MOSCOW, June 2 (RIA Novosti)

The United States will redeploy bulk of its naval fleet to the Pacific Ocean by 2020, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said on Saturday.

"By 2020, the navy will reposture its forces from today's roughly 50-50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60-40 split between those oceans," Panetta said at the 11th Asia Security Summit of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore.

"That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, combat ships and submarines," he added.

Panetta rejected the suggestion that changes in U.S. military strategy aimed at containing China's growing influence.

"Some view the increased emphasis by the United States on the Asia-Pacific region as some kind of challenge to China. I reject that view entirely," he said.

U.S. President Barack Obama announced in November 2011 that the Asia-Pacific region was a top priority of the country's security policy.

"President Obama has stated that the United States will play a larger role in this region over the decades to come. [As for defense policy], we will play a central role in promoting strong partnerships and strengthen the capabilities of the Pacific nations to defend and secure themselves," Panetta also said.

MOSCOU, 2 juin - RIA Novosti

Les Etats-Unis élargiront leur présence militaire dans la région Asie-Pacifique ces prochaines années, 60% des navires de guerre américains seront déployés dans cette région d'ici 2020, a déclaré vendredi à Singapour le secrétaire américain de la Défense Leon Panetta.

"La répartition de la flotte américaine entre les océans Atlantique et Pacifique passera de 50/50 actuels à 60/40 avec une priorité pour le Pacifique. Il s'agit de six porte-avions, de la plupart de nos croiseurs, destroyers, navires de débarquement et sous-marins", a indiqué M.Panetta.

Cette stratégie apportera la stabilité dans cette région importante pour les Etats-Unis, elle ne vise aucunement la Chine, mais est plutôt appelée à combattre le terrorisme, la piraterie maritime, le trafic de drogue et la traite des êtres humains, selon lui.

La réalisation de cette stratégie américaine prendra des années, mais le ministère américain de la Défense possède les fonds nécessaires pour le faire, a-t-il ajouté.

La Marine américaine compte au total 285 navires de guerre, selon le site officiel de l'US Navy.

June 1, 2012: STRATEGY PAGE

The Chinese firm (Chongqing Jianshe Industry Group) that supplies CS/LM12 six barrel 7.62 machine-guns to the Chinese Army is now offering the weapon to police organizations. The United States first introduced this multi-barrel machine-gun design fifty years ago, for use in jet fighters and firing 20mm rounds. Also called the "Gatling Gun" (after the original 1860s version that was hand cranked), the 1960s version required electrical power to spin the barrels.

The basic design was soon adapted to fire 7.62mm bullets and used on helicopters or ground vehicles. China began building similar weapons in the 1990s, and now uses some of these 7.62mm weapons with elite infantry units.

The latest version of this weapon is the U.S. Air Force GAU-2B. This is a remote control turret using a six-barrel 7.62mm machine-gun. This system has a rate of fire of 3,000 rounds per minute (50 per second), and max range of 1,500 meters. The system weighs 363 kg (800 pounds), including 4,000 rounds of ammo. A member of the aircraft crew uses a video game like interface to operate the gun.

The Chinese CS/LM12 has adjustable rates of fire (2,500 to 6,000 rounds a minute). The original GAU-2 (called M134 by the U.S. Army) was built to handle 6,000 rounds per minute rate, but it was found that 4,000 rounds a minute was adequate and used available ammo more efficiently.

1 June 2012 by Greg Waldron - FG

Singapore - India has expressed early interest in the possibility of obtaining more Boeing C-17 strategic transports to follow its firm order for 10 of the type.

"There is some initial indication that they might be interested in as many as six to eight more," says Dennis Muilenburg, chief executive of Boeing Defense, Space & Security. "These are decisions that will have to be made by the Indian customer," he said at the Shangri-La Dialogues, an annual defence conference in Singapore.

Unsourced media reports in India have long hinted that New Delhi may obtain more than the 10 C-17s it has on order. In August 2011, Indian defence minister A K Antony told the nation's parliament there were no plans for a follow-on buy.

Last year, Boeing reduced the number of C-17s produced annually to 10 from 15. Muilenburg says that based on the current backlog, the company can keep its final assembly line in Long Beach, California, open until the third quarter of 2014.

"We continue to see international opportunity beyond the current firm backlog, and so we're hopeful to extend production beyond that date," he says. He adds that it is "difficult to say" how long the line can be kept open beyond late 2014.

"We do see opportunities for perhaps two or three more years [contingent on international sales]," he says. "It's highly dependent on those decisions moving forward on a pace that supports the production line.

"We go through a deliberate process every quarter looking at the future order potential and the longevity of production, and continue to manage things to be sure we continue to deliver on schedule and on cost."

Boeing says India's C-17s are due to be delivered in 2013-2014.

Muilenburg also confirmed recent reports that Indonesia has expressed interest in obtaining the AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter.

June 1st, 2012 By Army News Service - defencetalk.com

The Army’s next-generation friendly force tracking system that equips Soldiers with a faster satellite network, secure data encryption and advanced logistics for improved tactical communications and situational awareness has deployed to installations in Korea.

This marks the first time Soldiers outside of evaluation and training exercises will be equipped with the software-enhanced Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below/Blue Force Tracking, or FBCB2/BFT, known as Joint Capabilities Release, or JCR.

The Army’s Project Manager FBCB2, assigned to the Program Executive Office Command, Control and Communications-Tactical, began fielding JCR in April to the 2nd Infantry Division, and various formations of the 8th Army. Fielding to Korea will continue through September and includes fitting more than 1,000 platforms with the upgraded capability.

Delivering JCR to the peninsula was accomplished one year ahead of schedule and fully synchronized with unit training requirements, said Brig. Gen. Chuck Taylor, 2nd Infantry Division, deputy commanding general-maneuver.

“This JCR-BFT improves our readiness to support our mission in the Republic of Korea-U.S. Alliance especially mission command on the move,” said Taylor, who pushed for the early fielding. “Our mission readiness will be significantly increased with JCR-BFT. Since BFT is our common tactical mission command fighting system, JCR-BFT mapping, encryption and user defined open architecture is an exponential leap for our Soldiers.”

FBCB2/BFT is a critical part of the Army’s tactical communications network that Soldiers rely on for situational awareness. The system includes computers, global positioning equipment and communication systems that work in tandem to provide near real-time information to combat leaders at the tactical level. Soldiers inside vehicles can plot the location of enemy, friendly and neutral objects and exchange command and control messages.

Because 8th Army units must maintain “Fight Tonight” readiness, the JCR fielding was tailored to each Major Support Command using the “crawl, walk, run” strategy,” said Jeff Forgach, readiness management chief for Project Manager FBCB2/BFT. The “crawl” phase came during testing at the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 12.1 last fall, while the current fielding to forces in Korea serves as the “walk” phase. The “run” phase will come this October when JCR fielding to 13,000 combat platforms in Afghanistan begins.

“We’re confident in the network, we’re confident in the software, but one of strategies was small steps,” said Forgach. “Kick the tires and let’s see how it performs. Korea is a diverse environment of scope and scale and 2ID does have day-to-day missions in support of the host nation. We know they’ll embrace the capabilities, they’ll utilize it and they’ll give us valuable lessons learned that we can adjust if necessary in preparation for Afghanistan.”

The 2nd Infantry Division is the first unit to receive JCR for maneuver platforms, said Forgach.

“There was a thirst for these capabilities. This leadership very aggressively pursued the best capabilities available from the entire ASA(ALT) (Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) marketplace,” said Forgach. “They made this happen.”

Among the many upgrades JCR brings is the premiere of JCR-Logistics, which integrates FBCB2/BFT capability with Movement Tracking System. MTS is a vehicle-based system that tracks combat support and combat service support vehicles, as well as other assets. It offers a Radio Frequency Identification capability to provide in-transit, real-time visibility of critical cargo.

The MTS JCR-Log provides the technology necessary to communicate with and track tactical wheeled vehicles and cargo in near real times, , enabling the safe and timely completion of distribution missions in support of full spectrum operations. The upgraded capabilities result in a seamless, two way situational awareness and message exchange between convoys and the maneuver formations to which they are delivering goods.

“JCR-Log represents a significant upgrade to the current capability set for MTS,” said Jim Carver, MTS fielding manager. “Most significantly, the ability to have two-way situational awareness/common operating picture with the maneuver elements in the theater of operations is key.”

Training managers from MTS and FBCB2 worked together and jointly developed programs of instruction and technical manuals that allow for greater flexibility in new equipment training presentations and a superior product for Soldiers.

Other JCR enhancements include access to the type one secret network through the KGV-72 encryption device, allowing users on-the-move to send secret data and interoperate completely with the command post. JCR also incorporates a new chat function and instant messaging capability. A powerful new map engine will allow Soldiers to render images and a Self Descriptive Situational Awareness feature allows for units to change task organization in the field.

JCR also utilizes the BFT 2 network, a new satellite infrastructure that can handle significantly more data than the first BFT. This capacity increase allows for more frequent and larger message traffic, and in many cases cuts the system’s refresh rate from minutes to seconds.

JCR capabilities will modernize the way lower echelons communicate and navigate in theater, and testing of JCR at recent NIE events received positive feedback from Soldiers.

Staff Sgt. Cody Moose, 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, said the chat room feature proved a huge capability and was widely used.

“I think it’s the best system we’ve tested so far and it seems like it’s working perfectly, exactly how it’s supposed to and how they told us it would,” said Moose. “It’s super easy to use. That’s the best part. Anybody that’s been on a chat room before knows how to use it.”

Capt. Luis Albino, commander of C Troop within 1st Squadron, 1st Calvary Regiment of 2/1 AD, referred to the upgraded FBCB2 as one of the best tools he’s seen in his seven years in the Army.

“I know where I’m at. I know where all my buddies are at. If the radio is down, I can still send a text,” said Albino. “They’ve made it more user friendly for the guys. That’s a tool they like.”

June 1, 2012 Karen Parrish / American Forces Press Service – defpro.com

ABOARD A MILITARY AIRCRAFT | The challenge for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region is translating strategy into action, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said May 30.

On his way to Singapore for the 11th annual Asia security summit known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey told American Forces Press Service that the U.S. “pivot to the Pacific” isn’t about establishing American dominance in the region.

Rather, he said, the goal is to work with regional partners to sustain and strengthen a cooperative security environment among Asian-Pacific nations.

The chairman noted that in this, his first visit to the dialogue, he wants to hear what other nations’ officials have to say on topics such as territorial disputes in the region’s seas. China and the Philippines both claim the South China Sea waters around Scarborough Shoal, and China and Japan dispute the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, near Okinawa.

Dempsey said the United States does not take sides in territorial disputes and encourages disputing parties to resolve such issues without coercion.

“What I already know is that we’ve been very clear about the need for cooperation in the maritime domain [involving] freedom of navigation,” he said. “I think that’s exactly the right position to place ourselves. But beyond that, I want to hear what these 27 nations [at the Shangri-La Dialogue] have to say, both to us and to each other -- because it will clearly be one of the most prominent issues.”

From the national strategic level where he works, the chairman said, the first priority in rebalancing defense strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region involves what he calls “intellectual bandwidth.”

“We’ve developed, over the course of 10 years, a core of real experts in the Middle East,” Dempsey said. “We need to form that same core of professionals for whom [Asia-Pacific expertise] is a lifelong work.”

The second step in the strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region is to build on that increased bandwidth to create and explore new opportunities to increase regional security, he said.

“We have to make that intellectual shift … and then listen to the signals that we receive from our partners,” he added, noting that standing, multinational forums often are able to deal with security issues before they become crises.

“I think that’s the great strength of NATO,” Dempsey said.

A security organization similar to NATO involving many Asia-Pacific nations’ participation may have value, the general said, but only if other nations want it.

“We would have to see the appetite for that among our partners and not just try to in some way impose it on them,” Dempsey said.

May 31, 2012 defpro.com

Liang Guanglie, state councilor and minister of national defense of the People’s Republic of China, met by request with Voltaire Gazmin, secretary of the Philippine Department of National Defense who was attending the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in Cambodia, on May 28, 2012 in Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia. The two sides exchanged views on bilateral relations and issues of common concern.

Liang Guanglie said that China and the Philippines are close neighbors across the sea. The Chinese side attaches great importance to the relations between the two countries and the two militaries and has taken various positive measures to promote them.

Liang Guanglie pointed out that the Huangyan Island is an inherent part of China, which is beyond all dispute. The Huangyan Island incident was entirely caused by the fact that a Philippine warship has harassed Chinese fishermen by force in the waters of the Huangyan Island. The series of practices adopted by the Philippine side following the incident have complicated the tension. The Chinese side demands that the Philippine side should earnestly respect China’s sovereignty instead of taking actions that may further complicate and escalate the situation.

Liang Guanglie hoped that the Philippine defense department and military set store by the overall interests, keep calm, exercise self-restraint, speak and act cautiously and take concrete actions to maintain regional peace and stability.

Gazmin thanked Liang Guanglie for meeting with him and exchanged views on sensitive issues confronting the two countries. Gazmin said that it is hoped that the defense departments of the two countries will continue to keep contact with each other to promote peaceful and reasonable resolution to the sensitive issues while the foreign affairs departments of both sides are dealing with the relevant sensitive issues.

31/05/2012 Sources : EMA

Du 8 au 18 mai 2012, les forces armées en Nouvelle-Calédonie (FANC) ont mené un important exercice interarmées appelé Kaori. Cet exercice visait à simuler l’évacuation de ressortissants multinationaux depuis un pays en situation instable et l’acheminement d’une aide humanitaire dans le cadre d’une opération autorisée par l’ONU.

L’exercice Kaori s’est déroulé dans la région de La Foa, à environ 100 kilomètres au nord de Nouméa. Sous le commandement de l’état major interarmées des FANC, le RIMaP-NC (régiment d’infanterie de marine du pacifique – Nouvelle Calédonie) a été engagé avec un groupement tactique interarmées (GTIA) de plus de 600 hommes et 70 véhicules, appuyé par un avion Casa et deux hélicoptères Puma de l’armée de l’Air ainsi que le Jacques Cartier, un bâtiment de transport léger de la Marine nationale.

Une fois débarquées par voies aériennes et maritimes, les forces terrestres ont conduit l’opération en deux temps avec, d’une part, la sécurisation de la zone, et, d’autre part, l’acheminement de l’aide humanitaire.

Cette année, la nouveauté de cet exercice conduit tous les deux ans depuis 1992, était l’intégration du groupement de soutien de la base de défense (GSBdD) de Nouméa à l’exercice. Ceci a permis de mettre l’accent sur l’aspect logistique inhérent à ce type d’opération (déploiement des modules de matériel de campagne pour des solutions d’abris, d’hygiène et de nourriture).

Deux sections de l’unité de réserve du RIMaP-NC ainsi que plus de 65 volontaires stagiaires du Groupement du Service Militaire Adapté (GSMA) de Nouvelle-Calédonie ont été engagés dans l’exercice.

Cet exercice de soutien de la France à un pays en difficulté a été mené en anglais et a permis de perfectionner les nombreux savoir-faire tactiques et techniques (livraison par voies aériennes et coordination 3D) nécessaires au bon déroulement de ces missions. Kaori constitue une étape dans la préparation de l’exercice d’intervention multinational Croix du Sud qui aura lieu en octobre 2012.

May 31, 2012 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: New Zealand Defence Force; issued May 28, 2012)

The Navy has successfully conducted trials of flying an SH-2G Seasprite helicopter from the deck of one of its Offshore Patrol Vessels, HMNZS OTAGO, marking a significant milestone in achieving the ship's full operational potential.

The trials have been conducted over the past month during which the Seasprite conducted 161 landings and takeoffs from OTAGO’s flight deck. The landings and takeoffs were done by day and by night in varying wind and sea conditions in the Hauraki Gulf and the Bay of Plenty sea areas.

"Operating helicopters from ships underway at sea is one of the most challenging activities any Navy undertakes," says Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral Tony Parr. "We have been flying helicopters from the frigates for many years, but now we are learning how to operate these aircraft from a different ship with different characteristics."

The trials proved that the Seasprite can conduct an airborne surveillance task from the OPV of up to 2.5 hours duration, which should enable 4500 square nautical miles to be covered in a single sortie by day or night.

"The trials have proven the helicopter can operate off the ship across a wide range of sea and wind conditions. Although it will be some time before the full potential is released the Navy can now begin helicopter operations during which time we will continue to learn and develop our capability."

The two Offshore Patrol Vessels—OTAGO and WELLINGTON— are large, complex vessels that operate from the freezing cold of the Southern Ocean to the tropical heat of the Pacific Islands, giving New Zealand a broad patrol and surveillance capability.

"The ability to land a helicopter on a ship underway at sea by day and night in different wind and sea conditions requires a rigorous and demanding test programme to determine what the limits of operation might be," said Admiral Parr. "The team in OTAGO, which included a number of RNZAF Seasprite technicians, were often operating in challenging conditions. Nevertheless the trials were completed in a thoroughly professional, safe and timely manner.

"There will still be a considerable period of learning as we gain experience operating the aircraft on actual deployments."

May 30, 2012 By Trefor Moss - the-diplomat.com

Defense leaders from around Southeast Asia are meeting in Phnom Penh this week for the 6^th ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM). The theme of the get together – “Enhancing ASEAN Unity for a Harmonized and Secure Community” – smacks of doublespeak: unity and harmony within ASEAN are sorely lacking at the moment, and no-one really thinks the ministerial meeting is going to rediscover them.

In the anarchy of the international arena, a club like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ought to be a reassuring place to be. The organization gives its ten members – small or medium-sized players in geopolitical terms – the opportunity to close ranks when dealing with the greater powers, and to speak with one voice loud enough to be heard in Beijing, Washington and any other place that needs to listen.

Unfortunately, ASEAN doesn’t work like that: individualism swiftly trumps collectivism whenever contentious issues arise.

In particular, ASEAN has a China problem. Ask the ten members about China, and you’ll get a kaleidoscope of opinions about what that country represents. Some ASEAN countries are very much pro-China: their own economic development is tied closely to Beijing’s, and they are comfortable with the political implications of their China connections. Others are cooler on relations with Beijing: they balance a wariness of Chinese influence with the obvious benefits of a healthy trading relationship. And finally, there are those that feel threatened by China and regard themselves as targets (or at least potential targets) of Chinese assertiveness.

 Unity on the question of how to handle China has therefore eluded ASEAN. And given the association’s nature, this is unsurprising: neutrality and non-intervention, not unity and collectivism, are ASEAN’s most cherished principles.

Nonetheless, it’s clear that the member states which feel most insecure about China – the Philippines and Vietnam – had hoped for at least some ASEAN solidarity in managing their territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea. They didn’t get it. Philippine proposals in 2011 for the creation of an ASEAN-China “Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation” in the South China Sea were hung out to dry by the other ASEAN countries, with only the Vietnamese expressing real support. Most instead backed a bilateral approach to arguments with China: in other words, they said they’d rather not get involved.

As the stand-off between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal – a disputed territory in the South China Sea – comes close to entering its third month, there’s certainly hope that diplomacy might still provide a solution to the complex problem of China-ASEAN tensions. This week’s ADMM could make some headway. More significantly, ASEAN officials last week completed a draft version of a new Code of Conduct governing behavior in the South China Sea; once finalized internally, this will be presented to China for discussion over the summer, though Beijing is presumed to have already had some unofficial input.

However, in ASEAN’s security discussions China has become the elephant in the room. At the ADMM, China is quite literally in the room: Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie is attending the event in Phnom Penh, even though this isn’t a gathering of the ADMM Plus, of which China is an official member. As for the drafting of the new Code of Conduct, there are concerns that the proposed regime will fail to take the all-important step: the setting out of clear rules in disputed zones. China is the constraining factor, with the draftees wary of presenting Beijing with a code that it cannot accept. But equally, drafting a code that fails to get to the heart of the South China Sea’s problems would be to squander a once-in-a-decade opportunity.

There’s no doubt that ASEAN is split on the issue of China and territorial disputes. What is less clear is whether ASEAN’s disunity is simply playing into China’s hands, allowing it to deal with each country individually, or whether Beijing is actively driving a wedge between ASEAN members that oppose China and those that are more sympathetic to the Chinese position.

“Beijing has consistently pursued a strategy to prevent the South China Sea issue [becoming] one between China and ASEAN,” suggests Zhang Baohui, an associate professor at Lingnan University. “It has argued that the any conflict is bilateral. To this end, Beijing has succeeded by using a few Southeast Asian countries to prevent the emergence of a united ASEAN agenda or strategy.” Zhang points to China’s economic leverage over Cambodia and Thailand in particular, and also to the fact that these two countries (and several others within ASEAN) have no direct stake in the South China Sea disputes. Their membership of ASEAN is their only real link to these affairs.

The spotlight has fallen on Cambodia especially: the country is China’s closest regional ally and a major beneficiary of economic aid from Beijing. It’s also the current ASEAN chair, which has given rise to suggestions that China is currently exerting undue influence on ASEAN through Cambodia at what it obviously a sensitive time for China-ASEAN relations.

Hun Sen, the Cambodian prime minister, was moved to declare publicly last month that his country had “not been bought” by China as a means of influencing ASEAN policy. However, even in public it hasn’t been difficult to see how Beijing links the issue of economic assistance with political support for China’s stance. When Hu met Hun Sen at the end of March, Reuters, for example, reported their discussions as follows: “Chinese President Hu Jintao asked close economic ally Cambodia on March 31 not to push talks on the vexed issue of the South China Sea "too fast" as he pledged to double bilateral trade to $5 billion and announced fresh aid to the impoverished country.”

Irrespective of the extent of Beijing’s control over Cambodia, its ability to split ASEAN – whether intentional or coincidental – is undeniable. However, China is also one of the few issues with the power to unite ASEAN. According to Mark Thompson, director of the Southeast Asia Research Centre at the City University of Hong Kong, non-intervention remains central to the ASEAN philosophy, with the result that ASEAN members are naturally in favor of balancing the competing influences of the US and China.

However, in its territorial disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam, China risks overstepping the mark, and violating ASEAN’s core principles. Chinese military action could therefore trigger the very circling of ASEAN wagons that Beijing’s policy has so far successfully prevented. “At the moment I think China has played its cards smartly enough,” says Thompson. “If ASEAN stands for anything, it stands for neutrality. Generally, the principle of the ASEAN Way, of non-interference, is accepted and even believed in, and so if push comes to shove you could see ASEAN rally [against China]. China understands that, and that’s why it has been acting relatively cautiously.”

China’s involvement in ASEAN constrains the group’s behavior, and militates against unity. But equally, China’s involvement in ASEAN is a self-constraint: only by treading relatively softly can Beijing continue to handle territorial issues bilaterally, as it prefers, as opposed to having to tackle ASEAN en bloc. So for all the damage that the long-running stand-off at Scarborough Shoal might be inflicting on ASEAN, it is at least encouraging to conclude that military action in the South China Sea is not in Beijing’s playbook. China can only divide and conquer ASEAN politically, not militarily.

The high-wing design will boast a 15,000-20,000kg payload

31 May 2012Flight Global

India's Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) and Russia's United Aircraft (UAC) have signed a contract confirming the Indian company's role in the bilateral Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) programme.

Under the agreement, HAL will undertake India's share of design and development activities at its aircraft research and development centre in Bengaluru, while its transport aircraft division in Kanpur will build prototypes and eventually commence series production, the company says. Facilities dedicated to the programme are already being set up at the latter location.

"HAL will showcase its expertise in the design of aircraft as well as systems, manufacturing and flight testing while jointly working with the Russian team in Moscow as well as in India," it says.

Other HAL R&D centres and manufacturing units will also participate in the effort by developing and manufacturing components, sub-assemblies and parts of the aircraft's composite structure.

Confirmed in late May, the new contract follows a September 2010 agreement between the governments of India and Russia. This established that the project would be a 50:50 venture between the countries, and also laid the ground for the establishment of an MTA joint-venture company between HAL, UAC and Russian arms export agency Rosoboronexport.

A high-wing design with two turbofan engines, the MTA is envisaged as offering a payload capacity of between 15,000kg (33,000lb) and 20,000kg. HAL forecasts an eventual requirement to produce 205 of the type, including 100 for the Russian air force, 45 for the Indian air force and 60 for "third countries".

Preliminary design for the MTA will commence with the signing of an additional contract, for which the discussions have already been concluded.

Moscow and New Delhi are also collaborating on the development of India's fifth-generation fighter aircraft; a stealthy design based on Sukhoi's developmental PAK-FA.