principal basis for his argument is the absence of a specific repetition of China’s “no first-use” policy in the latest edition of Beijing’s bi-annual white paper on defense. Acton, however, misreads the recent white paper and draws the wrong conclusion about China’s approach to nuclear weapons.

 

First, no first use has been a core feature of Chinese defense policy for decades, having been decided by Mao himself in 1964. If China abandoned or altered this policy position, it would reflect a major change in China’s approach to nuclear weapons – and a major change in China’s international image. This would not be a casual decision by China’s top leaders but rather a radical change precipitated by a major shift in China’s security environment. Although China’s concerns about U.S. missile defense policies that Acton notes are real, these concerns have existed since the mid-1990s and shape China’s current efforts to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear forces.

 

To date, China has focused on building a small but potent nuclear force with the ability to launch a secure second strike if attacked with nuclear weapons – what I call “assured retaliation.” The relatively small size of China’s nuclear arsenal and the doctrinal emphasis on survivability and reliability are consistent with a pledge to not use nuclear weapons first. Moreover, if China were to abandon or alter the no first-use policy, it would surely want to reap a clear deterrent effect from such an action and likely do so clearly and publicly, not indirectly and quietly through an omission in a report.

 

Second, the absence of the no first-use policy in the 2012 white paper does not support Acton’s contention that China is changing its nuclear doctrine. Here, Acton overlooks that this edition of China’s bi-annual defense white papers is different from past volumes in one important respect.

 

According to Major General Chen Zhou, one of the white paper’s drafters and a researcher at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, the 2012 white paper uses a thematic model (zhuanti xing) and not a comprehensive one. In the past, the comprehensively-oriented white papers all had the same title, such China’s National Defense in 2010. The title of the 2012 edition, however, reflects the new thematic focus: Diversified Employment of China Armed Forces. By discussing in more detail the structure and missions of China’s armed forces, the 2012 white paper dropped a chapter found in all previous ones entitled “National Defense Policy.” In the past editions, this chapter contained the references to China’s no first-use policy (as well as many other defense policies). Applying Occam’s razor, the lack of a chapter on China’s national defense policies can account for the absence of a reference to the no first-use policy.

 

In addition, the white paper’s discussion of the use of nuclear weapons is consistent with the no first-use policy. The white paper refers to “the principle of building a lean and effective force,” repeating language from the 2006 white paper that officially detailed China’s nuclear strategy for the first time. Second, it states that China’s nuclear weapons will only be used under one condition: “If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the [Second Artillery] will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack (jianjue fanji).” Here, the 2012 white paper uses the exact same sentence as the 2008 white paper, which did contain a reference to the no first-use policy. More generally, a nuclear counterattack is the only campaign for China’s nuclear forces that has been described in authoritative Chinese doctrinal texts, starting with the 1987 edition of the Science of Strategy (Zhanlue Xue).

 

Acton also cites a speech that Xi Jinping gave to party delegates from the Second Artillery in December 2012. In public reporting of his speech, Xi stated that the Second Artillery provides “strategic support for our great power status.” Xi also did not mention the no first-use policy. But Xi did not mention any other elements of China’s nuclear policy, either, or anything related to when and how China’s nuclear forces would be used. Instead, the absence of the no-first use policy in this speech was likely another “false negative” regarding a change in China’s nuclear doctrine.

 

Furthermore, Xi in his remarks praised the Second Artillery for “resolutely carrying out the policies and instructions of the party center and Central Military Commission.” Given that Hu Jintao re-affirmed no first use at the April 2012 nuclear summit in Seoul, these “policies and instructions” would have included the no first-use policy.

 

To be clear, Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering its no first-use policy. The debate was especially intense during the mid to late 2000s. Some participants in the debate suggested that no first use might not apply in certain situations that would be seen as equivalent of a “first use,” including conventional strikes on China’s nuclear forces or facilities as well as strikes on strategic targets like the Three Gorges Dam or the top Chinese leadership. In the end, however, a high-level decision was made to maintain the no first-use policy and the internal debate concluded without any change to China’s position.

 

Nevertheless, although no first use remains a central part of China’s approach to nuclear weapons, a certain and perhaps growing ambiguity surrounds the policy. As the Chinese debate indicates, under some set of extreme but nevertheless not implausible conditions, the policy might not serve as a constraint on first use even if China overall postures its forces primarily to deter a nuclear attack. Likewise, in the heat of a crisis, actions taken to deter a nuclear strike against China, such has placing forces on high alert levels, might be seen as indicating a preparations to launch first and invite a pre-emptive strike.

 

Thus, I agree with Acton’s policy recommendation about the need for a U.S.-China dialogue on nuclear weapons even though I disagree with his argument about China’s nuclear doctrine. More dialogue on strategic issues is needed at the highest levels between the United States and China, an area is prone to misperception and miscalculation. The ambiguity and uncertainty about the no first-use policy should be discussed. Indeed, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should the issue of nuclear dialogue when he visits China this week.

Partager cet article

Repost0
7 février 2013 4 07 /02 /février /2013 18:50

cyber warfare

 

7/2/2013 Ref: EU13-049EN

 

Summary: 7 February 2013, Brussels - A free and open Internet is at the heart of the new Cyber Security Strategy by the European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton and the European Commission. The new Communication is the first comprehensive policy document that the European Union has produced in this area. It comprises internal market, justice and home affairs and the foreign policy aspects of cyberspace issues.

 

The Strategy is accompanied by a legislative proposal (a Directive) from the European Commission to strengthen the security of information systems in the EU. This would encourage economic growth as people's confidence in buying goods online and using the Internet would be strengthened.

The Strategy is offering clear priorities for the EU international cyberspace policy:

  • Freedom and openness: The Strategy outlines the vision and principles on applying the EU core values and fundamental rights in cyberspace. Human Rights should also apply online and we will promote cyberspace as an area of freedom and fundamental rights. Expanding access to the Internet should promote democratic reform worldwide. The EU believes that increased global connectivity should not be accompanied by censorship or mass surveillance.
  • The laws, norms and EU core values apply as much in the cyberspace as in the physical world: The responsibility for a more secure cyberspace lies with all players of the global information society, from citizens to governments.
    Developing cyber security capacity building: The EU will engage with international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society to support global capacity building in third countries. It will include improving access to information and to an open Internet and preventing cyber threats.
  • Fostering international cooperation in cyberspace issues: To preserve open, free and secure cyberspace is a global challenge, which the EU will address together with the relevant international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society.

 

FAQ's on the International aspects of the Cyber Security Strategy

How can the core values be ensured in the worldwide web?

 

One example is human rights, which should also apply online as the European Union will promote cyberspace as an area of freedom and fundamental rights. Expanding access to the Internet should advance democratic reform worldwide. The EU believes that increased global connectivity should not be accompanied by censorship or mass surveillance.

 

What EU norms and laws should be used in cyberspace?

 

The responsibility for a more secure cyberspace lies with all players of the global information society, from people to governments. The EU supports the efforts to define norms of behaviour in cyberspace that all stakeholders should adhere to. Just as the EU expects citizens to respect civic duties, social responsibilities and laws online, so should states abide by norms and existing laws. An important pre-condition for free and open Internet that brings political and economic benefits to societies worldwide, is to maintain a multi-stakeholder governance model of the Internet.

 

Will there be new laws to address cyber threats?

 

No, the EU believes we have many international law instruments already that should be applied in cyberspace. However, some governments have proposed new treaties and conventions in cyber issues that the EU cannot support. We fear that the argument of cyber security will be used as a pretext to justify limiting the freedom of expression and access to information. For instance, the Budapest Convention includes all the important elements to assist in investigation, prosecution, and international cooperation to address cybercrime.

 

At present 49 countries have signed the Convention and many countries outside Europe have introduced its principles into their legislation. The EU has assisted the Council of Europe in disseminating the principles of this Convention worldwide, and we are currently financing new programs to promote the Budapest Convention and increase the rule of law in this area.

 

What does the EU intend to do on capacity building?

 

The EU will engage with international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society to support global capacity-building in third countries. It will include improving access to information and to an open Internet and preventing cyber threats. The EU will also actively participate in developing donor coordination for helping capacity-building efforts. These actions will focus on enhancing criminal justice capabilities in training prosecutors and judges, and introducing the Budapest Convention (Cybercrime Convention) principles in recipient countries' legal framework, building law enforcement capacity to advance cybercrime investigations and assisting countries to address cyber incidents.

 

How does the Strategy contribute to international cooperation in cyberspace?

 

To preserve an open, free and secure cyberspace is a global challenge, which the EU should address together with the relevant international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society. The EU will place a renewed emphasis on dialogue with third countries and international organisations, with a special focus on like-minded partners that share EU values. At bilateral level, cooperation with the United States is particularly important and will be further developed.

 

What the EU is doing on cyber defence issues?

 

Within the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Defence Agency (EDA) is developing cyber defence capabilities and technologies, improving cyber defence training & exercises. Given that threats are multifaceted, synergies between civilian and military approaches in protecting critical cyber assets should be enhanced. These efforts should be supported by research and development, and closer cooperation between governments, the private sector and academia in the EU.

 

The EU is also promoting early involvement of industry and academia in developing solutions and in strengthening Europe's defence industrial base and associated R&D innovations in both civilian and military organisations. The EDA will promote civil-military dialogue and contribute to the coordination between all actors at EU level - with particular emphasis on the exchange of good practices, information exchange and early warning, incident response, risk assessment and establishing a cyber-security culture.

 

Why does the Strategy address civilian and military issues?

 

Given that threats are multifaceted, synergies between civilian and military approaches in protecting critical cyber assets should be enhanced. These efforts should be supported by research and development, and closer cooperation between governments, the private sector and academia in the EU. To avoid duplication, the Union will explore possibilities on how the EU and NATO can complement their efforts to heighten the resilience of critical governmental, defence and other information infrastructures on which the members of both organisations depend.

 

Are the EU and NATO cooperating in cyber security?

 

There is a regular cooperation going on between the experts. After the Strategy is adopted, we intend to intensify cooperation with NATO in cyber security. Dialogue with NATO should ensure effective defence capabilities, identify areas for cooperation and avoid duplication of efforts.

Next Steps

The Directive must pass through the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament before adoption whilst the Cyber Security Strategy will remain as it is as it is not legislation.

Links

DG Connect

http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/cyber-security

EU Justice and Home Affairs

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/index_en.htm

Partager cet article

Repost0
12 mai 2012 6 12 /05 /mai /2012 11:55

Air-Sea-Battle-Strategy.jpg

 

May. 11, 2012 By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS– Defense news

 

The Air Sea Battle (ASB) concept initiated by the U.S. Navy and Air Force is an effort to make the most of the combined military capabilities of the U.S. The objectives are to carry out the strategies of U.S. commanders and defeat those of an enemy — traditional goals to be sure, but the ASB concept brings together a much wider matrix intended to match capabilities and threats in more efficient ways.

 

Observers tend to view ASB as aimed at specific threats — China and Iran — while Pentagon leaders insist the concept can be adapted to any adversary. In a May 10 blog post, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert avoided mentioning any specific country, but began with a reference that can quickly be interpreted as aimed at Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf.

 

“There’s been attention recently about closing an international strait using, among other means, mines, fast boats, cruise missiles and mini-subs,” Greenert posted. “These weapons are all elements of what we call an ‘Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2AD)’ strategy.”

 

The attention on Air Sea Battle comes as the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, prepare to meet on May 23 with Iran in Baghdad to discuss security concerns about Iran’s development of nuclear facilities. Without significant guarantees about Iran’s intentions, Israel has been preparing a possible military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, an event, Iran has threatened, that would cause a closure of Hormuz.

 

The ASB concept, Greenert wrote, was developed to defeat A2AD strategies such as the closure of the strait.

“This concept identifies how we will defeat A2AD capabilities such as cyber attack, mines, submarines, cruise and ballistic missiles, and air defense systems and, where applicable, ‘natural access denial’ such as weather, pollution, natural disaster, etc. The concept also describes what we will need to do these operations, especially as the threats improve due to technological advancements,” Greenert posted on his blog.

 

ASB, he explained, relies on tightly coordinated operations that cross operating “domains” — air, land, sea, undersea, space and cyberspace. ASB concepts include submarines hitting air defenses with cruise missiles in support of Air Force bombers; F-22 Air Force stealth fighters taking out enemy cruise missile threats to Navy ships, or a Navy technician confusing an opponent’s radar system so an Air Force UAV can attack an enemy command center.

 

The concept is also being used, Greenert posted, “to guide decisions in procurement, doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel and facilities.”

 

Reflecting the joint outlook at the core of ASB, Greenert also advocated for two key Air Force procurement programs.

“The joint force needs the new Long Range Strike Bomber to provide global reach and stealth as well as the new KC-46 tanker, upon which our patrol aircraft and strike fighters depend,” Greenert wrote. “These investments complement the other capabilities of Air Sea Battle such as the Virginia-class submarines, UAVs, Ford-class aircraft carriers, and long-range weapons.”

 

With Gen. Norton Schwartz, Air Force chief of staff, Greenert will continue his ASB discussion May 16 in a public event at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

 

Greenert’s ASB posting can be read by clicking here.

Partager cet article

Repost0

Présentation

  • : RP Defense
  • : Web review defence industry - Revue du web industrie de défense - company information - news in France, Europe and elsewhere ...
  • Contact

Recherche

Articles Récents

Categories