2 April 2014 airforce-technology.com

South Korea has started a process to acquire its long-desired four in-flight refuelling tanker aircraft in an effort to enhance the national air defence.

The estimated KRW1.4tn ($1.31bn) deal forms part of the country's attempts to augment its air defence in wake of escalating tension in morth-east Asia over the maritime interests of Japan, China and North Korea, Reuters reports.

The South Korean Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said in a statement that the purchase will be made through a competitive bid process and bids will be accepted by the end of June 2014.

Two unnamed industry sources were quoted by the news agency as saying that Boeing is expected to bid with a model that is based on a Boeing 767-level aircraft, such as the KC-46 Pegasus, while Airbus Group is likely to offer its A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT).

Other companies are also anticipated to enter the competition with commercial aircraft overhauled as tankers, the sources added.

A closed briefing is scheduled to be held by DAPA on 08 April to brief the bidders regarding the contract requirements.

Another source with direct knowledge of its requirements said the country aims to close a deal by the end of 2014.

The in-flight refuelling tankers are anticipated to enhance the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) fighter aircraft airborne operation time by more than one hour, the source added.

Scheduled to be acquired between 2017 and 2019, the new tankers will help extend the operational range of ROKAF's F-15K and KF-16 fighter aircraft fleet, as reported earlier by Yonhap News Agency.

Elbit Systems Athos 155mm howitzer (photo : behance)

29.03.2014 Defense Studies

MANILA, Philippines -- Elbit Systems Land and C41, a defense material manufacturer based in Israel, won the bid to supply the Army more than P368 million worth of artillery, a source privy to the bidding said.

“Elbit offers P368,837,332 for 12 pieces of 155 Howitzer canons with accessories and ammunition,” beating Bosnian firm BNT, the source said.

The second conference that concluded with the choosing of the winning bid was held in Camp Aguinaldo.

The defense department’s Bids and Awards Committee for the project is led by Assistant Secretary Efren Fernandez.

Elbit offered its Athos howitzer system.

Bids for the contract were opened on December 5 last year, following a pre-bid conference on November 22.

(Interaksyon)

April 2, 2014 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: The International Relations and Security Network; issued March 28, 2014)

Is The FD-2000 An Albatross Or A Raptor-Killer?

Why is China proposing to sell FD-2000 anti-aircraft missiles to Turkey? James Hasik thinks there are three possible reasons – Turkey is impressed with the system, China isn’t expecting a military confrontation with America any time soon, or internal disputes are clouding Beijing’s decision-making processes.

The Hurriyet Daily News reported [...] that enthusiasm has begun to wane amongst local subcontractors in CPMIEC’s proposed sale of FD-2000 anti-aircraft missile batteries to Turkey. CPMIEC has been blacklisted by the US government under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act, and Turkish firms are wary of winding up on the wrong side of the world’s biggest customer. As early as last October, Raytheon and Eurosam (MBDA and Thales’s joint venture) were asked to extend their pricing, and the bidding was again extended in January, so this deal is hardly done. Yet unexplained remains the motivation from the Chinese side. Why did Beijing allow CPMIEC to offer an important missile system to a NATO ally of the United States?

The actual quality of the product is hard to discern through public sources, and the heritage can be confusing. The FD-2000 is the export version of the HQ-9, itself originally a clone of the S-300 from Russia’s Almaz-Antey. Allied governments assuredly have better information. As I wrote earlier, the Slovak Air Force first brought its S-300s to a NATO exercise in 2005. The Hellenic Air Force has had 12 launchers since 2000, and test-fired some missiles back in December. The Bulgarians have the weapon too. Consider the Croatian battery that was actually sold to the US in 2003, and you can guarantee that the S-300 has been analyzed down to the smallest screw.

The Chinese missile is not quite the same, though it’s not clear whether it’s better or worse. Many Chinese companies are excellent contract manufacturers, and the industry may have tricked out the old Soviet technology. The record, however, is not good. Chinese efforts to copy Russian aircraft and engines have been thus far unimpressive, so one might wonder about the radars and missiles too. Indeed, in one second-hand report, I heard the FD-2000 described as the air defense equivalent "of a 1991 Hyundai.” Even at a Volkswagen price, that’s not a good deal.

But actual quality is not the issue: what matters in discerning motivation is Chinese perception of that quality. So suppose that the Chinese government actually would agree that the FD-2000 is effectively junk. Selling it to Turkey would put it into the NATO exercise cycle, and as many as 20 air forces could eventually fly against it to test its mettle. If CPMIEC had indeed sold the Turks a $3 billion albatross, word would get around, and the brand image of Chinese weapons would drop even lower than it is today. The Americans would be expected to grasp just how unimpressive China’s air defenses really were. So it’s unlikely that the export version could really be much less impressive than the domestic model.

On the other hand, over at Airpower Australia, Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon are much more impressed with the HQ-9, and it’s conceivable that their sources are Chinese and trustworthy. Suppose then that the Chinese government is quite proud of the quality of the FD-2000. Selling it to Turkey would put it into the NATO exercise cycle, and as many as 20 air forces could eventually fly against it. Then, if the FD-2000 were indeed a Raptor-killer, the Americans could be expected eventually to have a full understanding of just how impressive China’s air defenses really were. But they might not stay impressive for long, as the Americans would furiously work on countermeasures, and with the actual threat system in hand. So it’s unlikely that the Chinese expect to rely on a weapon like the FD-2000 for defense against the US.

This leaves at least three possibilities. The first is that the Chinese have advanced so far in air defense technology that the HD-2000 will be at least modestly impressive to the Turks and their allies, but still nothing compared to what the HQ-9 really is. That certainly would fit with the image that the most alarmed observers hold of China’s ballistic missile technology. But again, the track record in other areas in less impressive.

The second possibility is that the Chinese don’t care, as they consider the prospect of war with the United States quite remote. In that figuring, the posturing over shoals in the South China Sea, the bumper-car games with American ships, the Hainan Island incident, and every other “act of belligerent idiocy from Beijing," as Sydney Freedberg recently termed the histrionics, really are just a game. They’re all stage-managed Cold War antics, just like the Soviets used to enjoy. The bluster and the accompanying military modernization campaign is to show that China is not just the world’s outsourced manufacturing floor, but a modern state that should be taken seriously politically. They could do this with far more class and subtlety, but a variety of factors foreign and domestic keep them on the edge.

The third possibility is that the Chinese decision wasn’t all that strategically coherent. Perhaps this intended sale is not the result of a deep calculation by the Chinese government, but instead the outcome of a power-contest among Chinese elites, or the resultant of the military’s export sales regime just doing what it does.

Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence to support any of these scenarios. The first could be rather comforting around the Pacific Rim, depending on Chinese intentions. The second is quite unsettling for the US and its allies in that region. The third is intriguing, and would argue for a greater effort to understand Chinese interagency politics. Regardless, if the Chinese have badly misjudged their own product, we would know—assuming that the deal closes—when the Turks start howling. If they do know what they’re selling, we might never know—or just not know until the shooting starts.

31 March 2014 BAE Systems

Adelaide, SA: BAE Systems today signed an AU $77 million, five-year contract extension with Boeing Defence Australia (BDA) to continue support for the electronic warfare sub-systems aboard the RAAF’s Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft.

This extends the existing support contract until at least mid-2019 and retains 35 high skilled positions in South Australia. It also keeps BAE Systems at the forefront of Australia’s electronic warfare capability. The extension follows the recently announced signing of a five-year extension to the Wedgetail support prime contract between BDA and the Commonwealth.

BAE Systems has provided engineering, maintenance and spares support for the Wedgetail electronic warfare suite under subcontract to Boeing for the past two and a half years. The state-of-the-art equipment is operated by on-board sensor specialists to locate and identify radar emitters and to protect the aircraft and its crew from potential missile threats.

“We are very pleased to retain this work and specialist skills in South Australia,” said Kim Scott, Director Land & Integrated Systems. “We trust that continued success on this program will help demonstrate that this type of advanced technology and capability can be provided locally to world standards.”

“BAE Systems is a key partner in the Wedgetail support program”, said BDA’s Mark Horton, Acting Wedgetail In-Service Support Program Manager.  “The extension to BAE Systems’ contract recognises the results achieved during the initial support period and continues the excellent partnership we have established.”

“We are very proud to be associated with the Wedgetail project and look forward to continuing that association,” said Mr Scott.

02/04 Yann Rousseau, Correspondant à Tokyo - Les Echos.fr

Depuis les années 1960, les ventes des géants japonais du secteur devaient se limiter au marché national.

Début 1980, trois agents du KGB, se faisant passer pour des hommes d'affaires, approchèrent le bureau moscovite d'une maison de négoce japonaise. Ils cherchaient une machine capable d'usiner des turbines plus performantes pour une centrale électrique de Leningrad. Ils furent mis en relation avec la société Toshiba Machine. Et, un an plus tard, une commande d'un montant de plus de 4 millions de dollars était célébrée. Mais, en avril 1987, les Etats-Unis découvrirent que l'URSS utilisait l'engin pour fabriquer des hélices à propulsion « silencieuse » pour ses sous-marins nucléaires que Washington s'efforçait depuis des années de traquer.

Vertement réprimandé par son allié, Tokyo promit plus de vigilance pour faire respecter le strict embargo sur les exportations d'armes et de technologies sensibles que le pays, se proclamant pacifiste depuis 1945, s'était de lui-même imposé dans les années 1960. Et très peu de ventes d'équipements militaires furent ensuite tentées. Hier, le gouvernement de Shinzo Abe a annoncé qu'il allait, pour la première fois, assouplir ces principes d'interdiction et autoriser, sous contrôle, des ventes de matériel de défense à des nations ne représentant pas de menace pour la paix et la sécurité mondiale. « C'est l'un des plus grands changements de ces dernières décennies », résume Atsushi Tago, un professeur de relations internationales à l'université de Kobe.

Casser les coûts

Cet assouplissement, qui était réclamé par les grands industriels du secteur, va permettre de casser les coûts de développement des nouveaux équipements. Les groupes tels que Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries ou IHI ne pouvaient jusqu'ici viser que le marché domestique de défense, estimé à seulement 1.500 milliards de yens (10,5 milliards d'euros) par an. « Désormais, ils pourront espérer produire de plus grandes séries avec des contrats ou des partenariats à l'étranger », explique Atsushi Tago, qui rappelle que les grands projets de défense se font désormais en association entre plusieurs nations. En accédant à ces projets internationaux et en s'autorisant à vendre des équipements aux pays amis de la région, notamment en Asie du Sud-Est, le Japon veut aussi doper son aura régionale et se présenter en puissance de résistance crédible face à la très rugueuse poussée d'influence de la Chine dans la zone. Dès hier soir, les autorités de Pékin n'ont pas manqué de se déclarer préoccupées par ce revirement japonais.

Hawk medium range SAM (photo : pdff)

31.03.2014 Defense Studies

MANILA (PNA) -- The Department of National Defense (DND) is looking at the possibility of acquiring improved and enhanced versions of the Raytheon MIM-23 HAWK (Homing All the Way Killer) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

The HAWK is a US medium range SAM.

The DND stated that acquisition of this weapon aims to protect the country from air threats its shore-to-ship missile (SSM) launchers which it is planning to acquire for the Philippine Army at P6.5 billion.

The SSM project consists of 12 launchers, trailers and tracking systems and missiles that could be fired to hit naval or sea targets.

It will be carried out through “limited source bidding", a process where certain companies are invited to submit bids for the program.

The HAWK is capable of intercepting and destroying any hostile aircraft, drone, or rocket that may be sent to incapacitate or disabled the Army's SSM system.

It was initially designed to destroy aircraft and was later adapted to destroy other missiles in flight.

The missile entered service in 1960, and a program of extensive upgrades has kept it from becoming obsolete.

Israel, one of the operators of the HAWK missile, have upgraded the Phase 2 standard with the addition of a Super Eye electro-optical TV system for detection of aircraft at 30 to 40 kilometers and identification at 17 to 25 kilometers.

They have also modified their system for engagements at altitudes up to 24,000 meters. 

(PNA)

April 01, 2014 By Sophie Boisseau du Rocher & Bruno Hellendorff – The Diplomat

Russia’s big move shows both the limits and importance of diplomacy in territorial disputes.

 

On March 18, China and ASEAN gathered in Singapore to pursue consultations on a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea, alongside talks on the implementation of the Declaration of Conduct (DOC). The gathering came at a time of rising preoccupation over a perceived creeping assertiveness by China in pursuing its maritime claims. Just one week before, Manila and Beijing experienced another diplomatic row, after Chinese Coast Guard vessels barred the resupply of Philippine marines based in the Spratly Islands.

In broader terms, several high-profile developments have hinted that China is becoming more inclined to consider the threat and use of force as its preferred vehicle for influence in the South China Sea. China’s considerable maritime build-up has been accompanied by the merging of its maritime agencies into a unified Coast Guard unit, the publication of maps with a 10-dash line covering Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and even the announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, covering the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. All have contributed to turning the South China Sea into “Asia’s cauldron,” as one renowned expert titled his last book. A widely circulated photograph picturing Chinese sailors forming the slogan “The Chinese dream, the dream of a strong military” on the deck of the Liaoning did nothing to help mitigate nervousness over Chinese aims and strategy in the region.

The timing of these China-ASEAN discussions coincided with rising tensions in Eastern Europe around the fate of Crimea. In recent days, neither international law nor European pressure have proved of much value in the face of Russian resolve. Illegal in many respects, the Crimean referendum was still deemed valid in Moscow, which subsequently annexed the region. The Ukrainian military bases in Crimea were rapidly overwhelmed by pro-Russian forces as the last vestiges of political control from Kiev were swept aside, making a return to status quo ante increasingly remote. Russia clearly has the upper hand in Crimea. It successfully promoted its interests through a combination of intimidation and crawling assertiveness while answering European and American criticisms by pointing to Western interventions in Kosovo and Libya. The larger consequences of this strategy for Euro-Russian relations and stability in Eastern Europe remain unclear. However, this demonstration of how, in certain situations, force prevails over diplomacy, a notion long fought by the European Union, has opened a new Pandora’s box.

Certainly, Russia’s bid to bend international norms in its favor through the use of force, and Western reactions to it are being watched with great interest, and probably some trepidation, in Beijing and Southeast Asia. Whether the Crimea issue will have influence in Southeast Asia, in the context of competing territorial claims, is far from clear. However, the Crimean and South China Sea issues have several elements in common. One of the most prominent is the complexity of managing—let alone solving—territorial disputes, especially when dealing with an evolving power. Another is that both cases stress the necessity but limited efficacy of diplomacy.

Confronted with a complex and contradictory China, Southeast Asian countries may derive a sense of urgency from developments in the Crimea. For ASEAN and its members, the crucial question may well be whether they can succeed in convincing China of the long-term benefits of diplomacy over force and fait accompli. It may well be ASEAN’s last chance: Negotiations began 22 years ago, in 1992, and have yet to produce convincing results for either party. If the 2002 Declaration reaffirmed a commitment to international law and freedom of navigation, there has been obvious evidence of unilateralism by certain parties, be they the Filipino government, the Chinese military or even the Hainan authorities. The case may be pressed further in light of the Crimea events: should a Code of Conduct be effectively agreed, with—as China made clear—no deadline for its actual implementation, will it suffice to curtail national frustration from any party, limit tensions and therefore avoid escalation?

Diplomacy is important. It is the channel through which the different stakeholders can showcase and explain their diverging perceptions and interests, communicate, negotiate, and ultimately create a path to de-escalation and stabilization for future common benefit. But it could also prove limited in that it is largely dependent on power configurations and functions under a series of conventions and norms that can either facilitate or constrain discussions. In the Crimean and South China Sea cases, diplomacy is largely, yet not exclusively, undertaken under the particular framework of one international institution (the EU or ASEAN) engaging one great power (Russia or China). Facilitating discussions is the fact that in both situations, stakeholders are connected through a series of strong economic, political and institutional interests. The bad news is that these networks of interests look rather fragile when history becomes a self-asserted, and emotional, argument. Moreover, internal divisions within both the EU and ASEAN have the consequence of blurring the common vision that their members may seek to promote, weakening their negotiating position and constraining the options available to their diplomats. In both cases, the basic worry for the EU and ASEAN alike is to come up with a compelling response to political and military resolve, with international law and negotiations offering little assistance.

The Singapore round of consultations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea produced no notable progress. That is not much of a surprise to experts already of the opinion that the very process is merely cosmetic and deserving of little attention, arguing that China will not give way on what it considers its national and sovereign territory. Other authors have explained that Chinese diplomats are content with the DoC, and will not push for quick progress on a CoC as the latter would inevitably hurt the national interest. Such speculation and doubt over the scope and effectiveness of the negotiations did not alter ASEAN’s official line: sanctions do not help; consultations are always better. Will the future prove that correct? It appears that ASEAN’s bet is to prove that China sees an interest in these talks and would gain in following certain rules not just in terms of image and status but also in promoting its views and “dream” through an ASEAN platform.

Before the recent events in Crimea, ASEAN’s diplomacy was considered adequate by most stakeholders—with the possible exception of the Philippines, which nonetheless ceaselessly appealed to the bloc for help. All claimant countries and their neighbors found an interest in pursuing dual-track negotiations with China, bilateral and multilateral, the latter stage mainly serving, via ASEAN, communication purposes. But now may be the time to consider adding more substance to the discussions, and more glue to the Southeast Asian claimants.

The Crimea is far from the South China Sea, and the two contexts certainly differ in many respects. But Russia’s bold move has shown that resorting to international law to contain a great power’s resolve is not always effective. Even in Moscow, few would disagree, pointing to the invasion of Libya or that of Iraq as counterexamples. Whether the events of the Crimea provide lessons to Chinese and ASEAN diplomats is unknown, but they have made a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea an urgent diplomatic imperative. Success would showcase China’s “peaceful rise” as it would ASEAN’s diplomatic capacity. The efforts of both partners to create stability and security would also be welcome news to a heavily challenged international community.

* Bruno Hellendorff is a Research Fellow and Dr. Sophie Boisseau du Rocher is an Associate Researcher at the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security, Brussels.

March 17, 2014 Strategy Page
 

India is upgrading 600 of its Russian T-90 tanks with new electronics (navigation systems, thermal sights and fire control computers) and air conditioning at a cost of about $42,000 per tank. The main reason for air conditioning in the tanks is not the crew, but the electronics. Russia was asked to develop and install air conditioning but were unable to create a system that could handle the Indian climate. That failure caused a lot of damage to the Russian and foreign made electronics in the Indian T-90s, thus the need for these changes.

One of the most obvious reasons for this upgrade was the heat related problems. Despite years of effort India was unable to get the thermal imaging systems to operate reliably on its T-90 tanks. Most of the thermal imagers on the T-90s were down at any one time. The problem was eventually found to be heat, and the 40 degree (Celsius/104 Fahrenheit) heat is unavoidable because it's a desert area where Indian T-90s have to be stationed. The Indians paid $2.6 million for each tank (half the price of the U.S. M-1). Some 20 percent of the cost was for the thermal sight, similar to the one that makes the U.S. M-1 tank so effective on the battlefield. Unfortunately, tests of the T-90 revealed that the thermal sight system could not handle the heat of Indian summers once the air conditioning failed. Much of the border between India and Pakistan is desert, and most of India's armored units are stationed there. The problem is that while the T-90 had Russian developed air conditioning (something new in Russian tanks), it cannot handle the 100+ degree heat in tropical India. The Russians were unable to develop a suitable upgrade because there was no room inside the tank to install a more powerful, but larger, cooling system. The American M-1 air conditioning has been able to handle extreme heat, so the Indians knew it could be done and eventually found a supplier who could build a system that worked and fit into the space available.

The T-90 went into low level production in 1993, but was too expensive for the Russian army to buy more than a few of them. India eventually became the biggest user. The T-90 is based on the T-72, but has composite armor (plus reactive armor) and better electronics. The 50 ton tank uses a 125mm smooth bore gun, and can also fire the 9M119M Refleks-M missile (to 4,000 meters) at ground or air (helicopter) targets. The tank carries 43 tank shells or missiles, 22 of them in the autoloader carousel. India agreed to buy 310 T-90s initially and is to have over 1,600 of them by the end of the decade, most of them assembled in India using Russian made parts.

 One big reason India bought the T-90 is the 9M119 (AT-11) anti-tank missile, which weighs 23.6 kg (52 pounds), has a range of 100-4,000 meters and uses semi-automatic laser beam guidance system (the gunner keeps his sight on the target and the missile homes in on that.) Maximum time of flight is about 12 seconds. While the missile has a tandem warhead, making it useful against tanks with reactive armor, it can also be used against helicopters. The missile warhead can penetrate about 700mm of armor. The guidance system is quite accurate, hitting the target 80 percent of the time at maximum range in tests. The guidance system is also easy to use, making less well trained crews more effective. However, India insisted on building the missiles under license. This has created problems, as the Indian manufacturer has not been able to achieve sufficient quality control levels.

India deployed its first T-90 regiment (45 tanks) in May, 2002. The first T-90s were delivered to India in late November 2001. When they work, the T-90s are more than a match for anything the Pakistanis or Chinese have.

01 April 2014 Defense Studies

EADS-N.A., Herndon, Va., was awarded a $34,018,858 modification (P00772) to sole-source, Foreign Military Sales contract W58RGZ-06-C-0194 for six Lakota helicopters with the environmental control unit, mission equipment package and airborne radio communication (ARC-231) radios for the Royal Thai Army. 

Fiscal 2010 other procurement, Army funds in the amount of $34,018,857 were obligated at the time of the award. Estimated completion date is April 3, 2015. Work will be performed in Columbus, Miss. 

Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity.

(US DoD)

31.03.2014 Helen Chachaty - journal-aviation.com

L’agence d’acquisition d’équipements militaires de la Corée du Sud (DAPA) a officiellement lancé ce 31 mars son programme d’acquisition pour l’achat d’avions ravitailleurs. Baptisé « KC-X », l’appel d’offres vise à équiper l’armée de l’air, qui ne dispose pas à l’heure actuelle d’avions ravitailleurs pour sa flotte de chasseurs.

La DAPA annonce également qu’une réunion d’information se tiendra le 8 avril prochain, afin de détailler les exigences techniques liées à ce futur contrat. Les industriels intéressés ont jusqu’au 30 juin 2014 pour faire parvenir leurs offres.

Boeing et Airbus devraient sans surprise s’affronter sur ce nouveau marché : L’avionneur américain pourrait en effet proposer son KC-46A Pegasus, tandis que le constructeur européen cherchera à placer son A330 MRTT (Airbus Defence & Space), qui a par ailleurs déjà remporté quelques beaux succès à l’étranger, le dernier en date au Qatar il y a quelques jours à peine.

MOSCOU, 31 mars - RIA Novosti

L'Inde compte créer prochainement un nouveau corps alpin de choc comptant 90.000 hommes, qui devrait être déployé à la frontière chinoise, a annoncé le 25 mars le commandant de l'armée de terre indienne Bikram Singh. A ces fins, il est selon lui nécessaire de débloquer plus de 3 milliards de dollars supplémentaires dans le budget militaire pour compenser le déficit de munitions, écrit lundi le quotidien Izvestia.

New Delhi redoute l'escalade du conflit frontalier avec la Chine en raison du litige autour d'un territoire de 140.000 km². C'est la raison pour laquelle le nouveau corps alpin représenterait une force conséquente: 32 bataillons d'infanterie appuyés par trois divisions blindées, l'artillerie et la défense antiaérienne. Il devrait recevoir des chars russes T-90S, des obusiers M777 et des hélicoptères Apache américains, ainsi que des systèmes de défense antiaérienne israéliens.

L'argent pour la création de ce corps arrivera à partir du 1er avril, le début de l'année fiscale en Inde. Son armement complet devrait s'achever d'ici 2019. Mais uniquement si le budget alloué est suffisant.

Selon le général Bikram Singh, si le budget n'était pas revu à la hausse, les "troupes atteindront la capacité de mener des opérations militaires en 40 jours", au lieu de 20, tel que prévu par les directives.

Ali Ahamed, de l'Institut des études stratégiques et de défense, a rappelé que Bikram Singh n'était pas le premier général indien à pointer les sérieuses lacunes de l'état opérationnel de l'armée.

"Son prédécesseur Vijay Kumar Singh avait écrit il y a deux ans une lettre à ce sujet au premier ministre. La fuite de cette lettre dans la presse avait provoqué un scandale au sein de l'establishment indien. Le général a été accusé de haute trahison pour avoir rendu publiques ces informations, certains ayant pointé la motivation politique de son acte. Effectivement, immédiatement après sa démission, il avait rejoint l'opposition. Cependant, on peut difficilement reprocher au commandant actuel de l'armée de terre d'être déloyal", a-t-il déclaré.

"Des achats de nouveaux armements sont prévus ces prochaines années: du matériel d'artillerie, des systèmes de défense sol-air, des canons antichars et des hélicoptères d'attaque. Evidemment, ils auront besoin de nouveaux modèles de munitions. C'est la raison pour laquelle les 3 milliards de dollars sont nécessaires dès aujourd'hui, et pas dans les années à venir", a expliqué l'état-major de l'armée de terre.

Toutefois, l'allocation des fonds ne règlera pas le problème à elle seule. Le représentant de la chambre de commerce et d'industrie Arvind Kumar estime qu'il est nécessaire de fixer au niveau gouvernemental une directive exigeant, en cas d'achat d'armements étrangers, la production en Inde des munitions destinées à ces armements.

"Cela réduirait significativement leur prix et permettrait de gérer efficacement les réserves stratégiques et d'organiser des exercices militaires à moindre coût. A l'heure actuelle, l'Inde dispose d'une quarantaine d'entreprises qui pourraient participer à cette tâche. Cependant, une modernisation en profondeur de ces dernières s'imposerait", a déclaré Arvind Kumar.

Etant donné que 70% des armements de l'Inde sont des systèmes soviétiques et russes, il conviendra de régler la question des achats de munitions en collaboration avec Moscou.