30/01/2013 Mer et Marine

L’arrivée en Méditerranée de la première frégate multi-missions française n’est pas uniquement destinée à tester les capacités sonar du bâtiment dans les eaux de la Grande Bleue. L’Aquitaine doit également réaliser sous peu un tir de missile au large de l’île du Levant, où se trouve l’un des centres d’essais de la Direction Générale de l’Armement. A cette occasion, le bâtiment, livré en décembre à la Marine nationale, devrait prochainement mettre en œuvre un missile surface-air Aster 15, 16 munitions de ce type pouvant être embarquées par la FREMM afin d’assurer son autoprotection contre des missiles et aéronefs assaillants.

La frégate pourra également embarquer 8 missiles antinavire Exocet MM40 Block3, ainsi que 16 missiles de croisière MdCN (Scalp Naval), tous développés par MBDA. Le premier tir en mer de ce dernier ne sera pas réalisé par l’Aquitaine mais par la seconde FREMM française, la Normandie, actuellement en achèvement sur le site DCNS de Lorient. Cette frégate, qui doit débuter ses essais en mer au second semestre, doit réaliser un tir de MdCN en 2014.

29 Jan 2013 By Tim Ross, James Kirkup - telegraph.co.uk

Britain risks being dragged into a drawn out Afghan-style conflict in Mali, MPs warned after David Cameron announced that more than 300 troops would be sent to north Africa in the fight against al-Qaeda.

In a significant escalation of Britain’s military commitment to the region, Downing Street said that up to 330 troops would go to Mali and neighbouring countries.

Up to 40 will be based in Mali, training government troops as they support the French-led intervention against the country’s al-Qaeda-linked rebels. Another 200 will be sent to train soldiers in other African countries so they can join the assault.

Britain will also share intelligence and offer a roll-on roll-off ferry to carry French equipment to Mali. A joint logistics headquarters could also be established with France.

Philip Hammond, the Defence Secretary, conceded that there was a danger of “mission creep” in Mali but insisted that Britain had “an absolute duty” to intervene against terrorists.

Senior military figures and MPs from both sides of the Commons raised concerns of a lengthy conflict in north Africa resembling the wars in Afghanistan or Vietnam. In an urgent debate, Mr Hammond insisted that Britain’s role in the conflict was in the national interest, and promised an “efficient” result.

“The UK has a clear interest in the stability of Mali and ensuring its territory does not become an ungoverned space available for al-Qaeda and its associates to organise attacks on the West,” he said. “We have an absolute duty to intervene wherever there is a threat to Britain’s national security and the security of Britain’s interests around the world and this is exactly such a case.”

British troops will be authorised to open fire only in “self defence” , he said. No troops would provide “force protection” for the proposed European Union training mission in Mali and there was no “intention” to deploy front-line troops, he said. “We are very clear about the risks of mission creep. We have defined very carefully the support that we are willing to provide to the French and the Malian authorities.”

John Baron, a Conservative MP, warned Mr Hammond that Britain could be “drawn into ever deepening conflicts”. Jim Murphy, the shadow defence secretary, said the public was “wary and weary of conflict” and Frank Dobson, the former Labour cabinet minister, suggested that Mali could become Britain’s “Vietnam”, a war which he said began with American troops “in a training capacity”.

As French troops swept into Timbuktu, the former head of the Army, General Sir Mike Jackson, warned that nations involved in the country faced a “protracted guerrilla warfare”.

The troops being sent directly to Mali will join an EU-led training mission. The other 200 British troops being sent to the region will be deployed to English speaking countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana, which are contributing soldiers to support the Malian government.

Talks on the details of both missions were continuing last night. The Prime Minister’s spokesman disclosed that 70 British personnel were already based in Senegal operating a Sentinel spy plane to support the French, while 20 RAF crew were operating a C-17 transport, which will stay in Mali for three months.

The Government is also prepared to make British facilities available for “allies”, thought to include the US, to mount mid-air refuelling operations. It has refused to send drone aircraft to Mali because it cannot spare any from operations in Afghanistan.

The commitments so far will mean that up to 60 British personnel will be inside Mali, with about 270 elsewhere in the region.

Mr Cameron’s spokesman said: “It is in the international community’s interests to support the Malian government and the wider region in dealing with terrorist havens and that is exactly what we are doing.”

29/01/2013 18:08 Sources Marine nationale

Dans la matinée du 28 janvier 2013, après une semaine de transit, le groupe de projection composé du Bâtiment de Projection et de Commandement (BPC) Dixmude et de son escorte le Lieutenant de Vaisseau Le Hénaff est arrivé à Dakar. Le BPC était parti de Toulon le lundi 21 janvier avec à son bord 500 militaires de l’armée de Terre et 140 véhicules composant le second Groupement Tactique InterArmes (GTIA).

Arrimés à tous les ponts du navire, les véhicules sont libérés de leurs attaches. Les manœuvriers du Dixmude abaissent rapidement la rampe du radier et commencent à guider les conducteurs. La centaine de véhicules – VBL (véhicule blindé léger), VAB (véhicule de l’avant blindé), GBC 180, TRM avec citernes et remorques, AMX 10 RC, P4 et VBCI (véhicule blindé de combat d’infanterie) – franchit la rampe pour rouler, une fois sur le quai, vers la base de la station navale de Dakar, où ils resteront quelques jours afin d’être adaptés aux spécificités locales, entretenus et gréés avec le matériel adéquat. Dans le même temps, les nombreux containers embarqués sont déplacés du radier vers le quai où ils sont chargés sur des camions,.

En six heures, l’intégralité du chargement du GTIA 2 embarqué sur le Dixmude est débarquée et déplacée pour être stockée dans un endroit sécurisé où les mécaniciens et les logisticiens pourront s’affairer, avant le départ pour le théâtre malien. Le Dixmude restera encore quelques jours à quai afin de soutenir les troupes, qui n’ont pas encore débarqué. L’équipage assurera le soutien logistique et mettra ses installations et ses capacités de communication à disposition de l’état-major du GTIA afin de poursuivre la préparation des unités avant leur déploiement.

Grâce à ce déchargement, la mission de transport opérationnel du BPC Dixmude s’achève avec succès. La réussite de cette mission d’acheminement stratégique, menée pour la première fois par un bâtiment de projection et de commandement permet à ce navire de nouvelle génération réputé pour sa polyvalence éprouvée, d’ajouter une corde à son arc.

Grâce à ses moyens permettant d’améliorer et de faciliter la préparation opérationnelle et le maintien en condition physique des unités composant un groupement tactique, le BPC permet aussi de valoriser leur transit.

La participation du Dixmude à l’opération Serval a permis de déployer rapidement de nombreuses troupes – la capacité d’accueil théorique du BPC a été dépassée sans que cette augmentation ne soit la cause de problèmes -, équipées de leurs véhicules et de leur matériel, afin qu’elles puissent rapidement rejoindre le théâtre d’opérations.

29/01/2013 Sources Marine nationale

Le 28 janvier 2013, la Frégate Européenne Multi-Missions (FREMM) Aquitaine est arrivée à Toulon pour une dizaine de jours d’essais à la mer dans le cadre de la Vérification de ses Capacités Militaires. L’équipage commandé par le capitaine de vaisseau Rouvière a été accueilli par le vice-amiral d’escadre Yann Tainguy, commandant la zone maritime Méditerranée et par le vice-amiral d’escadre Magne, commandant la force d’action navale. Première d’une série de onze frégates, l’Aquitaine effectue la toute première escale en Méditerranée d’un bâtiment de ce type.

«Le premier exemplaire de la FREMM qui sera affecté à Toulon sera la Provence, attendue en 2015» précise l’amiral Tainguy. «D’ici là, les travaux de dragage du port ainsi que l’aménagement des quais avec toute l’infrastructure nécessaire au soutien de l’équipage seront achevés».

«Armée par seulement 94 marins contre les 250 des frégates anti-sous-marines d’ancienne génération, la FREMM Aquitaine marque une nouvelle ère dans la définition des équipages des bâtiments de combat» ajoute l’amiral Magne. «Le bond technologique opéré sur ce bâtiment dans le domaine la lutte sous la mer est extraordinaire, de même que la capacité future de la FREMM à mettre en œuvre le Missile De Croisière Naval (MDCN). Ce dernier atout fait de  ce bateau un outil révolutionnaire qui apportera un complément à la mission de projection de puissance de la Marinenationale».

En prélude à son prochain Déploiement de Longue Durée (DLD) en Atlantique (période d’endurance à la mer au cours de laquelle le bâtiment et son équipage vont être mis à l’épreuve pendant plusieurs mois), la FREMM Aquitaine va mettre à profit sa présence au large de Toulon en testant son système de combat et ses sonars de lutte anti-sous-marine dans les eaux hivernales de la Méditerranée. 

Arrivée de la FREMM Aquitaine à Toulon

photo EMA

28/01/2013 Propos recueillis par Jean-Michel Demetz - lexpress.fr

Le dossier du Mali est symptomatique de l'impuissance de l'Union. Président de la sous-commission Défense et Sécurité au Parlement européen, Arnaud Danjean (PPE) en décrypte les motifs.

L'Union européenne n'a pas été en mesure d'apporter une réponse ferme et univoque à une crise extérieure, cette fois au Mali. Pourquoi cette impuissance?

C'est dramatique. A chaque crise, on nous sert la même réponse: promis, l'UE sera présente... la prochaine fois. Pour la Libye, on pouvait accepter des circonstances atténuantes, compte tenu de l'urgence de l'intervention militaire et de l'ampleur des opérations. Mais pas pour le Mali! Voilà une zone mise sous surveillance depuis des années. En mars 2011, le Conseil européen avait adopté un texte, "Stratégie pour le Sahel", qui avait pour ambition - et c'était novateur - de mener conjointement politique de développement et politique sécuritaire. La problématique était parfaitement posée et les moyens, identifiés. Pourtant, la stratégie n'a jamais été mise en place. 

Pourquoi?

Pour des raisons bureaucratiques, en partie: l'écheveau que constitue le Service européen pour l'action extérieure (SEAE), dirigé par Catherine Ashton, ne fonctionne pas. Mais l'idéologie intervient aussi: une large proportion du personnel du SEAE ainsi que les crédits viennent de la Commission. Or, cette administration ne sait pas faire face aux questions sécuritaires et ne s'y intéresse guère. Si, comme il en était question dans cette stratégie, il s'agit de former et d'équiper au Mali des forces de sécurité compétentes, il n'y a plus personne.

Carence des institutions, mais aussi réticence des Etats européens...

Oui. Seuls quelques Etats membres sur 27 s'intéressent à l'Afrique, et encore, en ordre dispersé: outre la France, le Royaume-Uni (qui regarde surtout vers la corne de l'Afrique), l'Italie, l'Espagne, le Portugal, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas quelquefois... 

Au-delà, force est de constater que l'on ne parvient pas à mobiliser. D'autant plus que trois pays seulement ont une capacité militaire: la France, le Royaume-Uni, qui rechigne à des opérations dans un cadre UE, et l'Allemagne. C'est le seul des "grands" européens à voir son budget militaire augmenter, mais, pour diverses raisons, Berlin hésite à utiliser ses forces armées sur le terrain. Le Sahel aurait pourtant pu être un laboratoire grandeur nature d'une politique de défense européenne: la menace contre nos intérêts communs est objective; les Etats-Unis, pour des raisons budgétaires et de priorité accordée à l'Asie, n'ont pas de véritable stratégie dans la région, où ils laissent l'Algérie jouer un rôle moteur. En réalité, sous Sarkozy comme sous Hollande, à Bruxelles, la France a porté seule le dossier sahélien auprès de la haute représentante pour la politique étrangère, qui s'en est constamment tenue à des réponses dilatoires. Le résultat, c'est que les groupes djihadistes nous ont imposé leur calendrier.

Quid, alors, du rêve d'une politique étrangère commune?

Au Parlement européen, les députés poussent à une action collective. Mon rapport annuel sur la défense a été adopté à une large majorité regroupant conservateurs, sociaux-démocrates, libéraux et même quelques écologistes. Mais, en pratique, je constate une fracture croissante entre l'Europe du Nord et de l'Est, pour qui la priorité extérieure, c'est le voisinage oriental ex-soviétique (Ukraine, Caucase, Asie centrale), et les autres, qui voient dans le Sud proche la source de menaces immédiates.

La France a-t-elle les moyens d'agir seule au Mali?

La France peut, certes, arrêter une offensive djihadiste, grâce à ses forces spéciales et à son aviation. Mais reprendre le Nord-Mali et en chasser les islamistes armés, ce n'est ni faisable seul ni souhaitable. Sauf à être prêt à prendre le risque considérable de lourdes pertes et de dommages collatéraux.

January 28, 2013: Strategy page

Russian arms exports for 2012 were a record $15.2 billion. This is a major increase over 2010 (a then record $10 billion). That was an 18 percent jump from 2009 sales of $8.5 billion. That was less than two percent more than 2008's $8.35 billion. It was feared that the 2010 sales might be as high as it would get for a while. This was because the subsequent political upheavals in the Arab world might lead to large cancellations of orders, in part because of Russian willingness to use bribes to obtain sales, and past help in security matters to keep the ousted dictators in power. Russia did lose some orders, and there might be other cancellations (especially from Syria.) But India remained the largest buyer of Russian arms, despite complaints of poor quality and bribes.

Increasing these sales is very important for the Russian government. The defense industry employs over three million people and accounts for about 20 percent of industrial jobs in Russia. At the end of the Cold War in 1991, defense work was more than three times as large as it is now. It was the enormous size of the defense industry that played a major role in bankrupting the Soviet Union. The Russians were never quite sure (cost accounting not being a communist favorite) what proportion of their GDP was devoted to military spending, but it is estimated that it was over 20 percent. That was more than four times the figure for Western nations (and their generally larger per-capita economies).

Russian defense firms quickly realized, in the 1990s, that export sales were all that could save them. It worked. By 2007, Russia was exporting $8 billion worth of weapons a year. Two years before that there were hopes that sales might reach $10 billion for 2008. Russian arms exports had been growing rapidly for a while. In 2005 Russian arms exporters had already booked orders for six billion dollars-worth of sales per year through 2008. In 2004, Russian arms sales were $5.6 billion, and that went to $6 billion in 2005 and $7 billion in 2006. Russian arms sales were only $4.3 billion in 2003, and ballooned as the economies of their two biggest customers (India and China) grew larger. That, and the escalating price of oil (driven largely by increased demand from China and India), has sent international arms sales from $29 billion in 2003, to over $80 billion now. Oil rich countries, particularly those in the Persian Gulf, are eager to buy more weapons, with which to defend their assets.

Then problems developed, even before the current Arab situation. There were problems with the two largest customers; China and India.  Over the last decade, about a third of Russian arms exports went to China. But that is now way down, as Russian manufacturers feud with the Chinese over stolen technology. The Chinese have been quite brazen of late, as they copy Russian military equipment, and then produce their own versions without paying for the technology. Worse, the Chinese are now offering to export these copies. The Russians are trying to work out licensing deals with the Chinese, with limited success. The Chinese say their generals are angry over how Russia sells technology to potential Chinese enemies, like India. The Russians don't understand that, as they have been selling weapons to India for decades. Russia fears that the Chinese have just decided that they don't need to buy Russian technology, or equipment, any more, and can just steal what they need.

India is also unhappy with Russian sloppiness in handling large projects, like refurbishing a decommissioned Cold War era carrier. This project has been a financial disaster for India. Worse yet, India is buying more Western (Israeli, European and American) weapons, and notes the differences in performance and service. The Arabs were always more understanding, at least more so than China and India. But if Russia cannot change a lot of old habits real quick, their flourishing arms export business is going to slide back into the cellar.

Three years ago Israel became one of the top four arms exporters on the planet, shipping $7.2 billion worth of military equipment. The year before, Israel had exported $6.9 billion. The U.S. is the largest exporter, followed by Russia and Germany. Israel is now number four.

Half the weapons exported worldwide last year came from the United States (mostly) and Russia. European nations have long occupied the next three slots (Germany, France and Britain.) But lately, German and Israeli exports have been growing. The other big exporters are Spain, China, Netherlands and Italy. These top ten exporters accounted for over 90 percent of the exports. The major importers are Middle Eastern Arab nations, India, South Korea, China and (until recently) Greece.

Israel and Germany have been gaining more sales because of reliability and quality. Israel has a major advantage in that many of its weapons and military equipment have proved their worth in combat.

La deuxième compagnie du 2e REP se prépare à

embarquer pour sauter sur Tombouctou.
Crédit : EMA / armée de Terre

28/01/2013 12:56 Sources : EMA

En moins de 48 heures, les soldats français de l’opération Serval, en coordination avec l’armée malienne et des unités africaines, ont repris la boucle du Niger depuis la ville de Gao jusqu’à Tombouctou.

Ainsi, après s’être emparée de Gao dans la nuit du 26 au 27 janvier, la force Serval, en coordination avec des unités maliennes, a pris cette nuit (28 janvier) le contrôle de l’aéroport et des accès de la ville de Tombouctou par une manœuvre aéroterrestre.

Appuyée par plusieurs patrouilles de chasse et les hélicoptères du groupe aéromobile (GAM) et des moyens de surveillance (ATL 2, drone), la force Serval s’est emparée simultanément de l’aéroport de Tombouctou avec le GTIA 21eRIMa et des abords nord de la ville par le largage des parachutistes du 2erégiment étranger de parachutistes (2eREP). Le dispositif se réarticule actuellement pour consolider la position et permettre aux autorités et forces armées maliennes (FAM) de reprendre le contrôle de la ville.

Enfin, le bâtiment de projection et de commandement (BPC) Dixmude a accosté à Dakar ce matin. Il a entamé le débarquement des hommes et des véhicules du GTIA 2 qui commenceront sans tarder leur mouvement vers Bamako.

Crédit : EMA / armée de Terre

En moins de 48 heures, les soldats français de l’opération Serval, en coordination avec l’armée malienne et des unités africaines, ont repris la boucle du Niger depuis la ville de Gao jusqu’à Tombouctou.

Ainsi, après s’être emparée de Gao dans la nuit du 26 au 27 janvier, la force Serval, en coordination avec des unités maliennes, a pris cette nuit (28 janvier) le contrôle de l’aéroport et des accès de la ville de Tombouctou par une manœuvre aéroterrestre.

Appuyée par plusieurs patrouilles de chasse et les hélicoptères du groupe aéromobile (GAM) et des moyens de surveillance (ATL 2, drone), la force Serval s’est emparée simultanément de l’aéroport de Tombouctou avec le GTIA 21e RIMa et des abords nord de la ville par le largage des parachutistes du 2e régiment étranger de parachutistes (2e REP). Le dispositif se réarticule actuellement pour consolider la position et permettre aux autorités et forces armées maliennes (FAM) de reprendre le contrôle de la ville.

Enfin, le bâtiment de projection et de commandement (BPC) Dixmude a accosté à Dakar ce matin. Il a entamé le débarquement des hommes et des véhicules du GTIA 2 qui commenceront sans tarder leur mouvement vers Bamako.

25 January 2013 Liam Stoker - army-technology.com

With its armed forces undergoing something of a renaissance, Iraq has, since the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, inched towards something resembling normality. Corruption allegations and political machinations have, however, threatened to disrupt such progress.

With Saddam Hussein's regime toppled and the threat of insurgency diminishing, the US completed its withdrawal from active duty in Iraq in December 2011. Since then, a concerted effort has been made from the international community to not only secure the immediate future of the Iraqi population, but also to maintain Iraq's international sovereignty.

Decimated by the land operations from coalition forces that lead to the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein's government, the Iraqi Army's ground forces were in dire need of modernisation. All but four T-55 tanks, recovered from an old army base and placed into service with the Iraq Army's 1st Division, needed replacing.

Despite initial problems and contract cancellations owing to incomplete paperwork, and the persistent threat of collusion and corruption best exposed by recent contract terminations, the new Iraqi Army is beginning to take shape on the back of a recent spate of contract awards and equipment deliveries.

Ground forces rejuvenated with Abrams handover

Having been used extensively in the country by coalition forces to dispel the Iraqi Army's fleet of T-72 tanks during the initial invasion, the M1A1 Abrams tank was richly sought after. In March 2009, the US agreed an $860m foreign military sale, under which Iraq would receive 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks to help protect national sovereignty, of which the US paid $54m. The final shipment of nine M1A1s was delivered in September 2012.

Iraq's armoured corps will not solely be populated by Abrams tanks, after Hungary agreed to donate 77 T-72s in May 2005, with Defense Solutions receiving a $4.5m contract to refurbish them up to operational standards.

In order to compliment the use of battle tanks, the Iraqi Army has also received a substantial number of Armoured Personnel Carriers and combat vehicles from a variety of nations, avoiding becoming exclusively reliant on one particular nation for its defence equipment. As part of the arms deal that saw Iraq acquire Abrams tanks, the US also sanctioned the transfer of 400 Stryker combat vehicles to be used by elite units of the Iraqi Army.

Despite diplomatic concerns preventing the transfer of 180 M113A1 APCs from the UAE as a gift, Iraq was eventually donated 173 M113 APCs from Jordan , Pakistan and the UAE, while 713 M1114s and 400 M1151 HMMWVs were purchased for the Iraqi Army. Most recently, the Iraqi Army signed a $2.5bn contract with Ukraine for the delivery of 420 BTR-4 APCs, with deliveries currently underway.

Replacing shock and awe losses

Prior to the 2003 invasion, the country's air force comprised mainly of Soviet-era aircraft acquired from Russia. As the US Air Force exerted dominance over Iraq's airspace during Operation Shock and Awe, their Iraqi counterparts were decimated to such an extent that when the air force resumed operations in 2004, it consisted of just 35 personnel.

Work was, however, quickly underway to re-equip the IAF to such an extent that it could defend the country's interests from the skies. The 2007 establishment of the Coalition Air Forces Training Team (CAFTT) saw groundwork under which the IAF is to be retrained, culminating in the IAF planning, executing and monitoring its first ground security operation between 25 March and 1 April 2008.

It is planned that by 2015, 516 aircraft will comprise the Iraq Air Force, with the fleet due to increase by a further 34 aircraft by 2018. Specific helicopters mentioned have included Eurocopter EC 635 and Bell ARH-70 models, while 24 T-6 Texan II aircraft are also due to be purchased. A $3bn contract was signed in September 2011 for F-16 aircraft under an FMS contract from the US. A second lot of 18 F-16s was confirmed the next month, with deliveries scheduled to finish by 2014

The first F-16s are due to be delivered in December 2013 and, until such a time, Iraq's air space will remain largely unguarded. In preparation for their delivery, six Iraqi pilots are currently undergoing training in the US.

Corruption allegations hit Russian contracts

Analysis of the Iraqi Air Force's industry shows a lack of Russian-built aircraft, with a $4.2bn contract signed in October 2012 sensationally cancelled just a month later amid claims of corruption. Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki halted the deal after he suspected members of his own team had accepted bribes.

Russian military personnel refuted the allegations, suggesting that Iraq's regime had come under pressure from Washington to cancel the deal that made Russia the country's second-largest arms supplier. The deal itself had come under stringent criticism, with Iraqi MPs alleging the deal to be inadequate to its stated aim. In all 30 Mi-28 attack helicopters were due to be delivered to aid counter terrorism operations, with those opposing the contract stating their belief that the money would be better spent improving the country's intelligence services.

Iraq has been treading carefully in terms of defence procurement. With al-Maliki stating that the country did not want to become 'part of someone else's monopoly', contracts were shared between an array of countries including the US, Ukraine, Serbia, Jordan, Germany and Czech Republic. At the time the contract was signed, defence analysts expressed concern over US perceptions of Iraq pressing ahead with the acquisition of Russian equipment, fuelling suspicions in Moscow of Washington's influence over procurement proceedings.

Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade head Igor Korotchenko told the BBC that the cancellation of the deal was an unprecedented in Russian history, before confirming his belief that the US would not allow Iraq to go ahead with a contract of that scale and size. "As far as talk about corruption is concerned, I think it's a smokescreen. I can't see any scope for corruption in the Iraq deal. I believe this is just a pretext and the true reason is Washington applying pressure on Baghdad," added Korotchenko.

While the global community has made concerted efforts to resupply Iraq in an effective and efficient manner, political wrangling and one-upmanship threatens to derail this progress, potentially endangering the lives of Iraqi civilians attempting to put the past behind them. With insurgency still problematic in countries including Afghanistan, it is imperative that these efforts are not further disrupted by political machinations.

VBCI à bord du BPC Dixmude - photo EMA

24/01/2013 Par Isabelle Lasserre – LeFigaro.fr

Des Véhicules Blindés de Combat d'Infanterie sont en cours d'acheminement pour renforcer le dispositif français.

Après deux semaines de frappes aériennes, c'est l'armée de terre et ses chars qui montent en puissance dans le Sahel. Bientôt, de nouveaux blindés débarqueront dans le désert pour faire face aux tanks des djihadistes au nord du Mali. Au sein du second GTIA (Groupement tactique interarmes) embarqué depuis Toulon sur la Méditerranée, ont été chargés des véhicules blindés de combat d'infanterie (VBCI), un engin de combat dernier cri qui viendra renforcer les «Sagaie», VBL (Véhicule blindé léger) et autres VAB (Véhicule de l'avant blindé) déjà à l'œuvre sur le terrain.

Chars et hélicoptères d'attaque - trois Tigre ont été déployés - auront notamment pour mission de participer à la destruction de l'armement des groupes armés islamistes. de fabrication soviétique et russe récupérés par les djihadistes lors des combats contre l'armée malienne en 2012, pillés dans les dépôts de Gao et de Tombouctou ou récupérés dans les arsenaux libyens au moment de la chute de Kadhafi, en 2011.

Les groupes armés islamistes possèdent également des pick-up Toyota équipés de canons et des véhicules de combat d'infanterie. «Ils sont bien équipés. Beaucoup mieux que les talibans en Afghanistan. Leur matériel est d'une génération assez récente», explique un officier de l'armée de terre. Pas plus que les chars, les missiles sol-air provenant des stocks d'armes libyens n'ont été utilisés. «Mais il faut rester prudent. On ne peut rien exclure», prévient-il.

L'inquiétude concernant la possible utilisation de missiles sol-air, capables d'abattre un avion ou un hélicoptère, existait bien avant la guerre. Comme les camions lance-roquettes, les mortiers et les mitrailleuses lourdes, ils ont été ciblés depuis le début de l'intervention par les frappes aériennes.

Selon Les Échos, l'armée de terre s'apprêterait à envoyer dans le Sahel quatre chars Leclerc, le fleuron des blindés, le symbole de l'excellence guerrière de la France. Les états-majors ont pour l'instant démenti. Cependant, l'utilisation dans les sables du Sahara de ce monstre sacré ne constituerait pas seulement un signal politique et militaire fort.

Sur le terrain, certains spécialistes estiment qu'il apporterait un plus. Pas seulement pour détruire les chars des djihadistes. Mais pour surveiller, renseigner. «Un Leclerc, c'est plus qu'un char. C'est aussi une plate-forme d'observation mobile. Un superchar qui ouvre des capacités supplémentaires», explique un officier. En 1999, pendant la guerre du Kosovo, ils n'avaient pas tiré un seul coup de canon. «Mais ils ont permis aux militaires français de tout voir, jour et nuit.» Leur allonge de tir de 4.000 mètres permettrait aussi de compenser l'une des principales difficultés de cette guerre. L'élongation, c'est-à-dire la capacité, pour les djihadistes, dotés d'une grande mobilité, de se dissoudre dans l'immense espace désertique du Mali.

L'un des trois groupes islamistes armés qui occupent le nord du Mali, Ansar Dine (Défenseurs de l'islam), s'est scindé en deux, une partie de ses membres appelant jeudi à une «solution pacifique», au quatorzième jour de l'intervention militaire française au Mali. Des dissensions étaient déjà apparues dans cette organisation islamiste en décembre lorsque des cadres d'Ansar Dine avaient annoncé à Alger leur volonté de rompre avec le discours belliciste de leurs dirigeants. Ils ont créé un nouveau groupe, baptisé Mouvement islamique de l'Azawad (MIA), l'Azawad étant le nom que les Touaregs donnent au nord du Mali, en proie à des tensions indépendantistes depuis des années

Note RP Defense : le VBCI (Véhicule Blindé de Combat d'Infanterie) n'est pas un char. Il est armé d'une mitrailleuse 12,7 mm montée sur un tourelleau téléopéré et d'un canon de 25 mm positionné sur une tourelle monoplace

24 January 2013 by Dean Wingrin - defenceweb

The South African Air Force (SAAF) has defended the cancellation of its contract with Aero Manpower Group (AMG), a Denel business unit, and has hinted that a new contract may be negotiated.

The long standing contract between the SAAF and AMG provides specialist technical and support personnel who are responsible for the maintenance of a variety of SAAF aircraft at bases across the country. However, the SAAF has given notice to Denel that they will not be renewing the current contract, which terminates at the end of March.

Last week, Denel Personnel Solutions said that as there was no contract or orders beyond March 31 this year, the only option was “retrenchment of the entire AMG workforce”. AMG has held talks with the affected employees at the various SAAF bases and have outlined the plan for their retrenchment.

In response to negative media publicity, the SAAF has reiterated that the termination of the contract was because the contract had been declared irregular by the Auditor General.

Lt Col Ronald Maseko, spokesperson for the SAAF, said that “the contract dates back to a period (1986) where the current governance regime did not exist. Consequent to the Auditor General’s findings in 2009, that the contract does not comply with the Public Finance Management Act and National Treasury Regulations, the SAAF has engaged its strategic partner Denel Aviation in pursuit of an acceptable solution.”

Since then, Maseko notes, the Auditor General has consistently referred to this irregularity and the SAAF’s notice of termination dates back to 2011.

“The termination of the contract, in accordance with a provision stipulated in the contract, places the SAAF in full compliance with the Auditor General’s recommendations and allows the SAAF to develop its strategic partnership with Denel Aviation unhindered by governance irregularities,” Maseko emphasised.

Despite the looming crises which will severely affect the airworthiness of a number of SAAF aircraft, including those in the VIP squadron, the SAAF has not revealed any contingency plans should the contract not be renewed.

Trade Union Solidarity has said that at least 75% of the 523 Denel employees are in the scarce and critical skills band, without which efficient functioning of the SAAF will not be possible.

The VIP transport aircraft operated by 21 Squadron are almost exclusively signed out by AMG personnel and the effects of the contract cancelation will be keenly felt by the President and Cabinet Ministers. Other AMG personnel perform critical roles in workshops and testing laboratories.

Despite the impending crisis, Maseko notes optimistically that the negotiation of a new contract with Denel “can only benefit the development of a vibrant South African aviation industry that is capable of continued support to the SAAF in executing its mandate.”

Even SAAF personnel who work side-by-side with the AMG employees or who fly the aircraft are uncertain of what will happen from 1 April. While it appears that Denel may be going through the legal motions of advising their employees of a possible retrenchment, just in case a new contract with the SAAF cannot be negotiated in time, the affected personnel are going through a trying time.

January 24, 2013: Strategy page

The U.S. Navy is running out of money and is having a hard time avoiding the consequences. Thanks to all the new information systems added in the last two decades, the navy has been finding out quickly and in great detail how its current policies are running the ships and sailors ragged. The problem is that the navy has less money (because of budget cuts) and is unable to cope with high costs of replacing carriers and submarines that are dying of old age. The leadership has been unwilling to accept a small enough navy, especially one with fewer carriers, to match the current budgets. So ships are going to sea longer, with more broken or borderline equipment and crews that are fed up with all the time at sea. This problem has been growing for over a decade as more Cold War era ships got older and more difficult to maintain.

Efforts have been made to address the crew morale problem. Five years ago the navy adopted a policy of adjusting ship schedules so that crews spend at least half their time in port. This is called "dwell time." With some 60 percent of navy personnel married, time in port is important. The navy also eliminated its decades old policy of regular six month deployments at sea. These deployments were far away and kept sailors cut off from home. The new policy was to keep ships closer to their home port, the better to "surge" a larger number of warships in an emergency. In the past ships returning from a six month cruise usually required a month or so of maintenance and repairs in port, with a lot of the crew taking leave. Military personnel get 30 days of leave (vacation) each year. Thus ships returning from the old six month cruises were out of action for a month or more. The new policy eliminates most of that and more ships are available all the time. The new 50/50 policy uses a lot of shorter trips to sea. Carriers only go out for a week or two at a time, so their pilots can get some practice.

This new policy failed when the navy declared that growing tensions with Iran and China required a surge and has been hustling to find sailors and working ships to maintain a strong presence in the Persian Gulf and Western Pacific. The data management systems show maintenance being deferred, spare parts not available to keep a lot of weapons and equipment on ships running, and more and more sailors, especially experienced specialists, deciding that they have been pushed too far for too long and are getting out. Many navy leaders want to cut back on sea time and allocate money saved towards improving maintenance, readiness, and retention (sailors staying in).

Another issue that cannot be avoided much longer is that the navy cannot afford as many carriers as it has been used to. Replacing the existing Nimitz class carriers is simply too expensive. The new Ford class aircraft carriers keep getting more expensive. The first of them, the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78), was originally supposed to cost $8 billion, plus $5 billion for R&D (research and development of new technology and features unique to this class of ships). Now it appears that the cost of the Ford will not be $13 billion but closer to $15 billion. The second and third ships of the class will cost less (construction plus some additional R&D). Thus the first three ships of the Ford class will cost a total of about $40 billion.

The current Nimitz-class carriers cost about half as much as the Fords. Both classes also require an air wing (48-50 fighters, plus airborne early-warning planes, electronic warfare aircraft, and anti-submarine helicopters), which costs another $3-4 billion. Four years ago the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), the last of the Nimitz class carriers, successfully completed its sea trails and was accepted by the U.S. Navy. The Bush was ready for its first deployment in 2010. The next new carrier will be the first of the Ford class.

The first Nimitz entered service in 1975 and is currently set to serve for 49 years before decommissioning. All of the Nimitz class carriers are similar in general shape and displacement. But over four decades of use each new member of the class received recently developed equipment. This stuff was installed in older Nimitzs eventually as they went in for maintenance. The Bush, the last of the Nimitz class, has a lot of new gear that wasn't even thought of when the first Nimitz entered service. The first ship of the next class of carriers, the USS Ford, will be about the same length and displacement of the Nimitz ships but will look different. The most noticeable difference will be the island set closer to the stern (rear) of the ship.

While the Fords are much more expensive, the navy expects to reduce (by several billion dollars) each carrier's lifetime operating expenses because of greatly reduced crew size. Compared to the current Nimitz class carriers the Fords will feel, well, kind of empty. There will be a lot more automation, computer networking, and robots. The Bush has a lot of this automation already.

By the time the Ford enters service in 2015, even more of the crew will be replaced by robots than is the case in the Bush. The Ford will have as few as half as many sailors on board. Carrier based UAVs are also on the way. Work on flight control software for carrier operations is well underway. Combat UAVs (UCAVs) weigh about 20 percent less than manned aircraft and cost 20-30 percent less. They use less fuel as well. The Ford can take advantage of UCAVs because it is built to handle more sorties each day (about 150) and surge to about 50 percent more for a day or so. For this reason, many naval leaders believe a reduction in carriers is practical, as the use of UCAVs and smart bombs makes the remaining carriers (as few as six) much more effective.

Whatever the case, something has to be done, or the navy will tumble into a state of disrepair and inability to do much at all.

Rex Features

Jan. 24, 2013 by Greg Waldron – FG

Singapore - on 11 January, China's defence ministry confirmed that Chengdu J-10 fighters had been dispatched to keep an eye on two Boeing F-15 aircraft operated by Japan. According to its statement, the F-15s were trailing a Shaanxi Y-8 patrolling near a cluster of islands in the East China Sea that are contested by Beijing and Tokyo.

Irrespective of the merits of either party's claim to these islands, neither side appears willing to back down. Although the prospect of an all-out war over what Tokyo calls the Senkaku and Beijing the Diaoyu islands is remote, any conflict that may develop would involve air combat - possibly on a large scale. This would lead to Japan's historically strong air force being challenged by an ambitious newcomer.

In recent years China's air force has made significant strides. It now operates almost 500 advanced fighters, including about 200 single-engined J-10s and more than 270 Shenyang J-11s and Sukhoi Su-27s (above). It also operates several hundred more examples of older types, including nearly 400 J-7s: a license-built version of the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21. Unsourced media reports have speculated that some J-7s can be controlled remotely, effectively transforming them into cruise missiles.

While the Japan Air Self-Defence Force boasts fewer aircraft, it operates 153 F-15J fighters (below), 63 Mitsubishi F-2As, and over 80 McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms.

Commonwealth of Australia

Despite China's apparent numerical equality, experts feel it is in no position to impose and maintain aerial superiority - let alone aerial supremacy - over the disputed area.

"In short, Japan has a significant edge," says Oriana Mastro, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank. "But the Chinese can create challenges for Japan to maintain aerial superiority."

One challenge facing Japan, she feels, is its ability to provide constant surveillance of the disputed islands. As Chinese naval and aircraft activities become more routine, it will become harder for Tokyo to determine Beijing's intentions.

Beijing's Y-8-based KJ200 surveillance aircraft are largely untested - Rex Features

Indeed, Tokyo has identified persistent surveillance as a priority area. "The current mid-term defence programme [from March 2011 to March 2015] takes drones into consideration as part of the study on warning and surveillance posture around our country," Japan's defence ministry said in an email to Flightglobal.

"We will further study the efficiency and operational role of drones, the comparison of the cost-effectiveness with existing equipment [and] offsettability, and take into account technological trends."

Although Tokyo declines to mention specific programmes, unsourced media reports have suggested that it is interested in the Northrop Grumman RQ-4N Broad Area Maritime Surveillance variant of the Global Hawk, being developed for the US Navy.

Another regional defence expert feels that Beijing would be at a significant disadvantage in any shooting war over the islands.

China has adapted some of its aged H-6 bombers to act as tankers

"They can fly a few J-10s out and perhaps fly alongside Japanese F-15s, but could they sustainably project power that far out from the mainland over an extended period?" he asks. "China only has limited experience using its [Xian] H-6 as tankers." Tokyo, by contrast, can call on a four-strong fleet of Boeing KC-767s.

Another area where Beijing is weak is in airborne early warning and control (AEW&C). Its new force of Y-8-based KJ-200 and adapted Ilyushin Il-76 KJ-2000 platforms are untested, while Japan has four recently upgraded E-767 AEW&C aircraft (below) and 13 Northrop E-2C Hawkeyes.

US Air Force

"In a conflict Japan would have far better situational awareness," the source says. "Also, Japanese pilots are able to operate autonomously of ground control, but Chinese fighters would likely operate under GCI [ground controlled interception]."

Mastro feels that the current tensions will not greatly change long-term procurement trends, with both China and Japan to continue to build their air power capabilities. The key is for the USA and its Pacific ally to make the right procurement choices now, she says, so as to offer a capable deterrent to China 20 years from now.

"The trajectory is what concerns the USA," Mastro says. "China can create challenges without catching up, and they don't need to catch up to achieve political victories. With air power tipping in China's favour, [Beijing] may be more inclined to use force."