October 7, 2011 T. S. Subramanian – THE HINDU

DRDO is getting ready to launch Agni-II Prime

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) invitation to India in the first week of September to be a partner in its ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme is being analysed, according to V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister.

“We are analysing the report. It is under consideration,” he said on September 30 after the successful launch of the Agni-II ballistic missile from the Wheeler Island on the Orissa coast.

India has so far conducted six interceptor missile tests as part of its quest to establish a credible shield against ballistic missiles launched from adversarial countries. Of these, five interceptor tests, including the first three in a row, were successful.

The first interceptor missile test took place in November 2006.

These six tests featured a missile launched from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur on the Orissa coast, mimicking the path of a ballistic missile coming from an “enemy country” and an interceptor launched from the Wheeler Island destroying the incoming missile in mid-flight.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is the author of India's BMD programme and Dr. Saraswat is the programme's architect. He is DRDO Director-General.

Ballistic clash

A top DRDO official had described an interceptor destroying an incoming ballistic missile in mid-flight as “hitting a bullet with a bullet.”

After three successful test-flights of Shourya, Prithvi-II and Agni-II missiles, all surface-to-surface missiles, on September 24, 26 and 30, the DRDO is getting ready to launch Agni-II Prime from the Wheeler Island. “The two stages of Agni-II Prime, their rocket motors and the re-entry vehicle are ready,” the DRDO Director-General said.

Tessy Thomas, Project Director, Agni-II Prime, said: “We are flying” the Agni-II Prime in the first week of November and that “everything is ready” for the launch. The two-stage missile has a range of 3,000 km.

It will lift off from a road-mobile launcher, that is, a huge truck. Ms. Thomas was confident that a problem in the control system of Agni-II Prime in its maiden flight in December 2010 would be overcome this time.

The DRDO is also busy with the maiden launch of the Agni-V ballistic missile in December. The three-stage, surface-to-surface missile can take out targets 5,000 km away.

On schedule

“Agni-V is on schedule. We will launch it as announced by the Raksha Mantri [Defence Minister A.K. Antony] by the end of this year,” said Avinash Chander, Chief Controller (Missiles and Strategic Systems), DRDO. “All the sub-systems have been tested.”

Both the Agni-II Prime and Agni-V can carry nuclear warheads.

Oct 4, 2011 By Robert Wall - aerospace daily and defense report

LONDON — When defense ministers from NATO member states meet this week in Brussels, missile defense will be on the agenda. And while concrete decisions are not expected, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen hopes to be ready to declare some meaningful progress next year.

“Step by step, NATO’s territorial missile defense is becoming a reality,” he tells reporters in advance of the defense ministerial. He says he is hopeful that at the time the heads of government of NATO members meet next year in Chicago, the alliance will be ready “to declare an interim operational capability.”

Poland, Romania and Turkey already have agreed to host elements of the U.S.-European Phase Adaptive Approach — a key element of the NATO concept — and Rasmussen says others will be asked this week to prepare commitments.

More broadly, the ministers are likely to discuss the report from an Allied Command Transformation task force exploring potential areas of increased cooperation. Rasmussen has been pushing for more cooperation as part of his “Smart Defense” agenda and says he will work with governments in the coming months to identify projects they may be ready to lead. Program decisions are not expected this week, he notes.

Moreover, a decision by NATO to terminate military operations over Libya remains in limbo. Although Rasmussen says NATO is ready to stop its efforts as soon as the situation on the ground allows, he does not expect this week’s meeting to reach that conclusion.

Anti-ship missile development and testing - including that of the Dong Feng 21 –

has remained a high priority for the PLA. Image: vostokstation.com.au

09/27/2011  Contributor:  Nick Young - Defence IQ

Since the introduction of the contemporary anti-ship missile (ASM) by the Soviet Navy, ASMs have been developed to come in all shapes, sizes and guidance methods. Without a doubt, the largest contributor to this field is the former Soviet Navy (now the Russian navy), which developed no fewer than 12 systems of varying delivery methods (submarine, air or surface launched), only two of which have been combat tested.  So far, the Russian ASMs include some of the most feared systems to threaten naval platforms due to a varying combination of velocity, manoeuvrability, warhead and physical size. 

To date, the conventional ASM threat has focused on three key integers - high velocity, high manoeuvrability, low signature - that have concerned various navies around the globe. Now, a newer, potentially more potent anti-ship capability has been developed by the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The challenge remaining, then, is to explore this system in detail - its validity and potency in the current naval environment - with access only to information within the public domain. 

Many press outlets have reported the development of the ‘D’ variant of the Dong Feng 21 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), (NATO reporting name CSS-5), which is a missile equipped with what is believed to be a single manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV), with the sole mission of striking ships at sea.  DF-21 is a mobile, medium range ballistic missile that has reportedly achieved its initial operating capability (IOC). 

The Department of Defence (DOD) believes that the system has a range in excess of 1500km (>800nm), while Chinese sources claim a 2700km (1400nm) range. This latter range could  potentially provide a sea denial ability against any navy within range of the system.  For the purpose of analysis, 2000km will be assumed. It is reported that total flight time is around 12 minutes (720 seconds). It boasts a reported maximum velocity of between 3000 and 3500 ms-1, assumed to be during ballistic descent and re-entry.

The reported use of MaRVs will provide a capability to perform midcourse ballistic correction manoeuvres and this compounds the problem of intercepting a ballistic target. Such manoeuvrability coupled with any number of countermeasure capabilities makes a successful intercept difficult. 

System detection, classification & identification

To achieve this goal, the DF-21D system has to go through a standard sequence: detection, classification, identification and engagement. While sounding relatively straightforward, the technicalities of engaging a fleet of ships at sea is never quite that easy. Detection of ships at sea can be achieved by several methods including, patrols, over the horizon (OTH) radar (like the Australian Jindalee operational realisation network JORN system) or by satellite.  Each of these has advantages and disadvantages. 

Patrols are long and expensive and have coverage limited to the sensor range of the platform (airborne or surface). OTH radars are a much cheaper alternative long-term; however, their resolution is generally measured in hundreds to thousands of miles, hence not providing the level of quality to launch such a weapon.  Satellites, while initially expensive do offer an immediate long-term wide coverage, which is exactly how the DF-21D weapon system is reportedly targeted.

The detection of ships at sea from space is not new; the Soviet Union used ‘radar ocean reconnaissance satellites’ (RORSAT) from the late 1960s onward. Since then, technology has progressed and the capabilities of such systems are much greater. While it is possible to hide naval platforms or a fleet of naval platforms from satellites, such manoeuvres severely restrict movement, thus reducing their utility. Detection from space can be augmented with more locally based systems such as OTH radars and patrols or other assets such as electronic surveillance measures (ESM) that may help reduce the ability to hide from a targeting system. 

Classification, or even determining that the detected ship is a naval platform rather than a large merchant vessel such as super tanker or cruise liner, becomes a little more difficult. While the size of the ship can be estimated based on wake size and velocity, many oil tankers and cruise liners are as large as (or larger than) many warships, including aircraft carriers. 

The typical fleet composition (i.e., many ships in a small area) may give away the nature of the detected vessels since many fleets (especially the US Navy) sail with several ships surrounding the high value unit (HVU) - usually the aircraft carrier. Choke points may confuse the issue since many ships may be passing through such areas at once, although choke points provide an advantage to the DF-21D system to be augmented by other intelligence sources. Fleets could disperse more widely and this could cause problems for classification issues, although tracking all objects in a specific area should filter out fleet composition. 

Identification of the correct target for the DF-21D system can only reasonably be confirmed electro-optically, although contextual information may assist. Once a ship or set of ships have been classified as potential targets, an electro-optic satellite can be tasked to carry out specific identification reasonably easily. The use of visual or passive milli-metric wavelength (mmW) systems could perform this quite adequately, however precipitation (clouds, fog etc.) may be a concern. Once identification has occurred, the DF-21D missile can be launched. 

Initial threat flyout

Throughout the boost phase, it is likely that target positional data is continuously supplied to the warhead from the targeting and guidance sensors.  Whether a single communications link provides this data or whether the warhead performs organic data fusion is unknown. In terms of complexity, the former is less complex, requiring less on board processing. However, it potentially becomes a single point failure and opens up the potential for electronic attack. Organic data fusion, while overcoming the communication single point failure, will require the ability to receive multiple signals and process them, thus requiring more hardware and increasing overall launch weight. When initially exploring this missile’s capability, digging into the actual methodology is largely irrelevant, the only caveat being vulnerability to electronic attack to any communications link. 

Once the DF-21D is exo-atmospheric, it is assumed that various booster separations occur and the payload continues until it reaches its apogee -reportedly around 500km. Around the apogee, the MaRV is likely to separate from the main body (decoys could also be deployed at this stage to attempt to confuse any surveying sensors). The MaRV then begins its ballistic descent, rapidly accelerates to the peak speeds discussed earlier, taking around 155 seconds to reach the intercept point from the apogee. 

Warhead guidance & target acquisition

Only on its decent is the MaRV able to unmask its sensor and attempt to detect the target. The nature of the sensor is unknown; however, it is likely to be a radio frequency (RF), either passive or active. While an electro-optical sensor is feasible, it would not be usable due to the nature of the re-entry phase. The size of the MaRV will dictate the frequency of the sensor, which will probably require that it is small enough and light enough to fit into the MaRV, making it likely that it is no lower than J-band (10-20GHz) and maybe as high as M-band (94GHz). If we assume the seeker head is approximately half the size of the missile diameter, then the beamwidth for these two frequency bands will be between 1.64 and 0.26 degrees, respectively. Ignoring atmospheric absorption and other losses, at these beamwidths, the available coverage - at 500km - is between 820km and 130km. If a target, travelling at 30 knots, is located at the ballistic intercept point, (i.e. the ideal ballistic arc intercept with the sea surface), assuming the MaRV does not manoeuvre, then the target will remain inside the beamwidth of the sensor throughout its decent. 

Generally, the higher the sensor frequency, the greater the atmospheric absorption limiting the effective range of the sensor. Active sensors, as would be required for J and K bands, would suffer from two-way absorption. M-band could be passive, suffering only one-way absorption; however, the absorption levels at this frequency are much greater than for J and K bands. Since the sensor is likely to be limited in physical size, it is unlikely that it incorporates the level of output power necessary to overcome the absorption. Hence, it is unlikely that the sensor, in any of the probable frequencies, will detect the target if it is unmasked at an altitude of 500km. The nature of the Earth’s atmosphere means that the thickest part of the atmosphere will be nearer to the target, meaning that the sensor is unlikely to detect the target until quite late in the re-entry phase, requiring continuous updates from the surveillance and targeting system. 

As the MaRV hits the Kármán line, at an altitude of 100km, it would be expected that a communication blackout might occur. This is caused by the signals being reflected and absorbed by free electrons making up the plasma shield that envelopes the re-entry vehicle, created by the extreme heating of air by a strong shock wave created by the MaRV leading edges.  The attributes of this plasma shield will vary according to the altitude and shape of the re-entry vehicle. However, assuming the re-entry velocity equates to the maximum velocity of 3500ms-1, then, by coincidence, the re-entry temperature can be estimated as ~3500°K. The Saha equation may be used to determine the frequency cut-off for penetration of the plasma shield, which, for the MaRV, is around 0.5GHz, meaning that it is likely that communications can continue at this frequency and higher, further indicating that the DF-21D surveillance and targeting system can maintain contact with the MaRV during the re-entry phase. 

While relevant frequencies are able to penetrate the plasma shield, the MaRV still has to protect any seeker from the heating effects. This requires specialised materials to allow the RF energy to penetrate the heat shield. A composite material comprising boron nitride, silica and boron nitride yarn able to withstand temperatures of up to 4000°K, would also facilitate RF transmissions. As the MaRV begins to undergo negative acceleration, the electron density, and therefore plasma shield, decreases allowing the reestablishment of communications at frequencies below 0.5GHz. 

Summarising the re-entry phase - the phase of most concern from the DF-21Ds perspective - any onboard sensor will be limited until quite late in the re-entry phase (potentially 100km or less). However, the surveillance and targeting system can maintain contact with the target and the MaRV, providing uninterrupted targeting data. 

Destructive capability

The nature of MaRV has not been widely reported, but given that other DF-21 versions can carry a 600kg warhead, it probably is safe to say that DF-21D should be able to carry a similar weight. The amount of kinetic energy this would produce while travelling at 3500ms-1 is 3.6 terra joules, or about 5% of the power of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb, without the use of an explosive warhead. 

This is more than enough to destroy any naval platform up to destroyer size and enough to significantly damage or destroy something as large as a US Navy super carrier. If the MaRV contained a warhead, when coupled with the kinetic energy, it is likely that it would destroy something the size of a US Navy aircraft carrier. 

Defensive measures

The DF-21D will be at its most vulnerable during its boost phase. This is the phase from engine ignition until it is exo-atmospheric. During the boost phase, it is relatively easy to engage the missile with conventional hardkill effectors (surface-to-air missile) to achieve this. The launch must occur within the range of the hardkill effectors, which, for most systems, is around 80-120km. Placing such a SAM system in such a position exposes that platform to a pre-emptive attack. Hence, it is likely that the majority of the boost phase will occur relatively unhindered. Another possible solution is the use of something similar to the recently abandoned airborne laser (ABL); however, the limitation identified by the ABL programme would need to be overcome to develop a viable system. 

Intercepting the MaRV during the descent phase presents a number of difficulties. First among these is having suitable sensor coverage to detect and track the MaRV with fire control quality. Systems like SPY-1 are limited in their zenith coverage by the physics of the antenna, which can only electronically scan to 60° off the antenna boresight, (a characteristic of physics that afflicts all phased array antennas). Given that the SPY-1 scans at an angle of no more than 10 or 15° from the horizontal, this results in a cone shape blind spot of around 30-40° around the zenith. 

The reported range of the SPY-1 is approximately 200km. There are two aspects to this figure: the instrumented range, defined by the selected waveform known as instrumented range; and that of the basic physics, which is dependant on the effective radiated power (ERP) and the radar cross section of the target (RCS). Modification of the waveform, increasing the spacing between pulses, will change the instrumented range to encompass any particular range. The angle at which the MaRV descends means that there is very little clutter to interfere with the detection of the target. Hence, a normal radar, single pulse system can be utilised, rather than a complex waveform that requires processing such as Doppler filtering often used in high clutter environment (e.g. littoral regions). 

Based on physical size, the estimated MaRV RCS is around 2.2m2, meaning it is probable that SPY-1 could detect the MaRV at between 150km and 200km, or between 43 and 60 seconds, assuming the sensor is not distracted by any potential decoys. Giving a second or so for a targeting process, an intercepting missile can be launched travelling at a typical velocity of 1000ms-1, resulting in an intercept range of around 18km (or 18 seconds to go), with a combined velocity of 4500ms-1. This Mach 15 combined intercept speed would make it incredibly difficult for even an optimised fusing mechanism and blast fragmentation warhead to detect, initiate and distribute fragments against the MaRV. 

This suggests that using an ordinary SAM effectively against the MaRV would be near impossible - even a vaunted SM-2. Hence, intercepting the MaRV in the terminal phase is unlikely, so once the MaRV is in its ballistic fall, the likelihood of it hitting its target is very high. Guns are of little use against this type simply because of their limited range and accuracy, not to mention the lack of effect. 

A viable defensive solution

Once exo-atmospheric the DF-21D is potentially susceptible to attack from systems such as the US Navy’s standard missile (SM)-3, typically based upon a Ticonderoga cruiser. As the threat breaches the horizon, the platforms sensors (SPY-1) will acquire the rising target and commence tracking, facilitating the calculation of an engagement solution. The solution will incorporate a ‘window’ of opportunity, bounded by the very first time the missile can launch and achieve a suitable probability of intercept and a very last time. Once the threat enters this window, the SM-3 can be launched. 

The SM-3 is a three-stage missile comprising:

    Initial stage: A Mk72 booster that incorporates a four-nozzle thrust vector control, providing pitch, roll and yaw control for the missile - used for the initial launch

    Second stage: A Mk104, dual thrust rocket motor (DTRM)

    Third stage: A Mk136 third stage rocket motor (TSRM)

The initial stage propels the SM-3 from the launcher, accelerating it to around 1000ms-1. On burnout, the booster separates and is discarded and the DTRM ignites, accelerating the missile further. After MK 104 burnout and separation, the TSRM ignites, propelling the third stage out of the atmosphere, which includes the kinetic warhead (KW). The TSRM contains two separate propulsion pulses allowing optimisation of the engagement. 

Throughout its flight, the SM-3 receives in-flight target information, constantly updating the predicted intercept solution. During the third stage, approximately 30 seconds prior to intercept, the TSRM pitches over and ejects the nose cone, exposing the KW which starts its search for the target using its long-wave infra red (LWIR) seeker, augmented with received target data. The KW uses the solid divert and attitude control system (SDACS) to manoeuvre the KW to enable a hit-to-kill intercept. 

As the KW closes on the target, the LWIR seeker tries to determine the area where the MaRV is located, shifting its aim towards this area to increase the probability of a successful intercept. The KW collides with the target with a reported 130-mega joules of kinetic energy, equating to a 10 tonne truck travelling at 600 miles per hour. Such a strike is highly likely to destroy the target. 

While the Aegis/SM-3 anti-ballistic missile solution seems viable, and indeed tests have demonstrated its capability, it seems to need to engage the target prior to MaRV separation. This is not an issue in itself; however, to achieve this, it is likely that the SM-3 launch platform must be in a specific range to allow the SM-3 to reach the target prior to MaRV separation. Based on maximum reported range of SPY-1, this suggests the system must be within ~200km of the launch point to allow detection.  Even if this range is incorrectly reported, then the launch platform needs to be within 500km of the trajectory. Simply put, this is necessary to ensure that the operating envelope of the SM-3 suitably covers the trajectory path of the DF-21D while it is exo-atmospheric. The need for the launch platform to be in a suitable location to engage the DF-21D potentially exposes it to a pre-emptive attack since the intercept geometry dictates the launch position. 

Assessing threat viability

Based on available information and on first inspection, the DF-21D concept is viable. Whether the fully integrated system is effective – and what the concept suggests - is not something that can be easily verified.  Given the likely low cost of a DF-21D relative to naval platforms (especially the US carriers), the introduction of the DF-21D system is a game changer in terms of strategic naval warfare. The economical offset gives these weapons an unmatched potency almost equivalent to the introduction of the submarine and torpedo combination in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Without a doubt, US Navy aircraft carriers are susceptible to attack by these weapons. 

As this paper has explored, the vast majority of contemporary in-service SAM systems are unable to defend against this threat, while the information on the only potentially viable system suggests that the launch platform has to be exposed to achieve a successful engagement.  However, the Aegis/SM-3 combination is the only known naval system that can possibly negate this threat. Hence, any US moves towards the areas guarded by DF-21D would likely be preceded by the deployment of a Aegis/SM-3 platform. This potentially makes the Aegis/SM-3 platforms strategic assets, worthy of significant defence, themselves, to prevent a pre-emptive attack. 

Even if the Aegis/SM-3 combination is systemically capable of defeating the DF-21D, there is always potential for system failures in any stage of the engagement. While this applies equally to the DF-21D, as usual, the threat will always have the advantage. Given the tight engagement timeline for the SM-3, depending on the system element, failure would be potentially catastrophic. While the launching of multiple SM-3s may overcome some of the potential failures, it is not clear if the Aegis/SM-3 combination can manage multiple engagements of this nature. 

The only assured method of defence against the DF-21D is one of offense.  The DF-21D system relies heavily on its targeting and guidance elements that primarily consist of satellite-based sensors (although probably not exclusively). Hence, were the US to initiate a move into a DF-21D protected area, its best defence would be to incapacitate the targeting and guidance elements, which may be politically unacceptable. Fortunately, the Aegis/SM-3 combination can also engage satellites as demonstrated by operation BURNT FROST, the shooting down of the USA-193 satellite.  Even if the DF-21D system is not as capable as reports suggest, or does not work at all, PLAN has presented a difficult problem for the US in which any move could risk the US losing either political capital (going for the assured route of defence) or losing a significant asset - a US Navy aircraft carrier. This could immediately put the US on the back-foot before any combat occurred. 

In the final analysis, even the threat of introducing the DF-21D, let alone the actual introduction, changes the balance of power in huge areas of strategic importance around Asia. While systems do exist to mitigate this threat, none provides an ideal defence in either concept or execution, but they do form the basis of limited defence ability.

NEW DELHI, 26 septembre - RIA Novosti

L'armée indienne a testé lundi avec succès un missile balistique Prithvi-II, rapporte l'agence Press Trust of India citant les sources officielles.

Le missile a été tiré depuis le polygone de Chandipur, situé dans l'Etat d'Orissa (est). Par ailleurs, les médias indiquent qu'un tir réussi d'un missile balistique Shaurya a été effectué le 24 septembre depuis le même site.

La portée de Prithvi-II est de 350 kilomètres. Conçu par les spécialistes indiens, il est capable de porter des charges allant jusqu'à 500 kg, nucléaires ou classiques. La portée de Shaurya s'élève quant à elle à 600 km.

photo by IMI - source jpost.com

14 septembre 2011 Guysen International News

Les Industries militaires israéliennes ont testé avec succès, mercredi, dans le sud du pays, le nouveau missile "Javelot magique", rapporte le site IsraelDefense. Le missile "Javelot magique" a une portée de 40 kilomètres, une précision au mètre près et peut porter des têtes de toute nature. Il est prévu pour la destruction de cibles ennemies sensibles comme un poste de commandement ou des batteries de missiles.

6.09.2011 Konstantin Bogdanov -- french.ruvr.ru

05/09/2011 Source : La Tribune

Le comité ministériel d'investissement du ministère de la Défense a approuvé le lancement de quatre programmes qui ont été confiés au missilier.

MBDA a décroché au coeur de l'été le jackpot au moment où la France entre dans une période de disette budgétaire sévère. Avant la grande trêve estivale, le dernier CMI (comité ministériel d'investissement) du ministère de la Défense a approuvé fin juillet, selon nos informations, toute une série d'investissements dans de nouveaux programmes de missiles et dans la modernisation de certains grands programmes de MBDA (37,5 % EADS, 37,5 % BAE Systems et 25 % Finmeccanica). Soit un volume financier de l'ordre de 600 à 650 millions par an pendant une dizaine d'années. Ce qui va donner au missilier européen une belle visibilité en termes de charges de travail pour ses bureaux d'études et pour l'exportation avec des nouveaux produits dans des gammes où la France a déjà fait ses preuves.

Successeur du Milan

Après une très longue réflexion, le ministère de la Défense a finalement retenu pour le programme MMP (missile moyenne portée), successeur du Milan, qui a été l'un des grands best-sellers français à l'exportation, la solution proposée par MBDA (munitions) et Sagem (postes de tir) au détriment des propositions de « francisation » des missiles Javelin de l'américain Raytheon et Spike de l'israélien Rafael. Le développement de ce programme est estimé entre 150 à 200 millions d'euros. C'est une belle victoire pour le PDG de MBDA, Antoine Bouvier, qui s'est beaucoup battu pour ce programme majeur pour sa stratégie à l'exportation. Ce programme pourrait être notifié par la Direction générale de l'armement avant la fin de l'année 2011 et lancé en 2012. Le CMI a également décidé de lancer le programme ANL (antinavire léger), l'un des programmes majeurs de la coopération franco-britannique, qui s'inscrit dans l'accord de défense signé entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne en novembre 2010. Enfin, le ministère de la Défense va moderniser en 2012 une nouvelle version d'un des best-sellers de MBDA, le missile antinavire Exocet ainsi que le missile Aster 30 Block 1 NT (nouvelles technologies), fabriqué par MBDA et Thales. Ce missile disposera d'un autodirecteur bénéficiant de la technologie devenue mature en bande Ka qui apportera un potentiel de croissance pour les performances contre les cibles balistiques jusqu'à 1.000 km de portée, sans régression sur les performances contre cibles conventionnelles. M. C.

Photo SAC Simon Armstrong/Crown Copyright

26/08/11 By Craig Hoyle SOURCE:Flightglobal.com

The UK Royal Air Force’s Panavia Tornado GR4-equipped 2 Sqn has completed its contribution to the NATO mission in Libya, after achieving a notable first using a Raytheon Systems Paveway IV precision-guided bomb.

On 18 August, a GR4 operating from Gioia del Colle air base in Italy dropped a 226kg (500lb) Paveway IV to engage a moving patrol craft which was being operated by pro-Gaddafi forces near the Az Zawiyah oil refinery.

“This was the first time a Tornado crew had used a Paveway IV bomb to take out a moving target of this nature,” the UK Ministry of Defence said, adding that the target had posed a threat to Libyan civilians.

RAF Tornado strike aircraft have again used their Storm Shadow missiles during long-range missions flown from the UK

Separately, a package of GR4s flying from RAF Marham in Norfolk attacked a headquarters bunker in the Gaddafi stronghold of Sirte overnight on 25-26 August using an undisclosed number of MBDA Storm Shadow long-range cruise missiles. Tornado aircraft from Gioia del Colle also destroyed a surface-to-air missile system located near Al Watiyah on 25 August.

The RAF’s Tornado force has accumulated more than 5,400 flying hours in support of the UK’s Operation Ellamy since March. Its contribution is now being provided by the RAF’s 9 Sqn.

Test launch of a Prithvi (P-II) surface-to-surface missile by the Indian Armed Forces. (Photo: DRDO)

July 21, 2011 defpro.com

NEW DELHI | India successfully test-fired on Thursday its new quick reaction, short range Prahaar missile, regional media reported.

The missile blasted off at about 8.15 am local time (02:45 GMT) from the Integrated Test Range in the eastern state of Orissa, the Press Trust of India news agency said.

"The test launch was fully successful as the surface-to-surface, sleek missile mounted on a road mobile launcher, roared into an overcast sky, seconds within its blast off," a defense source was quoted by PTI as saying.

The 150-km range Prahaar is a single-stage missile fuelled by solid propellants, media reports said. It is designed to fill the gap between Pinaka, a 40-km multi-barrel rocket system, and the 350-km range, nuclear-capable Prithvi-II, a surface-to-surface strategic missile.

The uniqueness of the missile system is that "in one salvo, six missiles can be fired with multiple targets," PTI quoted a scientist associated with this project as saying.

The test was initially scheduled for Sunday, but was postponed for Thursday to allow for additional tests of the vehicle which the missile was mounted on, the Hindu website said. (RIA Novosti)

Jul 15, 2011 By Bradley Perrett aviation week and space technology

Beijing - For more than a century, surface warships have been struggling to survive against mines, submarines, aircraft and, more recently, cruise missiles. Now China’s rapid development of a sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) raises the threat to a new level.

The U.S. Navy, mindful of the threat and no less focused on advancing its technologies to protect its fleet, remains confident in its ability to project naval power globally on the surface as well as under water. But for less technologically advanced navies of the Asia-Pacific region, it is becoming difficult to see how in the decades ahead they can stand up to an opponent that can target surface ships with hypersonic homing warheads that can range more than 1,500 km (900 mi.)—and perhaps much farther.

China Daily is citing a range of 2,700 km for the revolutionary missile, the DF-21D, presenting the crucial data point in a report based on comments by the chief of the Chinese general staff, Gen. Chen Bingde. The Pentagon said last year the DF-21D’s range is “in excess of 1,500 km.”

If not a journalistic error, the statement means that U.S. aircraft carriers launching strike missions while keeping clear of DF-21Ds would need aircraft with even longer ranges than thought. It means that the DF-21Ds can be safely kept further inland. And, for Asian navies, it means the whole South China Sea can be covered from Guangdong, a Chinese province where DF-21Ds are based.

China’s second key revelation about the DF-21D is that it is still in development, though the U.S. has said it is in service.

“The missile is still undergoing experimental testing and will be used as a defensive weapon when it is successfully developed, not an offensive one,” says Chen. “It is a high-tech weapon and we face many difficulties in getting funding, advanced technologies and high-quality personnel, which are all underlying reasons why it is hard to develop this.”

Adm. Robert Willard, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said in December that the DF-21D had reached the equivalent of initial operational capability. Taiwan has also said China has begun to deploy the missile. Yet Chen’s comments, made after a meeting with his U.S. counterpart, Adm. Michael Mullen, imply that any DF-21Ds that have been deployed are not regarded as fully developed.

“It’s possible that an initial ASBM variant could be more basic,” says Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, an Asia-focused think tank in Arlington, Va. “Then maybe a follow-on variant could integrate some of the more sophisticated technologies, such as a high-altitude radar system.”

U.S. Naval War College Prof. Andrew Erickson says the tone of Chen’s remarks “could be interpreted to reflect a high level of uncertainly and ambivalence about the missile’s immediate prospects, directed at a Chinese audience through Chinese media.

“Viewed in this light, the three factors Gen. Chen outlines—funding, technology, talent—may be viewed as serious constraints, even bottlenecks, in the challenging task of successfully maturing and integrating an ASBM system of systems.”

China’s idea of “operational” may be closer to the U.S. concept of full operational capability, adds Erickson.

The appearance of Chen’s statement in China Daily, an English-language newspaper acting as a government mouthpiece directed at the outside world, is itself meaningful. The paper’s reports on sensitive subjects often appear to be carefully written to deliver Beijing’s message.

The DF-21D is one such sensitive subject, as the U.S. considers how it would counter Chinese attempts to dominate nearby seas and forcibly regain control of Taiwan. In the view of some analysts, surface warships—above all, aircraft carriers—are fundamentally too vulnerable to such a weapon, because their signatures are so large and the missile is very difficult to intercept.

In the May 2011 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute journal Proceedings, two Pentagon strategists, Navy Capt. Henry Hendrix and Marine Corps Lt. Col. Noel Williams, urge immediate cessation of U.S. aircraft carrier construction. Noting such threats as the DF-21D, they write, “the march of technology is bringing the supercarrier era to an end, just as the new long-range strike capabilities of carrier aviation brought on the demise of the battleship era in the 1940s.”

Skeptics respond that the DF-21D’s kill chain can be broken in several places—for example, in target detection and tracking before launch, communication of targeting data or final homing descent. Still, considering the crews and costs of surface ships, especially carriers, the stakes are high.

“Yes, the [U.S.] Navy would want to have a high degree of confidence that they could break a link in the kill chain, but there are no certainties here,” says Eric Hagt of the World Security Institute. “It’s a game of measures, countermeasures, counter-counter-measures, et cetera. Having said that, the U.S. remains a superior, technologically capable fighting force, so it stands to reason they are able to conceive of and develop sophisticated countermeasures to the ASBM.”

However, there are no guarantees, he stresses, adding that the real mission of the DF-21D is deterrence. “It could and probably will give the U.S. Navy much more pause for concern when getting involved in any potential scenario in the western Pacific closer to China’s shores.”

The views from China’s neighboring countries and Australia are even more sobering. From there, attacking the DF-21D kill chain must look like a challenge ranging from enormous to unthinkable. Over the past few years, the Asia-Pacific-region navies have increasingly shifted their resources to submarines. Japan intends to enlarge its submarine fleet to 24 from 18 and Australia, to 12 from six.

Recounting Chen’s remarks, China Daily says: “He did acknowledge . . . that Beijing is developing the Dongfeng-21D [DF-21D], a ballistic missile with a maximum range of 2,700 km and the ability to strike moving targets—including aircraft carriers—at sea.”

The range of 2,700 km has previously been attributed to earlier DF-21s built to attack fixed targets, raising the possibility that the figure has appeared in the paper only as a result of sloppy journalism. That would be quite an error, however, considering that the report was supposed to convey a message abroad.

China’s military, with a seemingly atavistic aversion to public statement, tends to reveal its capabilities by just letting the world see them. Examples include its demonstration of anti-satellite technology in 2007, when it blasted away an old weather spacecraft, and the seemingly casual rolling out of the so-called J-20 fighter prototype in view of an airfield fence at Chengdu in December 2010.

“My impression is that an ASBM range requirement is driven by the maximum range of U.S. weapon-delivery platforms associated with a carrier battle group,” says Stokes. “The 2,700-km requirement seems a bit more than what’s needed.”

Nonetheless, it is clear that extra range, whether immediately available or in a future version of the DF-21, would give China greater flexibility in basing and targeting. Hagt notes that fixing targets becomes more difficult and increasingly reliant on vulnerable satellites as the range rises.

China itself evidently sees a continuing role for aircraft carriers. In the same report, China Daily says the incomplete carrier China bought from Ukraine in 1998, Varyag, “is expected to serve primarily as a training vessel for pilots and deck crews.” Such training has always been assumed as the initial role of the ship, since China has little or no experience in the difficult business of operating fixed-wing aircraft at sea.

“China is a big country and we have quite a large number of ships, but they are only small ships,” Chen says. “This is not commensurate with the status of a country like China.” The U.S. is “a real world power” because it has 11 aircraft carriers, he adds. The general also says much Chinese military technology is at the level of U.S. equipment used 20-30 years ago.

July 13, 2011 Arms Control Association (ACA) - defpro.com

In light of justifiable concerns about Iran’s potential as a nuclear weapons state, the country’s latest military exercise, ending last week, provided some grounds for qualified relief. Although the official commentary was predictably defiant in tone, the overall choreography and the weapons actually fired bespoke neither the intent nor a current operational capability for Iran to strike at Israel or Europe. The absence in the exercise of systems likely to serve as nuclear weapons delivery vehicles belies contentions that Tehran is moving rapidly to achieve such a capability.

“GREAT PROPHET 6” FIREWORKS

In a ten-day extravaganza of martial events, dubbed “Great Prophet 6,” Iran conducted a prodigious number of missile launches, showcasing a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles, including some new missile types and a newly displayed silo basing mode. The live-fire exercises provided useful training for the troops and stimulated national pride among the population. Such displays of missile prowess also help Iran’s clerical government rally domestic support behind efforts to defy UN sanctions and send a warning message to potential aggressors.

MISSILES ARE THE MEASURE

Missiles are the premier weapon of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s ballistic missiles, in particular, occupy an iconic place in the power pantheon – they are fast to employ, hard for an enemy to locate and attack prior to launch, difficult to intercept in flight, and can potentially serve as a vehicle for delivering nuclear weapons to targets far from the country’s border. Iran already has medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in its arsenal, which can reach targets not only in neighboring states, but also in Israel. Moreover, given the heavy concentrations of U.S. troops in the region, even Iran’s shorter-range missiles can easily and quickly put the lives of U.S. soldiers at risk.

Anti-shipping cruise missiles – along with mines – provide one of Iran’s most credible deterrent threats, because they enable Tehran to effectively exploit its geographical position by threatening to interrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries a third of all the world's seaborne traded oil. Such a disruption, even short-term, would have incalculable effects on the international economy.

Iranian missile forces loom large in relative significance because of inadequacies in Iran’s air and ground forces. These forces “are sufficient to deter or defend against conventional threats from Iran’s weaker neighbors…but lack the air power and logistical ability to project power much beyond Iran’s borders or to confront regional powers such as Turkey or Israel,” according to a recent official U.S. assessment. [1] U.S. domination of the seas and skies in any military confrontation drives Iran into a disproportionate reliance on threatening to use missiles to level the odds. Even so, the practical utility of Iranian missiles is primarily limited at present to being an instrument of intimidation or terror when targeted against cities, given that Iran’s ballistic missiles lack accuracy against point targets and Iran’s cruise missiles are not suited to land-attack.

By acquiring nuclear warheads for its medium-range ballistic missiles, Iran could gain the ability to destroy specific targets. The deployments of missile defenses in Israel and the Persian Gulf are unlikely to give the defenders confidence that nuclear devastation would be averted in the event of an actual Iranian nuclear missile attack. Moreover, missile defenses are likely to spur rather than retard Iranian efforts to improve their missiles. Fortunately, Tehran would also be aware that its use of nuclear weapons would provoke retaliation that could result in its annihilation as a nation – a risk disproportionate to any conceivable gain.

WHAT DID THE EXERCISE ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATE?

The majority of missiles launched over the course of the exercise were either short-range, battlefield weapons, such as the solid fuel Fateh 110 or cruise missiles, such as the Tondar and Khalije Fars that were claimed to be effective against ships and fixed targets in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Of some two dozen missiles fired, only one was a medium-range missile with sufficient power and available space to carry a future nuclear warhead, the liquid fuel Shahab 3, a derivative of North Korea’s No Dong MRBM. Yet the Shahab 3’s range of approximately 1,000 km (with a 750 kg warhead) is not sufficient for it to reach Israel from a secure position in Iran. Iran has developed an advanced version of the Shahab 3, the Ghadr 1, to extend the system's range. This was accomplished by lengthening the airframe, using high-strength aluminum, and changing the shape of the missile’s warhead section. Yet the Ghadr 1 did not appear in the recent exercises.

The Iranian media also displayed, for the first time, underground missile silos, allegedly loaded with liquid fuel Shahabs. However, outside experts doubt the accuracy of the descriptions provided in the video coverage of the exercise and question whether Iran has any MRBMs operationally deployed in silos. In any case, such missiles would be far more likely to survive attack in a mobile basing mode than in fixed silos, which can be located in advance and effectively destroyed with little warning by the precision weapons available to the United States.

Iranian television reported further that Iranian forces had been equipped with a new, long-range radar system, the Ghadir, which was featured in the exercises.

WHAT WAS THE INTENDED MESSAGE?

Based on the statements of Iranian military leaders and reports in Iran’s media, the main messages of “Great Prophet 6” for friends and foe were: that Iran’s strength is increasing in spite of the UN sanctions; that Iran is not dependent on other nations for its defense; that Iranian missiles could not be effectively preempted or intercepted; and that any attack on Iran would be met with devastating retaliation.

The new radar and missile silos were offered as evidence than Iran cannot be disarmed and that retaliation was inevitable. The salvo launches of missiles were a reminder that missile defenses can be overwhelmed by numbers. The longer-range Shahab 3 symbolized Iran’s reach across the Middle East region, far beyond its own borders. Each of the systems displayed were described as the product of Iranian scientists and engineers, independent of reliance on foreign purchases or technical assistance.

READING BETWEEN THE LINES

There are, however, other conclusions to be drawn from Iran’s flexing of missile muscles. For those seeking to prevent or dissuade Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, the most important question is how much progress the exercises demonstrate toward Iran developing and deploying the missiles, which would carry nuclear warheads.

Realistically, medium-term delivery boils down to two existing systems: the liquid fuel, single stage Ghadr 1 MRBM, an advanced derivative of the Shahab 3, and the solid fuel Sejjil 2 MRBM, a two-stage system with sufficient range to target Israel from launch sites throughout Iran, but not yet operational. Neither missile was flown during “Great Prophet 6.”

The only MRBM launched was announced to be a Shahab 3, an unlikely candidate for fulfilling Iran’s likely nuclear delivery capability aspirations. It is possible that the Iranians foresee using the Ghadr 1 as a nuclear weapons platform, in spite of the disadvantages inherent to liquid fuel mobile missiles – in terms of their limited mobility and greater vulnerability to attack.

It is more likely that the Iranians see the Sejjil 2 as the preferred carrier for a possible future nuclear warhead. Iran is apparently feeling no need to exercise its only operational missile suited for the nuclear mission and the missile best suited for the nuclear mission has not yet reached an operational status appropriate for exercising. Thus, if the U.S. Government is correct in assessing that Tehran has not yet made a decision to build nuclear weapons, there would appear to be time for dissuading it from doing so.

A LONG-RANGE MISSILE THREAT NOT YET IN SIGHT

In a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, the U.S. intelligence community projected that Iran could test an ICBM within “a few years.” Most analysts predicted back then either “even odds” or a “likely chance” that Iran would test an ICBM by 2010. However, in 2009, senior military and defense officials testified to Congress that shifting from deployment of strategic interceptors to Europe in a third site to a program for deploying theater interceptors in a “Phased Adaptive Approach” was appropriate since the Iranian ICBM threat was evolving more slowly than previously thought.

The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis reported to Congress in 2011 that Iran was fielding increased numbers of SRBMs and MRBMs, “continuing to work on producing more capable MRBMs, and developing space launch vehicles, which incorporate technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems.” [2] The still unofficial Report on Sanctions of the UN Panel of Experts completed in May 2011 revealed that the Iranians had conducted two unannounced tests of the Sejjil 2 MRBM (in October 2010 and February 2011) [3] in addition to the five flight tests it had conducted since 2007. (A senior Iranian Republican Guard Corps Commander recently confirmed two previously unannounced “1,900 km-range” missile flights tests in February.)

The Iranians launched their second satellite in May 2011, using the Safir Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) and predicted that it would be followed by another satellite launch in the summer. Unlike the larger Samorgh SLV that had been displayed as a mockup in February, conversion of the Safir SLV to a ballistic missile would still only deliver a nuclear-sized payload about 2,100 km, according to the IISS Strategic Dossier, [4] roughly the same as the Sejjil 2 MRBM.

This summer’s “Great Prophet 6” exercise provides more evidence that, while Tehran makes steady progress on augmenting its stocks of enriched uranium and while R&D work continues on its most likely MRBM candidate for being able to deliver a future nuclear weapon within the region, Tehran’s present military focus is on demonstrating and enhancing its conventional capability to deter and defeat a preventive attack on the Islamic Republic itself. It has not flight-tested, or indeed even asserted a need for, an IRBM or ICBM – the missile categories most relevant to threatening the territories of NATO Europe and the United States.

_____

Notes:

1. Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran (Congressionally Directed Action), April 2010, p.7

2. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010, p.3

3. Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010), Final Report, p.26, http://www.innercitypress.com/1929r051711.pdf

4. The International Institute for Strategic Studies: “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment,” May 2010, p.31

21/06/2011 DGA

Peter Luff, ministre britannique des achats de défense et Laurent Collet-Billon, délégué général pour l’armement, réaffirment, le mardi 21 juin 2011 sur le stand de MBDA au salon aéronautique du Bourget, l’importance stratégique de la coopération franco-britannique dans le domaine des missiles.

Conformément aux décisions du dernier sommet franco-britannique du 2 novembre 2010, la Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) et le DE&S travaillent à la mise en place d’un secteur des missiles plus cohérent autour d’un maitre d’œuvre industriel européen unique, devant conduire à des gains significatifs pour les États (jusqu’à 30% de gains).

Laurent Collet-Billon et Peter Luff ont échangé en amont de la présentation des premières analyses sur l’optimisation de notre tissu industriel prévue début juillet. Parallèlement les deux pays travaillent au rapprochement des méthodes de travail en vue d'une gouvernance de plus en plus commune.

La DGA et le DE&S prévoient également de lancer une série de projets pour consolider cette initiative : lancement du développement du missile antisurface naval léger (FASGW(H)/ANL), évaluation des améliorations des missiles de croisière Scalp/Storm Shadow et feuille de route commune pour les technologies de défense aérienne à courte portée.