5 Feb 2015 By: Beth Stevenson - FG

The UK Defence Select Committee has criticised the government for conducting a mere 6% of the air strikes that are being carried out against Islamic State militants in Iraq. The Royal Air Force has been contributing aircraft and personnel to the effort since parliament authorised British air strikes in September, but the committee has claimed in a new report that with consideration of the expertise and resources at its disposal, the UK could and should play a much larger role. Although this is one of the “most extreme threats” facing civilisation in some 20 years, Rory Stewart, chairman of the committee, says that the UK’s role in combating it is “strikingly modest".

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L'Egypte va très certainement s'offrir 24 Rafale et une frégate multimissions FREMM

06/02/2015 Michel Cabirol  - LaTribune.fr

Le président égyptien, Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, a entre ses mains la proposition détaillée de la France pour la vente de 24 Rafale et d'une frégate multimissions pour environ 4,5 milliards d'euros.

28 janvier 2015 Crédits : Etat-major des armées / armée de l’Air

Lancée le 19 septembre 2014, l’opération Chammal vise, à la demande du gouvernement irakien et en coordination avec les alliés de la France présents dans la région, à assurer un soutien aérien aux forces armées irakiennes dans leur lutte contre le groupe terroriste autoproclamé Daech.

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05/02/2015 Sources : État-major des armées

Le 24 janvier 2015, 40 marins de la frégate Jean Bart ont reçu les honneurs de la marine américaine pour la qualité du travail effectué et la qualité des relations entretenues lors du déploiement de la frégate anti aérienne au sein du Carrier Strike Group One (CSG1) Vinson.

La frégate Jean Bart vient de passer trois mois dans le golfe arabo-persique au sein du Carrier Strike Group One (CSG1), à assurer la protection du porte-avions USS Carl Vinson et au contrôle de près de 4 000 aéronefs de la coalition en partance et retour de la zone d’opération du Levant, dans le cadre de l’opération Chammal.

Par la qualité des services rendus et son extension temporelle, soulignées par les américains, le Jean Bart a ainsi été rapidement considéré comme partie intégrante du groupe aéronaval. A ce jour, elle s’inscrit comme la frégate étrangère la plus présente autour du Carl Vinson lors ce déploiement.

Pour saluer cette intégration hors norme, aussi bien pour la France que pour les Etats-Unis, le commodore Stuffle, commandant les escorteurs du CSG1 (COMDESRON1), s’est rendu à bord du Jean Bart pour attribuer la Navy Achievement Medal et la Navy Commendation Medal à 40 marins. Par ces récompenses, ce n’est pas seulement le Jean Bart que les autorités américaines entendent remercier, mais bien, plus largement, la marine et les armées françaises pour la qualité de cet engagement à leurs côtés.

L’amiral Grady, commandant le CSG1, a ainsi voulu souligner que la marine française est l’une des rares marines capable de travailler au même niveau que l’US Navy en opération de haute intensité. L’amiral Grady indique dans son ultime message au Jean Bart :“Your operational attitude, innovation and can do attitude reflected great credit upon the legacy of the «Jean Bart», the French Navy and the strength of our longlasting partnership”.

Lancée le 19 septembre 2014, l’opération Chammal vise, à la demande du gouvernement irakien et en coordination avec les alliés de la France présents dans la région, à assurer un soutien aérien aux forces armées irakiennes dans leur lutte contre le groupe terroriste autoproclamé Daech. Depuis le 5 octobre, suite au renforcement du dispositif, les forces françaises s’appuient sur neuf avions Rafale, six Mirage 2000D un avion de ravitaillement C135, et un avion de patrouille maritime Atlantique 2. Le Jean Bart a quitté l’opération le 28 janvier, après trois mois de déploiement dans le golfe arabo-persique.

05/02/2015 Sources : État-major des armées  

Cette semaine, la force Chammal a réalisé 22 missions aériennes au-dessus du sol irakien. Trois d’entre-elles ont abouti à des frappes contre des objectifs de Daech, permettant d’appuyer les forces de sécurité irakiennes dans leurs combats au sol en neutralisant des combattants terroristes ou leurs capacités d’action.

Le 4 février, des chasseurs français ont neutralisé, lors d’une frappe d’opportunité, plusieurs véhicules terroristes et leurs occupants.

Le 30 janvier 2015 matin, lors d’une mission de reconnaissance armée conduite entre Mossoul, Kirkourk et Baiji, un groupe de 150 combattants de Daecha été identifié en position de combat contre des forces peshmergas irakiennes. Une frappe des forces françaises a permis d’en neutraliser une cinquantaine.

Le même jour et dans la même zone, les aéronefs ont également neutralisé une position de tir qui faisait feu sur des forces irakiennes.

Le 3 février 2015 après-midi, alors que les chasseurs français intervenaient dans le nord du pays, entre Mossoul et Sinjar, ils ont été chargés de bombarder un groupe de combattants de Daech ainsi qu’un de leur véhicule dans la région de Tal Afar.

Dans la soirée, la force Chammal a participé à un raid aérien de la coalition dans la région de Mossoul, visant à détruire une usine servant à la fabrication d’engins explosifs improvisés.

Hormis ces frappes, les aéronefs français ont conduit quotidiennement des vols de reconnaissance armée, de renseignement dans la profondeur, ou de ravitaillement, en étroite coordination avec nos alliés présents dans la région.

Lancée le 19 septembre 2014, l’opération Chammal vise, à la demande du gouvernement irakien et en coordination avec les alliés de la France présents dans la région, à assurer un soutien aérien aux forces armées irakiennes dans leur lutte contre le groupe terroriste autoproclamé Daech. Le dispositif est structuré autour de neuf Rafale, six Mirage 2000D, un avion de patrouille maritime Atlantique 2 et un avion ravitailleur C-135 FR.

January 13, 2015: Strategy Page

In September 2014 Israel received the fourth of six Dolphin class submarines from Germany. This the first of three new Dolphins that have a fuel cell based AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system which enables them to stay under water for over a week at a time. The Dolphins in general are also very quiet, and very difficult to hunt down and destroy. The first three Dolphins didn't have the AIP system.

Germany continues to build Dolphin class boats for Israel, with the next one due to arrive in 2015 and the last one in 2019. The first three arrived in 1998-2000. The second three Dolphins cost about $650 million each, with Germany picking up a third of the cost on two of them. The first two Dolphins were paid for by Germany, as was most of the cost of the third one. This is more of German reparations for World War II atrocities against Jews.

The three older boats have since been upgraded to include larger fuel capacity, converting more torpedo tubes to the larger 650mm size, and installing new electronics. The fuel and torpedo tube mods appear to have something to do with stationing the subs off the coast of Iran. Larger torpedo tubes allow the subs to carry longer range missiles. The larger fuel capacity makes it easier to move Dolphins from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Although Israel has a naval base on the Red Sea, Egypt, until 2012, did not allowed Israeli subs to use the Suez Canal. So the Dolphins were modified to go around Africa, if they had to.

As built the Dolphins could stay at sea for about 40 days (moving at about 14 kilometers an hour, on the surface, for up to 8,000 kilometers). Larger fuel capacity extended range to over 10,000 kilometers and endurance to about 50 days. The 1,625 ton Dolphins can carry 16 torpedoes or missiles and have ten forward torpedo tubes (four of them the larger 650mm/26 inch size). The Dolphins are considered the most modern non-nuclear subs in the world. The first three cost $320 million each. All have a crew of 35 and can dive to a depth of more than 200 meters (660 feet). The Dolphin design is based on the German 209 class subs but has been so heavily modified that it is considered a different class and only Israel has them.

In early 2014 Israel revealed that in 2013 its submarines spent 58 percent of their time at sea on combat missions while the rest of the time was spent for training. Israel currently has four Dolphin class subs in service. The Israelis also admitted that their subs sometimes go far (to Iran and the Red Sea) from their bases on missions. Give that Israel is not at war with anyone with a navy, these missions are probably related to collecting information on the ships and ports of potential enemies. That would include Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Sudan and so on. The navy revealed that the subs undertook 54 “special operations” in 2013 and that was a big increase from previous years.

No details were given on what the special operations were but based on what kind of surveillance operations Israel has conducted in the past and what U.S. subs did in that area during the Cold War. The Israeli subs have probably been using their passive (listen only) sonar to collect information about ports and warships as well as deploying and retrieving larger electronic sensors placed underwater near where enemy ships operate. Israel may also be tapping underwater communications cables. For some of these operations the Israelis would use divers carried on the subs as passengers. Israel has a small force of naval special operations troops similar to the American SEALS and the British SBS.

All of the Israeli subs are built in Germany, where the local media periodically pretends to be appalled at what the Israelis actually do with these subs. Thus back in 2012 revelations in German media that the Dolphin class boats were equipped in Germany with a special hydraulic ejection (from torpedo tubes) systems for launching missiles with nuclear warheads caused a stir. This was actually misleading, as well as being old news. The Dolphin class subs have long had the ability to launch Harpoon anti-ship missiles and longer range cruise missiles from the torpedo tubes. It makes no difference if the warhead has high-explosives or a nuclear bomb in it. For over a decade Israel and Germany played down this capability. For example shortly after September 11, 2001 Israel denied that it had submarines capable of firing cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. But the U.S. navy had reported spotting such missiles being tested by an Israeli sub in the Indian Ocean before 2001.

In 2000 it was widely reported that Dolphin class subs were being equipped with nuclear weapons. The 135 kilometer range Harpoon missiles were alleged to have been modified to carry a nuclear warhead and Israel. It was also asserted that Israel was developing a submarine launched 350 kilometer range cruise missile. Both of these weapons were launched from the subs torpedo tubes. Since then Israel has developed a new cruise missile, with a range of 1,500 kilometers and carrying a 200 kiloton nuclear warhead. These nuclear equipped subs were to provide an extra degree of security as all other Israeli nuclear weapons were in land bases and, in theory, could be wiped out by a surprise missile attack. A nuclear missile equipped submarine at sea would be much more difficult to find.

January 23, 2015:  Strategy Page

During the 50 Day War with Hamas in July-August 2014 Israel tested some new infantry equipment. This consisted of a new bullet-proof protective vest that is 15 percent lighter than existing ones. Israeli infantry do not regularly wear this type of heavy vest, but a lighter one that protects from shell and grenade fragments as well as most pistol bullets and ricochets from rifle and machine-gun bullets. To provide protection from snipers and machine-gun bullets SAPI (Small Arms Protective Inserts) were developed. These ceramic or polycarbonate plates are inserted in the front and rear of the protective vest. The basic "Level 3" SAPI plates are 25.4x305cm (10x12 inches) and weigh 2.1 kg (4.6 pounds) each. The new Israeli plates are lighter and thus easier for soldiers to wear for long periods. It’s very hot in Israel most of the time so the weight soldiers have to carry is particularly important. The SAPI plates double the weight of a protective vest so most of the time Israeli troops go without it. The lighter weight SAPI plates were popular in Gaza, particularly since Hamas used a lot of snipers. Only 400 of the new SAPI vests were available for testing, but 20,000 more are being ordered so large numbers of troops can use them is needed.

Also tested were new goggles, both day and night versions. These use shatterproof material and proved popular. Also much appreciated were the new ear protection, which kept very loud noises out. Max peak noise reduction was 30 db. Normal conversation is 65 db, a loud motorcycle is 110 db, a nearby jet engine is 140 db, a nearby shotgun blast is 165 db and battlefield explosions are often 180 db. Thus a 30 db reduction makes a big difference because noises over 140 db can be painful and lead to temporary or permanent hearing loss. With the new ear plugs troops could adjust these ear plugs to different levels of sound suppression.

There is also a new helmet in development that is lighter and provides better protection from sniper bullets. Providing better protection from high-powered sniper rifle bullets is important as Hamas and Hezbollah have learned that this is a very effective way of killing Israeli soldiers. In general Israeli troops will quickly defeat Hamas or Hezbollah gunmen in a fire fight, but a few snipers not only increases Israeli fatalities but also forces the Israeli troops to operate more deliberately and slowly, allowing more Arab gunmen to get away from a battle they are losing.  Israel has also pioneered the development and manufacturing of sniper detection equipment. But this is only useful after a sniper has fired. For pretection before that you need SAPI.

February 1, 2015: Strategy Page

Saudi Arabia is suddenly very alarmed at the vulnerability of their long borders with Iraq and Yemen. For generations the main border problem was smugglers. Since the 1990s the smugglers have been joined by huge numbers of people trying to enter Saudi Arabia illegally. Worse, the smugglers have now added hard drugs (cocaine, heroin and worse) to their inventory. Finally a growing number of the illegal traffic has been Islamic terrorists entering the kingdom with malice in mind. By late 2014 Saudi Arabia had reached the point where it had told its border guards to shoot-on-sight and shoot-to-kill if anyone caught illegally crossing and refusing to stop. This could cause problems with some of the Saudi tribes living near the border, where tribal members have been smuggling for generations and tribal leadership tolerates a lot of it (especially if they are getting a percentage). But the Saudis know that Islamic terrorists will exploit these relationships if they can and the Islamic terrorist threat. Is seen as more dangerous than tribal unrest.

The second big decision was the new border fence. There was already a border fence along the Iraq and Yemen frontiers, but it was not much of an obstacle. So it was decided to revive a 2006 plan for a security “barrier” along the Iraqi border that would cost over $13 million per kilometer. This would come to nearly $14 billion for the 900 kilometer Iraq border. Work was supposed to begin in 2007 but didn’t. The fence was to be finished in 2009 and wasn’t. The fence was intended to keep out Sunni Islamic terrorists (mainly al Qaeda) who sought to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Sunni Islamic republic, as well as Shia Islamic terrorists who wanted to establish a Shia Islamic republic under the leader ship of Iran. The fence would also reduce smuggling, which has been rampant along this border since the kingdom was established in the 1920s.

Then some government officials, and many ordinary Saudis, complained about the cost. Despite all the oil income Saudi Arabia is still having money problems. A growing population, with too many young people not willing to work as hard as all the imported help, puts an enormous financial burden on the kingdom. Building this fence, as designed, would require a lot more foreign experts and imported technology. So the security people were sent back to the drawing board, and came up with a cheaper solution, that would put more unskilled young Saudis to work. The new design cost only a billion dollars. It consisted of two barbed wire fences and lots of radars, heat sensing devices (infrared “radar”) and other sensors. This would take less than a year to build and would put plenty of people to work setting up 1,800 kilometers of fence, and installing the electronic devices. This new design was believed able to do the job as well as the original 2006 security fence, cost a lot less, and employ lots of Saudis. While completed, the cheap fence lacked many of the sensors (or used ones that were not reliable) and was easy to cut through. When these flaws became obvious enough to a lot of people there were calls for a return to the original design and in 2014 it was agreed to “upgrade” the border fence to standards first proposed in 2006.

The original design used lots of sensors, supported by 1,450 kilometers of fiber optic cables. The high-speed fiber optic lines allowed for real time monitoring of fifty radars (able to detect vehicles, pack animals and individual people) along with 78 monitoring towers equipped with optical day and night sensors (digital cameras) with zoom. The monitoring was done from eight command centers. From these centers sensor operators could quickly determine if someone was attempting to breach the border barrier and where. They could then order armed men to the trouble spot from 32 rapid response centers. There are ten vehicles equipped with surveillance equipment that can be sent to areas where trouble is expected, to make sure the trouble, if it shows up, is spotted and identified sooner.

Legal traffic goes through 38 crossings, which are heavily guarded and monitored. The foreign consultants that helped design the barrier warned the Saudis that the more effective the new border barrier was the more likely the personnel operating the system would be bribed. So the software used to run the monitoring and control system has safeguards and monitoring routines built in to detect and quickly report possible bribery activity. A similar barrier is being built along the Yemen border and all 5,000 kilometers of land borders will eventually have upgraded border security, now with some kind of fence and sensors.

02/02/2015 lemarin.fr

Le groupe aérien embarqué à bord du porte-avions Charles de Gaulle ne compte qu’un seul avion-radar E-2C Hawkeye, au lieu des deux de la dotation normale. En cause, des criques liées à la corrosion, sans doute saline, sur l'un des appareils qui devaient embarquer.

La Marine n’a pas eu le choix, puisqu’elle ne dispose que de trois des appareils livrés par la firme américaine Grumman, au lieu des quatre qu’elle n’a cessé de réclamer, depuis la construction du Charles de Gaulle.

Ce qui fait que la vie des Hawkeye de la flottille 4F de Lann-Bihoué est invariablement le même : en permanence, un des trois avions est en maintenance programmée pour plusieurs mois à l’atelier industriel de l’aéronautique (AIA) de Cuers, pendant que les deux autres sont en capacité de voler, à Lann-Bihoué (Morbihan), ou sur le pont du Charles de Gaulle.

Seulement cette fois, un de ces deux avions présentait des traces de corrosion sur les ferrures d’ailes, un endroit sur lequel il n’est évidemment pas possible de transiger.

Il va donc devoir intégrer un chantier anticorrosion, laissant à bord un unique avion-radar. Une dizaine d’E-2 de l’US Navy ont déjà présenté le même problème, et la solution est en cours de développement explique-t-on.

On peut estimer que cela n'amoindrit pas la protection du porte-avions, qui dispose de puissants radars et qui est accompagné d’une frégate antiaérienne encore mieux dotée que lui sur ce plan. Mais cela limite d’autant la capacité d’accompagnement de raids (une autre fonction des Hawkeye), au-dessus du territoire irakien. Il faudra, de plus, prier pour que cet avion unique n’ait pas des tracas mécaniques pendant son séjour sur le Charles de Gaulle.

February 2, 2015: Strategy Page

ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) was seemingly invincible and unstoppable in mid-2014. In July 2014 ISIL had recently taken control of Mosul (the largest city in northern Iraq) and was advancing on Baghdad, the Kurdish north and the capital of western Iraq (Anbar province).  Similar gains were being made in Syria. All that has changed in the last few months. ISIL still holds the cities of Raqqa (the largest city in eastern Syria) and Mosul in Iraq. But both cities are increasingly rebellious and require a growing number of ISIL gunmen to maintain control.  Now ISIL is in retreat in Iraq and Syria. Sunni tribes in Anbar and western Syria are in open revolt and subject to increasingly savage reprisals by ISIL gunmen (often foreigners, which makes the tribesmen angrier). Half the ISIL leadership has been killed by coalition (Arab, NATO and allied) warplanes since August 2014. This air support and a Iraqi soldiers, Kurdish troops, Shia militias and armed Sunni tribesmen have taken back much of the territory ISIL overran in early 2014. American and other Western troops are rebuilding the Iraqi Army and arming anti-ISIL Sunni tribesmen. Iran is training and sometimes leading Shia militias. In Syria ISIL is getting beaten by Kurds, Syrian soldiers and more Iranian trained Shia militias.

While still bringing in new recruits from outside of Syria and Iraq, ISIL has lost the propaganda war inside those two counties and the Islamic world in general. History often repeats itself and in the case of Iraqi Islamic terrorists there is, for the second time since 2007, a major dip in Islamic terrorist approval ratings because of the brutality of Iraqi Islamic terrorists. Back in 2007 it was the "Al Qaeda In Iraq" leadership that was out of control. At the time opinion polls in Moslem countries showed approval and support of al Qaeda plunging, in some cases to single digits. This came after the 2003 invasion of Iraq when al Qaeda managed to take itself from hero to zero in less than four years. Al Qaeda has since recovered somewhat but that kinder and gentler approach did not last and by 2013 the Iraqi al Qaeda (now ISIL) was again losing popular support. That was quite visible after June 2014 when ISIL seized control of parts of Iraq and promptly slaughtered captured Iraqi soldiers and police, mainly because these men were Shia. Then ISIL declared the parts of Syria and Iraq it controlled were the new Moslem caliphate.

Naturally the ISIL leaders running this new caliphate called on all Moslems to follow them in making the new caliphate work. Most Moslems responded, according to subsequent opinion polls, by expressing greater fear rather than more admiration for Islamic terrorist groups, especially ISIL. This was not a radical change in attitude. Earlier in 2014 al Qaeda leadership condemned ISIL for being completely out of control and not to be trusted or supported. Throughout 2104 opinion polls showed Moslems becoming more hostile to Islamic terrorists, seeing them as a cause for concern not as defenders of Islam. The same thing happened back in 2007. Then as now there continued to be young (teens and twenties) Moslem men who saw all this mindless mayhem as an attraction and kept rushing to join the slaughter (most often of themselves). The Islamic world has not been able to control these violent young men or the older men who encourage and organize this violence.

When al Qaeda could not, in 2007, exercise any real control over the parts (mostly Anbar province in the West) of Iraq they claimed as part of the new Islamic State and that claim was the last straw for many Moslems. The original caliphate came apart because the Islamic world was split by ethnic and national differences and the first caliphate fell apart after a few centuries.  Various rulers have claimed the title over the centuries, but since 1924, when the Turks gave it up (after four centuries), no one of any stature has stepped up and assumed the role. So when al Qaeda "elected" a nobody in 2006 as the emir of the "Islamic State of Iraq", and talked about this being the foundation of the new caliphate, even many pro-al Qaeda Moslems were aghast. The key allies of the Iraqi Islamic terrorists (the Sunni minority of Iraq), battered by increasingly effective American and Iraqi (Shia and Kurd) attacks, dropped their support for al Qaeda and the terrorist organization got stomped to bits by the "surge offensive" a year later. The final insult was delivered by the former Iraqi Sunni Arab allies, who switched sides and sometimes even worked with the Americans (more so than the Shia dominated Iraqi security forces) to hunt down and kill al Qaeda personnel.

Between then and 2013 al Qaeda in Iraq slowly rebuilt and received a major boost in 2011 when the Sunni Arab majority in neighboring Syria rose up against four decades of Shia dictatorship. While the Sunni Arabs are a minority in Iraq (20 percent of the population versus 60 percent Shia) it is quite the opposite in Syria (15 percent Shia and 75 percent Sunni). The Sunnis are most numerous in eastern Syria and western Iraq which the Sunnis see as one entity divided by artificial political boundaries imposed by Turks and the Western nations that replaced the Turks after 1918. This “Sunnistan” is the northernmost concentration of Sunni Arabs and long subjugated by non-Sunni or non-Arab powers. Turks and Persians (the Indo-European Iranians) have long fought over the area, with the Turks largely in charge since the 16th century. The Turks were Sunni and what is now called Iraq has long been, not surprisingly, a center of the long religious battle between Sunni and Shia sects of Islam.

Ever since al Qaeda showed up in the 1990s they were popular to Moslems in proportion to how far away the al Qaeda violence was. Once al Qaeda began killing people nearby Moslems tended to change their mind and actively dislike Islamic terrorists. Thus in 2013 37 percent of Turks were concerned about Islamic terrorism while by 2014it was 50 percent thanks to increased ISIL violence on the Syrian border and some inside Turkey itself. Similar situation further south where 54 percent of the people in Jordan were concerned in 2013 versus 62 percent now. In Lebanon, where the Syrian violence spilled over quickly after 2011 last year 81 percent were concerned in 2013 Islamic terrorism versus over 90 percent today.

The hostility towards al Qaeda in the region has tainted all forms of Islamic radicalism, including the Shia ones (especially Hezbollah in Lebanon). Yet once Islamic terrorism disappears again (as it does regularly) many Moslems will get nostalgic for those legendary warriors seeking to defend Islam. This is a cycle many Moslems would like to break, but so far the cycle of violence persists.

4 February 2015 Frank Gardner – BBC MidEast

Jordan has vowed to avenge the killing of its air force pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh by Islamic State (IS) militants.

This comes after an IS video appeared to show him being burned alive. Jordan confirmed the death, although the video's authenticity is being checked. Officials told reporters a convicted jihadist Jordan had tried to exchange for the pilot would be executed. The 26-year-old pilot was seized when his plane came down in Syria in December during a mission against IS. Mamdouh al-Ameri, a spokesman for the Jordanian armed forces, said on Tuesday that Lt Kasasbeh had "fallen as a martyr". "His blood will not be shed in vain. Our punishment and revenge will be as huge as the loss of the Jordanians." Jordan's King Abdullah: "It is every Jordanian's duty to stand together" The army also promised an "earth-shattering" response to his death.

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February 2, 2015 David Pugliese

The Canadian Forces/DND has updated what is going on in Iraq as far as its operations.

On January 30, while taking part in coalition missions in support of Iraqi security forces ground northwest of Baghdad, CF-18 Hornets bombed an ISIL mortar, according to the Canadian Forces.

The day before CF-18s bombed two ISIL fighting positions and two vehicles.

3 février 2015 Gaël Vaillant - leJDD.fr (AFP)

Le groupe Etat islamique (EI) a diffusé mardi une vidéo d'un homme en train d'être brulé vif dans une cage et a affirmé qu'il s'agissait du pilote jordanien capturé après le crash de son F-16 en Syrie le 24 décembre dernier. Dans une autre vidéo, l'organisation a menacé de s'en prendre aux millions de personnes ayant défilé le 11 janvier après les attaques djihadistes.

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