Weighing in on the debate with some authority on the subject are two of Britain’s leading experts on Armoured Vehicles today.
We have first, Professor Richard Ogorkiewicz, academic, scientific advisor, lecturer, and author of three books and more than 500 published articles on military engineering. Good afternoon,
Professor.
So, this is the outlook that many militaries face, and to which the wider industry is watching with anticipation to see the route that it’ll take. What are the key questions that need to be asked
in this scenario, and if you have to prioritise, what’s the one question that comes at the top of that list?
RO: Well, the first thing to look at is the general situation and I can see a major difference between what is happening in the East to what is happening in the West.
And, therefore, depending on which part of the world we consider to be important, the answers will vary. In particular, the West, as you well know, is running down its armoured
forces. In some cases, some countries have got rid of all the tanks. Whereas In the East, we have at the moment perhaps the most advanced tanks being developed in Korea and Japan and
possibly in China. So, it’s a very varying situation from the two parts of the world.
RdS: So, you’re saying that if we’re looking at this problem, let’s say, as a jigsaw puzzle, the first thing to do is to look at the pieces we have on the table and take
stock of the fleets in the shape that they are today. Chris, can you offer some perspective on that from the European or North American front?
CF: Well, I think I would concur that if you take, for example, the Royal Netherlands Army who once had a huge tank fleet this year de-commissioned its last two
battalions. The Belgian Army will soon pull out of its last Leopards. Countries like Germany, the UK and France are also reducing not only their main battle tanks, but also some of
their other fleets as well. If you look at the Middle East, there is no sign of any of the countries in the Middle East making any significant reductions in their tank fleet. I think
it’s really driven by what’s happened since the Cold War. People in Europe see there is no need for heavy armour. We’re now gearing up in some cases to more of a counter-insurgency
campaign, but if you look back at Gulf War I, Gulf War II, and even Chechnya, heavy armour was used. The Russians didn’t drive into Chechnya in pickup trucks. And if Bosnia had gone wrong,
that would really be a conventional ground manoeuvre action, but economics come into it. Most countries in Europe are slashing their defence budgets. Something’s got to give. In
the UK, we gave up our carrier capability and we’re going to give up a lot of our heavy armour capability and our artillery capability.
RdS: Well, there’s a lot of aspects there that we’ll probably drill into a little bit more in detail as we go along. In theory, would you say that with the current
fleets currently operating in Afghanistan – stretched as they are – if another conflict were to break out next week or in a couple of weeks’ time, would we be able to deal with that in terms of a
land force engagement? Chris first.
CF: Yes and no. I think the type of vehicle we deployed in Afghanistan was for one particular mission; like the Americans put a lot of heavy MRAPs in there. But
the terrain conditions in Afghanistan are quite different. So, some of the heavier vehicles were not suited to that terrain. I think the problem people are going to have is that in
the case of UK we have procured hundreds and hundreds of... well, we don’t call them MRAPs. We call them ‘protective patrol vehicles’. They are funded under urgent operational
requirements (UoRs) and once that conflict draws down, the army will have to decide if they go into their core defence budget, in which case the army pays for them, or they scrap them. And
if you look at UK, ground manoeuvre has been under-funded for well over 15 years and we are left with a lot of obsolete equipment which is now getting on in urgent need of replacement.
RdS: Professor Ogorkiewicz, could you elaborate a little bit more perhaps on exactly how much of a difference a variety of terrain makes to a land force engagement?
And do you think that this trend in heavier vehicles is sustainable?
RO: Well, the major difference, I think, is our vision of the future insofar as the urbanisation is concerned. If we’re considering operating in urban environments,
that calls for one kind of vehicle. If we’re thinking of operating in open warfare, open terrain warfare, then that leaves the ground suitable for other vehicles. So, that’s the first
thing. Exactly what is likely to be wanted is very difficult to forecast. I take the view that the heavy armoured vehicles in general will be required by those countries which face or
expect to have some territorial problems, border problems, and so on and so forth. Those who are away from that sort of thing, like the Netherlands, for instance, they adopt the view that
there is no need for heavy equipment. On the other hand, if you think in terms of conflicts in general terms, the less intense they are, the less likely they are to call for armoured
vehicles. Ipso facto, they’ll require light armoured vehicles of the kind that we’ve seen employed in Afghanistan and light in terms of armour, that is.
RdS: So, more or less as we’ve seen with Libya.
RO: Yes.
RdS: And we’ve not engaged from the ground at all. Had we have done, would you envision that in that more urbanised environment we would have encountered quite a few
problems, given that the fleets that we’ve been spending the last ten years plus developing have been geared solely to desert terrain, mountainous terrain, and so on?
RO: Well, Libya is not perhaps a good example to take because it’s not a very urbanised society. There are towns, obviously – there is Tripoli. But, by and large,
it’s open terrain, as British and Allied forces encountered in the campaigns of North Africa in the 40s. I think the urban terrain is more likely to be exemplified by Iraq, which involved
fighting in cities to a very large extent and very little in the open terrain.
RdS: Yes, and, Chris, I believe you’ve mentioned in the past to us that there has been quite a big gulf in the type of warfare we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
simple fact that we’re not in combat operations currently in Iraq anymore should lead to the fact that it was a successful campaign at least in comparison to the Afghanistan campaign, which we’ve
seen being dragged out for quite a while and many would argue primarily because we haven’t been equipped and perhaps still aren’t.
CF: Yes, I think that’s probably true. Certainly, in the early days of Iraq, we didn’t have the equipment. Then we started fielding some of the protective
patrol vehicles. If you look at what we’ve got in Afghanistan today, we are probably almost there in terms of what equipment we’ve got. We’ve got the Mastiff. We’ve got the
Ridgeback. We haven’t deployed tanks, unlike some other countries. And even Warrior is out there and CVRT out there. I think Warrior is a good case. That was originally
developed for conventional manoeuvre warfare some… over 20 years ago. That was deployed successfully in Gulf War I, in the Balkans, Gulf War II, and is now out in Afghanistan. That’s
probably gone through 100 modifications and we’re on the latest one, theatre-standard Herrick, which pushes the weight of the vehicle over 40 tons, but it’s still got fairly good mobility.
So, I think a vehicle in the future, you’ve got to buy a vehicle or procure a vehicle which is going to have a great deal of stretch potential because it will probably stay in service for 25 or
30 years. It’s going to get heavier because they’re going to put extra things on it. So, people are looking today at vehicles which have plenty of stretch potential and an electronic
architecture so you can upgrade that vehicle in the future much more than you can in the past. Certainly, as far as Afghanistan goes, we’ve at last got almost all of the equipment that we
want. Some of it has had to be modified once, twice, or even three times as the threat changes or as new technology evolves.
Modular specifications, like those to be incorporated into the British-made Ocelot, may
prove to be the most viable future for armour development.
Image: Crown Copyright/MOD 2011
RO: I agree wholeheartedly with Chris that the Warrior type vehicle is a very good example of the sort of general purpose, if you like, vehicle which is likely to be wanted
whatever the conflict. It’s a very adaptable vehicle. It’s tending to get a little bit heavy if you look at the general world trend exemplified by the German Puma and the general
growth in the weight of the Warrior itself, which has gone from 20 to 30 tons, but that kind of vehicle, I think is going to be perhaps the basic vehicle of the future.
CF: I think also, if we were talking ten years ago, everybody had the great vision. America had the future combat system; we had the future rapid effect system. And,
certainly, in those early days everything had to go on a C-130. That’s really gone out the window now because people used to say, “fly light, die first”, because a Hercules sometimes can
only take 12 or 14 tons. So, I think that C-130 element has gone. So, a lot of the new vehicles, even the 8x8s, some of them in the old days were about 14 tons. Some of the 8x8s
like Boxer are pushing at 30 tons. So, the only aircraft you can transport them rapidly in, when it comes in, in the case of Europe, is the A400 or the C-17, but the sheer cost of
transporting those vehicles into Afghanistan is not cheap.
RdS: That’s a very good point. I spoke recently with a representative from the Czech Army and they said that they had found great use in MRAPs – I think they had
borrowed the MaxxPro – but they’d also seen a lot of value in the light vehicles for transporting snipers up into the hills. In a time when some are saying, “light armoured vehicles have
had their day”, is that something that either of you would agree with?
RO: No. Light armoured vehicles will have a role to play whatever the conflict. From the very low-intensity conflicts right up to the full interstate
wars. I think light armoured vehicles will be needed whatever happens.
CF: Yes, I think there will be an enduring requirement for light armoured vehicles. I think in the future they are going to become more complex and I think if you
look at some countries round the world, they want very simple vehicles. Yet if you want… some of the Western nations, those vehicles are very complicated and I think there are training and
logistic problems, but there will always be a need for light vehicles and I think some countries around the world are going to go to a balanced force of tracked vehicles like CV-90, like the
Swedes have got CV-90 and they’re also buying a fleet of Patria 8x8 armoured modular vehicles and they’re also buying some all-terrain track carriers. So, I think some countries are really
going down the route... will only almost have a gendarmerie and counter-insurgency force. Other countries are going to a more balanced fleet which will be capable of undertaking a wide
range of roles across the full military spectrum.
RdS: Well, you were talking there earlier about having vehicles with a lot of stretch. Obviously, the argument with a vehicle that’s essentially a ‘jack of all
trades’ is that we could encounter a scenario in which we don’t have that, let’s say, ‘superiority’ in that one area in time to be cost-effective or save the lives we need to save before we’re
right in the thick of it. How do we surmount that obstacle?
RO: Well, depending on what premium you place on survivability, I don’t think you can get away from vehicles which are fairly heavy and large. It would be against the
laws of physics if you could devise a vehicle weighing two or three tons and having the protection of a Challenger. So, I think there will be no escape from having more than one kind of
vehicle depending on the nature of the conflict.
CF: It might well be that in the future, like in the artillery, units will be dual-roled. For example, the US Marine Corps field artillery units... they can take
155mm 777s or they can take 120mm mortars. If you look at Afghanistan, all the Warthogs are not being driven by the infantry. They’re being driven by the Royal Armoured Corps.
So, I think there will be flexibility covered, but you need a good industrial base to do that. In the case of UK, there is no longer a requirement for us to design vehicles.
RO: Or even modify them.
CF: Yes. So, if you look back 15 years, the amount of R&D capabilities that UK has lost is horrendous. Most of these MRAP-type vehicles, we’ve had to buy
from America and upgrade at fantastic cost in UK. I think our industrial R&D base for ground combat has already been eroded. In the space of a couple years’ time, it’s going to go
completely and we’ll just have to go to Germany, France, or another country and buy off the shelf and hope it meets our requirements.
RO: And then have great difficulties in modifying them if we want to.
BAE's Scimitar Mark II is a reconnaissance vehicle fielded in response to the MoD's UOR programme. Image: Defence
CF: Correct, because we have modified some vehicles. We’ve deployed them and they’ve broken down because to take a vehicle and modify it is a complex task and you
come in with problems with logistics, training, a supply line which might stretch from Afghanistan all the way round the world to America or somewhere else. It is a problem.
RO: It is indeed. Very good point, Chris, about the re-roling of units. If you go back a number of years, our Royal Armoured Corps regiment used to operate
Saladin armoured cars at one time and then go back to battle tanks at another time.
CF: Yes. It does take time, like the Northern Ireland situation. We had artillery units which stopped being gunners. They trained for three or six months
as infantry, they deployed to Northern Ireland, they come back, and they probably hadn’t touched an artillery system for 18 months. So, you need to train them. So, although you can
re-role people, it’s very easy to lose that core capability and it takes a long time to get it back.
RdS: If we’re talking about modifying vehicles – and we are saying it does take a lot of effort, a lot of time, and a lot of expense – what about the opportunity to create
more modular vehicles, ones that we could retrofit, and ones that could, as we see with the Foxhound that’s going out there – I think, next year – we have a vehicle in which we can transport
troops, but we can also have an ambulance there or whatever it may be. Is a modular approach a workable solution to this problem?
RO: Well, this is a minor example that you just quoted. This is just using a vehicle which happens to be fairly versatile and you’re not demanding too much of it
either. That’s going to be a change from one role to another, but for heavy vehicles, I doubt if you could have a modular principle. I personally am very sceptical of the sort of
approach that our Swedish friends pursued with the SEP [Fragmentation Protected Standard Platform] programme. It was an excellent programme in many ways, but I didn’t believe that the
modularity, which was to be part of it, was workable.
CF: I think if you look at what the Swedes… and even the Boxer programme has got a removable mission module. Every vehicle comes with that module and you can take it
off, but I think that in the hard light of day that probably won’t [be used]. What some countries are doing is having a modular kit in the back so you can re-role that vehicle. It’s got the
rails or the hooks in it. You can re-role it very quickly as an ambulance or a command post. Things like the M113, first fielded back in 1960 – there were probably 200 variants of
that! I think that is still there. The Warrior was an infantry fighting vehicle. There’s an artillery version and a command version. There’s an ambulance version. I
think in the near future there will be a multi-role chassis which you can put a bridge on it, mine-clearing roles, or a ‘dozer blade. So, certainly the medium vehicles, there is already a
fair bit of multi-roling there. Certainly, on 8x8s you can have many different versions, but when you get to a very heavy vehicle like a tank or a really heavy ISE, it is not always that
easy.
RdS: But why is that?
RO: Because the vehicles are different. You want different things. There isn’t a capsule that you could take out of one vehicle and put into another.
RdS: But isn’t that what we should be working towards a solution on, in order to make there be standards which everyone works from and sort of streamline our entire
approach to…
RO: The trouble with that type of approach is, it has been tried with aircraft in some cases. You end up with an imperfect solution. The optimised solution is
going to elude you if you’re going to try and make it a jack of all trades.
CF: I would agree with the professor. A tank... you can have a basic tank. You can then upgrade it for urban operations or even other missions, but the basic
thing is there. When you’ve got some other vehicles, you can take things out the back and put other things in. You can do that, but with very heavy vehicles it’s very different.
Most of the fleet, like Foxhound is a light protected patrol vehicle. They’re talking about taking the top off and putting on an open one for Special Forces, like the Italian light module
vehicle. You’ve got the basic one that has five people in it, but you put all the communications in it and you’re lucky to get four. There’s a two-door version. There’s a
flatbed. There’s an ambulance. So, for some of the vehicles, there is all that multi-role that’s there. You can have it for different missions, but you can’t necessarily re-role
it at short notice.
Image: pandur.cz
RO: It’s a matter of adaptation more than anything else, isn’t it? Like the M113 which you’ve quoted... a basic vehicle which you can adapt to a number of roles, but
you don’t change the vehicle.
CF: No, that’s it. You can add extra armour or change the inside. You can pop on different things... but the actual structure you cannot change it and you
shouldn’t really because that would be another can of worms.
RO: Quite.
RdS: Well, if it’s a case where it’s the heavier vehicles that are perhaps the brick wall to that solution, is it that we should be looking beyond just increasing the
weight of the armour? Should we be looking at more active protection or different solutions in terms of blast dispersal or whatever it may be? Is that the innovation that we
need? As you were saying earlier, Chris, with the R&D disappearing from this country, should we really be looking at other solutions to the IED issue and everything else?
CF: Well, I think the new generation of vehicles like the Puma. That’s got a modular armour system. You can put it in an A400, and when it gets there, you put the
armour on. I think, Professor, it’s already got a soft-kill DAS. Hasn’t it, the Puma?
RO: Yes, it has.
CF: Certainly, other people are... Merkava’s got the Trophy active defence system. So, active defence systems are there. It’s just that the land segment is
probably 20 years behind the air force side because a pilot wouldn’t take off in something that didn’t have [the required defence]. And it costs money. These things aren’t cheap and the
ground environment is so different than the aerial threat. I think the Professor is far more qualified than me – the ground threat is so diverse. It’s not easy to develop a system
that can cope with everything.
RO: And even if you can afford an active protection system, that doesn’t necessarily mean you can get rid of the armour because there will be bits of stuff flying
around. It’s going to hit you. Unless you’re fairly robust to take the secondary effect, your active protection system will not have done its job.
CF: No.
RdS: Fair enough. We’ve spoken a lot about what we can’t do. Is there – at least from a starting point, do you think – a way in which we can find a
solution? What would you do if, given you had the budget you needed – or working with the MoD’s budget as it is today –what would be your first avenue to approach a workable solution for
this issue?
CF: Well, I think we’ve got another project out there. The trouble is, in the past, the UK has probably spent between half a billion and a billion pounds on
programmes that have never come to fruition. You go back to the future family of light armoured vehicles, Tracer, Boxer, Future Rapid Effect System... all of those failed because either
they were international or the user changed the requirements. They just take too long. When you start a development programme, it can take ten years, by which time the threat will
change. I think the Professor might agree that you’ve really got to try to cut down that development period.
RO: Hear, hear.
CF: I think the Americans with the old Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft – that went from concept to first flight in under four years because it was a very tight
development. If you see the stages they have to go through and the amount of committees and paperwork, it all takes time. Every two years, the program manager changes. So, they
change it, but we’ve really got to try and speed up the whole cycle from when we want the vehicle to when we get it into service. It just takes too long at the moment.
RO: Chris is absolutely right because the situation changes. In ten years’ time, what seemed reasonable at the beginning of the ten years will probably become quite
unreasonable by the end of the ten years.
CF: Yes. Like FRES... if we had FRES now – the original concept – we probably wouldn’t deploy because it would probably be a death trap for the lads.
RO: Right.
RdS: Any closing thoughts from either of you, predictions, or things you would like to see?
CF: Professor?
RO: Well, I can see a continuing role for these two types of vehicles. One is what I would consider a general purpose infantry fighting vehicle; the vehicle that we
talked about already, which can be adapted to a number of roles. At the bottom end of the scale, I think we need something like the Ocelot or vehicles of that kind to do the patrolling and
quasi-police work.
CF: I would concur with that. I think once Afghanistan runs down, we will have to decide what we will take into core. Some of those vehicles were very good five
years ago. We’ll probably just leave them behind. The other ones, you’re going to have to bring back and upgrade. In order to do that, it’s going to cost a lot of money.
As UK only spends 2% of GDP and we’ve got to fund other programmes, it is going to be very difficult, but armoured fighting vehicles are still required and I think there is still an enduring
requirement for ground manoeuvre capability.
RdS: Christopher Foss and Professor Richard Ogorkiewicz, thank you both very much for weighing in on the discussion. Some very good points indeed from you both,
excellent food for thought, and we hope to hear more from you soon. Thank you!