UK highlights Apache lessons learned

07 December - by Beth Stevenson – Shepard Group

UK Army Air Corps (AAC) Apache attack helicopter operations conducted in Libya this year could have been ‘enhanced’ by better command and control (C2) and intelligence from the ground, a senior British Army officer has admitted.

Speaking at the Air Power in Irregular Warfare conference at Farnborough on 30 November, Lt Col Paul Tennant, CO 3 Regt AAC, described the ‘Op Ellamy’ Apache mission as ‘hard work’ but described the aircraft as ‘absolutely fantastic’.

According to Tennant, there was, due to the chaotic nature of the conflict, a 'lack of really dependable intelligence' in Libya: 'It is extremely difficult to assess risk if you do not have decent intelligence. You end up depending more than you would like on educated hearsay and opinion,’ he said. Tennant also questioned C2 procedures, which need refinement if they are better to serve the needs of the Land environment.

During some four months of deployment to Libya, Apache airframes completed relatively few combat hours compared to Afghanistan for example, but they were much more intense missions and expended much larger quantities of ammunition, Tennant described. AAC Apaches conducted a total of some 25 strike missions and took out around 100 targets.

'The team achieved as much as they could militarily within the Rules of Engagement, against some unique and substantial challenges, but the strategic effect was disproportional', said Tennant. He added that it was a testament to both aircraft and crews that there had been 'no hits' on the Apache airframes.

He also described a steep learning curve for the operation, such as operating the Apache from a ship, which Tennant said was immensely demanding, especially in terms of developing new rearming and refuelling techniques on deck at night. 'There were huge lessons learned,' he said.

In terms of his concerns specific to the maritime environment, Tennant stated: 'The AH [attack helicopter] sinks like a stone', describing how it could lose buoyancy and sink within 16 seconds. He was keen that efforts are continued to develop a device to arrest the rate of sink, giving the crew more time to escape.  The explosive canopies on the doors could also kill the crew if completely submerged in the water, due to the greater efficiency with which blast is transferred; crews currently need to jettison the doors before the aircraft hits the water, but a non-explosive maritime equivalent would retain the option if already ditched.

In conclusion, Tennant praised the operation, in particular since it had been conducted without any significant US assistance.  He stated that a host of extremely valuable lessons had been learned, all of which have already been absorbed into ongoing work to prepare for a more general contingency mindset beyond Afghanistan.