USAF, Industry Eye Cost-Savings For GPS III

Lockheed Martin Concept

Jan 19, 2012 By Amy Butler - aviation week and space technology

Washington - Despite its programmatic progress and status as an acquisition reform program for the U.S. Air Force, GPS III—as with any other Pentagon project—is under the microscope and could be subject to funding cuts.

The budget environment at the Pentagon gives new meaning to the term “capture team,” which is used to describe the group assigned by a company to win a program. Many contractors say they feel they are in a perpetual “capture team” mode, constantly fighting not only to win programs, but to keep them once they have won the contract.

Despite cohesion in the Pentagon in May 2008 when Lockheed Martin beat Boeing for the $1.5 billion GPS III development contract, financial pressure on defense spending has prompted some to question the Air Force’s plan for modernizing the satellite constellation.

Late last year, defense officials said some budget drills had examined if the project could be scaled back in scope or delayed. One reason, say some GPS experts, is that the satellites in orbit are lasting longer than projected, possibly allowing for a delay to the 2014 launch date for the first GPS III satellite without jeopardizing service. A final budget plan will be unveiled by the Pentagon Feb. 6.

Others question the architectural approach for GPS III. U.S. Marine Corps Gen. (ret.) James Cartwright, until last year the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that while precision navigation and timing (PNT) is a critical mission for the military and global economy, pursuing a constellation of large, expensive satellites is overkill. He notes that with the emergence of the L1C signal, which is to be included on the GPS III design, U.S. data will be compatible with that of foreign satellites conducting the same mission. There is an opportunity for the U.S. to build fewer spacecraft and share the burden of responsibility with other countries, such as those in Europe that are pursuing the Galileo system, he says.

Further, Cartwright notes that the threat of high-power jammers drowning out GPS signals is expected to grow far sooner than the Air Force can field high-power spot beams capable of boosting the GPS signal in a small footprint; this capability was originally planned for a later increment of GPS III satellite. Cartwright says more focus should be put on crafting an integrated PNT architecture that does not solely rely on large satellites, which can be vulnerable to jamming or an anti-satellite attack. Such a concept would include aircraft payloads that can provide a localized capability if a satellite goes awry or boost signals in a region if operations require it.

Late last year, Boeing also proposed a way for the Pentagon to pull away from its GPS III commitment: It offered an unsolicited proposal to sell more GPS IIF satellites at the current prices. The company hoped to gain more profit from the program, which had not produced the revenue anticipated because of production issues and an early guarantee of a low price. Boeing has since withdrawn the offer, but there is pressure, nonetheless, on Lockheed to make good on its GPS III promises.

Despite its detractors, GPS III may have escaped a major reduction. Lockheed Martin, which won a $1.5 billion development contract (including the first two satellites) over Boeing nearly three years ago, last week was awarded a $238 million contract for satellites 3-4, a sign that support for the effort is still strong in the Pentagon. The company is meanwhile pushing hard to find ways to reduce the cost of fielding a constellation. Air Force Space Command chief Gen. William Shelton said last week that the Air Force has opted to take the unusual step of launching two GPS III satellites per booster “where it makes sense.”

Lockheed Martin and the United Launch Alliance had proposed “dual launch” for GPS III as a way to save money. In the past, Air Force officials have been reticent to put two critical payloads on one rocket for fear of a launch failure, but a flawless track record by the United Launch Alliance with its Atlas V and Delta IV families has boosted confidence.

The Air Force has looked at implementing the dual-launch concept with space vehicle (SV) 9, though Keoki Jackson, Lockheed Martin’s GPS III program director, says the company is postured to do it as soon as SV-5 around 2017. Col. Bernard Gruber, GPS program manger for the Air Force, notes that while fewer launch vehicles must be purchased, the service will have to invest to conduct dual command and control and ensure the launch facilities can process two payloads simultaneously.

Furthermore, in accordance with an Air Force request to reduce personnel costs, Lockheed has removed about 150 people from the program to lower expenses as it heads to a “production baseline” manning level, Jackson says.

The company is also trying save the Air Force hundreds of millions of dollars, Jackson says, by using as many common practices, processes and materials as possible for GPS III, which is based on the A2100 bus like the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space-Based Infrared System (Sbirs) satellites the Air Force is also buying. Lockheed was criticized for bloated costs in the AEHF and Sbirs programs.

An up-front investment in a GPS III pathfinder satellite, an engineering and development unit that is being built using actual production processes and tooling but will not be used for operations, is also helping keep costs down, Jackson says. Using this unit, the company has identified “tens of millions of dollars in savings” for the production units to follow at the Denver assembly line. The pathfinder also helped the company identify a signal-timing issue and flight software changes that need to be made before building the first production unit. Eventually, Lockheed will ship the pathfinder to the Air Force to conduct a rehearsal for satellite processing prior to launch, a measure also designed to reduce risk.

Nearly all of the parts for the first production satellite have been delivered, and assembly in Denver will begin in the summer, with the first flight navigation panel expected in the fall. Launch is scheduled for May 2014.

Meanwhile, the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are working out what capability improvements they should plan for future satellites. In 2008, the Air Force laid out a “back-to-basics” block upgrade plan for GPS III, including an A model (the baseline now being built) and B and C models, which would contain incremental upgrades.

They have since scrapped that plan and now refer to a yet-to-be-formed SV9+ plan. OSD is leading this analysis of alternatives. Such capabilities as a high-power spot beam capable of penetrating fierce jamming or multidirectional cross-links had been considered for the later increments, but the study is moving forward with an eye toward affordability.

Some satellites will include a new nuclear-detection system (placed on all GPS satellites to alert of a nuclear blast) and the Distress Alerting Satellite System, an improved emergency beacon locator system.

Meanwhile, Gruber says the program is exploring several ways to introduce additional new capabilities and remove them if a funding shortfall occurs.

The Air Force’s GPS constellation now includes 31 operational satellites of varying age and configuration, says Col. Harold Martin, who heads up PNT efforts at Air Force Space Command. In many cases, these spacecraft are far exceeding design expectations. Though they all transmit a “standard signal,” some have had failures over the years and are relying on redundant systems. Block IIAs have a design life of seven years, while the IIFs and IIRMs were built to last for at least 12 years. GPS III will be built for 15 years of operation.

Martin says that an analysis of alternatives of architectures to augment the GPS system if spacecraft malfunction or are subject to an attack should wrap up later this year.