10/07/2012 MER et MARINE

Dans le sillage du porte-avions nucléaire USS Dwight D. Eisenhower et de son groupe aéronaval, un bâtiment beaucoup plus discret d'ordinaire a été vu dimanche franchissant le détroit de Gibraltar. Il s'agit de l'un des quatre sous-marins nucléaires lance-missiles de croisière de l'US Navy. Longs de 170.7 mètres et affichant un déplacement de 18.750 tonnes en plongée, les USS Ohio, USS Michigan, USS Florida et USS Georgia sont d'anciens sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins (SSBN) du type Ohio, reconvertis à partir de 2002. A cet effet, les 22 des 24 tubes précédemment utilisés pour les missiles balistiques Trident accueillent désormais des modules de lancement pour Tomahawk, soit 7 missiles par tube, et donc un total de 154 Tomahawk embarqués (engins capables de détruire une cible terrestre durcie à plus de 1500 kilomètres). Les deux autres tubes Trident, situés au plus près du kiosque, ont, quant à eux, été aménagés pour accueillir des équipements destinés aux commandos. Les SSGN ont, en effet, été également pensés pour mener des opérations spéciales et peuvent embarquer, en plus de l'équipage (154 hommes), 66 commandos SEAL. En plus des deux tubes modifiés pour le stockage d'équipements, les SSGN peuvent aussi transporter, en pontée, différents modules comprenant du matériel pour commandos (embarcations pneumatiques, sous-marins, drones...). C'est d'ailleurs le cas pour le SSGN croisé dimanche à Gibraltar. En matière électronique, la refonte a porté sur une modernisation des moyens, avec par exemple l'ajout de mâts optroniques et de nouveaux systèmes de communication, notamment satellitaires. Enfin, pour leur autodéfense, les sous-marins ont conservé leurs quatre tubes de 533mm, qui mettent en oeuvre des torpilles Mk48.

Un coup de pression sur la Syrie et l'Iran ?

Disposant d'une puissance de feu considérable, ces sous-marins constituent une véritable arme de dissuasion. Et, l'an dernier, un bâtiment de ce type a été utilisé pour la première fois lors de l'intervention militaire, en l'occurence en Libye. Ainsi, en mars 2011, dans le cadre de l'opération Odyssey Dawn, l'USS Florida a lancé à lui seul plus de 90 missiles Tomahawk sur les installations des forces fidèles au colonel Kadhafi. Aujourd'hui, le bâtiment entré en Méditerranée pourrait faire peser une réelle menace sur la Syrie, où l'Iran. C'est d'ailleurs peut-être la raison pour laquelle le franchissement de Gibraltar n'a manifestement pas été entouré d'une grande discrétion... Les Américains vont, en tous cas, pouvoir jouer les gros bras en Méditerranée orientale puisque l'USS Dwight D. Eisenhower doit s'approcher de la Syrie avant, normalement, d'emprunter le canal de Suez pour gagner la région du golfe Persique, où se trouvent actuellement deux autres porte-avions américain, l'USS Enterprise et l'USS Abraham Lincoln.

07/09/2012 James Bosbotinis - defenceiq.com

The May 2012 announcement by the Secretary of State for Defence that the variant of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (or Joint Combat Aircraft in UK parlance) to be acquired for the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force was again being changed marks the third iteration in a decade-long process.

The decision to revert to the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant instead of the F-35C carrier variant, justified on the basis of the supposed cost of configuring the Queen Elizabeth-class (QEC) for catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery operations (CATOBAR), has significant long-term implications for UK airpower.

The F-35B constitutes a substantially less capable asset than the F-35C, in particular with regard to range, persistence and internal payload, has a higher unit acquisition cost and greater through life costs and does not meet the UK’s deep persistent offensive capability (DPOC) requirement. This will require either the acceptance of a significant capability gap or the acquisition of another aircraft, that is, most likely the F-35A, to address the DPOC requirement. Moreover, the F-35B is projected to have an out of service date of 2042, whereas the QEC are expected to remain in service until 2070; follow-on systems (such as sixth generation optionally manned/unmanned maritime combat air systems) are projected to be configured for CATOBAR operations. The selection of the F-35B is thus neither cost effective nor the optimum long-term solution to UK airpower requirements.

This paper examines the implications of the F-35 variant decision for UK airpower, with a particular focus on the difference in capability between the F-35B and C, the DPOC requirement and the potential acquisition of the F-35A to fulfil it, and the loss of the strategic flexibility provided by CATOBAR. The paper will argue that the decision to acquire the F-35B is not cost effective and will leave the UK with a sub-optimal airpower capability.

Less capability at greater cost

The difference in capability between the F-35B and F-35C is significant. Due to the STOVL requirement, the F-35B has a shaft-driven lift fan integrated with its engine thus restricting the aircraft’s internal fuel capacity to 13,500 lbs; in contrast, the internal fuel load of the F-35C is 19,145 lbs. The difference in internal fuel is highlighted by the range and combat persistence of the respective aircraft; the F-35B has a mission radius of approximately 463 nautical miles and a time over target of fifteen minutes; for the F-35C, the figures are 613 nautical miles and thirty-six minutes respectively. These figures are based on a standard low observable configuration and internal payload of two 500 lb. bombs and two advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) for the F-35B and two 2000 lb. bombs and two AMRAAM for the F-35C. The preceding figures highlight a second key difference in capability; the reduced internal payload of the F-35B, which again is due to the aircraft’s STOVL configuration. The F-35A and C are both capable of accommodating 2000 lb. class munitions in their internal bays, whereas the F-35B has smaller weapons bays which are limited to 1000 lb. class munitions. In UK service, the F-35B will carry the Paveway IV 500 lb. precision guided bomb, thus creating a capability gap with regard to the prosecution of targets requiring 2000 lb. class penetrating weapons (for example, bridges and aircraft bunkers). This capability gap could be overcome via the carriage of weapons externally, for example, the Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile, albeit at the cost of the F-35’s low observability.

The difference in capability between the F-35B and C is compounded by the former’s greater cost – both in terms of unit acquisition and through life. The F-35B will have a unit cost of approximately $138 million compared to $117 million for the F-35C; according to figures in the latest US Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Report, the F-35B engine alone is projected to cost $27.7 million compared to $10.9 million for that of the F-35C. Projected through life costs for the F-35B in UK Service are estimated to be £1 billion higher than for the F-35C. If, as will be discussed below, it is necessary to also acquire the F-35A, the through life costs of operating a mixed F-35A/B fleet will be £2 billion above that of operating a single F-35C fleet. In addition, due to the superior capability of the F-35C vis-à-vis the F-35B, fewer of the former would need to be acquired thus generating additional savings. In this regard, the Telegraph in April 2012 cited a classified Ministry of Defence document which suggested that 97 F-35Cs could provide the same capability that would otherwise require 136 F-35Bs. The implications in cost terms are stark; 97 F-35Cs would cost approximately £6.8 billion, whereas 136 F-35Bs would cost approximately £11.26 billion: a difference of £4.46 billion.

The cost of converting the QEC for CATOBAR operations – the justification for reverting to the F-35B - although stated to be in the region of £2 billion for HMS Prince of Wales and substantially more for HMS Queen Elizabeth (whilst noting that each ship is projected to cost approximately £2.5 billion) is also subject to much debate. In March 2012, the Telegraph reported that the Assistant Secretary of the US Navy, Sean J. Stackley had written to Peter Luff, Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, informing him that the CATOBAR conversion would only cost half what the Ministry of Defence were projecting. The possibility that tensions within the Ministry of Defence regarding Carrier Strike, impinged on the CATOBAR conversion cost analysis, resulting in flawed risk assumptions (for example, pertaining to the installation of the electromagnetic aircraft launch system) and thus inflated cost projections, cannot be ruled out. Taken together with the above F-35 cost data, the debate regarding the CATOBAR conversion cost and the reduced capability of the F-35B, the argument that the decision to revert to the STOVL solution for Carrier Strike constitutes the most cost effective option for the UK appears to be fundamentally flawed.

The DPOC Requirement

Since the demise of the Royal Air Force’s Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) programme (the intended replacement for the Tornado GR 4) in 2005, the JCA has been expected to fulfil the post-FOAS requirement. This requirement, the deep and persistent offensive capability (DPOC), cannot be met by the F-35B. The decision to acquire the F-35B will either require the acceptance of a capability gap or the acquisition of a second F-35 variant, most likely the F-35A. The acquisition of a mixed JCA fleet has been considered previously and has also been considered as part of the 2012 variant debate. This would involve significant extra cost because of the need to integrate UK weapons into the F-35A, the additional cost of maintaining a mixed fleet and ensuring the compatibility of the aircraft with Royal Air Force air-to-air refuelling (AAR) assets. The latter would involve either the configuring of UK AAR aircraft – the new Voyager A330-200 – for boom AAR operations (Airbus Military has developed an Aerial Boom Refuelling System for the A-330-200) or adapting the F-35A for hose and drogue refuelling. Lockheed Martin reports that provision has been made for the fitting of the necessary equipment for hose and drogue refuelling within the airframe, albeit at additional cost.

The DPOC requirement is of central importance to the future of UK airpower. The Tornado is due out of service by the end of this decade whilst the Typhoon does not meet the DPOC requirement and needs investment to attain a full multi-role capability. The limited range, persistence and internal payload of the F-35B, especially with regard to the lack of an internal 2000 lb. penetrating munition capability, will not provide the level of strike capability that is required, in particular for initial operations against an adversary’s strategic targets defended by a still-intact integrated air defence system. The reach of the F-35B can be extended via external carriage of the Storm Shadow cruise missile. This would enable the F-35B to engage targets at ranges of up to approximately 713 nautical miles (based on an F-35B radius of 463 nautical miles and a potential Storm Shadow range of up to 250 nautical miles) with the stand-off range of Storm Shadow keeping the launching aircraft outside of the range of air defence systems (excepting perhaps the Russian-made 40N6-equipped S-400 or Chinese-made HQ-19). However, the F-35B/Storm Shadow combination would only be effective in the context of not having to penetrate deep into an adversary’s airspace due to the F-35B’s low observability being compromised via the external carriage of ordnance. In contrast, the F-35C may potentially be capable of engaging targets at ranges similar to or exceeding that of the F-35B/Storm Shadow combination whilst only carrying internal ordnance. The National Audit Office in its 2011 report on Carrier Strike gave the combat radius of the F-35C as 650 nautical miles whilst other sources have stated this figure to be in excess of 700 nautical miles. Most notably, a 2002 conference paper prepared by a member of the JSF Program Office gave the F-35C’s radius as 799 nautical miles (the same source attributes the F-35A with a 703 nautical mile radius and the F-35B a radius of 496 nautical miles).

The strategic implications of the F-35B’s limited range and internal payload are significant. The limited range of the aircraft will increase the requirement for AAR support for both sea and land-based operations; this is especially significant for early operations in a crisis or conflict where the provision of land-based support assets may be restricted or not yet available or vulnerable to attack. With regard to Carrier Strike, the core rationale for carrier airpower is the provision of independent airpower – a dependence on land-based support assets impinges on this critical aspect. The relative value of a British contribution to a coalition’s combat airpower will also diminish due to the selection of the F-35B. This is because other likely coalition partners, for example, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway and The Netherlands will be operating the F-35A which can engage a broader range of targets at greater range than the F-35B. In addition, the loss of interoperability with the US Navy will compound the relative decline in the importance and utility of British combat airpower in a coalition setting. In this regard, it is important to note that in order to enhance integration with the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps will acquire the F-35C in addition to the F-35B. This marks a significant departure from previous plans to transition to an all-STOVL force with the F-35B replacing STOVL AV-8Bs and conventional F/A-18C/Ds and EA-6Bs.

As the US reorients its force structure and doctrine toward the Asia-Pacific and Air Sea Battle, the UK, in order to maintain its desired position vis-à-vis the US, should seek to ensure that its force developments are relevant. The shift from the F-35C to B and away from a CATOBAR configuration for the QEC runs counter to this.

Moreover, unless the UK opts for a mixed JCA fleet, that is, acquires the F-35A with the additional cost of running such a fleet, the UK’s land-based airpower capability will also be sub-optimal. This again highlights the flawed nature of the decision to shift from acquiring the F-35C to the F-35B. The F-35C is the most capable version of the F-35, could fulfil the UK’s DPOC requirement from both land and sea, and would ensure that the UK possesses a robust and credible offensive air capability.

The Implications of a STOVL QEC

The most significant implication of the shift from a CATOBAR to STOVL configuration for the QEC is the loss of strategic flexibility and long-term growth potential afforded by CATOBAR. This goes beyond the F-35 variant debate and encompasses issues such as embarked intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, the resilience of Carrier Strike in the event of the F-35 programme being delayed or failing and the long-term viability of Carrier Strike.

The latter is far more uncertain following the shift to STOVL. This is because the F-35B has a projected out of service date of circa 2042, whereas the QEC are intended to remain in service until around 2070; unless the ships are then refitted for CATOBAR operations, Carrier Strike capability would be lost by default.

The UK has also foreclosed potential future cooperation with the US in the development of next generation systems such as the F/A-XX (the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler replacement), unmanned air systems such as the X-47B and unmanned carrier launched airborne surveillance and strike system and follow-on sixth generation systems.

In operational terms, the ship-air interface in a STOVL environment is no less complex than for CATOBAR operations. STOVL operations require more deck space than CATOBAR to enable the short take-off run and due to deficiencies in the F-35B’s performance, in particular the aircraft’s vertical landing bring back capability (the weight of payload permitted for a vertical recovery), ship-borne rolling vertical landings (SRVL) will be required (alternatively, any munitions being carried could be dumped prior to landing – an expensive approach considering the cost of precision guided munitions). A SRVL recovery will require as much deck space as a traditional CATOBAR recovery and can be expected to become routine due to F-35B performance shortfalls, through life technical risk and increasingly expensive weapons. The requirement for sustained investment in embarked training at sea for both aircrew and support personnel and the regular, sustained embarkation of the air group to ensure basic operational proficiency remains for STOVL as it would for CATOBAR operations. 

The F-35B’s performance limitations will also impinge on the effectiveness and credibility of UK Carrier Strike. The British government has not revised its policy regarding the size of the QEC air group, which will remain centred on just twelve F-35s. Based on the figures given in the aforementioned Telegraph article, 40% more F-35Bs are required to deliver the same effect as a force of F-35Cs. In essence, to deliver the same effect as twelve F-35Cs, the QEC should embark sixteen or seventeen F-35Bs. Therefore, the currently envisaged number of F-35s will need to be increased in order to provide the required capability. In addition, as discussed above, the F-35B has a reduced reach and punch compared to the F-35C, in particular with regard to the prosecution of hardened targets. The shift therefore from the F-35C to the F-35B will substantially reduce the capability of UK Carrier Strike and have a concomitant impact on its credibility in terms of constituting a force for influence and deterrence.

Conclusion

The decision to switch from the F-35C to the F-35B, and with it from a CATOBAR to STOVL configuration for the QEC, holds significant implications for the future of UK airpower. The limited range, persistence and internal payload of the F-35B reduce its military utility, in particular with regard to the prosecution of hardened high value targets and its increased dependence on AAR support, thus impinging on the capability and credibility of British airpower and its relative value to coalition operations.

Moreover, the variant switch does not constitute a more affordable option for the UK. The F-35B has a higher unit acquisition cost, greater through life costs and does not fulfil the UK’s DPOC requirement which will either necessitate acceptance of a serious capability gap or investment in other systems (such as the F-35A at considerably greater through life cost of a mixed fleet) to address the requirement.

In addition, the configuring of the QEC for STOVL operations generates uncertainty with regard to the long-term viability of UK Carrier Strike beyond the service life of the F-35B, and is however likely to necessitate fitting CATOBAR equipment in the long-term. The shift to a STOVL configuration for the QEC also imposes a substantial limitation on the long-term growth potential for UK Carrier Strike. This is especially with regard to possible UK involvement in US programmes developing future maritime aviation capabilities, in particular those relating to unmanned air systems which would offer substantial improvements in persistence, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike capabilities (especially satisfying DPOC requirements) compared to current systems and that offered by the F-35. This also applies at the level of UK airpower. Any future combat air system (manned or unmanned) the UK seeks to acquire will either have to be STOVL (to ensure compatibility with the QEC) or restricted to land basing, thus removing the potential for the UK to minimise the number of fast jet types it operates. The acquisition of the F-35C would enable the UK to acquire future air systems, designed for CATOBAR, which do not suffer the performance limitations imposed by STOVL, and are equally capable of operations from land or sea. This would at least ensure commonality (the development of and requirements for an interoperable force are beyond the scope of this paper) between Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force types and contribute to maximising the flexibility of UK airpower.

Simply, the contention that the F-35B constitutes the most cost effective option for the UK and the ‘right decision for the long-term’ does not stand up to scrutiny. The decision to acquire the F-35B requires greater expenditure at a time when the defence budget and wider economy is under significant pressure. The decision will deliver a sub-optimal capability and will reduce the flexibility, long-term growth potential and, ultimately, the strategic credibility of UK airpower. 

9 July 2012army-technology.com

The US Army has increased the scope of the existing common remotely operated weapon station (CROWS) II frame agreement by signing a contract modification worth Nkr508m ($84.5m) with Norwegian company Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace.

Under the latest contract modification, the company has received purchase orders for spare parts and depot support valued at Nkr198m ($32.9m).

A joint acquisition programme for weapon stations for the army's vehicle programmes, CROWS has been designed to improve efficiency for protection, training support and further development.

"The Protector remote weapon control system (RWS) in the CROWS II configuration enhances military troop protection and lethality by allowing soldiers to acquire and engage targets from the safety of a vehicle."

The Protector remote weapon control system (RWS) in the CROWS II configuration enhances military troop protection and lethality by allowing soldiers to acquire and engage targets from the safety of a vehicle.

Designed to be mounted on a range of vehicles, the system supports the mk19 grenade machine gun, 0.50-calibre M2 machine gun, M240B machine gun, and M249 squad automatic weapon.

The CROWS II programme is also being supported by BAE Systems by supplying thermal imaging modules or sights for use on CROWS II-equipped vehicles, such as the M1114 high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles.

To attain the required thermal sensitivity, smaller uncooled thermal sensors on remote weapon stations use less power than those that need to be cryogenically cooled.

The order is part of the $1.4bn CROWS II framework agreement signed in August 2007.

In April 2010, the US Army awarded an Nkr590m ($100.4m) contract to Kongsberg as part of the increase of the CROWS framework agreement for up to 10,349 systems, which was originally signed in December 2009.

09 Jul 2012 By Andrew Trotman – The Telegraph

Rolls-Royce has landed a $183m contract to supply the US Army with helicopter engines.

The contract, to support 500 M250 engines on more than 300 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior scout helicopters, will last a year, with the US having the option to extend it for another four years.

Rolls-Royce has supported the Kiowa Warrior fleet for 13 years, with the Kiowa Warriors completing more than 2m flight hours, including more than 750,000 hours in combat.

Dan Korte, president of defence at Rolls-Royce, said: "Rolls-Royce is focused on providing affordable, dependable support to help our military customers complete their missions every day. For years, we have been working hard to ensure these Army crews come home safely after every mission, and we are committed to providing our full support so that continues."

Rolls-Royce is structured into four divisions: Aerospace, Defence Aerospace, Marine and Energy.

Earlier this year the company unveiled record underlying pre-tax profits of more than £1bn for the first time, boosted by a strong order book that stood at £62.2bn at the end of 2011. It also opened a new manufacturing and training facility in Singapore, close to growth markets.

Roll-Royce completed the biggest deal in its history last year when it joined forces with Mercedes-Benz owner Daimler to acquire German engine maker Tognum for around £3bn.

The UK company will combine Tognum with its own Bergen business, which makes engines used across the maritime and power generation sectors.

July 9, 2012: Strategy page

Denmark is buying LITENING targeting pods for its F-16s. These cost nearly $3 million each and have annual maintenance costs of over $50,000 per year. The pods, packed with electronics and sensors, are very popular with fighter pilots, mainly because they contain FLIR (video quality night vision infrared radar) and TV cameras that enable pilots flying at 6,200 meters (20,000 feet) to clearly make out what is going on down on the ground. The pods also contain laser designators for laser guided bombs and laser range finders that enable pilots to get coordinates for JDAM (GPS guided) bombs. Safely outside the range of most anti-aircraft fire (five kilometers up and up to fifty kilometers away) pilots can literally see the progress of ground fighting and have even been acting as aerial observers for ground forces. These capabilities also enable pilots to more easily find targets themselves and hit them with laser guided or JDAM bombs. While bombers still get target information from ground controllers for close (to friendly troops) air support they can now go searching on their own in areas where there are no friendly ground troops.

The 200 kg (440 pound) pod hangs off a hard point, like a missile, bomb or fuel tank. Twenty-one years ago the first targeting pods (the U.S. two pod LANTIRN system) were nearly ready for service. These first electronic targeting pods, which looked like thin bombs contained laser designators and night vision equipment. The LANTIRN got a workout in the 1991 Gulf War, even though the system was still undergoing testing. Israel soon followed with a cheaper, more reliable, and more capable LITENING system. An American manufacturer then brought out the Sniper XR and XTP pod. All this competition has made the pods (one pod is all that is needed now) more capable, easier to use, more reliable, and cheaper.

Two years ago Denmark stopped training new jet fighter pilots. This came about because Denmark had decided to cut its force of jet fighters from 48 F-16s, to 30. The remaining F-16s will be refurbished so that they can continue to operate for the rest of the decade. Denmark plans to eventually replace their F-16s with F-35s. Because the F-35 is a much more capable aircraft, and Denmark has so few potential aggressors in the neighborhood, there will be fewer F-35s bought to replace the F-16 force. While the F-35 costs more than the F-16, having fewer of them also saves money on pilots. A fighter pilot takes five years, and several million dollars, to train.

July 8, 2012 Rafale News

According to the last issue of Air&Cosmos, the Rafale M24 that was lost on July 2 during a BFM exercise  would have been caught in the F-18 exhaust flux it was fighting with. The hot and turbulent air from the Hornet engines would have disturbed the pressure and temperature sensors of the Rafale leading to incoherent data transfert to the flight control system. Air&Cosmos put forward the hypothesis that the incoherent flight data could have triggered a flat spin forcing the pilot to eject at 3000 ft.

As a side note, the French Navy recently put into service a new underwater setup in order to train pilots to get out of their cockipt in case of a sea crash.

July 7, 2012: Strategy Page

One of the major problems new nuclear powers have is testing their newly developed weapons under realistic conditions. Because of a 1992 treaty, nuclear weapons may no longer be tested, even underground. Before that, there was a 1963 treaty that discouraged tests in the atmosphere, underwater or in space. The last above ground test by China) was in 1980.

But until the early 1960s the United States conducted 331 atmospheric tests, using nukes dropped from bombers, or in missile warheads, or even artillery shells. B-52s, for example, dropped 30 live nuclear weapons. The B-29 dropped three (two in combat), the B-45 dropped two, the B-36 six and the F-89 fighter-bomber one. The U.S. Navy fired a submarine launched ballistic missile with a live warhead, as well as testing nuclear depth charges and anti-submarine missiles with nuclear warheads.

Russia, Britain, France and China also carried out atmospheric tests. But new nuclear powers Pakistan, India and North Korea have not. They probably won't, because of the large quantities of radioactivity such tests put into the global atmosphere.

What all this means is that it's not enough to be able to design and test a nuclear weapon, but you have to deal with all the diplomatic and economic backlash from the rest of the world. This substantially increases the cost of developing workable nuclear weapons. Even computer simulation software has its limitations, and obtaining this software, and the hardware that can run it, is not easy.

July 6, 2012 defense-aerospace.com

July 2, 2012 Source: Congressional Defense Service

Reference: RL33745

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 24 at the end of FY2011 to 36 at the end of FY2018.

Under the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships have begun operating in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at Rota, Spain, in FY2014 and FY2015.

BMD-capable Aegis ships also operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.

The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2013 budget requests a total of $2,303.0 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the EPAA.

Issues for Congress for FY2013 include:
• the reduction under the proposed FY2013 budget in the ramp-up rate for numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships over the next few years;
• the cost effectiveness and U.S. economic impact of shifting four Aegis ships to Rota, Spain;
• U.S. vs. European naval contributions to European BMD;
• the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile;
• the capability of the SM-3 Block IIB Aegis BMD interceptor; and
• concurrency and technical risk in the Aegis BMD program.

As the CRS does not publish its reports online, this report is hosted by the Federation of American Scientists.

(PDF format)
Full text

July 5, 2012 defpro.com

LONDON | Northrop Grumman Corporation has been selected to supply the Platform Management System (PMS) for the Royal Navy's fifth Astute-class submarine, Anson.

Northrop Grumman's Sperry Marine business unit will supply the PMS for Astute Boat 5 under a performance partnering arrangement (PPA) with BAE Systems Maritime-Submarine. BAE Systems will install the PMS equipment, which controls and monitors the submarine's platform machinery and onboard systems, at its shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness, U.K. The contract also includes software, safety case, equipment and obsolescence management.

The Astute-class is the Royal Navy's latest series of nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines. Northrop Grumman's Sperry Marine business unit previously supplied the PMS for Astute Boat 4, Audacious.

"Our long experience in developing and configuring advanced naval electronics makes us ideally suited to meet the platform management system needs of these submarines," said Alan Dix, managing director of Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine. "This latest contract reflects confidence in the capability of our platform management system for this important Royal Navy programme."

The PMS will include control and monitoring software, human interface equipment and programmable logic controller-based hardware located throughout the submarine. All hardware has been system-engineered to meet naval hardware standards for shock, vibration, temperature and electromagnetic compatibility requirements.

Based on Northrop Grumman's Sperry Marine's innovative approach to configuring commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software to meet exacting military and commercial applications, the PMS for Astute Boat 5 will reduce life cycle costs for the U.K. Ministry of Defence and minimize programme risk. The system will provide an advanced network design that includes the stringent levels of safety and redundancy associated with nuclear submarine control systems.

The system's open architecture allows interfacing with third-party equipment via standard field-bus technology to provide an extremely versatile and expandable PMS solution.

Northrop Grumman's Sperry Marine in the U.K. has had a long and successful relationship with the Royal Navy, supplying and supporting machinery control systems, navigation radars, gyrocompasses and other navigation equipment. The company is also currently providing the PMS for the Royal Navy's Type 45 destroyers and has provided ships' inertial navigation systems for a variety of the Royal Navy's other surface ships and submarines.

AW169 helicopter

5 July 2012 army-technology.com

AgustaWestland North America has completed flight demonstrations of its AW139M twin-turbine helicopter to the US Army, as part of the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) programme at the company's facility in Philadelphia, US.

Flight demonstrations were conducted to allow the army to assess whether the aircraft was capable of addressing the shortfalls in its current OH-58D Kiowa Warrior fleet, while providing enhanced performance.

Issued by the army in late-April, AgustaWestland is one of five companies that have submitted responses to the AAS request for information (RFI).

AgustaWestland North America CEO Scott Rettig said that the company was confident that its product portfolio and military expertise would meet the US Army's mission needs, as they assess new technologies and further define the requirements for the AAS mission.

"We are confident that there is a tremendous market for multirole rotorcraft and in our ability to transform the latest commercial helicopter technology into next-generation military platforms," Rettig added.

AgustaWestland originally planned to bid an AW119 variant, in response to the army's first AAS RFI in 2010, but decided to update the response by offering a militarised version of the twin-engined AW169 helicopter, as reported by Aviation Week.

An AW169 helicopter has been conducting flight operations in Italy since 10 May, to complete both FAA and EASA certification, the AW139M was used as a technology demonstrator for evaluation purposes.

The helicopter has been designed to deliver enhanced performance and ensure lifecycle cost savings in the areas such as training, maintenance and support services.

The army is also scheduled to evaluate Bell Helicopters' OH-58D Block 2, Boeing's AH-6i, MD Helicopters's MD 540F, as well as EADS North America's AAS-72X helicopters in the next several weeks.

AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter launches a Hellfire

missile at a target – photo USMC

4 Jul 12 UK MOD - A Training and Adventure news article

Commando Gunners from 148 Battery, 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, have been training with US Marines in the dusty heat of the Arizona desert.

As the sun rises over the desert hills of southern Arizona, the US Marines and commandos of the British Fire Support Team can clearly see the similarities between Afghanistan and Yuma. From the unbearable heat to the uninhabitable terrain, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma's ranges set the stage for the finale of this year's Exercise Burmese Chase.

Burmese Chase, a bilateral training exercise between US and UK armed forces, is conducted every year to hone the skills of forward observers, and culminated on 20 to 22 June in three days of live-fire close air support on simulated hostile forces.

Marines from the 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), Supporting Arms Liaison Team Charlie, based at Camp Pendleton in California, trained together with the British Commando Gunners on the ranges of MCAS Yuma.

The training focused on the improvement of both nations' capabilities to call for fire from supporting arms, especially air assets. During their stint in Yuma, both 1st ANGLICO and 148 Battery called in dozens of air strikes and casualty evacuations to Marine Aircraft Group 39 assets, while Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 provided expeditionary refuelling support to keep the helicopters close to operations on the ground:

    "This is exactly what we will be doing in Afghanistan," said US Marine Captain Jesse Rangel of 1st ANGLICO.

    "This encompasses the whole Operation ENDURING FREEDOM scheme of manoeuvre for ANGLICO teams."

ANGLICO exists as a go-between for joint and international forces to co-ordinate supporting fires, be it ground artillery, naval artillery or air support. The forward observers of 148 Battery also co-ordinate supporting fires for ground forces, and often work with international assets. Both units strive to assure forces which haven't trained together can operate efficiently with each other:

    "We'll be establishing observation posts near villages," added Captain Rangel.

    "We'll be watching [US Marine] infantry, Jordan infantry and British infantry head in, and we need to be able to communicate with supporting aircraft with the equipment we have out here. We might have to communicate through a young [US Marine], British soldier or Afghan National Army soldier out front to provide support."

    "This is an amazing opportunity for us," said Captain Doug Webster, Commanding Officer of the 148 Battery, 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, Fire Support Team.

    "It's important because we worked a lot with the Marine Corps in our last deployment in Helmand province, Afghanistan. All of our boundaries were shared with Marine units. This is a good opportunity to share tactics, techniques and procedures."

Exercise Burmese Chase started with infantry immersion training, which also incorporated fire support and air asset co-ordination, then continued with live-fire artillery training and counter-IED (improvised explosive device) training:

    "Both units duly benefited," stated Captain Rangel. "We shaped the exercise so it could encompass the needs of everyone."

While the training took place in Arizona, another contingent of Marines from 1st ANGLICO travelled to the UK to engage in similar training.

July 3, 2012 defpro.com

USS NORMANDY, At Sea | The multinational training exercise FRUKUS 2012 completed the at-sea phase of training after conducting ship boarding and damage control training exercises, June 29.

During the training, guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) sent boarding and damage control teams to a Russian tugboat and Russian naval vessel Yaroslav Mudriy (727).

"In addition to being able to ensure that our international waters are safe and secure, it is necessary for us to be able help each other in the event of an emergency," said Capt. Kevin Hill, commanding officer of Normandy. "If one of our partner ships has been taken over or if the ship catches on fire or floods, then we need to work together to ensure that our ships are safe and secure."

Keeping the ships safe and working as one cohesive unit will help the nations involved with future operations to be more efficient when the real missions take place.

"It's good to be able to show our partners that we can be there to help them if they ever need help," said Electronics Technician 1st Class Alan Staas, boarding team member. "By demonstrating that we have the capabilities to board their vessel in a quick and efficient manner, whether it's for security or providing casualty assistance, it strengthens that bond that we strive to maintain as partners."

FRUKUS 2012 continued in St. Petersburg, Russia, after completion of the at-sea training.

FRUKUS is an annual exercise aimed at improving maritime security through an open dialogue and increased training between the navies of France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States.

02 July 2012  defenceWeb (Reuters)

Finmeccanica said the United States might restart ordering C-27J military cargo aircraft, a key part of the relaunch of the Italian aerospace and defence group's Alenia Aermacchi unit.

Earlier this year, the United States ended the procurement of C-27Js when contracts for 17 out of 38 aircraft initially planned had yet to be finalised.

Finmeccanica said a committee at the U.S. Congress had reconsidered the decision, Reuters reports.

"The cancellation was decided by the U.S. government ... but the congress, which has final approval over the budget, has taken steps to continue the C-27J program for at least another year," Alenia chief executive Giuseppe Giordo said on Friday.

U.S. defence contractor L-3 Communications Holdings is partner of Alenia in the C-27J project in the United States.

Finmeccanica is undergoing a restructuring plan that includes asset sales and an overhaul of unprofitable businesses.

The relaunch of Alenia includes focusing on proprietary products such as the C-27J. In May, Australia ordered 10 C-27Js worth 800 million euros.