Overblog
Suivre ce blog Administration + Créer mon blog
6 août 2014 3 06 /08 /août /2014 12:35
 Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper 2014)

 

source Japan MoD

 

CONTENTS

 
Digest
 
Part I: Security Environment Surrounding Japan

 

Chapter 1 Defense Policies of Countries


Chapter 2 Issues in the International Community
 
Part II: Japan's Security and Defense Policy
 
Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense Policy
Chapter 2 Organizations Responsible for Japan's Security and Defense
Chapter 3 National Security Strategy
Chapter 4 New National Defense Program Guidelines
Chapter 5 Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
 
Part III: Initiatives of Defense of Japan
 
Chapter 1 Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People and Secure the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace
Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Chapter 3 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation
 
Part IV: Bases to Demonstrate Defense Capabilities
 
Chapter 1 Measures on Defense Equipment, such as the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
Chapter 2 Relationship between the Japanese People and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF
Partager cet article
Repost0
7 mai 2013 2 07 /05 /mai /2013 16:35
Breaking Down Australia’s Defense White Paper 2013

May 07, 2013 By Rory Medcalf - thediplomat.com

 

Australia has set out to define its military strategy -- with China and the U.S. very much in mind. Rory Medcalf from the Lowy Institute gives us his take.

 

In an increasingly contested Asia, with China rising and America rebalancing, middle powers are struggling to redefine their defense strategies.  One such player, Australia, has now done so in a way that seeks to reconcile its extensive national interests with a close U.S. alliance, a web of new Asian security partners and a relationship of mutual respect with China.

It almost succeeds, but stumbles on a critical factor – money.  The current Australian Labor government is underspending on defense and so far the conservative opposition – likely to win power in an election due this September – is not promising much more.

Four years ago, the then Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd launched a defense white paper amid furious concern about China’s destabilizing rise. A much stronger Australian Defence Force was promised with new-generation submarines, cruise missiles, and joint strike fighters. This blunt document and its unusually clumsy diplomatic handling added to a drumbeat of political mistrust between Australia and its largest customer.

But a lack of credible budgeting undermined this vision of projected Australian firepower, and Canberra was caught committing the cardinal sin of statecraft: speaking loudly whilst carrying a small stick, the opposite of Teddy Roosevelt’s dictum.

With a quite different defense white paper launched last Friday, successor Prime Minister Julia Gillard treads a notably more cautious line, declaring that Australia "does not approach China as an adversary." China is listed this time as a military partner, complete with bilateral exercises, confidence-building dialogue and even an Australia-China Military Culture and Friendship week. 

The document builds on Ms. Gillard’s optimistic narrative of a prosperous ‘Asian Century’. It offers some even-handed and sophisticated appraisals of U.S.-China relations, and some acknowledgement of the need to watch for and manage risk, but does not fully convey how the Asian strategic environment is deteriorating and the possibilities of conflict rising.

So whereas the Chinese saw the Rudd plan as a red rag, it is tempting to caricature Australia’s new strategy as raising a white flag.

That is certainly not fair: alliance commitments still feature fundamentally in Canberra’s military strategy. The white paper says Australia will uphold a rules based-order, is prepared "to conduct conventional combat operations to counter aggression or coercion against our partners," and commits to buying electronic warfare aircraft that could help in such a contingency.

It also confirms steps to use Australian territory in support of the Obama Administration’s Asia pivot, beyond the presence of Marines in Darwin. Notably, airfields in northern Australia and the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean will be upgraded. This needs to be done for Australia aircraft anyway, notably the new P-8A Poseidon fleet currently being acquired, but will open the way to their possible future use by the U.S. military.

Notably, the white paper rejects the idea, advanced by prominent scholar and former official Hugh White, that Australia will somehow have to choose between the United States and China, and emphasizes the likelihood that those powers will succeed in avoiding major conflict.

The white paper also redraws the map of Australian security in a way that may not appeal to Beijing. It makes Australia the first country officially to define its region of strategic interest as the Indo-Pacific. This in itself is not an anti-China move, since the Indo-Pacific is above all an objective description of the super-region in which China is rising, given its large economic, energy and diplomatic equities across the Indian Ocean. And it is a natural fit with Australia’s two-ocean geography and the increasing attention being paid to resources development and military infrastructure in the country’s sparsely-populated north and west.

Still, like the multilateral forums which Australia’s new security policy also endorses (such as the East Asia Summit), this bold promotion of a broad Indo-Pacific canvas may discomfort Beijing insofar as it dilutes China’s influence and cements India’s place in the Asian power game.

From a diplomatic point of view, Canberra’s new document is an admirable balance between affirming alliance ties and not unduly insulting China. Indeed, defense diplomacy is one of the paper’s big themes, with pages devoted to how Australia’s small military is busy deepening constructive engagement all around the region, from Indonesia to India to Vietnam and Japan as well as China.

Yet it is hard to the escape the suspicion that one reason diplomacy gets such a big run in a supposedly military document is that it is much cheaper than preparing for war. For the worst-kept secret of Australian defense policy is that the fiscal cupboard is pretty much bare. The Australian economy has done much better than most developed economies in the post-financial crisis era, but the government still faces a serious budget deficit and a long list of domestic spending priorities in an election year.

This cut-price approach will make it increasingly hard for Australia to possess the cutting-edge forces it would need to contribute substantially to high-end contingencies alongside the United States in Asia. Moreover, highly constrained defense spending is at odds with the white paper’s expansive view of Australia’s national interests and military tasks – from stabilizing South Pacific nations to patrolling the Indo-Pacific commons and protecting the nation’s vast territories and offshore resources.

Last year Defense Minster Stephen Smith pointed to Pentagon austerity post Afghanistan as a precedent for Australia to extract its own peace dividend. This line was too clever by half.

While U.S. military spending is coming down from the unsustainable heights of  4.7% of GDP, Australia’s has hovered at 1.8% since 2001. Last year this was slashed to just 1.56% of GDP, its lowest level since the 1930s.

Australia is resigning itself to a European level of defense spending in a turbulent Indo-Pacific Asia where most military budgets are rising and competitive arms modernization is well advanced. This developed country risks letting its technology edge erode and its strategic weight slip away.

Whilst both sides of Australian politics claim to aspire to an eventual return to defense spending around 2% of GDP, neither is making that a priority.  

In particular, Australia is showing itself in no rush to acquire new submarines, even though it says it will press ahead with building 12 to replace its troubled fleet of six.

In the absence of strengthened maritime capabilities any time soon, Australia is starting to realize the alliance value of its strategic real estate.  An American space-tracking radar is being set up in Western Australia, increased rotations of U.S. bombers through Australian airfields are likely, and greater U.S. Navy access to Australia’s Indian Ocean coast may be next.

But a latent uncertainty in all of this may lie in what Australians think. There is already wariness among Australian elites as to how integrated the U.S. and Australian militaries should become. Even the most pro-alliance voices would naturally want Australia to have a say before it found itself at war.

Polling by Australian think tank the Lowy Institute shows that 55 percent of Australians are comfortable with U.S. bases in their country. But nobody knows for sure how Australians would feel if such bases became launch-pads for action in an Asian century gone wrong. So rather than resolving the nation’s security uncertainties, the new policy document confirms how difficult this will be to manage in the years ahead.

Rory Medcalf is director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute, Sydney. Follow him on Twitter: @Rory_Medcalf

Partager cet article
Repost0
26 avril 2013 5 26 /04 /avril /2013 11:55
Pourquoi il ne faut (presque) rien attendre du Livre blanc...

 

26 Avril 2013 Jean-Dominique Merchet

 

Le document sera publié lundi.

 

Au risque de casser l'ambiance, déjà bien plombée, le Livre blanc de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (LBDSN) risque de décevoir tous ceux qui en attendent une nouvelle vision et un nouvel élan. Après plus de neuf mois de travaux, dans une ambiance qu'on a connu meilleure, le LBDSN doit être rendu public par l'Elysée ce lundi 29 avril, comme nous l'annoncions.

Aucune des grandes orientations de notre défense ne sera remise en cause et, au final, on se demande bien pourquoi tant d'énergie a été dépensée pour le rédiger. Car les grands arbitrages politiques - ceux qui auraient pu bouleverser notre politique de défense et de sécurité - ont été rendu bien avant sa publication. Etat des lieux.

 

1) La dissuasion nucléaire. Le 22 décembre 2011, le candidat François Hollande publie un texte dans le Nouvel Observateur dans lequel il annonce son intention de maintenir la dissuasion nucléaire, dans ses deux composantes. Ce texte, d'une très grande fidelité à la doctrine française, est une surprise et clos définitivement le débat... avant qu'il ne commence. Toujours candidat, François Hollande se rend en visite à l'Ile Longue et à peine élu, il plonge à bord d'un SNLE. Puis lors de son intervention télévisée du 28 mars, il réitère son attachement à la dissuasion et confirme sa "modernisation". Ite missa est. La messe est dite.  C'est un non-sujet pour le LBDSN.

 

2) Les alliances et l'Otan. La France, revenue dans le commandement intégré de l'Otan en 2009, y restera. Discrete sur ce sujet, clivant à gauche, durant la campagne, l'équipe Hollande n'a jamais envisagé de revenir sur la décision de Nicolas Sarkozy. Habilement, le chef de l'Etat a demandé à Hubert Védrine, qui ne passe pas pour un atlantiste forcené, de rédiger un rapport sur le sujet et l'ancien ministre de conclure qu'il était urgent de ne rien changer... Même continuité en matière européenne, où l'enthousiasme initial se heurte à l'inertie continentale...  Idem pour nos accords de défense et partenariats stratégiques qui, tous, se poursuivent. Autant de non-sujets pour le LBDSN.

 

3) Le type d'armée. Le tournant radical a été celui de la professionnalisation des forces en 1996. Ce modèle d'armée n'est pas remis en cause et aucun retour à une forme de conscription ou d'un nouveau lien entre l'armée et la nation n'est envisagé. Non-sujet pour le LBDSN.

 

4) Les opérations extérieures. L'annonce d'un retrait accéléré d'Afghanistan et l'accent mis sur les Nations Unies pouvaient laisser croire qu'une nouvelle doctrine allait prévaloir, moins interventionniste et plus prudente. A partir de janvier, le Mali a fait la démonstration de l'exact contraire ! Rarement les militaires français sont intervenus avec une telle latitude pour détruire les enemis du pays... Les Opex continuent. Non-sujet pour le LBDSN.

 

5) Le niveau des dépenses militaires. Après bien des scénarios catastrophes et de jolis bras de fer, le chef de l'Etat a tranché en mars. Il n'y aura pas de baisse brutale du budget de la défense et les crédits de 2013 seront reconduits en 2014, avant de retrouver une légère croissance jusqu'en 2019. Le choix stratégique est clair, mais là plus qu'ailleurs, le diable se niche dans les détails (nous y reviendrons vite...). Sujet pour le LBDSN, mais sujet déjà tranché. Quant aux détails, il faudra attendre... de connaitre l'évolution de la situation économique des prochains mois et années.

 

Sur ces 5 sujets, les grands choix sont d'ores et déjà connus. Le LBDSN va simplement les mettre en forme, en réservant peut-être une ou deux (petites) surprises ou innovations. On sait, comme ce blog l'a raconté, que le contrat opérationnel des armées sera revu à la baisse, que l'accent sera mis sur la cyberdéfense, que l'on réduira, sans trop l'afficher, nos ambitions dans l'antimissile, que l'on insistera sur l'outre-mer et l'Afrique. Le tout fera une bonne centaine de pages.

Partager cet article
Repost0
2 février 2012 4 02 /02 /février /2012 08:25
Thales welcomes pragmatic Defence & Security White Paper



01 February 2012 Thales UK

In an era when Government funding is in decline, technologies are evolving at record speeds and Britain aspires to maintain its leading international role, it’s clear that the UK approach to acquisition and technology needs to be brought up to date.

We therefore welcome the clarity that the White Paper brings, and support the use of competition and ‘off the shelf’ acquisition, which is a pragmatic recognition of the approach that Thales has taken on many of its UK programmes. Critical to the delivery of this approach is the Government’s recognition of the importance of UK-based systems integration skills and key technologies that provide the battle-winning edge.

On the ground in Afghanistan, both the military and the Exchequer have benefited from Thales UK’s ability to fit ‘military off the shelf’ solutions to UK forces’ needs. Whether in Armoured Vehicles such as Mastiff or UAVs like the Hermes 450 (which has flown over 50,000 hours in support of operations in theatre) recent experience demonstrates the feasibility of combining an international supply chain with domestic integration skills to deliver battle-winning capability. What matters to the soldier on the ground is not where a piece of kit was manufactured, but whether it delivers the capability he needs.

UK Armed Forces must have unique capabilities which give them an edge in the field, on the seas, in the air and in cyberspace. The challenge going forward, however, is that the specific circumstances of each capability area vary wildly, frustrating one-size-fits-all approaches. We therefore look forward to working with Government to understand how the high level strategy laid out in this Paper will carefully be put into effect in a timely manner in each case.

The Paper also confirms the need to make special arrangements for a specific set of ‘strategic’ technologies, and the inclusion of capabilities like electronic warfare and cryptography highlights how C4ISR technologies are central to delivering ‘operational advantage’ in the 21st century.

Research and Technology underpins all of the UK’s Defence goals – responding to fast-changing threats in an agile way, improving export market share and performance, convergence with Security capabilities, and reorienting the economy towards advanced technology skills and manufacturing. Whilst the White Paper’s commitment to a consistent level of funding provides certainty, it is clear that this level will need to rise significantly above current levels if the UK is to achieve its broader goals.

Exports and strategic relationships are clearly critical in developing future capability and creating economies of scale, and Thales welcomes the commitment to Anglo-French collaboration as a key contributor in realising the UK’s ambitions at a time of constrained budgets.

Similarly, Government’s emphasis on the use of service-based solutions is an effective and pragmatic response to the decline in military headcount. This recognises the benefits generated through Contractor Support to Operations in recent years, and looks forward to the emerging Whole Force Concept where reservists and industry play greater roles supporting the military force.

Victor Chavez
Chief Executive
Thales UK

Partager cet article
Repost0

Présentation

  • : RP Defense
  • : Web review defence industry - Revue du web industrie de défense - company information - news in France, Europe and elsewhere ...
  • Contact

Recherche

Articles Récents

Categories