9 November 2011 naval-technology.com

Interocean American Shipping will be awarded a firm-fixed-price contract by the US Military Sealift Command for the operation and maintenance of the Sea-Based X-Band Radar platform (SBX-1).

The $28.18m contract includes four one-year option periods which, if exercised, will bring the cumulative value of the contract to $165.2m.

The SBX-1 radar, to be deployed to the Pacific Ocean, provides ballistic missile-tracking and countermeasures information to the ground-based midcourse defence system (GMD) for interceptor missiles.

Work will be carried out at sea, with completion to take place by September 2012.

October 28, 2011 by Galrahn - informationdissemination.net

CBC News is reporting that the Harper Government is at least pondering the idea of cutting their losses with the Victoria class submarines and replacing them with nuclear submarines. The Victoria class submarines have been plagued with problems since being acquired from the UK, and despite being described as the "military bargain of the century" when purchased for $750 million in 1998, they have become anything but.

The submarines are currently all out of service, with HMCS Victoria the soonest to potentially return to service by late next year. The article describes the issues.

One of the subs, HMCS Chicoutimi, has been in active service of the Royal Canadian Navy exactly two days in the 13 years since it was purchased from the Brits.

The Chicoutimi caught fire on its maiden voyage from the U.K. to Canada, killing one sailor and injuring a number of others.

It has been in the repair shop ever since, and isn’t expected back in service for at least another two years and $400 million more in repairs and retrofits.

The article goes on:

The other three would remain out of service until at least 2013. One may not be out of the repair shop until 2016.

By that time, the submarines will have cost taxpayers an estimated $3 billion, almost enough to have bought all new subs in the first place.

But the real problem is that by the time the whole fleet is in active service for the first time in 2016, the submarines will already be almost 30 years old with only perhaps 10 years of life left in them.

High-ranking sources tell CBC News the government is actively considering cutting its losses on the dud subs, and mothballing some if not all of them.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay is hinting they might be replaced with nuclear submarines that could patrol under the Arctic ice, something the existing diesel-electric subs cannot do.

I'm not sure how the costs break out over a single budget year, but based on the article it sounds like Canada has already spent $1 billion and will spend $2 billion more by 2016, which suggests costs that average around $500 million over the next 4 years. That's a lot of money just to get 10 years out of four SSKs.

If we do the math, basically the Harper government is faced with the very real problem. The repair costs will earn Canada 4 Victoria class SSKs that are already old for an investment cost of at least $75 million annually per submarine, and at the same time India is leasing the significantly more capable and new Russian SSN K-152 Nurpa for $900 million over 10 years - $90 million annually.

Something tells me Rep. Joe Courtney (Conn) could come up with a few ideas here - just saying. What would it cost to refuel and refit a Los Angeles class submarine for a second time to add 15 or so more years to the submarine? In 2005 the cost was slightly over $200 million, so even if we estimate the total refit per submarine to be around $350 million (serious modernization), Canada would only be spending $1.4 billion for four SSNs with a service life of 15 years vs $2 billion for four SSKs with a service life of 10 years. Another big advantage for Canada would be they could use the rest of the money to put their sailors through existing US Navy submarine training schools and use existing US contractor services for upkeep, both of which would allow Canada to save a bunch of money.

The cost difference for the hardware would be $25 million per sub per year for SSNs vs $75 million per sub per year for SSKs. While it is true the operational, maintenance, and personnel costs will be higher for SSNs than it would be for SSKs, there are likely enough cost savings to be gained through existing US infrastructure that it's hard to believe the SSNs would be so much more expensive as to make it a bad deal.

I'm just floating this idea, but really trying to highlight that leasing Los Angeles class SSNs would likely be cost neutral (or perhaps even cost saving) for the Harper government given the big problems Canada is facing with the Victoria class.

I don't know if the US Navy even has four 688s that they would be willing to sell to Canada (although in a time of short term budget cuts impacting the Navy, now is the time to talk about this type of thing). I also don't know if the US and Canada can work out a realistic agreement that would give Canada the ability to utilize US Navy infrastructure for training and other services related to 688s. I do know that going down the road of supporting foreign SSNs would be good for either/both Electric Boat and Newport News, because when one looks at the trends they are having in Australia with their submarine industry - a deal with SSNs with Canada now would go a long way towards getting process and framework for this type of high end military deals in place so when our next very close ally comes along - we have a system and experience in place to support such agreements.  

Source: Atlantic Council

10/20/2011 Jonathan Dowdall - defenceiq.com

2011 is proving a momentous year for European militaries, with both spending cuts and new cooperative ties radically shaking-up the defence establishment. Yet whilst the austerity screws continue to tighten in national capitals, in the European Union’s corridors of power, something far more fundamental is coming into force. On the 21^st of August, phase two of the EU’s “Defence Package” passed into binding law, beginning a paradigm shift for European defence industry relations. Indeed to put it simply - and in the words of an executive from one of Europe’s largest defence companies - “this is the biggest thing to happen to European defence ever.”

As always, Defence Dateline will take you through the key points of this landmark policy.

The need to “De-frag” EU defence

The Defence Package seeks to address the fragmentation and un-competitiveness of the EU’s defence industry. The core question is: how has a continent that spends a not-insignificant €200bn a year on defence ended up with so little “bang for its buck”?

The arguments about low overall investment are well known, but in addition, inefficiencies in EU member state defence spending are exasperated by the division of its defence industrial base into 27 national markets. This fragmentation creates additional costs for buyers – i.e. European militaries - in two ways.

Firstly, because nations must acquire and pay for a myriad array of export licenses for even the simplest inter-EU weapons sale, pan-European defence transactions incur significant overheads. In fact, the European Commission has estimated that individual national licensing regimes and a lack of uniformity in application processes generates €400m in costs a year.

Secondly, Europe’s defence industry has for many years remained outside of the EU free market, due to a key component of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty - Article 296. This article allows nations to exempt defence and sensitive military procurement contracts from EU open competition laws - under the banner of “national security interests”.

Unsurprisingly in an industrial sector populated by national champions and niche interests, in practice almost all defence contracts have been declared “Art. 296”, and thus closed to open tender. This has obvious implications for market transparency and supply-discrimination, but it also creates generally disadvantageous market conditions across the EU. In effect, most national companies have guaranteed first access to their government’s contracts, regardless of competitors just across the border. This is not good for market and pricing forces, and it is not good for European military effectiveness.

Leveling the playing field

To address these issues, the EU legislated a “two-for-one” package of laws in 2009 to tackle these systemic problems.

Part 1, which came into force on the 30^th of June 2011, addresses the issue of export licenses. It induces member states to replace their existing individual licences with a general EU certificate for arms transfers between member state markets. If successfully implemented, this should reduce the bureaucratic overhead for inter-EU transfers to a simple and quick “rubberstamp”. Cross-border industrial transfers, as well as military procurement, will both stand to gain from such a move, at a fraction of the current export licensing cost.

Part 2, which entered into force on the 21^st of August 2011, tackles the larger problem of national protectionism. This directive demands that national procurement agencies align their contract tender announcements into a common EU format. Yet more crucially, it also puts additional restrictions on the use of Art. 296, by demanding that most supply or service contracts above €412,000 or procurement contracts above €5.15mmust abide by EU free market laws, meaning that they must be publicly announced and left open to European bids.

It is this second provision which seeks to truly shake-up the old order. By pushing European defence procurement into the open market, the EU is seeking to break monopolistic and protectionist tendencies in the defence sector. Significantly more European defence bids should, under the Defence Package, be open to any company within the EU, without prejudice to their country of origin.

Testing times - theory and practice

Needless to say, this utopian vision of a truly open defence market will not manifest over-night. In fact, huge questions remain about the effectiveness and implementation of the Defence Package.

Firstly, Art. 296 is not dead or buried. Member states retain their sovereign “national security” opt-out, even under the new law, as this is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and transcends individual legislation. National capitals will still have the legal right to exempt certain contracts from foreign competition, and thus shield their national industries. The question will be how widely states choose to enact Art. 296 under the new law.

Pre-emptively, the EU has already tried to cover this eventuality. The package contains a specific technical annex categorising the types of defence equipment that can be declared “national security” sensitive. Member states have thus had their legal room for manoeuvre severely curtailed. Gone are the days where everything from ammunition to jeep tyres could be lumped into a safe bid guaranteed to be won by a national arms champion. The onus will now be on member states to justify why a contract is too sensitive to tender openly.

Indeed, should a national government refuse to open a contract to pan-European tender, they could be vulnerable to a legal challenge by member states who feel their defence companies are being discriminated against. The EU Court of Justice could then be asked to adjudicate against a transgression of the free market, with financial penalties if an infraction is deemed to have taken place. It is also likely this would incur a certain amount of political embarrassment for the transgressor.

Yet the above scenario presumes the basic mechanisms of the Defence Package will be observed - and this has also yet to be tested.

At the bottom line, there are political, and not legal, questions about these reforms. Would a smaller member state (Slovakia for example) be willing to risk a public duel on behalf of its national industry with Germany or France over a procurement bid worth, say,  €10m? And would the political fall-out be worth the cost, as recriminations fly and politicians pontificate?

We simply don’t know at this stage how honestly member states intend to deal with the new rules, and how willing others will be to challenge them if they don’t. Art. 296 is ultimately a red-line: something the EU cannot supplant completely through law. It will thus fall to bilateral politics to smooth out the details in practice.

Transatlantic implications?

Interestingly this inter-EU shake-up may also send shockwaves across the Atlantic, as the directive compels a larger number of bids to be tendered on the EU free market - but not necessarily to those outside of it.

For instance, effectively only two “categories” of contract existed in Europe in the past - open to the world (and thus the US) or closed to national champions only. However with the addition of “open EU market” to that list - and the legal compulsion to push more bids into this category it entails - it could transpire that European procurement agencies will, whilst opening up to the EU27, simultaneously reduce the number of truly global open bids. After all, member states have simultaneously been granted cheaper and easier arms export licences to their European neighbours, an advantage the US cannot match.

Thus, whilst strongly denied publicly by the European Commission, the incentives to “buy European” have certainly de facto increased. It is difficult to imagine the US being “locked out”, but these fundamental changes in procurement could certainly alter the buying preferences of EU member states regarding US military equipment.

“The biggest thing to happen to European defence ever”

As this analysis indicates, the sources of Europe’s defence woes have industrial and bureaucratic, as well as spending, roots. The EU has aggressively set out to rectify these deficiencies, highlighting an increased readiness to legislate on defence matters and to introduce greater competitiveness in the last “closed shop” in town.

Yet whether the efficiencies and reduction in fragmentation that lies at the heart of these efforts can realistically be achieved is, as has been explained, an open question. It must also be remembered that a key component of market “de-frag” is a reduction in the number of defence primes. A truly open EU defence market would naturally begin to more closely resemble the national market of the US - with almost all bids fought over by a small number of multi-sector conglomerates.

The loss of national champions this would entail across Europe will almost certainly send governments dashing for the Art. 296 card. It is the biggest potential show-stopper for these reforms.

It will therefore be the willingness of national capitals to negotiate between themselves the loss of national capacities, in the name of greater EU efficiency, that will make or break a truly open European defence market.

Jonathan Dowdell writes for  Defence Dateline Group.

October 20, 2011: STRATEGY PAGE

U.S. soldiers and marines are using a new magazine for the 40mm grenades they fire from their single shot M203 and M320 grenade launchers. The MAG-D looks like a large rifle magazine. It is spring loaded and holds five 40mm rounds. Troops can easily pull a 40mm grenade from the MAG-D and load it into their weapon. A loaded MAG-D weighs less than three kg (6.6 pounds) each and is designed to hang from the webbing of the protective vest, and make additional rounds quickly available to troops carrying a rifle with a M203 or M320 attached (under the barrel). In the past, the 40mm rounds were carried loose or in bandoliers, and often got dirty or damaged. MAG-D also eliminates confusion about where different types of 40mm grenades are (high explosive, flare, smoke, tear gas, fuel-air explosive). U.S. Marines were the first to use MAG-D (which was invented by a former marine) and want more of them.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army has replaced the M203 40mm grenade launcher with the M320, while the marines are still using the M203. The both launchers fit under the barrel of the M16 rifle (and similar weapons), and have been in use for forty years. The army bought 71,000 M320s (for about $3,500 each) to replace the 50,000 M203s it was using. The M320 is similar to the M203, but easier to use, has its own pistol grip, is more accurate and can be used separately from an M16 with the addition of a stock.

The biggest improvement with the M320 is its sighting system, which features a laser range finder. At night, an infrared range finder enables a soldier wearing night vision goggles to see the light beam. In over a year of testing, the M320s sighting system was seen to make the weapon much more accurate than the older M203. This was particularly the case with new users. With the M203, you got better after you had fired a hundred or so rounds. That took time, and was expensive (the 40mm grenades cost about $28 each). The 40mm grenades weigh 543 grams (19 ounces) each and have a range of about 400 meters. The grenade explosion can kill within five meters, and wound up to ten meters or more.

The marines also use the M32, a six round 40mm grenade launcher. It looks like a cross between a shotgun and a revolver type pistol. Most marine units are equipped with the M203, usually two or three per squad.

Royal Australian Navy's Collins class submarine in the floating dock. (photo : cumminscommentary)

17.10.2011 DEFENSE STUDIES

10.10.2011 KMW - army-guide.com

Outstanding levels of tactical, operational and strategic mobility, compelling combat effectiveness and maximum survivability are key requirements imposed on modern military vehicles today – whether they are designed primarily for combat, command and control, mission-specific roles or transport.

In contemporary conflicts, where the threat is often asymmetric yet deadly, protecting troops deployed in harm’s way from hostile fire, IED attacks, CBRN agents and even extreme climates conditions has become a top priority for commanders worldwide: around the clock and in every branch of every service.

This is reflected in the current procurement plans of the armed forces of many nations, including the Bundeswehr’s GFF/GTF project to develop protected C4I and mission-specific vehicles as well as protected transport capacity.

Under this programme, Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) of Germany have joined forces to develop a highly protected family of armoured multipurpose vehicles (AMPV) in the weight class up to 9 ton. Their design and layout take full account of operational experience accumulated by the German armed forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Engineered exclusively to meet the needs of the modern military, the AMPV family consists of two separate branches.

The AMPV,a prototype version of which is currently undergoing qualification by the German armed forces, is slightly over five metres long, two metres wide and two metres high. Empty, it weighs 7.3 tons and can carry a two-ton payload. The highly protected vehicle cell consists of a self-supporting steel hull with composite armour. Spall liners, reinforced flooring and cellular design offer excellent protection against mines and IEDs; while add-on armour modules supply extra ballistic protection.

High mobility likewise contributes to a vehicle’s overall battlefield survivability, and the AMPV design reflects this. The vehicle’s robust chassis, featuring independent wheel suspension, is engineered to withstand maximum punishment. An automatic transmission, permanent all-wheel drive, automatic differential locking management and combat wheels with a central tyre inflation system combine to assure superb mobility even in the toughest terrain.

A patrol version of AMPV (with an unprotected load space) will be available, as well as mission module carriers with a safety cell extending all the way back to the rear of the vehicle. For enhanced lethality, a remote control weapon station up to calibre .50 can be mounted on any AMPV vehicle.

Extremely compact, all members of the AMPV family largely consist of identical components, especially the logistically relevant parts of the vehicle. Moreover, their essentially uniform, highly ergonomic design makes all AMPV vehicles easy to operate as well as facilitating logistics and training.

07/10/2011 MER et MARINE

Appelés BMM, pour bâtiments multi-missions, les successeurs des bâtiments de transport légers (Batral) de la Marine nationale seront commandés l'an prochain. Ce nouveau programme remplace l'ancien projet BIS (bâtiment d'intervention et de souveraineté). Cet été, la Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA) a lancé un appel à projets en vue de notifier en 2012 le contrat, dont le financement est prévu par le projet de loi de finances. Différent du programme BSAH (bâtiments de soutien et d'assistance hauturier), qui sera lui aussi lancé l'année prochaine, le programme BMM va voir l'acquisition de trois navires afin de remplacer les Batral Dumont d'Urville, Jacques Carter et La Grandière. Les nouvelles unités seront basées aux Antilles, en Nouvelle-Calédonie et en Polynésie.


Le Batral Dumont d'Urville (© : MARINE NATIONALE)

Mise en service en 2014

Les BMM, dont la livraison est prévue à partir de 2014, seront des navires de type supply, c'est-à-dire des bateaux des bateaux de soutien et de ravitaillement, à l'image de ceux exploités dans le secteur offshore. Construits aux normes civiles, ils mesureront 60 à 80 mètres et afficheront un déplacement d'au moins 1000 tonnes. La DGA a spécifié que ces bâtiments devaient avoir une grue pour l'embarquement de conteneurs, pouvoir mettre en oeuvre des embarcations rapides et des plongeurs, être en mesure de transporter des armes et des munitions, et présenter une autonomie importante, leur permettant de tenir au moins 20 jours en opérations. De nombreux designs de navires peuvent correspondre à ces besoins. Dans le cadre du projet BIS, Rolls-Royce avait, par exemple, proposé plusieurs versions militaires de ses célèbres remorqueurs du type UT, qui rencontrent un certain succès auprès de différentes marines et garde-côtes. Mais le groupe britannique et ses bureaux d'études norvégiens ne sont sans doute pas les seuls sur les rangs. Le groupe français Piriou, qui a développé une gamme de patrouilleurs polyvalents de 60 à 80 mètres, les Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel (MPOV), peut par exemple se positionner .


Navire du type UT512 (© : ROLLS-ROYCE)


Navire du type UT515 (© : ROLLS-ROYCE)

Un financement interministériel

Contrairement aux BSAH, les BMM ne vont pas faire l'objet d'un partenariat public privé. En revanche, et c'est une grande nouveauté, il s'agit d'un programme dont le financement sera interministériel. En dehors du ministère de la Défense, qui pilote le dossier via la DGA, les ministères de l'Intérieur, des Pêches (Agriculture) et des Transports (Ecologie), ainsi que des Finances (dont dépend la Douane) vont également mettre la main à la poche. Car les BMM, qui seront armés par la Marine nationale, ne rempliront pas que des missions militaires, comme la surveillance et le contrôle des espaces océaniques outre-mer, ainsi que le transport de personnels et de matériel de l'armée de Terre. Leur action concernera aussi d'autres ministères, puisqu'ils assureront des missions de police des pêches, de lutte contre les trafics et l'immigration clandestine, de lutte contre les pollutions ou encore de soutien logistique des territoires ultramarins et d'aide humanitaire aux pays riverains suite à des catastrophes naturelles. La mutualisation de leur acquisition en interministériel, dans l'esprit de la nouvelle Fonction Garde Côtes (FGC), est donc logique.


Débarquement depuis le La Grandière (© : MARINE NATIONALE)


Blindé débarqué du Dumont d'Urville (© : MARINE NATIONALE)

Abandon des capacités amphibies

Entre les Batral et les BMM, la grande nouveauté est l'abandon des capacités de débarquement amphibies. Mis en service entre 1983 et 1987 (deux autres unités plus anciennes, les Champlain et Francis Garnier, ayant déjà été désarmés), les Batral ont, à l'époque de la guerre froide, été conçus pouvoir déployer une compagnie d'intervention Guépard de l'armée de Terre. Bateaux à fond plat pouvant s'échouer sur une plage, les Dumont d'Urville, Jacques Carter et La Grandière, longs de 80 mètres pour un déplacement de 1330 tonnes en charge, ont la possibilité de projeter 140 soldats et 12 véhicules, dont des blindés. L'embarquement et le débarquement des hommes et surtout du matériel se fait au moyen d'une rampe, qui se déploie après l'ouverture de la grande porte de proue. L'évolution des missions et des besoins, ces dernières années, a rendu moins évidente la nécessité de disposer, sur les successeurs de Batral, de capacités amphibies. Celles-ci auraient été intéressantes, comme l'histoire récente l'a montré, pour intervenir suite à des catastrophes naturelles dans des zones où les infrastructures portuaires sont inexistantes ou hors d'usage. Mais cette option n'a pas été retenue, peut-être dans la mesure où cela aurait nécessité le développement d'un bâtiment spécifique, plus coûteux qu'un supply, type de bateau construit à la chaîne pour l'offshore et logiquement moins onéreux, même avec quelques adaptations.


Le Francis Garnier chargé d'aide humanitaire pour Haïti, en 2008 (© : EMA)


Le Batral Dumont d'Urville (© : MARINE NATIONALE)

05/10/2011 MER et MARINE

Commandée en 2008 à l'issue des réflexions ayant abouti au livre blanc sur la défense, la nouvelle étude portant sur le second porte-avions français (PA2) est achevée. Les travaux ont, notamment, porté sur les différents modes de propulsion possibles. Il s'agissait d'évaluer, à long terme, les avantages et les inconvénients du nucléaire. Le principal bénéfice de ce mode de propulsion, adopté pour le Charles de Gaulle, est d'offrir une autonomie considérable, la place occupée par le combustible de propulsion pouvant être attribuée à d'autres fonctions. Dans un contexte de renchérissement du pétrole et de raréfaction des hydrocarbures (du moins ceux facilement atteignables), cette solution peut paraitre avantageuse en matière de coûts d'exploitation. Mais elle présente aussi des inconvénients. Comme l'a démontré le Charles de Gaulle, les contraintes en termes de sécurité sont importantes et, en temps de paix, la propulsion d'un porte-avions nucléaire (PAN) est gérée suivant les mêmes règles de sureté qu'une centrale nucléaire civile, ce qui n'est pas la solution offrant le plus de souplesse par rapport aux besoins opérationnels. Les mesures de sécurité, très importantes, ont évidemment un coût, auquel il faudra rajouter le démantèlement des installations une fois le bâtiment désarmé. Le rechargement des réacteurs est, de plus, dimensionnant lors des grands arrêts techniques et rend le navire inutilisable durant une longue période. En matière d'escales, il est aussi à noter que tous les pays n'acceptent pas les bâtiments à propulsion nucléaire, ce qui peut parfois être problématique. Quant aux ressources humaines, la réalisation d'un second PAN nécessiterait sans doute d'augmenter les effectifs spécialisés, notamment les atomiciens, qui demeurent des « perles rares » en matière de recrutement. Enfin, au cas où le PA2 serait construit et qu'il serait décidé de le doter d'une propulsion nucléaire, il conviendrait de développer de nouveaux réacteurs, ce qui entrainerait un surcoût important et rendrait sans doute plus complexe la mise en oeuvre de deux porte-avions équipés différemment.

En somme, bien que l'option nucléaire soit opérationnellement la meilleure, les contraintes évoquées, dans un contexte budgétaire compliqué, plaident plutôt en faveur d'un porte-avions à propulsion conventionnelle, telle le PA2 issu du projet de coopération franco-britannique mené entre 2006 et 2008. Ce projet n'est officiellement plus à l'ordre du jour, même si le gouvernement britannique a décidé de se séparer de l'un de ses deux futurs porte-avions, le Queen Elizabeth, actuellement assemblé à Rosyth, ce qui peut constituer une éventuelle opportunité (moyennant une adaptation aux besoins français).


Le design de PA2 présenté par DCNS fin 2010 (© : MER ET MARINE)

DCNS et STX ont un design en poche

Après l'abandon du programme franco-britannique en 2008, DCNS et STX France ont travaillé sur un nouveau design de porte-avions, s'affranchissant des contraintes liées à la coopération. Présenté lors du salon Euronaval 2010, le dernier modèle exposé porte sur un navire à propulsion classique doté de trois lignes d'arbres. Long de 285 mètres pour un déplacement de 59.000 tonnes en charge, ce projet se distingue par un important travail sur la carène, avec bulbe d'étrave très allongé et jupe à la poupe, ainsi que l'optimisation de la plateforme pour réduire fortement les coûts d'exploitation et de maintenance. Grâce à l'automatisation, l'équipage (hors groupe aérien embarqué) pourrait être réduit à 900 marins, contre 1260 pour le Charles de Gaulle, pourtant plus petit (261 mètres, 42.000 tonnes). Ce modèle de PA2 pourrait embarquer 32 Rafale, 3 Hawkeye et 5 hélicoptères. En profitant des techniques de construction modernes mises en oeuvre à Saint-Nazaire, la coque pourrait, aujourd'hui, être réalisée entre deux et trois ans seulement, auxquels il convient d'ajouter la phase d'essais et de mise au point des systèmes. En clair, s'il était commandé demain, ce second porte-avions pourrait être à la mer lorsque son aîné subira, vers 2016, son second arrêt technique majeur, qui sera assorti d'une importante modernisation.

L'étude commandée en 2008 et désormais achevée a pour but d'éclairer le président de la République sur les possibilités techniques offertes. Il y a trois ans, Nicolas Sarkozy avait renvoyé à 2011/2012 la décision de construire, ou non, le PA2. Jusqu'ici, l'Elysée a mis en avant le contexte économique difficile pour différer ce programme, dont l'utilité n'est pourtant pas remise en cause, un seul porte-avions ne permettant pas de disposer en permanence du groupe aéronaval, l'une des clés de voute l'armée française.

Mais la réalisation du PA2 demeure avant tout une question politique, son coût (environ 3 milliards d'euros à répartir sur plusieurs années) étant finalement assez faible comparé à d'autres programmes et, de manière générale, à ce que l'Etat dépense tous les ans en crédits d'équipement (16 milliards d'euros).

source flightglobal.com

Sept. 22, 2011 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: Saab AB; issued Sept. 22, 2011)

Defence and security company Saab has signed a frame agreement and received a first order from the EADS company Cassidian to supply safety-critical avionics equipment for the new advanced UAV system Talarion.

The order includes design and development of the Aircraft Vehicle Management Computer (AVMC), Communications Computer (CC) and Mission & Payload Management Computer (MPMC) for Talarion.

The work will be carried out by the Avionics Division of Saab’s business area Electronic Defence Systems, in Jönköping and Järfälla, Sweden, and deliveries of the first order will take place 2012-2014.

“The selection of Saab to provide mission and flight critical avionics equipment for this new advanced platform verifies our position as a competitive supplier in the avionics market,” says Micael Johansson, Senior Vice President and Head of Saab’s business area Electronic Defence Systems.

“It also acknowledges our product strategy of developing common avionics building blocks that could be adapted for many different functions for various customer needs.”

Talarion is a European development program to fulfill functional and operational capability for in-theatre ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance). Due to its specific design, Talarion is able to operate over its broad flight envelope spectrum thereby establishing persistent surveillance, precise adversary identification, localization and real-time intelligence.

Sep 15, 2011 By Bradley Perrett - aviation week and space technology

Sacheon, South Korea - Forget death and taxes. Probably the surest thing in aerospace these days is that South Korea will want serious technology transfer in any major military equipment order.

The country’s manufacturers are increasingly confident in their ability to win manufacturing contracts without the compulsion of offsets. More and more, they and the government want the know-how behind the systems that the country buys, with the aim of making the next generation themselves.

In an classic example of that process, the planned Korea Attack Helicopter (KAH) might end up as an amalgam of European, South Korean and U.S. technology if Boeing, as looks likely, wins Seoul’s separate AH-X rotorcraft for 36 heavy attack rotorcraft.

With a request for proposals likely within months, the other competitors for the AH-X competition are expected to be Eurocopter, offering the Tiger; Bell with the AH-1Z Viper; and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and AgustaWestland with the T-129, a derivative of the A129 Mangusta.

The South Korean army wants the Apache, say local and U.S. officials in government and industry. It has been trying to buy the aircraft for more than a decade, and its keenness has only risen with the transfer of U.S. Army Apaches ­(AH-64) from the peninsula to Iraq two years ago. While the preference of the South Korean forces is not always decisive in a country that often puts industrial development first, two factors are reinforcing Boeing’s already high chances.

One of those is the transfer of Apache airframe manufacturing to Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), which is shaping up as the national helicopter champion. KAI will build airframes for U.S. Army Apaches whether the country buys the aircraft or not, but South Korean orders will add to the orderbook.

A second factor is the definition of the indigenous Korean Attack Helicopter as an aircraft of about 5 metric ton—uncomfortably close to the gross weight of all of the AH-X competitors except for the 8-ton Apache.

Boeing’s approach to the offset requirement is to suggest the integration of Apache avionics on the KAH. As the U.S. government urges South Korea to put priority on interoperability with U.S. forces on the peninsula—and therefore choose the Apache—Boeing is stressing the value of the KAH being able to operate with its helicopter. Integration of U.S. weapons, such as the Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missile, would also be simplified by moving systems from the Apache to the KAH.

Each of the other likely bidders brings important advantages. South Korea and Turkey have a developing military-industrial relationship that would be further promoted by the choice of TAI and AgustaWestland. The army already operates earlier versions of the AH-1, so that type should offer attractively low costs at entry into service. And Eurocopter, already a partner with KAI in developing the Surion transport under the Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH) program, is well positioned to link its AH-X offer to codevelopment of the KAH. Moreover, all of those manufacturers can offer aircraft designed for NATO standards, somewhat diminishing Boeing’s claimed advantage in high levels of interoperability.

The Defense Acquisition Program Agency is expected to issue a request for proposals in January 2012, with responses due by April, selection in July and a contract in October.

A key part of the mission is the destruction of North Korean special forces attempting to infiltrate coastal or land borders, says an industry executive. The KAH, replacing OH-6s and AH-1s, will perform a broader close support and reconnaissance role. Under the influence of the industry ministry, called the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, it will be designed with a cabin of up to eight seats so it can be easily transformed into a civil transport. Marketed internationally with the Surion, it would help establish a South Korean helicopter export industry.

A Boeing executive says the company is not interested in taking a risk-sharing role on the KAH. So even if the company wins AH-X, KAI, the selected South Korean manufacturer, will have to work with another partner, such as Eurocopter, for the airframe and dynamics of KAH.

The transfer of Apache structural work to KAI’s plant here is emblematic of the country’s mastery of manufacturing and helps explain its determination to move on to developing aircraft. A Boeing official says the Korean company hit quality targets almost from the beginning of its Apache program. Judged against such metrics as tolerances, finish and precision of fasteners, the helicopter bodies were delivered to an unusually high standard, he says.

Airframe production is due to rise to five from three a month as the remanufacturing of U.S. Army Apaches ramps up. A KAI official says the company has the workers and space for the expansion but will need new tools. It plans to design some that it expects will cut production costs.

So far in the program it has introduced tools for making subassemblies that are positioned vertically instead of horizontally, as before. They are easier to work with and save space, says a KAI production engineer.

photo by IMI - source jpost.com

14 septembre 2011 Guysen International News

Les Industries militaires israéliennes ont testé avec succès, mercredi, dans le sud du pays, le nouveau missile "Javelot magique", rapporte le site IsraelDefense. Le missile "Javelot magique" a une portée de 40 kilomètres, une précision au mètre près et peut porter des têtes de toute nature. Il est prévu pour la destruction de cibles ennemies sensibles comme un poste de commandement ou des batteries de missiles.

Photo Thales UK

09/09/11 By Craig Hoyle SOURCE:Flight International

Operational trials with the British Army's Watchkeeper unmanned air system (UAS) remain on track to start next month, after the WK450 air vehicle has set a new endurance record in testing.

Maj Matt Moore, SO2 UAS for headquarters, Royal Artillery, said a WK450 completed an almost 14h flight in early September from West Wales airport.

With current approvals restricting test flights to daylight hours only, the aircraft landed with around 4h of fuel remaining, he said.

During the record-breaking UK flight, the aircraft's dual mission payload of an Elop Compass IV electro-optical/infrared camera and Thales I-Master/Viper synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indication sensor were employed, along with its data link.

 The WK450's dual mission payloads, data link and software were tested during the record-breaking sortie

The UAS was also taken to its 16,000ft (4,880m) service ceiling and 115km (62nm) away from the airport, Moore told the UK Air Warfare Centre's remotely piloted air systems symposium in Shrivenham, Wiltshire, on 8 September. The aircraft also flew using its operational-standard software, prime contractor Thales UK said.

Operational trials with the Watchkeeper will be conducted in October and November, with the first training flights over Salisbury Plain to be made from the Ministry of Defence/Qinetiq Boscombe Down site in Wiltshire in December.

Watchkeeper vehicles and equipment will be deployed to Afghanistan from late this year, to deliver one daily "task line" from the first quarter of 2012. A full service using six task lines should be in place within 12 months, Moore said.

In addition to continuing flight testing, other Watchkeeper activities currently include preparing modifications - such as the addition of covert lighting - for deployment in Afghanistan, Moore said.

Development testing with the WK450 has now passed 230 flights and 320h in the UK and Israel.

Thales UK/Elbit Systems joint venture Utacs is responsible for delivering the Watchkeeper system, which will replace an interim service in Afghanistan currently using leased Elbit Hermes 450s.

The service has delivered 50,000h of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance services for the British Army since April 2007.