02 juillet 2012 par Elodie Vallerey – USINE NOUVELLE

L’avion de transport militaire européen sera officiellement baptisé "Atlas" en marge du salon aéronautique de Farnborough.

Les spécialistes du secteur l’avaient surnommé "Grizzly". Un sobriquet pour souligner l'allure puissante et massive de l’avion militaire d’Airbus qui ne sera désormais réservé qu’aux prototypes de l’A400M.

Car le 6 juillet prochain, c’est le nom officiel d’A400M "Atlas" que prendra le transporteur lors de la "Naming Ceremony", cérémonie de baptême de l’avion, à Farnborough, en marge du traditionnel Royal International Air Tatoo, en Angleterre.

Un patronyme décidé par les sept pays à l’initiative du programme A400M : la France, l’Allemagne, l’Espagne, le Royaume-Uni, la Turquie, la Belgique et le Luxembourg. Le 6 juillet, des représentants des armées de l’air de chaque pays seront présents à Farnborough pour le baptême de l’avion.

L’armée de l’air française sera représentée par le général Guillaume Gelée, commandant des forces aériennes, a-t-elle annoncé dans un communiqué.

Le contrat de programme A400M, qui accuse des retards importants, lie sept nations dans le cadre du développement et de la production d’un appareil de transport aérien militaire qui viendra remplacer les Transall et Hercules en service dans ces pays.

Les armées françaises seront les premières à recevoir ce nouvel appareil. Il rejoindra immédiatement la base aérienne d’Orléans au sein de la MEST (Multinational Entry into Service Team) afin de débuter sa phase d’expérimentation pour une entrée en service prévue pour 2013 ou 2014.

07/01/2012  UK Ministry of Defence - defenceiq.com

It really is a pleasure to be at RUSI once again and to have the opportunity of discussing such an important issue and at such an appropriate moment.

And, to those from industry, I’m very glad that this event is focusing on you, and your businesses.

Focusing on the challenges - and opportunities - you will be encountering as Defence becomes more streamlined. More challenging. And more disciplined.

This is an appropriate moment for several reasons.

The White Paper is published, the defence budget is balanced, defence transformation continues apace, we are near reaching conclusions on the future of DE&S and the National Audit Office is considering our equipment plan prior to its publication.

So it's clearly the right moment to clarify some of the issues affecting defence companies. I also say that because I was somewhat baffled by elements of the pre-conference papers for this event.

There appear to be a number of misunderstandings - which I suspect may be more widely shared.

And I’m aware that some of these misunderstandings could be down to us. Perhaps we in MOD have not been sufficiently clear when it comes to explaining the principles, rationale and implications of the White Paper.

Six months on we’re now busy taking the White Paper forward. Have we, though, successfully concluded the whole communication process with industry?

I have worked hard - and continue to do so - to make sure that the logic and implications of our White Paper are fully understood within the MOD.

Changing a mindset has taken time even within our own organisation, never mind across industry.

And I think I may need to bang the drum a bit louder.

Take SMEs - Small and Medium-sized enterprises.  I was more than a little surprised when I saw that there was no mention at all of SMEs in those pre-conference papers.

That's because they are the life blood of any industry and are therefore something I highlight in every speech and meeting. Today will be no exception.

By the way, repeating new truths doesn't necessarily mean we think all the old ones have all lost their validity.

So if I talk up SMEs and don't say so much about Primes, it's not because I don't value both.

It's because I think we all - the Armed Forces, MOD, DE&S and the Primes - need to value SMEs much more than we have done.

So I welcome today as an opportunity to set the record straight on a number of fronts.

Later on I’ll be exploring the whole ‘off the shelf’ principle, and our commitment to exports. As well as clarifying our stance on sovereign requirements.

First of all, though, I want you from industry to be in no doubt whatsoever that you are a critical component of military capability.

Your people, your products, your services equip, transport, protect, clothe, feed, support our Forces.

As the Secretary of State has made clear, the defence of our nation is a team effort. Defence contractors, civilians and the Armed Forces themselves are the three essential pillars of the whole force concept which delivers modern defence.

And there are hundreds of you, of every size - primes, medium and small, even micro enterprises.

Some of you have a global presence - others are smaller firms based just here in the UK.

Many are involved in a range of activities and would not brand yourselves as defence-centric companies.

A number of you have been involved in the provision of UORs in recent years.

As I speak there are around five thousand contractors out in theatre, supporting our Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

I've had the honour of presenting medals to a number of them whose work has been crucial to our effectiveness there.

Last year industry also did a magnificent job in support of the Libya campaign, and - for the record - there’s a dedicated case study on their contribution to Operation Ellamy on page 24 of the White Paper.

In fact I also wrote letters of thanks and appreciation to some twenty companies of all sizes who played a crucial role in Op Ellamy. I could easily have written ten times that number.

Take just one example - Typhoon, and the way industry optimised its capability for that operation. Of course, the excellence of the aircraft played its part too, but it was private sector companies and their staff that kept it flying.

More generally, thanks to your innovation - and strong partnership working with organisations like DSTL - our Forces have superb kit.

In fact it is the best they have ever had. And as good as can be found anywhere in the world.

Thank you for your part in that remarkable achievement.

It may be a cliché, but it is true - necessity is the mother of invention. That has certainly been the case in Afghanistan.

And significant parts of that defence innovation, as is so often the case, are being transferred across to the civilian world.

I’m thinking here in particular of the advances in battlefield medicine which are also driving forward changes in the NHS.

So - you are a vital part, all of you, of our defence effort. You make defence happen.

But I have a problem.

It's this - I don't actually agree with the title for this conference.

Not because you aren't a critical component of military capability.

No, it's the first three words of the conference theme that worry me.

I think it was Voltaire who wrote that the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.

So it is with the “defence industrial base”, a term that makes my heart sink.

Put simply, it's not just about defence, because of the increasing overlap with Security - a major theme of the White Paper.

It's not just about industry but technology. More about that later.

And it's not about a narrowly defined base when so many of our key suppliers have supply chains that reach around the world.

For me, the phrase defence industrial base summons up visions of some giant monolith - shielded from the market forces that are always the driver of efficiency.

Faceless, intransigent - and unaccountable.

A powerful symbol of the problems that have faced defence acquisition in the past.

The complete antithesis of the way we intend to run our whole defence equipment and support programme.

Let's look specifically at that third word; ‘base.’

I have a problem with the very idea that we have - or indeed should have - a ‘defence industrial base’.

Quite frankly, it’s more complicated that that. In fact, I’m not sure it’s even factually correct these days to refer to a ‘defence industry’ as a collective concept. Your diversity is your strength.

The reality - as I said earlier - is that defence equipment and support covers a huge and diverse range of activity, and companies of just about every size, with varying degrees of dependence on the MOD budget.  And they are all important.

From primes to start-ups. Providing everything from syringes to submarines.

Their services and products often cover a range of sectors. They certainly don’t want to get pigeon holed.

Technology is driving fundamental change in our supply chain.

And those smaller companies are so often the ones who are proving to be innovative and agile - and sensitive to the customer's needs in these times of austerity.

They are out there winning international business in today’s tough global environment - and not waiting for the MOD to make up its mind about what it will buy.

That’s why we are looking for greater SME involvement in our procurement strategies.

Not for altruistic reasons - but because we are determined to drive in innovation and responsiveness.

So we will also hard-wire this approach into the reformed DE&S and its harder-edged relationship with the MOD customer.

Yes, there are defence industries. But as I said earlier, their supply chain spreads around the globe.

And there are industries which contribute to defence but which have their origins, or the majority of their business, in other sectors.

And there are industries that may not yet be on our radar which should be - and which must be encouraged to make their contribution to Defence.

We in Defence value you highly, but you are not a united industrial base as such.

We're also striving to increase the proportion of the equipment and support solutions that we buy in open competition. More of that later.

But we do understand the limits on competition in defence acquisition.

Above all on this issue, our security depends on us being able to protect our sovereign requirements for operational advantage and freedom of action. And we will.

Perhaps this is where the misunderstandings between us -  between the MOD and industry - most urgently need to be addressed.

These concepts were, after all, an important feature of the White Paper.

The old phrase "sovereign capability" trips easily off the tongue. But it can lead to some pretty woolly thinking.

The Defence Industrial Strategy of 2005 listed the capabilities industry had.  And then said what Government would do to protect them.

This allowed everybody and anybody to claim that their capability was essential and that, implicitly, the MOD would have to fund it.

An approach that proved to be unaffordable - and downright illogical in an age of rapid change.

In contrast, the White Paper "National Security Through Technology" does what it says on the tin.

It sets out an approach that starts with what the State needs for its security.

And then it looks at the different ways of achieving it, establishing affordability, what it will acquire, and how it will acquire it.

We are now embedding this approach.

The White Paper implementation team is looking now at exactly how best to embed these concepts - and that of exportability - in both Main Building and the Front Line Commands. And how to take account of the views of industry and DE&S.

The process we will follow is much more subtle and nuanced than some commentators seem to have understood.

We will buy equipment using the route most appropriate for that equipment bearing in mind its nature and our need for operational advantage and freedom of action.

We will seek exemptions from EU procurement rules to sustain our technological advantage where we need to.

It is important, however, that you recognise and understand that we're not going back to producing a long list of specific sovereign capabilities - effectively owned by specific companies - that we will protect.

Technology is changing too fast, and money is too tight - as indeed they both probably always were - to do that.

The future lies in open systems - as we see in the Land Open Systems Architecture approach.

I recognise this means big change for many larger firms in Defence.

But the gains for Defence as a whole are real. And I believe greater competitiveness will help the big companies too.

However, be very clear, the skills and resources to deliver operational advantage and freedom of action will be safeguarded when we must do so to protect the nation.

In the White Paper we set out the broad circumstances where this will apply.

The real challenge we all face is not new acquisition processes but constrained acquisition budgets here and, indeed around the world.

There will be skills the UK needs to safeguard and with development money for new projects constrained, some of them may be at risk.

We would have faced the challenge of how to deal with in any event, White Paper or no White Paper.

Having operational advantage and freedom of action in the future depends investment in the future of the right technologies now.

That is why we are constantly assessing what we believe are critical technologies - and why our decision to protect the Science and Technology budget from further cuts is so important.

We recently announced a billion pound investment in the Rolls Royce core production capability at Derby. Here is a clear example of a technology and skill set we know we do need to sustain.

Or the announcement at the end of last year of additional funding for research into next generation of highly capable air systems - a £40 million four-year research contract with BAE Systems to explore critical technologies and key systems integration.

There will be other such examples and we will take careful note of the views of industry as we identify and address them.

But it will be for the Government to determine how best to sustain the technology - perhaps, for example, by collaboration with one of our most trusted allies rather than by maintaining a single UK source.

Defence is a national business - but it is not an industry of the state.

The state has its defence requirements, and they are being met by an increasingly diverse range of suppliers.

How many of you realise that Hewlett Packard is our fourth biggest supplier?

Or that SMEs now win over 42 per cent of all the contracts we let?

Yes, the overall value of those contracts is lower, at 13 per cent of our spending. But it is a very significant amount given that the sheer scale of many of our programmes mean they are outside the scope of SMEs, at least as prime contractors.

There is, of course, the beguiling argument that spending money on Defence will create more jobs for UK PLC.

That, in essence, defence is in some way special in its capacity to generate employment.

This does have an academic term: ‘Military Keynesianism’.

Actually, John Maynard Keynes himself didn't approve of the concept.

In 1933, Keynes wrote an open letter to President Franklin Roosevelt. In that letter he said,

“... a war has always caused intense industrial activity. In the past orthodox finance has regarded a war as the only legitimate excuse for creating employment by governmental expenditure. You, Mr President, having cast off such fetters, are free to engage in the interests of peace and prosperity the technique which hitherto has only been allowed to serve the purposes of war and destruction."

So, I agree with Keynes - up to a point. There are many ways to stimulate an economy other than by investing in Defence.

We buy defence equipment and support that equipment because we need it to secure our nation.

It is the duty of the MOD to buy what we need to do that and to protect our sovereignty - no more, no less.

Where the consequences of the acquisition decisions we take in the MOD have implications for the responsibilities of other Government departments - or vice versa - the White Paper established a ministerial committee to address them.

There's a sub-set of full-blown military Keynesianism that asserts we should always try to buy defence equipment in our own country.

You don't have to be a "red in tooth and claw" capitalist to believe in capitalism's principal tenets.

We know that the greatest long-term good is served when competition is allowed to work. That means efficient markets and real wealth creation.

Of course it's good when British-based companies win UK defence contracts.

Often our needs will mean buying British from single sources; 40 percent of our defence equipment and support budget is spent that way.

And much of the remaining 60 per cent is also won by British companies too because you are so good at what you do.

Look through the announcements we have made recently - on Sea Ceptor, Sea Viper, the Core Production Capability, the refit of HMS Vengeance, maintaining Hercules, the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme, Foxhound, Scout - the list goes on.

Hundreds of highly skilled jobs secured by our acquisition and support decisions.

Of course buying defence equipment creates jobs. But so does investing in the arts, in hospitals, in schools, in roads, in housing.

If I tried to justify defence spending by its potential for job creation, others in Government would raise their eyebrows and offer a rather incredulous response along the lines of:

“Oh really? More jobs than funding research in the civil aerospace technology? Or rolling out Broadband across the UK?”

UK defence companies do make an important contribution to our economy. I celebrate that.

But, the only reasons for the MOD to go out of its way to protect their technologies are operational advantage and freedom of action.

Charlie Blakemore of BAE Systems told it like it was when he announced last month the loss of jobs at their munitions factory in Monmouthshire.

He said - and I’m quoting here from the BBC:

"We need to adapt to very challenging market conditions, and further reduce our overheads to drive better value for our customers and increase our competitiveness in the export market.”

His words capture the kind of hard headed realism companies across the spectrum need to adopt if they are to succeed.

There are new opportunities for industry too. Not just in equipment acquisition, but also in support.

And that means a new appreciation and understanding of what support means. And the number of services and capabilities it actually covers.

Particularly as we roll out the Total Support Force concept, which will include a sizeable number of contractors doing jobs we always thought were done by people in uniform.

There are real new commercial opportunities here for you. I appreciate the work being done by industry to help us drive this agenda forward to our mutual benefit.

Make no mistake. We do want you to thrive and prosper.

As the White Paper clearly spelt out earlier this year, it is in our interests to have successful - and competitive - defence industries.

As you heard from Susanna Mason, this is a Government committed to promoting an environment conducive to responsible defence exports.

Her appointment as MOD lead for exports is a tangible sign of our commitment to that.

One of our real challenges in implementing the White Paper is driving exportability into our requirement setting process from the very beginning.

But I realise that even a simple term like ‘exportability’ means different things to different people.

To be clear, in this context it does not simply mean "capable of being exported within the constraints of the export licensing regime".

We are proud of our responsible and tough regime - although I know it could often work more efficiently.

No, fundamentally it means, from the very beginning of a project, making defence equipment that the UK requires attractive to potential overseas customers. That brings benefits to us and to you.

Ensuring this issue is fully addressed as we devolve responsibility to the front line commands is a major White Paper implementation task.

And by the way, on the subject of international acquisition policies, I often hear it said that the White Paper does not address industrial participation.

That’s simply not the case. I refer you to page 48, paragraph 154 of the White Paper for a clear summary of our new policy.

The new approach towards engagement with overseas suppliers aims to encourage these companies to invest in the UK supply chain

For instance as a prime location to engage in research and development investment and technology transfer;

Crucially, these activities will also underpin the promotion of the UK’s defence and security exports, exploring what assistance can be provided to help UK exporters meet their global offset obligations.

It’s precisely because we want you to succeed, and to deliver our operational advantage and freedom of action into the foreseeable future that I have - for the first time - put a floor under the science budget. To ensure that we as a nation we can remain at the forefront of cutting edge, battle-winning technology.

Our national security depends on that. And that means a lot of opportunities for you.

A number of contractors have told me they consider the White Paper to be pragmatic.

Yes, it is.

Much of the policy it articulates is in fact a continuation of what had been the Department's direction of travel for several years.

It's just that the White Paper spells it out in black and white. And provides industry with the clarity - and honesty - you have been asking for.

However, the commitments to science, to exports, and to SMEs are new.

And it is a change from the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy which this year's White Paper replaces.

I also agree wholeheartedly with John Maynard Keynes when he said, or at least is believed to have said,

"When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?"

Well here are some of the facts - the realities - which I believe have changed or become more prominent over the last seven years:

A global network of alliances with whom we intend to cooperate more deeply:

The international distribution of manufacturing:

Massive civil sector investment in R&D that increasingly spins in to Defence:

Rapidly advancing, often disruptive technology (some increasingly expensive, other parts of which become ever lower-cost):

And increasing financial challenge and austerity.

And what do these facts - these new realities - mean in practice?

Sometimes they mean working more closely with our allies on acquisition.

On very large programmes like JSF with the US and a wide range of international partners.

On specific much smaller-scale programmes such as aspects of counter- IED technology with the Germans - as I saw at DVD last week when I met MineWolf Abacot.

Or across a wide portfolio of programmes in the framework of the wide-ranging Franco-British agreement. Here we are working on complex weapons, unmanned combat systems, support for A400M, and much more.

And then again, there are occasions when addressing this new world means single source non-competitive contracts to build nuclear powered submarines, to develop unmanned combat air systems, to build complex warships.

Sometimes it means mutual commitment like the one in the complex weapon pipeline arrangements.

The distinction between the old approach and the new one is this.

Our policy will, more often than in the past, lead the Government to open up our defence contracts to international competition -  just, indeed, as the last Government judged it right to do.

Also, don't forget that, as the EU takes more steps to enforce the Defence Procurement Directive, more and more European opportunities will open to British companies.

If you are competitive here, you will succeed there.

And recent history shows us that there is absolutely no reason why UK companies should not win MOD business.

Look at Foxhound. An excellent example of an agile and versatile vehicle - a contract competed for and won by British companies, Force Protection Europe and Ricardo, sustaining around 750 highly-skilled jobs across the UK.  And with huge export potential too.

Similarly, the Warrior Capability and Sustainment Programme - a contract which will create and sustain around 600 British jobs -    was won by Lockheed Martin UK in a competitive process.

And it’s also the case that big contracts awarded overseas will also help to open up those international markets to British companies.

The MARS tankers are a case in point.

A number of British companies took part in the international competition - which was quite rightly initiated by the previous Government because they recognised, as tankers, they were not “warlike stores”.

However, no British company submitted a final bid for the build contract.

Yes - of course I would have preferred it if there had been a competitive British bid. But in the end there wasn’t any British bid at all.

The build contract has been awarded to Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering of South Korea, but the ships are designed by a British company, BMT.

And there will be up to £150 million of associated contracts for the MARS project, many of them offering opportunities for SMEs here in the UK.

MARS means UK companies have the chance to show their potential to one of the world’s largest shipyards and for DSME to get first hand experience of the services and products that can be provided cost-effectively from UK companies.

I was in Korea at DSME's hugely impressive yard on Monday. I heard of the close working relationship developing between DSME and BMT. It looks very likely to lead to further ships, based on the successful MARS design, being developed and sold to third countries.

That means additional opportunities for the British marine engineering industry.

Of equal significance is the potential of opening up the Korean defence market for other UK companies as the strategic relationships created through MARS develop.

An early and encouraging sign is the significant breakthrough into the Korean naval propulsion market made by Rolls Royce. I was delighted to hear that contract announced on Tuesday in Seoul alongside representatives of the company.

I came back from South Korea yesterday and at the airport I met a Royal Navy team going in to discuss naval cooperation.

With many similar challenges and shared understandings, the potential for ever deeper collaboration and partnership is very real.

I do agree with the pre-conference papers that MOD is adopting the ‘tough love’ approach when it comes to our relationship with industry.

And we’re being equally as tough on ourselves.

We have recognised that we’ve got to change - and drive forward a new culture across the MOD.

That means changes ahead at DE&S and in the way we do business. You will be aware of Bernard Gray’s Materiel Strategy and the Defence Transformation agenda.

Work is still underway as decisions are being made and you will hear more about our thinking as soon as we are ready. However, we are determined that the MOD will be a better informed and more demanding customer.

Before I draw all this to a conclusion, I would like, briefly, to reflect on the overarching theme of this conference, "Defence, Industries and Society".

I think we’d all agree that today the nation - quite rightly - holds our Armed Forces in very high regard.

With Armed Forces Day on Saturday, we will see this high regard turned into practical support up and down the country. I'm looking forward to events in my own constituency.

The thousands of men, women and children who line the streets up and down the country for homecoming parades show that support and admiration.

The public also recognises - in very tangible ways - the sacrifices the Armed Forces and their families make. Just look at the success of a charity like Help for Heroes which has raised £100 million in its first four years.

However, we need to recognise that defence spending is in competition with all the other things that taxpayers’ expect the Government to spend their money on.

As it happens, there appears to be a greater willingness in the UK to fund Defence than in most Western nations.

But the British people have seen the news, they read the newspapers. They know that the MOD has been culpable of gross financial mismanagement and - let’s be frank here -  squandering their money.

The last two years of the Coalition Government have been spent dealing with the horrendous national deficit. But MOD Ministers have had this challenge compounded by Defence’s own broken finances.

Both were real security risks in their own right. A country cannot be strong unless its finances are strong.

And a Government department cannot do its job unless it manages its finances well.

In our case that is best summarised as "It's only by looking after the bottom line that we can really look after the front line."

It's no secret that balancing the MOD's books has been a tough and time consuming process.

But - we’re there. We’ve balanced the budget. We will be announcing an audited 10-year equipment programme as soon as the National Audit Office completes its work.

As a result we will be spending a lot of taxpayers' money on equipment and support.

Over ten years that will be £160 billion.

And - in contrast to the unfunded aspirations of the past, this is real money - including around £4 billion of contingency on the committed programme and £8 billion of headroom to fund additional projects from our Single Integrated Priority List.

Incidentally, that all gives defence companies a lot more certainty than most businesses ever have about their customer's requirements.

But if this happy state is to endure it will take a lot of discipline from all of us - and especially from the MOD - officials, front line commands and politicians.

The balanced budget, the Yellow Book review (something there wasn't time to talk about today incidentally), the Materiel Strategy, Defence Transformation and the White Paper are all essential building blocks of a new more confident, sustainable, effective Defence.

This may be the moment of maximum pain. But it's also the moment when the light at the end of the tunnel may actually be precisely that, and not the light of another train bearing down upon us.

So the messages of the White Paper must be understood properly both within and outside the MOD and the Armed Forces.

We must think more about defence and security as a continuum.

We must think more about technology, the way it is changing and what we need to protect the State.

And we must nurture the growing diversity of what once saw itself as a defence industrial base but is now a complex supply chain.

Changing the habits of a lifetime is never easy, but that is what I am inviting those of you who have not already done so to do now.

Companies have to be competitive. Growth will be hard won.

We will only be able to export something if it is competitive.

So how do we get there?

We build in exportability;

We support UK companies in export campaigns;

We invest in the right technologies;

We allow SMEs the space to flourish;

We protect our operational advantage and freedom of action;

We focus on building and retaining competitive advantage;

 We collaborate more with our closest partners;

And crucially, we always remember affordability.

This approach may be driven by austerity but just happens to be intellectually right too.

Our objective should not be to protect a defence industrial base.

It should rather be to create the right incentives to grow thriving, vibrant companies that can compete globally and supply Defence in the UK with what we need, when we need it, at a price that the taxpayer can afford.

25.06.2012 Czech MoD

Jun. 29, 2012 Defense News (AFP)

GENEVA — Sweden could loan a fleet of Gripen fighter jets to Switzerland as it awaits delivery of the craft’s next generation model, Swiss Defense Minister Ueli Maurer said on June 29.

Bern announced in November its intention to buy 22 Saab Gripen E/F fighter jets to replace its aging U.S. F-5 fighter fleet in an estimated 3.1 billion Swiss franc (2.5 billion euro) deal.

The E/F is still under development and Sweden could loan Switzerland about 10 of the current C/D model in the meantime.

Maurer made the announcement on June 29 after a two-day meeting with his Swedish counterpart Karin Enstrom, Swiss news agency ATS reported.

The loan would allow pilots to get trained up and avoid the costly upkeep of the F-5.

The Gripen, not available before 2020, was selected over the French Dassault Rafale and the EADS Eurofighter, sparking much debate in the Swiss parliament which has yet to give the purchase the green light.

A referendum will also likely be held on the deal.

juin 29, 2012 Mieszko Dusautoy (BRUXELLES2)

30 juin 2012, c’est la date d’entrée en vigueur fixée pour la plupart des dispositions de la directive sur les transferts de produits liés à la défense à l’intérieur de l’Union datant du du 6 mai 2009 (2009/43/CE). Alors que chaque Etat était censé avoir transposé ce texte dans sa législation il y a un an (le 30 juin 2011), huit pays sont toujours en retard et ont fait l’objet d’un avis motivé de l’exécutif européen : Belgique, Danemark, Finlande, Italie, Luxembourg, Pologne, Roumanie et Royaume-Uni.

Ouverture trop lente du marché

« Les marchés s’ouvrent trop lentement » estime la Commission européenne aujourd’hui. Les chaînes de productions sont encore trop souvent entièrement nationales, « empêchant des produits d’autres Etats Membres de faire partie de l’assemblage final ». Cela provoque des duplications dans les programmes de défense européens et pose des risques sur l’approvisionnement. Or, « des budgets défense réduits et une augmentation des coûts de développement rendent simplement trop coûteux pour n’importe quel Etat européen à lui tout seul de maintenir une base industrielle de défense nationale qui soit complète » explique le commissaire à l’Industrie, Antonio Tajani.

Un registre commun des entreprises européennes de la défense

La directive établit notamment un système européen de licence pour le transfert des produits liés à la défense. Avant, chaque Etat disposait de sa propre certification et une entreprise souhaitant exporter ses produits devait payer le prix d’au moins deux licences (plus si le transfert concernait plusieurs pays). Le surcoût est estimé à 400 millions d’euros en 2010 selon la Commission (pour un total de 21000 licences délivrées par les Etats Membres). En complément de ce dispositif de licences, la Commission a ouvert aujourd’hui un registre des entreprises de la défense européennes (Register of Certified Defence Recipients, CERTIDER, disponible ici mais pas rempli), centralisant les listes des Etats-Membres.

NB : Quelques chiffres. Le secteur européen de la défense emploie en Europe environ 400.000 personnes avec un chiffre d’affaires de 90 milliards € en 2010. Les transferts intra-européens de produits de défense s’élèvent à 9 milliards € pour lesquels les États membres ont délivré 21,533 licences.

29 juin 2012 Par Rédacteur en chef. PORTAIL DES SOUS-MARINS

L’état-major de la marine espagnole considère que la situation actuellement de sa force sous-marine est « intenable ». Sur les 4 sous-marins Agosta dont l’Espagne disposait au début du mois, aucun n’était opérationnel, et un d’entre eux a été désarmé définitivement depuis. Le dernier sous-marin, le Galerna, a subi début juin une rupture de la paroi d’un ballast et a dû entrer en cale sèche.

Le Galerna devait être ouvert au public lors de la “Journée des Forces Armées”. Lors de l’accostage, le sous-marin a heurté un quai du port de Carthagène. Un des ballasts a été percé, ainsi qu’un réservoir extérieur de carburant.

Après cet incident, le sous-marin a été ramené dans la base sous-marine, où les réparations ont eu lieu.

Alors qu’elle attend toujours la mise en service du premier des nouveaux sous-marins S-80, la marine espagnole est restée temporairement sans aucun sous-marin opérationnel. A l’accident du Galerna, il faut ajouter le désarmement du Siroco et l’entrée en cale sèche du Tramontana et du Mistral.

L’état-major indique que cette situation était prévisible : cela fait des années qu’il avertit de l’insuffisance du nombre de sous-marins espagnols. Mais, jusqu’au début juin, il était toujours resté au moins un sous-marin opérationnel.

Référence : El Confidencial Digital (Espagne)

June 29, 2012 defpro.com

Summary of the Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General

1. The UK’s armed forces are deployed across the globe on operations, such as in Afghanistan and on standing commitments, such as defending the UK’s air space. To conduct these activities, the armed forces require a wide range of supplies and spares for immediate and potential use. These supplies and spares are described collectively as ‘inventory’.

2. The inventory comprises more than 900,000 different types and more than 710 million items. The Ministry of Defence (the Department) splits its inventory into two categories:

• explosive, which is ammunition and missiles; and
• non-explosive, which ranges from clothing and medical supplies to spares for vehicles, ships and aircraft.

3. The Department’s inventory is of significant value. At the end of December 2011, the Department held inventory with a value of £40.3 billion (the gross value without adjustment for depreciation). In 2010-11 the Department spent £2.9 billion on inventory and it forecasts that it will spend between £1.5 billion and £2 billion each year for the next five years. The forecast spend equates to around an additional 3 per cent of the Department’s annual spending for those future years.

4. Inventory management is a recognised professional skill. The objective of inventory management is to minimise the risk of having insufficient stock while also minimising the cost of holding stock, and reducing the amount of money tied up in stock holdings. With a decreasing defence budget, it is increasingly important that the Department manages its inventory effectively and efficiently to achieve this objective.

5. In 2011 we reported on the supply chain to operations in Ministry of Defence: the use of information to manage the logistics supply chain and we qualified the Department’s accounts. Both pieces of work raised concerns about the Department’s ability to manage its inventory efficiently because of a lack of reliable information about stocks, the risk of failure in the base inventory IT systems in the central depots, and whether the Department was holding inventory that it no longer needed.

6. During the course of our study, the Department provided data for our analyses from a number of its inventory systems. However, problems in obtaining reliable information have limited the scope of our analysis, for example volumetric data held on the Department’s systems are incomplete and inaccurate. The Department is continuing its work to improve the quality of its data and has committed significant funds to improving its IT systems. These limitations, however, further highlight that the Department’s ability to manage its inventory is compromised by its current information systems and the data those systems hold.

7. This report examines the Department’s approach to managing its inventory. It considers whether:

• the Department is buying and holding the right quantity (Part One);
• the Department has appropriate strategies and structures in place to manage its inventory efficiently and effectively (Part Two); and
• the Department’s improvement plans will be successful (Part Three).

8. This report covers non-explosive and explosive items, held by the armed forces and in central depots. The report does not cover inventory managed on IT systems for the nuclear weapons inventory or loan items and war reserves.


KEY FINDINGS

ON WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT IS BUYING AND HOLDING THE RIGHT QUANTITY

9. Inventory holdings are increasing. Our examination showed that the inventory held by the armed forces and the non-explosive inventory held in central depots increased in value by 13 per cent from £17.2 billion to £19.5 billion (gross) between the end of March 2009 and December 2011. The quantity of items held by the armed forces and the number of different types of stock have also increased.

10. There are a number of reasons for the increase:

• There has been increase in operational activity over the last decade. The Department seeks to ensure adequate support for troops deployed to Afghanistan and to retain sufficient inventory to support operations rapidly such as in Libya in spring 2011. Overall, the Department considers that there are sufficient quantities of non-explosive inventory held in central depots to meet its target levels for meeting demands from the armed forces.
• The Department has brought in new equipment across the armed forces, for use now and for a range of operational scenarios. However, it has not consistently disposed of inventory it no longer requires. We found that as of March 2011 significant amounts of non-explosive inventory held in central depots were not being issued and consumed regularly. For example, £4.2 billion (gross) of non-explosive inventory has not moved for at least two years. This represents 10 per cent of the total inventory value as at March 2011. A further £2.4 billion (gross) of non-explosive inventory already held is sufficient to last for five years or more, based on the rate of usage since April 2009. The Department has had to set up central projects to dispose of inventory as a result of inconsistent disposals by project teams. During 2010 and 2011, these central projects identified £1.4 billion (gross) of inventory that could be sold or destroyed.
• The Department is buying more inventory than it uses. Between April 2009 and March 2011 the Department spent £4 billion on raw material and consumables, such as clothing or ammunition, but it has not used £1.5 billion (38 per cent). We estimate that the Department spent £12.5 million (gross) in 2010-11 on non-explosive inventory where it already had more than five years’ worth of stock in its central depots. These findings indicate that the Department is spending money on unnecessary levels of stock, which could be spent elsewhere in government.
• The Department is recording more inventory on its IT systems. This is in preparation for new IT systems and also in response to the qualification of its annual accounts. The Department has not been able to identify the proportion of the increase related to better recording of data.

11. Holding inventory that may not be used imposes a cost on the Department. We estimated the costs of storing and managing inventory borne by Defence Equipment and Support, the body within the Department responsible for procurement and support. These were at least £277 million in 2010-11. There is an opportunity cost for the Department if it stores inventory that will never be used. For example the Department may have to pay to create additional storage capacity to house new inventory items.

12. Future withdrawals from overseas bases will place more pressure on the Department’s central depot capacity. Overall the Department’s central depot space is under pressure and has little room for additional inventory. The planned return of the armed forces from Afghanistan by 2015 and from Germany by 2020 will exacerbate this situation when inventory from those locations is returned to the UK.

THE DEPARTMENT’S STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES TO MANAGE INVENTORY

13. The Department’s logistics strategy does not fully address the causes of unnecessary inventory holdings. The Department’s strategy is focused upon providing logistics support for current and future requirements. It does not, however, discourage over-ordering and therefore risks inventory levels increasing despite actions to reduce levels of unnecessary inventory.

14. The Department has set few efficiency targets for project teams to encourage them to buy and hold inventory in the right quantities. In line with the strategy, targets are focused on ensuring that there is sufficient inventory to meet requirements, rather than minimising over-ordering or managing inventory already being stored.

15. The Department has not successfully created incentives for project teams and the armed forces to consider the full impact of their decision-making. Inventory management is devolved to a number of teams with different responsibilities, each of which bears only a proportion of the overall costs. Despite departmental projects aimed at changing ordering behaviour there remain no incentives for teams to consider the impact on the Department overall. For example, the armed forces do not incur the cost of purchasing inventory until it is used and are not responsible for the consequences if they over-order. Similarly project teams do not incur the cost of storing the inventory they purchase. From April 2012, the Department has introduced separate budgets on consumable purchases to minimise over-ordering. It has also required project teams to obtain separate approval from the Director of Resources in Defence Equipment and Support for all purchases more than £0.5 million.

16. The Department does not understand the full cost of holding and managing inventory and does not use known costs as part of its day-to-day decision making. There is no comprehensive analysis of the costs of inventory management available, which makes it difficult for teams to make value for money judgements on whether to buy, retain or dispose of inventory.

17. The summary management and financial information on inventory that is provided to senior staff within Defence Equipment and Support is not sufficient for them to challenge and hold to account the project teams. Within Defence Equipment and Support, the gross and net values of the inventory holding are reported monthly to senior management. The reports do not currently highlight the reasons for changes or include information on the quantity or value of the flows in and out of the stores. In addition the performance management systems do not allow senior managers to review the fluctuations in the level or value of inventory stored and reveal the underlying reasons.

18. A lack of suitably qualified staff in post may undermine the Department’s efforts to improve its inventory management. At the end of November 2011, 20 per cent of inventory management posts were vacant, and of those staff in post, 13 per cent had not obtained the appropriate qualifications.

THE DEPARTMENT’S PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT

19. The Department acknowledges that it needs to improve its inventory management and has introduced several initiatives and changes to how teams manage inventory. These projects include introducing software to forecast likely demand more accurately and help reduce over- and under-buying. The Department is making considerable efforts to improve and the success of these projects should increase effectiveness and savings. However, most of these projects have not been operating for long enough to realise their benefits.

20. The Department has not yet put in place an accountability framework to encourage teams to manage their inventory efficiently as well as effectively. The Department’s strategy and performance reporting do not focus on efficient inventory management. As a result, the Department’s improvement initiatives have not yet addressed the lack of efficiency measurements or incentives for teams to consider the full implications of their decisions. Following a critical report by the Department’s Internal Audit and our discussions of informal findings from this report, in February 2012 the Department commissioned a review to try to establish and sustain more cost-effective inventory management. By May 2012 the review had made recommendations to improve inventory management and suggested further work necessary to deliver those improvements. With the exception of previously planned changes to the IT systems, the Department plans to implement those recommendations by March 2013.

21. The Department is making significant changes more widely to how it operates, the results of which may improve its management of inventory. Following the Strategic Defence and Security Review in October 2010 and Lord Levene’s review in June 2011, the Department plans to introduce a new operating model in April 2013. This will set out a customer–supplier relationship between the armed forces and Defence Equipment and Support. The Department’s objective is to strengthen decision-making and accountability for providing the armed forces required within budget, by holding the heads of the armed forces to account. The Department has yet to work through the implications for the organisations within it and determine how it will hold organisations to account for delivering to their targets.

22. The Department is exploring ways to achieve savings by outsourcing its procurement of commodities, such as clothing, and its central warehousing and distribution for non-explosives. It does not, however, yet have a strategic plan for inventory necessary to set robust requirements for outsourcing. It will only make significant savings if it stops buying more than it needs and disposes of inventory it no longer requires. As part of its internal approval process, the Department has recognised that it is not currently able to outsource and is addressing this in its work to develop the options for outsourcing.


CONCLUSION ON VALUE FOR MONEY

23. The Department has a number of appropriate criteria to satisfy, such as supporting long-term operations, when setting inventory levels. However it is clear that, in a number of areas, these criteria have already been exceeded and the Department continues to add yet more inventory. This does not represent value for money.

24. The Department recognises there are problems with its inventory management, and has introduced projects to improve its practices. However, the root cause of the excess stock is that management and accountability structures fail to provide the incentives to drive cost-effective inventory management. The Department will need to address these weaknesses comprehensively to deliver value for money.


RECOMMENDATIONS

25. Our recommendations are aimed at helping the Department achieve value for money from its inventory management.

(a) The Department should develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy for the size, value and composition of the inventory that it needs to retain, and use this as a basis for setting coherent targets and management approaches. The Department has made improvements to better manage inventory, but does not yet have a coherent and comprehensive view of the size and value of the inventory it needs to retain. Consequently the Department cannot manage its inventory as a strategic asset or set coherent targets and management approaches. Its strategy should embed good inventory management behaviours as standard business practices, for example ensuring that project teams do regularly review their inventory to identify items for disposal.

(b) The Department should expand its financial information and use it to improve cost-effective decision-making. The Department does not collect all the information needed to understand the full cost of managing inventory, nor does it centrally collate and report its cost information. The Department cannot, therefore, make informed decisions and evaluate whether it is achieving value for money from these decisions. The information should be collated in a manner that allows the full cost to be estimated for individual types of stock. Costs should include that of holding and managing stock by the armed forces.

(c) The Department should reduce the amount it spends each year on inventory where it already holds sufficient stocks. The Department holds £4.2 billion of inventory that has not moved in over two years and a further £2.4 billion of holdings sufficient to cover five years of use. However it spent £1.5 billion in 2009-10 and 2010-11 on consumable inventory that it has not used.

(d) The Department should set up management and accountability structures that incentivise good inventory management. The Department will be introducing a number of significant reforms over the next few years, including new operating models for the Department overall, and for Defence Equipment and Support. The Department should use the opportunity presented by these reforms to set up management and accountability structures that encourage teams to manage inventory efficiently as well as effectively.

(e) The Department should address its problems in managing inventory before it outsources some of its warehousing, distribution and commodity procurement functions. The Department is exploring options for outsourcing but there are risks to achieving value for money owing to a lack of a comprehensive top-down strategy, robust information and skilled staff. The Department will need to successfully address these to avoid paying a premium for outsourcing.


(To read the full report and for additional resources, please visit the NAO website at http://goo.gl/sJejN) 

(Photo courtesy Defence Materiel Administration, FMV):

June 28, 2012. David Pugliese - Defence Watch

The Swedish Navy’s Visby stealth corvette has passed a major milestone by firing a RBS15 anti-ship missile, according to the Swedish Defence Force.

The Bofors RBS 15 anti-ship missile, known as sjömålsrobot 15 in Sweden, is used to fight other ships at long stand-off distances, and is one of the major weapons systems aboard the corvette. The RBS 15 weighs nearly half a tonne, and accelerates from 0 to 100 km/h in under half a second.

The Visby corvette is stealth vessel, so the missile is fired from a tube inside the ship. The delivery of the first two ships is now due in the fall.

Jun. 28, 2012 By GERARD O’DWYER Defense News

HELSINKI — Norway is becoming so frustrated over the long delays in receiving 14 NH90 helicopters it ordered in 2001 that officials are considering following Sweden’s example and buying tactical and transport helicopters that can be quickly delivered as a gap filler.

In a joint $1.2 billion acquisition, Finland, Sweden and Norway contracted to acquire 52 multirole NH90s in 2001 from NHIndustries as part of the Nordic Standard Helicopter Program agreed among the three countries.

The Norwegian Armed Forces has so far acquired just one NH90 helicopter, delivered in November. The NATO Frigate-type NH90s are earmarked to replace the Norwegian Coast Guard’s Lynx helicopters and to provide a helicopter anti-submarine warfare capability to the new Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates.

However, Norway’s growing impatience is centered on an NH90 development program that has been plagued by slow deliveries, as well as slower certification and acceptance.

The Swedish government responded to its NH90 delivery delays by ordering 15 Black Hawk helicopters in April 2011. The decision was prompted by a significant shortage of tactical, transport and medevac helicopters to support national defense tasks and Sweden’s ground troop operations in Afghanistan.

Sweden’s military plans to have the entire complement of 15 Black Hawks, which forms part of a separate, $700 million long-term helicopter-availability project, operational by 2017.

For its part, Sweden had ordered 20 NH90 helicopters (designated HKP14), 13 with a high cabin configuration suited to tactical troop transport, combat search and rescue, and medevac operations. The full fleet of NH90s is not expected to be operational until 2020.

Just a handful of NH90s have so far been delivered to Norway, Finland and Sweden. The continuing delays, despite repeated assurances of delivery by the supplier, have tested Norway’s patience, said Norwegian Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide.

“If they [NHIndustries] cannot come up with a credible delivery plan, we need to consider looking at other options,” Eide said. “The contractor has not delivered according to schedule. What is holding us back now is not the contract, but that we want this helicopter, which is an excellent machine. But we must use taxpayer’s money in a sensible manner. We have made it very clear that we expect action, not promises.”

Norway’s expanding need for tactical and transport helicopters, and the uncertainty over the delivery dates for all of the 14 NH90s, means the MoD may need to look at other options, including the acquisition of off-the-shelf models, Eide said.

NHIndustries, which concedes the reasons for Norway’s growing impatience, said it is working with the MoD on new measures to support a more credible schedule designed to accelerate delivery.

“We are confident the new measures will have a real positive impact to resolve the delays and put deliveries back on a firmer track,” said Aage Jørgensen, NHIndustries’s chief adviser in Norway. “We have agreed with Norway to deliver fully operational helicopters from 2014, and this is the target we are working toward.”

Established in 1992, NHIndustries is owned by Eurocopter, AgustaWestland and the Dutch group Stork Fokker Aerospace.

juin 28, 2012 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (BRUXELLES2)

Oubliés dans l’architecture du Traité de Lisbonne, les ministres des Affaires étrangères veulent retrouver un rôle. Alors ils phosphorent sur le « futur de l’Europe ». Sous la houlette de Guido Westerwelle, le ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, une dizaine d’entre eux ont entrepris de se réunir régulièrement pour « tirer les leçons de la crise actuelle de la dette et voir comment l’Union européenne peut être plus efficace et  plus démocratique ».

Le compte-rendu de ces discussions est prévu pour septembre. Mais un rapport « intermédiaire » de 8 pages donne déjà, en guise de première réflexion, des premières pistes sur la gouvernance économique, l’efficacité démocratique et… la politique extérieure. Et quelles pistes ! Au menu, regroupement une seule tête pour le président du Conseil et le président de la Commission, mise en place d’une chambre des Etats (avec le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux), … et au niveau de la politique étrangère et de défense (ce qui nous intéresse particulièrement), majorité qualifiée, revitalisation, regroupement, mise en commun voire… armée européenne !

Une réflexion « germanique »

Cette réflexion n’est pas entièrement nouvelle. De nombreuses personnalités ont réfléchi sur l’avenir de l’Europe à plusieurs reprises. Si le travail reste encore très théorique, avec de grandes idées. Mais cette fois, plutôt que d’envisager un nouveau cadre législatif, les ministres ont souhaité « concentrer leurs propositions dans le cadre des traités existants ». La troisième réunion du genre, à Berlin le 19 juin, a réuni environ une dizaine de ministres du centre (Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Danemark, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, Pologne) et du sud de l’Europe (Italie, Portugal et Espagne).

La France a participé à ces travaux par le truchement de son ambassadeur. Le ministre était « retenu par d’autres obligations » m’a assuré un diplomate tricolore. Aux premières réunions, aussi, la France n’était pas représentée au rang ministériel. Il faut avouer que cette réflexion sur l’Union politique n’est pas vraiment encore ressentie comme une priorité par Paris : par l’équipe Sarkozy car ce n’était pas son logiciel de pensée, par l’équipe Hollande car elle arrive et est aussi prise en un débat délicat issu du référendum sur la Constitution entre ‘nonistes’ et ‘ouiistes’ que le Président ne souhaite pas vraiment rouvrir. Les plaies ne sont pas encore refermées. Et l’ancien secrétaire général du parti sait combien ce débat a coûté en divisions et en temps perdu. Sur les questions de politique étrangère, la France ne devrait cependant pas ressentir de difficultés à acquiescer (presque) à la plupart des points évoqués, puisqu’ils rencontrent nombre des préoccupations des « Weimar » (les cinq pays signataires de la « lettre de Weimar »).

Etre plus ambitieux sur la politique de défense

Les « Dix » veulent ainsi une « Europe plus engagée dans le monde » (le terme allemand « Globaler Spieler Europa » frappe plus fort). Certaines questions comme l’aide au développement, le contrôle des migrations, les négociations sur le climat, la sécurité énergétique et la politique commerciale doivent être reliées à la PESC et la PSDC. Le service diplomatique européen doit « continuer d’être renforcé », la prochaine étape étant la révision de la décision fondant ce service en 2013. « Pour faire des progrès, nous devons dès maintenant faire les bons choix » précisent-ils cependant. Nous devons également chercher à avoir des « sièges communs » dans les organisations internationales. Nous devons poursuivre le chemin pour pouvoir « parler toujours plus fort à l’extérieur avec une voix ». Les 10 envisagent de prendre davantage de décisions dans le domaine de la PESC à la « majorité qualifiée ». Une petite révolution…

Vers une armée européenne

Les « Dix » affirment surtout la nécessité d’une « revitalisation de la sécurité et de défense commune ». La « plupart » des ministres affichent ainsi des « objectifs ambitieux » en matière de politique de défense. Cela passe par « renforcer la planification civile et militaire et les capacités de conduite de l’Agence européenne de défense, avec davantage de partage et d’exploitation en commun des capacités ». Nous devons passer en revue – ajoutent-ils – ces « possibilités de mutualisation et partage des capacités ». Dans le long terme, nous devrions viser une « politique de défense européenne avec une articulation des efforts de l’industrie de l’armement »,  ce qui pourrait également inclure  pour « certains » États membres « une armée européenne ».

télécharger le rapport dans les Docs de B2

28 Jun 2012 By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent- The Telegraph

Unused military equipment worth billions is being hoarded by the Ministry of Defence costing the taxpayer almost £300 million a year, a report has found.

MoD officials have ordered £4.2 billion of stock that ranged from bayonet scabbards to aircraft engines for “which it had experienced no demand” for two years, the National Audit Office said.

The Armed Forces have also stored equipment for aircraft that are no longer in service, NAO inspectors found. The RAF still holds 54 years worth of bomb dropping devices for Nimrods despite the aircraft being retired from service two years ago.

Similarly the Navy has six giant propellers worth £1.1 million for three Type 42 destroyers that will be decommissioned next year.

With some warehouses full to 90 per cent capacity there are worries that more space will have be rented to store kit returned from Afghanistan in 2015 and when the Forces leave Germany in 2020.

Despite defence cuts the MoD has increased spending on its stock by 13 per cent rising by more than £2 billion to £19.5 in two years.

The costs of storing and managing the growing inventory were put at £277 million per year.

The over-ordering has been caused by staff lacking “incentives” to keep spares down as well as a shortage of trained stock managers.

The MoD said it was undertaking a review to address the issues raised by the report.

Peter Luff, Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, said: "Appropriate reserves of equipment are essential to be able to deploy our Armed Forces at short notice and sustain them on operations across the world.

"Afghanistan is our top priority and to ensure commanders are not constrained, we have rightly increased the amount of kit and spares available to support the front line.

“The challenge of managing and maintaining vast amounts of equipment, including explosive materials, around the world should not be underestimated but I know that the MOD’s assets must be more efficiently managed.

"That is why we are undertaking a number of initiatives to address this long-standing issue.

"We are changing the way we buy, store and dispose of equipment stocks and investing in IT systems to help us record the hundreds of thousands of items in our inventory."

Richard Bacon, a Tory MP, said: “When it comes to spending taxpayers’ money, the Ministry of Defence is something of a shopaholic, spending billions of pounds on supplies it doesn’t need.”

28 juin 2012 Par Rédacteur en chef. PORTAIL DES SOUS-MARINS

Le vice-amiral Fernando Zumalacárregui Luxán présidera vendredi, dans la base navale de Carthagène, la cérémonie officielle de désarmement du sous-marin ’Siroco’.

Il était déjà inutilisé depuis 2 ans, faute d’argent pour le remettre en état.

Finalement, le ministère espagnol de la défense a décidé de le désarmer et d’utiliser ses équipements en meilleur état pour réparer les 3 autres sous-marins de la même classe Agosta.

Référence : La Verdad (Espagne)

La frégate De Zeven Provincien et son radar SMART-L (en noir)

photo THALES

28/06/2012 MER et MARINE

L'agence d'acquisition des matériels du ministère néerlandais de la Défense a notifié à Thales un important contrat dans le domaine de la défense anti-missile balistique (DAMB). L'électronicien a, ainsi, été chargé de modifier les radars de veille à longue portée SMART-L dont sont équipées les quatre frégates néerlandaises de la classe De Zeven Provincien, unités de 144 mètres et 6500 tonnes mises en service entre 2002 et 2005. Thales fera en sorte que ces senseurs, d'une portée de plus de 500 kilomètres, soient optimisés pour assurer une alerte avancée en cas de tirs de missiles balistiques. A l'issue de cette mise à niveau, le SMART pourra détecter un missile balistique peu après son lancement. Les frégates seront capables, grâce à leur radar, de poursuivre plusieurs cibles simultanément et déterminer leurs points de départ, leurs trajectoires et leurs lieux d'impact. A terme, les frégates De Zeven Provincien, Tromp, De Ruyter et Evertsen devraient même être capables d'intercepter des missiles balistiques. Les bâtiments pourront, en effet, tirer des missiles américains SM-3, conçus spécialement pour ce type d'interception. On notera d'ailleurs que depuis 2006, la marine néerlandaise a mené des essais de lutte anti-missile balistique avec l'US Navy.

Par ailleurs, si les Pays-Bas s'engagent dans cette voie, d'autres marines européennes pourront faire de même, à commencer par celles dont les bâtiments sont dotés d'un radar de la famille SMART-L. C'est le cas notamment des frégates franco-italiennes du type Horizon et des destroyers britanniques du type 45, qui mettent en oeuvre un S1850M. Ces plateformes ne sont pas dotées, comme les frégates néerlandaises et allemandes, d'armes américaines (SM-2 MR) mais de missiles européens Aster, dont une version, l'Aster Block1, est proposée pour la DAMB.