14th April 2014  – by Sven Biscop * - europeangeostrategy.org

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) events can seem a touch religious. One congregates to profess one’s belief in the Holy Alliance. And because it is holy, there is little tolerance for heretics. Making my way to the Transformation Seminar 2014, organised in Paris by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) on 7th-9th April, I had reason to look over my shoulder for religious zealots. For I had just published a policy brief about NATO’s upcoming Wales Summit, in which almost as an aside I had actually questioned the continued relevance of ACT. I need not have feared, however.

The crisis in Ukraine naturally dominated the conversation at the seminar. Because of the crisis, of its three core tasks of collective defence, expeditionary crisis management, and cooperative security and partnerships, NATO will again put more emphasis on the first. Defence of the alliance’s territory and the security guarantee offered by Article 5 will be the main focus of the NATO apparatus for some time to come.

That does not mean that NATO will no longer do crisis management, but as a consequence in many future non-Article 5 contingencies the European Union (EU) may be the institution that will be called upon to take the lead, as it is doing already in its broader southern neighbourhood. Therefore NATO must be able to offer the EU reliable support in terms of command and control. In other words, the Berlin Plus Agreement, which ought to give the EU (or de facto even an ad hoc coalition led by European states, as in Libya) guaranteed access to NATO headquarters, must be revived.

When it comes to the capabilities which European interventions require, the current crisis will hopefully create a sense of urgency in the implementation of the European Council conclusions on defence of December 2013. Given the meagre results of NATO’s Smart Defence initiative (if one discounts projects that were retroactively stamped with the Smart Defence label), the EU does indeed seem the more promising avenue for multinational programmes to address European capability shortfalls. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) could incorporate these collective European initiatives, including the contributions from non-NATO EU Member States.

Finally, a lot more political consultation between the EU and NATO is necessary, in the first place about our strategy for our eastern neighbourhood.

I thought this was just my heretical thinking, but all of the above was put forward by senior American voices. Suddenly my heresy has been adopted by the largest diocese in the church (which has undoubtedly found the light of its own accord – I dare not attribute its conversion to my scriptures).

This conversion is perfectly rational. Russia remains far too weak to be a strategic competitor of the United States (US). It can only be a spoiler that distracts US attention from what it perceives as the real strategic competitor: China. However, the US can only focus on China and Asia to the extent that the European continent is secure – that is a vital American interest. Therefore the US has to engage with the crisis in Ukraine, making it clear that Article 5 offers as strong a guarantee as ever, to give its European allies and partners the self-confidence for resolute diplomacy. But the US’ undivided attention we will never again have. The focus on Asia has just been reaffirmed in the latest Quadrennial Defence Review. And thus the US still expects that Europeans themselves take the lead in addressing all security problems short of Article 5 in their own broader neighbourhood.

That puts even more pressure on Europe to deliver – and rightly so.

Oh, and I am still not convinced of the continued relevance of ACT.

* Prof. Sven Biscop is a Senior Editor of European Geostrategy. He is also Director of the ‘Europe in the World Programme’ at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels. He writes here in a personal capacity.

The Afghan presidential election that took place on 5 April marks the first democratic transition of power since current President Hamid Karzai took office. It also represents an important milestone for Afghanistan and for international actors operating in the country since the fall of the Taliban. The elections were of particular significance for the US, with Washington having been the primary driver of international engagement – military and otherwise – in the country for over a decade.

Washington views the Afghan elections from the vantage point of post-Karzai US-Afghan relations but, perhaps more importantly, also against the backdrop of shifting strategic and domestic priorities, which renders Afghanistan less central to the country´s foreign policy than it once was. Still, the election and its outcome promises clarity on the future of US troop strength – and their purpose – in the years to come. This, in turn, will determine the future presence of both NATO and the EU as well.

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04.04.2014 Par Olivier Berger, grand reporter à La Voix du Nord - Défense Globale

Le mardi 8 avril de 18 h à 20 h, amphi B7 de l'université Lille III au Pont de Bois à Villeneuve-d'Ascq, une conférence consacrée aux drones : considérations tactiques, industrielles, légales et éthiques. Avec le colonel Christophe Fontaine, commandant de l'escadron de drones 1/33 Belfort et le lieutenant-colonel Jérôme de Lespinois, responsable de programme à l'IRSEM.

Le jeudi 17 avril à 18 h, salle du conseil privé de l'hôtel de ville de Lille : Côte d'Ivoire, Libye, Mali, l'hélicoptère au cœur des opérations. Avec le colonel Pierre Verborg, chef du bureau emploi opérationnel aéromobile de la division aéronautique du Commandement des forces terrestres.

Entrée libre sans inscription.

Mise à jour par la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l’UE

Mise à jour par la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l’UE

Pakistan will arguably be the most crucial regional player in post-2014 Afghanistan. Close religious and cultural links notwithstanding, its links to the Taliban give Islamabad considerable leverage and influence over any peace process. However, the protection and support granted to insurgent groups ­operating in Afghanistan over the past decade has had unintended domestic consequences for Pakistan, with the growing number of terrorist attacks now posing a ­significant threat to the country’s internal stability. Failure to reach a political settlement in Kabul is therefore likely to have a spill-over effect that would further weaken Islamabad’s ability to contain extremist groups operating inside Pakistan.

Despite the complexity of US-Pakistan relations, a complete US withdrawal by the end of 2014 – with the concomitant risk of a security vacuum developing along Pakistan’s border – is not in Islamabad’s interest. However, the implications of even a reduced transatlantic footprint are bound to contribute to a reckoning with extremism, and the forces that encourage it, inside Pakistan itself.

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The EU-US Summit on 26 March will mark eight months since the partners decided to formally launch negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The aim of the TTIP – if finalised – is to remove tariffs, align regulatory standards and open up government procurement. Born out of the need to boost economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic and to respond to the rise of emerging markets, the Partnership will add an extra €120 billion to the EU economy annually, according to estimates by the European Commission. While President Obama’s first visit to Brussels will likely be dominated by an agenda focusing on Ukraine and economic recovery, it is also worth thinking about some of the more sensitive areas involved in the TTIP discussions.

One such area relates to defence industry and markets. Back in June 2013, public procurement of defence and security goods was included in the Commission’s negotiating mandate. Given the sensitive nature of defence procurement, however, both sides have, for the time being, agreed to drop a ‘defence TTIP’. This situation is indicative of a broader negotiating environment that has seen a moratorium on including an investment chapter in the Partnership and other sectoral exclusions. Therefore, at first glance, the TTIP’s overarching aims of abolishing tariffs, enhancing the compatibility of the EU and US regulatory environment and ensuring a greater flow of goods, services and investments in the transatlantic space will not apply to the defence sector. But is this necessarily the end of the story?

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Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to India from 12-15 December 2013 – during which he requested greater defence and security cooperation in the years to come – underscored the close bilateral ties between the two countries. President Karzai’s attempt to enlist regional allies in support of a stable post-2014, post-transition Afghanistan also raises questions about the extent to which Afghanistan’s neighbours are prepared to modify their engagement in the near future.

The bilateral relationship between India and Afghanistan has deep historical and geographical roots. Yet, to date, India’s engagement in Afghanistan has mainly centred on civilian contributions and economic development. This is partly due to Pakistani resistance and fears over India’s growing regional influence. Possible developments in the relationship with Islamabad will therefore have a bearing on India´s future Afghanistan policy – and vice versa.

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Mise à jour par la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l’UE

The benefits of an open and accessible internet for growth and development have been acknowledged on numerous occasions. But as the potential of the digital economy for fostering innovation and creating new business opportunities grows, so too do the difficulties with protecting it. In February 2014, the EEAS presented the Friends of the Presidency on Cyber Issues with a Food for Thought Paper (‘Further Strengthening European Cyber Diplomacy’). According to the document, ‘the EU and its Member States should be in a position to present a coherent and comprehensive suite of policies which keep pace with the ever shifting international landscape, taking into account the strategic policy goals of other actors in the field’.

Strategic engagement with key regional partners is central to securing the Union’s economic and political interests. It is therefore useful to clarify the scope of existing (as well as potential) cooperation with the EU’s main strategic partners, especially those with regional influence, i.e. the United States, Brazil, South Korea, Singapore, South Africa, China, Egypt and India. Structured cyber consultations with Washington, Beijing and Delhi are already in place, and other less formal cyber dialogues – with South Korea and Brazil among others – are also underway.

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With every new major international crisis, it does not take long for diplomats and observers to start wondering ‘what does China think?’. This is also true for the Crimean crisis. A few days into the crisis, the Russian foreign ministry announced that the Chinese and Russians shared ‘broadly coinciding points of view’ on the situation.

Looking to China for reassurance is driven by many factors. The rise of China as a global power is just one. China is often seen as a sort of ‘swing’ power, capable of tipping the political balance between entrenched political warriors whose preferences are already well known. In this sense, China’s reaction is not always predictable. After the 2008 Russia-Georgian war the Chinese maintained a stance of public politeness towards Russia but, in private, were clearly against the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia – thereby helping Central Asian countries resist alleged Russian pressures to recognise the independence of those entities.

Hence the rush by Russia to claim Chinese support for its actions in Ukraine – in a bid to claim greater legitimacy for its military invasion of a post-Soviet state. However, the claim that China is on Russia’s side is spurious.

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