15th, 2011 par faycal - algerie-focus.com

Le ministre français de la Défense, Gérard Longuet, est attendu à Alger avant la fin de l’année en cours, apprend-on auprès de source diplomatique.

Le responsable français effectuera une virée en Algérie dans le but d’appuyer les constructeurs militaires européens dans leur prospection sur le marché algérien.

Depuis plusieurs semaines, les responsables français tentent de convaincre leurs homologues algériens d’acquérir des armes françaises (Lire notre article), notamment les Frégates et les Corvettes, d’autant plus que le pays voisin, l’Allemagne, a réussi à se positionner sur le marché algérien en toute discrétion (Lire notre article), bousculant ainsi le fournisseur traditionnel du pays, la Russie (Lire notre article).

La visite de M. Longuet sera précédée par des visites de délégations militaires françaises qui tenteront de lui préparer le terrain.

15 July 2011 by Leon Engelbrecht – defenseWeb

There is something of a “Catch 22ⁱ” in arms acquisition. During times of peace it is argued that there are higher priorities than military preparedness, while on the outbreak of hostilities equipment may be unavailable because industry is not ready to manufacture, because of embargo or because the supplier state has need of the equipment itself.

South Africa has experience of each of these situations. In a Military Academy research paper titled The Union Defence Force between the two World Wars, 1919-1939, Lt Col Dr Ian van der Waag quotes the then-defence minister, Oswald Pirow, as saying in September 1938: “In spite of all its potential wealth, South Africa has much poverty and there is a definite upper limit to what the country is prepared to spend on defence.” He was tabulating factors that made South African participation in an international war unique. Other factors included that no section of the population was prepared to support a defence policy which aimed “exclusively at making soldiers out of the youth of the country”; the certainty that the Union or its nearest neighbours could never become the main theatre of a major war; and that due to its geographical position, South Africa's maximum effort will not have to be made until six months after the outbreak of hostilities. “This allowed a period for intensive preparation”. Pirow also noted the country's manpower resources when compared with those of even second-class powers were very limited, that its geographical position was such that large-scale gas or air attack on the civil population need not be seriously considered and the certainty that, “with hardly any conceivable exception, our troops would be called upon to fight a mobile war.”

The development and production of modern arms take ever longer. Author Clive Wilsworth in his excellent “First in, First Out, The South African Artillery in Action 1975-1988ⁱⁱ notes the GV5 and self-propelled (SP) GV6 was developed from a need identified in 1968 and formalised in 1973 “when the gunners set the requirements to modernise their equipment in line with the Army's upgrading programme”. Work began in 1974 under the rubric Project Boas. When Apartheid South Africa suddenly saw a need in late 1975 to intervene in Angola, neither system was ready and the South African Artillery had to rely on the 88mm towed quick-firing gun and the breech-loading towed 140mm howitzer. Both were outranged by the Soviet artillery available to the Cuban and Angolan MPLA forces, notably the BM21 multiple rocket launcher. Ironically, South Africa's own MLRS programme, Project Furrow, had also started in 1974. As with the tube artillery, this system was also nowhere near ready when hostilities commenced. Wilsworth wrote that the G5 was conceived in July 1976. The first three were delivered to the Artillery on May 21, 1982. The first battery was commissioned in October 1985 and deployed the next July-August during Operation Alpha Centauri. The G6 followed under Projects Buzzard and Zenula. Three pre-production models saw action as “Juliet Troop” during Operation Modular, in November 1987. Regarding the FV1 Visarend MLRS and the Valkiri rocket, Wilsworth added it is still a common misperception that the quest for rocket artillery only started after Operation Savannah, the 1975 intervention. “The massive firepower of the [MLRS] was already appreciated before the first contact in Angola.” The system entered service in 1979 with the first instructors' course held at Kentron South (later Denel Somchem and now part of RDM) in May 1979. The first use of the Valkiri in combat was in August 1981 during Operation Protea. All of these were “operationally urgent” requirements during a war situation when funding was less of an issue than otherwise.

Around the same time the South African Navy (SAN) would suffer major disappointment when on November 4, 1977 a United Nations Security Council armaments embargo came into effect against South Africa. The country had two years before ordered two D'Estienne d'Orves/Aviso A69-class corvettes and two Agosta-class submarines from France. Originally ordered for the French Navy, the corvettes were re-named the SAS Good Hope and SAS Transvaal while buildingⁱⁱⁱ. The South African ensign was hoisted on the Good Hope on September 17, 1977. The Agosta submarines were named SAS Astrant (Afrikaans, “cheeky”, “bold” or “impudent”) and SAS Adventurous. Both projects were progressing well when the embargo came into force and as a member of the UNSC France had no choice but to cancel both projects at the end of that month. The SAS Good Hope had its further sea trials suspended and was prohibited from leaving harbour. On November 7 the ship was moved upriver of the Scorff draw bridge in Lorient harbour – likely to prevent the crew from sailing the ship without authorisation – as the Israelis had done with their missile craft in the 1960s. The next day she and the Transvaal were embargoed when it was formally announced they would not be delivered. South African equipment and stores were removed from both – and the Agostas – and the project team and naval personnel in France were returned home by Christmas.^iv The submarines and ships were later respectively sold to Pakistan and Argentina – although Nigeria also showed interest in the ships. The SAS Astrant became S135 Hashmat, SAS Adventurous became S136 Hurmat, the SAS Good Hope became the ARA Drummond (P31) and the Transvaal the ARA Guerrico (P32).

The saga of the monitor HMS Erebus illustrates the last conundrum: when the supplier state has need of the equipment itself. In 1934, the Ministry of Defence took the decision to install 13-inch (325mm) coast defence guns on Robben Island to protect the approaches to Cape Town harbour. Under the same scheme, Durban would be fitted with nine-inch (225mm) ordnance. South Africa then approached the British Admiralty to provide the guns. Protracted negotiations followed, leading to a compromise in December 1938 in terms of which the British would loan South Africa the monitor, HMS Erebus, until the guns could be delivered and installed. With the South African Naval Service moribund, the Union Government (then headed by Prime Minister General JBM Hertzog) decided to designate the monitor a self contained artillery battery to be manned by the SA Army. She would be known as the Erebus Heavy Battery, Coastal Artillery Brigade. (A “monitor” is essentially a small hull fitted with battleship armament. The Erebus had been was built in 1916 under an emergency WW1 building programme, along with a sister, the Terror. Both served during that conflict and were used as training ships afterwards as a result of their limited utility. The Erebus was fitted with a single turret bearing two 15-inch 42-calibre weapons, the same as fitted to battleships such as the HMS Warspite. Her ship's company was 13 officers and 191 men on a hull displacing 8450mt.) A detachment was sent to Britain to master the ships’ guns and were to have sailed home with her in mid-August 1939. However, some repair work could not be completed in time and with war imminent – and South Africa’s position uncertain – the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, indefinitely postponed the departure. When Britain declared war, some of the South Africans did indeed refuse duty and demanded repatriation. South Africa declared war on September 6 after a Cabinet revolt during which Deputy Prime Minister Jan Smuts ousted Hertzog. Churchill now wished to retain the Erebus and South Africa received some 9-inch guns for Robben Island in her stead^v.

Thus one often has to make do with what is in the stores, or go without...

Of course, technology is not a panacea. Writing about the South African War (1899-1902), Douglas Porch noted that “technology and organisation were only adjuncts to, not substitutes for, inventive operational solutions”. Their firepower, which normally gave them 'an important, but by no means decisive, advantage' in colonial warfare was somewhat counter-weighted by the artillery of the two republics^vi.”

Paddy Griffith writes that beyond “the doctrines of offensive and the defensive, success in battle depends on the technical balance between the two sides in that battle^vii. Wars tend to bog down when conditions are such that an initially favourable attack is unable to finish off the enemy with a single blow. Often this is a matter of general strategy: for example, when too weak a force is deployed to attack too large an enemy. In other cases, however, the failure to win a decisive result will have more to do with the technical tactical balance than with the numerical or strategic one. In both WWI and the more recent Iran-Iraq War [1980-1988] the fighting bogged down because the tactical attacker was unable to sustain his momentum and mobility through the whole depth of the enemy's defences. His forces were too vulnerable when they moved, so they had to dig in and stay put. The tactical balance between two sides is decided by the relationship of four characteristics: fire-power, mobility, protection and the quality of the troops troops each side has deployed.”

Griffith continues that choosing the right new technology (NT) and tactics is never easy “and this is borne out by the 30 years before 1914. The problem was not that the general were stupid or lacked insight, but simply that they were faced with too many new weapons and potential technical innovations for sensible judgments to be made. In fact, the allegedly 'unimaginative' cavalry general Douglas Haig [by 1918 the commander of the British Expeditionary Force] was actually a pioneer in military aviation and motor transport before the war, and would later be sympathetic to the claims of the tank corps.”

NT often suffers from “gold plating”, where the designer or the project officer “wants to incorporate several new and desirable features into the new weapon. The result is that the complexity, difficulty and expense of designing the final version become so overwhelming that the basic original requirement is almost lost from view. And then during the work-up phase there will be teething troubles not just with one new technology but with several, and all at once. In many cases, such as the American attempt to produce an armoured divisional air defence system (DIVADS)^viii [between 1977 and 1985] … finding solutions to the technical problems involved become so expensive that the whole project has to be cancelled.”

Some technological solutions have an impact on organisational structure. Automation has reduced the size of vehicle and gun crews, saving labour in the primary function perhaps, but leaving the same crews short-handed when it comes to mounting guard, maintaining their equipment and changing tyres or fixing tracks. The infantry section still roughly musters ten, although up to three of these are now vehicle crew in the mechanised forces, reducing the dismount section to just seven. Furthermore, the strictures of the assigned vehicle means ten is generally a definitive upper number: it is generally the maximum number that can be carried by most infantry combat vehicles (ICV) or armoured personnel carrier (APC). These vehicles are cramped at the best of times, and when loaded for combat – with full stores of equipment, victuals and ammunition, can be completely jammed in.

The small starting size of the dismounted component of such a section should raise serious concern about the efficacy of this critical battlefield element, especially its ability to absorb casualties and stay in the fight. It bears recall it is these infantrymen who do the fighting in any army in every war. Every higher structure merely adds a leadership, administrative and support layers. Thus at company level one has nine sections and two layers, at the battalion 27 sections and three layers.

Seven section dismounts multiplies to 21 platoon dismounts, 63 company dismounts and just 189 battalion riflemen. For the 1944 infantry section it was 30 platoon dismounts, 90 company dismounts and 270 battalion riflemen. The represents a massive drop in “bayonets”, which is not offset by the notional firepower of the assigned APC or ICV. The APC, in theory, should carry the infantry to the edge of the battle area, where they debus and fight forward on foot. The APCs then retire to a laager and perhaps provide covering fire. How long they will survive to do this is debatable, considering the light armour of standard APC (proof against ball rounds from assault rifles and machine guns). ICV, doctrinally, carry infantry onto the objective (meaning into the enemy position). But the standard ICV is a thin-skinned APC fitted with a cannon, rather than a machine gun, and perhaps precision-guided missiles. Writing about the first-of-breed, the BMP-1 (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty, meaning "fighting vehicle of infantry"), Griffith noted it “seemed to represent a formidable mixture of firepower, armour and mobility for the infantry, to give it plenty of punch even against armour; in practice, as the 1973 Yom Kippur (October) War showed, the BMP was alarmingly vulnerable...”

A mounted attack into the “Smokeshell” complex during Operation Sceptic in June 1983 illustrated this to a South African audience when a Ratel ICV platoon fell foul of Soviet 14.5 and 23mm anti-aircraft guns used in the ground role. Three of its four vehicles, still carrying dismounts, were hit and two were “knocked out”; the driver and a soldier being killed in the “21A” vehicle and the commander and six troops in the “21C” vehicle^ix. The incident was one of the heaviest single cases of loss during the 1966-1989 Border War and graphically illustrated how vulnerable dismounts are when mounted in light APCs or ICVs – truly hostages to fortune.

The solution has been to up-armour the APC and ICV or even to convert tanks to this role. This happened as long ago as WWI, in the shape of the Mark IX tank. The next conversion was during the Normandy campaign of WWII, where surplus M7 Priest self-propelled guns (based on the M3 Lee/Grant) were stripped of their guns and sent into service carrying twelve troops. This and subsequent conversions became known as Kangaroos and were used as APCs throughout the remainder of the northwest Europe campaign. In the modern era, Israeli concern and experience with light APC has led to the revival of tank conversions. Several, such as the Israeli Achzarit, the Serbian VIU-55 Munja and the Russian BTR-T (Bronetransporter-Tyazhelyy, “Armoured Transporter–Heavy”), are based on the venerable T55. The BMPT, a slightly different concept (Boyevaya Mashina Podderzhki Tankov, "Tank Support Fighting Vehicle"), is based on the T72.

Griffith, writing in 1991, supposed these heavy APC and ICV would come to resemble the Israeli Merkava (chariot) main battle tank (MBT). He was right. The latest conversion is the Namer (both a contraction of Nagmash [APC] Merkava" and Hebrew for “leopard”), based on Merkava Mark IV. The Namer is armed with either M2 Browning machine gun or Mk 19 grenade launcher mounted on a Samson Remote Controlled Weapon Station, another 7.62x51mm FN MAG machine gun, 60mm mortar and smoke grenades. Like Merkava Mark IV it is optimized for high level of crew survival on the battlefield. Namer may carry up to 12 crewmen and infantrymen and a stretcher, or two stretchers and medical equipment^x. Arguably the most survivable MBT in the world, the Merkava is not invulnerable, as was demonstrated in the 2006 Lebanon War. Israel may have over-relied on the tank in order to reduce casualties and suffered accordingly. The wikipedia records Hezbollah missiles penetrated the armour of five Merkava Mark IV tanks, killing 10 crew. Weapons used included the Russian RPG-29 'Vampir', AT-5 'Konkurs', AT-13 'Metis-M', and laser-guided AT-14 'Kornet' missiles. Another Merkava IV tank crewman was killed when a tank ran over an improvised explosive device (IED). “This tank had additional V-shaped underside armour, limiting casualties to just one of the seven personnel (four crewmen and three infantrymen) onboard. In total, 50 Merkava tanks (predominantly Merkava IIs and IIIs) were damaged, eight of which remained serviceable on the battlefield. Two Merkava Mark IVs were damaged beyond repair, one by powerful IEDs, and another, it is believed, by Russian AT-14 'Kornet' missiles^xi. All but two Merkava Mark IV tanks damaged during the war were [eventually] repaired and returned to the IDF. The Israeli military said that it was satisfied with the Merkava Mark IV's performance, and attributed problems to insufficient training before the war”.^xii

The BBC reported in August 2006 “all of these enhancements have not proved sufficiently effective against the most modern anti-tank systems operated by determined fighters on the ground. Part of the answer may be to adopt new kinds of armour. But, as ever, part of the answer will be tactical - changes to the way tanks are employed and the way they operate in concert with other elements of ground-power, like infantry and artillery.^xiii” Maybe, but the critic may wonder if this is not a repeat of the quest for a role for horsed cavalry on the 20^th Century battlefield.

This, of course, does not address issues surrounding the small size of the dismount section, that will likely divide into two teams of perhaps three and four infantrymen each. When either of these comes under fire and takes casualties, the number of dismounts available for combat falls rapidly, especially when buddies fall out of the line to aid wounded comrades. Just one casualty in either team could reduce it to nothingness and evaporate the combat power of the section. Technology has changed the infantry, as much as any other branch, and a “task which would once have required a platoon of 30-40 men may now be carried out by a … section of eight to 12 men, each divided into two or three 'fireteams' that will similarly be capable of doing the job that previously needed the whole squad.^xiv” This may be true, but there is a definitive bottom limit, and in the case of the diminutive mounted section, the line may have already been crossed.

Another irony of military organisation is that as the section atrophies the support elements have blossomed. The greater the technological prowess of the armed forces, the larger its support units and the lower its tooth-to-tail (or combat-to-support) ratio. The reverse is equally true. US author and wargame pioneer James F Dunnigan notes that a typical Western-style division is just “one third combat troops, the rest [is] combat support. Depending on the type of division and nationality, infantry comprises 8-30% of division strength, tank crews 1-10%, and artillery (including anti-aircraft and antitank weapons) 6-12%. … Since combat divisions account for 20-50% of army manpower, combat troops comprise only 10-25% of all personnel. In all armies, combat support troops are very much the majority.”^xv

Since the working conditions of a military clerk or storeman resemble that of their civilian peers, it has been suggested that for the majority of military personnel, their employment is “just another job”. In their The Military : More Than Just a Job?, Charles Moskos and FR Wood noted that there has been a “creeping occupationalism” in the military, with more and more people seeing it as just another way of earning a living rather than as a “profession of arms”.^xvi This is a major debate in itself that falls outside the scope of this paper. The question is what remedy there is for this phenomenon – at least within the context of this writing. One that suggests itself is the US Marine Corps approach of “every marine a rifleman”, an approach that has given that branch of the America armed forces great cohesion, moral strength and morale. On Wake Island, during the early days of the early days of the Pacific War (December 7-23, 1941), pilots continued the fight as ground officers, leading supply clerks and cooks in a final defensive effort after all the Marine aircraft were shot down^xvii. In Vietnam, it led to a close cameraderie between the Marines on the ground and aircrew, with the latter taking great risk to provide close air support to the latter.

“There is both a practical and moral dimension to the credo 'every Marine a rifleman',” the writers of USMC Manual MCWP 6-11 Leading Marines aver.^xviii “The force structure of the Corps reflects its central purpose: an expeditionary force in readiness. And because it is expeditionary, it is also austere. Austerity places a premium on the role of every Marine. There are no 'rear area' Marines, and no one is very far from the fighting during expeditionary operations. The success of each of these operations depends on the speed and flexibility with which Marines build combat power. Marines fighting with manoeuvre elements are backed up by fellow Marines who labour unceasingly to support the mission by building logistic bases, running truck convoys, distributing supplies, and fighting when needed to.

“There is almost nothing more precious to a Marine than a fellow Marine. This traditional bond flows from the combat training which all Marines receive, officer and enlisted, and the shared danger and adversity inherent in expeditionary operations. … This cohesion between Marines is not a function of a particular unit within the Corps. It is a function of the Corps itself. When a Marine reports to a unit, he or she may be unknown personally, but is a known quantity professionally.”

Crédit photo : SLD, salon du Bourget, juin 2011

14.07.2011 sldinfo.com

Par Robbin Laird
Adapté de l’anglais par Virginie Lecat [1]

 Lors du Salon du Bourget, MBDA a invité deux pilotes de chasse de la Royal Air Force à présenter le retour d’expérience de leurs opérations en théâtre libyen, notamment quant à l’utilisation du Tornado et des armes de précision : Mark Lawson, pilote, et James Cooke, officier de système d’armes, appartenant à l’escadrille 9 RAF Marham.

Un équipage de deux hommes opère le Tornado, déployé pour la première fois en opération en 1982. Opération la plus longue depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale, les premières missions en direction de la Lybie ont été effectuées depuis le sol britannique, impliquant trois ravitaillements en vol. Des patrouilles mixtes Tornado-Eurofighter ont également permis aux pilotes de la RAF de bénéficier d’une meilleure appréhension de la menace.

Opération la plus longue depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale, les premières missions en direction de la Lybie ont été effectuées depuis le sol britannique, impliquant trois ravitaillements en vol. Des patrouilles mixtes Tornado-Eurofighter ont également permis aux pilotes de la RAF de bénéficier d’une meilleure appréhension de la menace.

Le missile de croisière Storm Shadow a été employé en premières frappes avec un taux de réussite particulièrement élevé. Le Brimstone, arme de choix pour les cibles en théâtre urbain, fut par ailleurs utilisé en un deuxième temps pour venir à bout des blindés lybiens. La RAF a aussi déployé pour la première fois en opération le missile AIM-132 fabriqué par MBDA. Il s’agit d’un missile air-air de courte portée ASRAAM (Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile), lequel remplace les Sidewinder AIM-9 au sein des armées de l’air britannique et australienne. Il peut notamment détruire des cibles aéroportées, blindées, voire des missiles sol-air. Son rôle essentiel est celui d’interdiction aérienne. Autre équipement essentiel : Le RAPTOR (Reconnaissance Airborne Pod TORnado), fabriqué par la Goodrich Corporation. [2]

L’utilisation des équipements a bien-sûr varié selon la nature des missions et des cibles préétablies, ce qui a notamment conduit à passer rapidement du Storm Shadow au Brimstone, une des contraintes majeures en matière de frappes de haute précision étant la limitation des dommages collatéraux

———–

Notes et Références

[1] Voir aussi côté anglais : Operation Ellamy Update

[2] D’après Wikipedia, « ce pod de reconnaissance dont la RAF est équipée pour sa flotte de Tornado GR.4A conti enta un capteur de reconnaissance DB-110, un système d’enregistrement en imagerie et un système de liaison de données sol-air. Le capteur est infrarouge et électro-optique, permettant les missions de jour comme de nuit. La retransmission de données permet à l’imagerie d’être exploitée quasi instantanément ».

source defenceweb.co.za

12 July 2011 by defenceWeb

The Nigerian Air Force has finished upgrading four of its 24 Alpha Jet trainers and will soon return them to service.

The Nigerian Air Force’s (NAF’s) Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Marshal Mohammed Umar, said that the jets were reactivated in an effort to ensure combat readiness. The Nigerian Air Force has over the last several years been upgrading and modernising its equipment, much of which has been or remains inoperable. It is not yet clear if the NAF will upgrade its other 20 Alpha Jets.

Umar was speaking at a two-day logistics conference entitled, “Enhancing the existing logistics management system for efficient NAF air operations”, held at Sam Ethnan Air Force Base, Ikeja, Lagos, last week.

The Nigerian Daily Independent quoted Umar as saying that the four jets were upgraded by a firm in Germany as the original manufacturer, Dassault-Dornier, no longer exists.

Umar added that the aircraft had been returned to their base in Kainji, Kogi State, waiting to fly.

Nigeria originally received 24 Alpha Jets, but the IISS 2010 Military Balance only listed six as being combat capable. The upgrade of the four aircraft was meant to occur sooner but a lack of funds had stalled the project.

Umar noted that upon taking office in September last year, his administration has viewed logistics as an important aspect of Air Force operations. He said that the increase in Nigerian Air Force operating tempo over the years had consistently challenged its logistics readiness – much of Nigeria’s air force has been declared not airworthy. The Air Force came close to collapse following its involvement in an attempt to topple General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime in 1985, after which it was starved of funds and support. However, in 1999 the Air Force began a modernisation drive.

Nevertheless, many aircraft are stored in non-flyable condition and have been earmarked for disposal or sale, including Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21s, Sepecat Jaguars, Lockheed C-130s, Aero Vodochody L-39s and Dornier Do 128s (although one C-130 was refurbished in 2009). Other aircraft, including Alpha Jets, Aeritalia G222s and Aerospatiale/Eurocopter Super Pumas are being refurbished.

Nigeria has one of the biggest air forces in West Africa, which was recently boosted by an order for 15 Chengdu F7s from China, comprising 12 F7-Ni fighters and three FT-7NI trainers. These have replaced its grounded MiG-21s. Deliveries were completed in the middle of last year.

Other recent purchases include two ATR 42 maritime patrol aircraft, the first of which was delivered in December 2009, as well as AgustaWestland AW109 light utility helicopters, an extra G222 and five Super Pumas, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly.

11 July 2011 by defenceWeb

The Special Forces (SF) are acquiring a further, undisclosed, number of Zodiac Hurricane 753 air-deliverable rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) and associated equipment. The order, for R5.294 million, was placed last month and follows a simlar, R1 million, contract in December last year.

The website of the state arms acquisition agency, Armscor, shows the Special Forces in November 2009 also placed an order worth R9 934 700 with the Parachute Industries of SA (PISA) for an unknown number of semi-rigid 7.53m Zodiac boats as part of an “ medium range air deliverable boat system.” The contract was placed on November 26. It followed an order, on October 8, 2009, for a number of same-sized inflatable boats, worth R333 740.

The boats are launched from South African Air Force C130BZ Hercules transports using US-company Airborne Systems' Maritime Craft Aerial Delivery System (MCADS). Airborne Systems says MCADS is the only airdrop system for large RIBs certified for use with the C-130. In an operational scenario, an extractor parachute pulls the load from the aircraft. The boat and airdrop platform separate immediately after exit. The boat lands in the water ready for use and is generally followed by Special Forces parachutists who land near and board it for immediate operations. The platform can be prepared to float for recovery or to sink for covert operations.

MCADS was designed, developed and tested by Airborne Systems in response to US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) operational requirements and is now in use with a number of countries. The company adds that a successful airdrop of a new Zodiac 7.5m RIB for the South African SF last year September resulted in the purchase of a number of PURIBAD platforms, and associated spares.

Zodiac Hurricane first supplied high speed outboard powered assault RIBS in the 1994, a company bochure explains. The Zodiac Hurricane 753 OB FC is typically used by a two man crew to transport an eight person commando team in ship-to-shore, ship-to-ship and shore-to-ship assault missions. The deep Vee fibreglass hull and inflatable collar combined with jockey style seating; provides the seaworthiness, shock mitigation, stability, maneuverability and low signature required to operate reliably and effectively in a hostile maritime environment. The ruggedised hull and collar construction and highly responsive twin outboard motor propulsion system allows the Hurricane 753 to operate safely in heavy weather and alongside larger craft during ship boarding operations.

The boats will likely be delivered to the seaward-orientated 4 SF Regiment at Langebaan in the Western Cape. PISA is a Zodiac subsidiary.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:

• Length overall – 8.05 meters (26.4 ft.)

• Beam overall – 2.74 meters (9.0 ft.)

• Beam (collar deflated) – 2.03 meters (6.7 ft.)

• Collar diameter - 0.56 meters (22 in.)

• Collar volume – 3633 liters (128 cu. Ft.)

• Fuel capacity – 503 liters (133 US gal.)

• Displacement (with full fuel) – 2100 kg. (4000 lbs.)

• Max Speed – 44 Knots with 1500 kg. payload, range 145 NM; Max HP 2 x 200 HP

FROM THE ARMSCOR BULLETIN SYSTEM:

Supply and delivery of Zodiac Hurricane 753 air - deliverable boats and associated equipment.

EMTM/2010/541 30 Jun 2011 R5 294 602,00 Parachute Industries of SA (Pty) Ltd

Zodiac inflatable boats and accessories

ESCW/2010/260 27 Jan 2011 R243 026,71 Zodiac International

Supply and delivery of Zodiac Hurricane 753 air-deliverable boats and associated equipment

M/2010/327 2 Dec 2010 R1 048 020,00 Parachute Industries of SA (Pty) Ltd

Supply and delivery of medium range air deliverable boat systems

EMTM/2009/33 26 Nov 2009 R9 934 700,00 Parachute Industries of SA (Pty) Ltd

Zodiac inflatable boats

ESCW/2009/41 8 Oct 2009 R333 740,00 Parachute Industries of SA (Pty) Ltd

Parachute universal rigid inflatable boat aerial delivery sub-systems and components

ESDS/2007/210 21 Nov 2007 R562 432,00 Parachute Industries of SA (Pty) Ltd Lelebotse Projects & Engineering

Zodiac inflatable boats

ESCW/2007/269 1 Nov 2007 R555 737,60 Parachute Industries of SA (Pty) Ltd

Jul 11, 2011 ASDNews Source : NATO

Today, 9 July 2011, NATO aircraft carried out a precision strike on a pro-Qadhafi missile firing position near Tawurgha, south of Misrata. NATO intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance was conducted over a period of time to ascertain the military use of the site. It was confirmed as being used to launch indiscriminate attacks on Libyan civilians in the area, including the port and city of Misrata.

The missile site was hidden in and operated from a set of farm buildings. It was also used to store other military equipment, as well as acting as a staging area for pro-Qadhafi forces to instigate attacks on civilians.

"By using civilian sites for military purposes, the Qadhafi regime has once again shown complete disregard for the welfare of Libyan civilians. The loss of this facility to pro-Qadhafi forces will reduce the pressure on Misrata and provide further protection to the civilian population in this area," said Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Commander of Operation Unified Protector.

NATO's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR is being conducted under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which calls for an immediate end to all attacks against civilians and authorizes all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya.

9 juillet 2011 par Diawara Samou | Le Patriote

Promu Général de Division et nommé chef d’état-major des Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), le jeudi 7 juillet dernier, Soumaïla Bakayoko a la lourde responsabilité d’organiser et de mettre en place la nouvelle armée ivoirienne. Vu le contexte dans lequel cette nomination intervient, il est clair que la tâche du nouveau Général trois étoiles de l’Armée de Terre s’annonce, à la fois, rude et exaltante. En effet, plusieurs défis majeurs s’imposent au nouveau patron de l’armée ivoirienne. D’abord, celui de la réorganisation d’une armée fragilisée par les nombreuses crises sociopolitiques, qui ont marqué le pays durant ces dix dernières années.

Réorganiser une armée fragilisée

De 2000 à 2011, l’armée ivoirienne, s’immisçant très souvent dans la politique, a fait face à des dissensions internes, allant jusqu’à des affrontements entre frères d’arme. Le comble de cette division est né de la partition qui a suivi le déclenchement de la crise armée du 19 septembre 2002. Avec, d’un côté, les Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS) et de l’autre côté, les Forces armées des Forces Nouvelles. Après plusieurs tentatives de rapprochement, suscitées et appuyées par les différents accords politiques, les deux armées avaient fini par se retrouver avec la création d’un Centre de commandement intégré (CCI). Cette unité, composée d’éléments FDS et FAFN, menait des patrouilles mixtes dans différentes zones du pays. Cependant, avec la récente crise post-électorale, les choses se sont plutôt dégradées. Là, dans un souci de survie contre la barbarie du régime illégal de Laurent Gbagbo, plusieurs jeunes volontaires se sont armés pour aller au front. Et aujourd’hui, tout ce beau monde se réclame aussi des FRCI. Ce qui, bien sûr, ne facilite pas les choses. Le Général Bakayoko, avec l’appui des structures techniques comme le PNRRC (Programme national de réinsertion et de réhabilitation communautaire) et le PNSC (Programme national du service civique), devra donc faire un grand nettoyage. Aussi aura-t-il pour mission d’extirper des rangs des FRCI les brebis galeuses qui ne cessent de ternir l’image des soldats.

L’ordre, le respect et la discipline

Parallèlement à la réorganisation, le nouveau CEMA et son équipe devront insuffler un nouvel esprit au sein de « la grande muette ». Il s’agit d’un esprit républicain, qui prend en compte l’ordre, le respect et la discipline. Soumaila Bakayoko et ses hommes en ont conscience. Car, c’est bien dans cette optique que les militaires se sont retrouvés en atelier, les 22, 23 et 24 juin derniers à Grand-Bassam, autour du thème «quelle armée pour la Côte d’Ivoire nouvelle ?». Après trois jours de réflexion, plusieurs recommandations avaient été faites. Ce sont entre autres, l’intégration de 11.000 ex-éléments FAFN dans l’Armée nouvelle, la lutte contre le racket et la corruption, la formation et la sensibilisation au respect des droits de l’homme, la mise en adéquation du recrutement, des formations, des emplois avec les besoins réels…et surtout, le retour aux valeurs républicaines, le rapprochement du commandement des troupes, la transparence dans la gestion des ressources allouées aux unités et l’occupation quotidienne des troupes. Ce sont là, selon les conclusions de l’atelier de Grand-Bassam, des facteurs qui devront contribuer à l’instauration de la cohésion au sein de l’Armée nouvelle.

Army Air Corps Apaches are operating from the deck of HMS Ocean-photo UK MoD

08/07/11 By Craig Hoyle SOURCE:Flight International

British Army Westland/Boeing Apache AH1 attack helicopters engaged regime targets on 39 occasions during the type's first month of combat use in Libya, the UK Ministry of Defence has revealed.

The first offensive mission was launched from the Royal Navy assault ship HMS Ocean on 3 June, using four Apaches flown by pilots from the Army Air Corps' (AAC) 656 Sqn. The aircraft had been embarked in late April as part of an exercise, before the vessel was moved to off the Libyan coast late the following month.

Apaches flew 13 such missions totalling a combined 30 sorties by 3 July, said Lt Col Phillip Cook, SO1 of the Joint Helicopter Command's air manoeuvre planning team.

During this time they engaged regime targets on a total of 39 occasions, using their Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided air-to-surface missiles, unguided rockets and 30mm cannon. Targets included ground vehicles, main battle tanks, vehicle checkpoints, coastal radar sites and patrol boats being used by pro-Gaddafi forces to deploy mines, Cook said.

The Apaches are flown in either a two- or four-aircraft package, with the AAC also having worked in conjunction with French army Eurocopter Tigers flown from the French navy command ship the Tonnerre. They have also received support from RN Westland Lynx HMA8 helicopters and Sea King 7 airborne surveillance and control system aircraft, and from coalition intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms.

"Our aim is to maximise the effect that both helicopter strike groups can provide," Cook said. "The employment of the Apache has provided a visual demonstration of NATO's resolve, and furnished it with additional options in terms of strike assets. Their use has increased the sense of risk and uncertainty in the minds of the pro-regime leaders and forces and had a valuable psychological effect."

A fifth Apache is also now aboard HMS Ocean, having been transported to the region using a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel. The AAC detachment totals almost 90 personnel.

photo defense.gouv.fr - exercice serpentex 2009

08 Juillet 2011 RTLbe/ Belga

Les chasseurs-bombardiers F-16 belges engagés dans l'opération "Unified Protector" de l'Otan en Libye ont effectué au cours de la semaine écoulée quatre missions de bombardement - toutes de nuit - qui n'ont causé aucun "dommage collatéral", a assuré vendredi le ministère de la Défense.

Ces avions, qui opèrent depuis la base d'Araxos (sud-ouest de la Grèce), ont ainsi réalisé le dimanche 3 juillet une mission nocturne avec "engagement du système d'arme" - en clair le largage d'une bombe -, deux missions identiques le lundi 4 juillet, dont l'une s'est soldée par un largage de bombes. Le mercredi 6, les deux missions nocturnes ont toutes deux conduit à une frappe aérienne, a indiqué un porte-parole du ministère au cours de son point de presse hebdomadaire sur les opérations militaires à l'étranger. Il a assuré que ces bombardements n'avaient causé aucun dommage collatéral, sans préciser ni la nature ni la localisation des objectifs visés. En date du 27 mai, les appareils belges engagés depuis fin mars dans l'opération "Unified Protector" avaient largué 129 bombes au total - 43 bombes à guidage laser et 86 à guidage GPS -, selon des chiffres révélés récemment par le ministre de la Défense, Pieter De Crem (CD&V). En Afghanistan, les F-16 belges déployés à Kandahar (sud), d'où ils fournissent un appui aérien aux troupes terrestres de la force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (ISAF, dirigée par l'OTAN), ont réalisé huit missions durant la semaine, mais utiliser leur armement, a précisé le porte-parole. (PVO)

08.07.2011 Sergyi Way - army-guide.com

DTM, a privately owned South African armoured vehicles company, will be proudly exhibiting the Springbuck Six armoured and landmine protected vehicle at the leading defence exhibition DSEi, to be held in Excel London from 13-16 September 2011.

Visitors will have the opportunity to view the Springbuck Six at stand N3-140.

The range of Springbuck armoured personnel carriers have been designed for ease of operation and repair, using internationally available drive-line components for assured reliability as well as availability of parts. With ballistic protection of B6 upgradeable to B7, the all-steel armoured v-shaped hull can withstand a TM57 landmine or equivalent under the hull or two under any wheel. This permanent 4x4 vehicle not only boasts exceptional manoeuvrability but with its powerful MWM engine also handles effortlessly on the open road. Special attention has been given to the ergonomics of the driver and its 10 passengers.

As South Africans we look forward to showcasing our Springbuck Six APC to the defence industry at DSEi 2011.

7 juillet 2011 Par Rédacteur en chef. PORTAIL DES SOUS-MARINS

Confrontée à de graves difficultés budgétaires, l’Italie a décidé aujourd’hui de retirer un porte-aéronefs, le Garibaldi, des opérations militaires contre le régime de Mouammar Kadhafi, escomptant une économie de plus de 80 millions d’euros.

L’article est disponible sur le site du journal.

Référence : Le Figaro

July 6, 2011: STRATEGY PAGE

Algeria has ordered two Russian Stereguschyy class corvettes. Russia already has completed two of these and four more are under construction. These are small ships (2,200 tons displacement), costing about $125 million each. These "Project 20380" ships have impressive armament (two 30mm anti-missile cannon, one 100mm cannon, eight anti-ship missiles, six anti-submarine missiles, two eight cell anti-missile missile launchers, two 14.5mm machine-guns ). There is a helicopter platform, but the ship is not designed to carry one regularly. Crew size, of one hundred officers and sailors, is achieved by a large degree of automation. The ship also carries air search and navigation radars. It can cruise 6,500 kilometers on one load of fuel. Normally, the ship would stay out 7-10 days at a time, unless it received replenishment at sea. Like the American LCS, the Russian ship is meant for coastal operations. The Russian Navy wants at least fifty of them, but has to settle, for now, for 30.

Russia has become the go-to provider of short range, low cost, warships. Currently, Russian shipyards are building nearly $6 billion worth of warships for foreign customers (India, China, Algeria, Vietnam and Indonesia) and many of these orders were obtained because Russia had a reputation for inexpensive, rugged, coastal warships.