19/09/2014 LePoint.fr

Ne pouvant contrer la puissance américaine, les djihadistes vont se replier en ville pour mener des actions de guérilla et pousser la coalition à la faute.

Face à l'arsenal déployé par les États-Unis, les djihadistes du groupe État islamique (EI) vont se replier sur les zones urbaines et mener des actions de guérilla pour défendre leurs fiefs. Pour éviter d'être la cible de l'aviation américaine, cette organisation extrémiste, qui a proclamé un "califat" sur un territoire à cheval sur l'Irak et la Syrie aussi grand que le Royaume-Uni, va réduire sa mobilité dans les importantes régions désertiques où ses combattants et matériel sont facilement repérables. L'EI va "se mettre en position défensive en se dissimulant dans les zones urbaines d'où il peut combattre" en cas d'attaque, explique le général britannique à la retraite Ben Barry, expert militaire à l'Institut international d'études stratégiques (IISS).

Depuis ses succès en Irak, l'EI contrôle plusieurs villes importantes notamment Mossoul, Tikrit, Tell Afar dans le nord de l'Irak, Fallouja et partiellement Ramadi dans l'Ouest. En Syrie, il dirige d'une main de fer Raqa, son fief dans le Nord, la moitié de Deir Ezzor (Est) et de nombreuses localités de moindre importance.

"Se mêler à la population"

Autre raison de se déployer dans les villes : pousser les forces américaines ou irakiennes à la faute. "Elles infligeront des pertes parmi les civils en voulant frapper les djihadistes", note le général. "Et ces derniers utiliseront leurs outils de propagande pour monter les sunnites contre le gouvernement irakien (dirigé par les chiites, ndlr) et éroder la légitimité de la coalition internationale", prévoit-il.

Ce mouvement a déjà commencé, selon Ahmed al-Sherifi, un expert irakien en matière de sécurité. "Daesh (acronyme de l'EI) a commencé à retirer certains combattants, notamment les étrangers, pour les diriger vers la Syrie. Ils n'ont gardé que les Irakiens, car ils peuvent aisément se mêler à la population en cas d'attaque", dit-il. L'expert ajoute qu'à Mossoul, les djihadistes ont abandonné leurs centres de commandement installés après la conquête de la ville le 10 juin, pour des maisons privées dans des quartiers populeux où ils font profil bas.

Même tactique en Syrie après l'annonce du secrétaire américain à la Défense Chuck Hagel que la campagne aérienne viserait en Syrie "les sanctuaires" de l'EI. À Deir Ezzor, un militant, Abou Ossama, a constaté qu'ils avaient vidé le principal dépôt d'armes de la région situé dans l'ancien siège du gouvernorat, et fermé à Mayadine, plus à l'est, la quasi-totalité de leurs positions. Même les champs pétroliers ont été désertés et les familles des combattants étrangers, qui vivaient dans des bâtiments résidentiels, ont été évacuées. "Ils disparaissent mais laissent des espions pour les informer", assure-il. Dans la province d'Alep (Nord), le groupe s'est retiré de ses sièges d'al-Bab, un de ses principaux fiefs dans cette région.

Retour à un modèle insurrectionnel

Pour Thomas Pierret, expert de l'islam en Syrie, "le seul cas où les bombardements lourds pourraient vraiment faire la différence, c'est sur les fronts où l'EI concentre des troupes comme à Marea, au nord d'Alep, tenu par les rebelles". "Si les Américains frappaient, l'EI n'aurait d'autre choix que de vider les lieux et de laisser avancer les rebelles", qui luttent à la fois contre l'EI et le régime de Bachar el-Assad.

Avec 35 000 hommes sur 215 000 km2, l'EI va devoir faire des choix. "L'EI possède des unités organisées, un commandement capable de diriger plusieurs opérations simultanément et la capacité d'utiliser des armes lourdes prises aux armées syrienne et irakienne", relève Christopher Harmer, un analyste de l'Institut pour l'étude de la guerre, un think-tank américain. "Comme les frappes américaines vont endommager les éléments visibles de la structure militaire de l'EI, cette organisation va revenir à un modèle insurrectionnel en se mêlant à la population civile, ce qui rendra plus difficile d'atteindre ses combattants", souligne-t-il.

"L'EI utilisera ses cellules dormantes, les tireurs embusqués, les voitures piégées ou les assassinats ciblés. Pour le moment, l'engagement américain ne représente pas une menace conséquente pour l'EI", assure Christopher Harmer. Richard Barret, spécialiste en contre-terrorisme, va dans le même sens : "L'EI ne peut pas contrer les raids américains et il va donc inverser son processus de développement. D'un mouvement clandestin terroriste, il avait progressé vers un 'État' et il va devoir redevenir ce qu'il était avant".

September 11, 2014 by Kris Osborn - defensetech.org

A key architect of the air bombardment strategy in the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom said the U.S. military must have significant success with its efforts to destroy the Islamic State from the air.

On Wednesday night, President Obama’s announced that the U.S. will lead a coalition to step up targeted airstrikes against ISIL. As the mission shifts from humanitarian support and protecting U.S. personnel to more aggressive strikes aimed at a much wider set of targets, some analysts have  questioned if the U.S. will need ground combat troops or if air power will suffice.

The U.S. has utilized air bombing strategies to support friendly forces, such as the Iraqi Security Forces, hoping to advance on the ground.

Attacking ISIL is not similar to dismantling a country’s military such as the initial bombing campaigns in the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. It’s more similar to the airstrikes the U.S. and allied forces have executed against insurgent and Taliban leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade.

A dispersed group of fighters deliberately blending in with the civilian population and travelling in small groups in vehicles like pick-up trucks and armored vehicles has proven difficult or high-risk to pinpoint from the air with even the best precision-guided weaponry.

Even so, one of the authors of the air-power strategy called “effects-based” warfare, said using some of those same concepts may still apply when attacking a mobile insurgent terrorist group such as ISIL.

Retired Air Force Col. John Warden, known for his strategic involvement in creating and implementing effects based warfare, helped the George H.W. Bush administration prepare for the use of precision air-power in the Gulf War.

Effects based warfare is based on the premise that precision air power can achieve a particular strategic effect without necessarily attacking large numbers of fielded forces or the infrastructure of the attacked area.  Success is achieved by attacking and disabling the enemy’s centers of gravity, referred to by Warden as the five rings – leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, fielded military forces.

“The concept of the five rings says that anytime you have more than one person operating against you, such as a group, you have the formation of a system,” Warden told Military​.com in an interview.

Warden explained that this means any group, such as ISIL, would have the elements of the five rings such as leadership, supply lines or system essentials and places to store things such as infrastructure, fielded forces and potentially support from the elements of the local population.

“ISIL looks pretty straightforward,” he said, suggesting that some elements of effects-based warfare could potentially prove useful against ISIL should attacks continue, despite the fact that they are largely a guerilla force on the move and not a country or area with a fixed infrastructure.

The idea of effects-based warfare is to achieve what’s called strategic paralysis and render an enemy force unable to fight by targeting leadership headquarters, command and control and supply lines, Warden explained.

Avoiding civilian casualties through the use of strategy and precision technology from the air – all while preserving much of the infrastructure of the attacked area – is fundamental to effects-based warfare.  The advent of precision weaponry such as GPS and laser-guided bombs has, to a large degree, made this possible.

This approach proved quite successful during the Gulf War and opening attack or “shock and awe” conducted at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, ISIL poses a much different challenge.

“Where we have had success it is not because we have killed every guy that has a bomb. It is because we have succeeded in destroying the ability of the opposition group to function in an organized and coherent way by attacking the leadership, attacking their communications, and attacking their supply lines —for the most part — without doing any significant damage to general infrastructure and little or no damage to the population that they are operating in,” Warden said.

The USS Bush carries as many as 44 F/A-18s, including both Hornets and the more technically advanced Super Hornets. Navy Hornet and Super Hornet pilots have been flying surveillance missions over Iraq for weeks, in part to use their on-board electro-optical cameras and infrared sensors to identify potential ISIL targets. These missions were done in anticipation of a potential order to conduct strikes, defense officials said.

F/A-18s are configured with a host of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons such as GBU-54 500-pound laser-guided bombs, some of which were dropped near Irbil, Iraq, against ISIL mobile artillery targets. Laser-guided bombs can be guided by a laser-designation from the air or nearby ground forces.

Many of the bombs, such as the GBU 54s dropped in Iraq are known as Laser Joint Direct Attack Munitions or LJDAMS. Many JDAMS also rely on GPS guidance to pinpoint their targets.

The GBU 54 is a 581-pound glide bomb with a range of up to 15 nautical miles, service officials said. The weapon uses semi-active laser guidance as well as GPS and inertial navigation systems.

Navy officials said standard laser guidance packages on bombs prove exceptionally accurate in clear conditions against stationary targets. However, with significant amounts of environmental factors such as airborne dust, smoke, fog, or cloud cover, the guidance packages can have difficulty maintaining “lock” on the laser designation while pursuing moving or maneuvering targets, Navy officials said.

This is the reason the GBU-54 was engineered; it is a dual-mode precision-guided bomb designed to destroy fixed and re-locatable or moving targets, service officials said.

The Super Hornet is also configured to fire AIM-9X sidewinder air-to-air missile, the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM, the Joint Standoff Weapon, the Small Diameter Bomb and the Mk-84 general purpose bomb, Navy officials said.

On the deck of the USS Bush, the F/A-18s are joined by five EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft, four E-2 Hawkeye surveillance planes, two C-2 cargo aircraft and as many as 12 MH-60 Sea Hawk helicopters, Navy officials said.

In the Arabian Gulf, the USS Bush is joined by the USS Philippine Sea, a cruiser and two destroyers, the USS Roosevelt and USS O’Kane.

16/09/2014 Par Laure Mandeville – LeFigaro.fr

Tandis que les États-Unis se mobilisent au sein de la coalition internationale pour combattre les djihadistes de l'État islamique, les analystes militaires sont perplexes sur la tactique à adopter. Outre les bombardements, ils estiment qu'un engagement au sol est inévitable.

C'est un général des marines à la retraite respecté que Barack Obama vient de charger de coordonner l'effort de guerre international destiné à combattre l'État islamique. John Allen était commandant en chef adjoint de l'armée américaine dans la province irakienne d'Anbar, entre 2006 et 2008, au moment crucial du ralliement des tribus sunnites contre l'insurrection islamiste que combattait alors l'Amérique, expérience jugée précieuse, alors que ces tribus vont à nouveau être l'objet d'une tentative de séduction de Bagdad et de Washington. Il a aussi été chef adjoint du commandement central américain en charge du Moyen-Orient, puis patron de la coalition internationale en Afghanistan entre 2011 et 2013… Allen connaît également très bien le général Lloyd Austin, patron du Commandement central, qui sera chargé de la campagne militaire américaine contre l'EI.

Suite de l’article

PARIS, 15 septembre - RIA Novosti

La Russie apporte une assistance militaire à la Syrie, à l'Irak et à d'autres pays de la région pour les aider à lutter contre la menace terroriste, a déclaré lundi à Paris le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères Sergueï Lavrov.

"Nous avons parlé de notre contribution au soutien du gouvernement irakien, qui vise à diversifier ses possibilités de combattre les terroristes et d'assurer la sécurité de l'Etat. Nous apportons à l'Irak une assistance, y compris militaire, en vue d'accroître la sécurité dans le pays. Nous agissons de la même façon dans le cas de la Syrie et d'autres pays de la région", a fait savoir M.Lavrov en marge de la conférence internationale sur la situation en Irak tenue dans la capitale française.

September 16, 2014: Strategy Page

The United States has declared that it will seek to destroy ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) without putting any troops on the ground in Iraq or Syria. That means no American regular troops will be sent in for offensive combat. Some will be there to help with security around the massive U.S. embassy compound, and perhaps other American facilities as well. There will also be a lot of security contractors. While these are civilians, many are veterans of the U.S. Army, Marines, Special Forces and so on. Given their civilian status, there may be a temptation to use the contractors if a lot of offensive muscle is needed. By the end of the year there will be at least 5,000 American military personnel in Iraq and even more contractors. That number is expected to grow in 2015 is needed.

Meanwhile there will be American troops in combat. These will primarily be special operations troops from the army (Special Forces, Rangers), marines, navy (SEALs) and air force (para-rescue). There will be some similar special operations troops from American allies. Britain and Australia are already in and others are expected to join, including some Moslem special operations units that worked with NATO in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Air Force will also have air control teams on the ground, although these will often work with commando units. Many American special operations troops are trained to act as ground controllers and many have experience in combat doing this. The Western nations prefer to have a Western air controller on the ground confirming what is going to be hit. But this is not absolutely necessary. Nearly all armed UAVs fire their missiles using the vidcams (with zoom) they carry. Manned aircraft (including heavy bombers) have similar capability in the form of targeting pods. These are very popular with fighter pilots, mainly because they contain FLIR (video quality night vision infrared radar) and TV cameras that enable pilots flying at 6,200 meters (20,000 feet) to clearly make out what is going on down on the ground. The pods also contain laser designators for laser guided bombs and laser range finders that enable pilots to get coordinates for JDAM (GPS guided) bombs. Some have software that can identify many military vehicles and systems automatically. The 200 kg (440 pound) pods hangs off a hard point, like a missile, bomb, or fuel tank. Pilots and bomber crews are trained to use these pods to select and hit targets from the air if there is no one on the ground to help out.

The Iraqis and Kurds have some trained air controllers. The Iraqi ones were trained to call in strikes from Iraqi warplanes armed with Hellfire missiles. The Kurdish ones have been known to work with American Special Forces teams. It’s possible some might be allowed to operate on their own. Trusting the Iraqis, with all the bribery, divided loyalties and such is still discouraged.

The commando teams (usually three to a dozen troops) will definitely be on the ground in Iraq. Syria is another matter and they might or they might not. The problem in Syria is that ISIL is not just fighting the government (Assad) troops but also most other rebel factions. ISIL is estimated to have up to 30,000 armed men in Syria and Iraq but this includes many allies (some very recent and who previously were enemies of ISIL). The core (most reliable) ISIL force is less than 10,000 armed men. Some of these guys are very effective in combat and American troops encountered some of them in Iraq earlier. The ISIL “allies” can switch sides very quickly if the Islamic terrorists gets hammered real bad. That will happen if Iraq and the Kurds use their elite (usually special operations) ground forces to go after ISIL. This tactic is no secret to many ISIL men, who are veterans of the 2004-8 terrorism campaign in Iraq and know about how such combinations quickly shattered the Taliban in late 2001 and has hurt the Taliban badly ever since.

While ISIL knows a lot about avoiding smart bombs and missiles they also know that if they are to control their new “Islamic State” (eastern Syria and western Iraq) they have to use bases and concentrate gunmen to deal with armed opposition. There is no tactic that will make ISIL immune to smart bombs under those conditions, not if they still want to control territory in their new “Islamic State.”

16 septembre 2014 Romandie.com (AFP)

Beyrouth - Les jihadistes de l'Etat islamique ont abattu mardi un avion militaire syrien au dessus de Raqa, leur bastion en Syrie, selon une ONG.

Les combattants de l'EI ont tiré sur un avion militaire syrien qui s'est écrasé. Il s'agit du premier appareil abattu depuis le début des raids du régime contre eux en juillet et depuis l'instauration du califat fin juin, a indiqué à l'AFP l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH).

Selon son directeur Rami Abdel Rahmane, l'appareil s'est écrasé sur une maison de Raqa, causant des morts et des blessés.

Des comptes jihadistes sur Twitter ont félicité les lions de l'Etat islamique. Allah Akbar, Merci à Dieu, c'est confirmé qu'un avion militaire a été abattu au dessus de la ville de Raqa, écrit l'un d'eux. Un autre compte montre la photo de la carcasse calcinée qui est, selon l'EI, celle de l'avion.

Cette opération intervient au moment où les Etats-Unis ont annoncé qu'ils pourraient frapper des positions de jihadistes en Syrie dans le cadre de leur nouvelle stratégie visant à la destruction de l'Etat islamique en Irak et en Syrie.

16-09-2014 Par RFI

L’ONU annonce le retrait de plusieurs positions des casques bleus sur le plateau du Golan, face à l’avancée des rebelles syriens sur ce territoire. Une décision qui intervient après plusieurs incidents entre la Force des Nations unies chargée d’observer le désengagement (Fnuod) et des combattants liés à al-Qaïda.

Lire l’article

11/09/2014 JDD

28 août 2014 par Thomas Flichy de La Neuville, professeur à l’École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr

La brusque émergence de l’État islamique en Irak et au Levant, loin de se réduire, comme le voudraient certains commentateurs, à un simple épiphénomène, se présente comme un événement fondamental qui a d’ores et déjà entraîné un renversement géopolitique majeur.

LA LIQUIDATION du régime de Saddam Hussein par les États-Unis a entraîné un chaos interne à l’Irak qui a prioritairement bénéficié aux compagnies pétrolières chinoises. Ce sont elles qui ont raflé la mise du démantèlement de l’État irakien.

Devant cette déroute géopolitique, les États-Unis cherchent aujourd’hui à préserver les contrats signés au sud dans la partie chiite et au nord, dans le Kurdistan.

L’exploitation du gaz de schiste américain ne rend pas indispensable l’importation de gaz irakien. En revanche, il est important d’empêcher une mainmise totale de la Chine, devenue l’adversaire principale des États-Unis.

Un renversement complet

Pour ce faire, les États-Unis ont décidé de mettre fin à la progression de l’État islamique. Armer les Kurdes ou d’autres minorités irakiennes au détriment des islamistes sunnites se présente, à l’évidence, comme un renversement complet de politique.

En effet, le Kurdistan armé menace la Turquie, alliée traditionnelle de l’Amérique. D’autre part, il s’avère totalement illusoire de limiter l’avance djihadiste sans s’appuyer sur la Syrie de Bachar-el-Assad. Enfin, comment contenir l’essor islamiste sunnite sans le soutien de l’Iran ? Au cours des derniers mois, les États-Unis se sont ostensiblement rapprochés de l’Iran tout en prenant leurs distances par rapport à Israël.

Ce mouvement s’est aujourd’hui accéléré. Les États-Unis ménagent toutefois leur allié saoudien, terrorisé par la menace d’un État islamique pouvant le faire voler en éclats. Ils n’ont d’ailleurs pas émis de protestation à l'encontre des bombardements saoudiens en Libye, Etat destiné à devenir la métastase nord-africaine de l’EI.

Le choix du réalisme

Le choix par les États-Unis d’une politique réaliste au Moyen-Orient, qui est en train de prendre de court l’ensemble des chancelleries européennes, se traduit par un nouvel équilibre dont les éléments majeurs sont les suivants :

    ♦ La Turquie, menacée à l’Est par le Kurdistan armé est fragilisée en raison de son soutien aux islamistes syriens et libyens.

    ♦ Israël, qui a le plus grand mal à stabiliser la bande de Gaza, peut tenter de jouer l’alliance avec l’Égypte afin de se présenter comme un glacis empêchant la connexion entre le Califat Irakien et son émirat Libyen.

    ♦ L’antagonisme entre le Qatar et l’Arabie Saoudite est exacerbé.

    ♦ Enfin, de nouveaux rapports vont se nouer entre les puissances géoculturelles que sont l’Iran et la Russie, qui ont misé triomphalement sur une politique réaliste du temps long, et l'Amérique de l'après État-islamique.

August 13, 2014: Strategy Page

Hamas hoped for a big popularity boost by taking on Israel again. Didn’t work out that way. While there is a lot of sympathy for the Palestinian civilians in Gaza, Hamas is getting no love. It’s gotten so bad that even when Israel bombed mosques that Hamas has been using to store rockets or fire rockets from there were no protests even in Moslem countries. Hamas appears to be suffering from the Al Qaeda Disease. This happens when an Islamic terrorist group gets a lot of Moslems killed and seems to have no realistic agenda to justify the lives it so enthusiastically snuffs out. Hamas should have seen this coming as what is happening to them is just another case of Islamic terrorist groups suffering a big drop in popularity even among Moslems. This was also seen happening with Iraqi Islamic terrorists (ISIL or Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) who, for the second time since 2007, suffered a major dip in approval ratings because of their seemingly pointless brutality.

Back in 2007 it was the "Al Qaeda In Iraq" leadership that was out of control. Back then opinion polls in Moslem countries showed approval and support of al Qaeda plunging, in some cases into single digits. Thus after the 2003 invasion of Iraq al Qaeda managed to take itself from hero to zero in less than four years. Since that low point al Qaeda recovered somewhat but that kinder and gentler approach did not last and by 2013 the Iraqi al Qaeda (now rebranded as ISIL) was again losing popular support. That was quite visible in 2014 when ISIL seized control of parts of Iraq and promptly slaughtered captured Iraqi soldiers and police, mainly because these men were Shia. ISIL put videos of these mass killings on the Internet.

Then ISIL declared the parts of Syria and Iraq it controlled were the new Moslem caliphate. Naturally the ISIL leaders are running this new caliphate and are calling on all Moslems to follow them. Most Moslems have responded, according to recent opinion polls, by expressing greater fear rather than more admiration for Islamic terrorist groups, especially ISIL. In the meantime (earlier in 2014) al Qaeda leadership condemned ISIL as completely out of control and not to be trusted or supported.

In the last year opinion polls show Moslems becoming more hostile to Islamic terrorists, seeing them as a cause for concern not as defenders of Islam. The same thing happened back in 2007 and now, when Hamas began getting more aggressive towards Israel in June of 2014 they found that there Hama was now considered as pointless, and dangerous to Moslems, as ISIL

When al Qaeda showed up in the 1990s as a post-Afghanistan international Islamic terrorist organization they were popular to Moslems in proportion to how far away the al Qaeda violence was. Once al Qaeda began killing people nearby Moslems tended to change their minds and disliked the Islamic terrorists. In 2013 37 percent of Turks were concerned about Islamic terrorism while now it is 50 percent thanks to increased ISIL violence on the Syrian border and some inside Turkey itself. In 2013 54 percent of the people in Jordan were concerned versus 62 percent for the same reason. In Lebanon, where the Syrian violence spilled over quickly after 2011 last year 81 percent were concerned about Islamic terrorism versus 92 percent today.

The hostility towards al Qaeda in the region has tainted all forms of Islamic radicalism, including the Shia ones (especially Hezbollah in Lebanon). Yet once Islamic terrorism disappears again (as it does regularly) many Moslems will get nostalgic for those legendary warriors seeking to defend Islam. This is a cycle many Moslems would like to break, but so far the cycle of violence persists.

Containers of bleach reagents sit aboard the container ship MV Cape Ray in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Virginia, Jan. 11, 2014. U.S. Navy Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Isaiah Sellers

13.08.2014 par Philippe Chapleau – Lignes de Défense

Le navire US Cape Ray qui croise en Méditerranée, a réalisé la destruction de 581 tonnes de produits chimiques (du "methylphosphonyl difluoride" selon un communiqué de l'OIAC) entrant dans la composition du gaz sarin. Cette opération réalisée au moyen de deux unités mobiles de destruction (des "Field Deployable Hydrolysis Systems"), sous la supervision des inspecteurs de l'OIAC, va se poursuivre avec la destruction de 19,8 tonnes de gaz moutarde.

Les résidus liquides sont conservés à bord et seront déchargés en Allemagne et en Finlande où ils seront, à leur tour détruits.

On consultera ici les pages spéciales consacrées au Cape Ray.

ISIL source war news updates

August 12, 2014: Strategy Page

The growing power of Sunni Islamic terrorist group ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in the last year has caused the Saudis and Iranians to pause their growing Sunni-Shia feud because both countries have more to fear from ISIL and its rabid brand of Sunni Islamic terrorism than from each other. Signs of this unofficial truce can be seen in several ways. Saudi Arabia has backed off on its anti-Iran propaganda and is quietly cooperating with Iran to deal with ISIL advances in Syria and Iraq. Iran reciprocated when it recently ordered the shutdown of several semi-legal satellite TV channels run by some rabidly anti-Sunni (but high ranking) Shia clerics. The Saudis were not happy with these unofficial satellite TV operations but what prompted the most senior Iranian leaders (the clerics that actually run the Iranian religious dictatorship) to shut these operations down was a complaint from the leader of Hezbollah that this sort of TV programming was making life more difficult for Shia in Lebanon. While Shia Moslems like to believe that their form of Islam is the best one, they also have to live (or die) with the fact that only about ten percent of all Moslems are Shia and 80 percent are Sunni.

The Shia have always been playing defense against the more numerous Sunni and radical Sunni groups like ISIL are particularly dangerous. ISIL (al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria) began as Iraqi Sunni Arab nationalists who lost their jobs, power and wealth when Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party were overthrown in early 2003. Saddam Hussein was a secular dictator, who tolerated Islamic terrorists if they attacked his enemies and behaved while hiding out in Iraq. After Saddam’s forces were thrown out of Kuwait in 1991 his policy changed and he declared that he was actually religious and he backed Sunni Islamic terrorist groups as long as they helped him keep the Shia Arab majority of Iraq under control. Sunni Islamic terrorists were willing to do this because Sunni conservatives consider Shia heretics worthy only of torture and death. The Iraqi Shia had staged a major rebellion against Saddam right after Saddam’s army get chewed up trying to hang onto Kuwait in 1991. That rebellion festered throughout the 1990s. Saddam and his key associates developed relationships with Sunni tribal leaders and Sunni Islamic terrorist groups, who had for decades been forced to keep their heads down. Once Saddam was out of power in 2003 the Sunni tribes and Islamic terrorists lost the financial and military support Saddam provided for over a decade. The Sunni Arab minority (about 20 percent of Iraqis) also lost control of the Iraq economy and all that oil money. This came as a big shock. Many of these Sunni Arabs wanted their wealth and power back and were willing to do anything to accomplish that task. That led to support for Islamic terrorist groups. The Sunni Arab minority in what is now Iraq has long dominated the area and feels that this domination is a right and a responsibility. They were always wealthier, better educated, more organized and prone to ruthlessness. By merging with Islamic terrorists they acquired the belief they had divine approval for their goals.

ISIL began as ISI (Islamic State in Iraq) in 2004 and was one of many Sunni Islamic terrorist groups operating in Iraq back then. By 2010 ISI was almost destroyed due to U.S. efforts, especially getting many Sunni tribes to turn against the Islamic terrorist groups. But after U.S. forces left in 2011 the Iraqi government failed to follow U.S. advice to take good care of the Sunni tribes, if only to keep the tribes from again supporting the Islamic terrorist groups. Instead the Shia led government turned against the Sunni population and stopped providing government jobs and regular pay for many of the Sunni tribal militias. Naturally many Sunni Arabs went back to supporting terror groups, especially very violent ones like ISI.

After 2011, as the Iraqi Shia were turning on the Sunni Arab minority, there was a rebellion against a minority Shia government in Syria, led by the Sunni Arab majority there. The Sunni tribes of western Iraq were linked by culture and sometimes family links with the Sunni tribes of eastern Syria. The rebellion in Syria got ISI thinking about forming a new Islamic Sunni state out of eastern Syria, western Iraq, Baghdad (historically the seat of Sunni power in the area, despite it now being half Shia) and Mosul. Actually this also includes Lebanon and all of Iraq, but this was kept quiet initially. This decision had ISI spending a lot more time and effort recruiting in western Iraq after 2011. ISIL was created in 2013 when ISI sought to become the dominant rebel group in Syria by persuading men, especially foreigners, from other Islamic terrorist groups fighting in Syria to join a new, united Islamic terrorist group called ISIL. This caused problems because of the harsh way ISIL treated civilians and anyone who opposed them. ISIL relished the publicity their atrocities received. But al Qaeda knew from bitter experience (in Iraq from 2006-2008) that the atrocities simply turned the Islamic world against you. The bad relations between ISIL and all the other Islamic radicals in Syria reached a low point in June 2013 when the head of al Qaeda (bin Laden successor Ayman al Zawahiri) declared the recent merger of the new (since January 2013) Syrian Jabhat al Nusra (JN) with ISIL unacceptable and ordered the two groups to remain separate. That was because the merger was announced by ISI/ISIL without the prior agreement of JN leadership. Many JN members then left their JN faction to join ISIL. JN leaders saw this as a power grab by ISI/ISIL and most of the JN men who left to join ISIL were non-Syrians. Many of these men had worked with ISI before and thought they were joining a more powerful group. A month later al Qaeda declared ISIL outcasts and sanctioned the war against them. By January 2014 this had turned into all-out war between ISIL and the other rebel groups in Syria.

That was not the first time al Qaeda has had to slap down misbehaving Iraqi Islamic terror groups and won’t be the last. But it’s not a problem unique to Iraq. It is a problem for Saudi Arabia because the Saudis finance al Nusra and some of the other Islamic terrorist rebels in Syria that are now at war with ISIL. To the Saudis such support is the lesser of two evils as ISIL is crippling rebel efforts to overthrow the Assad government. This is also part of the ideological war the Saudis (and most other Sunni Moslems) are fighting with Shia Iran (and its Shia allies the Assads and the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon). Meanwhile the Saudis continue crushing the Sunni Islamic terrorists that try to attack them at home. This includes local members of ISIL. All this sounds somewhat bizarre, with Saudi Arabia funding missionaries that create Islamic terrorists who become uncontrollable and seek to overthrow the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Absurd it may be, but it is a familiar pattern in this part of the world where religion and politics have long been intertwined in absurd and tragic ways.

Aug. 11, 2014 By Richard Tomkins (UPI)

The U.S. Defense Department says neutralization of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile is more than 70 percent complete.

More than 70 percent of Syria's surrendered chemical weapons have reportedly been neutralized by specialists aboard a U.S. container ship in the Mediterranean.

The U.S. Department of Defense said a field-deployable hydrolysis system is being used in the neutralization effort to neutralize Syrian chemicals by essentially mixing the chemicals with water and sodium hypochlorite bleach.

A total of 74.2 percent of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile has now been rendered harmless under international agreements -- including a U.N. Security Council resolution -- following reports that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had used such weapons in 2013 in an effort to quell insurrection in the country.

The destruction process began in early July. The original chemical cargo from Syria was about 600 tons of methylphosphonyl difluoride, the main precursor of sarin and other nerve agents, and 20 tons of mustard gas.

The neutralized chemical agents are not dumped at sea. They are transported in containers to commercial waste-treatment facilities.