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22 mai 2012 2 22 /05 /mai /2012 17:46

NATO-Active-Layered-Theatre-Ballistic-Missile-Defence--ALTB.jpg

 

22 May 2012 ThalesRaytheonSystems

 

MASSY, France, (May 15, 2012) – ThalesRaytheonSystems (TRS) Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Interim Capability (InCa) system deployed successfully during a recent NATO Air and Missile Defence Exercise (AMDEX) at Ramstein in Germany. TRS delivered a key component of the interim BMD capability for the NATO Air Command Centre at Ramstein following a contract awarded to TRS in January 2012 by the NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency on behalf of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme.

 

Operational achievements at AMDEX included the connection of the Ballistic Missile Defence Operations Center (BMDOC) at Air Command Ramstein to NATO Command and Control units, sensors, weapons systems across NATO nations, and to US ships to support engagement monitoring, and exchanging of critical data with the US Command and Control System.

 

Commenting on the AMDEX exercise and key achievements, Alessandro Pera, ALTMBD Programme Manager said, “I am very proud of the fact that we have delivered BMD capabilities for territorial protection in such a short timeframe, and that the operational community is satisfied with the results.”

 

“TRS’ experience in deploying Air C4I and sensor systems around the world demonstrates our expertise to build and develop systems, with our customers, that can address evolving threats including territorial missile defence and theatre missile defence command and control capability; a top threat facing NATO and a focus at the forthcoming NATO Chicago Summit,” said Jack Harrington, Chief Executive Officer at ThalesRaytheonSystems. “As the world’s first fully integrated Command and Control system and largest Air Operations system of its kind, NATO ACCS developed by TRS is currently under test by multiple nations and plays a key role in NATO's BMD infrastructure,” Harrington added.

 

At AMDEX, ACCS also demonstrated the Real Time Ballistic Missile engagement monitoring tool that has been under development as part of NATO’s ALTBMD Programme, and that will in the future transition to NATO's primary Command and Control system for execution of BMD engagements. ACCS, an example of Smart Defence, provides opportunities for common training, standard operational procedures and centralized maintenance for all NATO nations, significantly reducing support costs and increasing manning flexibility. As NATO evolves in the future, ACCS is designed to adapt to new operational challenges whether it be for continued advancements to Air C2 or additional Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities. ACCS provides the solid command and control foundation for the alliance.

 

About ThalesRaytheonSystems

ThalesRaytheonSystems is an international company specializing in air defence systems, command and control systems, 3-D air defence radars, battlefield and weapon locating radars. Since its founding in 2001, TRS has become one of the defence industry’s most successful transatlantic joint ventures. The company employs 1,600 people and is equally owned by Raytheon and Thales.

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22 mai 2012 2 22 /05 /mai /2012 16:45

Finmeccanica logo.svg

 

May. 21, 2012 By ZACHARY FRYER-BIGGS   Defense News

 

As it consolidates to create savings amid shrinking global defense budgets, Italy’s Finmeccanica group is reorganizing its U.S. properties internally to find efficiencies and create a new, unified brand. The working title: Finmeccanica Defense.

 

“What defense companies need to do is to get ahead of the wave,” William Lynn, chief executive officer at Finmeccanica subsidiary DRS Technologies, said in an interview with Defense News. “You need to lower your cost structure in advance of any revenue declines, because if you don’t, your [profit] margins crash.”

 

Lynn, who was appointed CEO in January, is following a two-step plan, starting with the consolidation of DRS’s two units, and then creating an overarching identity for the collection of Finmeccanica’s U.S.-based subsidiaries to be led by DRS.

 

“We need to pull things together and manage it from a single headquarters with a single set of priorities and a unified voice to our customers,” said Lynn, who stepped down as U.S. deputy defense secretary in October.

 

The process should be concluded in 2013, he said. “We haven’t landed completely on names, but Finmeccanica itself has an overarching brand, and then AgustaWestland Helicopters, Alenia Aircraft and so on. We’ll have the same construct in the United States.”

 

Lynn said these two steps will result in a company with less overhead and greater efficiency.

 

“That gives us greater management agility, it gives us the ability to use all of our resources, and it’s lowered the cost structure,” he said.

 

The opportunity to consolidate comes not from long-term planning but rather a failure to unify the company following Finmeccanica’s 2008 acquisition of DRS. The result is a lack of identity for the company’s U.S. subsidiaries, experts said.

 

“Maybe in Europe they know who some of the constituent parts of Finmeccanica are, but in the United States, who the hell is Finmeccanica?” said Byron Callan, an analyst with Capital Alpha Partners. “There’s a branding exercise that they need to go through, or a rebranding exercise.”

 

The lack of brand recognition is a result of how the company has managed its foray into the U.S. market, said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, Arlington, Va., and a consultant to defense companies.

 

“It has almost no identity in the United States because it hasn’t pursued a consolidated brand,” he said. “This should be one of the world’s great brands, and yet it has been fragmented and not brought together in the popular mind.”

 

As a result, opportunities envisioned as part of the DRS acquisition have not appeared, Thompson said.

 

“When Finmeccanica bought DRS, it thought that it would give the American company access to the global market, and the Italian parent access to the U.S. market,” he said. “Things haven’t really worked out the way that the company planned. The Italian parts of Finmeccanica don’t have much of a footprint in America, and DRS does 90 percent of its sales in the U.S.”

 

By realizing cost savings, Lynn hopes to help the world’s eighth-largest defense contractor claim more than its current fraction of the U.S. defense market.

 

“You can try to ensure that whatever revenue level you’re at, your cost structures allow you to make a healthy margin, so that you’re a moneymaking operation and an attractive investment for shareholders,” he said.

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22 mai 2012 2 22 /05 /mai /2012 15:58

Predator B MQ-9 Reaper photo General Atomics Aeronautical S

 

May 18, 2012 defense-unmanned.com

(Source: GA-ASI; issued May 16, 2012)

 

GA-ASI and UK Partners Validate New Open Payload Architecture During Sovereign Payload Capability Demonstration

 

SAN DIEGO --- General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA‑ASI), a leading manufacturer of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, tactical reconnaissance radars, and electro-optic surveillance systems, along with SELEX Galileo and Cobham Aviation Services, today demonstrated a new open payload architecture during the Sovereign Payload Capability Demonstration (SPCD) held at GA-ASI’s Gray Butte Flight Operations Facilities in Palmdale, Calif.

 

The event included a live flight demonstration over the Pacific Ocean of a GA-ASI Predator B/MQ-9 Reaper UAS fitted with a SELEX Galileo Seaspray 7500E surveillance radar and showcased the radar’s ability to track targets on land, in the littoral and maritime environments, and from air-to-air. An international audience was in attendance, including officials from the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the Ministries of Defense of the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and The Netherlands.

 

“Today’s demonstration represents a significant step toward the goal of operational independence for Predator B,” said Frank W. Pace, president, Aircraft Systems Group, GA-ASI. “Our open payload architecture greatly reduces integration complexity by allowing payload providers and mission systems integrators to develop their own payload control software and ultimately integrate their own payloads.”

 

The SPCD is part of a joint Independent Research and Development (IRAD) effort between GA-ASI and SELEX Galileo to prove the concept and architecture for a fully certified Predator B incorporating a separate mission management system that supports the independent and cost-effective upgrade of future sovereign payloads.

 

GA-ASI performed the software and hardware modifications to the Predator B system to implement the open payload architecture, while SELEX Galileo delivered the radar and supported the integration work. Cobham provides support to UK airworthiness procedures and through-life support as GA-ASI’s teammate in the UK responsible for whole life support arrangements for the Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s) MQ-9 Reaper UAS.

 

“We’re thrilled to be partnering with GA-ASI and Cobham on such a forward thinking programme. Customers don’t want to be locked into particular payloads, they want the flexibility to integrate their own capabilities and sovereign control over the missions they fly,” said Fabrizio Giulianini, CEO of SELEX Galileo, adding, “Today’s demonstration was the first step in proving the concept of our platform and sensor-agnostic skyISTAR mission management system which will be flexible enough to meet the needs of any UAS programme going forward. To meet the demanding sensor requirements of these future UAS, our Seaspray radar exemplifies the foundation of advanced AESA technology that will allow us to provide high-resolution, multi-mode, multi-domain, and very wide-area coverage surveillance to users."

 

“Cobham is delighted to partner with GA-ASI and support this initiative by providing expertise to the airworthiness certification and sensor integration portions of this exciting program,” said Peter Nottage, president of Cobham Aviation Services.

 

Initial testing of the new architecture was completed in September 2011, demonstrating the ability to host third party-developed payload control software on existing airborne and Ground Control Station (GCS) processors. Today’s SPCD is the first phase in the flight demonstration process, with future phases envisioned to demonstrate systems integration independent of GA-ASI’s involvement.

 

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., an affiliate of General Atomics, delivers situational awareness by providing unmanned aircraft, radar, and electro-optic solutions for military and commercial applications worldwide. The company’s Aircraft Systems Group is a leading designer and manufacturer of proven, reliable unmanned aircraft systems, including Predator A, Predator B, Gray Eagle, and the new Predator C Avenger.

 

SELEX Galileo, a Finmeccanica company, is a leading player in defence electronics. The company employs over 7,000 people and operates mainly in three domestic markets: the UK, Italy, and the U.S. through dedicated legal entities.

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22 mai 2012 2 22 /05 /mai /2012 07:45

Nato summit may 2012

 

21 mai 2012 Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer - directrice du German Marshall Fund of the United States-France.- atlantico.fr

 

François Hollande est arrivé ce dimanche à Chicago pour le 25e sommet de l'OTAN avec la volonté de défier Barack Obama et ses alliés européens sur le dossier afghan. Alors que onze années après le début des opérations, militaires Américains et Européens admettent avoir perdu le contrôle des domaines qui détermineront l’avenir de l’Afghanistan, quelles seront les réelles conséquences de la décision française sur l'organisation transatlantique et sur l'avenir du pays ?

 

François Hollande est arrivé à l'Élysée avec la volonté de défier le Président américain Barack Obama et ses alliés européens sur le dossier afghan, en annonçant puis en réitérant sa principale promesse de campagne en matière de politique étrangère, à savoir retirer les troupes françaises combattantes d’Afghanistan (déployées principalement dans la province de Kapisa et le district de Surobi) d’ici la fin de l’année 2012, soit deux années plus tôt que la date de 2014 fixée au sommet de l’OTAN à Lisbonne en 2010.

 

Même si le président français et son ministre de la défense Le Drian ont cherché à rassurer leurs partenaires américains et européens quant à l’engagement français pendant et après la phase dire de « transition » (le transfert des responsabilités de la sécurité du pays aux forces de sécurité afghanes) et à rappeler « l’unité et la solidarité » de l’Alliance à Chicago, cette annonce unilatérale arrive à un moment peu opportun pour l’Alliance atlantique : les conséquences de la crise économique sur les budgets de défense américain et européens et les difficultés rencontrées sur le terrain dans la mise en œuvre de la transition face à la capacité de résistance et de nuisance des talibans, incitaient, encore plus que les précédents sommets de l’OTAN, à l’unité, au moins de façade, autour du principe du « in together, out together » et à définir ensemble une stratégie de long terme post-2014.

 

Le consensus qui se dégage de la plupart des récentes analyses d’experts consiste à minimiser l’ampleur des conséquences de la décision française, celles-ci seraient principalement d’ordre tactique. Or, sur un théâtre d’opérations comme l’Afghanistan où une stratégie politique de long terme fait défaut depuis 2001, la tactique (et bien souvent les hésitations et/ou bavures tactiques) façonne voire remplace la stratégie globale de la coalition. La décision française aura donc inévitablement des implications d’ordre stratégique, d’autant plus que la France, forte de ses 3400 militaires en Afghanistan, est le 5e contributeur. Washington mais aussi Berlin et Londres ont averti Hollande de ces risques. Les effets ont déjà commencé à se manifester, non pas au travers d’autres annonces de retrait militaire, mais au travers d’une déclaration des talibans, à l’ouverture du sommet de Chicago, demandant aux pays engagés en Afghanistan de « suivre l’exemple de la France » et de retirer leurs troupes d’Afghanistan. Les Talibans avaient fait des annonces similaires en amont et après les retraits des troupes combattantes canadiennes et néerlandaises et à l’occasion de précédents sommets de l’OTAN. A chaque fois, ils mettent en avant ce qu’ils ont identifié comme étant le talon d’Achille des sociétés occidentales : le poids des opinions publiques, très largement et de plus en plus en faveur d’un retrait des troupes. La décision française est ainsi présentée par les talibans comme « fondée sur les réalités et un reflet de l’opinion de son pays ».

 

Les puissances occidentales sont, on le voit bien, aujourd’hui en panne de stratégies d’intervention et surtout post-intervention : en témoignent les trois mois de réflexion que le Président Obama s’était accordé pour décider du renfort militaire en Afghanistan fin 2009, ainsi que la quasi-absence, en Europe, de débat politique sur ces questions et l’embarras des gouvernements à expliquer les raisons de l’engagement des troupes auprès de leurs opinions publiques - une critique clairement formulée pendant la campagne par Hollande à l’égard de la « guerre de solidarité » dans laquelle la France a été engagée en Afghanistan. Onze années après le début des opérations militaires, le décalage croissant entre le discours otanien autour d’un engagement international de long terme post-2014 et la réalité de la politique du « sauve qui peut », a profité aux talibans, assez lucides pour comprendre qu’il peuvent gagner en puissance en gagnant et en gardant l’initiative des idées et du discours politique. Or, ceux qui remportent la bataille des idées, font aussi perdre partiellement la maîtrise du terrain aux troupes intervenantes.

 

Exacerbé par les calendriers électoraux et de retrait des troupes fixés à Washington et dans les capitales européennes, l’affichage de success stories sur le terrain est régulièrement contredit par les limites des tactiques déployées, engendrant un cercle vicieux dans lequel les puissances occidentales se piègent elles-mêmes : plus les membres de la coalition cherchent à donner du sens à leur action et à reformuler leurs objectifs, plus les réalités du terrain s’éloignent de leur discours, car celles-ci changent rapidement au contact d’une présence étrangère de plus en plus perçue comme des forces d’occupation, et moins la Coalition est capable d’élaborer une stratégie claire pour l’Afghanistan. D’où le choix par défaut de revoir à la baisse les objectifs en Afghanistan. Barack Obama avait signalé ce rétrécissement des objectifs de la coalition internationale en Afghanistan dès la fin 2009, recentrant les objectifs sur les aspects sécuritaires uniquement (lutte contre Al-Qaida et le terrorisme) et ce qu’il est devenu commun d’appeler à Washington « Afghan Good Enough ». Or, la revue à la baisse des objectifs pour l’Afghanistan, couplée d’une vision à durée indéterminée de formateurs et de forces spéciales après 2014, montre le difficile, voire l’impossible exercice d’équilibre que l’administration Obama et ses alliés européens opèrent pour tenter de satisfaire les pressions et positions divergentes au sein de leur opinion publique, parlement et commandement militaire.

 

 

A Chicago, la France tout comme ses alliés européens, devront répondre aux pressions américaines pour qu’ils s’engagent à poursuivre et à financer une assistance à la formation des forces de sécurité afghanes. La promesse de Hollande de retirer les forces « combattantes » lui permet de laisser des troupes françaises pour des missions d’une « autre nature ». Hollande adopte ainsi les orientations données par le traite d’amitié et de coopération établi entre la France et l’Afghanistan fin janvier 2012 et qui organise leur coopération bilatérale dans les domaines civil, économique, diplomatique, politique, en plus d’un soutien logistique et de formation militaire. Mais former des forces de sécurité déconnectées de toute autorité politique crédible et légitime à laquelle elles devraient être rattachées, pose la question de la durabilité et de l’efficacité de cette mission après 2014. Américains et Européens admettent aujourd’hui que l’OTAN a perdu le contrôle des domaines qui pourtant détermineront l’avenir de l’Afghanistan : la justice, la réconciliation politique et les dynamiques régionales qui s’autonomisent des diplomaties occidentales.

 

Hollande et son équipe regardent déjà au-delà de Chicago et de l’Afghanistan, comme le montre leur volonté d’ajuster l’engagement otanien de la France, en investissant davantage dans les « partenariats européens », alors que les Etats-Unis orientent leur stratégie de défense vers l’Asie. La décision de Hollande de s’écarter du calendrier fixé par l’administration américaine à Lisbonne en 2010, s’accompagne d’une volonté clairement exprimée dans ses entretiens de politique étrangère, de redonner à la France et à l’Union européenne une plus grande place et une voix plus importante dans la prise de décision notamment au sein de l’OTAN, se refusant de laisser dicter la politique française par les Etats-Unis. Sur ce plan, Hollande va pouvoir toutefois apprécier l’influence renforcée de la France au sein de l’OTAN, trois années après la réintégration de la France dans la structure militaire intégrée de l’OTAN, y compris sein des structures de commandements de l’OTAN. La tradition gaulliste-mitterrandienne « ami, alliés mais pas alignés » avec les Etats-Unis a un bel avenir sous Hollande et inquiète Washington. C’est pourtant la continuité qui prime ici : le Président Sarkozy s’était lui aussi écarté de la position américaine sur plusieurs dossiers de politique étrangère (désarmement nucléaire, Afghanistan, Israël-Palestine, Libye en recourant initialement à un groupe de contact ad hoc au détriment de l’OTAN).

 

Hollande répond en quelque sorte aux sollicitations formulées par Obama dans sa nouvelle stratégie de défense de février 2012 où il appelait les Européens à davantage partager le fardeau de la sécurité régionale et internationale en renforçant et mutualisant leurs propres capacités de défense. Mais les projets de Hollande pour une Europe de la défense plus forte se confronte à des tendances qui vont dans la direction opposée : la majorité des gouvernements européens se concentrent sur la gestion de la crise économique, réduisent leurs budgets de défense et la Libye a montré le manque de volonté politique en Europe en matière de défense et l’incapacité de la France et du Royaume-Uni à construire une coalition solide lorsque les Etats-Unis délègue le leadership. Dans ce contexte, l’OTAN persistera à exister comme l’alliance principale pour la sécurité transatlantique, et la France gagne à continuer à s’engager et à investir dans l’Alliance, tout en renforçant la voix européenne, mais pas au détriment de ses partenaires transatlantiques et de la solidarité.

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21 mai 2012 1 21 /05 /mai /2012 17:49
NATO Chicago Summit Declaration

0 May. 2012 NATO

 

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012

 

Press Release (2012) 062

Issued on 20 May. 2012

  1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Chicago to renew our commitment to our vital transatlantic bond; take stock of progress in, and reconfirm our commitment to, our operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere; ensure the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to deal with the full range of threats; and strengthen our wide range of partnerships.
     
  2. Our nations are united in their commitment to the Washington Treaty and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies.  Our 2010 Strategic Concept continues to guide us in fulfilling effectively, and always in accordance with international law, our three essential core tasks – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members.
     
  3. At a time of complex security challenges and financial difficulties, it is more important than ever to make the best use of our resources and to continue to adapt our forces and structures.  We remain committed to our common values, and are determined to ensure NATO’s ability to meet any challenges to our shared security.
     
  4. We pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations serving in NATO-led missions and operations.  We commend them for their professionalism and dedication and acknowledge the invaluable support provided to them by their families and loved ones.  We owe a special debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured during the course of their duties, and we extend our profound sympathy to their families and loved ones.
     
  5. Today we have taken further important steps on the road to a stable and secure Afghanistan and to our goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.  The irreversible transition of full security responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is on track for completion by the end of 2014, as agreed at our Lisbon Summit.  We also recognise in this context the importance of a comprehensive approach and continued improvements in governance and development, as well as a political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration.  We welcome the announcement by President Karzai on the third tranche of provinces that will start transition.  This third tranche means that 75% of Afghanistan’s population will live in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security.  By mid-2013, when the fifth and final tranche of provinces starts transition, we will have reached an important milestone in our Lisbon roadmap, and the ANSF will be in the lead for security nationwide At that milestone, as ISAF shifts from focusing primarily on combat increasingly to the provision of training, advice and assistance to the ANSF, ISAF will be able to ensure that the Afghans have the support they need as they adjust to their new increased responsibility.  We are gradually and responsibly drawing down our forces to complete the ISAF mission by 31 December 2014.
     
  6. By the end of 2014, when the Afghan Authorities will have full security responsibility, the NATO-led combat mission will end.  We will, however, continue to provide strong and long-term political and practical support through our Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan.  NATO is ready to work towards establishing, at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, a new post-2014 mission of a different nature in Afghanistan, to train, advise and assist the ANSF, including the Afghan Special Operations Forces.  This will not be a combat mission.  We task the Council to begin immediately work on the military planning process for the post-ISAF mission.
     
  7. At the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December 2011, the international community made a commitment to support Afghanistan in its Transformation Decade beyond 2014.  NATO will play its part alongside other actors in building sufficient and sustainable Afghan forces capable of providing security for their own country.  In this context, Allies welcome contributions and reaffirm their strong commitment to contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF.  We also call on the international community to commit to this long-term sustainment of the ANSF.   Effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF will build upon existing mechanisms, integrating the efforts of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of the international community.  They will be guided by the principles of flexibility, transparency, accountability, and cost effectiveness, and will include measures against corruption.
     
  8. We reiterate the importance Allies attach to seeing tangible progress by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding its commitments made at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011 to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected.  The forthcoming elections must be conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution.  Their transparency, inclusivity and credibility will also be of paramount importance. Continued progress towards these goals will encourage NATO nations to further provide their support up to and beyond 2014.
     
  9. We also underscore the importance of our shared understanding with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding the full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights.  We recognise also the need for the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict.
     
  10. We also recognise that security and stability in the “Heart of Asia” is interlinked across the region.  The Istanbul Process on regional security and cooperation, which was launched in November 2011, reflects the commitment of Afghanistan and the countries in the region to jointly ensure security, stability and development in a regional context.  The countries in the region, particularly Pakistan, have important roles in ensuring enduring peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and in facilitating the completion of the transition process.  We stand ready to continue dialogue and practical cooperation with relevant regional actors in this regard.  We welcome the progress on transit arrangements with our Central Asian partners and Russia.  NATO continues to work with Pakistan to reopen the ground lines of communication as soon as possible.
     
  11. We look forward to our expanded ISAF meeting tomorrow.
     
  12. The Alliance continues to be fully committed to the stability and security of the strategically important Balkans region.  We reiterate our full support for KFOR, which continues to act carefully, firmly and impartially in accordance with its United Nations mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244.  KFOR will continue to support the development of a peaceful, stable, and multi-ethnic Kosovo. KFOR will also continue to contribute to the maintenance of freedom of movement and ensuring a safe and secure environment for all people in Kosovo, in cooperation with all relevant actors, including the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the EU Special Representative, as agreed, and the Kosovo authorities.  We will maintain KFOR’s robust and credible capability to carry out its mission.  We remain committed to moving towards a smaller, more flexible, deterrent presence, only once the security situation allows.  We welcome the progress made in developing the Kosovo Security Force, under NATO’s supervision and commend it for its readiness and capability to implement its security tasks and responsibilities.  We will continue to look for opportunities to develop NATO’s ongoing role with the Kosovo Security Force. 
     
  13. Last year, through the UN-mandated Operation Unified Protector (OUP), and with the support of the League of Arab States, our Alliance played a crucial role in protecting the civilian population in Libya and in helping save thousands of lives.  We commend the Libyan people for the progress achieved to date on their path towards building a new, free, democratic Libya that fully respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, and encourage them to build on that progress.
     
  14. Our successful operation in Libya showed once more that the Alliance can quickly and effectively conduct complex operations in support of the broader international community.  We have also learned a number of important lessons which we are incorporating into our plans and policies.  With OUP, NATO set new standards of consultation and practical cooperation with partner countries who contributed to our operation, as well as with other international and regional organisations.  In this context, we recognise the value of the Libya Contact Group.
     
  15. The Alliance is also contributing to peace and security through other operations and missions:
     
    • We welcome the extension of the mandate of our counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa, Operation Ocean Shield, for a further two years through to 2014.  The decision to carry out enhanced actions at sea should allow us to be more effective in eroding the operational reach of pirates at sea.  We remain committed to supporting international counter-piracy efforts, including through working together with the EU Operation Atalanta, as agreed, Combined Task Force 151 and other naval forces, and through our ongoing participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.  We encourage the shipping industry to adopt Best Management Practices and other measures proven effective against piracy, in compliance with international law.
       
    • Operation Active Endeavour is our Article 5 maritime operation in the Mediterranean which contributes to the fight against terrorism.  We are reviewing strategic options for the future of this operation.
       
    • We continue to provide the African Union (AU) with operational support, at its request.  We have agreed to extend strategic air and maritime lift support for the AU’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and support the development of the AU’s long-term peacekeeping capabilities, including the African Stand-by Force.  We stand ready to consider further AU requests for NATO training assistance.
       
    • We have successfully concluded the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) which contributed to a more stable Iraq by assisting in the capacity building of Iraq’s security institutions.
       
  16. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, the lack of effective institutional arrangements to protect women, and the continued under-representation of women in peace processes, remain serious impediments to building sustainable peace.  We remain committed to the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related Resolutions which are aimed at protecting and promoting women’s rights, role, and participation in preventing and ending conflict.  In line with the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Policy, the Alliance, together with its partners, has made significant progress in implementing the goals articulated in these Resolutions.  In this regard, we have today endorsed a Strategic Progress Report on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions into NATO-led Operations and Missions, and welcomed Norway’s generous offer to provide a NATO Special Representative for these important issues.  In this context, and to further advance this work, we have tasked the Council to: continue implementing the Policy and the Action Plan; undertake a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO operations and missions; further integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities; and submit a report for our next Summit.   
     
  17. We also remain committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related Resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict.  We note with concern the growing range of threats to children in armed conflict and strongly condemn that they are increasingly subject to recruitment, sexual violence and targeted attacks.  NATO-led operations, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, are taking an active role in preventing, monitoring and responding to violations against children, including through pre-deployment training and a violations alert mechanism.  This approach, based on practical, field-oriented measures, demonstrates NATO’s firm commitment on this issue, as does the recent appointment of a NATO Focal Point for Children and Armed Conflict in charge of maintaining a close dialogue with the UN.  NATO-UN cooperation in this field is creating a set of good practices to be integrated in NATO training modules and taken into account in possible future operations.
     
  18. Our operational experiences have shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security.  We reaffirm our Lisbon Summit decisions on a comprehensive approach.  In order to fulfil these commitments, important work on NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and on stabilisation and reconstruction is ongoing. An appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability has been established, both at the NATO Headquarters and within Allied Command Operations, in accordance with the principles and detailed political guidance we set out at our Summit in Lisbon. 
     
  19. We will continue to enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN in line with the UN-NATO Declaration of September 2008.  We welcome the strengthened cooperation and enhanced liaison between NATO and the UN that has been achieved since our last Summit meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, and which also contributed to the success of OUP.
     
  20. NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO.  Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity; NATO and the EU should continue to work to enhance practical cooperation in operations, broaden political consultations, and cooperate more fully in capability development.  NATO and the EU are working side by side in crisis management operations, in a spirit of mutual reinforcement, and in particular in Afghanistan, Kosovo and fighting piracy.  NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence.  NATO also recognises non-EU Allies’ ongoing concerns and their significant contributions to strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.   In this context, NATO will work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing; we welcome the efforts of the EU, in particular in the areas of air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance and training.  We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas by European Allies and Partners.  We also encourage the Secretary General to continue his dialogue with the EU High Representative with a view to making our cooperation more effective, and to report to the Council in time for the next Summit. 
     
  21. We continue to work closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation, and in addressing new security threats.  We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.
     
  22. NATO has a wide network of partnership relations.  We highly value all of NATO’s partners and the contributions they make to the work of the Alliance as illustrated through several partnership meetings we are holding here in Chicago.  Partnerships play a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security.  NATO’s partnerships are a key element of Cooperative Security which is one of the core tasks of the Alliance, and the Alliance has developed effective policies in order to enhance its partnerships.  Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, we have pursued cooperation with our Euro-Atlantic partners to build a Europe whole, free and at peace.  For twenty years, our partnerships have facilitated, and provided frameworks for, political dialogue and practical regional cooperation in the fields of security and defence, contribute to advancing our common values, allow us to share expertise and experience, and make a significant contribution to the success of many of our operations and missions.  NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin in April 2011 approved a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy to enhance the effectiveness of NATO’s partnerships.  We will continue to actively pursue its further implementation with a view to strengthening NATO’s partnerships, including by: reinforcing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and our relationships with partners across the globe, while making full use of flexible formats; further developing our political and practical cooperation with partners, including in an operational context; and through increasing partner involvement in training, education, and exercises, including with the NATO Response Force.  We will intensify our efforts to better engage with partners across the globe who can contribute significantly to security, and to reach out to partners concerned, including our newest partner Mongolia, to build trust, increase transparency, and develop political dialogue and practical cooperation.  In this context, we welcome the Joint Political Declaration between Australia and NATO.
     
  23. We appreciate our partners’ significant contributions to our practical cooperation activities and to the different Trust Funds which support our partnership goals.  We welcome the Status Report on Building Integrity and the progress achieved by NATO’s Building Integrity Programme which has made important contributions to promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence sector of interested nations. 
     
  24. We welcome our meeting in Chicago with thirteen partners 1 who have recently made particular political, operational, and financial contributions to NATO-led operations.  This is an example of the enhanced flexibility with which we are addressing partnership issues in a demand and substance-driven way.  Our meeting in Chicago with partners provides us with a unique opportunity to discuss the lessons learned from our cooperation, and to exchange views on the common security challenges we face.  Joint training and exercises will be essential in maintaining our interoperability and interconnectedness with partner forces, including when we are not engaged together in active operations.  We will share ideas generated at this Chicago meeting with all our partners, within the appropriate frameworks, for additional discussion. 
     
  25. In accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to security in the North Atlantic area.  Based on these considerations, we will keep the progress of each of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance under active review, judging each on its own merits.  We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance in accordance with previous decisions taken at the Bucharest, Strasbourg-Kehl, and Lisbon Summits.  We welcome progress made by these four partners and encourage them to continue to implement the necessary decisions and reforms to advance their Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  For our part, we will continue to offer political and practical support to partners that aspire to join the Alliance.  NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security continue to advance stability in Europe more broadly.
     
  26. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2 to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and strongly urge intensified efforts towards that end.  An early solution, and subsequent membership, will contribute to security and stability in the region.  We encourage the negotiations to be pursued without further delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible.  We welcome, and continue to support, the ongoing reform efforts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and encourage continued implementation.  We also encourage its efforts to further build a multi-ethnic society.  We appreciate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s substantial contributions to our operations, as well as its active role in regional cooperation activities.  We value the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s long-standing commitment to the NATO accession process.
     
  27. We welcome the significant progress that Montenegro has made towards NATO membership and its contribution to security in the Western Balkans region and beyond, including through its active role in regional cooperation activities and its participation in ISAF.  We also welcome the increasing public support for NATO membership in Montenegro, and will continue to assist this process.  Montenegro’s active engagement in the MAP process demonstrates firm commitment to join the Alliance.  Montenegro has successfully implemented significant political, economic and defence reforms, and we encourage it to continue on that path so it can draw even closer to the Alliance.  We will keep Montenegro’s progress towards membership under active review.
     
  28. We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We welcome the significant progress that has been made in recent months, including the establishment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers, and the political agreement reached on 9 March 2012 on the registration of immovable defence property as state property.  These developments are a sign of the political will in Bosnia and Herzegovina to move the reform process forward, and we encourage all political actors in the country to continue to work constructively to further implement the reforms necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration.  The political agreement on defence and state properties is an important step towards fulfilment of the condition set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010 for full participation in the MAP process. We welcome the initial steps taken regarding implementation, and we urge the political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to further their efforts to work constructively to implement the agreement without delay in order to start its first MAP cycle as soon as possible.  The Alliance will continue to follow progress in implementation and will provide assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform efforts. We appreciate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s contribution to NATO-led operations and commend its constructive role in regional and international security.
     
  29. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. The NATO-Georgia Commission and Georgia’s Annual National Programme (ANP) have a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit.  We welcome Georgia’s progress since the Bucharest Summit to meet its Euro-Atlantic aspirations through its reforms, implementation of its Annual National Programme, and active political engagement with the Alliance in the NATO-Georgia Commission. In that context, we have agreed to enhance Georgia’s connectivity with the Alliance, including by further strengthening our political dialogue, practical cooperation, and interoperability with Georgia. We continue to encourage and actively support Georgia's ongoing implementation of all necessary reforms, including democratic, electoral, and judicial reforms, as well as security and defence reforms.  We stress the importance of conducting free, fair, and inclusive elections in 2012 and 2013.  We appreciate Georgia’s substantial contribution, in particular as the second largest non-NATO troop contributing nation to ISAF, to Euro-Atlantic security.
     
  30. We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders.  We welcome Georgia’s full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and other unilateral measures to build confidence.  We welcome Georgia’s commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate.  We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states.  We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally-recognised territory of Georgia. 
     
  31. Here in Chicago, our Foreign Ministers are meeting with their counterparts from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, in order to take stock of their individual progress, plan future cooperation, and exchange views with our partners, including on their participation in partnership activities and contributions to operations.  We are grateful to these partners that aspire to NATO membership for the important contributions they are making to NATO-led operations, and which demonstrate their commitment to our shared security goals.
     
  32. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are important for lasting peace and stability.  We are encouraged by the progress being made, including in regional cooperation formats, and will continue to actively support Euro-Atlantic aspirations in this region.  Together, Allies and partners of the region actively contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, including through regional cooperation formats.
     
  33. We continue to support Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.   We welcome Serbia’s progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path.  NATO stands ready to continue to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with Serbia.  We will continue assisting Serbia’s reform efforts, and encourage further work.
     
  34. We call upon Serbia to support further efforts towards the consolidation of peace and stability in Kosovo.  We urge all parties concerned to cooperate fully with KFOR and EULEX in the execution of their respective mandates for which unconditional freedom of movement is necessary.  We urge Belgrade and Pristina to take full advantage of the opportunities offered to promote peace, security, and stability in the region, in particular by the European Union-facilitated dialogue.  We welcome progress made in the European Union-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, including the Agreement on Regional Cooperation and the IBM technical protocol.  Dialogue between them and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region are key for a sustained improvement in security and stability in the Western Balkans.  We call on both parties to implement fully existing agreements, and to move forward on all outstanding issues, including on the conclusion of additional agreements on telecommunications and electricity.  We welcome progress achieved and encourage further efforts aimed at consolidating the rule of law, and other reform efforts, in Kosovo. 
     
  35. An independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.  Marking the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, we welcome Ukraine’s commitment to enhancing political dialogue and interoperability with NATO, as well as its contributions to NATO-led operations and new offers made.  We note the recent elimination of Ukraine’s highly enriched uranium in March 2012, which demonstrates a proven commitment to non-proliferation. Recalling our decisions in relation to Ukraine and our Open Door policy stated at the Bucharest and Lisbon Summits, NATO is ready to continue to develop its cooperation with Ukraine and assist with the implementation of reforms in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP).  Noting the principles and commitments enshrined in the NATO-Ukraine Charter and the ANP, we are concerned by the selective application of justice and what appear to be politically motivated prosecutions, including of leading members of the opposition, and the conditions of their detention.  We encourage Ukraine to address the existing shortcomings of its judicial system to ensure full compliance with the rule of law and the international agreements to which it is a party.  We also encourage Ukraine to ensure free, fair and inclusive Parliamentary elections this autumn.
     
  36. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.  We remain determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration.  We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.
     
  37. This year, we mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.  We welcome important progress in our cooperation with Russia over the years.  At the same time, we differ on specific issues and there is a need to improve trust, reciprocal transparency, and predictability in order to realise the full potential of the NRC.  In this context, we intend to raise with Russia in the NRC Allied concerns about Russia’s stated intentions regarding military deployments close to Alliance borders.  Mindful of the goals, principles and commitments which underpin the NRC, and on this firm basis, we urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia, as mediated by the EU on 12 August and 8 September 2008 3.  We continue to be concerned by the build-up of Russia’s military presence on Georgia’s territory and continue to call on Russia to ensure free access for humanitarian assistance and international observers.
     
  38. NATO and Russia share common security interests and face common challenges and our practical achievements together reflect that reality.  Today, we continue to value the important role of the NRC as a forum for frank and honest political dialogue – including on subjects where we disagree – and for promoting practical cooperation. Our cooperation with Russia on issues related to Afghanistan – notably the two-way transit arrangements offered by Russia in support of ISAF, our joint training of counter narcotics personnel from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan, and the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in support of a key ANSF need – is a sign of our common determination to build peace and stability in that region.  NATO-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation has expanded and all NRC nations will benefit from the lessons to be learned from the first civil-military NRC Counter-Terrorism exercise, and the capabilities available under the NRC aviation counter-terrorism programme which is now operational.  We also note with satisfaction our growing counter-piracy cooperation off the Horn of Africa.  We are committed to, and look forward to, further improving trust and reciprocal transparency in: defence matters; strategy; doctrines; military postures, including of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; military exercises; arms control and disarmament; and we invite Russia to engage with the Alliance in discussing confidence-building measures covering these issues.
     
  39. At a time of unprecedented change in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East, NATO is committed to strengthening and developing partnership relations with countries in the region, with whom we face common security challenges and share the same goals for peace, security and stability. NATO supports the aspirations of the people of the region for democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law – values which underpin the Alliance. 
     
  40. The Libya crisis illustrated the benefits of cooperation with partners from the region.  It also showed the merit of regular consultations between the Alliance and regional organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States.
     
  41. NATO is ready to consult more regularly on security issues of common concern, through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as bilateral consultations and 28+n formats.  We recall our commitment to the MD and the ICI and to the principles that underpin them; the MD and ICI remain two complementary and yet distinct partnership frameworks. We are also ready to consider providing, upon request, support to our partners in the region in such areas as security institution building, defence modernisation, capacity development, and civil-military relations.  Individualised programmes will allow us to focus on agreed priorities for each partner country.  
     
  42. The MD helps to strengthen mutual understanding, political dialogue, practical cooperation and, as appropriate, interoperability.  We welcome the Moroccan-led initiative to develop a new, political framework document for the MD, and look forward to developing it together soon with our MD partners.  We encourage the MD partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO.  The MD remains open to other countries in the region. 
     
  43. We welcome Libya’s stated interest to deepen relations with the Alliance.  We are ready to welcome Libya as a partner, if it so wishes.  In that perspective, the MD is a natural framework for this partnership.  We stand ready, if requested, and on a case-by-case basis, to consider providing assistance to Libya in areas where NATO can add value.  NATO’s activities would focus primarily on security and defence sector reform, while taking into account other international efforts.
     
  44. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation in the ICI.  We warmly welcome the generous offer by the State of Kuwait to host an ICI Regional Centre, which will help us to better understand common security challenges, and discuss how to address them together.  We encourage our ICI partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO.  We remain open to receiving new members in the ICI.
     
  45. We are following the evolution of the Syrian crisis with growing concern and we strongly support the efforts of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, including full implementation of the six-point Annan plan, to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.
     
  46. We welcome progress being made in Iraq.  The NATO Transition Cell now established in Iraq is helping to develop our partnership.
     
  47. With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance.  We welcome the constructive approach in the renewed dialogue on Transnistria in the 5+2 format, and encourage further efforts by all actors involved.  With respect to all these conflicts, we urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats.  We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability.  We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act.  
     
  48. The Black Sea region continues to be important for Euro-Atlantic security.  We welcome the progress in consolidating regional cooperation and ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms, in the spirit of transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness.  We will continue to support, as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.
     
  49. Cyber attacks continue to increase significantly in number and evolve in sophistication and complexity.  We reaffirm the cyber defence commitments made at the Lisbon Summit.  Following Lisbon, last year we adopted a Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and Action Plan, which are now being implemented.  Building on NATO’s existing capabilities, the critical elements of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Full Operational Capability (FOC), including protection of most sites and users, will be in place by the end of 2012.  We have committed to provide the resources and complete the necessary reforms to bring all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection, to ensure that enhanced cyber defence capabilities protect our collective investment in NATO.  We will further integrate cyber defence measures into Alliance structures and procedures and, as individual nations, we remain committed to identifying and delivering national cyber defence capabilities that strengthen Alliance collaboration and interoperability, including through NATO defence planning processes.  We will develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against, and recover from cyber attacks To address the cyber security threats and to improve our common security, we are committed to engage with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with international organisations, inter alia the EU, as agreed, the Council of Europe, the UN and the OSCE, in order to increase concrete cooperation.  We will also take full advantage of the expertise offered by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia.  
     
  50. We continue to be deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery.  Proliferation threatens our shared vision of creating the conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  We share the United Nations Security Council’s serious concern with Iran’s nuclear programme and call upon Iran to fully comply with all its international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors.  We further call upon Iran to cooperate with the international community to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme in compliance with its NPT obligations.  We support the immediate resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means and encourage a sustained process of engagement within the format of the P5+1 and Iran talks.  We are deeply concerned by the proliferation activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and call on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and international obligations, especially by abandoning all activities related to its existing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.  We strongly condemn the launch by the DPRK on 13 April 2012 using ballistic missile technology.  We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT and the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under UNSCR 1977.  We also call on all states to strengthen the security of nuclear materials within their borders, as called for at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.  We will continue to implement NATO’s Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.  We will ensure NATO has the appropriate capabilities, including for planning efforts, training and exercises, to address and respond to CBRN attacks.  
     
  51. Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations can never be tolerated or justified.  We deplore all loss of life from acts of terrorism and extend our sympathies to the victims.  We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism with unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter.  Today we have endorsed NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, and task the Council to prepare an Action Plan to further enhance NATO’s ability to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism by identifying initiatives to enhance our threat awareness, capabilities, and engagement.
     
  52. A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance.  While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations concerned, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security.  Today, we have noted a progress report which outlines the concrete steps taken since our last Summit and describes the way forward to integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO’s policies and activities.  We will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value.  To this end, we will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; develop our competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further develop our outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-by-case basis.  We welcome the offer to establish a NATO-accredited Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania as a contribution to NATO’s efforts in this area.  We task the Council to continue to refine NATO’s role in energy security in accordance with the principles and the guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by the new Strategic Concept as well as the Lisbon decisions.  We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.
     
  53. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.
     
  54. In Lisbon, we called for a review of NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in the evolving international security environment.  We have today approved, and made public, the results of our Deterrence and Defence Posture Review.  NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept.  Consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts. 
     
  55. We will ensure that the Alliance continues to have the capabilities needed to perform the essential core tasks to which we committed ourselves in the Strategic Concept. To that end, we have agreed a separate Chicago Defence Declaration and endorsed the Defence Package for the Chicago Summit, outlining a vision and a clear way forward towards our goal of NATO Forces 2020.
     
  56. We welcome the recent Council decision to continue the NATO Air Policing Mission in the Baltic states, and appreciate the recent commitment by the Baltic states to enhance their host nation support to the participating Allies.  Allies remain committed to contributing to this mission, which is also an example of Smart Defence in practice. This peacetime mission and other Alliance air policing arrangements demonstrate the Alliance’s continued and visible commitment to collective defence and solidarity.
     
  57. The Alliance’s recent operational experiences also show that the ability of NATO forces to act together seamlessly and rapidly is critical to success. We will, therefore, ensure that the Alliance’s forces remain well connected through expanded education, training and exercises.  In line with the Alliance’s commitment to transparency, and in the expectation of reciprocity, these activities are open for partner participation and observation on a case-by-case basis.  In this context, we attach particular importance to next year’s “Steadfast Jazz” exercise for the NATO Response Force which, along with other exercises, will contribute to the ability of NATO forces to operate together anywhere on Alliance territory and in wider crisis management operations. 
     
  58. We continue to be concerned by the increasing threats to our Alliance posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.  At our Summit in Lisbon we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.  Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.
     
  59. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them.  This capability is purely defensive. 
     
  60. We are pleased today to declare that the Alliance has achieved an Interim NATO BMD Capability.  It will provide with immediate effect an operationally significant first step, consistent with our Lisbon decision, offering the maximum coverage within available means, to defend our populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack.  Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability.  Only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for common funding.  Within the context of the NATO BMD capability, Turkey hosts a forward-based early-warning radar. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment.
     
  61. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to this Interim Capability will be ensured.  Given the short flight times of ballistic missiles, the Council agrees the pre-arranged command and control rules and procedures including to take into account the consequences of intercept compatible with coverage and protection requirements.  We have tasked the Council to regularly review the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development, for us by our next Summit.
     
  62. The Alliance remains prepared to engage with third states, on a case by case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness.  Given our shared security interests with Russia, we remain committed to cooperation on missile defence in the spirit of mutual trust and reciprocity, such as the recent NRC Theatre Missile Defence Exercise.  Through ongoing efforts in the NATO-Russia Council, we seek to determine how independent NATO and Russian missile defence systems can work together to enhance European security.  We look forward to establishing the proposed joint NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and the joint Planning Operations Centre to cooperate on missile defence. We propose to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the current respective missile defence capabilities of NATO and Russia. Such concrete missile defence cooperation is the best means to provide Russia with the assurances it seeks regarding NATO’s missile defence plans and capabilities.  In this regard, we today reaffirm that the NATO missile defence in Europe will not undermine strategic stability.  NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities.  NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.  While regretting recurrent Russian statements on possible measures directed against NATO’s missile defence system, we welcome Russia's willingness to continue dialogue with the purpose of finding an agreement on the future framework for missile defence cooperation.
     
  63. We remain committed to conventional arms control.  NATO CFE Allies recall that the decisions taken in November 2011 to cease implementing certain CFE obligations with regard to the Russian Federation are reversible, should the Russian Federation return to full implementation. NATO CFE Allies continue to implement fully their CFE obligations with respect to all other CFE States Parties. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end.
     
  64. At our Summit in Lisbon, we agreed on an ambitious reform programme.  This package of reforms remains essential for guaranteeing the Alliance is responsive and effective in carrying out the ambitious tasks envisioned in our Strategic Concept, the Lisbon Declaration, as well as the Declaration on Defence Capabilities we have adopted today.  To this end:< >NATO Command Structure.  We are implementing a leaner, more effective and affordable NATO Command Structure with its first phase and its package elements being effective during 2012.  The number of subordinate headquarters, as well as the peacetime staffing and establishment, are being significantly reduced and implementation will be complete by 2015.NATO Headquarters.  We have rationalised a number of services between the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS).  The move to the new headquarters in 2016 provides a unique opportunity to achieve more efficient and effective support to the work of the Alliance.  We welcome the ongoing review of the IS, and the forthcoming review of the IMS; we look forward to the continuation of these reforms in line with those being carried out by nations.  An important part of this comprehensive reform will be a review of our priorities and IS and IMS spending to identify activities that are no longer needed, improve efficiency, and achieve savings.  This review will take place with the appropriate involvement of the Military Committee.NATO Agencies.  The consolidation and rationalization of the existing NATO Agencies’ functions and services is underway with new NATO Agencies for Support, Communication & Information, and Procurement, to be stood up on 1 July 2012.  The new Agencies’ executives will work to optimise savings and improvements in effectiveness as the new entities mature over the next two years. Resource Management.  We have achieved solid progress in reforming the management of NATO’s resources in the areas of programming, transparency, accountability, and information management. These reforms are making NATO resource and financial management more efficient, and are helping us to match resources to requirements.  In this context, we will continue to reform our structures and procedures in order to seek greater efficiencies including from better use of our budgets.We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United States as well as the people and City of Chicago.  The decisions we have taken at our Summit in Chicago reinforce our common commitments, our capabilities and our cooperation, and will strengthen the Alliance for the years ahead.

 

  1. Australia, Austria, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates.
  2. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
  3. As complemented by the French President’s letter dated 16 August 2008 and subsequent correspondence on this issue.
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21 mai 2012 1 21 /05 /mai /2012 06:56
Boeing Delivers RAF's 8th C-17 Globemaster III

 

May 20, 2012 ASDNews Source : The Boeing Company

 

Boeing delivered the United Kingdom's eighth C-17 Globemaster III to the Royal Air Force (RAF) today during a ceremony at the company's final assembly facility in Long Beach.

 

"I'm honored and delighted to deliver the Royal Air Force's newest C-17 to join the fleet at Number 99 Squadron, where our seven C-17s are in constant demand flying missions in support of Defence and other government agencies' requirements," said RAF Wing Cmdr. David Manning, Officer Commanding 99 Squadron. "It's a great feeling to know that we have the capability to deliver crucial supplies to the front lines with little notice, or to transport injured troops home with a better chance of survival because of the capability and flexibility of the C-17. This newest C-17 will be a welcome addition to the Air Force fleet."

 

The RAF C-17s are operated by 99 Squadron at RAF Brize Norton. The first RAF C-17s entered service in 2001 and have surpassed 74,000 flight hours -- 15 percent above the projected rate. The UK Ministry of Defence, citing ongoing demand, ordered additional airlifters for delivery in 2008 and 2010 and contracted for its eighth C-17 in March.

 

"RAF C-17s are ever-present when there's a need for humanitarian relief or peacekeeping around the world," said Bob Ciesla, Boeing Airlift vice president and C-17 program manager. "We're proud to support the Royal Air Force in providing for the mobility needs of their great nation, and we are grateful for the partnership with the UK Ministry of Defence and U.S. Air Force that made this delivery possible in such a short time."

 

"The RAF fleet's airlift capacity, increased by this latest delivery, is backed by a comprehensive sustainment services program," said Boeing Defence UK Managing Director Mike Kurth. "As part of the worldwide C-17 'virtual fleet,' RAF C-17s are supported through the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP), a Performance-Based Logistics agreement. The support provided to the RAF under the GISP arrangement results in an excellent mission-capable rate at one of the lowest costs per flying hour."

 

Boeing has delivered 242 C-17s worldwide, including 216 to the U.S. Air Force active duty, Guard and Reserve units. A total of 26 C-17s have been delivered to Australia, Canada, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the 12-member Strategic Airlift Capability initiative of NATO and Partnership for Peace nations. India has 10 C-17s on order for delivery in 2013 and 2014.

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21 mai 2012 1 21 /05 /mai /2012 06:48

Nato summit may 2012

 

Mai 21, 2012 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (BRUXELLES2 à Chicago)

 

C’est fait. Les Alliés ont pu déclarer à Chicago la capacité « intérimaire » pour le bouclier anti-missiles déployé sur le territoire européen. Un bon succès pour Barack Obama sur son sol. Un important travail en amont avait été engagé au niveau des experts, des ambassadeurs et des Ministres pour avoir un premier accord sur l’aspect financier du dispositif comme sur une partie de l’aspect opérationnel, notamment les règles d’engagement. Mais il n’a pas été possible d’aller plus loin. Et les discussions vont continuer pour arriver au second stade, la capacité « initiale ».

 

Un instrument complémentaire, défensif, non dirigé contre la Russie


Il est bien précisé, selon la déclaration publiée dimanche (20 mai) à l’issue de la réunion des Chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement que la défense antimissile peut venir « compléter le rôle des armes nucléaires dans la dissuasion mais elle ne peut pas s’y substituer ». Cette capacité est « purement défensive et est mise en place à la lumière des menaces provenant de l’extérieur » de la région euro‑atlantique. Les capacités de défense antimissile de l’OTAN devraient « compliquer les plans d’un adversaire et limiter les dégâts ». Une défense antimissile efficace pourrait « aussi offrir un instrument utile à la décision en période de crise ». À l’instar des autres systèmes d’armes, les capacités de défense antimissile « ne peuvent garantir une efficacité totale et pérenne ». Mais, « de pair avec des forces nucléaires et conventionnelles efficaces », elle montre la « détermination (de l’Alliance) à assurer la dissuasion et la défense contre toute menace pour la sécurité et la sûreté de nos populations ».
 Précision ultime : « La défense antimissile de l’OTAN n’est pas dirigée contre la Russie ; elle n’a pas non plus la capacité de porter atteinte à la dissuasion stratégique russe. » Et l’Alliance de répéter « dans un esprit de réciprocité, de transparence maximale et de confiance mutuelle, » vouloir chercher « activement à coopérer avec la Russie dans le domaine de la défense antimissile » comme avec les pays tiers « déterminés au cas par cas ».

 

Financement en commun


Ce qui semble acquis aujourd’hui, c’est que les Alliés ne financeront en commun qu’une seule chose : le surcoût pour passer du C2 (le système de commandement et de contrôle) du dispositif antimissiles de théâtre (qui a déjà été agréé au sommet de Prague) à un C2 antimissiles de territoire. Le dispositif total coûtait environ 928 millions d’euros, dont un peu moins de 800 millions ont déjà été sinon financés, du moins engagés (au titre de la défense de théâtre). Soit un surcoût de 157 millions d’euros (200 millions $) à répartir entre les alliés selon les règles habituelles de financement sur une dizaine d’années. Si on prend en compte la clé de répartition fixée pour 2011, cela devrait faire environ 22 millions d’euros pour la France, soit environ 2 millions d’euros par an.

 

Et moyens en nature


C’est une « infime » partie du coût global de l’ensemble. Le bouclier tout compris « pèse » au moins quelque milliards de $, supportés en grande partie par les Américains — mise à disposition de navires – fregate Aegis, présence d’un radar américain d’alerte en Turquie… — et par quelques pays qui fournissent des moyens « en nature ». La France devrait ainsi fournir ou mettre à disposition des moyens d’alerte avancée qui n’ont pas été spécialement développé pour la défense anti-missiles mais pour la dissuasion ou le renseignement : un radar transhorizon, terrestre, encore en développement (à l’Onera) et des moyens satellitaires sur la base du démonstrateur Spirale (entre 2009-2011). Les Pays-Bas et l’Allemagne devraient aussi participer en nature, avec la fourniture de moyens d’interception type Patriot, des radars. D’autres pays n’envisagent pas, en revanche, d’y participer. Il en est ainsi de la Belgique. « Nous ne participerons pas directement au bouclier anti-missiles, autrement que par le financement en commun » a ainsi précisé Didier Reynders lors d’une conférence de presse, ajoutant ironiquement « je n’ai pas senti de menace particulière suscitant la convocation d’un kern », (un conseil des ministres restreint) .

 

Zone de couverture


La défense anti-missiles dans sa version « intérimaire » ne couvrira qu’une faible partie de l’Europe, la bordure sud-est : Turquie, Roumanie, Bulgarie, et une partie des Balkans. En gros, une capacité correspondant à la menace telle qu’elle est définie. C’est-à-dire celle de l’Iran, même si ce pays n’est à aucun moment désigné (mais c’est un secret de Polichinelle) qui ne dispose pas encore d’armes à longue portée pouvant menacer tout le territoire européen selon les experts. La capacité initiale (IOC) devrait être atteinte entre 2016 et 2018 et la capacité pleine (FOC) à l’horizon 2018-2020.

 

Règles d’engagement


Les règles d’engagement ont été agréées, avant le sommet de l’OTAN, entre ambassadeurs. « On ne peut pas se permettre de réunir un NAC (le conseil de l’Alliance Atlantique) et d’attendre une décision politique » a ainsi précisé à quelques journalistes (dont B2) un diplomate de l’Alliance. « En cas de tir d’un missile, il n’y a que quelques minutes pour réagir et intercepter celui-ci ». Il y a donc une « délégation d’autorité aux militaires, avec fixation d’un cadre strict sur la manière dont on délègue, précisant dans quels cas on tire, avec un degré de délégation variable selon la période de crise ». L’objectif est « que la marge d’appréciation des militaires soit aussi faible que possible, avec l’exécution de plans prédécidés ». Ensuite, « savoir qui appuie sur le bouton : la nationalité compte peu quand les règles sont prédécidées ».

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21 mai 2012 1 21 /05 /mai /2012 06:18

BouclierAntiMissileC2Otan5818a-337x450-source-B2.jpg

 

Le Command et Control, centre nerveux du bouclier anti-missiles,

et objet de toutes les attentions des Français

 

Mai 21, 2012 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (BRUXELLES2 à Chicago)

 

La position française sur le bouclier anti-missiles, mis en place par l’OTAN (à la demande des Américains), a évolué au fil du temps. De très réticente, au début du projet, cette position est devenue moins hostile au fil des années, estimant que défense anti-missiles était complémentaire de la dissuasion nucléaire. Mais il y encore des résistances, des réticences qui ne s’expriment pas qu’à gauche. Avant de céder ses fonctions, Gérard Longuet, le ministre de la Défense de Nicolas Sarkozy avait ainsi souligné – devant quelques journalistes dont B2 – que tout ne pourrait pas être réglé à Chicago. « Il y a toute une série de questions qui ne pourront pas être réglées à Chicago, en l’état de l’art, de la technologie, et des finances. » A commencer par celle des déchets. « Que se passe-t-il avec les débris et déchets d’un missile intercontinental détruit sur le territoire européen pour protéger le territoire américain » ? De façon plus générale, il avait aussi exprimé certaines réticences sur ce bouclier anti-missiles, « ce mythe de la protection absolue » qui existait déjà « avec la guerre des étoiles » et existe toujours. La « défense de théâtres d’opération contre des missiles à courte portée est en partie plausible (tandis que la défense de territoires contre des missiles à longue portée reste hautement problématique ». Et de conclure par un plaidoyer en faveur de la dissuasion nucléaire : « le rapport coût rendement justifie pleinement le choix français de la dissuasion. Ce qui évite de le faire payer à un prix trop élevé. »

 

Les 4 conditions posées par la France


François Hollande, comme auparavant son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Laurent Fabius, ont repris à Chicago, à leur compte certaines des préventions françaises. Le Président de la république a ainsi résumé, dimanche en fin d’après midi (heure de Chicago), les quatre conditions posées par la France :

1° La défense anti-missiles « ne peut pas être un substitut à la dissuasion nucléaire mais un complément » (NB : une tradition française qui figure dans la déclaration adoptée) ;

2° il doit y avoir un « contrôle politique de son utilisation. Nous aurons y à travailler » (NB : il s’agit essentiellement des règles d’engagement qui ont été approuvées pour la capacité intérimaire avant la réunion) ;

3° il importe que « nos industriels soient directement intéressés » ;

4° il doit y avoir une « maitrise des coûts pour qu’il y ait pas une dérive financière qui serait insupportable pour le budget de l’Alliance ».

 

La France donne son quitus au bouclier anti-missiles


François Hollande a ajouté un cinquième principe : « Il ne peut pas être question que des pays se sentent menacés par cet dispositif anti-missiles, je pense notamment à la Russie. Le dialogue avec la Russie doit donc être maintenu ». Et de conclure « Sur ces 4 conditions, le communiqué final nous donne satisfaction ».

Commentaire : même si le nouveau président français a crédité à son compte le succès de l’entreprise, on ne peut dégager entre la gauche et la droite française de grandes différences d’approche. Sur ce point, la position française est restée plutôt identique.

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20 mai 2012 7 20 /05 /mai /2012 07:50

Jean-Yves-Le-Drian-nato-summit-may-2012.jpg

 

19.05.2012 par P. CHAPLEAU Lignes de Défense

 

Jean-Yves Le Drian, l'amiral Guillaud, Jean-Claude Mallet, le général Denis Mercier ont été reçus dans l'après-midi par Leon Panetta, le secrétaire d'Etat US à la Défense (photo DoD). Un communiqué a été diffusé au terme de cette rencontre:

 

“Today Secretary Panetta met with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian to discuss the upcoming NATO Summit and plans for transition in Afghanistan. Secretary Panetta congratulated Minister Le Drian on his appointment as Defense Minister, emphasized the outstanding cooperation between our two countries on many defense issues, and thanked Le Drian particularly for the significant contributions that France has made to ISAF.
“Secretary Panetta and Minister Le Drian discussed strategies for investing in defense during times of austerity and looked forward to the conversation on defense capabilities at the NATO Chicago Summit.
“The two ministers committed to working closely together on Iran, Syria, and the Arab Spring, where Secretary Panetta praised French leadership and resolve in addressing these challenges.”


Deux réflexions personnelles. 1) On s'en doutera, chacun a bien pris note des réflexions de l'autre durant cette rencontre policée. Pas de quoi mettre en péril l'axe atlantique. 2) côté Com', l'équipe du ministre est réactive (thanks by the way). C'est appréciable et apprécié.

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16 mai 2012 3 16 /05 /mai /2012 16:40

USS Simpson (FFG 56)

 

May 16th, 2012 By US Navy

 

Sailors assigned to guided-missile frigate USS Simpson (FFG 56) participated in a multinational training exercise aboard the Hellenic navy training ship Aris at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Center (NMIOTC) in support of exercise Phoenix Express 2012 (PE12) in Souda Bay, Crete, May 12.

 

The training included boarding procedures, proper weapons handling, and engaging compliant and non-compliant ships. It also gave the multinational service members the opportunity to train with other countries and learn to work together.

 

Working together in an environment where security forces come from many different nations and backgrounds means the instructors had to make sure the participants were at the same capability level in order to properly function as a team during the training.

 

“This training is important because these are the basics,” said Senior Chief Fire Controlman Allen Bylls, a Simpson boarding team member. “You want to do this in a controlled training environment so you can get the fundamentals down before you go out into a real world situation.”

 

The combined training also helps service members identify and overcome potential obstacles that could get in the way of the team’s performance.

 

“One of the biggest obstacles we encountered was the language barrier,” said U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Brenton Paulk, a staff instructor from Rota, Spain. “It’s something we are learning to overcome during our training and I think learning how to interact with other nations will be helpful during real-world maritime interdiction operation.”

 

PE12, a multinational maritime exercise between Southern European, North African and U.S. Naval forces, is designed to improve cooperation among participating nations and help increase safety and security in the Mediterranean Sea.

 

Participants and observers in PE12 include Algeria, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Libya, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and United States.

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16 mai 2012 3 16 /05 /mai /2012 11:35

SV-Protected-Mobility-Recce-Support-variant--troop-carrier-.jpg

 

15.05.2012 General Dynamics UK

 

UK MoD confirms commitment to Specialist Vehicle programme in Armoured Fighting Vehicle pipeline

 

The UK MoD has confirmed in its Planning Round 2012 (PR12) announcement today that funding for its future Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) pipeline, which includes the Specialist Vehicle (SV) programme, is part of its core programme of committed funding, thus protecting the core component of Force 2020 for the British Army.

 

General Dynamics UK will deliver the most modern medium-weight AFV fleet in the world today for the British Army, featuring the most advanced ISTAR capabilities and providing the best possible protection for the soldiers using it. The SV programme is a Modified-off-the-Shelf (MOTS) solution that brings huge economic and industrial benefit to the UK, and is expected to attract valuable export orders from overseas markets.

 

“We welcome the announcement by the Secretary of State for Defence confirming that the SV programme is secure in the MoD’s future AFV pipeline and core programme of committed funding,” commented Dr. Sandy Wilson, president and managing director of General Dynamics UK, the prime contractor on the programme. “This is great news for the soldiers who will use SV; it is great news for the UK supply chain involved in designing and manufacturing SV; and it is great news for General Dynamics UK in South Wales and validates General Dynamics’ continued investment in the United Kingdom.”

 

Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Wall said, "I am delighted that £5.5bn is secured for the Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) pipeline over the next decade. SV is a key programme in this mix: It will provide the mobility, flexibility and protection to provide our commanders with critical battlefield information in the most demanding of environments."

 

Benefits to the UK economy and industry

 

The SV programme is a tangible demonstration of how the modification in the UK of a European Offthe-

 

Shelf platform – a process called Modified Off the Shelf or MOTS – can deliver increased value for money to the British taxpayer, support British jobs throughout the supply chain, and deliver a solution with great export potential; making SV a key capital programme for the UK economy over its 30 year lifespan.

 

A recent audit study by Ernst & Young concluded that the SV programme would generate total economic output of over £9.8 billion, with a corresponding Gross Value Added (GVA) of £4.7 billion over the life of the programme. To this end, General Dynamics UK recently invested £12 million in state of the art facilities in Wales, establishing a Centre of Excellence for Land Systems, where the programme’s intellectual property and the UK’s sovereign AFV capability will reside.

 

General Dynamics UK has signed a major sub-contract with Lockheed Martin UK, based in the East of England, for the turret of the Scout variant. Thales UK in Scotland is also contracted to provide a full optronics suite including the gunners and commander’s sights on Scout, using their latest Orion technology, which are used for reconnaissance and targeting, and short-range sensors to provide local situational awareness in the vicinity of the vehicle. Contracts have also been signed with 12 other UK based suppliers, as well as a number of European suppliers. Further contracts will be signed as the programme progresses, bringing further economic benefits to regions around the UK.

 

A direct consequence of the SV programme’s robust UK content and supply chain is a stronger British supply chain, a continuing UK sovereign AFV capability and a British Army equipped with a fleet of modern, highly capable and easily deployable, armoured fighting vehicles.

 

Benefits to the British Army

 

The SV programme will deliver an initial family of four vehicle variants to the British Army - Scout for the manned reconnaissance role, a Protected Mobility Reconnaissance Support (PMRS) vehicle, plus Recovery and Repair variants, with possible future variants such as a light-tank with a 120mm direct fire gun and turret solution, a bridge layer, command and control post, ambulance and Overwatch missile defence system to name a few. Also, the combination of SV’s Common Base Platform (CBP) and General Dynamics UK’s proprietary electronic architecture (EA) means that the British Army will be able to develop and grow its core medium-weight AFV capability much more easily than in the past. The open nature of the electronic architecture designed by General Dynamics UK was a key reason why the MoD chose the General Dynamics solution in the first place. The electronic open architecture will allow for the easy addition of new capabilities to the platform when needed, resulting in a more cost effective upgrade path, whilst the common base platform across all variants will ensure that it will be less expensive and easier to manage logistics, supply and training requirements. General Dynamics UK’s solution reduces cost of repair and upkeep, reduces weight and increases available space inside AFVs while providing the required power and data architecture for the high power and high data demands of modern networked vehicles fighting in a digital age. Currently each different vehicle type used by the Army requires its own support lines, and by extension is less financially efficient.

 

Excellent progress on SV programme

 

Since signing the contract for SV in July 2010 the industry team has made excellent progress on the SV programme, meeting all milestones set by the MoD on budget and on schedule. Amongst the key achievements are:

 

    24 contracts signed with suppliers to the programme across the UK and Europe;

 

    Testing of key components completed;

 

    First development turret for the Scout variant of SV built and tested;

 

    CT40 cannon system integrated into turret and successfully fired;

 

    Representative PT3 Scout SV prototype unveiled;

 

    New armour system tested against latest IED threats;

 

    Powertrain physically integrated in the Mobile Test Rig (MTR).

 

Excellent export potential

 

The recent Ernst & Young audit study conservatively estimated the potential export value of the SV programme to be approximately £1.3 billion or more in its first 16 years, based on expressions of interest from a number of countries. Many of these countries are understood to be considering upgrading to SV for it levels of capability and survivability. The UK Government’s announcement that the SV programme is secure in the AFV pipeline and in its core programme of committed funding will encourage these countries to more closely consider SV for their AFV needs as it offers the future growth and protection they will need to protect their troops.

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14 mai 2012 1 14 /05 /mai /2012 12:00

mv-22b osprey multi mission aircraft with both a vertical t

 

14 May 2012airforce-technology.com

 

The UK Royal Air Force (RAF) has selected CeraTech's durable, high thermal resistant Firerok cement for the Bell Boeing-built V-22 Osprey's concrete hardstand and apron construction project at RAF Mildenhall, in Suffolk, England.

 

Specialty Products president, Tres Swann, said that Firerok's corrosion resistance it to resist hydraulic fluids and other hydrocarbons in extreme military environment.

 

Ceratech CEO, John Hyman, said: "The combined thermal and corrosion resistance of Firerok makes it a perfect fit for extreme conditions and its durability provides a lifecycle 3-5 times longer than any portland product."

 

Firerok comprises of a dense crystalline structure which dramatically improves thermal resistance. The cement is being used at installations in the US, England, and the Mid-east.

 

Firerok can endure intermittent temperatures as high as 1,850°F, and sustained temperatures up to 570°F, while retaining its strength.

 

The denser bonding of the Firerok reduces permeability for the aircraft while enabling them significantly more durable in caustic and corrosive chemical environments.

 

The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey is a multi-mission, military, tilt-rotor aircraft with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL), and short take-off and landing (STOL) capabilities.

 

Powered by twin Rolls-Royce AE 1107C-Liberty engines, the V-22 aircraft is being designed to provide a combination of the functionality of a conventional helicopter along with the long-range, high-speed cruise performance of a turboprop aircraft.

 

The Osprey provides amphibious assault, combat support, long-range special ops infiltration and exfiltration, transport, search and rescue, medical evacuation and tanker capability.

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14 mai 2012 1 14 /05 /mai /2012 07:45

S70i--polish-sikorsky.jpg

 

May 13, 2012  Tomasz Basarabowicz - defense-update.com

 

The Polish Ministry of National Defense is embarking on the acquisition of a new transport helicopter for the Polish military, at an estimated budget of US$1 billion. This multi-phase helicopter procurement will be divided into several stages, the first will include the acquisition 26 aircraft for the Army, Navy and Air Force through 2017.

The Air Force will also receive three helicopters configured for Combat SAR (CSAR).


The American company Sikorsky and Italian-British Agusta Westland are both expected to face each other competing for the Polish tender, as they did in other markets recently. Sikorsky is expected to offer the battle hardened S70i while Augusta-Westland is likely to offer the ultra-modern AW 149.

 

Both players are well positioned in Poland – Sikorsky owns PZL Mielec and runs the S70i assembly line in the country while Augusta-Westland have acquired PZL Świdnik, an experienced manufacturer of Sokół helicopters widely used by Polish Army and Navy.

 

AgustaWestland will be promoting the AW149 for the Polish tender. If they win, production would probably move to their new local subsidiary PZL Świdnik.

 

Two other contenders also likely to consider the Polish tender are the Franco-German Eurocopter and NH Industries, both pan-European helicopter manufacturers. Eurocopter, part of the EADS group, has already gained a foothold in the civilian market in Poland – Eurocopter sold 23 aircraft for the state operated Air Medical Emergency Service (Lotnicze Pogotowie Ratunkowe). Eurocopter could offer the Cougar (and possibly EC275 for the Naval and Air Force tenders).

 

The Kaman SH-2G Super Seasprite augments the Polish Navy frigates in operations at sea. Photo: Marian Kluczynski

 

As a joint venture between AgustaWestland, Eurocopter and the Dutch company Fokker, NH Industries could be facing two of its parent companies in this tender, and therefore is likely to opt out of the game. Nevertheless, given the strong footing of the NH90 in NATO, the Polish military could benefit from acquiring the helicopter, if the NH Industries parents will decide to join forces rather than compete each other. Moreover, the maritime and army versions of the NH90 would offer advantages in common logistics and support.

 

The Polish Navy currently uses the Mi14PL for anti-submarine warfare missions. Photo: Marian Kluczynski

 

The Polish Army currently operates a fleet of different Mil helicopter types, including Mi-2, Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters and 29 Mi-24 attack helicopters. In addition, the inventory includes more than 30 locally built W-3 Sokól multipurpose medium helicopters manufactured by Polish helicopter company PZL-Swidnik.

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13 mai 2012 7 13 /05 /mai /2012 15:39

UK MOD

 

May 13, 2012. David Pugliese - Defence Watch

 

From the UK’s Minstry of Defense:

 

Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir David Richards has written in today’s Daily Telegraph why the MOD’s decision to use the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter to deliver the UK’s Carrier Strike capability is the right one. Here follows the full article.

 

Military command is about taking difficult decisions in changing and challenging circumstances. Over the 40 years I have had the honour to serve in the Armed Forces, I have consistently found that such decisions demand both vision and courage. The change of course over our carrier programme announced this week certainly required both. It was not easy, but it is right.

 

It is worth explaining why I, and my fellow military chiefs, proposed this move. Carriers are expensive – there is no way around that. But they offer a capability that few can match: an independent, flexible, sovereign base, not tied to other countries’ wishes, that can operate around the world.

 

By choosing the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) model of the Joint Strike Fighter over the Carrier Variant that we had previously ordered for our two new aircraft carriers, the UK is significantly shortening the time it will take to deploy our maritime air power.

 

For me, this is the key factor. We are getting an exceptional military tool that is capable of projecting power, deterring our enemies and supporting our friends. In an uncertain world, this is a capability that I know we all wish to have sooner rather than later.

 

It is worth understanding why this change is necessary. Two years ago, we looked at the facts we had, and made our decisions. They were right at the time, and based on the best information available. But since the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), some important things have changed.

 

The more cutting-edge aspects of the carrier jet programme proved very difficult to cost accurately. What we were told in 2010 has changed.

 

We had an opportunity to put this right, and it has been taken.

 

Contrary to the criticism levelled at the Ministry of Defence in the past, when the facts changed, our decisions did too.

 

The reasons why it was right to do this are clear. First, the improvements to the STOVL aircraft since the SDSR are impressive. Once a troubled project on probation, it has now demonstrated its capabilities, flying more than 900 hours. This reduces the danger of complications and cost increases that we feared in 2010.

 

Second, we could not operate the previous aircraft from a British carrier before 2023 at the earliest. By choosing STOVL aircraft, we have removed the risk of further delays, giving the UK a powerful carrier strike capability years earlier than would otherwise be possible.

 

Stretching the gap in carrier capability any further is neither desirable nor necessary.

 

Third, the costs of converting carriers to operate the Carrier Variant have increased by over £1bn, and may rise further. This raised the prospect of this vital capability being unaffordable – or of having to take money from other key programmes.

 

Whilst it is true that the Carrier Variant offered greater range, this is not a crucial advantage – given our major investment in air-to-air refuelling – when weighed against the greater time to bring it into service, and the increasing cost. The balance has tipped back in favour of STOVL, which has distinct advantages of its own, such as versatility and agility.

 

Switching to STOVL means we are getting an outstanding capability sooner, for less financial and technical risk. It also gives us the ability to operate two carriers if we choose, a decision that the next SDSR will review.

 

Managing the Carrier Strike programme is as complex and demanding as the maritime and air environments in which these ships operate. They are not just mobile flight decks, but among the most capable intelligence and targeting tools in the world.

 

Both the Carrier Variant and the STOVL aircraft represent a generational shift from the jets that we use today. Through their computer technology, stealth and communications they are more capable than their ship- or land-based predecessors. They are cutting-edge, multi-role platforms fit for the battlespace of the 21st century.

 

They can both carry the full range of weapons we intend to buy.

 

The bedrock of successful combat capabilities is Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. This allows us to understand, track, strike and remain poised to react to the unexpected. It is this capability that ensured our success in Libya.

 

The Joint Strike Fighter increases it immeasurably.

 

This fifth-generation aircraft is a weapons system unmatched by our rivals, and will be an integral part of the package we offer our friends and allies – not least the French, with whom we have developed such a close relationship, and the Americans, who have been and will continue to be essential partners in developing our new capability.

 

Yesterday’s decision guarantees that we will have a hard-hitting carrier capability up to five years sooner than looked likely. The advice of the Chiefs of Staff is clear: this is the right decision for the Armed Forces, and the right decision for Britain.

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13 mai 2012 7 13 /05 /mai /2012 14:41

air f-35a aa-1 flight top lg-source DefenceWatch

 

 

13.05.2012 Par Nathalie Guibert LE MONDE

 

A Londres, la presse évoque une "volte-face", et les travaillistes blâment l'"incompétence" du premier ministre, David Cameron. En annonçant, jeudi 10 mai, qu'il changeait d'avis sur le choix de son futur avion de combat, le gouvernement britannique essuie de vives critiques. En cause : l'achat du Joint Strike Fighter F-35, le chasseur bombardier furtif de cinquième génération de l'industriel américain Lockheed Martin.

 

Après des mois d'hésitations, pressé par la contrainte budgétaire, M. Cameron opte pour une version moins chère de l'appareil qui équipera les futurs porte-avions de Sa Majesté. La décision, au passage, esquinte la coopération prévue dans ce domaine avec la France.

 

Le JSF est l'avion des superlatifs : c'est le programme d'armement le plus cher de l'histoire militaire. Il coûtera au contribuable américain au moins 1 500 milliards de dollars (1 160 milliards d'euros) sur un cycle de vie d'un demi-siècle, a dû reconnaître en mars le Pentagone. "Plus que le produit national brut annuel de l'Espagne!", a dénoncé Winslow Wheeler dans la revue Foreign Policy.

 

Critique des plus tenaces, cet ancien expert auprès du Sénat américain assure : "Il est temps de le jeter à la poubelle." Les Européens auraient eux aussi une très bonne raison de le faire. "Avec le JSF, les Américains peuvent tuer l'aviation de chasse européenne", assure un gradé français. Adieu Rafale, Gripen et autres Eurofighter ? Au lancement, Washington voulait en fabriquer 6 000, pour en exporter la moitié (à titre de comparaison, la chasse française compte 270 appareils). Le bijou supersonique visait à remplacer tous les avions de combat de la génération actuelle.

 

PAS OPÉRATIONNEL AVANT 2019

 

Mais la saga du JSF tourne mal. Ses capacités techniques restent à prouver. Ses coûts s'envolent. Son calendrier dérape. Il devait être mis en service dans l'US Air Force en 2011 ; il ne sera pas opérationnel avant 2019. Or, 400 milliards de dollars ont déjà été dépensés selon le dernier rapport très critique de la Cour des comptes américaine.

 

La crise pousse tous les clients du JSF, ou presque, à réduire leur commande, ce qui ne manquera pas à terme de renchérir son prix à l'unité. L'Italie, qui en voulait 131, a indiqué en février qu'elle se contenterait de 90. L'Australie a annoncé début mai différer l'achat de 12 premiers avions.

 

Le Royaume-Uni fait partie des principaux pays acquéreurs. Londres a prévu d'acheter 150 appareils. Dans cette commande, une centaine d'entreprises britanniques doivent trouver leur compte. Mais les contraintes budgétaires pourraient ramener l'ambition à 50 JSF, ce que le gouvernement n'a pas confirmé jeudi. Ce n'est pas le seul point.

 

Londres avait prévu d'équiper ses deux futurs porte-avions du F-35C, c'est-à-dire celui qui peut être catapulté. L'autre version, le F-35B, est l'avion à décollage vertical. Il est moins performant : il va moins loin et emporte moins d'armement. Mais, récemment, le coût de la catapulte américaine, une toute nouvelle technologie électromagnétique, a explosé. Le devis a doublé, pour atteindre 2,5 milliards d'euros. Et Lockheed Martin a indiqué que la version C ne pourrait être livrée qu'en... 2023.

 

Le Royaume-Uni, qui a désarmé tous ses porte-avions, ne se voit pas attendre au-delà de 2020 pour retrouver ce symbole de souveraineté. Le pays disposera alors d'un bateau flambant neuf. Le HMS Queen-Elizabeth ne peut être mis à l'eau sans avions. "Les faits ont changé, et notre décision par conséquence aussi", a expliqué le ministre de la défense, Philip Hammond, jeudi au Parlement. "Ce gouvernement ne va pas poursuivre aveuglément des projets sans tenir compte des augmentations de coûts et de délais." Les conservateurs reviennent ainsi au choix initial... de leurs adversaires travaillistes.

 

CONSIDÉRATIONS STRATÉGIQUES

 

La décision de changer pour le F-35C avait été prise en 2010 par David Cameron au nom de considérations stratégiques. Elle avait été inscrite en 2010, dans la stratégie de défense nationale comme "plus rentable". Le quotidien britannique The Guardian rappelle jeudi ce qu'avait alors dit le premier ministre conservateur de ses prédécesseurs : "Les bateaux qu'ils ont commandés étaient incapables de travailler effectivement avec nos partenaires-clés en matière de défense, les Etats-Unis et la France."

 

Le F-35C était devenu un solide point d'appui de la coopération franco-britannique. Car la catapulte, c'est le système du Charles-de-Gaulle et de ses Rafale. S'il n'était pas sûr que l'avion américain, très lourd, puisse vraiment apponter sur le bateau français, d'aucuns voyaient déjà des Rafale sur le HMS Queen-Elizabeth.

 

L'affaire a été scellée dans le traité de Lancaster House signé fin 2010 par David Cameron et Nicolas Sarkozy. Un accord de défense qualifié d'historique. Son point 9 proclamait "la capacité à déployer une force aéronavale d'attaque intégrée franco-britannique". Une décision de long terme : "Cela permettra à la Royal Navy et à la marine française de travailler dans la plus étroite coordination pendant les trente prochaines années."

 

L'avion sème la zizanie. Au Canada (65 avions commandés), il a provoqué début avril une crise politique entre la majorité et l'opposition, celle-ci reprochant au gouvernement d'avoir dissimulé le coût du programme : 25 milliards de dollars contre les neuf annoncés.

 

TENSIONS EN EUROPE

 

En Europe, l'affaire crée des tensions. Des sources militaires françaises réclament une discussion avec les Etats-Unis dans l'OTAN : la crainte majeure est que le JSF impose une nouvelle norme aux alliés. Elle les obligerait à acquérir, pour leurs propres avions, des morceaux de systèmes américains, pour continuer à être "interopérable", c'est-à-dire à travailler ensemble.

 

De plus, l'avion a déjà absorbé d'importants budgets au Royaume-Uni, en Italie, aux Pays-Bas, au Danemark. "Huit milliards de dollars de recherche et développement européenne sont déjà partis dans les poches américaines", peste l'avionneur Dassault. Comme les budgets de défense fondent, l'effort consenti pour le JSF pourrait détourner ses acheteurs d'autres projets de défense. A Paris, certains craignent que Londres renonce au drone armé du futur lancé en commun.

 

"Les pays concernés par le JSF n'ont plus d'autre choix que de se mettre ensemble pour assumer dans la durée l'avion, la maintenance et l'entraînement, ce qu'ils ne pourront faire seuls", note une source militaire de haut niveau dans l'OTAN. "Nous avons besoin d'armées de l'air fortes en Europe, pour s'épauler les uns les autres dans des opérations en coalition", s'inquiète un cadre de l'armée de l'air française.

 

Un optimiste évoque cependant une opportunité : "A l'horizon 2020, les armées qui ont pris du JSF n'auront plus de moyens. Et en Europe, seules la France et l'Allemagne auront retrouvé une capacité d'investissement dans la recherche pour un avion", souligne cette source de la défense.

 


 

Trois modèles et 400 milliards de dollars dépensés

 

AIR_F-35_JSF_Variants_lg.jpg

 

Trois modèles Le Joint Strike Fighter, avion de combat polyvalent de nouvelle génération, compte trois versions : F-35A (conventionnelle, choisie par l'US Air Force), F-35B (décollage vertical, choix des marines), F-35C (catapulté, choix de l'US Navy).

 

Huit pays partenaires Le JSF est développé par les Etats-Unis en partenariat avec huit pays qui avaient prévu au départ d'acheter 730 avions : Royaume-Uni, Italie, Pays-Bas, Australie, Canada, Danemark, Norvège, Turquie. Autres clients : Israël, Singapour, Japon.

 

Coût L'investissement américain dans le JSF approche 400 milliards de dollars (309 milliards d'euros) pour développer et produire 2 457 avions sur plusieurs décennies. Le besoin de financement du programme, 13 milliards de dollars par an jusqu'en 2035, est "sans précédent", selon la Cour des comptes américaine. Il était prévu de livrer 1 591 avions en 2017, chiffre revu à 365.

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13 mai 2012 7 13 /05 /mai /2012 11:44
F 35 britanniques : what a mess[*] !

 

13 Mai 2012 Jean-Dominique Merchet

 

Le revirement de Londres sur le choix du futur avion de combat F 35, annoncé jeudi dernier, illustre le désarroi dans lequel se trouve la défense britannique. Des finances publiques à sec, des forces armées littérallement lessivée par dix ans de guerres (Irak, Afghanistan), une industrie qui a perdu des pans entiers de ses compétences et, cerise sur le gateau, des politiques, très divisés, qui ne savent pas où ils veulent vraiment aller.

 

En comparaison, la situation française apparait exceptionnellement favorable... mais il n'y a pas lieu de s'en réjouir. Car, volens nolens, le destin de nos pays est lié. Le Royaume-Uni est, pour l'heure, le principal partenaire militaire de la France. Son affaiblissement est au final notre affaiblissement.

 

Revenons au F 35... en sachant bien que ce n'est qu'une étape de plus dans une longue descente aux enfers. Il y en aura d'autres, et elles se décideront d'abord aux Etats-Unis, puisque Londres a fait le choix de s'en remettre à Washington pour équiper son aviation. Et que le programme de F 35 (l'ancien Joint Strike Fighter) de Lockheed n'est pas à proprement parler une réussite. Trop complexe (trois versions très différentes) et trop cher : le dernier rapport du Congrès américain parle de 400 milliards. Ce n'est pas fini, car les avions ne sont toujours pas en service et on ne sait ni quand, ni qui sous quelle forme et en quels nombres ils le seront un jour.

 

En décembre 2006, le gouvernement britannique annonçait sa décision d'acheter 135 F 35 dans sa version B. Cette version est à décollage court et atterrisage vertical (STOVL, en anglais). C'est la version développée spécialement pour l'aviation de l'US Marine Corps et qui doit succèder aux Harriers britanniques.

En octobre 2010, le gouvernement britannique (qui entre temps est devenu conservateur) change de cap. Il est décidé d'acquérir des F 35 mais dans sa version C, celle de l'US Navy. C'est un appareil naval traditionnel conçu pour décoller d'un porte-avions avec une catapulte et y apponter avec un brin d'arrêt (Catobar, en anglais). Moins complexe techniqument, l'appareil est à la fois moins couteux et plus performant en terme de capacités d'emport (carburant ou armement). Il oblige cependant à disposer de porte-avions pouvant le mettre en oeuvre. Le nombre d'appareils que Londres souhaitent acheter est réduit, mais le chiffre exact n'a pas été rendu public. En tout cas, pas 135...

Nouveau contre-ordre, jeudi 10 mai 2012 : le secrétaire à la Défense Philipp Hammond annonce aux Communes que Londres a décidé de revenir à l'achat de la version B (STOVL) ! La justification est la suivante : même si l'avion est moins cher, l'adaptation du futur porte-avions Queen Elizabeth se révèle hors de prix : la facture de l'adaptation a doublée, pour atteindre 2 milliards de livres (2,5 milliards d'euros...) ! Une somme proprement folle. Et l'avion ne sera pas disponible, au mieux, avant 2023, dans douze ans... Passons sur le fait que les Britanniques construisent deux porte-avions, sans savoir que faire de l'un des deux (Prince of Wales) puisqu'il a été jugé trop cher d'arrêter le chantier. Quant au reste de l'aviation britannique, elle repose sur l'Eurofighter Typhoon, qui n'est pas non plus la réussite du siècle, en matière de coûts et de performances...

 

De ce côté-ci de la Manche, on fait grise mine. Le choix de 2010 apparaissait comme la volonté de Londres de se rapprocher du modèle français pour, à terme, envisager un groupe aéronaval commun. Cette perspective s'éloigne, même si l'on avait beaucoup exagéré les possibilités de rapprochement en la matière. En effet, poser un avion sur un porte-avions est une chose, le mettre en oeuvre en est une autre. On a vu des Rafale se poser sur des porte-avions américains et participer à quelques exercices, mais imaginer que les avions français ou britanniques puissent être mis en oeuvre, de manière opérationnelle, à partir de porte-avions de l'un ou l'autre pays est une pure vue de l'esprit. Ne serait-ce que parce qu'il faut tout le soutien mécanique et l'armement des avions : il faut beaucoup de place et beaucoup de monde pour s'en occuper. Où les mettrait-on ? On oublie aussi un peu vite que le F 35 C (Catobar) est plus lourd (plus de 31 tonnes, à pleine charge) et qu'il ne pourrait pas être mis en oeuvre par le Charles de Gaulle. Les Américains développent d'ailleurs, à très grand prix, des catapultes électriques. Bref, on a un peu rêvé, comme on le fait depuis plus dix ans, sur un porte-avions franco-brtiannique. L'annonce de jeudi n'est qu'un douloureux retour au réel.

 

Très réelle aussi, l'inconséquence du choix des pays qui se sont embarqués dans le projet F 35... et qui s'en mordent les doigts. L'avion n'est pas là, il siphonne leurs crédits de recherche-développement et même les Britanniques découvrent qu'ils n'auront pas accès aux codes-sources, les secrets les plus précieux pour un programme de cette complexité. En clair, ils se sont mis entre les mains des Américains et financent la destruction d'une capacité européenne (ou autres, pensons au Canada, au Japon...) de concevoir les futurs avions de combat. Belle réussite !

 

* "Quel b*** ! "... pour les non-anglophones

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13 mai 2012 7 13 /05 /mai /2012 09:14

LogoEDA COLOR

 

Mai 13, 2012 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (BRUXELLES2)

 

Les directeurs nationaux de l’armement de l’Union européenne se sont rencontrés à l’Agence européenne de défense, jeudi 10 mai, pour un conseil d’administration consacré aux différents projets en cours du pooling and sharing – comme le ravitaillement en vol -, le système Sesar, les drones, des marchés de défense, les drones… Peu avant, ils avaient pu s’entretenir de façon informelle avec le sous-secrétaire US au Commerce, Eric Hirschhorn.

 

Les directeurs européens de l’armement ont aussi été « briéfés » sur la nouvelle initiative américaine du contrôle des exportations d’armes. Une réforme qui a pour objectif de diminuer la procédure pour l’achat de pièces et composants aux Etats-Unis, et d’améliorer l’interopérabilité militaire entre les Etats-Unis et de ses amis et alliés, tout en mieux contrôlant l’exportation vers les pays les plus préoccupants. Les États-Unis prévoient ainsi a expliqué Hirschhorn « de réviser les listes de contrôle des exportations plus précisément ».

 

Une présence qui devient une habitude. Les Américains, très intéressés par les développements des Européens en matière capacitaire, ne veulent désormais plus en louper un gramme. On sait en effet que le projet de ravitaillement en vol (Air-to-Air Refuelling) a fait l’objet d’un petit « ping-pong » entre l’OTAN et l’Union européenne. Une discussion franche et amicale – comme on dit en termes diplomatiques. Ce projet développé au niveau européen aurait bien aussi été porté par l’Alliance Atlantique. Il « a fallu convaincre les Américains de tout l’intérêt de voir ce projet développé par les Européens » m’a expliqué un expert du dossier.

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12 mai 2012 6 12 /05 /mai /2012 07:40

f35b_uk2.jpg

 

May 11, 2012 Richard_Dudley - defense-update.com

 

In a much awaited announcement, the United Kingdom has decided to reverse its previous selection and will now focus its efforts on acquiring the Lockheed Martin F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft instead of the conventional F-35C naval model of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

 

In an address to Parliament on 10 May, Defense Secretary Philip Hammond confirmed that the government had decided to dump plans to purchase the F-35C naval model in recognition of unanticipated cost increases and delays in converting the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers to accommodate the F-35C conventional aircraft.  Secretary Hammond said that the cost of converting only a single aircraft carrier had escalated to an amount at least double the original estimate of $1.6 billion; an amount he said would adversely impact other national defense capabilities.

 

Britain is officially back with the STOVL F35B. Photo: Lockheed Martin

 

The ousted Labour Party originally selected the F-35B STOVL for deployment aboard the Royal Navy’s new 65,000 ton aircraft carriers then under construction, a decision that was dropped in favor of the conventional F-35C fighter by the Conservative Party’s coalition government in their Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) published in September of 2010. The government’s 2010 SDSR cited the lower cost of the F-35C as grounds for the change as well as the longer range and enhanced performance of the F-35C variant.

 

The British government is now attempting to downplay the enhanced capabilities of the F-35C when compared to the B variant. One senior source within the Defense Ministry stated that a return to the F-35B STOVL will not have any significant effect on the Royal Navy’s air operations. This source said that the weapon’s payloads originally planned for the F-35 would not change considering the missions to be flown and the longer range of the C variant was of little importance since inflight refueling would overcome any differences in range between the B and C models.

 

With a return to the F-35B STOVL variant, the Ministry of Defense can now discontinue the costly modifications being performed on the Royal Navy’s two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, modifications that would be needed to accommodate the F-35C. To operate a conventional fighter, the carriers required installation of catapults and arresting gear, the so-called “cats and traps.”

 

Design modifications needed to convert the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to handle the conventional F-35C proved to be more complex and invasive than expected requiring changes in 250 compartments instead of the originally planned 80 compartments.  Installation of the General Atomics manufactured Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and arresting gear. These modifications, Secretary Hammond noted, would delay the operational deployment of the carrier strike force until 2023, an unacceptable delay of at least three years beyond initial plans.

 

Part of the cost escalation, according to an unnamed defense source, is the result of American government insistence that the General Atomics-built EMALS be procured through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program instead of directly from the manufacturer.  The source claims this requirement added as much as seven percent to the modification costs.

 

Carrier modifications have already cost between $65 million and $81 million with additional exit costs to US contractors anticipated and still being negotiated.  Additional funds would be required to install takeoff ramps on the two carriers.  The UK has already spent nearly $3 billion on the F-35 program in development costs and production fees.

 

In a statement, the Ministry of Defense confirmed it was still committed to interoperability with US and French naval forces, but emphasized that the Royal Navy’s renewed focus will “now be much less on being able to fly our aircraft off US or French aircraft carriers and vice versa, but more on ensuring that our carrier strike capability can integrate with allied forces in joint or coalition operations.”  The Ministry further stated that the critical issue with the French was ensuring the two nations could have at least one aircraft carrier operational at all times to provide “cover for each other during refit periods.”

 

In the 2010 SDSR plan, the sitting government at the time admitted that, in selecting the conventional F-35C variant, the Royal Navy would be unable to maintain a continuous air arm at sea and only one of the new aircraft carriers would be modified with catapults and arresting gear while the second vessel would either be mothballed or be sold.  Since the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force would be operating the F-35 jointly, an aircraft carrier could be deployed on a much reduced schedule.

 

Implied in the decision to revert to the F-35B, the government appears to be entertaining the prospect of commissioning and operating both carriers allowing the Royal Navy to maintain a continuous sea presence with one ship at sea while the other is undergoing refit or maintenance. Publicly, the Ministry of Defense admits that no money has been budgeted to fund a crew or support requirements for a second carrier and no decision would be forthcoming until the 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review is released.  Secretary Hammond also stated that the number of F-35Bs the UK will procure will not be decided until the 2015 SDSR is completed.

 

Under the 2010 plan, the first carrier, the Queen Elizabeth, would have been laid up or sold off once completed with the second carrier, the Prince of Wales, to begin operations sometime in 2020 after being equipped with catapults and arresting gear to fit the F-35C. The new plan calls for the Queen Elizabeth to begin sea trials sometime in 2017 with the initial carrier-deck test flights of the F-35Bs scheduled for 2018 and operational deployment in 2020. The Prince of Wales is likely to follow shortly after this.

 

Hammond told members of Parliament that both carriers would be completed with a “STOVL configuration – giving us the ability to provide continuous carrier availability throughout the life of the ships.”

 

Rolls-Royse, manufacturer of the LiftSystem propulsion system integrated with the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine to power the F-35B, and BAE Systems, the fabricator of the B variant’s aft fuselage, will both benefit from this decision.

 

The decision to revert to the B variant also continues the UK’s storied history using STOVL aircraft. This history looked to come to an end with the UK’s early retirement of its fleet of Harrier GR7/9s.

 

Lockheed Martin is scheduled to deliver the first of three UK aircraft for test and evaluation during a special ceremony at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida following the Farnborough Air Show.  A second F-35B model is scheduled for flight testing soon with a third model to follow sometime in 2014.

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 21:22

Russia's view of European missile shield source Ria Novisti

 

2012-05-11 22:31:17 xinhua

 

La Russie est prête à détruire les installations de défense anti-missile des Etats-Unis en Europe si Moscou considère qu'elles représentent de réelles menaces, a annoncé vendredi le ministre de la Défense, Anatoly Serdyukov.

 

"(Le déploiement) suscite nos inquiétudes, c'est pourquoi nous détruirons la défense anti-missile", a déclaré M. Serdyukov aux journalistes à Sotchi, ville russe de la mer Noire.

 

Il a indiqué que les forces russes n'allaient pas avoir besoin de mesures supplémentaires pour mener cette mission, car les missiles Iskander existants sont capables de neutraliser les plateformes de lancement américaines.

 

Par ailleurs, M. Serdyukov a déclaré que Moscou attendait toujours les propositions des Etats-Unis sur le système de défense anti-missile controversé en Europe.

 

Moscou s'oppose depuis longtemps au déploiement des installations de défense anti-missile près de ses frontières et demande des garanties juridiquement contraignantes aux Etats-Unis et à l'OTAN prouvant que le bouclier anti-missile ne vise pas la Russie.

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 18:11

F-35B test aircraft BF-3 source asdnews

 

11.05.2012 Vincent Lamigeon, grand reporter à Challenges Supersonique

 

Elles étaient belles, les promesses du traité de défense franco-britannique de Lancaster House, signé en novembre 2010. Avec cette nouvelle étape dans l’Entente cordiale, juré-craché, on allait voir ce qu’on allait voir : une force expéditionnaire commune interarmées ; des porte-avions interopérables dans les deux pays, grâce au choix britannique de se convertir aux catapultes ; un drone de surveillance MALE (moyenne altitude longue endurance) commun ; une collaboration plus poussée dans le domaine des missiles, de la dissuasion, des satellites, des sous-marins, de la guerre des mines, de la R&T.

 

Dix-huit mois plus tard, quel bilan tirer ? Beaucoup de palabres, quelques avancées indéniables, notamment dans les missiles. Pour le reste, le tableau est éloquent : BAE cogne à bras raccourci sur le consortium Rafale en Inde après la sélection du chasseur français par New Delhi. « On n’a jamais vu une telle violence », assure un proche du consortium. Le projet de drone franco-britannique, pour parler clairement, est au point mort : le Royaume-Uni apparaît peu motivé, au point d’envisager de lancer une compétition impliquant aussi le Talarion d’EADS et l’Avenger (successeur du Reaper) de l’américain General Atomics. Des pressions se font jour pour que le projet franco-britannique intègre aussi l’Allemagne et l’Italie, via EADS et Finmeccanica.

 

Le Royaume-Uni a porté hier un nouveau coup de canif –ou de poignard-  aux accords de Lancaster House en choisissant de revenir à son projet initial de commander la version à décollage vertical (STOVL, pour « short take-off and vertical landing ») du chasseur F-35 de Lockheed Martin, dite F-35B, également choisie par le corps des Marines. Que signifie concrètement cette décision ? Londres renonce ainsi à sa commande de F35-C, la version catapultée du chasseur américain choisie par l’US Navy, ce qui enterre définitivement toute possibilité d’accueillir des Rafale sur le futur porte-avion britannique HMS Queen-Elisabeth, ce dernier étant dépourvu de catapultes. Bref, plus d’interopérabilité avec la France, contrairement à la lettre et à l’esprit du traité.

 

Pour justifier son choix, Londres brandit l’argument financier : le coût de conversion des deux porte-avions à une architecture à catapulte aurait doublé à deux milliards de livres (2,5 milliards d'euros) par rapport à l'estimation initiale. Un coût inconcevable en période de disette budgétaire, d’où le retour au F-35B, que Londres avait pourtant abandonné en 2010. « L’autre solution était d’acheter des Rafale Marine, moins chers et immédiatement disponibles ! », plaisante à peine un spécialiste de la défense français. Ce qui supposait quand même de modifier les navires britanniques.

 

Techniquement, le choix du F-35B pose question : il emporte moins d’armes et a une portée moindre que le F-35C. L’absence de catapultes interdit l’accès aux porte-avions britanniques des chasseurs français, mais aussi des avions américains, excepté ceux des Marines. Il semble que les soucis récurrents de développement du F-35C ait balayé ces arguments.

 

Ce coup dur n’est qu’un nouvel exemple des dégâts causés par le F-35, ou JSF, dans l’industrie de défense européenne. Le programme avait déjà siphonné les budgets de R&D en Grande-Bretagne, aux Pays-Bas, en Italie, au Danemark, ou en Norvège. 8 milliards de dollars, assure Dassault. Il s’est en plus révélé un casse-tête technologique, dont la mise en service a été reportée à plusieurs reprises, et un gouffre financier pour les Etats-clients. Le coût unitaire de l’appareil a doublé en dix ans, de 81 millions de dollars à 162 millions, coûts de développement inclus, selon le GAO, l’équivalent américain de la Cour des comptes.

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 12:59

F-35 for the United Kingdom STOVL B variant

 

10/05/2012 zonebourse.com (Reuters)

 

Hausse des coûts et retards à répétition ont obligé la Grande-Bretagne à revenir jeudi sur une décision concernant le type d'avions de combat qu'elle doit acheter.

 

Londres optera à présent pour une version du F35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), construit par Lockheed Martin, à décollage vertical, ce qui était le choix du précédent gouvernement, travailliste, qui avait été jugé inadapté par le gouvernement conservateur de l'actuel Premier ministre David Cameron.

 

Le F-35B n'a donc ni besoin de catapulte, ni de filets d'arrêt pour être adapté aux deux futurs porte-avions qui équiperont la Royal Navy.

 

Le gouvernement britannique a déclaré que le coût de conversion avait doublé à deux milliards de livres (2,5 milliards d'euros) vis-à-vis de l'estimation initiale figurant dans un rapport d'étude sur les dépenses militaires en 2010.

 

Cameron avait dit voici deux ans au Parlement que les dispositifs classiques - filets d'arrêt et catapultes - s'imposaient pour "permettre à nos alliés d'opérer à partir de nos porte-avions; cela nous permettra d'acheter la version embarquée du JSF la plus adaptée, la moins chère, dotée d'un rayon d'action plus étendu et transportant plus d'armement".

 

Le F-35B a un rayon d'action plus court que la version du JSF choisie au départ, le F-35C. Mais des responsables de la Défense insistent sur le fait que les inconvénients seront compensés par la capacité d'employer deux porte-avions en même temps. Chacun d'eux est censé embarquer 12 jets.

 

Des responsables ont également dit que les alliés américains et français ne voyaient aucun inconvénient à ne pas pouvoir atterrir sur les porte-avions britanniques.

 

Mais certains se demandent si le F-35B ne coûtera pas plus cher que le F-35C sur le long terme.

 

Londres a pour l'instant commandé trois F-35 en version test pour un coût de 632 millions de dollars. Le premier doit arriver dans deux mois.

 

Lockheed a conçu le F-35 comme avion furtif et multitâches, dont le coût de développement approchera les 400 milliards de dollars.

 

La Grande-Bretagne s'est engagée en 2001 à en acheter 138, essentiellement la version conventionnelle F-35A, pour remplacer ses Tornado et Harrier.

 

En 2010, le gouvernement actuellement en place a dit, sans autre précision, qu'il en commanderait moins. Le ministère de la Défense a dit qu'il ne prendrait pas de décision avant le prochain passage en revue des dépenses militaires, en 2015. (Mohammed Abbas et Rhys Jones, avec Tim Hepher à Paris, Wilfrid Exbrayat pour le service français, édité par Benoît Van Overstraeten)

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 12:56

F-35B-source-LdDef.png

 

11.05.2012 par P. CHAPLEAU Lignes de Défense

 

On le savait depuis hier: Londres a donné sa préférence au F-35B à décollage vertical fabriqué par la société Lockheed Martin pour équiper ses porte-avions (cliquer ici pour voir le reportage de Ski News). Une décision justifiée par "l'augmentation inacceptable et les délais" qu'aurait représenté le maintien du choix du F-35C à catapulte, choix qui aurait eu l'avantage de permettre aux avions français et britanniques (voire US) de pouvoir utiliser indifféremment les porte-avions de l'un ou l'autre des deux (trois) pays.

 

Cliquer ici pour lire la déclaration du ministre britannique de la Défense.

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 07:45

F-35B Lightning II joint strike fighter-01-2012

 

10/05/2012 lefigaro.fr (Reuters)

 

Hausse des coûts et retards à répétition ont obligé la Grande-Bretagne à revenir aujourd'hui sur une décision concernant le type d'avions de combat qu'elle doit acheter.

 

Londres optera à présent pour une version du F35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), construit par Lockheed Martin, à décollage vertical, ce qui était le choix du précédent gouvernement, travailliste, qui avait été jugé inadapté par le gouvernement conservateur de l'actuel Premier ministre David Cameron.

 

Le F-35B n'a donc ni besoin de catapulte, ni de filets d'arrêt pour être adapté aux deux futurs porte-avions qui équiperont la Royal Navy.

 

Le gouvernement britannique a déclaré que le coût de conversion avait doublé à deux milliards de livres (2,5 milliards d'euros) vis-à-vis de l'estimation initiale figurant dans un rapport d'étude sur les dépenses militaires en 2010.

 

Cameron avait dit voici deux ans au Parlement que les dispositifs classiques - filets d'arrêt et catapultes - s'imposaient pour "permettre à nos alliés d'opérer à partir de nos porte-avions; cela nous permettra d'acheter la version embarquée du JSF la plus adaptée, la moins chère, dotée d'un rayon d'action plus étendu et transportant plus d'armement".

 

Le F-35B a un rayon d'action plus court que la version du JSF choisie au départ, le F-35C. Mais des responsables de la Défense insistent sur le fait que les inconvénients seront compensés par la capacité d'employer deux porte-avions en même temps. Chacun d'eux est censé embarquer 12 jets.

 

Des responsables ont également dit que les alliés américains et français ne voyaient aucun inconvénient à ne pas pouvoir atterrir sur les porte-avions britanniques.

Mais certains se demandent si le F-35B ne coûtera pas plus cher que le F-35C sur le long terme.

 

Londres a pour l'instant commandé trois F-35 en version test pour un coût de 632 millions de dollars. Le premier doit arriver dans deux mois.

 

Lockheed a conçu le F-35 comme avion furtif et multitâches, dont le coût de développement approchera les 400 milliards de dollars.

 

La Grande-Bretagne s'est engagée en 2001 à en acheter 138, essentiellement la version conventionnelle F-35A, pour remplacer ses Tornado et Harrier.

 

En 2010, le gouvernement actuellement en place a dit, sans autre précision, qu'il en commanderait moins. Le ministère de la Défense a dit qu'il ne prendrait pas de décision avant le prochain passage en revue des dépenses militaires, en 2015.

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 07:40

LogoEDA COLOR

 

Brussels - 10 May 2012 EDA News

 

http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/News/Hirschhorn1.sflb.ashx

 

On 10th May 2012, EDA Chief Executive Claude-France Arnould met with Eric Hirschhorn, the Under Secretary of the U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security. They had a detailed and productive discussion on a range of issues of mutual interest including security of supply, and the defence industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic.

 

Under Secretary Hirschhorn then briefed the National Armaments Directors on the U.S. export control reform (ECR) initiative. The essential goals of the ECR are four: (1) to focus on the most important items from a military standpoint and on the countries of greatest concern; (2) to enhance military inter-operability among the U.S. and its friends and allies; (3) to reduce disincentives to purchasing U.S. parts and components and (4) to reduce unnecessary licensing paperwork and related administrative burdens. He explained that the United States accordingly plans to revise the export control lists to be specific about what is controlled and what is subject to which lists. Further, it will transfer less significant items from the controls administered by the Department of State to the more flexible control regime of the Department of Commerce. The U.S. also is taking steps to strengthen enforcement of its export control rules.

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 07:15

BF02-source-TheTelegraph.jpg

 

10 May 2012By David Richards* - The Telegraph

 

Our new fighter jets will give Britain an outstanding military capability much sooner.

 

Military command is about taking difficult decisions in changing and challenging circumstances. Over the 40 years I have had the honour to serve in the Armed Forces, I have consistently found that such decisions demand both vision and courage. The change of course over our carrier programme announced this week certainly required both. It was not easy, but it is right. It is worth explaining why I, and my fellow military chiefs, proposed this move. Carriers are expensive – there is no way around that. But they offer a capability that few can match: an independent, flexible, sovereign base, not tied to other countries’ wishes, that can operate around the world.

 

By choosing the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) model of the Joint Strike Fighter over the Carrier Variant that we had previously ordered for our two new aircraft carriers, the UK is significantly shortening the time it will take to deploy our maritime air power. For me, this is the key factor. We are getting an exceptional military tool that is capable of projecting power, deterring our enemies and supporting our friends. In an uncertain world, this is a capability that I know we all wish to have sooner rather than later.

 

It is worth understanding why this change is necessary. Two years ago, we looked at the facts we had, and made our decisions. They were right at the time, and based on the best information available. But since the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), some important things have changed.

 

The more cutting-edge aspects of the carrier jet programme proved very difficult to cost accurately. What we were told in 2010 has changed. We had an opportunity to put this right, and it has been taken. Contrary to the criticism levelled at the Ministry of Defence in the past, when the facts changed, our decisions did too.

 

The reasons why it was right to do this are clear. First, the improvements to the STOVL aircraft since the SDSR are impressive. Once a troubled project on probation, it has now demonstrated its capabilities, flying more than 900 hours. This reduces the danger of complications and cost increases that we feared in 2010.

 

Second, we could not operate the previous aircraft from a British carrier before 2023 at the earliest. By choosing STOVL aircraft, we have removed the risk of further delays, giving the UK a powerful carrier strike capability years earlier than would otherwise be possible. Stretching the gap in carrier capability any further is neither desirable nor necessary.

 

Third, the costs of converting carriers to operate the Carrier Variant have increased by more than £1 billion, and may rise further. This raised the prospect of this vital capability being unaffordable – or of having to take money from other key programmes.

 

While it is true that the Carrier Variant offered greater range, this is not a crucial advantage – given our major investment in air-to-air refuelling – when weighed against the greater time to bring it into service, and the increasing cost. The balance has tipped back in favour of STOVL, which has distinct advantages of its own, such as versatility and agility.

 

Switching to STOVL means we are getting an outstanding capability sooner, for less financial and technical risk. It also gives us the ability to operate two carriers if we choose, a decision that the next SDSR will review.

 

Managing the Carrier Strike programme is as complex and demanding as the maritime and air environments in which these ships operate. They are not just mobile flight decks, but among the most capable intelligence and targeting tools in the world. Both the Carrier Variant and the STOVL aircraft represent a generational shift from the jets that we use today. Through their computer technology, stealth and communications they are more capable than their ship- or land-based predecessors. They are cutting-edge, multi-role platforms fit for the battlespace of the 21st century. They can both carry the full range of weapons we intend to buy.

 

The bedrock of successful combat capabilities is Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. This allows us to understand, track, strike and remain poised to react to the unexpected. It is this capability that ensured our success in Libya. The Joint Strike Fighter increases it immeasurably.

 

This fifth-generation aircraft is a weapons system unmatched by our rivals, and will be an integral part of the package we offer our friends and allies – not least the French, with whom we have developed such a close relationship, and the Americans, who have been and will continue to be essential partners in developing our new capability.

 

Yesterday’s decision guarantees that we will have a hard-hitting carrier capability up to five years sooner than looked likely. The advice of the Chiefs of Staff is clear: this is the right decision for the Armed Forces, and the right decision for Britain.

 

  • General Sir David Richards is Chief of the Defence Staff
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