14/01/2013 Par Isabelle Lasserre, Service infographie du Figaro

INFOGRAPHIE- Paris veut à terme empêcher durablement les groupes terroristes de nuire.

Contrairement à l'intervention franco-britannique en Libye, la guerre déclenchée vendredi contre les islamistes au Mali a été préparée de longue date. Certes, le pouvoir politique français a semblé un temps tergiverser. Le tempo a été imposé par la nouvelle poussée des djihadistes vers le sud aux autorités françaises. Dans les états-majors, cependant, l'opération avait été planifiée à l'avance. Les militaires français savaient que Paris, cible désignée d'Aqmi (al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique) depuis plusieurs années, serait, malgré l'habillage politico-diplomatique autour de l'Union européenne et des forces africaines, en première ligne. Ils savaient aussi que la fenêtre météorologique permettant d'intervenir efficacement se refermerait en mars, avec le début de la saison des pluies.

Officiellement, la France intervient en soutien de l'armée malienne. Dans les faits, c'est elle qui depuis trois jours mène entièrement l'opération «Serval» destinée, selon Paris, «à stopper la menace terroriste». Avec des moyens conséquents. Des forces spéciales transportées à bord d'hélicoptères de combat pour donner l'assaut contre les colonnes islamistes. Des raids aériens menés par les Mirage 2000 et F1 basés au Tchad, dans le cadre de l'opération «Épervier». Des Rafale en alerte sur le territoire français. Des appareils de surveillance venus du Sénégal. Et l'arrivée à Bamako de plusieurs centaines de militaires prépositionnés en Côte d'Ivoire et au Tchad, pour protéger les ressortissants européens et contribuer à «stabiliser» la région. L'opération durera «le temps qu'il faut», a prévenu le ministre de la Défense. «Il y avait nécessité d'agir de manière rapide», a-t-il poursuivi. Si la France a pu réagir aussi efficacement, c'est parce qu'elle dispose encore de forces prépositionnées dans plusieurs capitales africaines.

L'intervention est aussi la suite logique de l'opération libyenne en 2011. «Il ne s'agit en fait que de la deuxième bataille de la guerre en Libye», explique le général Vincent Desportes, ancien chef de l'École de guerre. D'une part parce que la conquête du Nord Mali s'est faite par des mercenaires revenus au pays après avoir combattu aux côtés de Kadhafi. D'autre part parce que les islamistes se sont armés en pillant les stocks d'armes libyens à la faveur du chaos qui a accompagné la chute du raïs.

La première étape de l'opération militaire, qui vise à bloquer la progression des colonnes armées venant du nord et infliger des destructions aux islamistes en donnant un grand coup de pied dans la fourmilière, se déroule bien, même si l'heure du bilan n'est pas encore venue. Les étapes ultérieures risquent en revanche d'être plus complexes. À terme, il s'agit en effet de permettre à l'armée malienne de reconquérir son intégrité territoriale et d'empêcher durablement les groupes terroristes de nuire. Or, la France n'a pas pour l'instant l'intention de mettre des troupes au sol pour le faire. «En aurait-elle l'intention, on peut légitimement se demander si elle en aurait encore les moyens», commente un officier. L'armée malienne est en déroute. Quant aux forces africaines qui ont commencé à se déployer dans la région et doivent être formées par des conseillers occidentaux, beaucoup doutent de leur efficacité face aux combattants surarmés et extrêmement déterminés d'Aqmi et de ses alliés, qui évoluent dans un désert deux fois grand comme la France. En dix ans, les forces occidentales n'ont pas réussi à former une armée capable de tenir tête aux talibans en Afghanistan.

«On a fait le plus facile. Il va maintenant falloir constituer une vraie force africaine capable de reprendre le nord du pays. Cette seconde étape sera longue. Mais elle est indispensable. Car si on se contente de repousser les islamistes vers le nord, ils s'éparpilleront, dans le désert ou dans les pays voisins, avant de revenir», prévient le général Desportes.

Dans cette affaire, la France surfe sur un consensus, international et national. Mais aura-t-elle suffisamment de force pour mener la guerre jusqu'à son terme? Tout en soutenant l'opération et en offrant un soutien logistique et des moyens de renseignements, les États-Unis ont choisi de rester dans l'ombre. Pour l'UMP Arnaud Danjean, président de la sous-commission défense du Parlement européen, l'intervention était «nécessaire et légitime». Il regrette cependant que les pays européens ne participent pas davantage à l'effort, «alors que le processus d'une mission européenne dans le Sahel est acté depuis des semaines…»

LIRE AUSSI:

» Pourquoi la France a passé la vitesse supérieure au Mali

 

» À Bamako, entre espoir et inquiétude

 

» La France entre en guerre au Mali

 

» Comment l'armée française a évité une déroute au Mali

Jan. 12, 2013 by Dave Majumdar – FG

Washington DC - Despite a declining budget, the US Air Force is committed to its secretive Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) programme. However, what kind of military capacity the service will be able to offer in the future is an open question.

"Long term, we're committed to the long range strike bomber," says USAF Secretary Michael Donley. "We're going to try to keep programmes like that on track. But every programme would be affected if sequestration were to hit."

Sequestration was originally scheduled to be enacted on 2 January, but a last minute deal reached between the Obama Administration and the US Congress delayed the maneuver by 51 days. If the Congressional sequestration were to be enacted, it would automatically cut US defence outlays immediately by about 10% every year for 10 years. "Sequestration is a self-inflicted wound on national security," says US Army Gen Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "It's an irresponsible way to manage our nation's defense. It cuts blindly, and it cuts bluntly."

The Pentagon, in a memo issued by deputy secretary of defense Ashton Carter, has already taken steps to try to mitigate the damage by deferring maintenance and civilian personnel actions. But even if sequestration were to be avoided, analysts say that defence budget cuts are all but unavoidable given the massive hole in Washington's coffers.

In that eventuality, the Pentagon needs the ability to manage its finances in a strategic manner. "We need budget certainty; we need time to absorb the budget reductions; we need the flexibility to manage those reductions across the entire budget," Dempsey says.

Even with potential defence cuts, USAF leaders say that they know what the service will look like in the 2020s. "You can see what the Air Force will look like now in 2020 in terms of new capabilities coming onboard," Donley says. "The [Boeing KC-46] tanker will be fielded. The [Lockheed Martin] F-35 will be fielded. We'll be well along in the development of the bomber program. We will have developed further in the cyber area, for example. So you can see based on our priorities, and the dollars that are being invested now when these capabilities will deliver."

But Donley cautions: "But the underlying issue is size, overall capacity of the armed forces."

en vol de jour à bord d’une Gazelle Viviane.

Visibilité excellente, vulnérabilité maximale. 

(photo MinDefFR)

12.01.2013 par Frédéric Lert (FOB)

On s’était familiarisé avec Nijrab, Tagab puis Brega, Bengazi… A chaque année son théâtre d’opération et sa géographie nouvelle. Voici donc venir Konna et Mopti sur l’atlas des guerres françaises. Ces villes placées au centre du Mali, à l’exacte limite entre le sud et le nord du pays, sont à présent les points focaux de l’opération Serval qui a pour but d’arrêter l’offensive djihadiste.

Des moyens français ont été positionnés à Mopti dans la nuit du 10 au 11 janvier. Certaines informations parues dans la presse font état de huit rotations de Transall. Dans le même temps, des hélicoptères étaient mis en place à Ouagadougou, au Burkina Faso voisin. C’est de cette ville qu’est parti un premier raid français hier dans l’après-midi, pour stopper une offensive rebelle partie de Konna en direction de Mopti.

Un coup d’œil rapide sur une carte montre qu’il y a environ 200 km de Ouagadougou à la frontière malienne. Ajoutez une centaine de kilomètres pour aller de la frontière à la zone des combats, entre Konna et Mopti. Un raid direct au départ de la capitale ne passe pas en terme d’autonomie : les hélicoptères ont donc bénéficié d’une zone de ravitaillement avancée, proche du Mali. Les Gazelle utilisées par l’Alat, et en l’espèce le 4ème RHFS (Régiment d’Hélicoptères des Forces Spéciales) disposent d’une autonomie d’environ 1h30 en ordre de combat. Ce qui laisse donc, déduction faite de l’aller-retour, et à condition de décoller au plus près de la frontière, une demi-heure de « playtime » au maximum sur la zone des combats.

L’intervention des hélicoptères aurait été décisive pour casser la dynamique ennemie et les rebelles auraient reculé « de plusieurs dizaines de kilomètres » selon des sources maliennes. Reste que cette intervention s’est faite de jour selon les informations officielles, ce qui s’est sans doute payé par le décès d’un pilote, le lieutenant Damien Boiteux du 4ème RHFS. Agé de 41 ans, le lieutenant Boiteux était très expérimenté, avec à son actif de multiples opex au Kosovo, en Bosnie et en Côte d’Ivoire. Le ministre évoquait une blessure par balle tandis que certaines sources font état d’un éclat qui lui aurait sectionné l’artère fémorale alors que son hélicoptère était déjà engagé sur le chemin du retour, après le raid.

Envoyer les Gazelle de jour contre une colonne fortement défendue est une décision qui ne peut se justifier que dans l’urgence. Rappelons ici en deux mots que la Gazelle comme son nom l’indique, est à l’origine un appareil pacifique, conçu pour le transport « corporate », qui a effectué  son premier vol en 1967. Séduite par sa rapidité et sa manœuvrabilité, et faute de mieux, l’Alat en a fait par la suite la clef de voûte de ses capacités d’attaque. La Gazelle est un appareil rapide, bien adapté au vol à très basse hauteur, mais n’offrant aucune protection à son équipage. Celui-ci est assis face au danger, dans sa bulle de plexiglas, avec pour seule protection le gilet pare-balle et la visière du casque Gueneau… Sans influence sur les munitions de 7,62 à 23 mm dont disposent les rebelles maliens…

Le 4ème RHFS dispose d’une douzaine de Gazelle de deux modèles différents : les SA341 équipées d’un canon de 20mm et les SA342 « Viviane » mettant en œuvre le missile HOT. Les deux types d’hélicoptères seraient engagés dans les combats, avec sans doute une prééminence accordée à la Viviane. Celle-ci peut à priori décocher ses missiles à distance de sécurité mais elle doit pour cela se découvrir et s’exposer en demeurant en stationnaire une vingtaine de secondes, le temps que le missile filoguidé frappe sa cible.

Pour réduire cette vulnérabilité, l’Alat privilégie le combat de nuit pour lequel a été conçu le viseur Viviane. La quasi totalité des entraînements, et particulièrement au sein du 4ème RHFS, se fait après le coucher du soleil. Ce mode opératoire a parfaitement réussi en Libye : face à des ennemis solidement armés, les Gazelle ont accumulé plusieurs dizaines de raids sans recevoir un seul impact. Mais en Libye, l’Alat maîtrisait tous les paramètres de son intervention, ce qui n’a sans doute pas été le cas pendant ce premier raid malien.

12 Janvier 2013 Elysée.fr

C’est avec une vive émotion que le Président de la République a appris le décès au Mali du lieutenant Damien BOITEUX, chef de bord d’un hélicoptère du 4ème régiment d’hélicoptères des forces spéciales de Pau.

Le chef de l’Etat adresse à la famille et aux proches du défunt ses sincères condoléances et s’associe pleinement à leur douleur.

Il salue le courage et le dévouement de nos soldats engagés aux côtés des forces maliennes contre les mouvements terroristes.

Son action a contribué à arrêter l’avancée des forces terrestres vers Mopti et restera dans nos mémoires.

Jan. 9, 2012 by Galrahn - informationdissemination.net

Normally when a defense budget is passed, I can't wait to dig through it and highlight all the important details. This time, with no associated appropriations bill (or plan) coming anytime soon, it would be a waste of time to suggest anything in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Act is worth discussing, because it is worthless until the elected folks in Washington, DC get their budget priorities sorted out.

There is one section in the bill that I do want to highlight though. This reads like something inserted by a lobbyist, and it doesn't belong in my opinion.

SEC. 131. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1. The Marine Corps is a combat force that leverages maneuver from the sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
2. The Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon naval vessels, they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations and, operating ‘‘from the sea’’, they require no third-party host nation permission to conduct military operations.
3. The Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet this full range of military operations.
4. Due only to fiscal constraints, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels, which adds military risk to future operations.
5. The Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30 operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to Congress that will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
6. Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1. the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
2. the Navy should carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements;
3. the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships as a component of the balanced battle force;
4. the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
5. operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and acquisition cost; and
6. maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the national security of the United States.

To me this looks a lot like some Marine Corps General and his industry buddies throwing their weight around via Congress to try an influence the Analysis of Alternatives taking place regarding the LSD(X). Congress should not be trying to influence the decision unless they are ready to pony up the big bucks for what they are basically calling for - which to me sounds like more LPD-17s.

From what I understand, LSD(X) will be a design to cost ship. The recurring cost (ship 3 and beyond) is pegged to be about $1.2 billion in the shipbuilding budget. That makes the LPD-17 hull a nonstarter without a significant increase in cash from Congress.

The Marines face several challenges in dealing with amphibious requirements, but two stand out as important challenges that must be addressed. The first challenge is that the lift footprint of the amphibious MEB is growing, and the second challenge is that the MPS squadron only carries about 70% of the MEB's equipment. With limited funding and only one platform in the shipbuilding plan able to address these issues - the LSD(X) - folks are either going to have to get creative to solve these challenges, or accept that the challenges will not be solved.

The LSD(X) is a choice between 4 alternatives.

The first choice is a new build, best possible lift vessel for $1.2 billion recurring. I have no idea what design that would be, but if we are being honest it almost certainly wouldn't be anything similar to a current LSD if it is going to meet the stated requirements.

The second choice is for a LPD-17 mod, best possible for $1.2 billion recurring. I do not believe that is possible, but I'm sure there is a shipbuilding guru who other Marines call "General" willing and ready to convince a gullible politician it is possible. Experts I have spoken to in NAVSEA say it's not possible, and I'll trust their expertise and opinion over any Marine General when it comes to shipbuilding.

The third choice is to use a foreign design brought up to NVR standard at a cost of no more than $1.2 billion recurring with the third ship. The design that is specifically highlighted with this option is the French Mistral class. The ships would be built at a US shipyard. There is not a consensus whether these ships can be built in a US shipyard for $1.2 billion recurring.

The fourth option is to build two ships - a MLP and an AFSB - and use the combination of both ships to replace the single LSD. The idea is for the AFSB vessel to cover both the lift for amphibious groups and carry residual lift for the MPS MEB while MLP serves as a well deck surrogate. What is important to understand here is that the AFSB design would actually be a non-mil spec LPH with a limited hanger capacity, but it gives the option for that vessel to carry forward the helicopters in an ARG while the LHA/LHD operates 20 JSFs. Neither the MLP or AFSB would be a gray hull though, which is a major reason why old school Marine Generals who have been doing amphibious assaults for 30 years (cough!) hate the idea.

When I read Section 131 of the 2013 National Defense Act, what I read as "Sense of Congress" actually represents the traditionalists mindset on amphibious capability and their Gulf coast lobby buddies.

But the bottom line is this. The fourth option is the only option that will actually meet the capacity requirements for amphibious lift and the MPS, but I fully expect the United States Marine Corps to outright reject the very suggestion of any option away from the traditional 3 ship ARG. The third option for a foreign design will be rejected solely because it is a foreign design, even though the logic of that escapes me completely when the ships are being built in US shipyards. A new design is possible but unlikely, and until we see more in-house design expertise in NAVSEA I can't say that is necessarily a bad thing.

So ultimately I fully expect the final choice for the LSD(X) to be a LPD-17 mod that the Navy budget cannot afford, and in the end I suspect the Marine Corps will end up with about 8 LSD(X) because that is all they can afford.

But if it was me, I would go for the MLP + AFSB concept. I believe it carries with it the highest risk, but I also believe it would give the Marine Corps the most flexibility when it comes to operations at sea. In my opinion it is much easier for the USMC to remain a relevant national defense asset when they are operating from more ships than when they are operating from fewer ships, and the MLP + AFSB option puts Marines on well over 40 vessels that deploy frequently, vs less than 30 possible vessels that deploy less frequently when one picks the quality LPD-17 mod option.

Jan. 10, 2013 by Dave Majumdar – FG

Washington DC - Even as the US Army moves forward with fielding its first unit of Boeing AH-64E Block III attack helicopters, the service is planning to add further improvements to the Apache gunship.

"Right now, we are currently fielding the first unit equipped, our FUE [first unit equipped] unit, with Echo-models, and we're on track to meet that fielding schedule," says Col Jeff Hager, the army's Apache programme manager.

Hager adds that Boeing has delivered 28 of 51 low-rate initial production AH-64Es that it is contracted to build. This year, the company will start producing full-rate production aircraft for an eventual total of 634 helicopters.

But even as the AH-64E transitions into full-rate production, some systems engineering work remains, Hager says. The changes, which will come in production Lots 4 through 6, include better embedded diagnostics for improved maintenance. The Apache will also gain the Link-16 data-link, which is typically found on fixed-wing combat aircraft. It will also be afforded improvements to its mast-mounted Northrop Grumman APG-78 Longbow fire control radar, which will improve range and add overwater capability.

Hager says that the army has not quite decided how the overwater capability would be used, but he says the Longbow radar in concert with the Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire missile could be used to attack landing craft or small warships. In the future, active electronically scanned array radar could be added to the aircraft.

Another addition will be the cognitive decision aiding system (CDAS), Hager says. CDAS is designed "to help the pilot and the crew with some of those tasks that tend to get a little cumbersome at times," he says. "It'll help him in those tasks in specific."

The army also intends to support Boeing's efforts to sell the Apache overseas, Hager says. Boeing's attack helicopter vice president, Dave Koopersmith, says that the company has seen an uptick in interest internationally for the Apache recently. "We have more demand signals for this dominant capability in this attack helicopter space," he says.

January 10, 2013: Strategy Page

Recent Chinese TV coverage of Chinese Air Force training revealed that the code word for the main Chinese training base is “Area 52”. This is an interesting shout-out to the U.S. Air Force Tonopah Test Range (also known as Area 52) in Nevada. This has long been the site for testing new aircraft, and providing advanced training for fighter pilots. Nearby is Area 51, an even more secretive base used for experimental aircraft and, according to local lore, UFO activity.

What this shows is how much China understands that the only way to achieve victory in the air is to adopt Western pilot training methods. China is doing this in a big way. China is already getting rid of its thousands of old Cold War era warplanes. These were copies of Russian designs and Chinese air force experts noted that no one ever won a war with these aircraft. Since the 1990s China has been acquiring Western-style designs (MiG-29, Su-27/30) from Russia and developing similar aircraft. But these aircraft are only effective if operated by highly trained and experienced pilots. So China has provided the large quantities of fuel and spare parts needed to keep their several hundred modern fighters in the air a lot. This, however, was not enough. The pilots who started out on the old Cold War style aircraft did not become much better when moved to modern fighters, even after a lot of time in the air. Something was missing, and that turned out to be technical education and specialized training in the intricacies of modern air combat. That meant greater use of realistic flight simulators (so very dangerous maneuvers could be practiced). So the Chinese are taking care of all this, including establishing a “pilot university” that provides a four year academic and flight training program. All this closely follows methods and techniques pioneered by the United States.

The Chinese Air Force now has a training unit that will accurately (as possible) portray enemy (especially American and Indian) aircraft and combat tactics. Thus there are three Blue-Army Aggressor Squadrons (Blue is the bad guys in Chinese training, Red is the good guys) for this. One is equipped with Su-30s, to represent American F-15s or Indian or Vietnamese Su-30s. Another has the J-10A, which is similar to the F-16. The third squadron has J-7s (Chinese copies of the MiG-21), which represent low end threats, like the many MiG-21s India still uses.

Using your own aircraft for "aggressor (or dissimilar) training" began in 1969, when the U.S. Navy established the original "Top Gun" fighter pilot school. This was done in response to the poor performance of its pilots against North Vietnamese pilots flying Russian fighters. What made the Top Gun operation different was that the training emphasized how the enemy aircraft and pilots operated. This was called "dissimilar training". In the past, American pilots practiced against American pilots, with everyone flying American aircraft and using American tactics. It worked in World War II because the enemy pilots were not getting a lot of practice and were using similar aircraft and tactics anyway. Most importantly, there was a lot of aerial combat going on, providing ample opportunity for on-the-job training. Not so in Vietnam, where the quite different Russian trained North Vietnamese were giving U.S. aviators an awful time. The four week Top Gun program solved the problem. The air force followed shortly with its Red Flag school. In the early 1980s, the Russians established a dissimilar air combat school (and began building Western style fighters), and the Chinese followed in 1987.

Over the last four decades the two American training programs have developed differently, and the entire concept of "dissimilar training" has changed. The navy kept Top Gun as a program to hone fighter pilot's combat skills. The air force made their Red Flag program more elaborate, bringing in the many different types of aircraft involved in combat missions (especially electronic warfare).

After the Cold War ended in 1991, it became increasingly obvious that none of our potential enemies was providing their fighter pilots with much training at all. In other words, the dissimilar training for U.S. fighter pilots was not as crucial as it had been during the Cold War. Actually, it had been noted that flying skills of Soviet pilots was declining in the 1980s, as economic problems in the USSR led to cuts in flying time. During that period American pilots were actually increasing their flying time. Moreover, U.S. flight simulators were getting better. American pilots were finding that even the game oriented combat flight simulators had some training value. But now, with China aggressively doing all they can to improve pilot quality, the U.S. has to pay more attention to staying ahead.

09/01/2013 Ariane Nicolas - francetvinfo.fr

January 9, 2013 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: Project On Government Oversight; issued January 8, 2013)

U.S. Central Command has released some interesting numbers on the performance of modern air systems in Afghanistan; the data do not augur well for our defenses in the next decade, nor for the suitability of the man who appears likely to be the next secretary of defense, former Senator Chuck Hagel -- his admirable iconoclasm toward some national security dogmas notwithstanding.

With the Department of Defense budget looking at no real growth or even reductions in the next few years, there will be a clear need for defense systems that offer more performance for less cost. The data from Afghanistan on what drones are contributing to the war there show that we are getting little but paying a lot, the reverse of what we will need in the future.

These data notwithstanding, drones are the embodiment of what conventional wisdom in Washington holds to be the wave of the future for air power -- the quintessence of the high tech cutting edge that the pundits want more and more of and just the kind of myth that politicians appointed to senior executive branch positions fall for time and time again.





The Pentagon's new leadership needs the wit to recognize that the conventional wisdom on these (and other) systems can be badly wrong, and it needs the moral courage and political dexterity to act, standing up to the embedded material and intellectual special interests in the Pentagon, Congress, and think tanks that leap to the defense of these systems time after time. Without such brains, guts, skill, and, especially, persistence in the next Pentagon leader, our defenses are in for a rough ride -- downhill -- in coming years. In short, we need real deeds from a tough, no-nonsense executive, not just interesting, sometimes iconoclastic words.

The Air Force component of CENTCOM (AFCENT) releases numbers to the public each month on Air Force and allied sorties and weapon releases in Operation Enduring Freedom (which mostly means the war in Afghanistan) for drones and manned aircraft. (Data on CIA drone activities in Pakistan and elsewhere are not included.)

The released data are bad news for drone advocates. They show that in the first eleven months of 2012, the U.S. and NATO forces involved in Afghanistan conducted 1,505 air-to-ground "strike sorties" -- i.e., those that involved the release of at least one weapon. A total of 3,886 weapons were released on those strike sorties -- 3,439 from manned aircraft and 447 from remotely piloted aircraft, or drones (namely, the MQ-1B Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper). In other words, the drones were responsible for just 11.5 percent of the air-to-ground weapons used in the war. Manned aircraft, such as the A-10, F-16, F-18, AV-8B and B-1B, were responsible for the other 88.5 percent. Put simply, in the air war in Afghanistan -- called by some "the Drone War" -- drones did little better than 10 percent of the weapons delivery.

Little as they did in the first eleven months of 2012, they did even less in 2011, when manned aircraft released 5,117 weapons and drones released just 294 -- or 5.4 percent of the total.

The AFCENT data is very sparse on allowing more meaningful comparisons between drones and manned aircraft in the Afghanistan war. AFCENT declined to provide this writer more detail, but it gave some useful data to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in the United Kingdom. That data shows that in 2011, manned aircraft flew almost 24,000 of the total close air support sorties -- whether a weapon was released or not -- and they flew well over 17,000 in the first ten months of 2012. Drones flew 10,300 sorties in the same category in 2011 and 7,600 in 2012. Thus, the manned aircraft are responsible for about 70 percent of the total sorties in both years.

More importantly, manned aircraft are flying an even larger percentage of the strike sorties: aircraft performed 1,743 strike sorties, or 88 percent, in 2011 and over 1,100, or 82 percent, in the first ten months of 2012. Finally, for delivering numbers of weapons during a strike on a target, drones averaged 1.4 weapons per strike in 2012; aircraft averaged twice that.

Nor is there any basis to think that drones have been delivering weapons more accurately. According to DOD's weapons tester, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Reaper, for example, is capable of employing only two types of munitions: the AGM-AGM-114 laser-guided "Hellfire" missile and the GBU-12 laser-guided bomb. Manned aircraft carry a far greater variety, and while CENTCOM has not released the data, anecdotally it appears that most manned aircraft munitions are GPS-guided JDAMs, which have fewer limitations from clouds and weather and other causes than do the drones' laser-guided munitions.

That the drones are responsible for such a small percentage of the air-to-ground war in Afghanistan is the natural result of their inherent limitations. Prominent among them is their tiny payload compared to manned aircraft: The "more capable" drone, the MQ-9 Reaper, carries roughly one-ninth to one-fourth the payload of an A-10 or an F-16.

Nor are the drones cheaper to buy and operate. Using the Air Force's definition for all the components in a Reaper unit, they cost about $120 million to buy, compared to about $20 million for the original A-10 and about $55 million for a modern F-16. A Reaper "CAP," or unit, costs about $20 million per year to operate, compared to $5.5 million for an A-10C for a year or $4.8 million for an F-16C.

In short, with drones like the iconic Reaper, our forces get less performance for more cost -- compared to 35-year-old aircraft designs such as the A-10 and F-16.

These data notwithstanding, drones continue to be the darling of opinion in much of DOD, journalism, and think tanks. Articles repeatedly label Afghanistan as "the drone war," and one think tank drone advocate even referred to the AFCENT information as a "powerful data point" in favor of drones being "here to stay." They may, indeed, be here to stay, but that will be based on politics and hype, not performance in Afghanistan -- and perhaps the affinity of some for what drones are doing in Pakistan and Yemen under CIA control.

Whoever is the next secretary of defense will face a choice. He or she can operate at the policy wonk level, as so many already have, ignoring these kinds of basic nuts and bolts data. When they do so, and are told by in-house advocates of drones (or F-35s, or Littoral Combat Ships, or C-130Js, or almost anything else) that the newest technology is cheap and effective, the secretaries of defense with policy wonk and/or political backgrounds have proven themselves to be undisposed to serious, informed questioning. They end up taking the advocates' assertions at face value and acting on them.

The next steps in this process are as predictable as the sunrise: when some outsider suggests a budget cut, the DOD bureaucracies easily convince the secretary that their "affordable" and "effective" weapon systems will no longer be available. Then, the secretary proclaims the idea of insufficient resources for these pet rocks to be a "doomsday." In doing so, facilitators of business as usual like Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta thoroughly isolate themselves from the fact that the additional cost and low performance of these systems is much of what is driving the budget beyond acceptable levels of spending.

It is easy for the in-house advocates to co-opt the secretary of defense when he or she comes from an institution like Congress, where rhetoric and appearances trump facts, especially if the words are articulated cleverly or forcefully.

Such superficiality is precisely the profile Senator Chuck Hagel had as a member of the Senate. He was frequently in the news saying something interesting, often against the dogma of the Republican Party or even American politics in general. But, quick, tell yourself something he actually did of consequence in the Senate -- legislation or other important actions, not just words. Draw a blank? So did I, and I was watching up close and personal as a Republican Senate staffer for many of Hagel's twelve years there. Beyond the rhetoric, his record is quite sparse.

At a time when its budget is declining and advocates, backed by generally accepted myths, press hard for their particular hobby horse to be protected while others go begging, the Pentagon needs someone with a demonstrated record as a tough, acutely well informed downsizer or as an accomplished infighter against the powerful bureaucracies that run free under politically oriented secretaries of defense. A talker, not a doer, Senator Hagel, no matter how much I may admire his politics, is not the right person.

This is not to say that the other publically mentioned candidates for the job would be better.

As a denizen of the think tank and policy world, Michelle Flournoy -- as intelligent as she seems to be -- has been operating in a world where soft-policy differences are the stock in trade, not bureaucratic fights down in the weeds over the quality of data on performance or costs. As the chief architect of DOD's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review as the Pentagon's under secretary of policy, she showed little interest in or understanding of how the building actually operates at the basic level.

As undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics and then as deputy secretary of defense, Ashton Carter has shown little ability to master the bureaucracy. In fact, he let slide far more problems than he has done anything meaningful about. That is all too clearly the case with, for example, the Pentagon's most expensive program ever -- the F-35 -- which remains both unaffordable and a gigantic performance disappointment after four years of Carter's ministrations.

The vast chasm between conventional wisdom and reality on drones, their costs, and what is and is not working at the tactical level is replicated in myriad ways in the secretary of defense job portfolio -- from assault rifles to missile defenses to arms control and especially to questions of war and peace.

What we need least is yet another dilettante who specializes in politics of the moment and fancy words.

January 5, 2013 defense-update.com

U.S. Air Force officials have decided not to renew a contract with Italian aircraft manufacturer Alenia North America to support and induct the small, Italian-made C-27A transport aircraft into the Afghan Air Force. This is the second U.S. blow aimed at the Italian aircraft manufacturer, after the termination of acquisition of C-27J Spartan by the US Air Force. According to the Air Force, Alenia failed to generate a sufficient number of operational aircraft for effective Afghan Air Force airlift capability. Aviation Week reports.

In 2008, the U.S. paid $314 million for the purchase of 20 former Italian Air Force G.222s — designated the C-27A by the Air Force — to give to the fledging Afghan National Army Air Corps, later the Afghan Air Force, an independent tactical transport capability to replace Soviet-era Antonov An-32s.

However, their introduction to service has been far from smooth. Only 16 of the aircraft have been delivered to Afghanistan, with four remaining in Italy. Despite a deployed team of contractors, the aircraft struggled with serviceability issues and have been grounded twice — once in December 2011 on airworthiness grounds, and again in March 2012 because of safety issues that delayed the training of Afghan personnel.

24/12/2012 Mer et Marine

Deux évènements ont marqué, le 21 décembre, le programme NH90. Tout d’abord, la livraison à la Belgique du premier des 8 hélicoptères commandés au consortium NH Industries (détenu à 62.5% par Eurocopter, 32% par AugustaWestland et 5.5% par Fokker Aerostructures) pour ses forces armées. Cet appareil est en version TTH (Tactical Transport Helicopter), comme le seront les trois prochains exemplaires belges. Les quatre machines suivantes seront des NFH (Nato Frigate Helicopters), version navalisée du NH90, qui sera embarquée sur les frégates belges Léopold 1er et Louise Marie, en remplacement des Alouette III actuellement en service.

Le 21 décembre toujours, la Direction Générale de l’Armement prenait livraison, également sur le site Eurocopter de Marignane, du 1er Caïman Marine, appellation française de la version navale du  NH90, au Standard 2 (ou Step B comme disent les industriels). Après une courte période d’évaluation conduite au Centre d’expérimentations pratiques et de réception de l’aéronautique navale (CEPA/10S), l’appareil renforcera la flotte de 7 Caïman déjà en service au sein des flottilles 31F et 33F, basées à Hyères (Var) et Lanvéoc-Poulmic (Finistère). Ces machines, livrées depuis 2011 au standard 1 (Step A), seront progressivement mises au niveau le plus récent entre 2014 et 2017.

Autoprotection, MU90 et réservoirs externes

Le standard 2 du Caïman Marine introduit le système d’autoprotection de l’hélicoptère, comprenant notamment des leurres électromagnétiques et infrarouges. Il ouvre également la voie à la capacité de tir de la torpille anti-sous-marine MU90, attendue en 2013, tout en améliorant différents systèmes du standard précédent. La nouvelle version permettra, de plus, l’emport de réservoirs externes afin d’améliorer l’autonomie de l’hélicoptère. Celui-ci pourra disposer de deux bras de chaque côté de la cellule, chacun étant capable d’emporter un bidon de carburant ou une torpille (avec panachage possible de deux bidons, un bidon et une torpille ou deux torpilles). A terme, le Caïman français, à l’instar du NH90 italien avec le Marte Mk2/S, pourra également mettre en œuvre un ou deux missile(s) antinavire léger(s).

Premières capacités ASF et ASM sur le standard 1

Sans attendre l’arrivée du standard 2, la Marine nationale, suite aux expérimentations menées par le CEPA/10S, a ouvert mi-novembre une capacité de lutte au dessus de la surface (ASF) pour les Caïman au standard 1. Et, toujours sur ce premier standard, une première capacité de lutte anti-sous-marine (ASM) devrait être disponible avant le mois de février.

Déployé depuis ses bases littorales ou sur les frégates des types Horizon et FREMM, les Caïman Marine pourront, dans le domaine de la lutte ASM, mettre en œuvre un sonar trempé FLASH, des bouées acoustiques et des torpilles MU90. En dehors de la lutte au dessus de la surface, ces appareils servent également aux missions de sauvetage en mer et au transport opérationnel. Sur les 27 Caïman commandés pour la marine française et livrables d’ici 2021, 13 seront dotés d’une rampe arrière (dont les 7 premiers) permettant l’embarquement rapide de troupes ou de matériel, avec une capacité d’emport d’environ 16 passagers.

Jan. 8, 2013 - By JOHN T. BENNETT  - Defense News

Former Nebraska Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel’s nomination to replace Leon Panetta as U.S. defense secretary will bring something old and something new into the national spotlight: President George W. Bush’s Iraq war and a shrinking Pentagon budget.

Senate Armed Services Committee members and staff are reviewing Hagel’s decades-thick policy statements, votes and views ahead of a yet-unscheduled confirmation hearing.

But even as that deep dive is only in its infancy, it already is clear Hagel’s sharp opposition to the 2007 surge of additional U.S. forces in Iraq — which many credit with turning around that conflict — will take center stage. And it’s a safe bet that congressional proponents of avoiding deep Pentagon spending cuts will press the nominee over what he recently labeled a “bloated” Defense Department budget.

That remark came during a 2011 interview with the Financial Times, in which Hagel also said, “The Pentagon needs to be pared down. I don’t think our military has really looked at themselves strategically, critically in a long time.”

That comment is drawing the ire of national security-minded conservatives in Washington. Already, right-leaning think tanks and organizations are circulating white papers and talking points slamming a number of Hagel’s past comments on issues, including about cutting the DoD budget.

“The current secretary of defense and the White House have suggested that sequestration will be a calamity for our national security,” said Danielle Pletka of the conservative American Enterprise Institute. “How can you reconcile your demand for greater cuts and the rejection of those cuts by the incumbent?”

Such points inevitably will be picked up by Republican senators as they prepare to question the nominee in coming weeks.

Hagel’s allies, such as Fred Kempe, president and CEO of the Atlantic Council, are not tipping their hand about how deeply Hagel might want to reduce military spending.

But in a Jan. 8 television interview, Kempe, who worked closely with Hagel in the nominee’s post as Atlantic Council chairman, noted one of his heroes is former President Dwight Eisenhower. That U.S. wartime general-turned-commander in chief “had a very, very sober view of military spending and … came in after a war and had to make some tough decisions.

“Ultimately, it’s President Obama’s decision in the end,” Kempe said. “Certainly in this budget situation, you’re going to have a real hard look at the defense budget. And I think he’ll [Hagel] bring his business acumen and his toughness to play in this.”

Iraq Payback?

Whether the nation is aching for a new discussion about the still-controversial 2003-2011 Iraq war, it’s about to get one.

The former GOP senator angered many in his own party in 2006 when he broke with the George W. Bush administration and congressional Republicans over the conduct of the Iraq war. Some sources and pundits say the attacks Hagel is experiencing now are, in large part, payback for doing so.

Hagel penned a controversial 2006 Washington Post op-ed that began: “There will be no victory or defeat for the United States in Iraq.”

The then-senator took umbrage with what was at the time one of the top U.S. goals in Iraq.

“The time for more U.S. troops in Iraq has passed. We do not have more troops to send and, even if we did, they would not bring a resolution to Iraq. Militaries are built to fight and win wars, not bind together failing nations,” Hagel wrote. “We are once again learning a very hard lesson in foreign affairs: America cannot impose a democracy on any nation — regardless of our noble purpose.”

The op-ed was deemed remarkable, in part, because of the sharp language Hagel used.

“We have misunderstood, misread, misplanned and mismanaged our honorable intentions in Iraq with an arrogant self-delusion reminiscent of Vietnam,” Hagel wrote. “Honorable intentions are not policies and plans.”

Hagel also raised concerns about the economic toll the Iraq war was inflicting on the United States.

“The United States must begin planning for a phased troop withdrawal from Iraq. The cost of combat in Iraq in terms of American lives, dollars and world standing has been devastating,” Hagel wrote.

“We’ve already spent more than $300 billion there to prosecute an almost four-year-old war and are still spending $8 billion per month. The United States has spent more than $500 billion on our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And our effort in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, partly because we took our focus off the real terrorist threat, which was there, and not in Iraq.”

Many of his views appear to place him at odds with several Armed Services Committee members, and that committee would have to approve his nomination before it moves to a full upper chamber vote.

One is former anking member John McCain, R-Ariz., to whom some in the GOP Senate caucus will look for guidance on how to vote if Hagel’s nomination reaches the upper chamber’s floor.

The Obama administration opted against a tense confirmation process for Susan Rice, who on Dec. 13 withdrew from consideration to become secretary of state over fears that McCain and other GOP senators would either block it or turn the confirmation process into a major political fight.

Whether the Hagel-McCain split over Iraq policy will lead McCain to oppose his friend remains an open question.

In 2008, McCain said he and Hagel are “close and dear friends” who simply reached different conclusions about the Iraq conflict. In the same interview, McCain called Hagel a “respected leader in America” who “served his country admirably, with honor and distinction.”

On Dec. 20, McCain told Defense News he had not yet decided how he would vote.

The Opposition

An anti-Hagel campaign has sprung up since his name was floated by the White House.

Pro-Israeli lawmakers, organizations and pundits have seized on 2008 comments Hagel made about the “Jewish lobby” intimidating U.S. lawmakers. Hagel and his allies have struck back, saying the nominee believes in the American-Israeli alliance.

Conservative pundits have deployed to cable TV networks to criticize his views. One is former George W. Bush-era Iraq adviser Dan Senor, a close adviser to 2012 GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney.

Senor noted that some of Hagel’s views, such as questioning whether the kinds of stiff sanctions the Obama administration has placed on Iran over its alleged nuclear ambitions actually work, place him out of synch with the president.

One website calls Hagel “too extreme to be secretary of defense,” and lists his views on a range of issues.

The Republican National Committee, in a blog post, questions whether pro-Israeli lawmakers such as Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., ultimately can support the nomination. The blog post questions if the administration can secure the 60 votes necessary to avoid a filibuster and confirm Hagel as defense secretary.

For his part, Schumer, in the hours after Obama announced Hagel’s nomination, is holding his cards close.

“Chuck Hagel, as a former colleague and a patriot with a decorated service record, has earned the right to nothing less than a full and fair process in the Senate,” Schumer said in a Jan. 7 statement. “I look forward to fully studying his record and exploring his views.”

Some conservative Washington hawks believe Hagel is too antiwar to advise any president on the use of American military power. Not so, say his allies.

“Hagel is not a pacifist, and certainly not the dove that his critics have claimed he is. He remains firmly within the foreign policy mainstream in Washington, and has supported past wars that I have opposed,” said Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute. “But his general inclination, hardened after the debacle of Iraq, is to avoid foreign crusades and to resist pressure to send U.S. troops into harm’s way in pursuit of unclear objectives that do not advance U.S. interests. That is a mindset that the neoconservatives cannot abide.

“I don’t believe … Obama chose Chuck Hagel in order to humiliate the Republican Party,” Preble said. “I don’t think he intended to shine the light on the bitter divide between the neoconservatives and traditional foreign policy realists. I think he picked Hagel because he likes him, and trusts him.”

As Washington awaits his nomination hearing, the issue to track as the nominee meets one-on-one with lawmakers, then answers hours of tough questions in a public hearing, is whether enough senators come to trust Hagel.

07/01/2013 Vincent Lamigeon, grand reporter à Challenges Supersonique

2013, année de la dégradation des ambitions stratégiques de l’armée française ? L’épée de Damoclès tangue dangereusement au-dessus des trois armes. L’année 2013 s’annonce décisive pour les ambitions stratégiques du pays et le format de ses armées : la commission du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale doit rendre ses conclusions au président de la République en février, avant la présentation au Parlement, à l’été, d’une nouvelle loi de programmation militaire (LPM). Dans le contexte budgétaire actuel, l’exercice risque de virer aux grands coups de hache dans le budget de la défense. Industriels et militaires craignent que le Livre blanc acte une baisse drastique des ambitions militaires de la France, et que la nouvelle LPM en tire les conclusions en réduisant fortement l’effort de défense français (1,5% du PIB estimé en 2013).

A première vue, l’édifice de la défense française tient encore debout. Les arbitrages du ministère de la défense ont préservé, pour un budget 2013 "de transition", des commandes jugées incontournables. La DGA doit notamment commander cette année un premier système intermédiaire de drones MALE pour remplacer les Harfang actuels (probablement des drones américains Reaper de General Atomics), mais aussi 3 systèmes de drones tactiques SDTI (Sagem), 4 400 postes de communication tactique CONTACT (Thales), 220 armements AASM (Sagem), 20 torpilles lourdes Artémis (DCNS). Le ministère a aussi prévu de lancer la rénovation des avions de transport maritime Atlantique 2, et surtout de commander – enfin…- les ravitailleurs A330 MRTT (Airbus Military), qui ont fait cruellement défaut lors de l’opération Harmattan en Libye. Les forces françaises prendront aussi livraison de 11 Rafale, 4 hélicoptère d’attaque Tigre, 3 appareils de transport A400M, 12 hélicoptères de transport NH-90, 83 blindés VBCI, ou encore 4036 panoplies du fantassin Félin.

Mais on voit mal comment Jean-Yves Le Drian pourrait éviter des mesures d’économies drastiques. Le diagnostic est connu : le budget de la défense français a décroché par rapport à la trajectoire financière fixée par la loi de programmation militaire 2009-2014, basée sur des hypothèses macroéconomiques très - trop- ambitieuses. La trajectoire d’une croissance annuelle de 1% a été abandonnée, du fait de la crise de la dette, au profit d’un maintien du budget en euros constants (« zéro volume »), lui-même remplacé par un maintien en euros courants (« zéro valeur »). Ce qui signifie, en clair, une baisse du budget, si l’on tient compte de l’inflation. Selon le chef d'état-major des armées, l'amiral Edouard Guillaud, il manquera ainsi fin 2015 10 milliards d'euros au budget de la Défense par rapport à la loi de programmation militaire, et 40 milliards en 2020 – 130% du budget annuel de la défense- si la trajectoire financière reste la même.

La conséquence prévisible, c’est l’avis de la commission de la défense du Sénat sur l’équipement des forces qui le résume le mieux : « Dans ces conditions, le format des forces tel que dessiné par le Livre blanc de 2008 [30 000 hommes déployables en 6 mois pour un an, 70 avions de combat projetables, 1500 hommes projetables en quelques jours à 7-8000 km, NDLR] est définitivement hors de portée, écrivaient le 22 novembre les sénateurs Daniel Reiner, Xavier Pintat et Jacques Gautier. Une renégociation des grands contrats d'équipement des forces semble inéluctable, car les huit premiers programmes représentent 80 % des crédits d'équipement. La renégociation de contrats, déjà renégociés en 2008, va être très difficile et ne se traduira que par de maigres économies budgétaires, le plus souvent dans le long terme, au prix d'une réduction des cibles, d'un accroissement des délais de livraison voire d'une dégradation de la qualité des équipements. » Pour résumer, du sang et des larmes, à la fois pour des industriels qui vont devoir accepter des baisses de cibles, et pour les militaires, qui ne toucheront probablement pas tous les matériels promis.

Quels programmes seront touchés ? Le lugubre jeu des pronostics est ouvert : « Les décisions les plus faciles, à défaut d’être les plus avisées, sont de ne pas lancer les futurs programmes, comme le programme Scorpion de renouvellement des blindés de l’armée de terre, ou de limiter au maximum leur taille, souligne un spécialiste. Les cibles des grands programmes déjà lancés pourraient aussi être revues. » La dissuasion étant sanctuarisée par le président de la République (813 millions d’euros de crédits de paiements en 2013 pour le missile balistique M51 et son adaptation, 614 millions pour la simulation...), les décisions douloureuses pourraient se faire sur les autres programmes : le Rafale, dont la cible est de 286 appareils, pourrait rester bloqué à la commande actuelle de 180 avions ; les cibles de l’A400M, des frégates FREMM, des sous-marins nucléaires d’attaque Barracuda, des blindés VBCI, ou encore des hélicoptères Tigre et NH-90 pourraient aussi être revues à la baisse. Rien de décidé à l’heure qu’il est, mais d’ores et déjà une certitude : le millésime 2013 aura un goût âcre pour la défense française.