Mai 2013 – Le point de vue de StratAdviser Ltd

Le contexte

Le livre Blanc de la Defense Nationale vient d’être remis au Chef de l’État. Quatre priorités stratégiques sont définies :

    la spirale Caucase/Proche-Orient/Méditerranée

    l’Afrique

    l’océan Indien

    les DOM-TOM

– auxquels il convient d’ajouter les enjeux stratégiques de « l’arctique » dont la France ne pourra pas s’exclure – qui conditionnent la répartition de l’enveloppe de quelque 30 milliards d’euros entre nos trois armées (Terre, Air et Marine) par la prochaine Loi de programmation militaire (LPM).

La combinaison de prétentions stratégiques ambitieuses avec une dotation contrainte de moyens impose, pour maintenir une fonction souveraine de défense cohérente, 3 changements de paradigmes :

    repenser les  états-majors existants en créant des structures de commandement sur mesure de type « Groupes Interarmes » ;

    abandonner la « logique régimentaire » pour faire place à la formation de nouvelles unités tactiques, modulables et redimensionnables en fonction des nécessités propres à chaque mission (Afghanistan : 3 500 ; Mali : 3 000 ; …) ;

    renforcer le recours à une sous-traitance compétente, hyperspécialisée, parfaitement au clair avec les enjeux stratégiques et leurs déclinaisons tactiques, s’intégrant « naturellement », de manière « transparente » dans les dispositifs.

Les récentes opérations menées en Lybie et au Mali démontrent la nécessité pour les entreprises spécialisées dans le soutien et la  logistique militaires de s’intégrer dans une logique de mutualisation et du partage de l’effort de défense tout en développant leur capacité d’adaptation des matériels et services de soutien (transports, logistique, restauration, santé …) à des opérations non prévues, menées pour une période indéterminée sur des théâtres peu ou mal connus, dont les deux caractéristiques clés sont « l’étirement » et « l’instabilité ».

Cette opportunité de développement pour les entreprises spécialisées dans le soutien et la logistique  de défense  va aller croissant. Des initiatives comme le SOFINS (Special Operation Forces Innovations Network Seminary) organisé par le Commandement des Opérations Spéciales (COS) – premier rassemblement en Europe des responsables et acteurs des forces spéciales avec une centaine de PME françaises – démontre l’importance croissante de cette sous-traitance compétente, hyperspécialisée destinée à s’intégrer de manière « transparente » dans les dispositifs.

L’impact sur la médecine militaire

Au delà de l’aptitude à identifier les appels d’offre, à déchiffrer le cahier des clauses administratives particulières (CCAP) et le cahier des clauses techniques particulières (CCTP), à constituer, le cas échéant, le groupement momentané d’entreprises (GME) – étapes qui constituent un prérequis incontournable souvent maitrisé – la différentiation se fera désormais sur la démonstration de 2 capacités essentielles :

    la capacité à rassurer le représentant du pouvoir adjudicateur (RPA) sur l’adaptabilité des matériels et services de la PME ou du GME aux deux caractéristiques clés que sont « l’étirement » et « l’instabilité » des théâtres à venir d’une part, à intégrer les contraintes « santé » au sens large d’autre part ;

    la capacité à rassurer les futurs expatriés impliqués dans la garantie de bonne fin de l’exécution du contrat sur le fait qu’ils bénéficieront d’une sécurité individuelle optimale et d’une prise en charge médicale de premier plan quel que soit le théâtre concerné.

Démontrer ces deux capacités essentielles ne s’improvise pas. Il convient de faire valider les matériels et services proposés par des experts et consultants maitrisant toutes les dimensions de la médecine militaire en opération (réglementation, y compris STANAG ; prévention des risques, y compris environnementaux et NRBC ; hygiène et amélioration des conditions de travail, y compris ergonomie et ambiance tactiques ; soutien de proximité ; évacuation tactiques ou stratégiques ; …). Il convient aussi, de mettre en place, au profit de vos expatriés, une chaîne logistique santé adaptée à la mission  que vous leur confierez et au théâtre où ils seront déployés.

*** StratAdviser Ltd, grâce à ses consultants et à son réseau de plus de 150 experts, vous apporte une évaluation et des conseils d’amélioration des aspects « santé » de vos appels d’offres à destination du ministère de la défense ou des industriels  majeurs comme, par exemple, le Groupement des Industries Françaises de Défense Terrestre (GICAT), et au-delà, des acteurs européens de la défense.

StratAdviser Ltd à travers DI2M (sa Division Internationale Médecine Militaire) et MEDCO (sa direction dédiée aux conseils « santé » à destination des entreprises) est à votre disposition pour étudier les solutions à même d’assurer le soutien santé optimal de vos expatriés.

N’hésitez pas à nous contacter : contact@stratadviser.com pour aller plus loin.

StratAdviser Ltd

2nd Floor, Berkeley Square House,

London,

W1J 6BD UK

Phone:  +44 (0) 207 8874510

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May 14, 2013: Strategy Page

In Afghanistan the U.S. is making yet another attempt to curb corruption in the Afghan national police. The most effective Taliban weapon against the police is money. Bribes are not the only problem the police have. There are other forms of corruption like senior officials stealing much of the millions of dollars given to the Afghan government to pay and maintain the police. Hundreds of millions of those dollars have disappeared, leaving police in many parts of the country unpaid, unfed, without fuel and ammo and worst of all, cursed with wretched medical care if they are wounded in action. For the cops, it’s too often all about the money.

Lower ranking police not only demand bribes, but also steal or extort cash from innocent people they threaten with arrest. The Taliban have found that the police will for the right price back off from arresting the guilty or carrying out raids. The police will even sell you weapons, ammunition, and information. Too many police never miss an opportunity to steal. The traffic police are considered the worst. Not only will they frequently stop motorists and demand bribes but they will seize cars for the least infraction and later release the vehicle to its owner with most of its parts missing. The presence of U.S. troops or advisors can prevent overt acts of corruption by the police but the corruption is endemic in Afghanistan. It’s the great curse that keeps the country poor and dangerous. It is the main reason why Afghanistan is still the poorest and most dangerous country in Eurasia.

A year ago a new police anti-corruption unit was set up with punishment powers consisting of specific actions commanders could take against misbehaving subordinates (firing, reassignment). In the last year hundreds of corrupt cops have been found out and punished this way. The system was recognition that prosecuting dirty cops is often ineffective because the corrupt courts make this virtually impossible. This is a major problem for the senior commanders caught stealing millions of dollars. In effect, they cannot be punished, or get only a few months in jail and keep most of the millions they took.

Last year some four percent of the 125,000 police were formally charged with corruption. The actual number is several times higher but it’s difficult to get enough proof to change a policemen. The corrupt cops protect each other and will threaten civilian accusers and witnesses with violence or death.

A growing number of senior Afghan officials and tribal leaders are speaking out on how important it is to curb the corruption. This problem is causing more anger and unrest around the country as local warlords steal (via extortion or outright theft) large amounts of the foreign aid. Some of this money goes to hiring more gunmen, who in turn terrorize the population to prevent any organized resistance to the local warlord. This is how the Taliban operates and these Islamic radicals are seen as just another bunch of corrupt thugs. Alas, being a greedy thug has long been admired in Afghanistan, although not by the victims. Because there’s so much more money in Afghanistan the last decade (foreign aid, drug profits, and more economic activity) there is more to steal and a growing number of ambitious and thuggish Afghans are doing just that. The foreigners, and many Afghans, recognize that, in the 21st century, this traditional culture of corruption is an impediment, not a recipe for success. In Afghanistan tradition is killing the future.

14.05.2013 Pacific Sentinel

12 mai 2013 Par Olivier Fourt Lignes de défense

Direction l'Amérique du Sud, pour évoquer un sujet méconnu : le programme spatial brésilien. Le spatial est une activité dite « duale », c’est-à-dire civile et militaire. Les puissances du Conseil de sécurité et les pays émergent ont bien compris l’importance de maîtriser ces technologies de pointe, comme a pu s’en rendre compte Olivier Fourt, qui a visité le Centre technique aérospatial (CTA) de San-José dos Campos, dans l’Etat de Sao Paulo.

May 14, 2013: Strategy Page

The U.S. Air Force recently had still more serious problems with the troops who handle, and operate, its nuclear weapons. This time 17 officers were relieved from ICBM launch duty. This suspension is only supposed to last for two months or so, assuming that training and attitude problems can be fixed. There is some doubt that these problems can be fixed.

These 17 officers are among the ones who actually launch ICBMs. Two of them are in charge of ten silos, each containing an ICBM. The two officers monitor the readiness of those missiles and, if they receive orders, both have to agree to launch their missiles. Each pair of launch officers is in a separate underground bunker and five of these bunkers are in the same area, each with ten nearby ICBM silos. Each pair of launch officers can, if need be, take over control of another launch control team’s missiles if that launch team’s bunker is destroyed or put out of action.

The 17 launch control officers were suspended because a surprise inspection revealed that they did not know all the details of their jobs they were supposed to know. There was apparently a breakdown in training and leadership in their squadron (which controls 50 silos) and wing (which controls three squadrons). Air force leaderships also believes that there is still an attitude problem among those who maintain and operate the ICBMs.

Problems with training, leadership and attitude among troops who handle and operate nuclear weapons were first noted in the 1990s, after the Cold War ended. The problems have been getting more and more attention in the last decade. Back in 2009 it became obvious that the situation was getting worse. That’s because twice that year the air force had to relieve the commander of a combat wing. One was a B-52 bomber wing while the other was a Minuteman ICBM wing.  In the case of the ICBM wing two other senior officers were also relieved (one of them the guy in charge of the Wing Maintenance Squadron.) In both cases, the reason was "loss of confidence in his ability to command". That's milspeak for "too many little things have gone wrong and you are making your bosses nervous."

In the case of the dismissed missile Wing commander there had been two accidents with the large trailers that move the missiles. A vehicle accident is normally not grounds for removing a Wing commander but in this case it was just one of many problems. Two missile wings also failed their Nuclear Safety Inspection. There were also incidents of misconduct by members of the Wing that lost its commander. Too many problems and the commander becomes a problem.

In 2009 many nuclear weapons units were having problems with the two week long Nuclear Safety Inspections that take place every 18 months. Because of the embarrassing problems with nuclear weapons security over the previous three years, these inspections had become stricter. Scary inspections have become fashionable again, and commanders who don't get with the program are headed for early retirement.

These inspections are not unique or a surprise. All of the Missile Wings have been based where they are for over four decades. The word comes down the chain of command about what is expected, and if anyone screws up, officers (or, more rarely, NCOs) are relieved and careers are ruined. Heads did not roll in 2009 just for specific inspection failures. The word from on-high was that the units handling nuclear weapons had to be over-the-top fanatic about nuclear safety and security. This was a switch from then current practices. By 2009 the attitude was that if there is a pattern of failure, the commander gets relieved and life goes on. But this alone was not fixing the problems.

This persistent problem resulted in the return of the old SAC (Strategic Air Command) attitude. This is one of those rare cases where it is recognized that the Good Old Days were better, or in this case, meaner, tougher, more effective and safer. In 2009 that led to the establishment of the Global Strike Command (GSC). This outfit would, as SAC once did, control all air force nuclear weapons and delivery systems (ICBMs and heavy bombers.) This came sixteen years of trying to do without SAC.

In 1992 SAC, which had control of air force nuclear bombers and missiles since 1946, was disbanded and the ICBMs, and their crews, were transferred to the new Space Command. SAC had long been the butt of many jokes, for being uptight and fanatical about security, discipline and the myriad details for handling nukes. Everyone tolerated this because, after all, SAC had charge of all those nukes, heavy bombers and ICBMs. When Space Command took over, they eased up on the tight discipline and strictness about procedure that had been the hallmark of SAC for decades. The old timers complained, but many of the young troops liked the new, looser, attitudes.

Officers operating the ICBMs were no longer career "missileers", but Space Command people. Time that used to be spent on studying nuclear weapons security and missile maintenance issues, was now devoted to subjects of more concern to Space Command (satellites and communications, for example). Standards fell, efficiency slipped. Then in 2005, the missile crews lost their Missile Badge, and had it replaced with a generic Space Command badge.

Then, in 2007, there was much angst when it was discovered that six nuclear cruise missiles had accidentally been mounted on a B-52 and flown halfway across the country. How could this happen? The old timers knew. While many of these older officers and NCOs were pleased when SAC went away early in their careers, they knew that it was that act, and the subsequent "loosening up", that led to the lax attitudes that put those six nukes on that B-52. All this was part of a major, post-Cold War reorganization of the USAF. It was the beginning of the end of a decades old tradition of handling nuclear weapons safely and securely.

In 2008, the air force brass reinstated the Missile Badge, for any missile crew member who belonged to a missile crew that was certified CMR (passed some strenuous inspections to be declared Combat Mission Ready). The badge had been used for decades, until 2005, when it was withdrawn and replaced by the generic "Space Wings" of the USAF Space Command, which took control of the ICBMs in 1993. SAC, it turns out, has been coming back quietly for quite some time, both for the bomber units, as well as the missile ones.

But as the recent failures indicate, not everyone has gotten with the program. Among the new SAC people there were many who were still “Space Command” at heart. This is attributed to the fact that with the end of the Cold War in 1991 the strategic nuclear weapons were no longer as crucial as they had been since the late 1940s. For decades the United States and Russia (as the Soviet Union) each had thousands of nuclear armed ballistic missiles (and a few hundred bombers) aimed at each other. That got the attention of people in SAC and encouraged everyone to concentrate. After 1991, the incentive was no longer there and it is still not there. But when you are handling nukes, the old SAC fanaticism is still the best way to go.

May 14, 2013: Strategy Page

In April the latest version of the Kiowa Warrior scout helicopter (the OH-58F) made its first flight. The army had wanted to buy a new scout helicopter design, using an existing civilian model. But years of evaluations led the army to conclude that the fifty year old Bell 206 model, used as the basis for the OH-58A, was still the best available. None of the new candidates were sufficiently superior to outweigh the fact that the basic Bell 206 design, as upgraded and modified since the 1960s as the OH-58, had more than kept pace with potential new rivals. So the army upgraded the OH-58D with much improved electronics (Internet Internet-like capabilities and the ability to control nearby UAVs) and pilot protection. A lot existing components were replaced with new versions that were stronger and/or more powerful. About 60 percent of the components in the F model are new. Production begins in two years and the first of over 300 OH-58Fs (upgrades or new aircraft) will enter service in 2016.

This move is made necessary because the current U.S. Army fleet of 230 OH-58Ds is wearing out. Ten years of war have hit the OH-58Ds hard. Those used in Iraq were in the air 72 hours a month while those in Afghanistan were airborne 80 hours a month. In peacetime, these choppers spend about 24 hours a month in the air. Moreover, combat use puts more stress on the aircraft. Plus there's battle damage, which included twenty destroyed in combat. The current solution is to spend several billion dollars to refurbish and upgrade the current fleet to the OH-58F standard and thus keep the OH-58 in service for another 10-12 years. It is believed that a replacement will be found and built before then, or the OH-58 will go through another round of upgrades. This has worked for other military systems (the Sidewinder air-to-air missile, the B-52 bomber and C-130 transport) so this is not a particularly daring choice. It just works.

The OH-58D has a top speed of 226 kilometers per hour, and a range of 241 kilometers. It has a mast-mounted sight, which carries a powerful FLIR (heat sensing camera) and a laser designator. The OH-58F will move the sensors to the body of the aircraft, right in front of the pilots. The OH-58D is lightly armed, and usually only carries four Hellfire (anti-vehicle) or Stinger (anti-aircraft) missiles, or 14 70mm unguided (or guided) rockets. The upgrades don’t change the weapons load, and OH-58D users are still arguing for a new engine. Over the decades, the new equipment and weight has been added, without an increase in engine power. For a scout helicopter, the OH-58 was getting more sluggish as it got older. This was not good, even though the OH-58F is five percent lighter than the OH-58D, which helps a bit.

To help ease the workload on the OH-58Ds, the army is reorganizing its light aviation battalions, by removing some OH-58 helicopters, and adding RQ-7 Shadow UAVs. The new battalions have 29 aircraft, eight of them UAVs. All this is the result of years of experience with the RQ-7, and some tests, using UAVs as scouts for helicopter gunships, or in cooperation with scout helicopters, rather than the traditional scout helicopter (like the OH-58) operating exclusively. The tests were successful, and the army is updating its tactics as well.

In the last decade, scout helicopters have been doing a lot less scouting, having been replaced by MQ-1C, RQ-7 and Raven UAVs. The scout helicopter pilots are relieved at having UAVs take over some of the more dangerous missions. In particular, the scout helicopter pilots are glad to lose the job of going in to "draw enemy fire" (and thus reveal where the enemy is). This sort of thing has gotten a lot of scout helicopter pilots killed. But there are still situations where the superior situational awareness (two pilots with four eyes, four ears and two noses) of humans is preferable. There are some even more basic considerations. The RQ-7 can stay in the air for up to eight hours per sortie, about three times longer than the OH-58 while the new MQ-1C can do four times better than that.

The army is also equipping some of its AH-64 helicopter gunships with digital communications that enables them to see what the UAVs are seeing. The OH-58s often scout for the AH-64s, finding targets. Now the RQ-7s can do it better, by letting the AH-64 pilots see what the RQ-7 has detected. There are also systems that allow the AH-64, or OH-58 pilots to take control of UAVs. The OH-58F will have both of these capabilities. Meanwhile, it's expected that the army aviation battalions will gain more UAVs, and lose helicopters.

14 May 2013 navyrecognition.com

French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian confirmed this morning in Daily Ouest-France, the construction of 11 FREMM multi-mission frigates (as opposed to eight according to recent rumors following the publication of a White Paper on Defense last week) and 6 Barracuda new generation nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). The Minister also announced an increase in defense resources and personnel in Brittany.

French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian confirmed this morning in Daily Ouest-France, the construction of 11 FREMM multi-mission frigates (as opposed to eight according to recent rumors following the publication of a White Paper on Defense last week) and six Barracuda new generation nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). The Minister also announced an increase in defense resources and personnel in Brittany.

During the presentation of the French White Paper on Defence and Security, it was announced that 24,000 jobs would be cut between 2014 and 2015. The consequence is a growing concern in both the French military and the suppliers or contractors of the Ministry of Defence.

Brittany region should be spared from the anticipated cuts. It is in any case the assurance given by the Minister of Defence: "Overall, the military and defense industries located in Brittany are reinforced by the White Paper."

French President Francois Hollande, already during his campaign last year, assured the maintenance of the nuclear deterrence which he considers a priority. Its two components, sea-based and air-based, "guarantees our independence and our strategic autonomy, it will therefore be preserved" said Jean-Yves Le Drian. "It involves the replacement of ballistic missile submarines based in Brest as well as their escort vessels".

In French Navy doctrine, Anti-submarine Frigates and SSNs are used to secure pathways and provide escort to SSBNs when they sail out to their patrol area. This escort mission is critical and plays a key role in the credibility of the whole sea-based French nuclear deterrence. Existing ASW Frigates are expected to be gradually replaced by Aquitaine class FREMM Frigates. First of class, Aquitaine, has just been commissioned in the French Navy and is based in Brest to provide escort to SSBN. Barracuda class submarines are currently under construction and are expected to replace the existing Rubis class SSN starting in 2017.

This same desire is expressed in "preserving the capability to project naval power" through the Charles de Gaulle carrier battle group (According to white paper rumors, the French aircraft carrier would be decommissioned)

French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian confirmed this morning in Daily Ouest-France, the construction of 11 FREMM multi-mission frigates (as opposed to eight according to recent rumors following the publication of a White Paper on Defense last week) and 6 Barracuda new generation nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). The Minister also announced an increase in defense resources and personnel in Brittany.

Finally, "in industrial terms, the main defense sites located in Brittany will be reinforced despite the difficult economic circumstances," said the Minister of Defence. This means that 11 FREMM multi-mission frigates and 6 Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarines will be built as originally planned. FREMM Frigates are built at DCNS Shipyard in Lorient, Brittany. "What is not decided yet is the timing but it will be calibrated so that there is no gap in the chain of production and no capacity gap for the research and development"

Source: Ouest-France, Lignes de Défense blog by Philippe Chapleau

Le Livre blanc de la défense est trop flou sur la question des équipes de protection privées, selon les armateurs. (Photo DR)

02.05.2013 lemarin.fr

Le nouveau Livre blanc de la défense confirme que la lutte contre la piraterie restera une priorité dans les années à venir mais ne donne pas vraiment satisfaction aux armateurs. Leur organisation professionnelle, Armateurs de France, " regrette que le document ne reprenne pas les engagements du gouvernement sur la protection privée embarquée".

Le Livre blanc indique seulement que " pour répondre aux besoins de la sécurité du transport maritime, et lorsqu’il n’est pas possible de recourir aux équipes de protection de la Marine nationale, des solutions appropriées seront étudiées ".

Insuffisant aux yeux des armateurs qui rappellent que, " fin 2012 et à nouveau début avril, le ministre de la Défense puis le ministre des Transports ont pourtant confirmé leur intention d’autoriser les armateurs français à embarquer des équipes de protection privées, lorsque le ministère de la Défense ne peut pas mettre à disposition des militaires".

Selon les armateurs, les forces armées ne sont pas en mesure de protéger les navires marchands français dans un tiers des cas, faute de disponibilité ou du fait de délais de déploiement sur zone trop longs. " Les entreprises maritimes françaises perdent des marchés, faute de pouvoir garantir en continu la protection des navires, des équipages et de leurs cargaisons ", soulignent-ils.

14.05.2013 par P. CHAPLEAU Lignes de Défense

Jean-Yves Le Drian confirme, ce matin dans Ouest-France, la construction de 11 frégates multimissions (et non pas huit comme l'avait dit Patricia Adam dans Ouest-France la semaine dernière) et de six sous-marins Barracuda. Il annonce aussi des renforcements en moyens et en personnels à Lorient et Bruz (Ille-et-Vilaine).

Avec l’annonce, lors de la présentation du Livre blanc sur la Défense et la sécurité, de la suppression de 24 000 postes entre 2014 et 2015, l’inquiétude n’a pas manqué de grandir aussi bien dans les armées que chez les fournisseurs et prestataires de services du ministère de la Défense.

L’Ouest et plus particulièrement la Bretagne devraient être épargnés par les coupes claires anticipées. C’est en tout cas l’assurance donnée par le ministre de la Défense : « Globalement, l’ensemble militaire et industriel breton sera conforté par le Livre blanc ».

François Hollande, déjà pendant sa campagne électorale, a assuré du maintien de la dissuasion nucléaire, considérée comme prioritaire. Ses deux composantes, maritime et aérienne, « garante de notre indépendance et de notre autonomie stratégique, seront donc conservées, précise Jean-Yves Le Drian. Ça implique le renouvellement des sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins de Brest et de leurs bâtiments d’accompagnement ».

Cette même volonté s’exprime dans « la préservation de la capacité de projection de puissance aéronavale », à travers le groupe aéronaval du Charles-de-Gaulle dont des rumeurs annonçaient la disparition.

En revanche, le ministre a confirmé le nouveau renforcement des moyens de la DGA à Bruz (Ille-et-Vilaine) où « le nombre de personnels affectés à la recherche dans le domaine de cyberdéfense passera de 150 à 350, soit l’arrivée de 200 personnels hautement qualifiés qui vont renforcer ce site appelé à devenir le creuset d’une filière prioritaire ». Autre renforcement, celui des forces spéciales. La Force des fusiliers-marins et commandos de Lorient verra ses capacités technologiques, ses effectifs et son commandement renforcés.

Enfin, « en termes industriels, les principaux bassins bretons seront confortés malgré les conditions économiques difficiles », assure le ministre de la Défense. Ce qui signifie que 11 frégates multimissions (Fremm) et 6 sous-marins nucléaires d’attaque de type Barracuda seront construits. « Ce qui n’est pas encore tranché, c’est le cadencement mais il sera calibré pour qu’il n’y ait aucune rupture de la chaîne de production et aucune rupture de capacités des bureaux d’étude ».

14/05/2013 Armée de l'air

Mardi 7 mai 2013, une cérémonie de remise d’insignes et de poignards d’officiers s’est déroulée sur la base aérienne (BA115) d’Orange, sous la présidence du général Guillaume Gelée, commandant les forces aériennes.

Après les honneurs au drapeau et la revue des troupes, une remise de brevet de pilote d’hélicoptères, appelée «macaronnage» a été réalisée au profit de dix stagiaires. Puis, cinq élèves officiers ont reçu leur poignard, symbole de leur accession au corps des officiers de l’air.

Le centre d’instruction des équipages d’hélicoptères de la BA 115 d’Orange a pour mission d’élaborer, de dispenser, et de contrôler la formation opérationnelle de tous les équipages d’hélicoptères de l’armée de l’air (pilotes, instructeurs, mécaniciens d’équipage, sauveteurs-plongeurs et treuillistes). Organisme majeur de formation de la brigade aérienne d’appui et de projection, cette unité délivre annuellement une quinzaine de brevets de pilote d’hélicoptères du second degré ainsi que les principales qualifications des équipages.

14 mai 2013 Par Julien Bonnet - Usinenouvelle.com

L'armée américaine a décidé de mettre un terme l'an prochain à ses achats d'hélicoptères Lakota, a indiqué le responsable du constructeur aéronautique européen EADS aux Etats-Unis, Sean O'Keefe. Il déplore l'impact des coupes budgétaires automatiques décidées par le Congrès américain alors que le Pentagone avait confirmé en novembre dernier une option pour acheter 34 Lakota, d'une valeur de 181,8 millions de dollars.

Le Pentagone a décidé de mettre un terme l'an prochain à ses achats d'hélicoptères Lakota d'Eurocopter, a indiqué lundi 13 mai le responsable du constructeur aéronautique européen EADS aux Etats-Unis, Sean O'Keefe.

Dans une tribune publiée sur le site du magazine Defense News, il explique que l'appareil est actuelement "assemblé par des effectifs très qualifiés, dont plus de la moitié sont d'anciens combattants, dans l'usine de production d'hélicoptères de mon groupe à Columbus, dans le Mississipi".

"L'armée a décidé qu'il serait temps de mettre fin à ce programme couronné de succès l'an prochain", ajoute Sean O'Keefe, fustigeant l'impact des coupes budgétaires automatiques décidées par le Congrès américain.

Pour remplacer le Lakota, hélicoptère développé par Eurocopter "dans le respect des délais et du budget prévus", l'armée s'apprêterait à "acheter plus d'hélicoptères tactiques Black Hawks et à en récupérer qui reviennent d'Afghanistan pour les modifier, alors que ces appareils coûtent deux fois plus cher à opérer et à entretenir", déplore en outre ce responsable d'EADS.

L'armée américaine avait confirmé en novembre à EADS une option pour acheter 34 hélicoptères UH-72A Lakota, d'une valeur de 181,8 millions de dollars, dont la livraison devait débuter en septembre. Cette option faisait partie d'un très gros contrat décroché en 2006 et qui prévoyait la livraison à l'armée de 347 hélicoptères d'ici 2016.

14/05/2013 Sources : EMA

Le 11 janvier 2013, les autorités maliennes demandent à la France son appui pour arrêter l'avancée de groupes terroristes en direction de Bamako et les repousser vers le Nord. La France lance en quelques heures une opération militaire en appui des forces armées maliennes.

Cette opération vise trois objectifs :

1. Aider les forces armées Maliennes (FAM) à arrêter la progression des groupes terroristes et à les repousser tout en assurant la sécurité des populations civiles;

2. Aider le Mali à recouvrer son intégrité territoriale et sa souveraineté;

3. Faciliter la mise en œuvre des décisions internationales en permettant le déploiement rapide de deux missions internationales complémentaires : la mission internationale de soutien au mali (MISMA) et la mission de formation de l'armée malien de l'union Européeenne (EUTM).

Pour chasser les terroristes du mali, quelques milliers de militaires français sont aujourd'hui engagés dans l'opération Serval aux côtés de leurs frères d'armés africains. les pays africains de la CEDEAo doivent à terme mettre pied une force constituée de 4 bataillons et du soutien et des appuis nécessaires.

14 May 2013 army-technology.com

Honeywell Technology Solutions (HTSI) has been awarded a contract to supply mission-capable heavy tactical vehicles to the US Army as part of a military vehicle programme.

Representing the continuation of the company's ongoing support to the programme, the $72.4m contract covers provision of vehicles, along with required training to the army personnel for safe operation and maintenance of heavy tactical vehicles fleet over the next three years.

Under the contract, the company's certified mechanics will repair, overhaul and deliver fully mission-capable vehicles for worldwide use by the US Army, Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers.

The instructor staff will also provide real time training to on-the-ground units prior to delivery, to ensure sufficient knowledge is provided to personnel on how to troubleshoot, order parts and repair equipment.

The comprehensive training will also enable operators to know all characteristics, capabilities and functions of the vehicles, before their actual deployment in combat operations.

Honeywell Technology Solutions president Carey Smith said: "Our teams have fielded and trained thousands of soldiers all over the world, and they understand the importance of ensuring that our soldiers are equipped to operate and maintain these trucks in any situation and in any region."

The heavy tactical wheeled vehicles programme comes under the TACOM Transportation Systems Program Executive Office.

Integral to the army's global logistical footprint, the 10t heavy tactical vehicles are primarily operated for personnel, supplies and equipment transport missions.

Trucks that include the heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), heavy equipment transporter, and the palletised load system have regularly been upgraded with latest technology and capabilities, while some others have received full armour packages.