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23 novembre 2011 3 23 /11 /novembre /2011 18:10
NATO Looks to Pool Resources Amid Budget Cuts

 

22 Nov 2011 Defensenews AFP

 

WASHINGTON - NATO countries are taking tentative steps to pool military resources in the face of shrinking defense budgets and to fill gaps exposed by the recent Libya campaign, a French general said Nov. 22.

 

The alliance hopes to unveil a number of cooperative projects in time for a NATO summit in Chicago in May that may include joint training for pilots of allied aircraft and shared maintenance for NATO vehicles, said Gen. Stephane Abrial, supreme allied commander for transformation.

 

"Budgets are decreasing everywhere. We cannot expect any possibility to spend more," Abrial told reporters at a Pentagon briefing.

 

"We need to spend better and the best way to spend better is to do more things together," he said.

 

The NATO-led air war exposed shortcomings among U.S. allies and underscored the need for sharing costly military resources, said Abrial, who is overseeing what the alliance calls the "Smart Defense Initiative."

 

NATO officials say the air campaign revealed how European states lacked munitions for fighter jets, unmanned drone aircraft, refueling tankers, targeting specialists and planes equipped for electronic jamming.

 

Under the initiative begun in February, the alliance has drawn up a long list of about 160 projects for pooled funding and expects a number of concrete programs to be announced when NATO meets in Chicago next year, he said.

 

"I'm very encouraged by the initial contacts I've had," said Abrial, who has visited about half of the alliance's 28 member states to discuss the initiative.

 

He said projects are "slowly moving from intentions to decisions" and that he is "very confident we'll be able to bring something to the table."

 

Two projects that will likely be ready to launch include plans for coordinated training of pilots for both helicopters and warplanes and arranging shared maintenance for an array of allied vehicles, planes and vessels - instead of each country having to fund separate training and maintenance efforts, according to Abrial.

 

The alliance was also looking at pooling funds to buy more unmanned aircraft for intelligence and surveillance and to organize a joint supply of expensive precision-guided munitions, he said.

 

During the six-month Libya air war, European governments ran low on munitions and had to turn to the United States to buy precision-guided bombs.

 

"Is there a way to procure, maintain and store (munitions) together in groupings of nations? We're looking at these aspects," he said.

 

Abrial acknowledged some challenges in trying to persuade alliance countries to share military hardware and expertise, as governments had concerns about jeopardizing local defense industries as well as sacrificing a degree of sovereign control.

 

Countries had to strike "a balance between sovereignty and solidarity," he said.

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23 novembre 2011 3 23 /11 /novembre /2011 17:45

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/var/dicod/storage/images/base-de-medias/images/marine/photos-des-breves/2011mchg153-090/1457636-1-fre-FR/2011mchg153-090.jpg

 

23/11/2011 par LV Haar - Sources : © PREMAR Manche – Mer du nord

 

En opération de guerre des mines au large de Dieppe, le chasseur de mines Maaloey  de la Marine royale norvégienne a subi une importante avarie au niveau de son système de propulsion. Engagé dans le groupe permanent de guerre des mines de l'OTAN, la réparation du navire de guerre nécessite un passage au bassin pour un échange standard de l'hydrojet tribord. La base navale de Cherbourg se positionne pour relever le double défi: accueillir un bâtiment de guerre étranger et lui permettre un retour en disponibilité opérationnelle rapide pour qu'il puisse poursuivre sa mission.

 

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/var/dicod/storage/images/base-de-medias/images/marine/photos-des-breves/2011mchg153-116/1457631-1-fre-FR/2011mchg153-116.jpg

Le 10 novembre 2011, le Maaloey  arrive au port militaire de Cherbourg alors que les quatre autres navires du groupe OTAN font escale à Boulogne-sur-Mer après une mission de deux semaines au large de Dieppe. L'objectif pour le chasseur de mines norvégien est de pouvoir rejoindre le reste du groupe pour une nouvelle mission au large de la Hollande à la fin du mois.

 

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/var/dicod/storage/images/base-de-medias/images/marine/photos-des-breves/2011mchg153-186/1457641-1-fre-FR/2011mchg153-186.jpg

Le Maaloey  n'est pas un bateau classique, en forme de catamaran, le navire de 275t est posé sur coussin d'air et sa coque en résine est extrêmement fragile. Le week-end est consacré à monter des lignes de tin au fond du bassin et à vider les soutes des munitions entreposées. Dès que la marée le permet, le 21 novembre, les équipes sont à pied d'œuvre pour l'entrée au bassin. Guidé par les marins de la base navale, le catamaran se glisse dans la forme 3 de la base navale, quelques heures plus tard, le bassin est à sec.

 

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/var/dicod/storage/images/base-de-medias/images/marine/photos-des-breves/2011mchg153-254/1457646-1-fre-FR/2011mchg153-254.jpg

L'hydrojet abîmé de plus de trois tonnes est retiré et remplacé par une pièce neuve. Les opérations se déroulent sur un bon rythme et la remise à flots du bassin est prévue le 24 novembre pour assurer la sortie et l'appareillage du chasseur de mines avant minuit.

 

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/var/dicod/storage/images/base-de-medias/images/marine/photos-des-breves/2011mchg153-215/1457621-1-fre-FR/2011mchg153-215.jpg

"Une expérience dense et enrichissante qui a décuplé la motivation du personnel de la base navale " selon le capitaine de frégate Yann Gautun commandant adjoint de la base navale de Cherbourg qui ajoute : "c'est toute la garnison de Cherbourg qui s'est jointe à l'effort pour que les délais soient respectés et que l'équipage du Maaloey soit bien accueilli ". Une première pour le port militaire de Cherbourg qui peut se féliciter d'avoir relevé avec succès les défis de cette opération inédite.

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19 novembre 2011 6 19 /11 /novembre /2011 13:35
"Afghanistan: en sortir ou pas?", une conférence le 30 novembre

19.11.2011 par P. CHAPLEAU Lignes de Défense

 

Le 30 novembre 2011, à 17h30, 29 quai Voltaire, Paris 7e,dans le cadre des« Mercredis de la Documentation française », aura lieu une conférence débat sur le thème « Afghanistan : en sortir ou pas ? ».

 

Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt, ancien ambassadeur de France en Afghanistan, Yves Boyer, professeur à l'École polytechnique et directeur adjoint de la FRS, Gérard Fussman, professeur au Collège de France,  Jean-Luc Racine, directeur de recherche CNRS au Centre d'études de l'Inde et de l'Asie du Sud de l'Ehess, et Isabelle Saint-Mezard, docteur en sciences politiques et enseignante à l'Inalco, feront un bilan, dix ans après le début du conflit afghan, et à la lumière de ses multiples facettes, de l'état des forces en présences et analyseront les perspectives d'avenir de la zone Afpak.

 

Plusieurs parutions récentes de la Documentation française sont consacrées à cette thématique:


AfPak Afghanistan - Pakistan, n° 50 de la revue Questions internationales de la Documentation française, juillet-août 2011.


- La politique étrangère de la France, « De la fin de la guerre froide au printemps arabe », par Frédéric Charillon, publié en juin 2011 dans collection les Études de la Documentation française. 

 

Pour s'inscrire :  bernadette.guilloux@dila.gouv.fr ou par tél au 01 40 15 71 74

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17 novembre 2011 4 17 /11 /novembre /2011 13:45
Economic Recession And Helicopters In Afghanistan

 

November 17, 2011: STRATEGY PAGE

 

One side-effect of the world-wide recession is that lots of the idle helicopters have found work in Afghanistan. There, the U.S. has been prodding other NATO nations to provide helicopters for their own troops. But too many of these nations either do not have helicopters to send or don't want send what they have into such a hostile environment. This is sometimes because the helicopters available are old, or not equipped for service in such a hostile environment.

 

The constant pressure from the United States, which has to supply emergency helicopter service when called on, has persuaded NATO allies to lease helicopters. Over the last five years this has led to the leasing several hundred helicopters for use in Afghanistan. Initially, many of them were Russian models from Eastern Europe. These were Cold War surplus machines from firms that had gone into the leasing business in the 1990s for foreign aid and peacekeeping operations. Three years of economic recession has made a lot of helicopters available in the West, and now more of these are headed for Afghanistan.

 

The basic problem, however, remains. European nations either don't have helicopters suitable for service in the hot and high (and dusty, and freezing in the Winter) conditions of Afghanistan, or their helicopter units are not organized and trained for service overseas, or the politicians don't want to send their helicopters abroad. These nations are content to lease helicopters, including crews and support personnel, from civilian firms.

 

Russian firms paved the way here. Russian and Ukrainian companies were already supplying heavy jet transports for NATO forces since the 1990s. These same companies had helicopters available as well. The Russians know their choppers will work in Afghanistan, because of their experience during the 1980s. Many of the same helicopter types are still in service, although with updates. Safety and reliability standards for Russian helicopters have also increased. There are also many non-Russian firms that offer helicopter leasing for "challenging environments" (mainly oil field or mining operations support). But the Russians were cheaper, and are less concerned with getting shot at. In the end, however, the pleas from the NATO troops for more helicopter support could not by the politicians back home and the demand for leased helicopters remained strong.

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17 novembre 2011 4 17 /11 /novembre /2011 08:45
NATO Embow XIII: learning how to deal with the Manpads threat

 

27th Oct 2011 By Jean-Michel Guhl in Cazaux, France - defencereviewasia.com

 

ONE of the most present and most concealed threats on the battlefield remains the shoulder-launched surface to air missile or Manpads – an abbreviation of man-portable air defence system. A light affordable and plentiful weapon with a low acquisition cost, it is also a war tool that outweighs by multiples the price of its likely target - a tactical fighter plane, helicopter or even a multi-engined airlifter. Intended for air defence by the military, Manpads have also unfortunately over the years landed in the hands of uncontrolled groups or terrorist organisations, accounting for some dramatic deadly attacks on civilian transport aircraft as well.

 

ONE of the most present and most concealed threats on the battlefield remains the shoulder-launched surface to air missile or Manpads – an abbreviation of man-portable air defence system. A light affordable and plentiful weapon with a low acquisition cost, it is also a war tool that outweighs by multiples the price of its likely target - a tactical fighter plane, helicopter or even a multi-engined airlifter. Intended for air defence by the military, Manpads have also unfortunately over the years landed in the hands of uncontrolled groups or terrorist organisations, accounting for some dramatic deadly attacks on civilian transport aircraft as well.

 

During the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), thousands of US-made FIM-92 Stinger shoulder-launched missiles were supplied, by the CIA via Pakistan, to the Mujahideen, along with British-made Blowpipes, older US FIM-43 Redeyes, and even Egyptian (Ayn-as-Sakr - Falcon Eye) and Chinese (HN-5) copies of the infamous Soviet 9K32M Strela (NATO SA-7b) Manpads!

 

These 10-kg missiles, capable of reaching Mach 2 in 5 seconds and with an average lethal range of just a few kilometres, were responsible for the destruction of many Soviet airlifters, as well as transport and attack helicopters. Only dedicated “shturmovik” fighter-bombers like the Su-25 “Frogfoot” and Su-22 “Fitter” fared much better, in general, thanks to their extremely sturdy airframe construction. From experience gained in that war and in peacetime exercises prior to 1994, the Soviets found that the best way for a group of gunships to survive their own attack run was to fly at extremely low altitudes towards the target and then split up, approaching it from different directions. After making their attacks, the helicopters would make a break-off turn and depart at extremely low altitudes, their wingmen providing mutual covering fire and all of them making full use of their electronic warfare equipment (decoy flares and IR jammers). Most of these techniques have also been adopted in the West. Just as a reminder: 333 airplanes and helicopters were lost by the Soviets to Manpads during their war 25 years ago.

 

Combating the Manpads threat has gained in importance in recent times with the use of countermeasures using various techniques. IRCM systems are designed to defeat both surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles by detecting the ultraviolet (UV) or infrared (IR) radiation from the missile exhaust trail and then initiating responses. Counter-measures include both flares – which are designed to give the missile a decoy target – and laser jammers – which cause missile guidance systems to abruptly steer away from the target aircraft.

 

In order to tackle the lingering Manpads menace as a whole, and with the Soviet tactical experience in mind, NATO has been organising every other year in Europe, since 1991, a series of two live exercises designated MACE and Embow. If MACE caters in priority with more expensive electromagnetic (EM) self-defence systems, Embow focuses only on ways to counter heat-seeking (IR) missiles fired from the ground.

 

Embow XIII in Cazaux air base

 

A total of sixteen nations participated in the 13th venue of Embow in 2011. The event took place at Cazaux, in France, and saw the attendance of participants from: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Turkey, UK, US, with Australia and New Zealand joining as longtime faithful allies of NATO from “down-under”. Aircraft involved were varied, ranging from fighter-bombers to attack helicopters, and from transport helicopters to big airlifters like the C-130 Hercules.

 

Orchestrated by NATO’s SG2/Aerospace Capability Group 3 on “Electronic Warfare and Survivability”, the main aim of Embow is to allow aviators to test, under live and monitored conditions, the capacity of their aircraft to evade infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles, from basic Manpads to more advanced surface to air short-range systems (SHORADS). As a cherry on the cake, the Embow trials are always performed in highly instrumented areas so that the participants can take a close look at the actual efficiency of the systems they field. Any noticed discrepancy is then funneled, in a second move, back to the industry for updating and improvements.

 

Spanning four weeks, from 18 September to 12 October, Embow XIII placed a strong priority on how to enhance or optimise the self-protection systems of NATO aircraft currently participating in overseas expeditionary missions: fighters, airlifters and helicopters alike. True to say, US airplanes and rotorcraft from other NATO nations have paid, since 2002 in Iraq and Afghanistan, a heavy toll to the insurgents, while furthermore ongoing air operations over Libya have proved in combat the value of the different EW systems developed by the European industry for their current generation aircraft.

As such, European manufacturers of electronic warfare equipment took advantage of Embow XIII to test current as well as prototypes of future EW systems during some 100 “live firing” sorties from Cazaux AB performed over the DGA Biscarosse test site and its extensive network of radars and trajectography equipment.

 

This was particularly the case for EADS Cassidian and the Spanish company Indra who used a CASA 212 test-bed from the French DGA (the French Defence Procurement Agency) to put on trial a new DIRCM designed for the self-protection of high-value transport aircraft. Dubbed Manta, this multi-spectral multi-band high-energy laser-based system (developed in partnership with Rosoboronexport of Russia), is able to counter several Manpads launched simultaneously from short distances. It is intended to equip the A400M at a later stage.

 

For the Embow XIII evaluation, Indra’s Manta was linked to sensors from Cassidian’s AN/AAR-60 MILDS (Missile Launch Detection System) as used today on many NATO tactical airplanes and helicopters, like the Tiger, Mangusta and Black Hawk.

 

Burning fires of deception

 

If the use of chaff (metal foil) in combat dates back to World War 2 – clouds of small metallic dipoles being dropped by attacking bombers to deceive or jam German radars – the use of flares (burning decoys) as counter-measures against heat-seeking missiles is more recent and truly appropriate for the jet age. The ubiquitous Infra-Red Countermeasures

 

(IRCM) decoy flare is nearly 50 years old. Simple, robust and effective, for many years it was the only means of providing aircraft protection against the IR-guided missile. For today’s flying combat machine, as a matter of fact, chaff and flares are a very common and worthwhile method of evasion against an incoming missile or to disrupt the “lock-on” of a tracking radar.

 

Initially a US invention – used first in the 1960s on the B-47, B-52 and B-58 strategic bombers aiming to penetrate heavily defended Soviet defence lines – IR flares never saw wide usage during the larger part of the Cold War. Aircraft-mounted self-defence flare launcher systems were first witnessed to be widely used by Israeli aviators over Beirut – particularly noticeable on TV newsreels - during the Lebanon war of 1981 and subsequent air operations against the PLO. Flares were also widely used by the Soviets over Afghanistan a few years later. With the widespread introduction of the SA-7 in 1984 and Stingers in 1985, helicopters became exposed to those missiles, and soon all of them were equipped with flare dispensers, active IR jammers, and exhaust dampers to reduce their infrared (IR) signatures. At first, only Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopters were so equipped, but eventually Mi-8 “Hip” transports received these counter-measures as well.

 

In fact, the Israeli Air Force’s brand-new General Dynamics F-16A Block 10 Fighting Falcons were unique in 1981 in being the first Western fighter jets to include the fitting of ALE-40 chaff/flare dispensers – systems for long reserved only for US strategic bombers – to provide an adequate self-protection against heat-seeking missiles. This was based on something the Israelis had learned the hard way during the Yom Kippur war of 1973. An intense conflict where, according to subsequent White House debriefings, the Israeli Air Force lost no less than 102 aircraft – 32 F-4s, 53 A-4s, 11 Mirages and 6 Super Mysteres – mostly to Egyptian and Syrians surface to air missiles. Two helicopters, a Bell 205 and a CH-53, were also shot down this way. In all these cases, the Israeli aircraft were totally devoid of any IR self-defence systems.

 

What exactly are these IRCM systems? They are in fact a very simple invention, based on canisters bolted to the airframe and firing one or more flaming decoys in sequence in the direction of an incoming infrared-guided missile. IR flares are cartridges usually discharged individually or in salvoes by the pilot (or automatically by a tail-warning system on cue). Usually accompanied by simultaneous vigorous evasive manoeuvering, these decoys are supposed to lure a missile and make them miss them intended target by heading to the decoy’s heat source instead.

 

Since they are intended to deceive infrared missiles, these flares burn at temperatures of thousands of degrees, incandescing in the visible spectrum as well. They have proved their value repeatedly in combat. Flare decoys are however only effective in the terminal phase acquisition of missiles fitted with IR signature seeker heads, i.e. a very short moment in time, which explains why fully automatic self-defence systems with cued sequencers are now preferred.

 

Flare decoys are simple inexpensive cigar-sized containers, in general square or round, commonly composed of a pyrotechnic composition based on magnesium or another hot-flaming metal, with burning temperature equal to or hotter than an aircraft engine exhaust. As said, the trick is to make the infrared-guided missile seek out the heat signature from the flare rather than that of the aircraft’s engine(s).

 

In contrast to electro-magnetically (EM) radar-guided missiles, IR-guided missiles are very difficult to spot as they close on an aircraft. They have no radar signature, and they are generally fired from the rear, directly toward the jet pipe of an aircraft or the hot exhaust of a turbine. In most cases, during combat, pilots have then to rely on their wingmen to spot the missile’s characteristic smoke trail and alert them. Since Manpads are inherently far shorter-legged in distance and altitude range than their radar-guided counterparts, good situational awareness of altitude and potential threats continues to be a very effective defence against them. Luckily, much more advanced electro-optical systems – as developed over the past two decades – can now detect missile launches automatically from the very distinct emissions of a missile’s rocket motor, both in the infrared (IR) and ultra-violet (UV) bands.

 

How does it work? In flight, once the presence of an IR missile is indicated, flares are released by the aircraft in quick succession in an attempt to decoy the incoming missile; most IRCM systems are automatic, while others – the earlier ones – required manual jettisoning of the flares, thus limiting their efficiency. The aircraft will then pull away at a sharp angle from the flare (and the terminal trajectory of the missile) and reduce engine power in attempt to cool its thermal signature. Optimally, the missile’s seeker head is then confused by this change in temperature and sudden flurry of new hotter signatures, and therefore follows the flare(s) rather than the aircraft… giving the pilot(s) a chance to fight again another day!

 

For the IR generating cartridges, two approaches are possible: either pyrotechnic or pyrophoric. “As stored”, explains Major Thomas Vermeersch, a test pilot with DGA in Cazaux, “chemical-energy-source IR-decoy flares contain pyrotechnic compositions, pyrophoric substances, and highly flammable substances. Upon ignition of the decoy flare, a strongly exothermal reaction is started, releasing infrared energy and visible smoke and flame, the potency of the emission being dependent on the chemical nature of the payload used.” There are a wide variety of calibres and shapes available for aerial decoy flares depending on their manufacturer. In short, due to volume storage restrictions on-board modern platforms, many aircraft of US origin employ square-shaped cartridges. Cylindrical cartridges (from 19 to 60mm in general) are used mainly on board French aircraft as well as those of Russian origin. They are much more resistant to warping and handing damages.

 

The coming of DIRCM systems

 

But in the present day combat theatre, flares are not enough, and new inventions are now being conceived to deceive shoulder-launched infrared missiles. This is especially so with the development of new-generation seekers, dubbed SG4 by NATO, that are now able to discriminate easily between jet pipes and flaming decoys. This aptitude was well demonstrated in a video shown to the press in Cazaux by Isabelle Lecuyer, the person in charge of aircraft self-protection systems with DGA. This revealed that a Mirage 2000D dropping traditional flares could not evade the “lock-on” of a newer generation IR tracker - thus giving the sword a clean edge over the shield…

 

But new counter-measures are being designed in order to protect aircraft further against the Manpads threat. Among the most promising is the Directional Infrared Counter-Measure system (DIRCM), a solution nowadays principally produced by Northrop Grumman, ITT Corporation and BAE Systems in the USA, and by Elbit Systems in Israel. Thales, Terma, Saab and Indra in Europe are also working on new DIRCMs, as is Russian industry.

 

More advanced than conventional flare-based IR counter-measure systems, a standard DIRCM is a lightweight, compact system designed to provide mission-vulnerable aircraft – like strategic airlifters and large helicopters – with increased protection from common battlefield IR threats. The term DIRCM is used as a generic moniker to describe any IRCM system that tracks and directs energy toward the menace. Such is the AN/AAQ-24 Nemesis, a DIRCM system which consists of a missile warning system (AN/AAR-54), an integration unit, a processor, and laser turrets (Small Laser Targeting Assembly, SLTA). Early versions used an arc lamp to generate the jamming signal. Newer versions use diode-based pump systems. DIRCMs will be installed as standard on C-17 and MC-130 airlifters, and CV-22 and CH-53E rotorcraft. Nemesis is also the basis for the Northrop Grumman Guardian system marketed for commercial aircraft. Pending the completion of ICAO tests on the viability of such options, they will likely be fitted to many commercial carriers in the near future. So will the Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-Measure system (LAIRCM) and LAIRCM-Lite which is a strict C-17 programme that uses a combination of laser jammers and flares due to the limited availability of some LAIRCM components.

 

First US try at fooling the IR threat

 

It took some time for scientists to develop IR countermeasures. By the mid 1960s, an understanding of missile operations and radiation emission from pyrotechnic flames was becoming more mature. As a result, the objectives of new research contracts in the USA became more specific. They undertook the task to develop a pyrotechnic source that radiated in a narrow wavelength band and emitted selectively:

1 - in the specific IR bands resulting from the radiation produced by aircraft;

2 - and capable of operating in the sensitive region of the detector used in the adversary missile guidance system.

 

The requirement of this effort brought the first attempt to create a pyrotechnic decoy that radiated in regions corresponding to regions where aircraft usually diffuse heat. Today one might identify such a decoy as a “spectral or colour adapted” flare, but in the mid 1960s the researchers did not appreciate how important it would be to have a decoy that would radiate with the proper spectral properties.

 

In 1967, the US Navy China Lake test centre reported on the development of a decoy flare intended for launching from the AN/ALE-29 dispensing set installed on a number of US military aircraft. The goal was for the flare to defeat the AA-2 “Atoll” short-range, infrared homing air-to-air missile developed by the Soviet Union using the Sidewinder 1A as a surrogate. This was a not too complex issue, in reality, as the “Atoll” (Vympel K-13) was similar in appearance and function to the American AIM-9 Sidewinder (after which it had been reverse-engineered using an unexploded missile recovered in China in September 1958). Early flare developments were aimed at providing protection in the infrared 2m to 3m bandpass region. As missiles improved, the threat moved to also operate in the infrared 3m to 5m bandpass region. In 1968, the US Navy set out to develop a family of infrared flares that were effective in the 3m to 5m bandpass region. They considered changing the combustion mode to a much higher rate, burning more material, lengthening the flare by two inches, altering the AN/ALE-29 dispenser to “squarish” holes, and altering the composition to improve efficiency. The Mk 46 Mod 0 flare, put in production in 1968, was the first US-made flare developed with the above objectives. The need for 120-150 decoy flares on an aircraft operating in a dangerous area was considered mandatory. It was the first time that IRCM investigators suggested that the number of flares that could be carried by aircraft of that era would be insufficient to provide complete protection.

 

But it took another 10 to 15 years for IRCM systems to become commonplace, and once the Manpads threat turned into a “no escape” lethal issue - something complicated by the use of antiquated weapons like the RPG against low flying aircraft - thus adding more odds in the unending battle between the sword and the shield.

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16 novembre 2011 3 16 /11 /novembre /2011 13:25

http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/getasset.aspx?itemid=39338

photo USAF - source Flight Global

 

November 16, 2011: STRATEGY PAGE

 

NATO leaders are examining the costs of the seven month operation in Libya and have concluded that more UAVs are needed. That's because it's cheaper (by about 80 percent) to use UAVs for most missions, rather than the larger and much more expensive manned aircraft. The Americans did send in some UAVs (mainly Predators and Reapers) and these performed more effectively, and cheaply, than manned aircraft.

 

While there are some kinds of wars where current UAVs have limited use, like where the enemy has lots of high-altitude anti-aircraft weapons, for the near future, NATO won't be facing anything like that. The future is more peacekeeping and operations like the recent Libyan one. In these new ops, cheaper, slower and unmanned aircraft can stay in the air longer, keep a better eye on the ground, and carry enough missiles or smart bombs to take care what needs to be hit. Best of all, the UAV can do it at less than a fifth the cost (in dollars per flight hour) compared to manned aircraft. Aircraft are much more expensive with people on board, and cannot stay in the air nearly as long. Most UAVs are propeller driven, which is cheaper and slower. Both are good for trolling the land beneath for targets, or just to keep track of who is doing what.

 

For the NATO nations that participated in the Libyan operations, these savings are not theoretical, they are real. UAV makers are rejoicing, while manufacturers of manned aircraft are reconsidering their product line.

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15 novembre 2011 2 15 /11 /novembre /2011 18:50

nato

 

November 15, 2011 defpro.com

 

During Exercise Steadfast Juncture 2011 which took place in Lithuania from November 1 to 12 readiness level of the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC-B) (Netherlands) to take the lead of the NATO Response Force (NRF) in 2012 was evaluated. The event involved military and civilian personnel of several NATO commands and headquarters which had been chosen for duty in NRF in 2012.

 

Command Post Exercise, which was located in the Pabrades Training Area, tested and provided evaluation of functioning of JFC-B command, control, communications, and information systems, readiness of the command post for deployment, operations and sustention, and collaboration with other forces.

 

Certification of NRF was based on a crisis response operations scenario involving deployment over a long distance beyond the Alliance’s borders and fulfillment of certain tasks. “We generated a scenario reflecting all the typical challenges NATO forces face in modern world,” said Maj Gen Jean Fred Berger, commander of the NATO's Joint Warfare Centre (Norway) and officer in charge of the scenario of Steadfast Juncture 2011.

 

During the Exercise events were organised to give a closer view on the event for Lithuanian and foreign political and military representatives, including Minister of National Defence of Lithuania Rasa Jukneviciene and Chief of Defence of Lithuania Lt Gen Arvydas Pocius, Minister of Defence of Latvia Dr. Artis Pabriks and Chief of Defence of Latvia Maj Gen Raimondas Graube.

 

Lithuania has been a host of such NATO exercise for the first time. “As a host nation Lithuania has done a really great job to have the Exercise go smoothly. “My implication regarding the best reviews of the Exercise Command and of JFC Commander is that Lithuania has established a higher standard for such exercise and reaffirmed its name as a reliable NATO country,” Chief of Defence of Lithuania Lt Gen Arvydas Pocius commented on the Exercise.

 

During the Exercise a Deployable Command Post brought from Italy was stationed in the Pabrades Training Area and provided shelter and workspace for several hundred of military and civilian personnel from al the Alliance’s countries as well as NATO partner countries. Lithuanian company which will end its tour of duty in NRF this year was in charge of protecting the command post throughout the Exercise.

 

Steadfast Juncture 2011 took place simultaneously in 6 more countries apart from Lithuania: Greece, Italy, Germany, Spain, Norway and the Czech Republic, and data exchange was ensured over the NATO communications and information systems.

 

In line with respective requirements, the NRF rotation for 2012 was certified in Steadfast Juncture 2011 as highly ready and technologically advanced, comprising land, air, maritime and special operations forces components, and deployable within an especially short time to operations in any region of the world.

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14 novembre 2011 1 14 /11 /novembre /2011 18:35

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/var/dicod/storage/images/base-de-medias/images/air/actualites/images-2011/images-novembre-2011/exercice-steadfast-juncture-20112/1448142-1-fre-FR/exercice-steadfast-juncture-2011.jpg

 

14/11/2011 Actus Air - Texte : CDAOA

 

Du 1er au 13 novembre 2011, s’est déroulé l’exercice otanien Steadfast Juncture, à Brunssum, aux Pays-Bas. Il consiste en une simulation assistée par ordinateur visant à entraîner et à évaluer la capacité C2 (commandement et contrôle) de la composante aérienne du commandement des forces interalliées (JFC – joint force command ) de Brunssum, en vue d’une certification pour la prise de commandement de la NATO response force 2012 (NRF-force de réaction rapide de l’Otan) par le JFACC (joint force air component command- centre interallié de commandement et de conduite des opérations aériennes) allemand de Kalkar.

 

Grâce à un scénario complexe, l’Otan va tester les capacités de commandement et de coordination du JFC de Brunssum, notamment pour la mise en œuvre d’opérations d’entrée initiale, de missions de maintien de la paix ainsi que l’acheminement d’aides humanitaires dans un contexte de crise internationale.

 

Le renseignement, les systèmes d’information et de communication stratégiques, la défense antimissile balistique de théâtre, l’influence en opérations et la coopération civilo-militaire sont autant de domaines qui devront être maîtrisés pour obtenir la certification de l’Alliance.

 

L’armée de l’air française contribue activement à cet exercice. Ainsi, une quinzaine d’aviateurs ont été déployés pour partager leur expertise avec leurs homologues allemands. Pour mémoire, la composante air de la NRF 17 est sous commandement de la France jusqu’à la fin de l’année 2011.

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14 novembre 2011 1 14 /11 /novembre /2011 13:00
Un aviso va participer en Méditerranée orientale à la lutte contre le terrorisme

 

14 novembre 2011 Par Rédacteur en chef. PORTAIL DES SOUS-MARINS

 

Des périodes imprévisibles et intenses d’opérations maritimes en Méditerranée sont un des outils utilisés par l’OTAN pour contrer toute tentative des terroristes. Baptisées “Deterrent Surges”, ces opérations mettent en œuvre des moyens de l’OTAN convergeant vers des zones définies pour une période prédéfinie. Elles permettent non seulement de lutter contre le terrorisme, mais aussi de construire et de renforcer la connaissance de la situation maritime de la zone par l’Alliance Atlantique.

 

A partir du 12 novembre, l’OTAN a commencé à concentrer des moyens en Méditerranée orientale pour plus d’une semaine de patrouilles intensives.

 

« Le socle de cette opération Deterrent Surges est le groupe “Standing NATO Maritime Group 2” et la reconnaissance aéro-maritime. Pour cela, nous avons ajouté des bâtiments libérés spécifiquement pour cette opération, » explique le capitaine de vaisseau Olivier Bodhuin, chef des opérations au Headquarters Maritime Command de Naples. « La France et la Roumanie apportent une contribution importante à cette opération, montrant que les nations donnent une grande importance à l’opération Active Endeavour, plus de 10 ans après son lancement. L’aviso Commandant Birot a récemment quitté l’opération Unified Protector, au large de la Libye, et, en tant que Français, je suis très satisfait de voir le Birot participer à l’opération Deterrent Surges en soutien direct aux opérations, » a déclaré le commandant Bodhuin.

 

Selon le contre-amiral Javier Gonzalez-Huix, adjoint Opérations, l’opération Active Endeavour n’a jamais cessé un instant, malgré les opérations au large de la Libye. « Il est clair que les demandes de bâtiments étaient importantes pour la Libye, mais l’attention portée à Active Endeavour n’a jamais disparu de cet état-major. Souvenez-vous que cette opération n’est pas seulement des bâtiments en mer. Il y a un réseau de renseignement qui la soutient et des technologies sophistiquées qui fonctionnent toute la journée, tous les jours. »

 

Référence :OTAN

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14 novembre 2011 1 14 /11 /novembre /2011 07:45

http://www.meretmarine.com/objets/500/30997.jpg

 

Un chasseur de mines français

crédits : MARINE NATIONALE

 

14/11/2011 MER et MARINE

 

Débuté le 28 octobre, le déploiement en Manche du Standing Nato Mine Counter Measures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) s'est achevé samedi 12 novembre. Les bâtiments engagés se sont retrouvés à Boulogne pour dresser un bilan des opérations, qui ont été interrompues à deux reprises en raison de conditions météorologiques difficiles. Au final, seules 4 mines historiques ont été découvertes et neutralisées par la force, soit deux par le chasseur de mines français Croix du Sud et deux autres par son homologue belge, le Narcis. En plus de ces unités, le SNMCMG1 était composé du navire de soutien estonien Tasuja, ainsi que des chasseurs de mines Maaloey (Norvège) et Flaming (Pologne). On notera que le Maaloey, victime d'une avarie, a rejoint le port militaire de Cherbourg pour y être réparé.

 

Le groupe de guerre des mines de l'OTAN a participé à l'« assainissement » des fonds marins et la sécurisation des activités maritimes, une mission menée toute l'année par les plongeurs démineurs et les bâtiments anti-mines de la Marine nationale.

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12 novembre 2011 6 12 /11 /novembre /2011 12:30

nato

 

11/11/2011  Contributor:  Paul Smyth - defenceiq.com

 

For NATO, the Libyan crisis is a welcome success.  The Alliance largely fulfilled it’s United Nations mandate to protect civilians and member states wanting Gaddafi’s removal.  Despite some tragic collateral incidents the 7-month military campaign was executed with unprecedented precision, no NATO personnel were killed and the intervention was successfully concluded without putting ‘boots on the ground’.  Officials in Brussels and the other coalition capitals may feel justifiably pleased, but behind any pride or contentment should be a major concern that casts a shadow over the success of the intervention.

 

As freedom fighters liberated Tripoli media clips showed how easily Gaddafi’s many weapon stocks could be pilfered.  Most worryingly the looting included Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), raising the spectre that terrorist or insurgent groups may acquire such deadly weapons.  With NATO dominating the sky over Libya revolutionary forces had no need for air defence weapons, so where have they gone?

 

Bombarded by NATO’s air power Gaddafi’s forces may have been issued with MANPADS but they do not appear to have featured much in the conflict and no coalition jets were shot down over Libya.  Perhaps a combination of coalition tactics, inadequate user training (especially among mercenaries) and poor serviceability limited the use of deployed missiles, but the paucity of reported missile firings is a concern as it suggests Gaddafi’s forces may not have fielded many of the missing weapons.

 

If, instead, a number of MANPADS have been smuggled out of Libya, coalition achievements there may be spoilt by events elsewhere.  Should the conflict result in terrorist or insurgent groups receiving a welcome boost to their ability to attack commercial and military aviation, the success of NATO’s operation would be compromised by an increased threat to civil aircraft, military drones and helicopters.

 

Despite popular portrayal in TV dramas and Hollywood movies, in reality terrorists have great difficulty in obtaining surface-to-air missiles.  They are expensive, cannot be home-made, attract a higher level of intelligence interest, and have a shelf-life.  Plenty of terrorists hope to target commercial aircraft but few have the means to do so.  Access to looted Libyan MANPADS may bring that intent closer to reality, especially as some of Gaddafi’s missiles were advanced weapons with increased performance.  Unfortunately, despite other successes, the Libyan War may prove to be an unwelcome milestone in the threat to airliners.        

 

Gaddafi’s missing MANPADS could pose a threat not only to civil aviation but also military aircraft.  In 2006, Israeli Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) played a crucial part in the Lebanon War, yet despite Hamas’ considerable preparation for the conflict and the resistance it offered to Israeli ground forces it failed to prevent UAVs having a ubiquitous presence over the battlefield.  Western nations pursued a similar omnipresence over Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan and have become used to operating UAVs where the greatest risk to drones is a mid-air collision.  If an irregular enemy had access to modern MANPADS that calculation would change and possibly disrupt UAV activity.  With their growing dependence on UAVs Western forces would be annoyed to find that their success in Libya produced an own-goal elsewhere.    

 

Similarly, Afghan insurgents have frequently targeted ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) helicopters but with rare success.  Often they are forced to use unguided Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) as anti-aircraft weapons.  The arrival of ex-Gaddafi MANPADS in Afghanistan would enhance the insurgent threat to helicopters and sour the sense of achievement felt by those ISAF member nations which fought in Libya.

 

Special efforts to find and recover lost missiles are extremely welcome and should be pursued with the utmost alacrity, not just through national initiatives but also by concerted international activity.

 

Intelligence sharing is one obvious area where parochial barriers must be overcome to assist the retrieval of these weapons.  The celebrations following Gaddafi’s demise will soon pass.  The danger from looted surface-to-air missiles will not.  Until these are dealt with he will cast an ominous shadow over the aviation community with airliners, UAVs and helicopters at particular risk.  Gaddafi’s MANPAD legacy may yet tarnish NATO’s success.

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9 novembre 2011 3 09 /11 /novembre /2011 19:15
ThalesRaytheonSystems to upgrade Nato missile defence

9 November 2011 airforce-technology.com

 

ThalesRaytheonSystems (TRS) has been awarded a contract by the Nato Air Command and Control System Management Agency to upgrade its Interim Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Capability.

 

Under the contract, the company will upgrade the operational hardware and software of the missile defence as per Nato's air command and control system (ACCS) configuration.

 

The contract is in support of Nato active layered theatre ballistic missile defence (ALTBMD) programme, which will form the basis of an interim territorial ballistic missile defence capability.

 

ALTBMD programme manager Alessandro Pera and ACCS programme director Bernard Garot said the upgrade will provide the Nato commander with a new critical capability to perform ballistic missile defence missions.

 

Work will be implemented in the Nato command and control network within the next six months.

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9 novembre 2011 3 09 /11 /novembre /2011 12:45

nato

 

 2011-11-08  xinhua

 

Le président des Etats-Unis et le chef de l'OTAN Anders Fogh Rasmussen se sont engagés lundi à prendre davantage de mesures pour renforcer les capacités de défense de l'alliance militaire afin de faire face aux menaces de sécurité du XXIe siècle.

 

Lors de leur rencontre à la Maison Blanche, les deux dirigeants ont identifié cet axe d'actions comme l'un des objectifs du sommet de l'OTAN qui se déroulera les 20 et 21 mai 2012 à Chicago.

 

"Ils ont convenu que le sommet de Chicago devrait s'efforcer d'élargir et d'approfondir les relations de l'OTAN avec d'autres pays partenaires non membres de l'OTAN", a aussi fait savoir la Maison Blanche.

 

MM. Obama et Rasmussen ont également discuté de l'opération militaire de l'OTAN en Libye, d'une durée de sept mois, qui a aidé l'opposition libyenne à renverser le régime de Mouammar Kadhafi et à prendre le contrôle du pays.

 

Par ailleurs, le président américain a examiné avec M. Rasmussen les "progrès importants" réalisés dans le cadre de la mission de l'OTAN en Afghanistan et la façon dont le sommet de Chicago pourrait définir la phase suivante, qui constituera une étape majeure de transition pour le pays.

 

Lors du sommet de Lisbonne en novembre 2010, les dirigeants de l'OTAN se sont fixés l'objectif d'amorcer la réduction de la présence militaire en Afghanistan en 2011 en vue d'un transfert complet du contrôle des missions de sécurité aux Afghans d'ici 2014.

 

Dans son discours télévisé du 22 juin, M. Obama a annoncé le retrait de 33 000 militaires américains d'Afghanistan d'ici l'été 2012 et envisagé le retrait des 70 000 soldats restants d'ici 2014.

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7 novembre 2011 1 07 /11 /novembre /2011 18:20

http://www.meretmarine.com/objets/500/30998.jpg

 

Un chasseur de mines lors d'une opération de "pétardage"

crédits : MARINE NATIONALE

 

07/11/2011 MER et MARINE

 

Le Standing Nato Mine Counter Measures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) a appareillé vendredi du port militaire de Cherbourg pour poursuivre son opération de guerre des mines au large de Dieppe. Le travail de cette force navale, débuté le 28 octobre, s'était interrompu le 2 novembre en raison de conditions météorologiques défavorables à la chasse aux mines, les bâtiments ne pouvant mettre en oeuvre leurs moyens au delà d'une mer de force 3. Durant la première phase, une mine allemande de plus de 2 mètres de long a été contreminée par le chasseur de mines français Croix du Sud, le 1er novembre.

 

En dehors de ce bâtiment, le SNMCMG1 est composé du navire de soutien Tasuja (Estonie), ainsi que des chasseurs de mines Maaloey (Norvège), Narcis (Belgique) et Flaming (Pologne).

 

Le 12 novembre 2011, le groupe fera escale à Boulogne-sur-Mer.

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7 novembre 2011 1 07 /11 /novembre /2011 17:35

http://www.asdnews.com/data_news/ID39352_600.jpg

 

Nov 7, 2011 ASDNews Source : General Dynamics Corporation (NYSE: GD)

 

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada - General Dynamics Canada recently completed the last in a series of on-time deliveries of updated computer systems for the 16 operator consoles aboard each NATO Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, as well as on two aircraft mission simulators. The AWACS Computer Upgrade Project was awarded to General Dynamics Canada by the NATO AWACS Programme Management Agency (NAPMA) in July 2009.

 

"The upgraded mission consoles make the NATO AWACS the most advanced aircraft of its kind in service today," said Mike McKinnon, Senior Program Manager for NATO Programs at General Dynamics Canada. "AWACS crews can now conduct their missions with unprecedented speed and effectiveness."

 

Designed and engineered specifically for the NATO AWACS aircraft and simulators, the upgraded operator consoles deliver a substantial improvement in computing features, capabilities and performance compared to the previous system. Among the improvements, the upgraded consoles deliver faster collection and collation of situational awareness and tactical information, enabling mission operators to more efficiently track and direct air and ground assets while maintaining vital connections with ground command centers.

 

General Dynamics Canada also supplies the Mission Data Recorders (MDR) and Mission LAN Systems (MLS) for the NATO AWACS fleet. The MDRs record, time-tag and store all mission data and audio communications that take place during a mission. The MLS is the central backbone of the fiber-optic local area network within the aircraft. It provides switching of all high-speed Ethernet data communications among the mission consoles, multi-sensor integration computers, the MDR and airborne mission computers.

 

NATO operates a fleet of 17 Boeing E-3A 'Sentry' AWACS aircraft from the NATO Air Base in Geilenkirchen, Germany. The NE-3A is a modified Boeing 707 equipped with long-range radar and passive sensors capable of detecting air and surface contacts over large distances.

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6 novembre 2011 7 06 /11 /novembre /2011 09:00

cyber warfare

 

05.11.2011 Romandie News

 

Dans sa lutte contre la cybercriminalité, la Suisse envisage de profiter du savoir-faire de l'OTAN. Un partenariat avec le Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) de l'organisation militaire est "une possibilité", selon le Département de la défense.

 

La porte-parole du Département de la défense, de la protection de la population et des sports (DDPS), Silvia Steidle, a confirmé samedi l'information parue dans la "Südostschweiz" et l'"Aargauer Zeitung". En collaborant avec la CCDCOE, les experts suisses auraient des informations et des connaissances supplémentaires.

 

L'OTAN a créé à Tallinn (Estonie) en 2008 la CCDCOE pour lutter contre la cybercriminalité. "Il y a déjà des contacts entre experts mais le groupe de travail Cyber Défense du DDPS n'a mené actuellement aucune discussion officielle", a ajouté Silvia Steidle.

 

Groupe de travail

 

Malgré des standards sécuritaires élevés, la Suisse entend se prémunir davantage contre le piratage. Le Conseil fédéral a créé en décembre 2010 un groupe de travail "Cyber Défense" pour affiner sa stratégie. Le gouvernement présentera au printemps 2012 sa vision dans ce domaine.

 

Une éventuelle collaboration avec l'OTAN ne constituera pas encore l'objet du rapport. Si la Suisse n'est pas membre de l'alliance militaire, elle collabore déjà avec elle depuis 1996 dans le cadre du "Partenariat pour la paix".

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28 octobre 2011 5 28 /10 /octobre /2011 18:10

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/var/dicod/storage/images/base-de-medias/images/ema/le-chef-d-etat-major/111028-cema-deplacement-de-l-amiral-guillaud-a-act/deplacement-de-l-amiral-guillaud-a-act/1433930-5-fre-FR/deplacement-de-l-amiral-guillaud-a-act.jpg

 

28/10/2011 Sources : EMA

 

Le 20 octobre 2011, l’amiral Edouard Guillaud, chef d’état-major des Armées (CEMA), s’est rendu au commandement allié de la transformation (ACT, Allied Command Transformation ).

 

Le CEMA s’est entretenu avec le général Stéphane Abrial, commandant suprême des forces alliées pour la transformation (SACT, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation ) pour évoquer les dernières avancées en matière de cyberdéfense et de défense antimissile.

 

Il a poursuivi sa visite en saluant la contribution du personnel des services français, militaires et civils, au quartier général de l’ACT et le bénéfice partagé à la fois par l’OTAN et la France dans cette coopération.

 

La France a été l’un des 24 pays à signer l’accord de collaboration formalisée entre l’ACT et les services de transformation des nations lors de la table ronde des responsables de la transformation en décembre 2010.

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28 octobre 2011 5 28 /10 /octobre /2011 07:30

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2007-06/11/xinsrc_34206041110060152634014.jpg

source news.xinhuanet.com

 

October 27, 2011 defpro.com

 

MANTA is ready to be implemented onboard aircrafts, as proved through the tests conducted by the Alliance in France

 

Madrid | The MANTA system, a solution developed by Indra to protect aircraft from surface-to-air missile attacks, was tested by NATO with positive results. The system passed the tests during the recent EMBOW trials, which consist of exercises conducted by the Atlantic Alliance, an entity that has studied threats to air platforms and countermeasure technologies for over 30 years.

 

Trial EMBOW XIII has been conducted, from September 19th to October 14th 2011 in DGA Missiles Testing centre at Biscarrosse (France), and has been managed by France (Direction Generale de l'Armement)

 

The solution successfully passed the tests and proved its technology maturity and readiness to be implemented onboard aircrafts. The system achieved Technology Readiness Level 8, which certifies it is prepared to enter service and countermeasure MANPAD threats, that is, infrared missile launchers.

 

In order to ensure a successful participation of the MANTA DIRCM system at EMBOW, DGA and Indra have been working together in an effectiveness test program, conducted at DGA facilities, from May to September 2011. This program has exhaustively validated the MANTA DIRCM system with more than 130 tests and 20 flight hours, which imply a total of around 500 DIRCM protection trials (as every test includes several different MANPADS operating simultaneously).

 

MANTA DIRCM system has been integrated and certified cleared for flight in a DGA C-212 aircraft to perform the flight tests.

 

This important milestone is the culmination of a long technology development effort, in which Indra has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Defence and INTA (Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial).

 

A SHIELD AGAINST MISSILES

 

MANTA DIRCM is an aircraft self-protection system against IR guided missiles, mainly from the MANPADS family. Its operational sequence starts when an incoming missile is detected, and finishes when the missile is deviated by the DIRCM laser. The whole countermeasure process is completed in a very short time, being MANTA DIRCM system able to respond to the attack of simultaneous missiles due to the fact that it emits a jamming sequence that is effective against different missile seekers without requiring a prior identification. MANTA is the result of the collaboration between Indra and Rosoboronoexport.

 

MANPADS are guided Surface-to-Air Missiles, targeted at the infrared signature of the aircraft and easily operable (portable by one man). These artifacts are the main reason for military aircraft losses in conflict zones. MANPADS are a serious concern due to their enormous proliferation in hands of terrorist groups.

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26 octobre 2011 3 26 /10 /octobre /2011 11:30

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0f/Flag_of_Georgia.svg/800px-Flag_of_Georgia.svg.png

 

October 25, 2011 defpro.com

 

MOSCOW | NATO is still prepared to grant membership to Georgia and Ukraine on condition that they implement reforms, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai said on Tuesday, according to RIA Novosti.

 

Georgia has been negotiating NATO membership since 2006, when it signed the Intensified Dialogue on Membership Issues.

 

In April 2008 at the Bucharest NATO summit, Georgia and Ukraine were given a green light for NATO accession on condition that they carry out military and political reforms.

 

“Georgian government has been working hard to secure membership in NATO in accordance with the Bucharest agreements,” Appathurai said during the press conference in Moscow. “In Georgia's case, reforms and compliance with NATO standards are required, including practical and political measures.”

 

However, he said Georgia is unlikely to be included in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) that is due to be announced at the upcoming alliance's summit in Chicago in 2012.

 

The MAP, which was launched in April 1999 at the Alliance’s Washington Summit, is aimed to help countries aspiring to NATO membership in their preparations. (RIA Novosti)

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26 octobre 2011 3 26 /10 /octobre /2011 07:00

nato

 

October 25, 2011 defpro.com

 

MOSCOW | NATO may not end its mission in Libya as early as planned, CNN quoted U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying on Tuesday, according to RIA Novosti.

 

Last week, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the alliance was planning to wind down its operation in Libya by October 31. The preliminary decision was approved during a NATO council meeting on Friday, with the formal statement expected to be made this week.

 

But Panetta told journalists during his visit to Japan on Tuesday that Libya’s ruling National Transitional Council wanted NATO to extend its mission.

 

"I noticed today that there were comments from some of the Libya leadership asking that NATO continue its mission during this interim as they are trying to establish some of their governance," CNN quoted the U.S. minister as saying.

 

The decision is up to NATO, he said, adding that the United States is looking at its long-term relations with Libya's military.

 

Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said last week Russia was introducing a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for an end to the no-fly zone over Libya. Moscow hopes that the resolution will be passed "in the next few days," he said.

 

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 introducing a no-fly zone over Libya in March, a month after an uprising against Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s authoritarian rule broke out in the North African country. The resolution also authorized "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians from attacks by pro-Gaddafi troops.

 

The U.S.-led military operation in Libya began on March 19. NATO took over control of the operation on March 31. (RIA Novosti)

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26 octobre 2011 3 26 /10 /octobre /2011 05:50

nato

 

MOSCOU, 26 octobre (Xinhua)

 

Un officiel de l'OTAN a déclaré mardi que le système conjoint anti-missile proposé par la Russie était impossible, mais que Moscou devrait connecter son système de défense anti-missile à celui de l'alliance occidentale.

 

L'OTAN a rejeté la proposition russe car elle ne peut sous-traiter sa sécurité à des pays tiers, a expliqué James Appathurai, représentant spécial du secrétaire général de l'OTAN dans le Caucase et l'Asie centrale, dans une interview accordée à l'agence de presse Interfax.

 

Moscou s'oppose au déploiement des installations de défense anti-missile de l'OTAN près de ses frontières, déclarant que cela représenterait une menace pour sa sécurité et bouleverserait l'équilibre stratégique des forces en Europe.

 

La Russie a également cherché pendant longtemps à obtenir une garantie juridique de la part de Washington et de l'OTAN comme quoi son système de défense anti-missile ne visait pas la Russie.

 

Mais M. Appathurai a déclaré que si la Russie connectait son système de défense anti-missile à celui de l'OTAN, Moscou obtiendrait "une garantie finale de 100%".

 

Selon lui, le système de l'OTAN dirigé par les Etats-Unis ne peut représenter une menace pour les missiles stratégiques russes pour des raisons évidemment techniques.

 

"Nous avons été clairs sur ce point: il (le système de défense anti-missile) n'a pas les capacités techniques pour bouleverser la capacité russe à contrer une frappe nucléaire", a souligné M. Appathurai.

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25 octobre 2011 2 25 /10 /octobre /2011 18:20

http://defencesummits.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/french-air-force-reuters-640x480.jpg

 

Source: Reuters

 

10/25/2011  Richard de Silva - defenceiq.com

 

This past summer, Defence IQ spoke with Lieutenant General Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger, the Deputy Commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command Ramstein, who joined us on the line direct from Ramstein Airbase in Germany.  For some background, Lt Gen Ploeger has a long and coloured history within airpower dating back to his enlistment in the German Air Force in 1967 up to his current position in this senior leadership role.  Throughout his career, which has seen him take up numerous command and staff assignments, he’s been awarded the Silver and Gold Cross of Honour of the Bundeswehr, the Order of Merit on the Ribbon of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Black Eagle Order Third Class of the Republic of Estonia…

 

Defence IQ     A very good afternoon General, it’s a pleasure to have you with us today.

 

FWP      Yes.

 

DIQ      I trust you’re well?

 

FWP      Pretty well, accustomed to the European Time Zone again after a lengthy stay in the US for very important cause at Maxwell Air Force Base and then ten days of I think at least some leave!

 

DIQ      Excellent, well we’re glad to have you back on this side of the Atlantic.  For now, thank you very much for making some time for us.  I think for those who perhaps need clarification, could you just start by telling us how important a role does the Alliance play in both European defence and in global defence?

 

FWP      Yes.  The answer is quite obvious.  When we look at the new strategic concept we see that the Alliance is and remains the cornerstone of defence for its member nations and the importance of Article V has been highlighted again.  The Alliance started as an alliance of necessity during the Cold War period when we faced a common Russian threat but it changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain to an alliance of choice.  But we again see a change in the Alliance as an alliance of necessity because of the changed financial environment we are moving into and I will come to that field again when I look at Alliance air power and sea power. 

 

When you look at the history of the Alliance, NATO has always been a sea and air power Alliance and these are of course very expensive and critical capabilities that require a lot of financial investment and when we look at the current situation, due to the high costs of state of the art technology, the Alliance, especially in the area of air and sea power, will continue to be an alliance of necessity because otherwise we will not be able to achieve the required capabilities to cope with the current and future challenges in front of us.

 

DIQ      Well looking at these current and future challenge, being that much of the air power focus has been towards irregular warfare of late, what developments have been made in recent years in the way air support actually provides reliable ISR, specifically for counterinsurgency operations.

 

FWP      I think ISR is that field where we see the most dramatic developments, especially technologically both in process and in experience.  The most obvious signs of this are through the introduction of new assets with vastly improved capability, whether that’s through better product, that is vastly improved sensors, better loiter time, extended loiter time through those unmanned systems like Global Hawk and Predator or survivability by the introduction of stealth capabilities.  While overall processes continue to develop, particularly through experience gained in recent and ongoing operations, when we look at Afghanistan and Libya, our ability to exploit this capability has developed in parallel with the technological changes giving us a truly networked capability to exploit in real time.  Traditional ISR is the primary role of unmanned area systems, but full motion video capability makes it more than competent in filling, especially for a time sensitive targeting or coined missions, and furthermore changed detection software allows an effective use in any coined scenarios, especially when we look at the threat posed to our forces in Afghanistan by IEDs.

 

DIQ      Okay, what about the use of electronic warfare with modern airborne operations? I think it’s known that the ISAF mission has recognised a lack of EW assets to meet the necessary requirements – that’s on public record – but do you think the reaction to this should simply be a drive to increase EW assets or are there alternative options open in insuring that we have that required capability?

 

FWP      I think we should be aware of the fact that we will always have a demand for additional assets.  So the demand for electronic warfare assets will always outstrip our ability to provide them and looking at the financial situation we are in, there is at the moment no light at the end of the tunnel that we would be able to procure more specialised electronic warfare systems.  So we need to look for alternative options and there is one option that looks into the area of increased availability of electronic warfare assets.  Because they are getting a bit older we need to look at ways how to make them more available for our operation, we need to look at the way we use those assets, whether we do it really effectively enough or whether there are ways we improve them. And we need to look at a more balanced and effective mix of the systems, that is airborne systems as well as ground systems that are helping our forces in Afghanistan to cope, especially with the IED [threat] and with the threat by the Afghan Taliban forces.  So a mix of those measures should help us to overcome that problem.  In the end, there is also the way to acquire additional capabilities in the Alliance through cost sharing and common procurement but that is still an area that needs to be debated in Brussels in the political fields.

 

 

DIQ      Just curious…does the deficit in the use of EW stem at all from a concern over inadvertently disrupting civilian systems?  I mean is it just that there’s a need to be as cautious as possible?  Is that holding us back at all in terms of either acquiring the technology or knowing when best to use it?

 

FWP      No, definitely not.  It needs to be well coordinated with all parties involved in such an operation, but of course we also need to maintain operation security, so there are various fields that need to be observed and the necessity not to overly disrupt civilian communication systems does not really impact on our mission.  I think we can cope with the situation.

 

DIQ      Yes, good to know.  Just going back to your mentioning earlier of Libya, the operation there is of course primarily an Allied air mission, can I ask what have been the key lessons learned to date on dealing with an adversarial air and ground force from the perspective of the Alliance and are there any gaps that you can point to, either technological or tactical, that have been identified in the needs of the Allied forces?
[eventodf]

 

FWP      When we look at the Libyan operation, the air mission of course is in focus also and especially in the media.  We should, I think however, not forget that the operation Unified Protector as it is called in NATO is an operation that also encompasses embargo operations performed by our fellow comrades at sea.  When I look at the threat posed by Libyan air forces I can state that they do not pose a real challenge because air superiority and air dominance was quickly achieved already during Operation Odyssey Dawn that proceeded Operation Unified Protector when we started to implement the no-fly zone, thus the Libyan Air Force is no longer a factor of ours.  The Libyan ground forces have demonstrated the capability to quickly adapt in tactics.  For instance they are copying opposition tactics thus making NATO’s air-to-ground operations to protect civilians from attack by Gaddafi forces very demanding and very complex.  Operation Unified Protector [brought to light] the importance of the enablers, that is especially to add to our refuelling, ISR, unmanned area systems and last but not least, low CDE weapons, weapons with a very low collateral damage factor.  The contribution of the US Air Force in those fields for mission success is essential and is vital because the European NATO nations alone do not possess enough capabilities.

 

Another lesson learned from Libya operations was that air operations of that type require a robust Air-Sea II organisation that could only be built up in the Libyan case by heavy augmentation from throughout the NATO command structure, thus highlighting the need to adjust personnel feelings for Air-Sea II in our new NATO command structure that was agreed upon by our defence ministers – thank God – in their footprint decision in early June. So an earlier, let’s say ‘lack of personnel’ was properly corrected when our defence ministers decided on the footprint of the NATO command structure in early June, this was already I think the most important lesson identified and then learned and corrected by the Alliance.

 

DIQ      Are there any particular examples that you could possibly give us in terms of the Libyan forces adopting ground tactics from others in order to make the lives of your officers in the air a lot more difficult?

 

FWP      Yes, it is quite obvious when they learned that whenever they used their normal tanks, their normal weapon systems, which the Libyan Gaddafi forces used for attack against Libyan civilians, they were constantly under attack.  They quickly changed by applying opposition forces tactics, that is, that they also used pick-up trucks and mounted their howitzers and mortars on those, and rather than running around in uniform, they started running around in civilian clothes, et cetera, et cetera, thus making life for us really difficult.

 

DIQ      Okay, we’ll look at that in a moment, but I just wanted to pick up on this topic of air superiority first and I think it’s perhaps a given to say that UAVs are still being seen by most as the future of this domain.  But can you tell us what the inherent challenges are in actually rolling out an increased unmanned capability and how is this likely to shape the future of the Alliance?

 

FWP      Let me start with some principles.  The basic elements of air power still remain the same and they are the key to air power superiority.  These are the characteristics: speed, range, flexibility, and with the UAVs now we add a new dimension to those basic three characteristics, and that is persistence – beyond the physical limits of an air crew – so that should be kept in mind.  That’s the typical areas for unmanned systems are the so-called Dirty, Dull and Dangerous missions, provided that that is at the moment an area that needs to be kept in mind, provided that they are operating in an uncontested environment.  Thus, especially when you look at persistence capability of unmanned systems, the concentration on ISR in developing UAV capabilities revolutionised this field, and it will continue to influence the development of tactics, techniques and procedures in the Alliance.

 

The increased use of unmanned systems of course has impacted on our Air-Sea II processes and especially the training of personnel to start with the simple operation of the UAVs, that is the pilot or the ground crew and the maintenance crew, to employ the UAVs in their operations to exploit the capabilities of the UAVs to their limits and finally to do command and control of UAVs in air operations.  The key tasks however will still be the domain of manned systems that is gaining and maintaining air superiority, especially in contested environments.

 

DIQ      And of course UAVs hosting electronic warfare systems are at present primarily being used to disrupt communications as you said, is this likely to mature soon to a more focused attempt to disrupt weapons or IEDs or those types of ordinance?  In other words, how long before you see UAVs contributing more than the relatively modest role that they seem to be playing at this time?

 

FWP      I think the main driver will be the demand and the requirement coming from ongoing operations and when ongoing operations continue to require development in these fields there will be more specialisation.  When you look at the development in the Israeli Air Force, they also developed their capabilities following the requirement coming from their operations to deal with insurgents, to deal with certain threats and thus they developed their unmanned systems capability to a very tremendous capable air force.

 

DIQ      So I suppose it has to be, from what you’re saying, an organic process.  We won’t know until we know.  I am also curious, in going by the recently publicised accounts of successful air operations, such as with Prowlers apparently being used in the elimination of key Al Qaeda targets, the ongoing air operations in Libya as we’ve been discussing, or the effectiveness of airborne COIN in Afghanistan specifically, does this all suggests the need for a rethink by those defence ministries who are scaling back their air forces as to whether that really is appropriate – and is it possible for us to see these types of achievements that we’re witness to today with less varied air capability in terms of, for example, a single platform like the Joint Strike Fighter or indeed a predominantly unmanned fleet?

 

FWP      This is indeed a very interesting question and the answer is not easy.  I think most of our defence ministers are fully aware of the needs, but they need to find the middle way between what is required by the mission they give to their defence forces and what is financially available and then there is the second argument that scaling back in numbers does not necessarily mean that it is also a scale back in capability.  The capabilities when you look at the new weapons systems are today far more superior than those capabilities that we used during the Kosovo air campaign for instance just over a decade ago in terms for instance of targets destroyed per mission.  When you look at those times, eleven years ago in March ‘99, we were able as a rule to attack one target with one aircraft.  Now with more modern aircraft and more modern air to ground weapons we can attack several targets with one sortie, with one mission, so this multiplies the capability of forces.

 

With regard to new platforms such as the Joint Strike Fighter, they bring enormous capability to our inventory, not least of which is through their ability to network and that is complimented by the versatility of their enhanced technology.  An unmanned fleet is not, and I repeat what I said before, is not a stand alone item but complimentary to the very capable platforms we currently have and will acquire in the future with for instance the joint strike fighter and our challenge will be to use these new assets as effectively as we can and again this may require the Alliance look at its members, member states, specialising for instance in particular roles and capabilities and probably working to new areas of role and responsibility sharing.

 

DIQ      It’s good to have an authoritative voice on that subject.  Just to retread very quickly on an issue you raised earlier with ground forces reportedly exploiting civilian populations and the difficulty that air forces have in perhaps identifying combat adversaries …given the intensity with which civilian casualties are again reported in the press and the huge impact that this can sometimes have on missions overall, particularly when adversaries may seek to exploit these incidents to build up public pressure, is a more focused effort needed do you think to enhance combat identification and situation awareness in general, and how are strikes coordinated from the ground to actually minimise these risks?

 

FWP      You can believe me – and this is a true, honest answer – that especially civilian casualties is an area of greatest concern for us, for the air forces, especially when we look at our Afghanistan mission.  Because this field has a huge impact on public opinion and how NATO forces are in total seen in Afghanistan and thus we try and do our best to reduce any collateral damage during incidents and enhance our ability to distinguish between friend and foe.  Although this is a highly challenging task we can for instance point to the Libya operation where we achieved the best success rate ever …and the occasional weapon that was going astray because there was a technological problem was quickly identified by us and we came forward with the announcement that this was a weapon going astray due to a technical failure, so that Gaddafi was not able to really exploit this mishap.

 

DIQ      Right.

 

FWP      On the other hand we try to perfect really – we can not say ‘to enhance’ – we try to perfect our processes to 100% non-failure process so that any weapon that is delivered to a target is under full control, both by the air crew as well as by the ground crew and to achieve this goal we invest a lot in intensive training for especially our forward air controllers and technical air control parties on the ground in Afghanistan to make sure that no unintended collateral damage is really achieved so that there is the risk of civilian casualties reduced to zero if possible and the achievement over the last one and a half years was really immense, immense and we are now, when you look at the bare figures, only responsible for a very, very small fraction of the number of civilian casualties we see in Afghanistan.

However, there is still this challenge and we have to cope with any situation where a ‘civ/cas’, civilian casualty, even occurred and we will investigate every event to learn from these events and to exclude any mistakes in the future.

 

DIQ      Is there one thing that you would put that success down to?

 

FWP      I think the most important element is our enhanced training of the ground crews, the forward air controllers and of course the enhanced distribution and availability of equipment, modern equipment available to the forward air controller crews like rover equipment so that both the air crew and the controllers on the ground have the same picture.

 

DIQ      Outstanding.  Well it does make sense for it to be a priority and we’re delighted to hear that it’s having such great progress in such a short time.  Lieutenant General Ploeger we do have to end there for now, but may I say it’s been a privilege sir to hear your thoughts on these issues.  Thank you very much indeed for your time and I wish you all the best of luck to you and all of those serving at the Alliance.  Thank you.

 

FWP      Yes, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you and to answer your questions.

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25 octobre 2011 2 25 /10 /octobre /2011 17:50

http://rt.com/files/politics/nato-russia-us-moscow-russia-671/high-pacific-missile-defense.n.jpg

 

This handout image courtesy of the US Missile Defense Agency shows a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) being launched at the Pacific Missile Range Facility off the island of Kauai in Hawaii (AFP Photo / HO /US Missile Defense Agency)

 

25 October, 2011, Robert Bridge, RT.com

 

NATO officials say they are willing to “cooperate” with Russia in the US missile defense system for Europe, while balking on the possibility of building a single system.

 

The US missile defense shield slated for Europe “does not pose any threats to Russia's defense capabilities,” James Appathurai, NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General told his Russian hosts at a press conference in Moscow.

 

The NATO official went on to say that the shield lacks the technical capabilities to disrupt Russia's potential to fend off a nuclear strike.

 

As for providing written "legal guarantees" that the system would not be aimed at Russia, Appathurai balked, saying they were not needed.

 

The “ultimate guarantee”  for Russia is to connect its system to NATO's, he said. As for specifics, the NATO official only offered vague suggestions, like providing “data exchanges and coordination” between the two systems.

 

Needless to say, the proposal did not sit well with Russia's Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin.

 

"If Mr. Appathurai is really certain that technically the US missile defense cannot create impediments for Russian strategic nuclear forces, then what is the reason for the US refusal to put these guarantees on paper," he asked.

 

At least providing legal guarantees is the only way to convince the parties of the seriousness of their intentions, Rogozin added.

 

Moscow has said in the past that anything short of full cooperation in the developmental and operational stages of the system will be unacceptable. More than that, failure to come to terms could be the spark that ignites the next arms race.

 

"In the coming decade we face the following alternatives,” Russian President Dmitry Medvedev warned. “Either we reach agreement on missile defense and create a full-fledged joint mechanism of cooperation, or … a new round of the arms race will begin.”

 

It is clear that this scenario would be very grave, Medvedev added.

 

Thus far, however, few people in Europe – the very people who will be caught in the middle of any hypothetical arms race – seem to understand how serious Russia is about this system, and the threat it potentially poses to its national security.

 

The NATO official, certainly aware of Moscow’s growing frustration with the stalled negotiation process, expressed hope that NATO and Russia would continue to cooperate if Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is elected president next year. Given the dubious level of cooperation thus far between the two sides, however, Appathurai may be in for a bitter surprise.

 

After all, it was Putin in Feb. 2007 who lectured NATO in general and the United States in particular over the “almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.”

 

“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe,” Putin told fellow delegates at the Munich Security Meeting. “On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”

 

Thus, it remains to be seen how NATO and Russia will continue their relations in the increasingly likely event of Putin being elected president next year.

 

Appathurai said the formation of a single system – which apparently is not the same thing as "data exchanges and coordination" – is impossible since "NATO cannot entrust its security to third parties."

 

NATO cannot go beyond these limits or cooperate with other partners, however strongly they may be trusted, he said, adding that the western military bloc has already made “serious concessions” to Russia.

 

Appathurai succeeded in raising eyebrows even further with his announcement that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO if they decide to implement the reforms which are in line with NATO standards.

 

Exactly what those “standards” may be, especially given NATO’s track record of late, was not specified.

 

In light of Russia’s experience with its less-than-predictable neighbors, Appathurai’s comments will not be well received. On August 7, 2008, for example, Georgia launched a major military offensive against Russian peacekeepers and civilians in Tskhinval, the capital of South Ossetia, thus sparking a 5-day war that culminated in a ceasefire agreement five days later.

 

How Russia will respond to a hostile government being granted membership in an increasingly active military bloc is anybody's guess.

 

Meanwhile, Ukraine, which has a lengthy lease agreement with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, has been prone to severe political seizures, most recently with the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, the former Ukrainian prime minister who was found guilty of abuse of office and sentenced to seven years.

 

Speaking on the situation in Libya, which just witnessed the death of former leader Muammar Gaddafi after he had been taken prisoner, the NATO Security General assured that the new Libyan authorities will not create an extremist Islamic state.

 

The Libyan transition authorities have reassured us and the global community that the political process will proceed in strict accordance with the international law and human rights, he told the press conference at Interfax offices in Moscow.

 

Meanwhile, NATO is not imposing “development paths” on any country, he added.

 

Each country has the right to “democratically create its political system, its own laws, its own cultural values, and we respect that right,” he said. The “generally accepted principles of human rights” are very important for us, and we constantly remind our friends, in particular, Libya, about the need to respect them, Apparthurai said.

 

Russia has expressed its concerns with the NATO military operation in Libya, which had been limited to the task of “protecting civilians,” saying that the military bloc exceeded its mandate,” basically siding with the anti-government forces.

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25 octobre 2011 2 25 /10 /octobre /2011 12:40

nato

 

October 25, 2011 defpro.com

 

NC3A Brussels and The Hague | At a conference in Heidelberg, Germany, 19-20 October, senior officials from the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) briefed transatlantic industry leaders on upcoming business opportunities for capabilities that underpin NATO’s new strategic concept.

 

The upcoming contract opportunities, amounting to some 1.47 billion Euro in multi-year projects to be launched over the next two years, include investments in satellite communications, cyber and missile defence, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. They are focused on enabling the Alliance to counter modern security threats, further the transition strategy in Afghanistan, and undertake missions where and when necessary.

 

“This is very tangible proof of the Alliance’s commitment to the vision laid out in the new Strategic Concept – modern defence that is able to counter complex security challenges,” said Georges D’hollander, NC3A General Manager, “Under Secretary General Rasmussen, NATO is pursuing greater efficiency and effectiveness, cutting costs, consolidating its Agencies and reforming its structures, but also investing in state of the art capabilities to protect 900 million citizens from both traditional and modern security threats.”

 

Some of the projects announced include:

 

• Secure communications to support the training of military police in Afghanistan, as part of the overall transition strategy;

• Advanced communications to support the ISAF mission as NATO transitions to Afghan lead for security operations;

• Cyber and missile defence;

• State of the art satellite communications that will allow the Alliance to mount complex operations where and when necessary;

• Maritime information systems to support counter-piracy and other operations;

• Systems that allow NATO Nations, decision-makers and commanders to rapidly share information, assess and respond to threats.

 

Most of the projects are scheduled to begin in late 2011 and 2012.

 

Over 400 senior representatives from companies from Europe and North America attended the event, the fifth such Industry conference organized by the NC3A. This year’s conference was organized in partnership with AFCEA Europe’s flagship ‘Technet’ event.

 

“Our partnership with AFCEA emphasizes the need for broad cooperation, including with Industry, research and academia, in order to effectively and efficiently tackle today’s security challenges,” said Mr. Kevin J. Scheid, NC3A Deputy General Manager and Director of Acquisition.

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23 octobre 2011 7 23 /10 /octobre /2011 12:05

http://www.trdefence.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/the-associated-press-2011-10-21_l.jpg

 

in this Thursday, Sept. 8, 2011 file photo, a portrait depicting Libya's former ruler Moammar Gadhafi is riddled with bullet marks and vandalized with paint on a wall in Tripoli. AP photo

 

October 21, 2011 TRDEFENCE - The Associated Press

 

NATO’s top commander said today he will recommend the end of the alliance’s seven-month mission in Libya. Adm. Jim Stavridis made the announcement on his Facebook page ahead of a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s governing body.

 

In this Thursday, Sept. 8, 2011 file photo, a portrait depicting Libya's former ruler Moammar Gadhafi is riddled with bullet marks and vandalized with paint on a wall in Tripoli. AP photo

 

The council, which comprises envoys from all 28 member countries, is deciding on when and how to end its bombing campaign in Libya a day after Moammar Gadhafi’s death.

 

“As [supreme allied commander] I will be recommending the conclusion of this mission to the NAC in a few hours,” Stavridis wrote. “A good day for NATO, a great day for the people of Libya.”

 

The council’s decision will depend on his recommendation, but will also take into account the wishes of Libya’s new government and of the United Nations, under whose mandate NATO carried out its operations.

 

NATO earlier said its commanders were not aware that Gadhafi was in a convoy that NATO bombed as it fled Sirte. In a statement Friday, the alliance said an initial Thursday morning strike was aimed at a convoy of approximately 75 armed vehicles leaving Sirte, the Libyan city defended by Gadhafi loyalists.

 

One vehicle was destroyed, which resulted in the convoy’s dispersal. Another jet then engaged approximately 20 vehicles that were driving at great speed toward the south, destroying or damaging about 10 of them.

 

“We later learned from open sources and allied intelligence that Gadhafi was in the convoy and that the strike likely contributed to his capture,” the statement said.

 

After Libya’s former rebels killed Gadhafi on Thursday, officials said they expected the aerial operation to end very soon. But the North Atlantic Council may also decide to keep air patrols flying for several more days until the security situation on the ground stabilizes. The success of the military operation has helped reinvigorate the Cold War alliance and polished the reputation of France and Britain, the two countries that drove it forward. Analysts attributed its success to the fact that NATO remained steadfast over the summer during a long and grinding stalemate against Gadhafi loyalists and avoided the temptation to send ground troops into Libya.

 

NATO’s Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen says the end of the campaign “has now moved much closer.” He has also hailed the success of the mission, saying that it demonstrated that the alliance continues to play an “indispensable” role in confronting current and future security challenges. NATO warplanes have flown about 26,000 sorties, including over 9,600 strike missions.

 

They destroyed Libya’s air defenses and over 1,000 tanks, vehicles and guns, as well as Gadhafi’s command and control networks. The daily airstrikes finally broke the stalemate that developed after Gadhafi’s initial attempts failed to crush the rebellion that broke out in February.

 

In August, the rebels began advancing on Tripoli, with the NATO warplanes providing close air support and destroying any attempts by the defenders to block them. French President Nicolas Sarkozy said Friday that “the operation has reached its end.” But how to draw down the campaign will be decided “with our allies and also with input from the (interim government).” But in London, Britain suggested that NATO may not immediately complete its mission in Libya, wary over the potential reprisal attacks by remaining Gadhafi loyalists.

 

“NATO will now meet to decide when the mission is complete, and once we are satisfied that there is no further threat to the Libyan civilians and the Libyans are content, NATO will then arrange to wind up the operation,” British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond told BBC radio. Sarkozy, British Prime Minister David Cameron and President Barack Obama discussed the NATO campaign in a video conference late Thursday.

 

“They discussed the need to maintain the NATO-led operation while a threat remained to civilian life,” a spokeswoman for Cameron’s office said, on customary condition of anonymity.

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