Overblog Tous les blogs Top blogs Entreprises & Marques Tous les blogs Entreprises & Marques
Suivre ce blog Administration + Créer mon blog
MENU
28 décembre 2012 5 28 /12 /décembre /2012 08:30

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-EsS0lAbI67U/UNhCYI-29nI/AAAAAAAAWeY/zftvn9NdiOA/s1600/Z9+Harbin_KL+Yim.jpg

Chinese made Z-9 helicopter. (photo : K.L. Yim)

 

 24.12.2012 Defense Studies

 

 
Choppers Cambodia-bound
 
Cambodia's air force will be strengthened by the arrival of 12 military helicopters, including four attack choppers, from China next year, government officials said yesterday.
 
 
Prak Sokha, a spokesman for the Royal Cambodian Air Force, told the Post yesterday that 25 Cambodian pilots and mechanics were training in China in preparation for the Kingdom receiving the Chinese-made Z-9 helicopters between April and August.
 
 
“We expect that by April, some of them will finish their training and will return with two helicopters,” he said.
 
Of the 12 helicopters, four would be used for fighting purposes, six for general transport and two for transporting high-ranking officials, Sokha said.
 
 
These comments echoed earlier reports quoting Royal Cambodian Arm Forces commander Pol Sarouen and Royal Cambodian Air Force commander Soeung Samnang saying similar things.
 
 
“What I am not so clear on is whether the Cambodian government has bought these or whether they have been granted to us,” Sokha said.The government, boasting of a new era of cooperation with China, announced in August last year it had struck a deal with the superpower to receive a batch of Z-9 helicopters for $195 million. Media reports at the time suggested a loan from China would cover the cost.
 
 
About 100 tanks and 40 armoured personnel carriers, believed to be from Ukraine, arrived at Sihanoukville port in late October, one of the largest single shipments of military vehicles in Cambodia’s recent history.
 
 
Sam Rainsy Party lawmaker Son Chhay said he was concerned about the percentage of the national budget allocated to military spending and the fact the government was making decisions about purchases without debate in parliament.
 
“We have doubts about equipment that is not accounted for or [deals] that are not transparent,” he said.
 
 
Chhay said military equipment from China was often expensive and of poor quality and the origin and volume of Cambodia’s military acquisitions were a topic for parliament.
 
 
“We as parliamentarians have a right to know,” he said.
 
 
Mey Vann, a director from the Ministry of Finance, could not be reached for comment.
 
 

(PhnomPenhPost)

Partager cet article
Repost0
21 décembre 2012 5 21 /12 /décembre /2012 12:35

Yi Long UAV pic1

Chinese Yi-Long (Wing Loong) UCAV

 

20 December 2012 William Gallo – Pacific Sentinel

 

Analysts say China is using its rapidly expanding defense budget to make impressive advances in drone technology, prompting some to worry that the United States' global dominance in the market could soon be challenged.

 

At a recent biennial airshow in the southern coastal city of Zhuhai, China unveiled a new generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Long-time observers of Chinese military capability reported the drones on display were bigger and more sophisticated than in the past.

 

Though many of the prototypes and models on display at the Zhuhai air show did not have explicit military purposes, others appeared to be clones of U.S. drones, such as the Predator or Reaper, which have both been used in deadly missions on suspected militants.

 

There is no evidence suggesting China plans to use its drones in a similar manner as the United States, and observers say Beijing is still likely far behind Washington in drone technology.

 

US Defense Report Calls China's drone advances "alarming"

 

But a report published in July by the Defense Science Board, a committee that advises the U.S. Defense Department, suggested that Beijing's ramped up spending and research on drones could threaten U.S. supremacy in the sector.

 

The unclassified report called China's recent focus on UAVs "alarming," warning Beijing could "easily match or outpace U.S. spending on unmanned systems, rapidly close the technology gaps and become a formidable global competitor in unmanned systems."

 

Richard Bitzinger, an ex-CIA analyst and senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says he dismisses parts of that report as being "melodramatic."

 

"There's certainly cause for concern and for watchfulness. But how could the Chinese outspend the United States on drones? I just don't see it," he said. "The United States has literally thousands of drones."

 

How has China used drones?

 

Bitzinger says it is difficult to determine how China, or any other country, uses drones, partly because of their often-times covert nature. He says drone programs with obvious military purposes are often disguised as only having humanitarian roles, such as disaster relief, counter-piracy or crime-fighting.

 

"Kind of all these warm fuzzies, these kind of 'mom-and-apple-pie,' benign things that you can say 'That's what we're building the drones for, and oh, by the way, we have a military purpose for them, as well," said Bitzinger. "When I hear all the kind of uplifting and peaceful-sounding kind of things [about drones], I think 'So what. They can be converted in a matter of hours, if not sooner, into an offensive, or at least an explicitly military, capability.'"

 

For China, state media said those reportedly peaceful missions include patrolling maritime regions. In September, the Xinhua news agency reported that China's State Oceanic Administration would step up the use of drones to "strengthen marine surveillance" in disputed areas of the South China Sea. A government report earlier this year called for 11 drone bases to be established along China's coastline by 2015.

 

But other missions were seemingly more mundane. The state-run Global Times reported in June that Beijing police is using a drone to spot illegal opium poppies in rural areas of the capital. Last year, the paper said the department would also use unmanned aircraft to "monitor traffic accidents, conduct aerial surveillance, or help with rescue operations."

 

So far there are no known instances of China carrying out deadly attacks with weaponized UAVs. But Li Yidong, a designer for the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, told the Global Times that one of the UAVs on display at the Zhuhai air show appears to have carried out 20 missions and fired 15 missiles, judging from the number of red stars and missile patterns on the drone.

 

At the Zhuhai air show, Huang Wei, the director of a drone program at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation told the Global Times that UAVs were, "as the Americans say," fit for missions that are "dirty, dangerous and dull."

 

Possible deadly missions in the future?

 

Bitzinger warns that if Beijing did decide to use drones for explicitly offensive missions, such as targeting suspected militants, it would likely draw on the experience of the U.S. military, which has used the highly effective unmanned planes to target militants in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

 

"The United States is basically field-testing the whole idea of drone warfare," said Bitzinger. "Armed hunter-killer drones have been going very well for the United States. And people walk away with this as a lesson. One of the lessons is, "Gee, it would sure be nice to have one of those things."

 

Wendell Minnick, Asia bureau chief at Defense News, says there is no evidence to suggest that China desires to carry out deadly drone strikes. But he says that if it did, it would likely point to U.S. drone use as justification.

 

"There's certainly an argument to be made that if the U.S. can make the same type of judgment call and justification for hitting militants in Pakistan, what's to stop the Chinese from hitting Tibetan or Uighur rebel groups that are technically within China's own sovereign country?" he asks.

 

The danger of Chinese drone exports

 

Another area of concern for the United States is that China will increasingly export its relatively inexpensive drone technology to nations around the world. That fear was heightened when the Global Times said in November that "some foreign sales" were reported at the Zhuhai air show.

 

Minnick says that Chinese drones, many of which are specifically produced for the export market, are very attractive for nations that cannot afford or are otherwise prevented from purchasing the U.S. alternatives.

 

"Our drone exports are very expensive platforms, very sophisticated. The Chinese produce a much cheaper variety that basically does the same job," said Minnick. "The Chinese have got cheap labor, technological know-how, and are looking at an export market that's growing."

 

But Bitzinger says price is only one factor that nations consider when purchasing foreign military equipment. He warns Beijing will not likely become the "Wal-Mart" of international drone sales anytime soon.

 

"I'm sure they'd like to be, but the question is, do you want to buy Chinese equipment?" asks Bitzinger. "The reliability, the maintenance of these things is still unproven, and there's a lot of political baggage that comes with buying Chinese [products]."

 

Bitzinger also says Chinese exports of drones may be limited by international arms sales regulations that govern exports of weapons and "dual-use" goods that have both civilian and military purposes.

 

Still, Bitzinger and other analysts warn against being dismissive of Chinese drone capability.

 

"I think at this point, they're still very much in that developmental, exploratory phase," he said. "That aside, I don't see them getting out of the business. I think they'll continue to work on it and get better."

Partager cet article
Repost0
21 décembre 2012 5 21 /12 /décembre /2012 08:45

DF31A Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

 

December 19, 2012: Strategy Page

 

On December 7th China conducted another test of its truck mounted DF-31A ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile). This was the second such test in the last four months and indicates that the DF-31A has matured after two decades of being questionable. Seventeen years ago China put the DF-31 into service, sort of. This was China's first solid fuel ICBM (and had a range of over 8,000 kilometers) and was roughly equivalent to the U.S. 30 ton Minuteman I (which entered service in 1962 with a range of 9,900 kilometers). The DF-31 weighs about 41 tons, 20 meters (62 feet) long, and 2.25 meters (7 feet) in diameter. It was designed for use on submarines, land silos, and mobile launchers. The truck mounted ones halt at those "parking lots in the middle of nowhere," visible in satellite pictures of Qinghai province, and fire from positions the missile guidance system has already been programmed with. The DF-31 has been shown stored in a TEL (transporter, erector, launcher) vehicle. Driving these vehicles along special highways in remote areas provides more protection from counterattacks rather than using a reinforced silo. The improved DF-31A has multiple (up to 5) warheads and more range (up to 12,000 kilometers, which could cover most of the United States).

 

The DF-31 has been in development for over twenty years and only had its first successful launch twelve years ago. It's now believed to have a reliable and accurate guidance system, as well as a third stage that carries multiple 50 kiloton nuclear warheads. Only about a dozen DF-31s are in service, plus about a dozen DF-31As. Many of these appear to be aimed at European Russia.

 

Last July the new DF-41 ICBM with multiple warheads was tested. China can apparently put 3-10 warheads in the DF-41 final stage. The DF-41 has not been displayed publicly but thanks to most Chinese having cell phones, and many knowing how to send photos to foreign web sites without getting arrested, there are photos of the DF-41 available. The DF-41 appears to have had a lot of development problems because few have been built and fewer (less than a dozen) put into service. The DF-41 is the only Chinese ICBM that can reach all of the United States.

 

Three years ago China announced that its nuclear armed ballistic missiles were not aimed at anyone. Like most countries, China has long refused to say who its nuclear armed missiles are aimed at. Most of those missiles only have enough range to hit Russia or India, or other nearby nations. For a long time most were very definitely aimed at Russia, which had rocky relations with China from the 1960s to the 1990s. But after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the new and much smaller Russia became friendlier with the wealthier (more capitalist but still run by communists) China. Relations between China and India also warmed up and then went into a deep freeze during the past decade.

 

China is believed to have over 400 nuclear warheads, most of them installed on ballistic missiles. Only a few dozen of these missiles can reach the United States. These include the older (and about to be retired) DF-5, plus the newer DF-31A and DF-41. For the last two decades China has had about two dozen DF-5 ICBMs, their only missiles that can reach the United States. Few of these are believed to be operational because of reliability and maintenance problems. The U.S. has since installed 18 ICBM interceptor missile systems in Alaska. These are to deal with North Korean missiles but could also destroy most Chinese missiles headed for the United States. Thus it makes sense for China to simply say that it is not aiming any of its missiles at anyone. Modern guidance systems can be quickly (in less than an hour) programmed for a new target, so it doesn't really matter that, normally, the missiles have no target information in them. The DF-5s, moreover, are liquid fueled and the considerable activity required to ready them for launch can be detected by spy satellites.

 

The DF-5s are to be replaced by solid fuel DF-41s. These missiles can be moved, erected, and launched from a special truck. With a 15,000 kilometer range they can reach all of the United States. The third stage contains 3-10 warheads, each with an explosive yield of at least 100 KT. The DF-41s appear similar to the American 36 ton Minuteman III (a 1960s design that has been much upgraded since then).

 

India is of growing concern to China but there are shorter range ballistic missiles, like the DF-21, to deal with that threat. The Chinese introduced the DF-21 in 1999, and now has over a hundred in service. Many have non-nuclear warheads. This missile has a range of over 1,800 kilometers and can haul a 300 kiloton nuclear warhead. It's a two stage, 15 ton, solid fuel rocket. Launched from Tibet, the DF-21 can reach most major targets in India.

 

Then there is a submarine launched missile the JL (Julang) 2 SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missile). This missile has had a lot of problems as have the SSBNs (ballistic missile carrying nuclear subs) that carried them. The 42 ton JL-2 has a range of 8,000 kilometers and would enable China to aim missiles at any target in the United States from a 094 class SSBN cruising off Hawaii or Alaska. Each 094 boat can carry twelve of these missiles, which are naval versions of the existing land based 42 ton DF-31 ICBM. The JL-2 was supposed to have entered service three years ago but kept failing test launches. No Chinese SSBN has ever gone on a combat cruise because these boats have been very unreliable.

 

About two thirds of Chinese nuclear warheads are believed to be in missile warheads, most of them DF-21s. Normally, these warheads are stored separately and mated to the missiles only for actual use or the occasional training exercise.

Partager cet article
Repost0
20 décembre 2012 4 20 /12 /décembre /2012 08:45

Agni V Launch

 

December 19, 2012 Vivek Kapur - IDSA COMMENT

 

In the face of international opposition, North Korea launched a rocket on 12 December 2012 to place a satellite in orbit.1 Its earlier four attempts had all failed; the first of these was in 1998 and the most recent failure was in April 2012.2 The “successful” launch on 12 December 2012 places North Korea among the few nations (United States, Russia, China, Japan, Europe, India, Pakistan and possibly Iran) that possess the ability to build long range ballistic missiles. What has added to international concerns about North Korea’s missile programme is its transfer of missiles banned by multilateral treaties and conventions to countries such as Pakistan and Iran as well as its support for international terrorist groups.3

 

India has no direct dispute with North Korea and the distance separating the two countries serves to further reduce threat perceptions. India’s interest in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes comes from the reported clandestine co-operation between North Korea, Pakistan and Iran in this regard. There have been persistent reports that North Korea has assisted Pakistan’s missile programme in return for Pakistani assistance with its nuclear weaponisation programme. The current Pakistani ballistic missile capability extends to a reported range capability of about 1500 to 2500 km, which is equivalent to that of the North Korean Taepodong-I missile and its further developments. The test conducted on 12 December 2012 by the Unha-3 rocket gives North Korea a range capability of 5500+km or the equivalent of the Taepodong-II missile.4 India’s Agni-V missile was claimed to have a range of 5500 km and falling into the classification of an ICBM. This is a range capability not currently possessed by Pakistan and one, if inducted by Pakistan from North Korea, would be detrimental for Indian security. Iran has also been suspected of being a recipient of North Korean ballistic missile technology.5 Iran’s acquisition of long range ballistic missile capability from North Korea would further complicate India’s security situation. Beyond this direct impact of North Korean missile proliferation, India, as a responsible member of the international community, has no choice but to support international action and restrictions on countries that act and behave in a manner that is found unacceptable by the rest of the world.

 

India has ballistic missile armed countries on its Northern as well as Western borders. Further, territorial disputes exist with both of these neighbours. The steady spread of ballistic missile technology to ever more states continues unabated. Although the likelihood is remote presently, there is no guarantee that in the near to medium term future such technology will not be available with more of India’s neighbours. There is also the alarming, but above zero, possibility of ballistic missiles falling into the hands of terrorist groups especially in “failing” or “failed” states such as Pakistan whose military includes several sympathisers of terrorist groups. (Two terrorist organisations, Hamas and Hezbollah, have already demonstrated the ability to obtain and use such weapons – Fajr-5 missiles with ranges of 75 km – against Israel).6 Such developments in its neighbourhood have adverse implications for India.

 

No country is in a position to be able to control the proliferation of ballistic missile technology all by itself, India included. Even missiles with non-nuclear payloads could be a major threat to India’s security and economy. Hence, if unable to avoid the proliferation of ballistic missiles in South Asia, India would have no choice but to work towards countering this threat. Nuclear armed ballistic missile attacks would be countered by India’s declared Nuclear Doctrine and executed by the Indian strategic forces. The challenge here would lie in dealing with situations where the country responsible for the launch of a nuclear attack cannot be easily identified, as in the case of missiles launched from sea.

 

There are two possible solutions to countering the conventional payload ballistic missile threat. The first would be to harden all population centres and other vital facilities against such attacks. Given the very large number of these and the ever increasing range and accuracy of ballistic missiles available with an ever increasing group of countries, this is unlikely to be feasible or even prove sufficient. The second option would be to develop a viable Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is already working on a ‘only terminal stage intercept’ BMD system, which has achieved several notable successes during its trials to intercept target ballistic missiles in the exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric stages. Ballistic missile proliferation in India’s neighbourhood requires the development of a more capable BMD system.

 

While the DRDO’s BMD project is reportedly proceeding well and should be available for initial deployment in the near future, it is only a terminal phase system as of now. There is a need to extend the current capability towards the ability to engage ballistic missiles during their mid-course and boost stages as well as during the terminal stage of their flight. DRDO may need to explore air-based, Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) and Electromagnetic (EM) gun based solutions in addition to its current land based ‘anti-missile missile’ BMD system to achieve a more robust and capable BMD system or a system of systems capable of reliable boost phase, mid-course phase and terminal phase ballistic missile intercept and destruction.

 

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology has continued despite international efforts to curtail it. This proliferation poses threats to India’s security. India may face a conventional as well as nuclear ballistic missile threat in the near to medium term future. The possible spread of these ballistic missile capabilities has the potential to further complicate India’s security situation. India is preparing to deal with the nuclear ballistic missile threat from its potential adversaries through its nuclear doctrine and nuclear forces. However, the increasing ballistic missile threat would require a combination of developing a full spectrum (boost phase, mid-course phase and terminal phase) BMD capability. The current DRDO BMD programme needs to be extended to attain such a capability.

  1. 1. “UN condemns North Korea over rocket launch”, http://www.dw.de/un-condemns-north-korea-over-rocket-launch/a-16450004, accessed on 17 Dec 2012.
  2. 2. “UN Security Council condemns North Korea rocket launch”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20697922, accessed on 13 Dec 2012.
  3. 3. See, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/overview.html and http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-5.htm accessed on 17 Dec 2012.
  4. 4. Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat”, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR..., Pp 11, accessed on 13 Dec 2012.
  5. 5. “N. Korea rocket launch draws more worry than Iran's”, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46988250/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/n-kore..., accessed on 13 Dec 2012.
  6. 6. “Iran supplied Hamas with Fajr-5 missile technology”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/21/iran-supplied-hamas-missile-..., accessed on 17 Dec 2012.
Partager cet article
Repost0
11 décembre 2012 2 11 /12 /décembre /2012 11:35

AAD LAUNCHED (1)-23 nov 2012 source Livefist

 

December 5, 2012: Strategy Page

 

On November 24th India held more tests of its ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system. This one involved intercepting multiple incoming ballistic missiles and was declared a success. As a result of this, and several other successful tests earlier this year, Indian missile development officials believe their anti-missile system is ready for mass production and deployment. This would provide some Indian cities protection from Pakistani or Chinese ballistic missiles.

 

The Indian system uses two types of interceptors. The Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) missile is the larger of the two and is used for high altitude (50-80 kilometers up) interception. The short range Advanced Air Defense (AAD) missile is used for low altitude (up to 30 kilometers) intercepts. The two missiles, in conjunction with a radar system based on the Israeli Green Pine (used with the Arrow anti-missile missile), provide defense from ballistic missiles fired as far as 5,000 kilometers away. A third interceptor, the PDV, is a hypersonic missile that can take down missiles as high as 150 kilometers and is still in development. India is the fifth nation to develop such anti-missile technology.

 

The Indian system has been in development for over a decade. Ten years ago India ordered two Israeli Green Pine anti-ballistic missile radars. That equipment was used six years ago in a successful Indian test, where one ballistic missile was fired at another "incoming" one. The Israeli Green Pine radar was originally developed for Israel's Arrow anti-ballistic missile system. Arrow was built, in cooperation with the United States, to defend Israel from Iranian and Syrian ballistic missiles. India has since developed, with Israel, the Swordfish radar, which has similar capabilities to the Green Pine and has been operational for two years. Swordfish is part of a system that integrates data from satellites and other sources in order to detect and track incoming missiles.

 

The interceptor missiles and the fire control systems were designed and built in India, although more Israeli technology may have been purchased to speed things along. India wanted to buy the entire Israeli Arrow system but the United States refused to allow the sale (which involved a lot of American technology). The Indian ABM system wasn’t supposed to become operational for another two years. But the developers believe it is ready now and are asking parliament for money to start building systems to defend places like New Delhi (where parliament is). Even so, it’s doubtful that the ABM system would be operational, even if just around New Delhi, by 2014. Then there is the question of just how effective the India ABM system really is. India has a shabby reputation with developing weapons. Projects go on for decades without ever producing operational weapons. But joint-ventures with other countries (like Russia, France, and Israel) have been more successful. Israel is believed to be more heavily involved in this ABM than official pronouncements indicate. If so, this would be a good thing, even if the Indians don’t like to publicize it.

 

China and Pakistan could only defeat the Indian ABM defenses by firing more missiles at the same time than the Indians could handle. It's also possible to equip warheads with decoys in an attempt to get the interceptor missile to miss. Israel has technology designed to deal with these decoys and India can probably purchase that. But against an overwhelming number of incoming missiles, some are going to get through.

Partager cet article
Repost0
1 décembre 2012 6 01 /12 /décembre /2012 08:00
China Grows A Pair

November 30, 2012: Strategy page

 

China has put two helicopter gunship designs into production. Both the "back-up design" (WZ-19) and the troubled (and delayed) favorite WZ-10 have entered service. The WZ-19 armed scout helicopter has been spotted in the air for two years now, most recently painted in military colors. The WZ-19 was earlier known as the Z-9W. The WZ-19 is yet another Chinese helicopter based on the Eurocopter Dauphin (which has been built under license in China for two decades). The WZ-19 is a 4.5 ton, two seat armed helicopter. It can carry a 23mm autocannon and up to a ton of munitions (missiles, usually). Cruising speed is 245 kilometers an hour and range is 700 kilometers. The WZ-19 is basically an upgraded Z-9W.

 

China Grows A Pair

China has also been developing (since the 1990s) a larger (7 ton) and more complex WZ-10 helicopter gunship. This project has been going on for 14 years and several prototypes have been built. Attempts to buy or steal helicopter gunship technology from Russia and South Africa failed. Two years ago some of the prototypes were sent to Chinese Army aviation units for field testing. While not a failure, the Z-19 was apparently seen as a more capable combat helicopter. The WZ-10 had a lot of problems and was, at one point, in danger of being abandoned. The Chinese persevered and fixed most of the defects and put WZ-10 into production. Because the Z-19 is basically an armed scout helicopter and China still wants something more like the American AH-64 Apache, the WZ-10 was made to work, after a fashion.

Partager cet article
Repost0
28 novembre 2012 3 28 /11 /novembre /2012 13:15

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6BadjlBd8x4/Trdj6bglMyI/AAAAAAAAAhk/wgR8UyLBpFE/s1600/South_China_Sea_Map.jpg

 

27 November 2012 By Sarosh Bana-  Pacific Ssentinel.

 

US President Obama was hard pressed to play the pacifist at a rather fractious ASEAN summit in Cambodia, where discussions on the maritime disputes of some of the grouping’s 10 members with China boiled over. The three-day annual summit of the Association of South-East Asian Nations concluded on 20 November without resolving the dispute between these countries and a by far militarily superior China. The impasse thwarted the 45-year-old grouping’s efforts towards deepening cohesion within this economically vibrant region and its aspirations of transforming itself into an EU-like community by the end of 2015.
 
Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over almost the entire South China and East China seas have sparked disputes with its neighbours such as Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. Apart from Japan and Taiwan, the rest are ASEAN member countries, as also Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand. The bone of contention has been the various island enclaves, not of much value in themselves, but the possession of which would provide strategic, resource-rich continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that extend 200 nautical miles from the low-water shoreline.
 
Neither the United States nor China is a member of ASEAN, but each has votaries in the group. The flashpoint at the summit was the draft statement of the chairman – Cambodia, a staunch ally of Beijing – that pointed to a consensus against internationalising the South China Sea issue. This agitated the representatives of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia and Singapore. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, in particular, rose to challenge what he said was Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s attempt to preclude any debate on the territorial disputes and divert the focus onto economic issues instead.
 
Cautioning against allowing such disputes to escalate, Obama urged the gathering to take steps to ease tensions. He, however, avoided any talk on this issue in his meeting with outgoing Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on the last day of the summit. Washington has nevertheless advocated a “code of conduct” that would avert any clashes in the disputed territories.
 
China has long held the position that whatever disputes that may arise should be resolved through consultations and negotiations by the concerned sovereign states. In Phnom Penh it, however, said it was open to debating the issue within ASEAN, though without the involvement of any other parties, an oblique reference to the United States.
 
Coincidentally or not, China’s maritime disputes with its neighbours in the littoral have been gaining global attention ever since Obama’s announcement in January 2012 of his country’s “pivot” strategy in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are posing a threat to this fastest growing economic region in the world and its vital waterways, confounding diplomatic efforts, rousing hostilities and heralding a geopolitical power struggle between the world’s two leading economies – the United States and China.
 
Further, anti-Japan street protests swept across China in September as the two largest economies in Asia sparred over a disputed island territory in the East China Sea which each claimed as its own. Potentially vast gas and oil fields have been estimated off the shores of the island, called Diaoyu by China and Senkaku by Japan. The two neighbours strove to keep the naval conflict from spiralling, mindful of their entrenched commercial ties that have resulted in two-way trade reaching a record $345 billion last year, China being the biggest trading partner of Japan.
 
While the Asia-Pacific has hitherto been driven by commercial interests, the widening unrest in the sea lanes that are the lifeline of this region may eventually compel the validity of a military front on the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Much in the manner in which China’s growing might is being perceived today, the 28-member NATO had been founded in 1949 in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, with its prioritised purpose having been to deter Soviet expansionism. NATO had codified cooperation in military preparedness among the allied signatories by stipulating that “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all”.
 
Though Asia-Pacific countries are keen on safeguarding their territorial interests, they are at the same time anxious not to let regional conflicts flare into Asia’s next war. However, to lay the foundations of overall peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, a NATO-like security structure would need to be inclusive, having China within its ambit.
 
The return of Asia-Pacific to the centre of world affairs is the great power shift of the 21st century. This economically integrated region is traversed by half the world’s commercial shipping worth $5 trillion of trade a year. More than 4.2 billion people live there, constituting 61 per cent of the world’s population. And apart from straddling vital supply chains, it holds dense fishing grounds and potentially enormous oil and natural gas reserves, though at present it is a net importer of fossil fuels. Energy-hungry export-driven economies in the region, heavily dependent on raw material and fuel imports, are keen on exercising their suzerainty over the regional Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) that are critical to the survival of the entire Asia-Pacific community.
 
Washington’s “pivot” strategy is juxtapositioning its desire to be neutral with the imperative to raise its already formidable profile in the Asia-Pacific. Its numerous military bases in the region include 17 in Japan and 12 in South Korea, while it also has a presence in Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Guam and Singapore. Obama’s “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific entails the relocation of 60 per cent of America’s naval assets – up from 50 per cent today – to the region by 2020. The drawdown in Afghanistan, according to US deputy Defence Secretary Ashton Carter, will release naval surface combatants as well as naval intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities, as also more Army and Marine Corps. EP-3 signals reconnaissance aircraft have already moved from CENTCOM (Central Command) to PACOM (Pacific Command). There will be a net increase of one aircraft carrier, seven destroyers, 10 Littoral Combat Ships and two submarines in the Pacific in the coming years. America’s military outpost of Guam is being readied as a strategic hub for the Western Pacific and Marines are being forward-stationed there. A full US Marine task force will also be established by 2016 in Australia, a key Asia-Pacific partner of the United States. The US Air Force will shift unmanned and manned reconnaissance aircraft from Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific, apart from space, cyber and bomber forces.
 
The question remains whether this “rebalance” is aimed at containing China’s growing economic and military might or bolstering the American presence in the region. Beijing views Washington’s proposal as an attempt to curb Chinese influence across the region and to embolden countries to brazen out Beijing on the maritime disputes.
 
America’s concerted force multiplication in the region betrays the intent to forge some sort of a military front like NATO. “There is no multilateral organisation like NATO in the region,” notes Ashton Carter. “And in the absence of an overarching security structure, the US military presence has played a pivotal role over those last past 60 years, providing nations with the space and the security necessary to make their own principled choices.”
 
A NATO-like platform may not evolve soon, but appears inevitable in light of the rising volatility in the region. The similarities between now and at the time of NATO’s creation cannot be lost, notwithstanding the fact that the United States and China have very high stakes in their relationship, unlike the Cold War that had riven Washington and Moscow. Be that as it may, while announcing America’s renewed engagement in the Pacific, Secretary Clinton told the Pacific Islands Forum that “the Pacific is big enough for all of us”. There’s a lot of merit in keeping it that way.
 
Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) and can be found HERE.
Partager cet article
Repost0
27 novembre 2012 2 27 /11 /novembre /2012 18:55

J-15 test 12

 

Nov. 27, 2012 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: China Daily; published Nov. 27, 2012)

 

Fighter Jets Successfully Land On Aircraft Carrier

 

China has moved closer to its goal of building a blue-water navy, with pilots successfully landing on and taking off from the Liaoning, the country's first aircraft carrier, according to military experts.

 

Dai Mingmeng, a squadron leader from an aviation regiment of the East China Sea Fleet, landed a J-15 carrier-based fighter jet on the Liaoning on Friday morning, marking a milestone for the People's Liberation Army navy, according to the Beijing-based Mirror Evening News.

 

Following Dai, another four pilots also landed J-15s on the carrier and later took off, the PLA Daily reported on Sunday.

 

"This is a new landmark in the Chinese navy's efforts to develop the combat capability of its carrier battle group," Du Wenlong, a senior researcher at the PLA Academy of Military Science, said on Sunday.

 

"The carrier-borne fighter jet is the core of a carrier battle group and the success of landing and take-off tests is of unparalleled importance as pilots further their training," he said, adding that the successful exercises indicate the Liaoning and the J-15 have met the navy's requirements.

 

"It also proves that our personnel training system for the aircraft carrier is successful."

 

Xu Yongling, a former test pilot and military aviation expert, said: "The landing operation is totally up to the pilot's manual manipulation of the aircraft. Together with the risks of the whole landing process, it is far more difficult than performing an outer space mission.

 

"The achievement and significance of the first landing on the carrier is equivalent to a breakthrough in aerospace exploration," he said.

 

China Central Television broadcast footage of the landing and take-off on Sunday. It showed a J-15, which took off from an airport in an unidentified location, approaching the Liaoning.

 

The pilot then lowered the tailhook, a hook attached to the rear of the plane and used to rapidly decelerate during landings, and engaged the second arresting cable. The J-15 taxied about 50 meters and stopped.

 

The plane folded its wings and technical checks were made. After take-off preparations were complete, the pilot restarted the engines and flew off the deck.

 

According to Southern Metropolis Daily, the earliest landing test that was disclosed on the Internet took place on Nov 20 when a J-15 landed on the Liaoning. Details about the earlier test remain unknown.

 

Advanced jet unveiled

 

The Liaoning, a refitted Soviet-era carrier, entered active service in September and is now in the middle of its second sea trial after joining the navy.

 

Since being commissioned to the PLA navy, its crew has completed more than 100 training and test programs, according to Xinhua News Agency.

 

Earlier this month, reports and photos appeared on the PLA Daily and the website of the Defense Ministry stated that the Liaoning successfully completed a touch-and-go test on Oct 29. The reports did not disclose which aircraft carried out the test and how many jets were involved in the operation.

 

However, according to military observers, it was conducted by a J-15 fighter jet.

 

The news of the landing test also marked the debut of the J-15 as China's first generation multi-purpose carrier-borne fighter jet, the PLA navy said.

 

It has been given an official nickname - Flying Shark.

 

According to aviation fans and Western media reports, the twin-engine J-15 was developed by Shenyang Aircraft Corp, a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corp of China, and at least 12 prototypes have been manufactured and used in tests.

 

Xinhua said the J-15 is able to carry anti-ship, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and precision guided bombs. It quoted military experts as saying the J-15 has comprehensive capabilities comparable to those of Russia's Sukhoi Su-33 and the US F/A-18 Hornet.

 

Although it was developed based on the Su-33, the avionics and weaponry on the J-15 are more advanced than those of the Su-33, and the jet features domestically developed, cutting-edge technologies, such as an active electronically scanned array radar, radar absorbent material and an infra-red search and track system, military experts said.

 

The J-15 "likely exceeds or matches the aerodynamic capabilities of virtually all fighter aircraft currently operated by regional militaries, with the exception of the US' F-22 Raptor", according to Gabe Collins, a China observer in the US, and Andrew Erickson, professor at the US Naval War College, in an article on their website, chinasignpost.com.

 

The J-15 is particularly good in an aerial dogfight, due to its maneuverability and high thrust-to-weight ratio, said Kanwa Defense Review, a Canadian online magazine on defense affairs and weapon technology.

 

In addition to the advanced jet, the landing also cast the limelight on the arresting gear on the Liaoning, which is one of the most sophisticated mechanical instruments on aircraft carriers.

 

Only a handful of nations have the technology and ability to develop and manufacture arresting gear and none of them will export such technology to other countries, defense industry insiders said, noting that the situation left China no other choice but to develop the equipment itself.

 

More time needed

 

In spite of great success, the completion of the landing and take-off tests is only a small step toward the Chinese aircraft carrier's fully possessing combat capability, experts said.

 

"The tests were carried out in daytime and under relatively simple circumstances," Du Wenlong said. "Our pilots haven't performed landing and take-offs at night or in complicated situations, and they will need more training on how to intercept enemy aircraft and destroy targets at sea."

 

"Considering the experiences of other countries, I think we have to wait at least two years before our carrier-based fighter jets become fully operational," said Zhang Junshe, a researcher from the Naval Military Studies Research Institute.

 

"And taking the time needed to provide training for other planes, such as airborne warning and control system aircraft, and anti-submarine aircraft, into account, it will take four to five years for our carrier to obtain full combat capability."

 

The J-15 fighter jets will begin to conduct combat and formation drills only after other aircrafts complete landing and take-off training, he added.

 

To become a pilot for a carrier-based fighter jet, a PLA aviator has to pass four rounds of tests, said Zhang Hongtao, a senior officer of the PLA navy who is in charge of selecting pilots.

 

The selected pilots must be under 35 years old and have at least 1,000 flight hours, he said, adding that they also must possess a strong mind and have quick responses.

 

"A pilot in the US Navy usually spends at least 21 months in training before he is deemed qualified to perform duties on an aircraft carrier. I don't think we can do it in less time," Du said.

 

"A take-off process alone requires 65 actions by our flight deck personnel and each step cannot allow any error," said Li Xiaoyong, deputy chief of the aviation section on the Liaoning.

 

"Although this work is arduous and dangerous, none of us has shown cowardice, for we are 'super warriors' on the carrier."

 

"After the landing and take-off tests, those who once looked down on China's capabilities can no longer call it (the Liaoning) a shark without teeth," said Chen Bing, a news commentator.

Partager cet article
Repost0
21 novembre 2012 3 21 /11 /novembre /2012 19:15

Kongyu_2000-early-waring-aircraft.jpg

 

November 21, 2012 china-defense-mashup.com

 

2012-11-21 — China’s locally made early-warning aircraft have proven their operational capabilities in drills and can now direct different forces to respond more effectively to aerial threats, the People’s Liberation Army Daily reported yesterday.

 

Analysts said the report could be seen as a response to Western reports that downplay the effectiveness of China’s military modernisation effort.

 

The PLA Daily report, which appeared in an inside page, did not identify the aircraft that took part in the drills, but it was accompanied by an illustration of a KJ-2000 early waring aircraft in flight. It said the plane had become an air operational centre to command land, air and naval forces in several drills this year.

 

The aircraft is larger than ordinary fighter jets and can detect threats such as enemy airplanes.

 

“It is a historic leap for our army’s combat ability on the modern battlefield … as the combat information transport system successfully connected with our advanced fighter jets during the drills,” the report said, adding that China had spent more than five decades developing its early-warning aircraft systems.

 

“The new achievement also indicates our army has overcome some critical bottlenecks in multi-unit command.”

 

In June, a report by Japan’s Kyodo news agency quoted American and Taiwanese sources as saying the PLA had only nine such aircraft, including five small KJ-200s and four large KJ-2000s, and that they were at least 20 years behind the planes operated by the United States and Japan in terms of operational capability.

 

Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the Canada-based Kanwa Asian Defence Monthly, said China’s options were limited because it “doesn’t have enough advanced, big aircraft” suitable for the installation of early-warning systems.

 

“But it’s difficult to estimate how many years the PLA’s early-warning operation lags behind the Western countries because Beijing is trying to narrow the gap,” Chang said.

 

Lin Chong-pin, a former deputy defence minister in Taiwan, said the PLA Daily report was not propaganda, but further evidence of Beijing’s breakthroughs in the field.

 

“[The mainland] faced a developing bottleneck of military technologies in the 1990s, but it has made many breakthroughs in the 21st century, including the debuts of the J-21 and J-31 [stealth fighters] and the batch production of 052-D guided missile destroyers early this year,” Lin said.

 

He credited the rapid development to former president Jiang Zemin’s efforts to accelerate the army’s modernisation, including a funding boost and the unprecedented promotion of many officers with engineering backgrounds to decision-making positions.

 

The KJ series of early-warning aircraft debuted in the 2009 National Day parade, but the PLA Daily said the army had set up its first early-warning force five years earlier.

Partager cet article
Repost0
18 novembre 2012 7 18 /11 /novembre /2012 08:55

CH-3-drone.jpg

 

Nov. 17, 2012 washingtonpost.com (AP)

 

Pakistan’s largest drone, the Shahpur, has a wingspan of about seven meters (22 feet) and can carry 50 kilograms (110 pounds). The U.S. Predator, which can be equipped with two Hellfire missiles, has a wingspan more than twice that and a payload capacity over four times as great.

 

Pakistani drones also have much more limited range than those produced in the U.S. because they are operated based on “line of sight” using radio waves, rather than military satellites. The Shahpur has a maximum range of 250 kilometers (150 miles), while the Predator can fly over five times that distance.

 

The British newspaper The Guardian reported Tuesday that Pakistan was working on an armed drone but did not provide details.

 

The market for drones has exploded in Pakistan and other countries around the world in recent years, as shown by the array of aircraft on display at the defense exhibition in Karachi. Hoping to tap into a worldwide market worth billions of dollars a year, public and private companies wheeled out over a dozen drones that ranged in size from hand-held models meant to be carried in a backpack to larger aircraft like the Shahpur.

 

All the Pakistani drones on display were advertised as unarmed and meant for surveillance only. One private company, Integrated Dynamics, even promotes its aircraft under the slogan “Drones for Peace.” But several models developed by the Chinese government were marketed as capable of carrying precision missiles and bombs.

 

The Chinese government has offered to sell Pakistan an armed drone it has produced, the CH-3, which can carry two laser-guided missiles or bombs, industry insiders said.

 

Also being offered to Pakistan is a more advanced drone, the CH-4, which closely resembles a U.S. Reaper and can carry four laser-guided missiles or bombs, according to Li Xiaoli, a representative of the Chinese state-owned company that produces both the CH-3 and CH-4, Aerospace Long-march International Trade Co., Ltd.

 

Pakistan has yet to purchase any armed Chinese drones because their capabilities have yet to be proven, but is likely to do so in the future, said the civilian with knowledge of the Pakistani military’s drone program.

 

Only a few countries, including the U.S., Britain and Israel, are known to have actually used armed drones in military operations.

 

“China is a bit of a tough nut to crack as you’d expect,” said Huw Williams, a drone expert at Jane’s International Defense Review. “They frequently wheel out exciting looking aircraft but are yet to really demonstrate anything earthshattering.”

Partager cet article
Repost0
16 novembre 2012 5 16 /11 /novembre /2012 17:35

Yi Long UAV pic1

 

November 16, 2012 China Military News

 

2012-11-16 — China is flexing its muscles as an arms exporter with a growing array of indigenous weaponry, offering something for most budgets in the global arms bazaar and revealing its wider ambitions to strategic rivals and watchful neighbours.

 

As a new leadership was anointed in Beijing and the world looked on to see what direction it might take over the next decade, military officials from Africa to Southeast Asia were shopping for Chinese weapons in the country’s south.

 

Change has come fast in China, now the world’s second-largest economy, and with its rise has come a new sense of military assertiveness with a growing budget to develop modern warfare equipment including aircraft carriers and drones.

 

All the signs point to newly named Communist Party chief Xi Jinping, who is slated to become president next March, continuing China’s aggressive military modernisation.

 

Now the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter, China laid out its wares this week at an air show in Zhuhai, a palm-lined port between Macau and Hong Kong that becomes a heavily armed industry showcase every other November.

 

In the 10 years to 2011, China’s foreign military sales have increased 95 percent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

 

Among dozens of items shown publicly for the first time this week were Chinese attack helicopters, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and air defences. As usual, the exhibit halls contained everything from shoulder-fired weapons to cruise missiles.

 

“China is getting more aggressive in the export market as its own industrial base develops,” said Doug Barrie, senior fellow for Military Aerospace at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

 

“It looks at Russia and the U.S. as examples of how you can use the export arena to help develop your own industries.”

 

Between them, Washington and Moscow account for more than half of the world’s $410 billion in arms sales, but opportunities abound for China as the United States looks to cut its military spending to manage its mounting debt.

 

Still, U.S. spending dwarfs that of China. In its annual report on the Chinese military, the Pentagon in May estimated Beijing’s total 2012 spending would be between $120 billion and $180 billion. Washington will spend $614 billion on its military this year.

 

Most of Beijing’s trade is done with small states outside of the European Union, which like the United States, put China under an arms embargo after the crackdown on Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.

 

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Myanmar are among China’s biggest clients, with aircraft at the top of their shopping lists, SIPRI data shows.

 

Beijing does not release official figures for arms sales. Foreign estimates put the figure at about $2 billion in 2011.

 

STAR OF SHOW: STEALTH FIGHTER

 

Shenyang J-31 photo Greg Waldron Flightglobal

 

The undisputed star of the show this week was a sleek, quarter-sized model of China’s second stealth fighter, dubbed the J-31 by most Western analysts.

 

Although officially a concept plane, it bore what industry bible Aviation Week called a “striking resemblance” to a mystery jet that flew briefly at the end of October.

 

Photographs of the jet leaked, or orchestrated to look like a leak, and emerged on the Internet days before this week’s Communist Party Congress and leadership handover, and confirmed China’s place in a select club of stealth-capable nations.

 

“China has stood up,” said John Pike, director of Virginia-based GlobalSecurity.org, an expert on industry strategy.

 

Only the United States has successfully produced more than one stealth jet and the challenges facing China’s less experienced developers are undoubtedly immense.

 

The unveiling also served as a reminder to its neighbours of China’s growing clout as tensions rise over rival claims for territory in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

 

“China is doing this as part of a political equation,” said Robert Hewson, editor of IHS Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons. “It has had a rapidly staged coming out but I am surprised to see it here so soon.”

 

By mixing domestic and international messages, the model also filled a void left by the absence of top Chinese government officials distracted by the transition in Beijing.

 

BASIC BUT RELIABLE

 

The business end of the show is about present-day realities.

 

After relying heavily on Russian and to a lesser extent Israeli technology in the 1990s, China is pushing exports of home-grown equipment to expand its influence in areas like Africa where it is busy buying land and forging new allies.

 

“The Chinese used to simply produce cheap knockoffs of their basic Russian equipment. They have made very considerable advances, but still have problems, particularly with engines,” said Simon Wezeman, senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

 

“On some technology, they are now competitive on technology with European arms exports and very competitive on price.”

 

China has sold defence systems and co-developed a derivative of a Russian fighter with Pakistan and done smaller deals with African countries. There is also interest from Latin America.

 

Western analysts say China has a reputation for selling basic but reliable equipment with relatively few questions asked about its use, a key selling point.

 

But the range of products on display in Zhuhai is both increasing and gradually moving up in value, while remaining a decade or two behind the most advanced U.S. equipment.

 

COPYCAT APPROACH

 

For the first time at Zhuhai, China showed an export version of a long-range surface-to-air missile, the truck-mounted FD-2000, and a Predator-style UAV called the Wing Loong.

 

There was also a focus on systems that build relationships such as the L-15 trainer, which won its first export deal to an unidentified country at the show.

 

Admittedly, China’s other reputation for copying what it cannot make is unlikely to disappear any time soon.

 

A parlour game among delegates is to tick off the similarities between Chinese systems and foreign platforms.

 

“When you come and see these aircraft you relate them to what you have seen before. The K-8 is a Hawk, the J-10 a Eurofighter, the L-15 an Aermacchi M-346,” said an officer with an African air force delegation, asking not to be identified.

 

“That is why some people don’t want to send their planes here. You come back in five years and it’s called a J-something.”

 

Organisers said a record 650 companies from 38 countries showed up to present exhibits at the ninth Zhuhai show.

 

A few yards and a Chinese wall separate the military part of the show and Western aerospace suppliers striking deals with China’s fledgling civil aerospace industry.

 

This week’s flying displays included a surprise debut of the Z-10 months after U.S. company United Technologies admitted selling software that helped Beijing develop its first modern military attack helicopter.

 

“China’s aviation industry is turning out reasonably decent products,” said Pike in a telephone interview. “They are not there yet and they have a long way to go. But they are open for business.”

Partager cet article
Repost0
16 novembre 2012 5 16 /11 /novembre /2012 12:30

Defense.gov News Adm. Mullen departs the PLA Navy submarine

 

November 14, 2012 China Military News

 

2012-11-13 ( from popularmechanics.com and by Joe Pappalardo)  — The U.S. government is reporting that China, after decades of trying, is on the verge of fielding a true underwater leg of its nuclear deterrent, with new long-range missiles tipped with nuclear weapons on board its fleet of new long-range submarines. And that could transform the Pacific into a tense militarized zone reminiscent of the Atlantic during the Cold War.

 

On November 14 the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission will release its annual report to Congress, and that report will contain some sobering language about new Julang-2 missiles China plans to field in two years. (Drafts of the report, created by a Congressional mandate, have already been leaked.)

 

According to the report, JIN-class submarines, two of which have already been put to sea, would carry nuclear tipped missiles. Naval intelligence documents estimate five such submarines will be ready for service. The submarines and the JL-2 missile combination will give Chinese forces “a near-continuous at-sea strategic deterrent,” according to the report, and Beijing is “on the cusp of attaining a credible nuclear triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and air-dropped nuclear bombs.”

 

The Pentagon has watched warily as China has ramped up its submarine fleet, which helps the nation secure its economically vital sea lanes and protect its coastlines from incursion. China has quiet, diesel–electric submarines to lay mines and shoot missiles during combat close to their shores. But the larger, nuclear-powered subs are a newer acquisition, and arming them with nukes poses a different kind of threat to the United States and global powers such as Russia and India.

 

Sub-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are hard to spot until they shoot, making them the ideal second-strike weapon in a nuclear exchange. The Pentagon knows where all of China’s ICBM silos are and could wipe them out in a preemptive nuke strike if the nations came to blows. But subs need to be identified, tracked, and sunk. So, having submarines with nukes in their firing tubes makes China a more credible nuclear threat. That threat backs up every diplomatic, geopolitical, and military action of the government—a government whose goals are often at odds with those of the U.S. government.

 

What will the U.S. do about this new threat?

 

There will be some underwater cat-and-mouse games played in the Pacific. U.S. submarines will likely be waiting when American satellites spot a Chinese sub leaving the port. (Those subs will be visible in the shallows between Yulin Naval Base and deep water.) “Some U.S. attack submarines probably will follow the Chinese submarines if and when they deploy,” says Hans Kristensen, an analyst with the Federation of American Scientists. “Part of those operations will be to learn more about noise level and operational patterns.”

 

The range of the JL-2 is about 4500 miles. That means the sub’s missiles can’t target the continental United States from the Chinese coast. They could hit Los Angeles from a position 1000 miles west of Hawaii, while Washington, D.C., would be in range only if the submarine could sneak its way to a position about 1500 miles from the West Coast.

 

That’s the trick for these subs: surviving outside Chinese waters. Japan and America have assets in the Pacific that could detect submarines; a Chinese skipper would have to hide from them to get close enough to take a shot at the continental United States. And Christensen cites Office of Naval Intelligence reports that say the JIN submarines are less stealthy than Russian submarines built two decades ago. “They are too noisy to slip through U.S. antisubmarine networks,” he says. “The U.S. submarine community trained for more than 60 years to track nuclear-powered ballistic submarines . . . Given that record, I’d be surprise if China’s would live for long in a war. To me, they would be sitting ducks.”

 

However, American antisubmarine capabilities have waned since the Cold War. The United States will be decreasing its number of attack submarines, but those that remain will be operating in the Pacific—the Pentagon has already deployed more attack subs to Guam and Hawaii. The Littoral Combat Ship, a troubled Navy program, is expected to have antisubmarine capabilities, but those ships (as the name implies) are made to dominate shallow water.

 

Furthermore, last week news leaked that the Navy plans to cut nearly one-quarter of its highly specialized multi-intelligence aircraft in the next few years, including the P3C Orion sub-hunting airplane. It does have sub-tracking replacements coming online, such as the P-8A Poseidon, a converted 747 that can drop sonobuoys to detect subs, and torpedoes to sink them. But coverage may be thin. The Navy will have only about 50 P-8As to do the job formerly done by 200 P-3Cs.

 

During the Cold War, the Navy tracked Soviet subs using a network of underwater microphones called the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). This is still functioning, albeit with fewer sensors, in the Pacific. The Pentagon is working on next-generation tracking technology that could help mitigate the China sub threat. The Distributed Agile Submarine Hunting program, run by DARPA, is creating a maritime version of a satellite. These robotic listening posts could operate in shallow or deep water, and possibly follow enemy subs once they’d been detected.

 

The last-ditch defense against these missile threats are ground-based interceptors in Alaska, built to thwart an ICBM launch from North Korea. They could target the warheads fired from a submarine, Kristensen says, if the warheads were launched from far enough away.

Partager cet article
Repost0
16 novembre 2012 5 16 /11 /novembre /2012 08:30

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-516zIwB8OXI/UKUEm8XtemI/AAAAAAAAFBQ/etUlCMIjyRQ/s1600/Chinese_artist%E2%80%99s_CG_Imagination_of_PLA_Navy_LHD.jpg

 

15.11.2012 Pacific Sentinel

 

On November 13, CCTV Commentator, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, says China is developing a large amphibious assault ship which is similar to the Landing Helicopter Assault ship in United States Navy on CCTV-4 “Today’s Focus” Interview program. Yin’s voice is China’s first time publicly expression on amphibious assault ship development and attracts media attentions.
 
In the CCTV program, when the host asking that PLA new WZ-10 helicopters would be deployed on the aircraft carrier, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo replied: “WZ-10 and WZ-19 may deployed in China’s future amphibious assault ship. And China now is developing a new generation of amphibious ship, 40000 ton displacement, like U.S. Navy Landing Helicopter Assault LHD ship. The heavy transportation helicopters on this amphibious assault ship will be escorted by armed choppers like WZ-10 and WZ-19.”
 
There were indications that the Chinese Navy amphibious assault ship has displacement of 48,000 tons. When PLA Navy has these warships, China will be able to deploy armed forces in any country of the Western Pacific area. Analysts pointed out that, once the Sino-Japanese military conflict breaks, Chinese warships will use this type of amphibious assault ship on Okinawa and the Japan four largest islands landing operations.
 
Read the full story at China Military News
Partager cet article
Repost0
31 octobre 2012 3 31 /10 /octobre /2012 22:01

Defense.gov_News_Adm._Mullen_departs_the_PLA-Navy-submarine.jpg

 

November 01, 2012 By Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson - http://thediplomat.com

 

The engine of China's naval rise has flown under the radar - until now.

 

China’s military shipyards now are surpassing Western European, Japanese, and Korean military shipbuilders in terms of both the types and numbers of ships they can build. If Beijing prioritizes progress, China’s military shipbuilding technical capabilities can likely become as good as Russia’s are now by 2020 and will near current U.S. shipbuilding technical proficiency levels by 2030. China is now mass producing at least six classes of modern diesel-electric submarines and surface warships, including the new Type 052C “Luyang II” and Type 052D “Luyang III” destroyers now in series production.

 

Eight key themes, listed sequentially below, characterize China’s rise as a world-class military shipbuilder. For reference, the companies building the warships are China State Shipbuilding Corporation (“CSSC”) and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (“CSIC”).

 

1. China’s warship buildout thus far supports modernization and replacement, not rapid expansion

 

Over the past six years, China’s overall fleet of frontline combatants has expanded, but slowly, growing from 172 ships in 2005 to an estimated 221 vessels in 2012. However, the fleet has improved substantially in qualitative terms as newer ships and subs replace older ones. For instance, as Type 052 C/D Luyang-series destroyers, Type 054A Jiangkai II-series frigates, and Type 041 Yuan diesel-electric submarines have come into the fleet, they are allowing the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to steadily retire obsolete platforms like Luda destroyers and Ming submarines.

 

2. Chinese military shipbuilders are catching up to Russian and U.S. Yards

 

China’s large state-backed military shipbuilders are approaching their Russian and U.S. peers in terms of the number of warships built. China’s large submarine and surface warship buildout will, in a decade, likely have it become second only to the U.S. in terms of total warships produced since 1990. More importantly, the ramp-up of China’s construction of large warships in recent years will mean the PLA Navy will likely be taking delivery of larger numbers of modern surface combatants and submarines annually than the U.S. Navy.

 

Measured in terms of warships commissioned since 1990, China is now number three globally and is rapidly gaining on Russia, the number two country. Most of Russia’s post-1990 military ship deliveries simply reflected yards “finishing up” Soviet-era projects.

 

Chinese yards, in contrast, have come on strong over the past decade, with a big push in submarine construction that began in 2002-03 and a strong pipeline of surface warship deliveries that continues to gain steam to this very day. Chinese military shipyards—in particular the Changxing Island and Hudong Zhonghua yards near Shanghai—are humming with activity, and over the next 2-3 years, China is likely to commission enough large warships to put it second only to the U.S. in terms of large warships built and delivered since 1990.

 

3. China’s military shipbuilders are using modular mass production techniques

 

CSSC’s Jiangnan Shipyard is using modular construction methods to build Type 052-series destroyers. Modular construction involves building the ship in “blocks.” This maximizes a shipyard’s productive potential and also provides greater latitude for modifying designs and customizing ships. Modular construction also gives yards the flexibility to either build centers of expertise within the yard or outsource the production of certain components and then import them to the yard for final assembly.

 

CSSC’s Hudong Zhonghua shipyard also appears to be using modular construction techniques for the Type 071 LPD. The yard has now constructed four of the vessels, two of which are in service and two of which are in the trial/outfitting stage. They have also been able to fabricate the Type 071 hulls faster, with a time gap of nearly four years between the first and second vessels, but only 10 months between vessels two and three, and four months between vessels three and four.

 

4. China’s military shipyards appear to be sharing design and production information across company lines

 

Historically, CSIC built all Chinese submarines, but the current production run of Type 041 Yuan-class advanced diesel electric subs has seen at least two boats being built in CSSC’s Jiangnan yard. This suggests submarine construction expertise is growing outside of CSIC. However, there are no indications thus far that CSSC is doing submarine design work, which could mean that Beijing is making the companies and their design institutes share submarine design and construction information. Likewise, the new Type 056 corvette is being built in both CSSC and CSIC shipyards, suggesting that a standardized design and production approach is being shared by both companies.

 

5. China’s military shipbuilders will be able to indigenously build aircraft carriers

 

China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, which entered service on  September 25th of this year, started as an empty hull and gave CSIC valuable experience in effectively creating an aircraft carrier from the keel up. China has a total of seven shipyards with sufficiently large berths to assemble a carrier hull (three hundred meters or more), and the yards are basically equally dispersed between CSSC and CSIC. These yards are located in Dalian (CSIC), Qingdao (CSIC), Huludao (CSIC), Shanghai (CSSC), and Guangzhou (CSSC).

 

CSIC Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry complex near Huludao (where China builds its nuclear submarines) is a top candidate due to its large, covered building sheds where carrier parts could be fabricated in modular fashion and out of the view of satellite surveillance. The company says it has the “largest indoor seven-step” ship construction facilities in China. This facility, together with CSSC’s large new Changxing Island yard, and CSIC’s Dalian yard—which fitted out the carrier Liaoning that just entered PLAN service—are the three leading candidates to build China’s indigenous carriers.

 

6. China will retain a military shipbuilding cost advantage

 

We project that for at least the next five years, Chinese shipbuilders will have a substantial labor cost advantage over their counterparts in South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. CSSC’s Jiangnan shipyard can likely deliver a Type 052C destroyer for 24% less than it costs Korea’s Hyundai heavy Industries to produce a KDX-III destroyer. Likewise, according to disclosures in the July 2011 issue of Shipborne Weapons, Wuchang shipyard can produce a late model diesel electric sub such as the Type 041 for roughly 47% less than it would cost South Korea’s DSME to make a Type 209 submarine. The lower labor cost in China likely serves as a core driver. This may help explain the larger Chinese cost advantage in building submarines, since advanced submarines can require substantially larger number of man-hours to build than surface ships do.

 

7. China’s neighbors feel increasingly compelled to augment their naval forces in response to Chinese warship production

 

South Korea has decided to expand its procurement of advanced diesel-electric submarines to include nine KSS-III 3,000-ton submarines by 2020 and nine 1,800-ton subs by 2018. This acquisition will basically double the size of the country’s current sub force and substantially enhance its capabilities, since the biggest boats in the fleet are currently 1,800-ton vessels. South Korea has also elected to double its Aegis destroyer purchases over the next decade.

 

Similarly, Vietnam’s maritime friction with China and fear of the PLAN’s growing power is making Hanoi into one of the Russian defense industry’s star customers. Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia and is likely to take delivery of its first Kilo by the end of 2012. Hanoi is also adding advanced Russian anti-ship missiles and stealthy Gepard-class missile armed patrol boats to its naval force.

 

8. China now has the potential to become a significant exporter of diesel submarines and smaller surface warships

 

China’s shipbuilders are becoming increasingly competitive in terms of the ratio of cost to combat power they can deliver. For instance, the July 2011 issue of Shipborne Weapons reports that China will supply 6 potentially Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP)-equipped submarines to Pakistan for as little as 1/3 the unit price at which European shipyards would be able to supply comparable boats.

 

With the advent of the Type 041 Yuan-class diesel sub and Type 056 corvette, China now has two platforms for which it is already capable of series production and for which the unit costs are likely to drop significantly in coming years. The export version of Russia’s Steregushiy-class corvette, called Tigr, currently stands at around U.S. $150 million per vessel. As China’s Type 056 production run continues to expand, it would not be a surprise to eventually see the PLAN’s unit cost end up in the U.S. $110-120 million per vessel cost range, which would make the Type 056 a serious export competitor to the Tigr and other smaller Russian warships.

 

Conclusion

 

China’s naval shipbuilding industry has advanced to the point that it can series produce modern diesel submarines, landing platform docks (LPDs), destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and fast attack craft, albeit with some imported components for a number of key systems. The ongoing series production of Type 041 SSKs, Type 071 LPDs, Type 052 destroyers, and Type 056 corvettes strongly suggests that China’s military shipbuilders have rapidly assimilated commercial innovations such as modular construction.

 

Chinese naval shipbuilding faces several challenges moving forward. Most notably, six major questions remain:

 

1. Does Beijing have the political will to continue devoting substantial and growing resources to naval modernization?

 

2. Can China achieve requisite technical advances in weapons systems, propulsion, and military electronics?

 

3. Can China master the technologies needed to build nuclear submarines capable of surviving in a conflict with U.S. and Russian boats?

 

4. Can it build an aircraft carrier with catapults that would allow it to maximize the strike and air combat capabilities of the J-15 fighter it is likely to carry?

 

5. Will the Chinese leadership be willing to invest political and financial capital in establishing intensive and realistic training for the PLAN and provide diplomatic support for establishment of sustained access to facilities in key areas such as the Indian Ocean region?

 

6. Will continued weakness in the global ship market prompt Beijing to capitalize on the availability of shipyard space to further increase the pace of military shipbuilding?

 

China’s military shipbuilders are showing that they can meet Beijing’s current call for warships and could produce more if given the mandate and the resources. The U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific will need more than rhetoric if it is to remain credible in the face of China’s potential to rapidly produce modern warships.

 

The Pentagon should consider adjusting the U.S. Navy’s ship acquisition programs in response. As Chinese warships become better, the numbers ratio between the PLAN and U.S. Navy combatants will become increasingly important.  Given that shipbuilding is an industry where lead times can be many years, now is the time for Washington to begin responding to China’s warship production improvements and prepare strategically for further naval advances that Beijing is likely to unveil over the next 2-3 years.

Partager cet article
Repost0
16 octobre 2012 2 16 /10 /octobre /2012 16:45

 

October 16, 2012 China Military News

 

2012-10-16 — (by Bill Gertz) China’s military is set to conduct a test of a new and more capable anti-satellite missile that United States intelligence agencies say can knock out strategic satellites in high-earth orbit, according to U.S. officials.

 

However, a recent intelligence assessment said the test of the Dong Neng-2 direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon is being delayed in an apparent effort to avoid upsetting President Barack Obama’s reelection bid, said officials who spoke on condition of anonymity.

 

Intelligence reports from September and this month revealed China will test fire the new DN-2 missile from a ground base sometime in early to mid November.

 

The missile is described by intelligence agencies as a high-earth orbit interceptor designed to destroy satellites by ramming them at high speeds. The intelligence reports called the new missile a strategically significant counterspace weapon, said the officials familiar with the reports.

 

Testing a high-earth orbit anti-satellite missile would represent a major advance in China’s satellite-killing capability, which has been underway for more than a decade. High-earth orbit, also known as geosynchronous orbit, is the location of major communications and navigation satellites, which orbit at a distance of between 12,000 miles and 22,236 miles from earth.

 

China’s last ASAT test in 2007 destroyed a low-earth orbit weather satellite about 558 miles in space, causing an orbiting debris field of tens of thousands of pieces of metal that U.S. officials say will threaten orbiting satellites and human space travelers for 100 years.

 

U.S. officials said it is unlikely China will conduct an impact test of a kinetic kill vehicle against an aging weather satellite as occurred in 2007, although the possibility of a second, major debris-causing test cannot be ruled out.

 

Instead, officials said the test most likely will be a demonstration of a precision-guided direct ascent missile flying out tens of thousands of miles.

 

“If the United States loses the strategic high ground of high-earth orbit [from a Chinese  high-altitude ASAT missile], we are in real trouble,” said one U.S. official.

 

U.S. Global Positioning System satellites, used for both navigation and precision missile guidance, are located in medium-earth orbit, or about 12,000 miles, and thus would be vulnerable to the new DN-2.

 

Whether or not the test is successful, development of the new high-altitude DN-2 ASAT reveals that China’s military is planning for future high-orbit space warfare despite seeking international agreements banning weapons in space.

 

China’s January 2007 ASAT test drew protests from the United States and other spacefaring nations, who saw it as a major threat to satellites used for both military and civilian purposes. That test also produced tens of thousands of pieces of space debris which threaten satellites.

 

A second possibility is the DN-2 missile test will be fired against a target missile, as occurred in 2010 as part of a joint Chinese ASAT-missile defense test.

 

Pentagon spokesmen declined to comment on the DN-2 ASAT program.

 

Michael Pillsbury, a former Reagan administration defense policymaker, stated in a 2007 report to Congress that Chinese military writers advocated covert deployment of sophisticated anti-satellite weapons system like the kind now being developed by the People’s Liberation Army for use against the United States “in a surprise manner without warning.”

 

“Even a small scale anti-satellite attack in a crisis against 50 U.S. satellites—assuming a mix of targeted military reconnaissance, navigation satellites, and communication satellites—could have a catastrophic effect not only on U.S. military forces, but on the U.S. civilian economy,” said Pillsbury, currently with the Hudson Institute. Chinese military writings also have discussed attacks on GPS satellites that are located in high-earth orbit, he stated.

 

ASAT a top-secret program

 

China’s anti-satellite missile system is a key element of the communist state’s growing arsenal of asymmetric warfare weapons, and remains one of Beijing’s most closely guarded military secrets.

 

Defense officials have said that with as few as 24 ASAT missiles, China could severely weaken U.S. military operations by disrupting global communications and military logistics, as well as by limiting celestial navigation systems used by high-technology weapons. Such an attack also would severely degrade U.S. intelligence gathering efforts against global targets, a key strategic military advantage.

 

A U.S. official familiar with reports of the ASAT test said China’s delay in conducting the test until after the Nov. 6 election is a sign Beijing wants to help President Obama’s reelection campaign. “It implies they’d rather have him reelected,” said the official.

 

The Obama administration has adopted conciliatory policies toward China’s military buildup and its large-scale human rights abuses. Critics say the administration also failed to hold Beijing accountable for its unfair trade practices and currency manipulation.

 

The administration’s questionable policies were revealed by a 2009 State Department cable that quoted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as saying, “How do you deal toughly with your banker?”—a reference to China’s potentially coercive leverage over the United States through its large holdings of U.S. debt securities.

 

Richard Fisher, a Chinese military affairs specialist, said little is known publicly of the DN-2 missile. However, the DN-2 may be China’s designation for an ASAT missile and kill vehicle combination mounted on launchers dubbed KT-2, or KT-2A. This ASAT weapon is based on DF-31 or DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, respectively.

 

“ASATs derived from the KT-2 and KT-2A space launch vehicles have the potential to reach high earth orbits used by many strategic U.S. surveillance, communication, and navigation satellites,” said Fisher, with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

 

Fisher said in 2002, during a military show in China, the KT-2A was touted by Chinese officials as having a 2,000-kilogram payload that could reach high-earth orbits.

 

“Since its appearance a decade ago, the KT series of space launch vehicles presaged what we now know, that a key Chinese strategic goal has been to deny outer space as a sanctuary to support American military operations,” Fisher said.

 

A KT-1 microsatellite launcher was displayed at the Zhuhai air show in 2000, and “it was fairly obvious that this could become the basis for an ASAT, and it was used as the basis for the SC-19 ASAT demonstrated successfully in January 2007,” Fisher said.

 

Because China will not join a verifiable space control agreement, “Washington has little choice, if it is to continue to deter China militarily, but to build far greater redundancy, passive and active defenses for outer space,” he said.

 

China ASAT caused space debris

 

U.S. officials estimate that China’s 2007 ASAT test that destroyed an aging weather satellite in low-earth orbit now accounts for 45 percent of all space debris in low-earth orbit.

 

After a year of stonewalling by China on the test, an official U.S. demarche, or protest note, was sent to Beijing in January 2008. According to a copy of the note made public by Wikileaks, the protest warned the Chinese government, “Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or conflict.”

 

“The United States reserves the right, consistent with the [United Nations] Charter and international law, to defend and protect its space systems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to military,” stated the protest, made by then-U.S. Ambassador to China Clark Randt.

 

A joint State Department-Pentagon report to Congress on export controls made public in April states that China is “developing space-based methods to counter ballistic missile defenses of the United States and our allies, including anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.”

 

“As China advances in operational space capabilities, it is actively focusing on how to destroy, disrupt, or deny U.S. access to our own space assets,” the report said.

 

China is developing and refining its ASAT weapons as part of a “multi-dimensional program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by potential adversaries during times of conflict,” the report said.

 

“In addition to the direct-ascent [missile] ASAT program, China is developing other technologies and concepts for kinetic and directed energy for ASAT missions,” including electronic jamming of satellite communications and lasers that disrupt satellites, the report said.

 

ASAT weapons “have significant implications for anti-access/area-denial efforts against the United States in Taiwan Strait contingencies,” the report said. Those weapons and capabilities are being developed by China as a means to force the U.S. military out of Asian waters and territory and make it more difficult for U.S. forces to get into the region during a conflict, such as a defense of Taiwan. Other anti-access area denial weapons include anti-ship ballistic missiles, cyber warfare capabilities, and submarines.

 

Defense Intelligence Agency director Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess told Congress in February that “China successfully tested a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) missile and is developing jammers and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions.”

 

Burgess said that as “a prerequisite for ASAT attacks, China’s ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by technologies from China’s manned and lunar programs as well as technologies and methods developed to detect and track space debris.”

 

Another ASAT test by China will likely undermine the Obama administration’s controversial space arms control proposal, introduced in January. Many in the Pentagon oppose the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities over concerns it would place limits on U.S. space capabilities.

 

U.S. lagging in counterspace

 

Despite China’s continuing development of space weapons, the administration has done no research or development into so-called counterspace weapons and other capabilities that could deter China from its ASAT and anti-satellite laser and jammer arms, according to military officials. The opposition is based on the administration’s preference for arms control negotiations and agreements as a major element of its U.S. national security policies, the officials said.

 

Frank Rose, deputy assistant secretary of state for arms control, said in a speech in April that the space code of conduct would include legally nonbinding “transparency and confidence-building measures.”

 

However, a Pentagon Joint Staff assessment of the space code of conduct concluded that U.S. adherence to the code’s provisions would hurt U.S. space operations in several areas.

 

The Pentagon’s National Security Space Strategy from 2011 makes little mention of counterspace weapons. It states that U.S. policy is “to dissuade and deter” others from developing space weapons, without providing specifics.

 

The Pentagon indirectly demonstrated an ASAT capability in 2008 when it used a modified ship-based SM-3 anti-missile interceptor to shoot down a falling, low-earth orbit spy satellite that was considered a danger because its fuel tank might have passed through the atmosphere and landed on earth.

 

Cables detail PRC’s first ASAT test

 

According to a classified Jan. 12, 2010, State Department cable made public by Wikileaks, China conducted its most recent ASAT test on Jan. 11 of that year.

 

According to the cable, an ASAT missile designated SC-19 was fired from China’s Korla Missile Test Complex and successfully intercepted a CSS-X-11 medium-range ballistic missile launched from the Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center.

 

The two missiles were tracked by U.S. missile warning satellites to an intercept point at an altitude of about 155 miles in space.

 

Until then, the SC-19 had been used previously to boost China’s first successful direct-ascent anti-satellite intercept on Jan. 11, 2007, when a missile rammed into China’s FY-1C weather satellite.

 

“Previous SC-19 DA-ASAT flight-tests were conducted in 2005 and 2006,” the 2010 cable said. “This test is assessed to have furthered both Chinese ASAT and ballistic missile defense [BMD] technologies.”

 

The cable contained a U.S. protest note to China on the 2010 test seeking an explanation for Chinese officials about the purpose of the test and “what steps were taken to minimize the creation of orbital debris.”

 

The cable said that since the 2007 ASAT test, the United States had urged China not to conduct further space weapons tests.

 

An earlier cable revealed that U.S. intelligence agencies had advance word of the 2010 space weapons test, and noted that China was not expected to provide notification in advance of the test, which proved accurate.

 

Other State Department cables revealed conflicting statements from Chinese officials on whether China planned to conduct future ASAT tests. Chinese Foreign Ministry official He Yafei unequivocally stated to U.S. officials in June 2008 that China would not conduct future ASAT tests. In July, China Lt. Gen. Zhang Qinsheng said there were no plans for an ASAT test in the near future.

Partager cet article
Repost0
16 octobre 2012 2 16 /10 /octobre /2012 11:47

China Carrier (Liaoning)

 

October 16th, 2012 defencetalk.com (AFP)

 

Military spending by Asia’s major powers increased dramatically over the past decade with China leading the way, as its defense budget quadrupled since 2000, according to a study released Monday.

 

Defense spending in China and four other Asian countries doubled over 10 years and will surpass Europe’s military expenditures this year, said the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.

 

Asia’s arms race still leaves it trailing US defense spending, but it will ensure the United States likely will stick to its plan to shift the country’s strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific region, it said.

 

Defense spending in China, India, South Korea and Taiwan reached a total of $224 billion in 2011, which “equates to almost twice the amount spent by these five countries in 2000,” said the CSIS study.

 

“With Asian defense spending projected to overtake that of Europe by the end of 2012, the United States’ posture rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region is likely to continue,” it said.

 

In 2005, China’s military budget outstripped Japan’s as the largest in Asia and recorded a 13.4 percent annual rise that year.

 

Among all countries, China now ranks second behind the United States in total military spending, though the Pentagon budget still dwarfs Beijing’s defense spending at more than $600 billion (463 million euros) year.

 

Experts say China’s emergence as a global economic giant has driven the spike in military spending, as Beijing seeks to assert its influence beyond its borders to safeguard its access to sea lanes and resources.

 

In 2011, Beijing spent $25.8 billion on new weapons and related research and development, up from $7.3 billion in 2000, the report said.

 

China’s total defense budget grew from $22.5 billion to $89.9 billion between 2000 and 2011, said the report, citing official figures from the Beijing government.

 

But the study acknowledged that independent estimates put Chinese spending at a much higher level, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimating Beijing’s 2011 defense budget at $142.2 billion.

 

India’s defense spending grew 47.6 percent over the decade, reaching $37 billion in 2011. Japan’s military budget rose from $40 to $58.2 billion.

 

South Korea’s defense investments swelled from $17 to $29 billion, while Taiwan’s defense budget expanded at a slower pace, from $8 billion in 2000 to $10 billion in 2011.

 

Apart from Japan, which spent $238,000 per soldier in 2011, the four other countries devoted $28,000 to $44,000 to training, paying and equipping each of its soldiers, the study said.

 

“This discrepancy was predominantly caused by the small size of the Japanese forces, approximately 244,300 troops in 2011, relative to the other countries,” it said.

Partager cet article
Repost0
16 octobre 2012 2 16 /10 /octobre /2012 07:30

asia-pacific source harvard.edu

 

October 15, 2012 China Military News

 

2012-10-15 — On the afternoon of Oct. 4, 2012, seven Chinese naval warships passed through the international waters between Okinawa and Miyako and headed for the Pacific for an ocean-going exercise, which caused vigilance of Japanese side. Hong Kong media outlets speculated that the activity of Chinese submarines on the First Island Chain and even Pacific Ocean is about to open to the public. In this regard, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, director with the Chinese Navy Advisory Committee for Informatization, said in an interview with the People’s Daily online that it is very common that Chinese submarines departed from the First Island Chain to carry out exercises and the ocean-going exercise was determined by the depth of water. Meanwhile, Yin warned Japanese side to treat the routine training of Chinese navy rationally.

 

Depth of water determined the training of Chinese navy in ocean-going regions

 

According to news released by Japanese Defense Ministry, seven Chinese warships passed through the water channel between Okinawa and Miyako on Oct. 4, which include guided missile destroyers, frigates, submarine rescue ships and depot ships. The foreign media paid close attention to the participation of submarine rescue ships in the training, speculating that there might be submarines in Chinese naval warships. “The Sun,” a Hong Kong-based newspaper, also said on Oct. 8 that the public debut of Chinese submarine rescue ships might imply Chinese submarines’ coming out into the open on the First Island Chain and even Pacific Ocean.

 

To these speculations, Yin said that the water in the continental shelf of the East China Sea is shallow, which is about 100 meters deep in average, and it is unable to meet the training needs of nuclear submarines and large conventional submarines, therefore the Chinese submarines must head for the First Island Chain for exercises in recent years.

 

The best anti-submarine training place is the sea area in the east of the First Island Chain and behind the Miyako Strait, in which the depth of water reaches 2 to 3 kilometers. It is common that the navy of a country goes to such waters to carry out combat drills and anti-submarine drills on water surface. Yin stressed, “I think any country having naval forces will understand it.”

 

Japan should treat regular blue water training of China rationally

 

For a long time, Japan has been tracking and monitoring China’s military exercises on the Pacific Ocean and more than once dispatched surface ships to close to Chinese naval vessels during regular blue water trainings, which seriously interfered with China’s normal exercises.

 

Japan’s P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft almost scouts about Chinese naval vessels’ sailing on the open seas for one to two times every day. In addition, Japan also monitors and supervises the guided missile tests and target practices of guided missiles, recording the emission frequency of guided missiles and other data. All of these acts show unfriendly attitude. Therefore, Chinese side hopes that Japan can take into consideration the overall situation of China-Japan relations and treat China’s blue water trainings rationally and friendly.

Partager cet article
Repost0
7 octobre 2012 7 07 /10 /octobre /2012 16:35
Chine : un outil aéronaval en construction pour réaffirmer les ambitions géopolitiques de Pékin

 

octobre 7, 2012 by Marquis Seignelay - alliancegeostrategique.org

 

La nouvelle a fait le tour du monde : le « porte-avions » de la Marine populaire de libération a été mis en service le 26 septembre 2012 ! Cette entrée du navire en service actif est l’occasion de proposer quelques petites choses pour tenter d’apprécier la portée de l’événement. Ce qui est surprenant, c’est que l’attention des médias a été focalisée sur l’entrée au service actif d’un navire qui n’est capable de rien, ou presque, sur le plan opérationnel : le poids de la puissance aéronavale chinoise embarquée sur pont plat n’est donc pas actuel. Bien au contraire, la période allant des années 2015 à 2025 semble constituer un tournant aéronaval dans le monde et c’est bel et bien cela qu’il faut préparer. D’autre part, rien n’a été dit sur le nom du navire alors que la Chine ne baptise pas ses unités les plus importantes à la légère. Bien souvent, ces noms sur la mer valent au moins un discours adressé au monde, si ce n’est plus.

 

La Chine vers la puissance aéronavale embarquée : des années 80 vers 2011

 

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, dans l’un de ses ouvrages phares, « Le problème du porte-avions » (1991), abordait la question dans le chapitre II consacrait aux porte-aéronefs sous le sous-titre « les velléités chinoises » :

« On parle depuis le début des années 80 de l’acquisition de porte-avions par la marine chinoise : les premières rumeurs fai­saient état de l’achat de 5 porte-aéronefs du type Invincible qui auraient été construits sous licence. L’intention chinoise d’acheter des Harrier a évidemment donné crédit à ces rumeurs. Mais cette évaluation des possibilités chinoises s’est révélée beaucoup trop ambitieuse et ce programme n’a reçu aucun commencement d’exécution en dehors de l’acquisition de la coque du Melbourne ferraillé par les Australiens : les ingénieurs chinois l’ont minutieu­sement examiné avant de commencer la démolition : ils en ont cer­tainement tiré d’utiles enseignements, mais la technologie du Melbourne datait des années 50.

 

La marine chinoise n’a pas pour autant abandonné tout espoir d’acquérir des porte-aéronefs : le débat continue dans les re­vues navales, un auteur demandant la construction de porte-avions légers dans la première décennie du XXIe siècle, d’autres suggérant d’acheter aux États-unis l’un des deux Essex moderni­sés encore en réserve [27]. La conjoncture budgétaire et internatio­nale semble rendre de tels projets chimériques, mais le besoin subsiste, notamment sur le flanc sud, face au Vietnam : les avions basés à Haïnan peuvent couvrir les îles Paracels, mais pas l’archipel des Spratley, situé beaucoup plus au sud, où Pékin a récemment entrepris de renforcer sa présence. D’après des rap­ports américains, dont les conclusions ont récemment été rendues publiques, l’état-Major de la marine chinoise aurait poursuivi des études dans deux directions : à long terme, un porte-avions classi­que de 48 000 tonnes, avec des avions conventionnels : l’amiral Zheng Mingh, directeur du matériel de la marine chinoise, aurait étudié de très près les rapports sur les essais du Tbilissi soviéti­que ; à court terme, la conversion d’un roulier en porte-aéronefs de fortune, sur le modèle de ce que la Royal Navy a réalisé avec l’Argus. Un navire actuellement armé par le ministère des com­munications, le Huayuankou, pourrait faire l’objet d’une telle transformation. Des entretiens sur ce thème ont eu lieu en avril 90 à Pékin [28]. Mais même un porte-avions modeste risque d’être hors de portée de la Chine au moment où l’économie connaît une dé­pression qui risque d’être durable et où le maintien de l’ordre passe au premier rang des missions des forces armées. La marine chinoise ne disposera pas de porte-avions avant le XXIe siècle ».

 

Le long périple de l’ancien Varyag

 

Un petit retour en arrière s’impose : « Racheté en [1998] au chantier ukrainien par l’intermédiaire d’un homme d’affaires chinois, la coque, à environ 70% d’achèvement, a été remorquée en 2002 à Dalian ». Il s’agit du Varyag qui est la seconde unité de la classe Kuznetsov et celle-ci ne compte pas d’autres navires. Il est question que la coque vendue à la Chine devienne un casino-flottant (un croiseur porte-aéronefs, le Kiev, tête de série de sa classe, a connu un tel destin en Chine. Un navire de la même classe, le Minsk, est devenu un musée).

Il y eu des chancelleries qui ne furent pas dupes de la finalité du projet puisque la Turquie bloqua le passage de ses détroits (des Dardanelles et du Bosphore). C’est à se demander si l’initiative d’Ankara n’avait pas été influencée. La coque eu alors quelques difficultés à quitter la mer Noire. Les détroits turcs ont la particularité d’être sous la juridiction de traités internationaux (comme, par exemple, la convention de Montreux, c’est une des formes de désarmement naval) qui prohibent le passage de navire porte-avions. Le pont plat quitte donc finalement l’Ukraine en 2001 et arrive en Chine, à Dailan, en 2002. Mais, le navire qui est livré n’est doté d’aucun engin de propulsion.

 

© Inconnu. Le porte-aéronefs Kuznetsov.

© Inconnu. Le porte-aéronefs Kuznetsov.

 

Porte-aéronefs et non pas porte-avions

 

Le Kuznetsov et l’ex-Varyag sont plus des porte-aéronefs que des porte-avions -et la différence est fondamentale. Première chose, les soviétiques les ont conçu comme des « croiseurs porte-aéronefs ». Il s’agissait de pouvoir s’affranchir de la convention de Montreux par un artifice juridique. Hors, Coutau-Bégarie le relevait, avec une certaine malice, dans le café stratégique numéro 4 consacré à la géostratégie maritime, quand il posait cette question : « avez-vous déjà vu un croiseur de 40 000 tonnes ? » L’auteur évoquait le cas des croiseurs porte-aéronefs de classe Kiev. A titre d’exemple, les croiseurs lance-missiles à propulsion nucléaire de la même classe que le Pierre le Grand déplacent 26 000 tonnes à pleine charge. Et pourtant, ce sont les derniers croiseurs de bataille du monde.

De plus, la stratégie navale soviétique s’appuyait sur des bastions. Ces zones, au nombre de deux, étaient sous la responsabilité des flottes du Nord et du Pacifique. Il s’agissait pour la marine russe de construire, par diverses actions opérationnelles, des zones interdites à toutes les menaces dans l’optique de sécuriser les vecteurs nucléaires (SNLE principalement) qui pouvaient y patrouiller.

 

Une parenthèse doit être ouverte car il est régulièrement évoqué la création d’une sorte de bastion en Chine autour de l’île de Hainan. Une base souterraine pour sous-marin y a été aménagée. Qui plus, le porte-aéronefs chinois pourrait être amené à y patrouilleur selon l’analyse de quelques personnes afin de protéger cette zone, le flanc sud de la Chine, qui est assez vulnérable. Coutau-Bégarie relevait déjà cet état de fait au début des années 90. Parenthèse refermée.

Donc, il y avait nécessité de navires de défense aérienne car l’attaque anti-navires se faisait par avions à long rayon d’action (Tu-95 et 142, par exemple) et croiseurs sous-marins lance-missiles à propulsion nucléaire (les fameux Oscar I et II dont le Koursk était l’un des représentants). En outre, il n’y avait pas de projection de puissance dans la doctrine navale russe car elle était essentiellement défensive.. Mais pas seulement, soit dit en passant puisque la doctrine navale soviétique des années 70 et 80 prévoyait de mener une guerre des communications contre les routes alliés à partir des différentes bases avancées de l’URSS dans le monde. Alors, ces deux navires (ainsi qu’une classe de quatre autres croiseurs porte-aéronefs : les Kiev) sont des croiseurs lance-missiles en tout premier lieu. Le navire tête de série, le Kuznetsov qui est en service dans la Marine russe, permet d’appréhender la chose. Ils (exemple de la classe Kuznetsov) ont donc :

  • une batterie principale composée de missiles : « 12 missiles anti-navires SS-N-19 Shipwreck (« Granit » de 555 km de portée) situés sous le pont d’envol au milieu de la piste (la phase de tir interromprait donc les opérations aériennes). La défense anti-aérienne du bâtiment est assurée par 4 groupements de 6 silos à 8 missiles surface-air SA-N-9 (15 km de portée), 4 systèmes anti-aériens CADS-N-1 (2 canons de 30mm et 8 missiles SA-N-11 -8 km de portée- chacun) et 6 canons anti-aériens multitubes de 30mm. Deux lance-roquettes anti sous-marins complètent le tout » ;
  • et d’une batterie secondaire qui repose sur un groupe aérien embarqué : « Le groupe aérien du Kouznetsov se compose généralement de trente aéronefs dont des chasseurs embarqués Su-33, des avions d’entraînement Su-25UTG et des hélicoptères anti sous-marins Ka-27, de guet aérien Ka-31 et de transport d’assaut Ka-29. A l’origine, il était également prévu d’embarquer des chasseurs à décollage vertical Yak-141 Freestyle avant abandon du programme à la chute de l’URSS. Le Mig-29K a quant à lui été testé mais n’a pas été retenu face au Su-33« .

Le problème pour la Chine, c’est que le navire a été livré sans sa batterie principale. Cette dernière prend une place considérable à bord, ce qui fait que le groupe aérien est plutôt limité (30 machines, officiellement) par rapport au tonnage du navire (60 000 tonnes, contre 32 aéronefs et 40 000 tonnes pour le Charles de Gaulle). Le vaisseau n’est pas non plus optimisé, à l’origine, pour les opérations aériennes puisqu’il fallait composer avec un navire hybride (croiseur/porte-aéronefs) avec deux batteries aux solutions architecturales presque contradictoires.

 

CATOBAR versus STOBAR

 

De plus, les deux navires russes (et six avec les quatre Kiev) relèvent de la filière aéronavale des STOBAR (Short take-off but arrested recovery). C’est-à-dire que les aéronefs à voilure fixe décollent à la seule force de leur réacteur et avec l’aide d’un tremplin et ils reviennent apponter sur le navire avec l’aide de brins d’arrêt. Il n’y a pas de catapultes et c’est une différence vraiment fondamentale d’avec la filière CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take Off Barrier Arrested Recovery) qui compte comme seuls membres les Etats-Unis, la France et le Brésil. Si la filière STOBAR simplifie l’architecture des navires, elle implique que l’avion embarqué soit inférieur en performances à son homologue terrestre. La chose est simple à constater : un Su-33 qui décolle du Kuznetsov ne le fait pas avec son plein chargement de munitions et de carburant, comme il aurait pu le faire depuis une base terrestre. La masse maximale de l’appareil est de 33 tonnes. A contrario, et avec la filière CATOBAR, un Rafale qui est catapulté du Charles de Gaulle a les mêmes performances que celui de l’Armée de l’Air qui décolle d’une base terrestre : ils sont tout les deux aussi chargés. Sauf que le Rafale M est catapulté, à l’heure actuelle, avec une masse maximale de 21 tonnes. Cette symétrie des performances entre l’avion catapulté et son homologue terrestre est vraie dans l’US Navy depuis les années 50. Dans la pratique, cela aboutit à ce que le groupe aéronaval CATOBAR ait une portée très supérieure au groupe aéronaval STOBAR.

 

Une refonte modeste pour l’entrée en service

 

Si l’ex-Varyag arrive finalement en Chine en 2002, il n’entre en cale sèche qu’au cours de l’année 2005. Ce long retard reste à expliquer : était-ce pour cacher la finalité de l’opération ? Les deux porte-aéronefs musée et casino ne suffisaient-ils pas pour faire illusion ?. Finalement, le navire ne quitte sa cale que pendant l’année 2011.

6 années de travaux, c’est à la fois beaucoup et à la fois très peu. Il fallait, au moins, motoriser le navire. Par la suite, les chinois l’ont un peu adapté à leurs besoins, comme c’est expliqué par Mer et Marine :

« Doté de matériels chinois en plus de ses équipements d’origine russe, l’ex-Varyag, qui devrait porter le nom de Shi Lang, mesure 304 mètres de long et affiche un déplacement lège de 46.000 tonnes, son déplacement à pleine charge étant estimé à environ 60.000 tonnes. Doté à l’avant d’un tremplin incliné à 12 degrés, il disposera comme le Kuznetsov d’une piste oblique avec brins d’arrêt. Par rapport à son aîné, divers aménagements ont été réalisés. Ainsi, la capacité du hangar aurait été augmentée, pour permettre à cet espace d’accueillir 22 avions, contre 18 suivant les plans originaux. Le groupe aérien embarqué du Shi Lang devrait comprendre des avions multi-rôles J10 et des intercepteurs J15, version chinoise du Su-33 russe. On rappellera d’ailleurs que Moscou a suspendu la livraison de 50 Su-33 après avoir découvert que le chasseur avait été copié par les Chinois. Il conviendra également de voir comment sera traitée la problématique de l’alerte lointaine, indispensable pour tout déploiement aéronaval lointain, alors que la marine ne dispose d’aucun avion de guet aérien embarqué ».

 

Il semblerait que la batterie principale n’ait pas été renouvelée. Mais les chinois n’auraient pas mené les travaux nécessaires pour optimiser les opérations aériennes à bord du navire. Ainsi, la Russie refond actuellement l’ancien Gorshkov, navire de la classe Kiev, pour l’Inde. Donc, à titre de contre-exemple par rapport aux travaux menés sur le frère jumeau du Kuznetsov, le Liaoning de la marine chinoise, voici l’ampleur de la refonte Gorshkov : « Long de 283 mètres pour un déplacement de 45.000 tonnes en charge, le porte-avions, qui sera rebaptisé Vikramaditya, mettra en œuvre 20 avions MiG-29 K et 12 hélicoptères ». Le Su-33 a beau être légèrement plus grand que le Mig-29K, il y a 12 aéronefs d’écart entre les deux navires. Tout est relatif puisque la place à bord des BPC français pour les hélicoptères le montre, mais c’est à relever.

 

 

© Inconnu. L'INS Vikramaditya, porte-aéronefs refondu par la Russie et qui doit être livré en 2013 à l'Inde.

© Inconnu. L'INS Vikramaditya, porte-aéronefs refondu par la Russie et qui doit être livré en 2013 à l'Inde.

 

Un navire d’essais, d’expérimentations et d’apprentissage des arts aéronavals

 

Le navire sert donc à pratiquer de nombreux essais à la mer depuis 2011, et il a surtout fait l’objet d’une mise en service, plutôt que d’une refonte aussi ambitieuse que celle choisie par l’Inde pour un autre croiseur porte-aéronefs.

Pékin présente son porte-aéronefs (puisque ce n’est pas un porte-avions) comme un navire-école. Il y a un décalage entre ce qui se passe en Asie et ce qui est perçu dans divers endroits de l’Occident. Ce décalage en sera que plus dommageable pour ceux qui perçoivent très mal la montée en puissance des capacités aéronavales chinoises.

Dans un premier temps, l’apprentissage de l’outil aéronaval fondé sur un porte-aéronefs sera très long pour la Chine. Comme le faisait remarquer Coutau-Bégarie, il est nécessaire de distinguer deux notions différentes :

  • le groupe aérien embarqué, qui va de paire avec le navire porte-aéronefs ou porte-avions,
  • le groupe aéronaval.

Groupe aérien embarqué incomplet

 

Le groupe aérien embarqué n’est pas une notion qui va de soi. Par exemple, dans le colloque du CESM consacré au centenaire de l’aéronautique navale française, Coutau-Bégarie notait qu’il avait fallu attendre les porte-avions Foch et Clemenceau pour que la notion s’impose en France. Entre temps, bien des compétences qui avaient été acquises depuis le début de la guerre d’Indochine jusqu’à la Crise de Suez avaient été perdues. Les chinois peuvent difficilement passer à côté d’une telle unité organique qui permet de générer, diffuser et de régénérer les compétences opérationnelles.

 

Pékin a pris les devants. D’une part, la Chine a conclu un accord aéronaval avec le Brésil, en 2010, relatif à la formation des futurs pilotes embarqués chinois. D’autre part, il y a de nombreuses installations terrestres en Chine qui permettent le début de la formation du groupe aérien embarqué et des personnels méconnus mais ô combien indispensables pour sa mise en œuvre (rien que la gestion du pont d’envol est tout un art).

La marine chinoise bénéficierait d’une très bonne préparation avant de percevoir son navire-amiral : mais la pratique sur le porte-aéronefs demeure indispensable…

 

De plus, si la Chine prépare la constitution d’un groupe aérien embarqué et sa mise en œuvre à la mer sur son pont plat, il est à noter que ce groupe est incomplet. Par exemple, il n’y a pas d’aéronefs dédié à l’éclairage de l’escadre ou à la coordination et au soutien des activités aériennes (comme le relevait Mer et Marine dès 2011). Ce groupe est donc sans aéronef de guet aérien (AEW dans la terminologie anglo-américaine) et c’est un manque crucial car c’est l’absence de ce genre d’appareils qui a coûté bien des pertes aux anglais lors de la guerre des Malouines (sans compter qu’il semblerait que la Royal Navy ait été incapable de débusquer et suivre le 25 de Mayo, le porte-avions Argentin -il rentrera au port de lui-même après le torpillage du croiseur argentin Belgrano). Pékin préparerait diverses solutions pour palier au problème : des hélicoptères d’alerte lointaine auraient été développés pour le ou les porte-aéronefs et un avion de guet aérien serait également en développement… Par ailleurs, à quoi peut bien servir un tel appareil, si ce n’est pour équiper un porte-avions dotés de catapultes ?…


C’est sans oublier les hélicoptères de sauvetage qui sont, eux aussi, indispensables pour parer à toutes les éventualités. De même que les hélicoptères logistiques sont nécessaires pour faire durer le navire à la mer grâce aux liaisons qu’ils permettent de faire rapidement entre navires et entre l’escadre et la terre.

 

 

© Wendell Royce McLaughlin Jr. Planes of Carrier Air Wing 7 (CVW-7) fly by USS George Washington (CVN-73) during the ship's maiden deployment to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, May 20–November 17, 1994. Official US Navy photograph. Le CVN 73 George Washington est aujourd'hui prépositionné au Japon. Sur cette photographie, le groupe aérien embarqué était au grand complet : intercepteurs (F-14C Tomcat), chasseurs-bombardiers (F/A-18 Hornet), bombardiers (A-6 Intruder), avions de guerre électronique (EA-6B Prowler) et de guet aérien (E-2C Hawkeye).

© Wendell Royce McLaughlin Jr. Planes of Carrier Air Wing 7 (CVW-7) fly by USS George Washington (CVN-73) during the ship's maiden deployment to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, May 20–November 17, 1994. Official US Navy photograph. Le CVN 73 George Washington est aujourd'hui prépositionné au Japon. Sur cette photographie, le groupe aérien embarqué était au grand complet : intercepteurs (F-14C Tomcat), chasseurs-bombardiers (F/A-18 Hornet), bombardiers (A-6 Intruder), avions de guerre électronique (EA-6B Prowler) et de guet aérien (E-2C Hawkeye).

 

Absence de groupe aéronaval chinois

 

Outre le couple porte-aéronefs/groupe aérien embarqué, il faut pouvoir l’escorter. Ce n’est pas une mince affaire que d’articuler une base aérienne flottante (tout comme il faut protéger une base aérienne déployée à l’étranger… ou en France !) avec, au moins, un escorteur dédié à la lutte anti-sous-marine et un autre à la lutte anti-aérienne. Ainsi, il est impensable de nos jours de déployer un porte-aéronefs ou un porte-avions sans sous-marin nucléaire d’attaque pour assurer sa protection (sauf quand la nation détentrice du pont plat ne possède pas de SNA, mais alors elle déploie rarement son porte-aéronefs de manière indépendante). C’est l’escorte minimale pour protéger le porte-aéronefs. En la matière, il est difficile de dire que la SNA regorge de SNA (une demi-douzaine) par rapport au nombre de sous-marins classiques qu’elle met en œuvre. Mais le « hic » est que, historiquement, le sous-marin diesel-électrique est inapte à escorter une escadre.

 

Et c’est sans compter sur le nécessaire train logistique pour faire durer le navire à la mer : il faut autant ravitailler le pont plat que ses aéronefs que son escorte. Tout comme l’escorte doit pouvoir être relevé si besoin est par de nouveaux navires. Cela implique d’avoir une flotte de surface bien dimensionnée par rapport au besoin -même si le navire n’est pas destiné à être projeté loin de sa base. Par exemple, quand le Charles de Gaulle œuvrait au Sud du port de Toulon, l’escorte de SNA était insuffisante.

 

Le porte-aéronefs chinois se prépare à entrer en service depuis l’année 2011 : c’est-à-dire que son équipage prend en main le navire et le porte vers l’état opérationnel en qualifiant les systèmes les uns après les autres. Si le navire est livré en fin d’année 2012 (le 23 ou le 25 septembre, peu importe), c’est qu’il aura fallu au moins une année pour le prendre en main depuis ses premiers essais à la mer.

 

Dans le même temps, le navire a commencé les essais aéronautiques dont les objectifs sont autant de qualifier les hommes que les machines et l’intégration des deux aussi bien sur le pont d’envol que dans les airs. Il faudra probablement une bonne année pour prendre en main tout cela.

 

Mais il faudra encore une bonne année, si ce n’est plus, pour adjoindre au pilier du groupe aéronaval son escorte et un train logistique efficace. La Chine s’est essayé à la projection de forces à l’occasion des opérations de lutte contre la piraterie au large de l’Afrique. Si le fait de déployer quelques frégates dans le temps au large de la Corne de l’Afrique peut passer pour un effort « modeste » et « non-alarmant » sur la puissance navale chinoise, il faut bien comprendre que Pékin fait dans ce cadre ses armes pour projeter loin de ses côtes des unités navales…

Enfin, il sera intéressant d’observer comment la Chine couplera sa force aéronaval terrestre constitué d’appareils d’attaque à long rayon d’action avec son groupe aéronaval : complémentarité ou rivalité ?

 

Groupe Aéronaval Chinois (GAC) : vers 2022 ?

 

Bernard Prézelin, l’auteur actuel de « Fottes de combat », estimait en 2011, que cinq année, au minimum, serait nécessaire à la Chine pour construire un groupe aéronaval crédible (par rapport à ce qui se faisait pendant l’opération Harmattan). Il faudra certainement quelques années de plus car il sera nécessaire à la marine chinoise d’apprendre de nombreux exercices, voire d’interventions militaires. Par ailleurs, il est bon de noter que la Chine semble développer une coopération aéronavale avec le Brésil : est-ce que ce sera la seule ?

 

Dire que le groupe aéronaval chinois ne sera crédible que vers l’an 2022, ce n’est ni exagéré, ni une sous-estimation. La Chine se donne les moyens de préparer l’aventure avant la perception du navire afin de gagner du temps sur les enseignements à tirer de la mer. Elle parviendra à construire l’outil qu’elle ambitionne de se doter, à n’en pas douter. Donc, il serait surfait de craindre que le navire puisse actuellement, et dès sa livraison (comme s’il pouvait être livré « prêt à l’emploi en guerre »), être la pièce maîtresse d’un dispositif naval offensif.

 

Un outil pour la guerre des archipels ?

 

Coutau-Bégarie proposait une utilité au futur navire porte-aéronefs ou porte-avions chinois en 1991 : « La conjoncture budgétaire et internatio­nale semble rendre de tels projets chimériques, mais le besoin subsiste, notamment sur le flanc sud, face au Vietnam : les avions basés à Haïnan peuvent couvrir les îles Paracels, mais pas l’archipel des Spratley, situé beaucoup plus au sud, où Pékin a récemment entrepris de renforcer sa présence ». C’est une possible utilisation du navire, qu’il serve d’école ou non, qui a encore été avancé cette année. Si les tensions qui règnent entre le Japon et la Chine autour de l’archipel des Senkaku focalisent aujourd’hui l’attention, elles ne doivent pas faire oublier les conflits territoriaux qui perdurent sur le flanc sud de la façade maritime chinoise.

 

Un navire bien encombrant pour la diplomatie navale chinoise ?

 

C’est sur le plan de la diplomatie navale que le navire produit ses premiers effets car il est l’objet du fantasme d’une « Chine impéraliste ». Tout du moins, il montre que la Chine entend aussi projeter sa puissance aérienne par la voie des mers, au moins au large de ses côtes.

 

Mais en attendant le nécessaire apprentissage, il n’est pas un instrument de combat, ce qui va compliquer les bénéfices politiques à retirer de ses croisières. Cela pourrait même fragiliser sa position : un navire inapte au combat ne va pas dans un théâtre d’opérations où pourrait se dérouler des actions offensives de moyenne ou haute intensité. Et donc, le moral chinois pourrait recevoir un coup terrible en cas de crise régionale puisque le fleuron de la flotte resterait au port ou loin des combats, dans une sorte de « fleet in being« . La diplomatie navale peut être à double tranchant.

 

 

© Inconnu. Maquette de porte-avions nucléaire soviétique, l'Ulyanovsk, qui était construit à 20% lors de la chute du mur de Berlin. Il a été déconstruit sur cale par la suite. Il pourrait inspirer le projet 085 chinois.

© Inconnu. Maquette de porte-avions nucléaire soviétique, l'Ulyanovsk, qui était construit à 20% lors de la chute du mur de Berlin. Il a été déconstruit sur cale par la suite. Il pourrait inspirer le projet 085 chinois.

 

Deux porte-aéronefs et un porte-avions supplémentaires à percevoir pour la Marine chinoise ?

 

Le décalage entre la situation opérationnelle du porte-aéronefs chinois d’aujourd’hui et la montée en puissance des capacités aéronavales chinoises dissimulent ce qui pourrait se passer en 2022. Ce navire demeurera très certainement un navire-école (tout comme il sera le centre d’un groupe aéronaval école, à vrai dire) car tant qu’il flottera, il sera une inappréciable source d’enseignements opérationnels pour la Chine. Si jamais il devait ne plus naviguer pour bien des raisons, alors ce serait autant de temps perdu.

Mais si Pékin tient son calendrier, alors la marine chinoise pourrait sereinement faire entrer en service d’autres porte-avions à partir de 2022. Deux projets seraient actuellement menés en Chine :

  • le projet 085 : « Les autorités chinoises envisageraient la réalisation d’un porte-avions à propulsion nucléaire. Ce grand bâtiment de 93.000 tonnes pourrait être mis en service à l’horizon 2020 [...]. En ce qui concerne le porte-avions nucléaire, sa conception et sa réalisation pourrait être confiées aux chantiers Jiangnan, près de Shanghai. Ses dimensions seraient très proches de celles de l’ex-porte-avions nucléaire russe Ul’yanovsk, soit plus de 300 mètres de long. Mis sur cale à Nikolaev en fin 1988, ce navire avait été finalement démoli en 1992, alors que sa coque était à 20% d’achèvement ».
  • Le projet 089 qui compterait deux navires : « Les autorités chinoises envisageraient la réalisation d’un porte-avions à propulsion nucléaire [...] viendrait compléter le dossier « 089 », portant sur la construction dans les 5 à 8 ans [à partir de 2007] de deux porte-avions classiques de 64.000 tonnes. Dotés de deux catapultes, ils pourraient mettre en oeuvre 30 à 40 avions J-10. Ces bâtiments seraient dérivés du Varyag, le sistership non achevé du porte-avions russe Kuznetzov ».

Les équipages du premier groupe aéronaval auront constitué le noyau dur de la puissance aéronavale chinoise. C’est à partir de ce noyau qu’elle grandira. Les actuelles agitations autour de la livraison du navire font oublier le fait que bien des échos annoncent la construction de porte-avions en Chine. S’ils étaient livrés en 2022, alors la Chine ferait un pas de géant dans le club des puissances aéronavales.

 

C’est cet accroissement soudain de la puissance aéronavale chinoise à l’horizon des années 2020 que peuvent craindre les nations asiatiques.

 

Le temps long de la construction hauturière de la marine chinoise est bien adapté à celui de la mer qui est, aussi, un temps long, Pékin pourrait prendre de vitesse bien des rivaux. Il doit être clair pour tout le monde que l’acquisition d’un porte-avions et sa préparation pour qu’il devienne la pièce centrale d’un outil stratégique relève du long terme puisque :

  • quelques années sont nécessaires pour concevoir le navire dans un bureau d’études.
  • La durée de construction généralement constatée d’un tel navire et pour l’armer de tout ses systèmes est de 5 à 7 ans.
  • Enfin, 5 à 10 ans années sont nécessaires pour le transformer en un outil opérationnel (à force d’entraînements et d’échanges avec les marines alliés) capable d’opérer avec un groupe aéronaval.

Nous sommes en 2012, et autant dire que si, effectivement, la Chine construit une escadre école pour accueillir deux porte-aéronefs de plus, et avec, peut être, le premier porte-avions (à propulsion nucléaire) sur la tranche des années 2020-2025, alors elle prendra bel et bien toute l’Asie du Sud-Est de court.

 

Développement horizontal de la puissance aéronavale en Asie

 

Ce n’est pas vraiment une projection saugrenue puisque :

  • les programmes indiens d’acquisition de porte-aéronefs accumulent les retards : les navires (un, voire deux Air Defense Ship/Indigenous Aircrafts Carrier et l’INS Vikramaditya (ex-Gorshkov soviétique) n’arriveraient en flotte en 2013 (Vikramaditya) et les deux autres vers 2017-2020. Actuellement la marine indienne ne met en œuvre que l’INS Vikrant, navire qui accuse son âge.
  • La Russie maintient le Kuznetsov en service, mais elle n’a pas encore retrouvé les capacités nécessaires pour le remplacer, voire augmenter sa flotte de ponts plats. La démonstration la plus flagrante de cet état de fait est que la Chine aura réussi l’exploit de refondre et mettre au service un ancien porte-aéronefs soviétique (classe Kuznetsov) avant que Moscou réussisse à en faire de même pour honorer le contrat d’acquisition passé par l’Inde pour un autre ancien porte-aéronefs soviétique (le Gorshkov, donc, de classe Kiev). Mais Moscou devrait percevoir un second porte-avions (en plus de ses deux premiers BPC et de son Kuznetsov qui serait alors toujours en service) vers 2020 et ils seront complétés par les modernisations et réactivations des croiseurs lance-missiles classe Pierre le Grand.
  • la Corée du Sud aura toujours ses trois Dokdo (et pourquoi pas des F-35B à mettre dessus?).
  • Le Japon aura alors au moins quatre porte-aéronefs (avec, peut être, des F-35B, même si Tokyo dit ne pas s’y intéresser à l’heure actuelle) : les deux destroyers porte-hélicoptères 16DDH et deux autres navires de ce type, mais plus volumineux et grands : les deux 22DDH.
  • Les Etats-Unis auront toujours un porte-avions basé au Japon, en sus des autres naviguant de la mer d’Arabie jusqu’au Pacifique en passant par l’océan Indien (soit trois navires autour du Rimland, en plus du navire basé au Japon).

Dans une telle mêlée, deux ou trois porte-aéronefs et porte-avions chinois en plus de l’actuel, ce n’est pas difficile à justifier.

 

Le problème naval américain ?

 

Il demeure donc essentiellement les Etats-Unis dans la région pour contre-balancer la puissance navale chinoise en devenir, et dans une moindre mesure, l’Inde. Ils sont directement impactés par le potentiel défi et cela ne fait qu’accentuer leur problème naval : avec un navire stationné au Japon, un ou deux patrouillant dans le Golfe Persique et un autre faisant la jonction entre l’océan Indien et l’Asie du Sud-Est, il n’y a pas tellement de navires américains face à un, deux ou trois, voire quatre ! (à l’orée 2020) navires chinois jouant à domicile. Les navires de la marine de l’armée populaire de libération ont cet avantage d’être directement sur zone quand les navires américains passent un bon tiers de leur temps en transit.

 

Si Pékin armait deux, trois ou quatre porte-aéronefs et porte-avions entre 2020-2025, que feront les Etats-Unis qui disposent, en moyenne, d’autant de porte-avions dans la zone ? Les valeurs respectives des groupes aéronavals de chacun ne seront pas les mêmes, certes. Mais comment se posera le problème naval américain si Pékin allait jusqu’à lancer un porte-aéronefs ou porte-avions de plus que ce que peuvent aligner les Etats-Unis dans la zone ? C’est une chose que l’URSS n’avait pas osé faire : dépasser quantitativement l’US Navy dans la projection de puissance via les ponts plats. D’un autre côté, et à moins d’un affrontement de haute intensité, la Chine pourrait rapidement se convertir à la « diplomatie du porte-avions » et donc envoyer ses porte-avions faire sentir l’influence de Pékin dans toutes les zones jugées stratégiques par la capitale chinoise.

 

 

© Inconnu. Repris sur le site de DSI : "Une vue d’artiste tirée d’internet et montrant le 22DDH, nouveau type de « destroyer porte-hélicoptères » aux côtés d’un Hyuga. La JMSDF japonaise, qui devait recevoir 4 Hyuga, a décidé que les deux derniers bâtiments seraient substantiellement plus gros (plus de 24 000 tonnes contre 18 000 pour les Hyuga) et plus long (248 m, largeur de 39 m). Tokyo n'a toutefois pas encore montré d’intérêt pour le F-35B".

© Inconnu. Repris sur le site de DSI : "Une vue d’artiste tirée d’internet et montrant le 22DDH, nouveau type de « destroyer porte-hélicoptères » aux côtés d’un Hyuga. La JMSDF japonaise, qui devait recevoir 4 Hyuga, a décidé que les deux derniers bâtiments seraient substantiellement plus gros (plus de 24 000 tonnes contre 18 000 pour les Hyuga) et plus long (248 m, largeur de 39 m). Tokyo n'a toutefois pas encore montré d’intérêt pour le F-35B".

 

Des noms de navires pour l’ambition

 

C’est justement la volonté des Etats-Unis qui est mesurée par Pékin.

 

Sur le plan naval, il faut bien comprendre que la Chine ne donne pas, par hasard, des noms à ses navires. Par exemple, le navire-école chinois qui sert à former les officiers d’une marine océanique en construction porte un nom bien particulier : le Zheng He. C’était aussi le nom d’un amiral chinois du XIVe siècle. La particularité de ce marin est qu’il est soupçonné d’être l’un des premiers à avoir découvert l’Amérique du Nord dès le XIVe siècle (mais d’autres pistes portent à croire que ce serait une découverte viking qui daterait du Xe siècle -l’Europe est sauvée). Mais plus encore, du temps de cet amiral, la marine chinoise était une force océanique capable de croiser depuis la Chine jusqu’au Golfe Persique et de soumettre ces côtes à l’influence chinoise.

 

Dans un premier temps, donc, ce premier porte-aéronefs chinois etait baptisé « Shi Lang« . C’est le nom d’un amiral chinois qui servit sous les dynasties des Ming et des Qing, soit au XVIIe siècle. Une des réussites militaires de cet amiral a une résonance toute particulière, encore aujourd’hui : il réussi à soumettre l’archipel de Taiwan. Donc, et alors que Pékin niait toujours, pour la forme, que l’ancien Varyag soviétique allait devenir un navire militaire, il était attribué d’un nom à la symbolique très forte. Il semblait bien trouvé puisqu’il permettait à Pékin de matérialiser une volonté politique très forte de faire entendre raison à cet archipel pour qu’il rejoigne « une seule Chine, deux systèmes » -ou trois systèmes pour l’occasion. C’était une réaffirmation politique qui aurait fait écho à bien des discours. Mais c’était aussi un risque calculé car si la Chine montait progressivement d’un cran dans le cadre de cette crise larvée, elle le faisait très progressivement sans déstabiliser la région. Les Etats-Unis auraient alors reçu très clairement le message puisque l’archipel de la Chine nationaliste est sous leur protection (bien que Washington évite de franchir des lignes jaunes en accordant une trop grande protection aux yeux de Pékin – autre chose à noter, les Etats-Unis se méfient, peut être trop tard, de la réussite chinoise à espionner les matériels américains vendus à Taiwan, ce qui pourrait expliquer quelques lenteurs à la livraison de matériels).

 

Mais ce n’était qu’un nom de baptême officieux : rien de rien n’était officiel.

C’est bien dommage, dans un sens. Il a été dit que bien des esprits se focalisent (trop ?) sur les capacités supposées du navire. Sans paraphraser ce qui a été dit plus haut, ce porte-aéronefs n’est pas la pièce d’un groupe aéronaval opérationnel. C’est la pièce maîtresse de la montée en puissance de la Chine dans le club fermé des marines dotées d’une aéronavale embarquée sur porte-aéronefs ou porte-avions. Ce qui aurait dû retenir l’attention, c’est le nom du navire. Première observation, c’est le nom de la province il a été refondu et mis en service : Liaoning. Et alors ? Il y a bien un porte-avions Charles de Gaulle qui était baptisé Bretagne au début de son programme en France et la première frégate du programme FREMM qui est nommée Aquitaine. Deuxième remarque : la Chine ne semble jamais donner un nom à un navire de premier plan à la légère…

 

La troisième remarque n’est que le fruit de la supposition de l’auteur : Liaoning, ce nom n’est pas inconnu dans nos manuels d’Histoire. Liaoning est donc le nom d’une province chinoise. Cette entité administrative abrite une ville, Dailan, où a été refondu et mis en service le navire. La capitale de cette entité territoriale est Shenyang. Le nom mandchou de cette ville est « assez intéressant » : Moukden. En 1931, l’empire du soleil levant organise un faux attentat sur une ligne de chemin de fer appartenant à une société japonaise. Cet « attentat » (il est avéré aujourd’hui que c’est bien le Japon qui l’avait monté de toutes pièces) a été le prétexte pour Tokyo pour occuper la Mandchourie. La suite de l’Histoire est connue : la Chine côtière fut en grande partie soumise par les armes japonaises, et ce fut un massacre parmi les chinois. Aujourd’hui encore, Pékin exige des excuses du Japon et la fureur populaire chinoise explose à chaque fois que cette période est minimisée au Japon, comme quand un manuel scolaire japonais restait bien « modeste » sur cette période.


Il faudrait donc admettre que le nom du premier porte-aéronefs chinois ait été effectivement choisi en liaison avec cet événement historique qui inaugurait une période noire pour la Chine. Les gouvernements successifs de Pékin, depuis la proclamation de la République Populaire de Chine, s’acharnent à démonter, les uns après les autres, les traités « inégaux » que la Chine aurait eu à signer au XIXe siècle (essentiellement). Cette fois-ci, la Chine pourrait (ce n’est qu’une supposition) adresser un message très fort au Japon : il y a des contentieux à régler, et cela ne peut plus se faire sur des bases que les gouvernants chinois jugent ou jugeraient inéquitables. Pékin afficherait alors une ligne géopolitique constante, mais renouvellerait également sa volonté par cet acte fort.

Dans le cadre de cette supposition, ce n’est plus seulement l’archipel nationaliste et rebelle qui est visé, mais c’est bien le Japon. Le protecteur stratégique est le même dans les deux cas. Ce ne serait pas du tout la même chose entre la réintégration de Taiwan dans le giron chinois et le lâchage du Japon par les Etats-Unis :

  • d’un côté, il y a un archipel qui est divisé entre indépendantistes et un autre camp plutôt désireux de se rapprocher de la Chine (ce qui ne veut pas dire rattachement pur et simple). Si la pression des armes chinoises se fait sentir, la porte n’est pas non plus fermée à une solution politique.
  • De l’autre côté, il y a le Japon. L’archipel dépositaire de l’empire du soleil levant est sous protectorat américain depuis 1945.

La sécurité nationale japonaise repose sur la volonté des Etats-Unis à rester suffisamment engagé en Asie pour défendre et leurs intérêts, et l’archipel. Si donc le message de la Chine passe par ce navire, dont le nom ferait référence à l’incident de 1931, alors un défi est lancé au Japon et aux Etats-Unis.

La Chine fait sentir sa présence navale, via ses agences paramilitaires, le long de ses côtes à travers tout les archipels et îlots qui font l’objet d’une crise larvée depuis plusieurs années, voire plusieurs décennies (Taïwan donc, mais aussi les Senkaku, Paracels et les Spratleys). Ces confrontations navales qui se font via des forces civiles ou paramilitaires font craindre l’engagement des marines de guerre des pays concernés. Par son porte-aéronefs, Pékin pourrait (conditionnel, toujours) faire savoir que, à l’avenir, la volonté de la Chine est suffisamment forte pour engager un ou deux autres porte-aéronefs supplémentaires, voire un porte-avions nucléaire. Il y a donc un défi militaire qui est lancé. Le Japon a d’ores et déjà lancé deux destroyers porte-hélicoptères (16DDH) et devrait percevoir dans les prochaines années deux autres navires porte-hélicoptères (les deux destroyers 22DDH, notoirement plus grands). La question qui est posée aux Etats-Unis est celle de la volonté :

  • est-ce que Washington relève le défi chinois et reste partie prenante dans les différentes crises qui secouent le Sud-Est asiatique, notamment et surtout les crises territoriales ?
  • Ou bien est-ce que la stratégie d’engagement prioritaire en Asie décrétée par les derniers gouvernements américains (dont celui d’Obama) n’est pas subordonnée à une volonté politique suffisamment solide ?

Pékin fait sentir sa détermination, notamment, et pas seulement, par le poids de son engagement naval. Alors soit les Etats-Unis répondent présent et l’US Navy s’engage encore plus en Asie, soit le Japon et les autres nations asiatiques se retrouvent en tête-à-tête avec la Chine. A ce moment là, les modalités d’un équilibre des puissances entre elles seront tout autre avec une présence américaine en reflux.

Cette supposition sur le choix du nom du porte-aéronefs chinois demeure une supposition. Il est certain que la Chine ne choisit pas au hasard le nom de ses plus importantes unités navales qui constituent le fondement de sa puissance de demain. Si c’est une manière de tester la volonté politique américaine, alors la réponse façonnera pour beaucoup les équilibres géopolitiques des 20 ou 30 prochaines années. Dans ce cadre, l’Europe ne peut que s’attendre à un seul cas de figure : un désengagement américain encore plus grand du Vieux continent. Effectivement, il faut noter que :

  • si les Etats-Unis relèvent le défi asiatique jusqu’au bout en continuant à construire un front d’opposition à Pékin, alors les américains auront besoin de la majorité de leurs forces disponibles dans le Pacifique, et cela se fera certainement au détriment de l’Europe (qui investit beaucoup moins sur le plan militaire que le reste du monde).
  • Mais si les Etats-Unis abdiquaient face à Pékin et abandonnaient la stratégie de containment de la Chine dans le Pacifique, alors pourquoi est-ce que les Etats-Unis s’investiraient-ils en Europe ?!

L’arrivée du Liaoning au service actif peut signifier un outil supplémentaire dans les mains de Pékin pour intervenir dans les crises territoriales qui secouent la façade chinoise. Mais c’est un outil à double tranchant dans le cadre de la diplomatie navale car ce navire pourrait être un poids bien encombrant pour Pékin puisqu’il n’a pas de valeur opérationnelle. Par contre, la Chine lance deux défis à l’Asie, aux Etats-Unis et à ceux qui ambitionnent de compter dans les affaires du monde : d’une part, le nom du navire pourrait indiquer que Pékin entend disputer, à travers le Japon, le statut des Etats-Unis comme première puissance asiatique, mais exogène. D’autre part, que ce défi supposé réussisse ou non, la Chine pourrait être amené à faire rapidement, sur la période allant de 2015 à 2025, un saut quantitatif et qualitatif dans sa puissance aéronavale. Et ce défi là, il sera très difficile à contourner.

 

Pendant ce temps là, en France, le second porte-avions et le remplaçant du Charles de Gaulle se font attendre… Que sera la puissance aéronavale française dans le contexte des années 2020 et du défi chinois ?

Partager cet article
Repost0
3 octobre 2012 3 03 /10 /octobre /2012 12:15

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-xDb-yGx5WUc/UGvIQIK7e8I/AAAAAAAARno/ZzBoET4TOuM/s1600/1348459144_28499.jpg

 

October 02, 2012 China Defense Blog

 

Judging from the recent PLA Daily articles and internet photo "releases", the 8th LH brigade of the 38th Group Army, Beijing MR has become the 2nd LH unit armed with the latest Z-10 attach choppers (6th squadron).   It is interesting to note that the 8th is also home to the Z-19 light attack helicopter (5th squadron).

 

After two years of service with the 5th LH brigade, it is clear that the CMC is now ready to expand its Z-10 footprint

 

This Z-10 is obviously at Baoding (8 Army Avn Bde), where 12 large hangars (for MI-17) and 9 small hangars (for Z-10), all camouflage and with round roofs, have been built by 2011. They seem to be also constructing 8 large hangars (for Z-8?).

 

There are also round hangars at Sanshui-Daliao (6 Army Avn Bde), but they are not camouflaged and are in two consecutive rows of 10, not separated like those at Baoding.

 

Since Z-8 and Z-10 appear to go together, perhaps we should expect the next Z-10 squadron to be formed in 26 GA 7 Army Avn Regt (Bde?).

Partager cet article
Repost0
30 septembre 2012 7 30 /09 /septembre /2012 17:05

China Carrier (Liaoning)

 

28.09.2012

 

As I’m sure you all know by now, the formerly known Varyag Aircraft Carrier was commissioned into PLAN as Liaoning and given the Type 001 class AC with pennant number of 16. I haven’t spent as much time looking into this development, but it’s quite clear that there is a lot of excitement on Chinese military forum over Liaoning class. This news has already eclipsed the exciting unveiling of Shenyang AC’s 4th generation fighter jet (I’m using generation by Chinese standard) and the unveiling of the 052D class destroyers. The only news that has caused more stir in the recent years is the unveiling of J-20. On the English forum that I moderate, some of the fellow members have been waiting for 7 to 8 years for this moment. A few years ago, I had all but given up on Liaoning ever becoming a big part of PLAN’s blue water plans. This was even after Liaoning had been painted with PLAN colours in 2006. Now, it appears that Liaoning has a bigger role in PLAN than many people have expected.

For me, I haven’t been as excited about this development. I was quite excited when 054A and 056 came out. I was also excited when we saw that new mysterious large diesel submarine from WuChang shipyard in 2010. I was really excited when 052D came out. I couldn’t stop looking for more photos on it. I suppose I have already spent too much time looking at Liaoning from when it was first dragged to Dalian to when it was first painted to when it got the non-skid layers to when it was taken to dry docks to when work started on Island to when it made its first sea trials. The more exciting moments will still come in the future when we see J-15s take off and land on it. And after that, it will be interesting to see how PLAN intends to use this training carrier. I read a really great article by Andrew Erickson today, where he talked about how Liaoning will not be that useful in the immediate time facing US or Japan, but could be quite useful in South China Sea. When Liu Huaqing first envisioned a carrier in PLAN, he wanted a medium sized carrier that PLAN can use to dominate South China Sea rather than a super carrier to compete against USN. Of course, this was also back in the late 80s when PLAN had those skirmishes with Vietnam where it had no air cover against Vietnam’s Su-22s. Even as PLAN is still learning carrier op in these early years, Liaoning could make quite a difference in any South China Sea scenarios.

When I was going through articles on the commissioning of Liaoning, I think one of the more interesting parts is where someone from PLAN stated that this shows China can build a carrier. While he conceded the hull was built in Russia, he stated strongly that everything inside the ship and on the ship was designed and built in China. I would imagine that whatever the Russians are doing for the INS Vikramaditya is what China had to do for the former Varyag. It certainly explains why they took this many years to finally launch the ship. Thinking about that, it’s interested that China has managed to restore and modernize a larger ship faster than the Russians despite having to learn the entire structure of the ship from scratch. Reading an interviewed piece from the ship, it certainly sounded like the interior of the ship has been completely changed to the modern PLAN standards. It was stated to have a 24 hours cafeteria with two bars (one loud and one quiet). It was has a supermarket, a post office, a gym (probably also basketball court), a laundromart and a garbage treatment station. Sailors can communicate with family at home through computers and can even use their cell phones. I would imagine the condition to be similar to those pictures we’ve seen of the interiors of the No. 88 life style ship and the Type 071 LPD. PLAN has made a serious effort in the recent years to improve the living conditions of these newer ships as they strive to become blue water navy. So far, we’ve already seen the latest of Chinese sensors and close in weapon systems installed on Liaoning. We’ve also seen the living quarters of the sailors revamped and modernized to be similar to other new PLAN ships. I can only imagine that the navigation control, command area and carrier operations control rooms will also be upgraded to the latest and best PLAN could offer. Liaoning should have much more modern weapon systems on board than any previously Russia/Soviet built carriers. It should also be much more powerful than the refitted and modernized Vikramaditya. Once J-15 joins service, it should also theoretically be much more advanced and capable than any previous naval aircraft that operated off a Russia/Soviet built carrier. Now that they have the hardware that the Soviet navy never had, the much longer process of developing the software (training people and pilots for carrier ops) is about to start.

A while ago, I was asked about when I think a Chinese carrier will enter Persian Gulf. And I think this is a good place to put what I thought at that time. Eventually, a China carrier will leave the safety of the South China Sea and then the second chain of islands. It will move past Malacca straits to protect its energy routes from Africa and the Persian Gulf. I have the following thoughts for when that will happen:

First, we have to think about economics and political situation in China. If we have a serious political or economic problem in China, that would slow down all military procurement. So, let's for the sake of argument, assume that this will not be an issue; and the navy will continue to see 10% increase in its budget every year.

Secondly, China doesn't currently have any real oversea base. And I think they would need oversea base close to the Persian Gulf first before they can really enter into Persian Gulf. They already have some supply points or network of places to support their current operations in the Gulf of Aden. Good article to read is here. In order for China to enter the Persian Gulf, I'd imagine it would need an oversea base close to the Persian Gulf. The location talked about so far are Pakistan, Seychelles, Burma, Sri Lanka and any number of African countries friendly to China. This won't happen right away, but I think it will eventually happen by the end of this decade. I think that Gwadar, Pakistan and somewhere in Burma probably make the most sense. In the former case, that base could be protected by Pakistan army and air force. In the latter case, Burma would also be within range of Chinese air force (with refueling).

Third, what would be the carrier entering into the Persian Gulf? I can't imagine it will be Liaoning, which should serve in the role I mentioned up top. Aside from that, Liaoning is still using steam turbines. If we look at all of the recent PLAN deployments, there have been very few long range ones using steam turbines. Even now, none of the Sov destroyers have been to Gulf of Aden. So, that means it would have to be a domestically built carrier. If the first carrier is under construction in JN shipyard right now as I've been led to believe, the earliest it would enter service is toward the end of this decade.

After that, we have to look at the rest of the carrier group. The current generation of AAW and ASW ships (052C/D and 054A) is sufficient to escort something like Liaoning. The first domestic carriers will be expected to make longer deployments, which would require the next generation of escorts. They would also need something like 095, because the current nuclear subs are way too noisy. Even 095 is still expected to be at least one generation behind Virginia class, so they would probably need something that’s a generation better (like a 097 class). They would need larger AAW and ASW ships that have the propulsion to keep up with the carrier. Aside from the 097 class, everything else (including a new generation of AORs) should already be commissioned by the time the first domestic carrier is ready, so escorts will not be a limiting factor.

The part that will slow things down is the development of the air wing and learning of carrier operations. The first generation of air wing will probably achieve IOC by 2015. By then, the J-15 fighter jet, JJ-9 trainer and Z-8 helicopters should have had some experience on takeoff and landing on Liaoning. For PLAN to feel comfortable sending its carrier into the Persian Gulf and keep it there, it will probably want the second generation of naval air wing. It will probably comprise of a naval version of the new SAC fighter jet, Z-8/Z-15 helicopters for ASW/SAR and other missions, different variants of naval flanker playing the role of E/FA-18E/F/G/H, Y-7 AEW and next generation of naval trainer. Now, most of this is already in development, so optimistically speaking they will probably achieve IOC by 2025. And then, PLAN would probably like to operate it a couple of years before giving it an extensive deployment to Persian Gulf. So, I think it would take until the end of the next decade before PLAN can make a meaningful entrance. By then, they would have almost 2 decades of carrier operations and multiple aircraft carriers.

Partager cet article
Repost0
29 septembre 2012 6 29 /09 /septembre /2012 21:50

China Carrier (Liaoning)

 

Sep. 29, 2012 - By WENDELL MINNICK  Defense News

 

TAIPEI — As China celebrated the launch of its first aircraft carrier last week, images and video posted on the Internet raise new questions as to how far along the country has come in the development of its carrier capability.

 

Soon after the carrier, named Liaoning, was commissioned Sept. 25 at Dalian Naval Base, Western analysts began dissecting photos and videos posted by the country’s state-controlled media. Some believe the images raise the possibility that Liaoning might be closer to fielding a carrier-based fighter jet capability than previously thought, while others are unconvinced.

 

In the past, photos of what appeared to be the Shenyang J-15 Sea Shark fighter, a variant of the Russian Sukhoi Su-33, on the deck of the carrier were dismissed by analysts as mock-ups. No photos or videos have been seen of a fighter landing on or taking off from the carrier, but images and video from the induction ceremony show skid marks on the flight deck. A video also shows what appear to be the tail wings of two J-15s in the hangar deck.

 

Chinese media have consistently reported that the new carrier would be used primarily as a training platform and “to practice how to integrate with a combined task force,” said Gary Li, an analyst at U.K.-based Executive Analysis. Whether real aircraft or mock-ups, the presence of the planes on the ship indicates the Chinese are likely already — at the very minimum — practicing plane-handling techniques on the first-of-its-kind carrier.

 

According to Chinese state-controlled media, Liaoning is outfitted with state-of-the-art weapons, including a 150-kilometer-range active phased array radar capable of tracking 200 air targets; a 250-kilometer-range Sea Eagle surface-search radar; a 10-kilometer-range Red Flag 10 (FL-3000N) anti-missile system; and a two-kilometer-range 30mm 1030 automatic cannon for anti-ship missiles.

 

Besides the J-15, other aircraft could include the Zhi-8 transport helicopter and Kamov Ka-28 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter.

 

Some analysts said the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) might use the carrier initially as a helicopter carrier, akin to Japan’s Hyuga-class helicopter destroyers or the U.S. Navy’s Wasp-class amphibious assault ships.

 

“It is clear from certain pictures taken by the Chinese press in and around the carrier during the induction ceremony that there has been testing of the J-15 on the Liaoning,” Li said. “Tire marks on the runway suggest taking off and landing during sea trials, and one cameraman even managed to capture a J-15 test plane in the below deck hangar.”

 

But not everyone is convinced.

 

“I’m having trouble believing they’ve actually landed J-15s on this thing,” said Roger Cliff, a China military specialist at the Project 2049 Institute. Skid marks on the deck could be “touch-and-go” landings.

 

“The skid marks are well forward of where the arresting gear is,” he said. There is the possibility that they are also practicing takeoffs at sea.

 

“They could put J-15 prototypes, or even J-11s [Su-27], on the ship with a crane, take the ship out to sea, and practice taking off, landing back on dry land,” he said.

 

China would need a fighter that can handle a 3-degree angle of drop and a pilot would need to make several land-based arrested landings before trials can begin at sea, where the deck is pitching, Cliff said.

 

“When practicing on land, the consequence of touching down a foot behind where the deck starts is a poor landing score. If you do that on a carrier, you’re looking at a new aircraft, a new pilot, and repairs to the stern of the carrier,” he said.

 

Li said the J-15 is just one piece of the puzzle China needs to figure out.

 

“The lack of an early warning aircraft like the E-2 Hawkeye, even though a prototype has been spotted recently, and not enough dedicated ASW assets to go around in the form of Ka-28s [ASW helicopters], will mean that the Liaoning is not going to be conducting carrier operations in the true sense of the word for some time,” Li said.

 

Regional Jitters

 

The carrier could have a future combat role. Though analysts disagree about its capabilities, especially against the U.S. or Japanese navies, neighbors with territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, are taking the threat seriously.

 

“China operating a large carrier is no doubt raising concern among the other Asian nations,” said Bernard “Bud” Cole, author of “The Great Wall at Sea.” The addition of a carrier provides the PLAN “for the first time with a classic means of effectively projecting naval power at significant distances.”

 

“My sense is that the Chinese carrier has already served China well as a powerful information warfare tool, despite having not operated as a carrier yet,” said Bob Nugent, vice president of naval advisory services at AMI International, based in Seattle. From a strategic point of view, he said, the ship “sends the same message that much of the rest of its naval development over the past 20 years has — China will be a global naval power.”

 

What specific mission Liaoning and its successors will carry out remains to be seen, Nugent said, but the “inherent flexibility of the carrier flight deck, perhaps the ultimate ‘reconfigurable mission module,’ means that whatever the mission — from defensive sea denial to offensive power projection — the ship and its follow-ons can be quickly adjusted and moved to be ready.

 

“While she is clearly a test platform first, it is worth keeping in mind that other navies have pressed their test carriers into wartime service when needed,” Nugent said.

 

In a broader sense, the Chinese carrier program could spark an arms race in the region.

 

“The carrier will provide additional motivation for the other Asian nations to continue and perhaps accelerate their ongoing naval modernization programs,” Cole said.

 

Cole points to Japan’s acquisition of small carriers and new submarines; Australia’s plan to acquire a new class of submarines and its efforts to modernize its Navy in general; acquisition of submarines by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; and a stated desire to acquire submarines by Thailand and the Philippines.

 

“Further, the Indian Navy has very ambitious modernization plans, to include nuclear-powered submarines and three aircraft carriers: Those plans will likely receive a significant boost the first time a Chinese carrier steams west of [the Strait of] Malacca,” Cole said.

Partager cet article
Repost0
24 septembre 2012 1 24 /09 /septembre /2012 20:35
Asia Pacific-source harvard-edu

Asia Pacific-source harvard-edu

 

24.09.2012 Par Valérie Niquet, responsable du pôle Asie à la FRS - LE MONDE

 

Le 10 septembre, répondant à la décision de rachat des îles Senkaku à leur propriétaire privé par le gouvernement japonais, le ministère chinois des affaires étrangères a publié un communiqué en forme d'ultimatum faisant porter à Tokyo la responsabilité de "toutes les conséquences qui pourront s'ensuivre". Pékin rappelle que la Chine n'acceptera plus d'être "intimidée" et défendra le territoire "sacré" de la patrie. Le risque est désormais de voir le piège d'un engrenage incontrôlable se refermer en mer de Chine.

 

Condamnées à agir face à une opinion publique chauffée à blanc, les autorités chinoises ont dépêché une dizaine de bâtiments de surveillance et levé le moratoire sur la pêche dans la zone revendiquée par Pékin. Des centaines de bateaux pourraient se diriger vers les eaux territoriales japonaises, dans une exploitation des moyens civils au service d'un objectif militaire, selon les principes de la stratégie chinoise qui prône une "guerre sans limite". D'ores et déjà, les menaces de rétorsions économiques et de boycottage des produits japonais ont été utilisées sur Internet ou dans la presse chinoise. On se souvient qu'en 2010 la Chine avait utilisé l'arme du contrôle des exportations des terres rares - vitales pour l'industrie nippone de haute technologie - pour faire pression sur Tokyo alors que les tensions s'accumulaient en mer de Chine orientale.

 

Dans le même temps, des manifestations violentes accompagnées de pillages, autorisées, si ce n'est organisées par les autorités chinoises, se sont produites sur le territoire. Les biens et les personnes originaires de l'Archipel sont menacés et de grandes entreprises japonaises parlent à nouveau de quitter un territoire chinois où l'instabilité et les risques deviendraient trop élevés.

 

Conséquence immédiate, la Bourse de Shanghaï s'est effondrée et certains, en Chine, commencent à redouter les effets sur la croissance de cette stratégie de la tension. Si la Chine est devenue le premier partenaire commercial du Japon, l'Archipel contrôle des technologies vitales pour l'économie chinoise et demeure l'un des principaux investisseurs étrangers en Chine devant les Etats-Unis et l'Union européenne.

 

Les tensions autour de l'archipel des Senkaku-Diaoyu en mer de Chine orientale, administré par le Japon mais revendiqué par Pékin depuis 1971, ne sont pas isolées. Elles s'inscrivent dans un triple phénomène de manipulation des sentiments nationalistes en Chine depuis le milieu des années 1990, d'émergence décomplexée d'une puissance chinoise qui a semblé triompher seule de la crise de 2008, mais aussi de développement d'un sentiment paradoxal de fragilité du régime chinois confronté à des tensions économiques, sociales et politiques. Ce sentiment de fragilité est encore accru par les incertitudes de la transition politique que le 18e congrès du Parti communiste devrait entériner au mois d'octobre.

 

Le nationalisme, qui contribue à la légitimité du Parti, a pour principal objet le Japon, ennemi d'hier, puissance rivale aujourd'hui, allié des Etats-Unis et catalyseur de toutes les frustrations d'une puissance chinoise qui cherche à s'imposer dans sa zone. Au lendemain du 36e anniversaire de la mort de Mao, le premier ministre, Wen Jiabao, rappelait - à nouveau - le "siècle d'humiliation " que la Chine a traversé il y a peu, nourrissant un peu plus un sentiment de revanche très présent dans la population. "L'éducation patriotique" et sa dimension antijaponaise ont pris une part croissante dans la jeunesse et ont accompagné la reprise en main idéologique qui a suivi les événements de Tiananmen dans les années 1990. Alors que des réformes politiques graduelles apparaissent comme la seule stratégie viable de survie à long terme du régime, la crainte d'une "évolution pacifique" qui viendrait limiter l'influence des réseaux qui contrôlent le pouvoir chinois pousse au contraire au repli idéologique et à l'exploitation des sentiments nationalistes les plus exacerbés.

 

De leur côté, depuis 2008, les Etats-Unis ont été très touchés par la crise et Pékin a cru avoir le champ libre en Asie pour "saisir les opportunités" et imposer son leadership de puissance "émergente" face à une puissance "en déclin".

 

Les avancées de Pékin en mer de Chine depuis 2009, la constante mise en avant des "intérêts vitaux" - dont la mer de Chine semble faire partie - que le régime doit être prêt à défendre, y compris par la force, témoignent de cette assurance nouvelle du régime chinois en Asie.

 

Dans ce contexte, la stratégie de réengagement des Etats-Unis dans la zone, confirmée par le secrétaire d'Etat américain Leon Panetta, à l'occasion du dialogue Shangri-La qui s'est tenu à Singapour en juin, constitue pour la Chine un autre motif de déception et de frustration. La tentation est grande à Pékin, alors que les Etats-Unis entrent dans la dernière phase de leur période électorale, et que la relation avec la Chine constitue aussi un enjeu de la rivalité entre le président Barack Obama et Mitt Romney, de tester la réalité de cette volonté de réengagement de la puissance américaine en Asie.

 

Mais dans le même temps, en dépit de cette assurance nouvelle, le pouvoir chinois est conscient de ses faiblesses et de ses divisions. L'affaire Bo Xilai a révélé la corruption profonde du système. Signe de ce très grand sentiment d'incertitude, la "disparition" du vice-président Xi Jinping, pendant plus de deux semaines, a donné lieu, sur Internet, aux spéculations les plus folles.

 

Longtemps facteur de satisfaction pour le régime, le contexte économique est plus incertain alors que les effets de la crise mondiale se font sentir sur une économie très dépendante des exportations. Le rééquilibrage de la croissance est un échec. La consommation intérieure ne représente que 35 % du PIB, dix points de moins qu'en 2000, et l'indice Gini, indicateur des inégalités, est l'un des plus élevés au monde. Signe inquiétant pour le régime, comme à l'époque des Boxers lorsque la dynastie des Qing finissante tentait de manipuler le mécontentement populaire contre les étrangers, comme en 1919 lorsque le mouvement patriotique s'élevait contre une puissance japonaise à qui le traité de Versailles avait attribué les possessions allemandes du Shandong, certains des slogans utilisés dans les manifestations aujourd'hui dénoncent la corruption et l'inefficacité du pouvoir en place.

 

C'est dans ce contexte que, depuis 2009, les incidents et les provocations se multiplient en mer de Chine, face au Japon, mais aussi face aux Philippines, au Vietnam ou à l'Indonésie et même face aux Etats-Unis. Alors qu'en Asie du Sud-Est la Chine pouvait apparaître comme le moteur d'une régionalisation économique réussie, la multiplication des incidents sur mer, le caractère de moins en moins "pacifique" de l'émergence de la puissance chinoise la font apparaître aujourd'hui comme une menace fédérant dans une même inquiétude la quasi-totalité de l'Asie du Pacifique à l'océan Indien.

 

Face à cette menace, accrue par l'opacité du système politique chinois et les interrogations sur le rôle des éléments les plus radicaux - militaires ou civils - dans les prises de décision, la volonté de "retour vers l'Asie" des Etats-Unis a été très appréciée dans la région. Loin de la fin de l'histoire, ce sont des rapports de force proches de ceux de la guerre froide ou de l'Europe à la veille de la première guerre mondiale qui se mettent en place en Asie.

 

Aux Philippines, au Vietnam, des manifestations antichinoises sont organisées à chaque nouvelle crise, et Hanoï et Washington jettent les bases d'une coopération militaire. Au Japon, on veut croire aux déclarations de la secrétaire d'Etat Hillary Clinton en 2010 plaçant l'archipel des Senkaku dans le périmètre couvert par l'accord de défense unissant Tokyo et Washington.

 

Dans la région, le développement des capacités militaires s'accélère. Alors que la Chine exhibe son nouveau porte-avions, le Vietnam achète des sous-marins à la Russie et les Etats-Unis annoncent l'élargissement de leur système de défense antimissile en Asie. Face à Pékin, Washington est confronté à un dilemme difficile à résoudre. Jouer l'apaisement et rester en marge serait donner carte blanche à un régime chinois qui ne raisonne qu'en termes de jeux à somme nulle. Ce retrait, en minant la confiance des alliés et partenaires des Etats-Unis, aurait des effets déstabilisateurs et pourrait précipiter une crise plus grave encore. A l'inverse, le jeu des alliances pourrait déclencher un conflit majeur dans la région.

 

D'ores et déjà, certains analystes en Chine tentent d'appeler les Etats-Unis "à la raison" et de persuader Tokyo de la fragilité de l'alliance de défense nippo-américaine. Il n'est pas certain que l'Europe ait pris la mesure de ces défis cruciaux dans une région qui voit transiter une part majeure du commerce mondial et concentre trois puissances nucléaires, sans compter les Etats-Unis et la Russie. Dans le contexte d'une crise économique, la tentation de la réduction des budgets de la défense est grande. Celle du retrait aussi. Pourtant, en dépit de l'éloignement géographique, les préoccupations des autres puissances asiatiques doivent être prises en compte face à une Chine dont les orientations stratégiques inquiètent. Dans un monde aussi globalisé, la montée des tensions en Asie aura des conséquences considérables sur nos propres équilibres et nos propres choix.

 

Spécialiste des relations internationales et des questions stratégiques en Asie, Valérie Niquet est depuis 2010 responsable du pôle Asie à la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. Elle est également membre de l'Académie des sciences d'outre-mer et rédactrice en chef de la revue "Monde chinois-Nouvelle Asie". On lui doit une traduction critique en français de "Deux commentaires de Sun Zi" (Economica, 1994). Parmi ses nombreux articles et ouvrages, "Chine-Japon : l'affrontement" a été publié en 2006 chez Perrin.

 

 


L'instabilité des relations sino-japonaises

 

La qualité des relationss entre la Chine et le Japon dépend du contexte géostratégique et de l'analyse que le régime chinois peut en faire. Le 29 septembre marque le 40e anniversaire de l'établissement de leurs relations diplomatiques. Si le rappel constant de la guerre sino-japonaise et de ses atrocités est au coeur de l'éducation patriotique en Chine, à cette époque, Mao, recevant une délégation de parlementaires japonais, remerciait le Japon pour un conflit qui avait permis au Parti communiste d'arriver au pouvoir.


L'établissement des relations diplomatiques s'inscrivait dans un contexte stratégique qui - pour Pékin - était dominé par la menace "principale" soviétique alors que des incidents armés entre les deux ex-pays frères s'étaient produits en 1969. La Chine décidait de se rapprocher des Etats-Unis - menace "secondaire" - dans un basculement stratégique marqué par la visite de Richard Nixon en février 1972. Surpris par ces évolutions dont il n'aurait pas été informé, le Japon décidait d'accélérer son propre rapprochement avec Pékin.


Pour la Chine, l'établissement des relations diplomatiques avec une puissance japonaise en plein élan lui permettait de sortir de l'isolement et de bénéficier - alors que la révolution culturelle avait laissé l'économie du pays exsangue - d'une aide considérable.


Pour Tokyo, l'établissement rapide des relations diplomatiques avec une Chine qui ne pouvait l'inquiéter apparaissait aussi comme une source d'opportunités nouvelles et le moyen de démontrer à Washington que, désormais, ce sont aussi les intérêts propres du Japon qui présideraient à ses choix diplomatiques.


Si la Chine - et Taïwan - avaient pour la première fois revendiqué l'archipel des Senkaku-Diaoyu en 1971, cette question de souveraineté ne constituait pas un enjeu majeur avec Tokyo. L'heure n'était pas à Pékin aux tensions avec le Japon devenu le premier pourvoyeur d'aide au régime. En 1992, Pékin pourra aussi se féliciter de la bonne volonté japonaise lorsque Tokyo sera la première puissance à rompre l'ostracisme imposé à la Chine par les puissances occidentales après les événements de Tiananmen en juin 1989. La visite de l'empereur du Japon en Chine, la même année, marquera l'apogée de ces relations.


Le contexte est bien différent. La menace soviétique a disparu et la Chine s'est hissée au deuxième rang mondial mais le régime continue d'analyser la situation internationale comme "incertaine". Cette fois, ce sont les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés en Asie qui suscitent son inquiétude.


Si les relations économiques entre Tokyo et Pékin sont marquées par une forte complémentarité, le Japon est aussi redevenu pour le régime chinois l'exutoire des frustrations accumulées dans la population. Cette stratégie de la tension, mise en oeuvre depuis la fin des années 1990 et la désastreuse visite du président Jiang Zemin à Tokyo, alimente en retour la radicalisation d'une partie de l'opinion publique japonaise face à une Chine qui déçoit et inquiète.


La question territoriale dans ce contexte n'est qu'un prétexte, ou le marqueur de l'état des relations entre les deux puissances asiatiques. En 1978, Deng Xiaoping, à la veille de lancer la politique de réformes et d'ouverture qui allait transformer le pays, déclarera que la question des Senkaku-Diaoyu devait être "mise de côté" pour laisser la voie libre à une fructueuse coopération entre les deux pays. L'archipel semble faire partie de ces "intérêts vitaux" pour la défense desquels les autorités chinoises multiplient les gesticulations martiales. Ainsi, le degré de tension entre Tokyo et Pékin, quel qu'en soit l'objet apparent, constitue un baromètre précis du degré d'ouverture et d'intégration au système mondial voulu par Pékin.

Partager cet article
Repost0
6 septembre 2012 4 06 /09 /septembre /2012 18:53
U.S., Japan consider Guam drone pact

 

September 6th, 2012 by mike.hoffman - defensetech.org

 

Japan and the U.S. are considering plans to use Guam as a hub for spy drones to monitor Chinese naval activities in the Pacific, according to a report in the Japan Times.

 

The U.S. already has Global Hawks stationed at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The U.S. Air Force plans to expand the number of spy drones at Andersen and welcome Japan drones over the next decade as the Japanese military plans to buy its own drone fleet.

 

Japan’s Self-Defense Force had planned to buy Global Hawks of its own before the deal was scuttled due to price concerns. The Japanese have remained confident in their plans to buy their own drones, especially as the Chinese naval fleet has stepped up their patrols throughout the Pacific.

 

Japanese military leaders currently fly the P-3C patrol aircraft to monitor Chinese naval movements. The investment in a Global Hawk or the U.S. Navy’s version of the RG-4, the Triton, would be a considerable step up in Japan’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.

 

U.S. and Japan air forces would share hangars and maintenance facilities for their drone fleets, according to the Japan Times report.

 

The U.S. Air Force’s Global Hawk arrived at Andersen in 2010. It’s the Air Force’s largest drone, although it does not carry weapons like the Predator or the Reaper.

 

U.S. Global Hawks from Guam flew missions over Japan after the massive tsunami obliterated the country. The Global Hawks provided intelligence and imagery for humanitarian clean up.

 

MQ-4C Triton

MQ-4C Triton

Northrop Grumman unveiled the MQ-4C Triton in June as part of the U.S. Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program. It’s expected to fly a considerable chunk of it’s missions over the Pacific monitoring the Chinese and North Koreans.

Partager cet article
Repost0
25 juin 2012 1 25 /06 /juin /2012 17:20

China-AF-Helmet.jpg

 

June 25, 2012 China Military News

 

As China has increased the training flights for its pilots, it has also abandoned the old Soviet style rigid tactics. Pilots are now expected to show initiative and innovative flying tactics. To take advantage of this, last year the Chinese Air Force instituted a fighter pilot competition that culminates in an annual exercise that determines which ten fighter pilots would be able to wear a “Golden Helmet” for the next year. This is a regular flight helmet decorated with a special blue, red and gold pattern that marks the wearer as one of the elite combat pilots in the Chinese Air Force.

 

More cynical members of the Chinese Air Force are wondering how long it will take before paying a bribe will help you “earn” one of the Golden Helmets. While the program is seen as a smart move to encourage competition and improve skills, many air force officers have seen too many programs corrupted by greed and a military culture that is more tolerant of corruption than it is in achieving combat skills.

Partager cet article
Repost0
25 juin 2012 1 25 /06 /juin /2012 12:05
The Chinese Golden Helmet

 

June 24, 2012: Strategy Page

 

As China has increased the training flights for its pilots, it has also abandoned the old Soviet style rigid tactics. Pilots are now expected to show initiative and innovative flying tactics. To take advantage of this, last year the Chinese Air Force instituted a fighter pilot competition that culminates in an annual exercise that determines which ten fighter pilots would be able to wear a "Golden Helmet" for the next year. This is a regular flight helmet decorated with a special blue, red and gold pattern that marks the wearer as one of the elite combat pilots in the Chinese Air Force.

 

More cynical members of the Chinese Air Force are wondering how long it will take before paying a bribe will help you "earn" one of the Golden Helmets. While the program is seen as a smart move to encourage competition and improve skills, many air force officers have seen too many programs corrupted by greed and a military culture that is more tolerant of corruption than it is in achieving combat skills.

Partager cet article
Repost0

Présentation

  • : RP Defense
  • : Web review defence industry - Revue du web industrie de défense - company information - news in France, Europe and elsewhere ...
  • Contact

Recherche

Articles Récents

Categories