14 août 2012 98,5 fm (La Presse Canadienne)

OTTAWA - La lutte qui fait rage en coulisses pour le remplacement du chef d'état-major de la Défense nationale s'est retrouvée sur la place publique, mardi, révélant du même coup des points de vue souvent opposés concernant l'avenir des Forces canadiennes après la guerre en Afghanistan.

Le général Walter Natynczyk doit quitter ses fonctions au cours des prochaines semaines. La rumeur veut que le gouvernement de Stephen Harper soit prêt à recruter son successeur à l'extérieur de l'armée, et à confier le poste convoité à un officier à la retraite.

L'un des noms qui circulent le plus est celui de l'ex-lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, qui a dirigé les Forces canadiennes jusqu'en 2010 et rédigé un important rapport recommandant un remaniement majeur de la structure de commandement militaire.

Une nouvelle publiée en ligne lundi voulant que M. Leslie ait passé une entrevue pour le poste a été réfutée par plusieurs sources bien informées 24 heures après sa publication. L'ancien lieutenant-général, qui est maintenant membre de la haute direction du Groupe CGI, n'a pas voulu commenter l'affaire.

L'autre nom évoqué est celui de l'ex-lieutenant-général de l'armée de l'air Angus Watt, qui dirige maintenant l'Administration canadienne de la sûreté des transports aériens.

Selon Douglas Bland, titulaire de la chaire d'études en gestion de défense de l'université Queen's, ces rumeurs semblent être le signe d'une lutte de pouvoirs interne alors que M. Harper tente d'aller de l'avant avec sa refonte de la Défense nationale.

La proposition de M. Leslie d'alléger la structure de commandement et de réaliser des économies d'un milliard de dollars a été saluée par les proches collaborateurs du premier ministre et les membres du gouvernement conservateur, mais accueillie froidement par les hauts dirigeants de la Défense nationale.

La structure actuelle, lourde et coûteuse, est le résultat de réformes menées par le général Natynczyk et son prédécesseur, Rick Hillier. Son démantèlement a commencé avec le budget déposé par les conservateurs ce printemps.

D'après M. Bland, si la candidature d'Andrew Leslie ou d'un autre officier retraité est retenue, cela voudra dire que les modifications apportées récemment par le chef d'état-major ne sont pas assez draconiennes au goût du bureau du premier ministre.

Il a affirmé que la participation active du bureau de M. Harper dans le choix du chef d'état-major de la Défense soulevait d'ailleurs des questions et laissait entendre que le premier ministre voulait voir de grands changements.

En juin, un comité de sélection formé de sous-ministres avait dressé une liste de candidats potentiels et mené une série d'entrevues. À l'époque, tous les aspirants étaient des officiers en service, soit l'actuel vice-chef d'état-major de la Défense, le vice-amiral Bruce Donaldson, le plus haut dirigeant du NORAD au Canada, le lieutenant-général Tom Lawson, et le commandant de la Marine royale canadienne, le vice-amiral Paul Maddison.

La nouvelle sur la possible nomination de M. Leslie au poste de chef d'état-major de la Défense a provoqué une dispute à l'interne, les partisans de l'ancien lieutenant-général accusant ses détracteurs d'avoir voulu saboté sa candidature et ces derniers reprochant à ses amis portant toujours l'uniforme de faire un peu trop sa promotion.

August 10, 2012 Tamir Eshel - defense-update.com

The Russian Army is planning to begin modernize its armored and mechanized forces beginning in 2015, fielding a new family of vehicles comprising a new main battle tank, armored infantry fighting vehicles, and various support platforms. The MBT will be based on the new Armata, the prototype is scheduled to enter field trials in 2013, about 10 months ahead of schedule. First Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Sukhorukov said. The new tank is under development at Uralvagonzavod in Omsk. The first deliveries of the tank to the Russian Armed Forces are scheduled for 2015. A total of 2,300 MBTs are expected to be supplied by 2020.

It should be remembered that the Russians are building their fighting forces not only against NATO, but more importantly, to protect their long southern borders with radical Islamic countries that may be gathering military power, and the growing dominance of China in the east. Armored and mechanized forces are key to maintaining military superiority or parity against such threats. The level of sophistication in meeting such threats is not as demanding as meeting the advanced technology fielded by US and NATO forces. According to preliminary reports, the new tank designated T-99 will be less radical and ambitious than the failed ‘Object 195’ or T-95, it will weigh less, therefore, become more agile and will be more affordable, compared to its more ambitious predecessors.

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The Russian industry is also developing the Boomerang family of 8×8 wheeled armored vehicles which will gradually replace the current BTR-90. Additionally, the Kurganets-25 tracked armored vehicle provides high degree of commonality with the new Armata tank. The Kurganets-25 will evolve into various models, gradually replacing BMP and BMD and MT-LB and other types of tracked armored platforms.

An artist concept view of the T99. Despite Russian occupation with ever higher caliber guns for their new tanks, the T-99 will be equipped with an improved version of the current 125mm cannon.

09/08/2012 Sources : EMA

Dans le cadre du désengagement suite à la transition de la Surobi, le jeudi 9 août 2012, sur le tarmac de l'aéroport de militaire de Kaboul, un airbus A340 de l'escadron Esterel ramène 150 militaires français en France. Principalement composé du Battle group Wild Geese, mais aussi du bataillon d'hélicoptères et des mentors des Advisor Team.

31.07.2012 Armée de Terre

25/07/2012 Michel Cabirol – LaTribune.fr

Français et Britanniques ont franchi un nouveau pas dans la coopération en matière de drones. L'armée de Terre devrait s'équiper du drone tactique britannique Watchkeeper. Ils vont préparer en outre la succession des Rafale et Eurofighter en lançant la première phase du programme de démonstration du système de combat aérien futur.

Cela reste timide... mais la France a quand même fait un pas dans sa stratégie d'acquisition et industrielle en matière de drones. Le ministre de la Défense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, et son homologue britannique, Philip Hammond, ont franchi "un nouveau pas dans la coopération franco-britannique en matière de drones", selon le communiqué du ministère de la Défense français. Ainsi, les deux pays ont signé deux accords-cadres (MoU). Le premier lance "la première phase du programme de démonstration du système de combat aérien futur (SCAF)", qui prendra le relais des Rafale et Eurofighter à l'horizon 2030. Soit un contrat d'études de 13 millions d'euros attribué à BAE Systems et à Dassault Aviation

Watchkeeper bientôt dans l'armée de terre

Le second concerne la coopération sur le drone tactique anglo-israélien Watchkeeper (à partir d'une plateforme israélienne Hermes 450), en coopération entre Elbit et Thales UK, pour remplacer les Sperwer à bout de souffle. L'évaluation de ce système sur une période d'un an (2013) a été confiée aux soins de l'armée de terre française. "En parallèle, les ministres ont évoqué la possibilité d'une coopération militaire entre les unités spécialisées des deux armées qui emploient les mêmes systèmes", a par ailleurs précisé le communiqué.

Paris prend son temps pour le MALE

En revanche, Paris souhaite prendre son temps pour l'acquisition d'un drone MALE (Moyenne altitude et de longue endurance). "Le temps ne presse pas tant la France a pris du retard dans ce domaine", explique-t-on dans l'entourage du ministre. D'autant qu'il n'y a pas encore de rupture capacitaire, estime-t-on. La rénovation des drones Harfang permettrait de faire la soudure avec une solution intérimaire. C'est là où la décision n'est pas facile à expliquer. Car Paris s'achemine bien vers l'acquisition du drone américain Predator de General Atomics, dont la plate-forme serait ensuite francisée par un industriel tricolore. Ce qui devrait rajouter un coût à un achat simple et sur étagère.

09 July 2012 Patryk Pawlak, Clara O'Donnell - iss.europa.eu

The latest wave of European military spending cuts is swelling the ranks of Americans who believe that Europeans are not contributing enough to global security. But this assessment is too harsh. It is true that Europeans spend less on defence than their American counterparts. They have also been less willing to use force in recent years. But the US itself is reassessing the merit of its military interventions over the last decade. And when one takes into account policies that are not strictly military, such as aid, sanctions and homeland security, Europeans are making some significant contributions to international stability.

A number of European countries are undoubtedly falling short of their NATO and EU promises to develop a global military reach. Many governments have been slow to transform their militaries from immobile forces designed to counter a Soviet invasion into rapidly deployable combat troops. Even prior to the economic crisis, most European NATO allies had stopped spending the alliance's agreed benchmark of 2 per cent of GDP on defence. And Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, the influential French blogger, estimates that the economic downturn will lead to a 30 per cent drop in total military spending by EU member-states between 2006 and 2014. As a result, even if America cuts its own defence budget by $1 trillion over the next decade – as Congress is currently considering – the US military will still receive more than twice as much as the armed forces of all EU countries combined.

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of European countries have also been reluctant to deploy troops, particularly for heavy combat operations. Many governments have refused to send their soldiers to the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. More than half of the European countries in NATO did not participate in the deployment to Libya. And many EU military and civilian missions have been too small to make a significant impact. Washington critics are particularly dismissive of the 60 EU officials advising Iraqis on how to improve their criminal justice system and the approximately 500 EU police trainers in Afghanistan.

Europe's recent military track record derives from the fact that most Europeans have not felt threatened. Many also do not believe that war should be used to obtain 'justice'. In a recent GMF survey of the US and 12 EU countries, only 33 per cent of Europeans believed that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice – in contrast to 75 per cent of Americans. In addition, Europeans have been particularly doubtful of the merit of Washington's use of force over the past decade, be it Afghanistan or Iraq.

In light of this mindset, Europeans have actually been quite active on the military front. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2011, Britain, France and Germany were still amongst the ten largest military spenders in the world (ranking third, fourth and eighth). The combined defence expenditure of European NATO members is still more than twice what China spends – even though Europeans do not reap the full benefits of it because they duplicate many of their military efforts.

For several years, European troops made up more than half of NATO's mission in Afghanistan. And on a per capita basis, Denmark and Estonia have suffered more casualties there than the US. Europeans undertook 90 per cent of the strike missions in Libya. In addition, many of the EU's missions, even if modest, are still helping to stabilise countries across the world. In the Gulf of Aden, an EU naval force protects vulnerable boats from pirates, including the World Food Programme vessels which deliver food to Somali people. In the months to come, the EU will deploy civilians to help the government in Niger reform its security sector (a country where, according to European governments, Islamist militants threaten international security). EU experts will also soon help improve the security at the international airport in Juba, the capital of newly independent South Sudan.

In any case, American policy-makers are themselves reconsidering the merits of how the US has used force over the last decade. The Obama administration has been extricating US armed forces from Iraq and Afghanistan – even though in both countries, the US has not achieved the level of stability which it had initially aspired to. The government's new defence guidance stresses that the US does not intend to deploy similar missions in future. It also argues that America cannot meet its security challenges through military force alone and that it must strengthen all the 'tools' of American power, including diplomacy, development, intelligence and homeland security.

These are areas in which Europeans are significant players. Combined, the EU institutions and member-states are the largest aid donor in the world. According to the OECD, they spent €69 billion in 2011 – notwithstanding the fact that some European countries reduced their budgets because of the economic crisis. This is more than twice the amount the US gave. Between 2002 and 2013, the EU institutions and member-states will notably have provided €11 billion in aid to Afghanistan. And in response to the Arab Spring, the EU institutions alone have offered nearly €7 billion over three years.

Europeans also invest significant resources in homeland security, even if budgets risk declining somewhat over the next few years because of the economic turmoil. Based on the latest OECD figures, the 21 EU member-states which belong to the organisation spent nearly €240 billion on 'public order and safety' in 2010 – nearly 90 per cent of what the US spent. This covers police forces, intelligence services, the judiciary and ministries of internal affairs. The US is a beneficiary of this spending too – in addition to supporting Europe's internal stability, these bodies tackle the international terrorism and organised crime that afflict Europeans and their allies alike.

European countries are also increasing the EU's involvement in security matters – including through the EU's bilateral ties with third countries. One EU agency, Frontex, monitors the Union's southern and eastern border, while another, Europol, tackles organised crime. EU funds for homeland security, although still modest, are increasing despite the economic crisis. From 2014 to 2020, the EU is expected to spend nearly €10 billion in this field. The money will notably fund research into intelligent maritime surveillance systems and help partner countries across the world fight criminal networks and monitor their borders more effectively.

European governments also leverage the EU's large common market to pursue their foreign policy objectives. They offer preferential trade ties to support the economic development of numerous fragile countries across the world, and to encourage them to improve their governance. Pakistan is one of the states which qualify for some of the EU's most generous trade concessions. EU countries also impose heavy sanctions on countries which they believe are undermining international security. Among other things, the EU recently introduced an oil embargo against Iran – even though the measure is inflicting significant economic hardship on Greece and other EU states which were already struggling with the financial crisis. And through the offer of EU and NATO membership, Europeans (and the US) have managed to spread stability across the European continent.

The fact that Europeans wield such extensive foreign policy 'tools' does not mean they always use them wisely. Nor should it allow Europeans to neglect their armed forces. Governments must ensure that their peacekeeping efforts are not hampered by inadequate military equipment, and that they retain the capacity to respond to a serious military threat if one were to emerge. But America is less alone in upholding global security than some in Washington would suggest.

This piece was first published by the Centre for European Reform

Source defenseindustrydaily.com

July 18, 2012: Strategy Page

The U.S. Army is upgrading 580 older ROVER (Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver) 3 and 4 units to the ROVER 6 standard. This will cost $41,000 per ROVER unit (which resembles a ruggedized laptop with several small antennae attached). The upgrade enables the older ROVERs to communicate to a lot more different UAVs, targeting pods and other airborne sensors. Upgrading older ROVERs is very popular with the users, who find ROVER extremely helpful in combat, For one thing, the latest model ROVER allows guys on the ground to relay target coordinates to aircraft digitally, along with marks (circles and so on made with a stylus on a touch screen) on an electronic map or photo showing exactly where the friendlies and hostiles are.

While ROVER 6 is basically an undated ROVER 4, there is another ROVER that has become very popular with commanders who find themselves and their troops under fire. Since it arrived three years ago ROVER 5, otherwise known as the fifth generation ROVER, was one of the most popular electronic gadgets for these officers. ROVER 5 is a small (14cm/5.5 inch wide) handheld video device that provides the user with UAV video feeds. Each ROVER 5 costs about $35,000 and is the size of a seven inch tablet computer. ROVER is more than three times heavier than a tablet (at 1.6 kg/3.5 pounds). But ROVER can still be hand held, and enables the user to direct the camera on the UAV supplying the video. A stylus is used for this. The additional weight in the ROVER is for all the electronics needed to receive a wide variety of signals and display several different video types, plus a larger battery. ROVER 5s are more often mounted in vehicles, giving convoys a top-down view of the terrain ahead. This has made it more difficult to ambush American troops. Commanders use ROVER 5 to check UAV feeds and their own troops.

The basic benefit of ROVER is that it allows troops to view real-time video from a UAV or aircraft overhead. Aircraft with targeting pods (like Litening and Sniper) or surveillance gear (like AC-130 gunships) are much more effective when the guys on the ground have a ROVER unit that can receive that video feed and share it with the airmen above.

 This kind of real-time, "common picture", capability makes air power much more effective, and reduces friendly fire incidents. U.S. Special Forces troops and infantry unit commanders use ROVER to obtain a larger view (than their low flying Raven UAVs can provide) of the surrounding area. This ROVER devices use a built in antenna to get the video from overhead UAVs or aircraft. The original ROVER system, as well as the current one, was developed and sent to the troops in record time. So don't let anyone tell you this sort of thing can't happen. However, except in wartime, such rapid technology development usually does not happen.

ROVER came to be a decade ago, when a Special Forces soldier, just back from Afghanistan, walked into the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and asked the technical people why his guys could not have a device that would allow them to watch the video being generated by a Predator, AC-130 or other aircraft overhead. In particular, the soldiers wanted the capability of the AC-130 getting video from a Predator that had spotted something the AC-130 was being sent to destroy. Since it was the Special Forces troops on the ground who were running, and fighting, the ground battle, it would help them a lot if they could see the real time video from Predators and combat aircraft. At that time, the video was being viewed by people in the aircraft, or the UAV operators (who were back in the United States, running things via a satellite link.) The ground troops had to ask the air force what could be seen on the video, and there was usually a delay in getting that information. It would be much better for all concerned if the ground troops could see that video in real time.

 The air force geeks went to work, and in two weeks had a ROVER prototype that Special Forces personnel could take back to Afghanistan. ROVER 1 was not terribly portable, but the Special Forces could haul it around in a hummer, and see what any Predators overhead were seeing. This proved very useful. A few months later, ROVER 2 appeared which allowed troops to view UAV vids on a laptop computer. By late 2004, ROVER 3, a 5.5 kg (12 pound) unit built to be carried in a backpack, was put into service.

 Although ROVER 3s cost $60,000 each, they addressed dozens of suggestions and complaints from the troops who used earlier ROVERs. Some 700 ROVER 3s entered service within a year. They were used in Afghanistan and Iraq, and could grab video feeds from army, marine and air force UAVs and bomber targeting pods (which have great resolution, even when the aircraft are 6,200 meters/20,000 feet up.)

 The ROVER 4 appeared in 2005. It allowed users to point and click on targets to be hit. With ROVER 3, the guys on the ground could see what they want bombed, or hit with a missile, but had to talk the bombers to it. This happens often, especially when the target is behind a hill or buildings, preventing the ground troops from using their laser range finders to get a GPS location. With ROVER 4, the bomber pilot, or UAV operator, is looking at the same video as the ground troops, and can confirm that the indicated target is what is to be hit. This is particularly important in urban warfare, where the building next door might be full of innocent civilians.

Shortly after ROVER 5 appeared three years ago, Tactical ROVER appeared. This is a 440 gram (one pound) hand held device that uses a variety of display devices (like helmet monocle, laptop, PC or tablet). Tactical ROVER was popular with the Special Forces, who often sneaked into hostile territory on foot, and need to minimize their weight load.

 The original ROVER gear was initially operated, mostly, by air force ground controllers. Now there are some 4,000 ROVER units out there, this allows platoon leaders and company commanders access, as well as Special Forces teams and some army or marine ground patrols.

 Without the wartime pressure, it would have taken a decade or more to get ROVER to where it got in only a few years. Special Forces frequently get special equipment made, as they have a "mad money" fund just for that sort of thing. But these new ideas do not always travel so quickly to the rest of the army. A decade ago, army planners did not see anything like ROVER being available until the 2020s.

From an “AirSea” to an “AirSeaCyber” concept?

(Image: defpro.com)

July 17, 2012 Honolulu, Hawaii  By Harry J. Kazianis / Pacific Forum CSIS – defpro.com

U.S. military must integrate cyber considerations into new AirSea Battle concept

In Pacific Forum’s PacNet #41 issue, Mihoko Matsubara correctly asserts that “countering cyber threats demands cooperation among nations, in particular public-private partnerships.” Cyber war has finally made its way onto the radar, and rightly so. Now the United States military must integrate cyber considerations into its new AirSea Battle concept.

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that the “next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber-attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems.” If true, cyber must be front and center in any military refocusing to the Asia-Pacific. Any failure to not correctly plan against this lethal form of asymmetric warfare could be a catastrophic mistake.

The US seems to be focusing the military component of its widely discussed ‘pivot’ to Asia on China’s growing military capabilities. While neither side seeks confrontation and one hopes none will occur, China’s development of a highly capable Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) battle plan to deter, slow, or deny entry into a contested geographic area or combat zone has been detailed extensively. Cyber war is clearly part of this strategy, with Chinese planners prepared to wage ‘local wars under conditions of informatization,’ or high-intensity, information-centric regional military operations of short duration. Prudent military planners must be prepared to meet this potential threat. Other nations such as North Korea and Iran are also developing A2/AD capabilities with cyber based components that could challenge US or allied interests.

In this type of threat environment, the US, along with its allies, should develop its own symmetric and asymmetric counter-strategies. A joint operational concept of AirSea Battle that includes a strong cyber component would give US forces and their allies the best chance to defeat adversary A2/AD forces. Of course, the current Joint Operational Access Concept does make strong mention of cyber operations. However, an even stronger emphasis on cyber warfare is needed. In short, AirSea Battle as an operational concept might already be obsolete and it should be reconstituted as an “AirSeaCyber” concept.

If cyber is to become a full-fledged component of AirSea Battle, its conceptualization and integration are crucial. A simple first step must be the recognition that cyberspace is now one of the most important battlefield domains in which the US and allied militaries operate. It is not enough to exercise battlefield dominance in a physical sense with technologically advanced equipment. With vital but vulnerable computer networks, software, and operating systems a potential adversary may choose an asymmetric cyber ‘first-strike’ to damage its opponent’s networked combat capabilities. Enemy forces could attempt to ‘blind’ their opponent by crippling computer and network-centric command and control (C2), battlefield intelligence gathering, and combat capabilities by conducting advanced cyber operations. Simply put: US and allied forces must fully understand and articulate the severity of the threat they face before they can map out any national or multinational strategies.

Working with potential cyber allies to identify common threats and working to mitigate possible challenges is crucial. One viable partner in creating effective cyber capabilities is South Korea. Seoul faces a number of problems from a growing North Korean asymmetric threat in a physical sense, as well as multiple challenges in cyberspace. General James Thurman, US Forces Korea Commander, recently noted that “North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber-attacks.” Pyongyang utilizes cyber capabilities “against a variety of targets including military, governmental, educational and commercial institutions.” With the US committed to South Korea’s defense, creating partnerships in cyberspace can only enhance such a relationship. Both sides must look past physical threats and expand their partnership across this new domain of possible conflict.

Japan is another possible cyberspace partner. As Matsubara accurately points out, “They [US and Japan] have more to lose. If cyber-attacks and espionage undermine their economies or military capability, larger geostrategic balances may be affected and the negative consequences may spill over to other countries.” Both nations have reported hacking incidents from Chinese-based hackers that have targeted defense-related industries and programs. With Japan and the US partnering on joint projects such as missile defense and F-35 fighter jet, the protection of classified information associated with these programs must be a top priority. As military allies, both must plan for possible regional conflict where cyber warfare could be utilized against them.

Sadly, restraints could develop that might hamper such partnerships. One recent example: historical and political tensions have delayed and possibly halted a defense agreement between Japan and South Korea. The pact would have assisted in the direct sharing of sensitive military information concerning North Korea, China, and missile defenses. Presumably, cyber-related information would have been at the center of such sharing. The agreement was supported by Washington, which has been working to reinforce trilateral cooperation with the two countries, as essential Asian allies. With all three nations facing a common challenge from North Korea, such an agreement would have been highly beneficial to all parties.

If other nations’ military planners rely heavily on asymmetric warfare strategies, US planners and their allies must also utilize such capabilities in developing their response. Cyber warfare offers proportionally the strongest asymmetric capabilities at the lowest possible cost. Almost all military C2 and deployed weapons systems rely on computer hardware and software. As other nations’ military planners develop networked joint operations to multi-domain warfare, they also open their systems for exploitation by cyber-attack. US and allied technology experts must begin or accelerate long-range studies of possible adversaries’ hardware, software, computer networks, and fiber optic communications. This will allow US and allied cyber commands to deploy malware, viruses, and coordinated strikes on fiber-based communications networks that would launch any enemy offensive or defensive operations. Cyber warfare, if conducted in coordination with standard tactical operations, could be the ultimate cross-domain asymmetric weapon in modern 21st century warfare against any nation that utilizes networked military technologies.

Any good operational concept must always attempt to minimize any negative consequences of its implementation. AirSeaCyber presents US policymakers and their allies with a toolkit to deal with the diverse global military challenges of the 21st Century. The inclusion of cyber obviously declares that the US and its allies are prepared to enter a new domain of combat operations. This focus could unnecessarily draw attention to a domain that should be left to ‘fight in the shadows’ to avoid engendering a new battleground with deadly consequences. Some argue that with the use of cyber weapons against Iran to degrade its ability to develop uranium enrichment technology, a dangerous new international norm – operational use of cyber weapons – is upon us.

While these arguments have some validity, cyber war, whether against corporations, nation-states, or even individuals, is now part of daily life. To not prepare fully for this eventuality means facing battlefield obsolescence. Any student of history knows the results of preparing for the wars of years past-likely defeat.

These are only a sample of capabilities that could be utilized to create a joint operational concept that transition from present AirSea Battle ideas into a more focused AirSeaCyber operational concept. Such notions are compliant with current fiscal realities, utilize modern military technologies, and can leverage existing alliance networks. Any operational concept that will guide US armed forces in the future is obsolete without intense conceptualizations of cyber warfare. Working with allies to develop ties in cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific can only create a strong force multiplier effect and should be considered a top priority.

(Harry Kazianis is Assistant Editor for The Diplomat and a non-resident fellow at the Pacific Forum. PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed.)

TEL AVIV, Israel, July 13 (UPI)

The Israeli navy is looking for new long- and short-range missiles systems to support major ground offensives, senior officers say, a strong indication amphibious operations are being planned for Lebanon, Syria or the Gaza Strip if a new war erupts.

Planners are currently in talks with Israel's defense industry and the Jerusalem Post reports they're looking closely at Israel Military Industries' 160mm Accular GPS-guided system that has a range of 25 miles.

The navy also wants longer range missile systems that will allow it to provide fire support for large ground offensives, and to hammer enemy bases or radar stations.

"These missiles will give us the ability to play a more influential role," a senior navy commander said.

The navy has not conducted a major amphibious operation since landing troops on the coast of south Lebanon during the initial phase of the June 1982 invasion of Israel's northern neighbor.

But it's currently undergoing a transformation from a largely coast patrol force to a full-blown deep-water navy with strategic capabilities.

This is largely due to the 1998-2000 purchase of three German-built Dolphin-class submarines that are reputedly capable of launching nuclear-armed missiles. Iran is considered their primary target.

Three more Dolphins, more advanced than the three currently in service, are being built and scheduled for delivery between 2013 and 2016.

The entire fleet of the 1,925-ton subs, built by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Weft of Kiel, should be operational by 2017.

As Israeli naval operations expand into the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, as well in the eastern Mediterranean where Syria has given the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet a base at Tartus, navy chiefs are pressing for at least two new major missile-armed surface combatants to protect Israel's vital shipping lanes.

These vessels would reinforce the current surface fleet of three Sa'ar-5 and eight Sa'ar-4.5 class corvettes.

An estimated 90 percent of all goods arriving in Israel come by sea, as do 90 percent of military hardware and security-relayed imports.

Plans to purchase new warships have fallen through because of funding problem, which have been exacerbated by the introduction of severe defense cutbacks for 2012-13.

One proposal has been to buy designs from Germany's Blohm + Voss shipbuilders and construct the vessels at the Israel Shipyards in Haifa, the navy's main base north of Tel Aviv on Israel's Mediterranean coast.

Israel Shipyards, a private concern, already builds the navy's Shaldag-class patrol boats. Another option is to build the new vessels in South Korea.

The navy also wants new patrol craft to protect the natural gas fields recently discovered offshore, and which would be tempting targets for Iran, Syria or Hezbollah.

According to Israel's Globes business daily, the navy is after "fast, long endurance patrol boats ... with large crews, a range of weaponry, state-of-the-art search and warning systems, and helicopter landing pads."

These vessels would have to patrol a wide area of sea, about the size of Israel itself, as the gas infrastructure expands.

Syria and Hezbollah are known to have anti-ship missiles, many provided by Iran and Russia, that are capable of hitting fixed offshore target inside Israel's exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean.

Hezbollah hit an Israel corvette off Lebanon in the opening days of the 2006 war with the Jewish state using a Chinese-designed C-802 missile.

The vessel was severely damaged. Another of the radar-guided missiles sank a passing Moroccan freighter

Israel is currently conducting a major upgrading of its armed forces amid growing concerns it will be involved in a new war with Iran and Hezbollah, and possibly Syria and even Egypt as well.

It's anticipating seaborne infiltration from Lebanon and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea, as well as attacks on its emerging gas infrastructure.

"Israel is concerned ... that Hezbollah will try to blockade it by attacking civilian cargo ships," observed the Post's defense editor, Yaacov Katz.

"Stopping ships sailing here would have economic and security ramifications and is therefore the first and primary challenge we will need to confront," a senior naval officer said.

The navy's concerns were heightened earlier this year when Russia delivered supersonic Yakhont anti-ship missiles to Syria. These have a range of some 20 miles and are capable of sinking large vessels.

Premier tir complet du missile de croisière naval MdCN

à Biscarrosse

12/07/2012 DGA

La Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) a réalisé sur le site de DGA Essais de missiles à Biscarrosse avec succès le premier tir complet d’un missile de croisière naval (MdCN) le 9 juillet 2012.

Ce 3e tir de développement, effectué sur le site de Biscarrosse (Landes) du centre « DGA Essais de missiles », est représentatif d’un tir à partir d’une frégate. Tous les objectifs ont été atteints, notamment la validation de la phase terminale avec guidage autonome par reconnaissance de scène infrarouge, qui assure une très grande précision d’impact. Le MdCN équipera à partir de 2014 les frégates multi-missions (FREMM) et les sous-marins Barracuda à l’horizon 2017.

Doté d’une portée de plusieurs centaines de kilomètres, le MdCN est destiné à frapper des objectifs situés dans la profondeur du territoire adverse. Il est complémentaire du missile de croisière aéroporté Scalp dont il est dérivé. Embarqué sur des bâtiments de combat positionnés de façon prolongée à distance de sécurité dans les eaux internationales, ostensiblement (frégates) ou discrètement (sous-marins), le MdCN est adapté à des missions de destruction d’infrastructures de haute valeur stratégique.

July 11th, 2012 By BAE Systems - defencetalk.com

BAE Systems has announced its intention to re-fly the Mantis UAS Concept Demonstrator – this time in UK airspace. This will be the first flight of a UAS (Unmanned Air System) of this class in UK airspace

Flying Mantis will enable the Company to continue to mature a number of UAS capabilities and technologies, underpinning BAE Systems’ strategy to become a world-class provider of unmanned air systems. The flight activity will support the development of future MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) and UCAS (Unmanned Combat Air Systems) operational capabilities, including the programmes announced at the Anglo-French Summit in February this year. By looking to fly Mantis in the UK, BAE Systems is directly aiming to address the associated challenges of airspace integration and safe operation of an airborne system in accordance with UK rules and regulations.

Over the coming months the Company will be working with the appropriate regulators to fully understand the safety, airworthiness and regulatory frameworks which will enable such a flight to take place in 2013.

The Company is currently looking at a number of potential locations in the UK which meet the trials objectives and will work with a number of agencies on the feasibility, timing and location of the flights. These locations will be selected in full consultation with the relevant authorities.

Tom Fillingham, Future Combat Air Systems Director, BAE Systems said: “We will undertake a further phase of flight trials for the Mantis but this time rather than going overseas we have given ourselves the challenge to conduct the trials in the UK. To secure our position as a provider of key capabilities in the unmanned market it is necessary that we continue to develop key skills and capabilities. Learning from the re-flight of Mantis will be used in future UAS programmes, including our partnership with Dassault Aviation.”

Le Guépratte - photo Marine Nationale

10/07/2012 Par Pierre Prier – LeFigaro.fr

REPORTAGE - La chasse menée par la force Atalante sur une zone vaste comme l'Europe commence à porter ses fruits.

Les pirates sont là. Leurs otages aussi. De la passerelle de la frégate française Guépratte, on aperçoit des tentes et des skiffs, les petits bateaux rapides en plastique des flibustiers somaliens, alignés le long du rivage, au pied de formidables falaises jaunes plongeant dans l'océan Indien. Depuis le petit matin, le navire de guerre longe les côtes du Puntland, région autonome du nord de la Somalie. C'est l'une des principales zones de départ des flibustiers, qui attendent aujourd'hui les rançons de 7 bateaux et de 213 marins. Trois cargos sont au mouillage. Parmi eux, le recordman de la captivité, le cargo Iceberg, battant pavillon panaméen, kidnappé le 29 mars 2010 au large d'Aden. Une rançon de 6 millions de dollars serait en négociation pour le vraquier et son équipage hétéroclite de damnés de la mer, Philippins, Soudanais, Pakistanais, Yéménites, Indiens et Ghanéens. Ils sont 23, probablement retenus à terre ; ils étaient 24, mais un officier yéménite est mort, de malnutrition ou suicidé, selon les versions.

L'arme de la vitesse

Le Guépratte, l'un des fers de lance d'Atalante, l'opération européenne antipiraterie, ne s'approche pas. Le commandant Éric Malbrunot a donné l'ordre de passer au large. Les pirates ont menacé d'exécuter tous leurs prisonniers après la première attaque européenne contre leurs installations à terre. Le 15 juin, l'hélicoptère d'une frégate espagnole a détruit plusieurs skiffs sur une plage près de Harardhere. La force, commandée en ce moment par le contre-amiral français Jean-Baptiste Dupuis, ne s'interdit plus d'aller frapper les dépôts logistiques des pirates, avec l'autorisation du gouvernement de transition somalien.

La méthode semble avoir montré ses limites, mais l'assaut a tout de même déstabilisé les bandits. Comme en témoignent les pérégrinations du dernier navire capturé, le pétrolier de 130.000 tonnes Smirny. Il remonte lentement vers la pointe de la Corne de l'Afrique. Ses ravisseurs hésitent visiblement à le laisser longtemps au même endroit. À bord du Guépratte, on suit pas à pas le sort du pétrolier. La frégate est reliée en permanence au réseau varié d'Atalante, mais aussi de tous les autres intervenants: Américains, Otan, Chinois, Indiens, Russes, Sud-Coréens, Japonais…

Le 17 juin, jour de l'appareillage de l'escale de Salalah, au Yémen, la mousson creuse la mer et fait tanguer la frégate. Pourtant, des appels proviennent des confins de la zone couverte par Atalante, aussi vaste que l'Europe. Le 19 juin, le cargo Lady Jana est attaqué dans le golfe arabo-persique mais parvient à semer ses agresseurs. Le lendemain, le méthanier Aries prend une grenade propulsée dans la coque. Pas une très bonne idée pour une gigantesque bonbonne de gaz flottante qui, heureusement, n'explose pas. Il augmente lui aussi sa vitesse, principale arme antipirates.

Le même jour, une silhouette se profile à l'horizon, celle du Tipu Maiden, un cargo philippin affrété par le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) de l'ONU. Chargé d'aide d'urgence pour la Somalie, il aura droit à un traitement VIP: escorte personnelle et transfert à son bord d'une Équipe de protection embarquée (EPE) constituée de marins du Guépratte spécialement formés.

Gardes privés

Hélas, la bonne volonté européenne est mal récompensée. Pour embarquer, le Guépratte a besoin d'une autorisation du gouvernement philippin, qui ne viendra jamais. Parce que le capitaine du cargo a déjà à son bord sa propre EPE privée, comme désormais 40 % des bateaux traversant la zone? Si les marins français avaient été déposés à son bord, les privés auraient dû être consignés dans leurs postes, selon le règlement d'Atalante. Consolation, le lendemain, après le transfert de l'escorte à un bâtiment américain, un écho apparaît sur le radar. Il se matérialise en une minuscule tache blanche se distinguant à peine du moutonnement des vagues. En dix minutes, un groupe de guerriers à l'allure impressionnante, casques, gilets pare-balles et grosses lunettes, fonce debout sur un Zodiac vers un skiff où trois hommes mettent immédiatement les mains sur la tête.

Parmi les soldats, un marin français originaire de Djibouti sert d'interprète. On trouve bien une Kalachnikov à bord, mais elle fait partie du bagage minimum des pêcheurs du coin. Le Zodiac part inspecter une bouée rouge à quelques encablures. Elle peut signaler une palangre, une ligne de fond lestée et semée d'hameçons, parfois utilisée par les pirates pour cacher leurs échelles et leurs armes sous l'eau à l'approche d'un bateau de guerre. La «Kalach», fusil d'assaut rustique, peut rester trois jours sous la surface de l'eau et tirer en sortant.

Cette fois, les hommes du Guépratte ne trouveront que des poissons. Mais les pirates ne désarment pas, malgré le mauvais temps. Avant d'atteindre sa prochaine escale, Dar es-Salaam en Tanzanie, le Guépratte aura encore reçu les nouvelles de deux attaques manquées au nord d'Oman. «L'activité de la piraterie baisse», se félicite toutefois le commandant d'Atalante, le contre-amiral Dupuis, qui reçoit à l'occasion d'un ravitaillement en mer dans le carré lambrissé de La Marne, pétrolier militaire où il règne sur un état-major bigarré mêlant officiers espagnols, britanniques, allemands, italiens…

Les chiffres parlent: 47 navires piratés en 2010, 25 en 2011, 5 depuis janvier 2012. Le nombre d'attaques semble lui aussi bien parti pour baisser: 176 en 2011, 32 depuis le début de l'année. Les raisons? «La dissuasion de forces navales de mieux en mieux coordonnées, l'observation des règles de sécurité recommandées, telles que la pose de barbelés par 70 % des navires de commerce, la présence de gardes privés sur environ 30 % des bateaux, l'aide au gouvernement somalien…»

Les pirates eux-mêmes confirment. Le site Internet Somalia Report, bien renseigné, a recueilli en juin les confidences de flibustiers se plaignant de la baisse de «commandes» des entrepreneurs en piraterie. «Ce sont les rançons qui financent les expéditions suivantes, et comme il y a moins de rançons…» L'Europe ajoutera prochainement un nouveau volet à son action, une aide à la justice somalienne, mission qui sera dirigée par un amiral français. Le transfert de la lutte antipiraterie aux Somaliens eux-mêmes se heurte toutefois au jeu des puissances régionales. Les Émirats arabes unis viennent d'annoncer qu'ils mettaient fin au financement de la police maritime du Puntland, forte d'un millier d'hommes, qui avait pourtant réussi à démanteler quelques camps. Les Émiriens ne souhaitent sans doute pas renforcer un «État autonome» que personne ne reconnaît officiellement. Atalante ne doit pas se reposer sur ses lauriers, juge l'amiral Dupuis: «La baisse est réversible.».