April 24, 2013 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: US Department of Defense; issued April 23, 2013)

Pentagon Contract Announcement

General Dynamic Land Systems Inc., Sterling Heights, Mich., was awarded a modification (No. P00019) to a previously awarded fixed-price-incentive contract (W56HZV-11-C-C002) with a maximum value of $180,399,976 to extend the ground combat vehicle technology development phase by six months.

Fiscal 2013 Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation, Army contract funds are being obligated on this award.

The Army Contracting Command, Warren, Mich., is the contracting activity.

BAE Systems Land and Armaments LP., Sterling Heights, Mich., was awarded a modification (No. P00019) to a previously awarded fixed-price-incentive contract (W56HZV-11-C-C001), with a maximum value of $159,481,403 to extend the ground combat vehicle technology development phase by six months.

Fiscal 2013 Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation, Army contract funds are being obligated on this award.

The Army Contracting Command, Warren, Mich., is the contracting activity

April 16, 2013 defense-aerospace.com

(Source: US Army Research Laboratory; issued April 16, 2013)

Army Researchers Improve Vehicle Design with Blast Tests

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, Md. --- With the growing threat of improvised explosive devices over the past decade, Army researchers have been hard at work testing and evaluating ways to keep Soldiers safe from bomb blasts.

The U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command analyzes under-body blasts, known as UBB.

Researchers at the Army Research Laboratory Survivability and Lethality Analysis Directorate have led to many improvements in vehicle design.

"Through live-fire tests, we have been able to provide a comprehensive characterization of the blast environment and occupant injuries during a UBB," said Sarah Coard, Army researcher. "Only by understanding the mechanism of injury can we apply engineering changes [to vehicles] to decrease the likelihood of those injuries. The blast environment is unique."

The Army's concern is always the same: how can a vehicle be modified to reduce the likelihood and severity of injuries to Soldiers?

"The test and evaluation community is working to a standard that 10 years ago would have been unimaginable," said Scott Welling, a member of SLAD's Engineering Analysis Branch. "The number of data channels that are used today in a test event is greater than five times the amount used prior to these conflicts."

Army experts are leveraging an ever-growing wealth of test data.

The Army's approach to live-fire testing, leverages mechanical engineering experts in the Engineering Analysis Branch and the crew-injury-physiology experts in the Warfighter Survivability Branch. Welling and Coard are partners as RDECOM's representatives on the integrated product team for live-fire testing. This ensures a comprehensive analysis of the survivability of both the crew and their vehicle.

"Another use for the data may be surprising," Coard said. "Improving the test instrumentation itself and refining and enhancing the test scenarios. One such instrument is the anthropomorphic test device, a crash-test dummy originally developed by the automotive industry. For UBB testing, it has become obvious that the ATD must be modified if it is to provide the most accurate data. So ARL is now leading an experimentation program to enhance the ATD for use in future tests."

Not only is instrumentation improving, but test designs have also become more sophisticated. In the past, a vehicle would often be tested with one crash-test dummy in it. Now, it is required that there be a crash-test dummy in every occupant location in a vehicle.

Officials said another significant change is the adoption of new and current injury criteria in order to make assessments more accurate and to achieve greater resolution in inferring what injuries would result and how. A further way that test design has evolved is by the introduction of new methodologies to analyze the motion of seats and floors.

The current war-time environment has caused testing specifications to grow and timelines to shrink. The Army has been responding to urgent materiel releases.

The Army is looking at the structural response of the vehicle and the survivability of its occupants.

For every vehicle or piece of equipment tested, researchers analyze the blast's effect on communications, mobility, firepower and mission success.

Because analysis demands so much more than merely capturing data, a holistic vantage point is vital, officials said. The testing enables researchers to provide this context to evaluators, program managers and vehicle designers.

Mar. 31, 2013 - By PAUL McLEARY – Defense News

Simulated N. Korea Conflict Shows Need for Mobile Firepower, Vessels

WASHINGTON — A recent U.S. Army war game against a North Korea-like failed nuclear state with powerful ground forces has exposed some materiel capability gaps that deeply worry Army planners, service leaders said.

After more than a decade of being able to use Kuwait as a staging area for Iraq and Afghanistan, officers worried that the ability to move into more remote areas without a nearby staging area has atrophied. Even more worrying is meeting the “anti-access/area denial” challenge presented by foes with missile and rocket standoff capabilities that would make any attempted forced entry a bloody affair.

The answer, officers say, lies in a variety of solutions, from light airborne forces to mobile firepower to upgraded watercraft.

The officers had taken part in the Army’s latest Unified Quest war game, and went over some of the game’s lessons with reporters during a daylong seminar March 19 at National Defense University in Washington.

“We saw the brittleness of our ability to defeat projected [year] 2020 anti-access/ area-denial challenges of potential adversaries during the game as units became isolated and some withdrew,” Col. Kevin Felix, Future Warfare Division chief at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), said during a roundtable discussion. While U.S. forces were able to gain a foothold in the contested territory, “there were problems with the buildup of follow-on forces and sustainment.”

Felix added that in the war game, “we found ways to create access” by air-dropping Stryker eight-wheeled vehicles and using the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey aircraft to get small units in quickly. But moving so quickly with such limited numbers meant those units were often quickly surrounded by larger enemy forces.

TRADOC is known to be working on a joint-entry operations concept that would use Army airborne forces to counter an enemy’s potential area-denial tactics.

Speaking at a conference in February, Col. Rocky Kmiecik, the Mounted Requirements Division director at the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence, said the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C., is helping develop the concept by looking at “mobile protected firepower for light airborne infantry.”

The idea is that since the Army divested its light Sheridan tanks, “airborne forces have a capability gap of mobile protected firepower,” he explained. One of the solutions the Army is considering is the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS), which is armed with a 105mm cannon.

Kmiecik warned that the Army is still developing its thinking on the subject, and that “we don’t know whether or not the MGS can meet what the light forces need.”

The concern over light mobile firepower was echoed by Lt. Gen. Keith Walker, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, at a breakfast meeting on March 20.

“Our force is heavy,” he said. “I’m not saying we have too many tanks and Bradleys [armored vehicles], but how do you get to the fight when you need to have the ability to do strategic maneuvering?”

The Army is still “probably a couple of Nobel Prizes away” from being able to field lighter vehicles that have the protection and firepower that leaders see as essential on future battlefields, he cautioned.

At National Defense University, Maj. Gen. Bill Hix, TRADOC’s director of Concepts Development & Learning Directorate, said that while there have been tests in air-dropping the Stryker, the problem remains, “how do you close that gap between early-entry forces and follow-on forces?”

Air-dropping Strykers might be the answer, he said.

Taking to Sea

Another capability that Army war gamers found useful during Unified Quest was watercraft. Since the game took place on something resembling the Korean Peninsula, “there are some new Army watercraft we used to maneuver forces around in this operation very agilely,” Hix said.

These boats “allowed us to get after a series of key places where [weapons of mass destruction were] suspected to be, very rapidly,” Hix said, while having the add-on effect of creating confusion within the enemy’s ranks due to multiple landings in a variety of locations.

The Army’s increasing desire to take to the sea has also been outlined in an Army equipment modernization strategy document released March 4. It offers a path forward for the modernization of the service’s existing watercraft fleet.

The Army’s landing craft utility platforms are old, having been built in the 1960s and 1970s, the paper complains, and are “in need of immediate modernization to provide the Army and the joint force the ability to meet its expeditionary employment concepts,” particularly in the Pacific region.

“Our aged fleet is slow and does not have the cargo capacity to deliver combat configured forces and sustainment materials/ equipment to the point of employment,” the paper continued.

The equipping plan, which stretches between fiscal 2014 and 2048, maintains that the Army wants to make force protection on its watercraft a priority by integrating technologies such as “scalable nonlethal-to-lethal escalation of force, selective integration of structural armor, ballistic glass, and remote weapons and robust communications architecture.”

While adding these capabilities, service planners admit they are willing to accept some risk in areas “such as sea mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, rockets, cannons and mortars.”

Between fiscal 2019 and fiscal 2027, the service also wants to find a replacement for its logistics support vessel while looking to make use of commercial solutions “with military-unique upgrades.”

While Unified Quest exposed capability gaps the Army must grapple with as budgets are being squeezed, the service is looking to innovate both doctrinally and materially as it continues to pore over lessons learned in Iraq.

In remarks at National Defense University on the 10th anniversary of the 2003 invasion, TRADOC commander Gen. Robert Cone concluded that while the United States “collapsed the Iraqis’ air defenses, their command and control, their logistics” in a matter of weeks, “that didn’t stop them from finding an alternative way of waging war.”

The trick, he and other Army leaders have concluded, is to try to understand and anticipate those alternative ways of making war before the enemy does.

23.03.2013 par P. CHAPLEAU Lignes de Défense

Le Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) a diffusé vendredi un pré-appel d'offres (draft RFP) pour le remplacement des M-113 (en service depuis 53 ans) par un "Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle" (on lira le texte du draft RFP ici). La première phase de ce projet prévoit une commande de 29 prototypes sous 4 ans (d'ici à 2017) puis une première tranche de 289 véhicules (2018-2020). Coût prévu: 1,5 milliard de dollars.

La deuxième tranche, d'un montant de 4,7 milliards, concernera 2 618 autres exemplaires de l'AMPV. Soit 522 exemplaires pour le transport de matériels, 386 pour le transport de mortiers, 933 véhicules radio, 790 ambulances et 216 mini-cliniques mobiles.

Parmi les projets annoncés,

des modèles du Stryker

et du Bradley

March 12, 2013: Strategy page

Faced with smaller budgets over the next decade the U.S. Army has halted evaluation of new UAVs and is standardizing on four existing models (Gray Eagle, Shadow 2000, Raven and Puma). All four of these were developed and purchased in large quantities over the last dozen years and will remain the primary army UAVs for the next 5-10 years.

The army currently has nearly 7,000 UAVs. Over 6,000 are micro-UAVs like the Raven and Puma, These tiny (under six kg/13.2 pound) reconnaissance aircraft have become very popular with the troops, anyone of which can become an operator after a few hours of training. These tiny UAVs are a radical new military aircraft technology that is took air recon to a new level. That level is low, a few hundred meters off the ground. The army has nearly 1,798 Raven and 325 Puma UAVs systems in use by ground troops. A complete system (controller, spare parts, and three UAVs) costs $250,000 for the Raven and over $400,000 for Puma. These tiny aircraft have changed how the troops fight and greatly reduced army dependence on the air force for air reconnaissance. The lightweight, hand launched Raven UAV can only stay airborne about an hour per sortie, but troops have found that this is enough time to do all sorts of useful work, even when there's no fighting going on. This is most of the time. The heavier Puma can stay up for 120 minutes.

Raven B (RQ-11B)

The two kilogram (4.4 pound) RQ-11 Raven UAV aircraft is popular with combat and non-combat troops alike. The army has developed better training methods, which enables operators to get more out of Raven. Combat troops use it for finding and tracking the enemy, while non-combat troops use it for security (guarding bases or convoys). In both cases, troops have come to use the Raven for more than just getting a look over the hill or around the corner. The distinctive noise of a Raven overhead is very unpopular with the enemy below and is often used to scare the enemy away or make him move to where he can be more easily spotted.

The current model, the Raven B (RQ-11B), was introduced six years ago, a year after the original Raven entered service in large numbers. This UAV is inexpensive ($35,000 each). The Raven is battery powered (and largely silent unless flown close to the ground). It carries a color day vidcam or a two color infrared night camera. It can also carry a laser designator and new gimbaled camera is being bought. The cameras broadcast real time video back to the operator, who controls the Raven via a handheld controller, which uses a hood to shield the display from direct sunlight (thus allowing the operator to clearly see what is on the ground). The Raven can go as fast as 90 kilometers an hour but usually cruises at between 40 and 50 kilometers an hour. It can go as far as 15 kilometers from its controller and usually flies a preprogrammed route, using GPS for navigation.

The Raven is made of Kevlar, the same material used in helmets and protective vests. On average, a Raven can survive about 200 landings before it breaks something. While some Ravens have been shot down, the most common cause of loss is losing the communications link (as the aircraft flies out of range or behind something that interrupts the signal) or a software/hardware failure on the aircraft. Combat losses have been high, as nearly 20,000 have been built and most of those have been lost in training or the battlefield.

From the very beginning the Raven changed the way troops fight. With the bird's eye view of the battlefield, commanders can move their troops more quickly, confident that they won't be ambushed and often with certain knowledge of where the unseen enemy is. The big advantage with Raven is that it’s simple, reliable, and it just works. The UAV can be quickly taken apart and put into a backpack. It takes off by having the operator start the motor and then throwing it. This can be done from a moving vehicle and the Raven is a popular recon tool for convoys. It lands by coming in low and then turning the motor off. Special Forces troops like to use it at night because the enemy can’t see it and often can’t hear it either.

Puma AE UAV

Last year the U.S. Army began using the larger (5.9 kg) Puma AE UAVs. So far 325 RQ-20A systems have been ordered and most have been delivered. Adopting Puma is part of an army effort to find micro-UAVs that are more effective than current models and just as easy to use. The Puma, a 5.9 kg (13 pound) UAV with a 2.6 meter (8.5 feet) wingspan and a range of 15 kilometers from the operator, has proved to be the next big (or micro) thing the army was looking for. Combat commanders quickly realized how useful Puma is and wanted more, as quickly as possible. This is not surprising as SOCOM (Special Operations Command) has been using Puma since 2008.

The army wants to equip each infantry company with a Puma system. That would mean 18 Puma AE UAVs per brigade and nearly 400 for the entire army. These larger UAVs have been most useful in route clearance (scouting ahead to spot ambushes, roadside bombs, landslides, washouts, or whatever). The larger Puma is particularly useful in Afghanistan, which is windier than Iraq and thus more difficult for the tiny Raven to operate.

Top speed for Puma is 87 kilometers an hour and cruising speed is 37-50 kilometers an hour. Max altitude is 3,800 meters (12,500 feet). Puma has a better vidcam (providing tilt, pan, and zoom) than the smaller Raven and that provides steadier and more detailed pictures. Because it is larger than Raven, and three times as heavy, Puma is much steadier in bad weather. Both Puma and Raven are battery powered.

Puma has been around for a decade but never got purchased in large quantities by anyone. The latest model uses a lot of proven tech from the Raven (both UAVs are made by the same company). Like the Raven, Puma is hand launched and can be quickly snapped together or apart. Another version, using a fuel cell, has been tested and was able to stay in the air for nine hours at a time. There is also a naval version that floats and is built to withstand exposure to salt water.

Each combat brigade is now supposed to have 35 mini-UAV systems (each with three UAVs, most of them Raven, but at least ten of these systems are to be Pumas). That means that each combat brigade now has its own air force of over a hundred reconnaissance aircraft.

RQ-7-Shadow

Then there are the larger UAVs. The Gray Eagle is replacing several other large UAVs. Most of these are the RQ-7 Shadow (over 300) and smaller numbers of MQ-5 Hunters, Sky Warrior Alpha and RQ-18 MAV (helicopter type) systems. The MQ-1C weighs 1.5 tons, carries 135.4 kg (300 pounds) of sensors internally, and up to 227.3 kg (500 pounds) of sensors or weapons externally. It has an endurance of up to 36 hours and a top speed of 270 kilometers an hour. MQ-1C has a wingspan of 18 meters (56 feet) and is 9 meters (28 feet) long. The MQ-1C can carry four Hellfire missiles (compared to two on the Predator), or a dozen smaller 70mm guided missiles. Each MQ-1C costs about $10 million. The army uses warrant officers as operators. The MQ-1C has automated takeoff and landing software and is equipped with a full array of electronics (target designators and digital communications so troops on the ground can see what the UAV sees).

The army began sending platoons (each with four aircraft) of its new MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAV to Afghanistan in 2011. The first MQ-1C aviation company was formed in 2009 and was assigned to the U.S. Army 160th SOAR (Special Operations Aviation Regiment), which belongs to SOCOM (Special Operations Command). The army plans to eventually equip each combat brigade with an MQ-1C company and establish over three dozen of these companies.

The MQ-1C is based on the MQ-1 Predator, which is a one ton aircraft and do most everything the Gray Eagle can except carry larger sensors and more weapons. The 159 kg (350 pound) Shadow 200s carry day and night cameras and laser designators but usually no weapons. Most of the new army heavy UAVs delivered over the next five years will carry missiles, and by 2015, the army wants to have over 500 MQ-1Cs and perhaps a few Shadow 200s that have not worn out.

The army is proceeding to spend scare cash on new sensors for existing UAVs and the old Shadow 200s have gotten other new components (engines, wings, and so on). This is because that while the army plans to buy nearly 500 Gray Eagles it has less than a hundred so far and are expensive. So money problems may halt or slow down procurement. Gray Eagle and Shadow are the key long range UAVs used by brigade and division headquarters to take in the big picture.

Jan. 10, 2013 by Dave Majumdar – FG

Washington DC - Even as the US Army moves forward with fielding its first unit of Boeing AH-64E Block III attack helicopters, the service is planning to add further improvements to the Apache gunship.

"Right now, we are currently fielding the first unit equipped, our FUE [first unit equipped] unit, with Echo-models, and we're on track to meet that fielding schedule," says Col Jeff Hager, the army's Apache programme manager.

Hager adds that Boeing has delivered 28 of 51 low-rate initial production AH-64Es that it is contracted to build. This year, the company will start producing full-rate production aircraft for an eventual total of 634 helicopters.

But even as the AH-64E transitions into full-rate production, some systems engineering work remains, Hager says. The changes, which will come in production Lots 4 through 6, include better embedded diagnostics for improved maintenance. The Apache will also gain the Link-16 data-link, which is typically found on fixed-wing combat aircraft. It will also be afforded improvements to its mast-mounted Northrop Grumman APG-78 Longbow fire control radar, which will improve range and add overwater capability.

Hager says that the army has not quite decided how the overwater capability would be used, but he says the Longbow radar in concert with the Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire missile could be used to attack landing craft or small warships. In the future, active electronically scanned array radar could be added to the aircraft.

Another addition will be the cognitive decision aiding system (CDAS), Hager says. CDAS is designed "to help the pilot and the crew with some of those tasks that tend to get a little cumbersome at times," he says. "It'll help him in those tasks in specific."

The army also intends to support Boeing's efforts to sell the Apache overseas, Hager says. Boeing's attack helicopter vice president, Dave Koopersmith, says that the company has seen an uptick in interest internationally for the Apache recently. "We have more demand signals for this dominant capability in this attack helicopter space," he says.

October 2012 - By Major Michael Wise, US Army - disamjournal.org

The European Union (EU) is an institution founded upon the precept of shared economic prosperity to prevent conflict. The idea of increasing interdependence in the coal and steel industries expanded into a trade union that eventually led to a common currency for seventeen of the EU’s twenty-seven members. The economic benefits of this regional trade liberalization scheme are apparent, but what are the effects of integration and coordination on industries that are undeniably strategic in nature? One might expect that the efficacy of EU and European Defense Agency (EDA) would not transcend into the aerospace and defense industry, but it turns out that the EU and EDA have a positive effect on exports in this arena. The consequences of this phenomenon reinforce the foundation upon which the European project set out to accomplish. There are lessons to draw from integration of the aerospace and defense industry as well as indicators that the US government and defense firms alike should consider.

The EU

European integration is an endeavor that has failed throughout the ages, often resulting in competition and bloody wars. As Adreas Staab puts it, “From the Roman Empire of Julius Caesar to Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin, European history is marked by many attempts to organize the multitude of nations and ethnicities into a more or less coherent political entity with competing views of how the different states should be related and the degree to which autonomy and sovereignty should be preserved.“¹ But something encouraging has transpired in Europe since the end of WWII. A few forward thinking elites gathered together to establish an economic union that would bind the war-making industries of coal and steel production among the usual states perpetrating war. Jean Monnet, a French entrepreneur and functionalist, presented a plan that would sow the seeds to what would develop into the EU. While there was always disagreement on the role and scope of institutions in integration, a constructive environment (owed largely to US security guarantees and fiscal support) allowed for a lasting peace and functional institutions to emerge. The debate between minimalism versus maximalism translated into proponents of intergovernmental models versus supranational bodies. This debate goes on even today, especially as the EU attempts to manage itself through a real challenge for the first time where the economic benefits are difficult to see amidst the current economic crisis.

Aside from the challenges of integration from nationalist tendencies and questions of sovereignty, the EU delivers massive benefits in the form of a common market with minimal barriers to trade among its members. The common currency is the obvious example of reducing trade costs whereby the drag of currency exchange is evaporated. Among members there are also customs agreements that essentially liberate any trade barriers within the EU and coordinate external economic policies resulting in a uniform arrangement. The EU tries to keep competition fair among its members and maximize industry potential by exploiting the benefits of comparative advantage and economies of scale. It also attempts to address the advantages of state aid among members. Article 87(1) of the European Community Treaty prohibits state aid in the form of subsidies, provided it affects trade between member states.² This distinction is important as will be pointed out in the pursuant discussion on World Trade Organization (WTO) cases involving US and European aerospace firms.

In sum, the EU facilitates European firm competitiveness by keeping trade barriers low and allowing for firms to maximize their productivity through specialization and market access through free trade areas. The implications are profound across a variety of industries. Surprisingly (or perhaps unsurprisingly, depending on one’s perspective), these advantages are translated even to the aerospace and defense industries. The ability of EU member states to generate war-fighting equipment is becoming increasingly interdependent.

The EDA

A regional cooperation of states, such as the members of the EU, will tend to view threats to their individual (and collective) national security differently. They will thus arm and equip themselves according to those different, sometimes divergent, assumptions. In theory, this doesn’t necessarily have to result in completely uncoordinated defense acquisitions. After all, maritime or land powers might simply adjust volumes and concentrations of the major categories of defense equipment. But in practice, European militaries developed a hodgepodge of equipment that is sometimes able to be integrated among (some) members and sometimes is only workable in an autonomous environment. Indeed, under Article 296 of the European Community Treaty, member states are permitted to make the bulk of their defense purchases on a national basis. With the view that European military forces must promote interoperability through tactics, techniques, and procedures, so must their equipment procurement be coordinated. In 2004, the Council of Ministers established the EDA to coordinate defense capabilities. In doing so, it implemented strategies to promote research, development, and armaments cooperation, and strengthen the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).³

The strategy to strengthen the EDTIB is grounded upon three underlying principles. The “three C’s,” serving as a guide in EDTIB enhancement, are capability driven, competence and globally competitive. The EDA endeavors to ensure Europe is equipped and capable to deal with security threats of the future by clarifying priorities with regard to military and industrial capabilities, consolidating demand, increasing investments, considering security of supply and increasing competition and cooperation within the industry.⁴ The EDA initiated efforts to improve Europe’s industrial capabilities in the aerospace sector with the Future Air Systems Project. Among other things, the main contribution of the EDA in this project is to examine the supply chain and to promote engagement with EU bureaucracies.

The idea of a coordinated strategy in European defense and procurement planning is not generally regarded in a positive way. This may be a reflection of an antipathy for real coordination among members’ national priorities. The EDA recognizes the apparent challenges of managing twenty-seven different views and has set its own top capabilities priorities appropriately. They include counter-IED, medical support, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), helicopters, cyber-defense, multinational logistics support, CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) information exchange, strategic and tactical airlift and finally fuel and energy.⁵ These priorities reflect a shift from territorial defense to a force projection capability. It happens that while conventional territorial defense warfare is more simplified for the warfighter, the limited intervention mindset involving projection of small forces is less industry intensive (think less tanks and more agile light units). This prioritization allows the European defense firms to focus on a more narrow market.

Analysis of institutional Effects on Performance

The EU seems to increase productivity by allowing its members to specialize in those areas where they enjoy a comparative advantage, and the EDA seems to allow its members to specialize within the global aerospace and defense market according to its strategy. The consequences of exploiting such advantages are extremely beneficial to the European aerospace and defense industry. This study analyzed export data from UN Comtrade of thirty-nine European countries from 1996 to 2010. The EU and EDA status is depicted in figure 1. It accounted for changes in membership status during the expansion years of 2004 and 2007. This analysis is limited to commodities related to aerospace and defense, in addition to components. These included ammunition, missiles, armored vehicles, warships and aircraft (civilian and military). Figure 2 is a graphical representation of total exports and depicts a steadily increasing trend. Other reports confirm this trend. The EU Observer cited SIPRI data indicating EU arms trade growth despite the economic crisis that embroils the rest of European industry.⁶
    

What could cause such an increase? The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a study indicating that while European defense spending cumulatively fell over the period covered here, expenditures on equipment remained constant (see figure 3). The increase is clearly not the result of domestic consumption. One might expect that integration would encourage specialization and dispersion of factor production; thereby supply chain effects might explain the increase in exports. This appears to be part of the story, but not all of it. Figure 4 shows the total exports separated by trading partners outside the EU and intra-EU trade. The intra-EU trade rises steadily as expected but exports to the rest of the world increase even more rapidly. These results indicate that European aerospace and defense firms are increasing their competitiveness abroad.

What is most interesting is that a regression analysis of exports on institutional membership makes a compelling case for the EU and EDA. This study included multivariate regressions where the independent variables included institutional membership status as well as a qualified and quantified variables depicting conflicts. These conflict variables normalized for an increase or decrease in global conflict that might have spurious effects on aerospace and defense export volume. These variables were generated from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program from the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. The analysis further considered fixed effects of trading partners of the exporting countries. Furthermore, the logs of the export volume served as the dependent variable so that data from low volume exporters could be compared to that of high volume exporters. The results showed that both EU and EDA membership serve as reliable predictors of export growth.

At the Firm Level

Using data from Defense News Top 100 firm rankings reported each year from 2000 to 2010, this study is able to depict individual firm trends during a similar period. Figure 5 displays defense revenue of every European defense firm that made the Defense News list from 2000 to 2010. Table 1 lists the top European defense firms for 2010. It is apparent that most firms enjoy the same trend of increasing revenue as was observed on European aerospace and defense exports. All this during an increasingly sparse domestic market for these defense-related products. This trend is confirmed by the EU Observer’s report on SIPRI’s 2010 analysis noting that most of the large firms saw measured growth while a few smaller firms witnessed contraction in revenue.⁷

The results and trends demonstrated in figure 5 beg more in depth investigation of some of the notable cases. The top performing firms vary in state involvement, product specialty and location, though all reside in the larger economic powers of the core of Europe. This study will examine BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica and Thales.

BAE Systems is a London-based defense firm that currently ranks second only to Lockheed Martin (US) in defense revenue. It is a multinational company with strong markets in the EU, US, Saudi Arabia, Australia, and India. Its products range from cutting-edge aerospace technology to conventional armored vehicle production. It is closely tied to US defense firms and has an integral part in the production of the multinational joint strike fighter, the F-35 Lightning. The firm plays an important role in the UK’s nuclear technology as well as high-end shipbuilding. BAE also develops cyber defense and information technology systems. Though primarily a UK based firm, it is also invested in several European aerospace and defense firms.

The European Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS) Company is a conglomerate of several consolidated defense firms in Europe. Headquartered in the Netherlands, its main subsidiaries are in France, Germany and Spain. These include Airbus and Eurocopter. It mainly produces aircraft and electronic systems and its primary markets are in the UK, North America, the Middle East, Russia, India, China, Brazil and Australia.

Finmeccanica is one of Italy’s largest industrial groups and is partially nationalized (30 percent). It also mainly produces aerospace technologies and develops components of Europe wide defense products like the Eurofighter (joint venture between BAE and EADS). 

The Thales Group is a French defense firm specializing in communication technology. It is also a somewhat nationalized firm, with state ownership at about 27 percent and is closely associated with Dassault Aviation.

The contrast and confluence of these competing firms is remarkable. BAE and EADS are publicly traded while Finmeccanica and Thales rely heavily on state support and investment. Finmeccanica, BAE and EADS work closely on the Eurofighter project among others.

EU and state programs give these firms even greater advantage, sometimes in a controversial manner. Airbus, the European civilian passenger aircraft manufacturer, and Boeing, the US aerospace firm, are engaged in a tit for tat legal battle citing improper subsidies on both sides. The US filed suit to the WTO that Airbus received an unfair advantage in government loans and launch aid. The EU countered with accusations of illegal tax breaks for production facilities in certain US cities. After nearly seven years of legal arguments, the WTO ruled in separate findings that both parties had cause to their accusations, though not as severe as initially brought forth. The competition and complaints are likely to continue for years to come. This case demonstrates two key advantages of the EU institutions. First, the very launch aid that the WTO declared illegal provided the necessary capital to get the industry up to a profitable level in Europe. Second, the EU was organized and large enough to bring great weight to the WTO in advocating the European industry’s case.

What About Externally Generated Competition?

This study has shown the advantages the European aerospace and defense industry enjoys due to its integrating and coordinating policies. The EU maintains regulations that protect firms from adverse effects of competition within the confines of its members, but firms also compete with each other in the external market. For instance, the top firms attribute their most important markets to the US, the Middle East, Australia, and India. Regulations on the conduct of member states in serving as an advocate for domestic industries do not appear to exist.

Competition for lucrative fighter aircraft contracts is generally fierce. In 2011, after years of deliberation, Switzerland announced that it would award Saab (Sweden) with the contract to furnish its military’s new aircraft. Saab had been in competition with Dassault Aviation (France) and Eurofighter (BAE/EADS/Finmeccanica). The evaluation was highly politicized, and leaked documents exacerbated speculation of unfair political pressure. Fast-forward a few months to January 2012 and the competition is eerily familiar, this time in India. The Indian military announced it would award its aircraft procurement contract to Dassault Aviation. This follows intense lobbying by the French government to woo buyers for its fighter. A foreign market is essential for France in particular because of the high priority it places on its strategic independence. Without a foreign buyer, its production lines would have to cease since it cannot afford to perpetuate production given its own budgetary constraints. Having been the lowest bidder in the Indian competition, it is entirely likely that the French government subsidized some of the costs in the agreement, thus undermining its competitors at Saab and Eurofighter. This kind of undercutting could also have taken place in bidding in the UAE and Brazil.

What are the Implications for the Future?
    
The characteristics of the EU institutions and proclivity to export could be defining a new type of military industrial complex. This European military industrial complex is one that enjoys the benefits of government advocacy but does not influence state fiscal policy. Instead, the European aerospace and defense industry maximizes profit and productivity by selling its war fighting equipment abroad. The trend of diminishing defense spending coupled with increased defense revenue points to the likelihood of such a scenario. The EU and EDA are likely to act as complementary institutions to facilitate and coordinate specialization in a way few countries will be willing to do. These firms will have all the aforementioned advantages but will not be constrained to a domestic market that will demand exclusivity. Instead, they will be allowed—and even encouraged—to pursue profit maximization while various member states exert political influence to secure contracts. The pursuit will not be uniform, as exemplified by nationalized firms in France and Italy. That said, European firms would most likely become even more integrated to reap economic benefits. The European aerospace and defense industry market penetration is also interesting to consider. These firms produce products that are not necessarily the most advanced (the US firms still clearly hold the advantage), but are very competitive in a cost to capability perspective. They court areas where there is a demand for their products at their price. Considering that these areas are places like the Middle East, India, Brazil, and the Pacific, these firms are likely to continue to do well. These areas are not only emerging markets with enormous potential, but also they are highly prone to armed conflict. With the influence the European aerospace and defense industry may exert upon the EU, it is not inconceivable that EU foreign policy (however uncoordinated) might seek to stabilize its market by accepting conflict abroad.    

On the other hand, the US military industrial complex must take note of these trends. It is fortunate the US firms are so integrated with European firms. The US leadership of the F-35 program is an important multinational production proof of concept. The problem is that the US commands a great amount of influence due to its own consumption capacity. The estimated US share of orders accounts for half of the demand. With more and more participants reevaluating their orders, that share is likely to increase. This actually perpetuates the status quo of the US military industrial complex generating a supply and forcing domestic consumption. It also reinforces the European firms’ practice of benefiting from an export surplus. The US is likely to seek to maintain its dominance on innovation and comfortable lead in technology. It must seek to exploit comparative advantage across the aerospace and defense industry. In doing so, it might be worth increased cooperation with the EDA or even to establish somewhat of a bilateral body to maximize efficiencies in the transatlantic defense industry. Such an arrangement would have limitations, of course. The Boeing and Airbus competition is not likely to subside, but then neither is competition among EU members abroad.    

Members of the defense cooperation community should take heed of these trends and seek to support cooperation with European firms and take advantage of internal EU competition where possible. The EDA’s priorities should serve as a guide to where the EU would like to head with respect to capacity development. The US has a lead in some of these areas. It might be worth engaging the EDA to narrow its list to further maximize comparative advantage vice duplicating efforts of US firms willing and able to sell products like ISR and strategic airlift equipment. The US has a lead in these sectors. Furthermore, US security and industry would profit from factor specialization, particularly in cyber defense, fuel and energy. Efforts in defense cooperation in key emerging markets such as Brazil and India will benefit greatly from understanding developing trends in the European defense industry. If the Dassault Aviation case serves as a guide, officers should pay attention to important contract competitions—not for the winners, but for those who lost out in recent battles who must secure a contract in order to maintain production. These firms may receive benefits from the state in the form of diplomatic persuasion or subsidies (or both) in the interest of maintaining domestic industry and employment. It is more probable that the nationalized firms would profit from such action compared to the consortium or public companies. Those firms might have their own method of lobbying through private means.

Conclusions

The results of this study indicate that not only do EU institutions and policies benefit European consumption but they also enhance their export capacity abroad. This is most likely attributable to the efficiency-promoting incentives of EU policies and coordinating efforts of the EDA. In doing so, industries across European borders are able to pursue their comparative advantages and reap the benefits of specialization. These benefits do come with a trade off. In specializing, the European military industrial complex becomes dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination. This is exactly what Jean Monet had in mind at inception of the European Coal and Steel community. As the EDA progresses and European defense products increase their global market share, the world will observe a new type of military industrial complex. This new model is one that does not influence its government to put its products to use (as in the US), but rather may encourage others to fight among themselves.

About the Author

MAJ Michael Wise, US Army, is a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) specializing in European Affairs. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy and is pursuing an MA from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His assignments in Europe include Germany and France.

Notes

1  Staab, (Kindle Locations 114-116).

2  Artis and Nixson, 137.

3  European Defense Agency.

4  Ibid.

5  Ibid.

6  Nielsen.

7  Ibid.

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Oct. 24, 2012 by Dave Majumdar – FG

Washington DC - The US Army is re-designating the Boeing AH-64D Block III Apache as the AH-64E.

The decision comes as the upgraded attack helicopter is moved into full rate production after a successful operational test phase.

The Block III has a significant enough boost in capabilities to warrant the change in designation, says Boeing's Ray Handy, marketing manager and a pilot for the AH-64.

The soon-to-be E-model's rotor blades are made of composites and the airfoil is shaped differently, he says. Moreover, the entire drive system has been completely revamped, with the engines and transmission significantly upgraded. "It's a completely new gearbox," Handy says.

The new drive system, in many respects, restores performance of the helicopter to earlier days. The introduction of the D-model in the 1990s added a large amount of weight to the aircraft over the years.

"It has taken us back to the days when the Apache was a much lighter aircraft," says Todd Brown, Boeing's chief rotary-wing test pilot. The E-model is similar in performance to the much lighter A-model helicopter, he adds.

The Block III's avionics have also been greatly improved. The biggest change is that the system has moved to an open-architecture design. But there have also been improvements to the flight controls and flight management systems.

The aircraft's mission capabilities have also been greatly improved, although Brown declines to elaborate. However, Boeing says one of the biggest improvements in that regard is the addition of a level four manned-unmanned teaming system, which will allow the aircraft's crew to work with unmanned air vehicles.

Les factures relatives à 475 millions de dollars d'achat de carburant, essentiellement du diesel et du kérosène pour l'armée nationale afghane (ANA), auraient disparues.

11/09/2012 Par Maurin Picard - LeFigaro.fr

Un nouveau scandale vient entacher les relations américano-afghanes déjà passablement dégradées par les accusations de corruption envers Kaboul et les meurtres de soldats étrangers.

L'inspecteur général spécial pour la reconstruction de l'Afghanistan (SIGAR), John Sopko, a révélé dimanche dans un rapport préliminaire remis au secrétaire américain à la Défense, Leon Panetta, que les factures relatives à 475 millions de dollars d'achat de carburant, essentiellement du diesel et du kérosène pour l'armée nationale afghane (ANA), étaient purement et simplement «introuvables» entre octobre 2006 et février 2011. À l'issue d'une enquête remontant six ans en arrière dans la comptabilité de la mission d'assistance de l'Otan, Sopko s'est ému des réponses lapidaires de ses interlocuteurs militaires à ses demandes de précisions. La moitié des factures sur la période allant de février 2011 à mars 2012 seraient elles aussi introuvables.

L'affaire ne pouvait plus mal tomber, à quatre mois de la passation de pouvoir pour la logistique des forces internationales à la jeune armée afghane, avant le départ définitif des dernières unités combattantes de l'Otan à l'horizon 2014.

Les déficiences pointées du doigt par Sopko, récemment nommé par Barack Obama avec mission d'identifier les comportements criminels ainsi que les fraudes et gaspillages au sein des projets contribuant à la reconstruction de l'Afghanistan, semblent multiples: le commandement allié en charge de l'entraînement des forces afghanes (CSTC-A, pour Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan) se serait avéré incapable de préciser si le carburant fourni à l'ANA a été utilisé ou stocké. Pis, certains cadres du CSTC-A, placé sous les ordres du général américain Daniel Bolger, auraient «broyé» des piles de factures, sans que l'enquête ait pu déterminer s'il s'agit de malveillance ou d'incompétence.

Derrière ces stocks de carburant volatilisés se profile le spectre des talibans, qui auraient largement infiltré l'ANA pour mieux la disloquer de l'intérieur lorsqu'elle prendra la relève progressive des forces de l'Otan à compter du 1er janvier prochain.

Le CSTC-A, qui aurait dépensé 480 millions de dollars en carburant en 2011-2012 et 1,1 milliard au total depuis 2007, a néanmoins demandé que ces frais soient portés à 555 millions de dollars d'ici à 2014. «Dans l'attente des justificatifs manquants, il est impératif de limiter ces dépenses à 306 millions de dollars par an», a répondu John Sopko, frappé par la sourde hostilité des officiers de ce commandement. Ceux-ci ont invoqué la montée en puissance des forces de sécurité afghanes, censées attendre un record de 352 000 hommes à la fin de l'année, ainsi que l'arrivée de 25 000 nouveaux véhicules et générateurs, arguant qu'une limitation de ces dépenses entraînerait une chute de 37 % dans la disponibilité opérationnelle de l'ANA.

The HEADS sensor inside a combat helmet.

Photo BAE Systems

10 July 2012 army-technology.com

BAE Systems has been awarded a contract modification for the delivery of additional Headborne Energy Analysis and Diagnostic Systems (HEADS) sensors to the US Army, to help determine the effects on the head from impacts during combat-related blast or explosions.

The new $16.9m contract extension forms a part of the original five-year contract secured by the company in June 2010 and brings the total value of the deal to approximately $34m.

Under the terms of new contract, the company will supply an unspecified number of HEADS Generation II helmet sensors to the army, which already uses more than 20,000 sensors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Don Dutton, BAE Systems protection vice president and general manager, said that the army had an urgent demand for technologies for identification of those in need of medical assistance for potential head and brain injuries sustained during combat operations.

''Traumatic brain injuries are known as a signature injury for soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan," he said. "The data collected by HEADS during a traumatic event can be used to develop better protective equipment and for supporting further medical treatment."

The HEADS is a small sensor placed inside a combat helmet to help the army and medical practitioners identify and diagnose combat-related traumatic brain injuries (TBI).

"Traumatic brain injuries are known as a signature injury for soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The data collected by HEADS during a traumatic event can be used to develop better protective equipment and for supporting further medical treatment."

The sensors enable constant and automatic collection of potentially lifesaving data, such as impact duration, blast pressures, ambient temperature, angular and linear accelerations, as well as the exact times of single or multiple blast events.

HEADS Generation II is an upgraded version of the company's HEADS Generation I sensor, featuring a wireless technology for downloading summary data of recorded events, a longer battery life, expanded pressure measurement and angular rate data.

Deliveries under the contract are scheduled to take place by the end of January 2013.

So far, the company has delivered more than 7,600 HEADS Generation I sensors to the US Army and Marine Corps from late 2007 to 2008.

June 5, 2012 defpro.com

LISLE, Ill. | Navistar Defense, LLC on Monday received a contract for $59 million to deliver 1,357 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) net kits for International MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) units in Afghanistan. The order from the U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command is considered an urgent buy.

RPG nets provide additional protection against the anti-tank weapon of the same name. Navistar previously fielded 970 RPG net kits for the MaxxPro family of vehicles to support Afghan operations. The new kits will be fitted onto MaxxPro units operating in theater. Delivery is scheduled to begin in August 2012 and be completed by the December 2012.

"Five years ago, almost to the day, we received our first MaxxPro contract to support the urgent operational need in Iraq," said Archie Massicotte, president, Navistar Defense. "We always strive to anticipate the needs of our warfighters and deliver on all contracts with the same urgency asked of us in 2007. We are proud to provide integrated solutions, such as the RPG nets, to our Armed Forces and we will continue to develop new solutions to meet the changing needs of the warfighter."

Navistar has fielded nine major MRAP variants during the last five years including the MaxxPro Dash Ambulance and the MaxxPro Recovery Vehicle. Earlier this year, the company retrofitted existing vehicles with a rolling chassis to upgrade and ready the fleet for future missions. Navistar is also currently competing for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) 1.1 and Standard Military Pattern (SMP) programs with new vehicle solutions. These new platforms were developed by leveraging and combining current assets of Navistar and our partners to create cost effective, robust and mature solutions that are available today.

May 13, 2012: STRATEGY PAGE

There is a rebellion brewing in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. It's all about the protective vest. This lifesaving bit of equipment has saved thousands of lives in the last two decades, but has, because of political grandstanding and media distortions, become too heavy and restrictive. The troops want lighter body armor, even if it does increase vulnerability to bullets. Marine and army experts point out that the drive (created mainly by politicians and the media) for "better" body armor resulted in heavier and more restrictive (to battlefield mobility) models. This has more than doubled the minimum weight you could carry into combat.

Until the 1980s, you could strip down (for actual fighting) to your helmet, weapon (assault rifle and knife), ammo (hanging from webbing on your chest, along with grenades), canteen and first aid kit on your belt, and your combat uniform. Total load was 13-14 kg (about 30 pounds). You could move freely and quickly like this, and you quickly found that speed and agility was a lifesaver in combat. But now the minimum load carried is twice as much (27 kg) and, worse yet, more restrictive.

While troops complained about the new protective vests, they valued it in combat. The current generation of vests will stop rifle bullets, a first in the history of warfare. And this was after nearly a century of trying to develop protective vests that were worth the hassle of wearing. It wasn't until the 1980s that it was possible to make truly bullet proof vests using metallic inserts. But the inserts were heavy and so were the vests (about 11.3 kg/25 pounds). Great for SWAT teams, but not much use for the infantry. But in the 1990s, additional research produced lighter bullet proof ceramic materials. By 1999, the U.S. Army began distributing a 7.3 kg (16 pound) "Interceptor" vest that provided fragment and bullet protection. This, plus the 1.5 kg (3.3 pound) Kevlar helmet (available since the 1980s), gave the infantry the best combination of protection and mobility. And just in time.

Since the end of the Cold War more of the situations U.S. infantry find themselves in involve lightly armed irregulars who rely more on bullets than bombs. The bullet proof vest eliminates most of the damage done by the 30 percent of wounds that occur in the trunk (of which about 40 percent tend to be fatal without a vest). The Kevlar helmet is also virtually bulletproof but it doesn't cover all of the head (the face and part of the neck is still exposed). Even so, the reduction in deaths is significant. Some 15-20 percent of all wounds are in the head and about 45 percent of them are fatal without a helmet. The Kevlar helmet reduces the deaths by at least half and reduces many wounds to the status of bumps, sprains, and headaches. Half the wounds occur in the arms and legs, but only 5-10 percent of these are fatal and that won't change any time soon. Thus since Vietnam, improved body armor has reduced casualties by more than half. The protective vests used in Vietnam and late in the Korean War reduced casualties by about 25 percent since World War II, so the risk of getting killed or wounded has been cut in half since World War II because of improved body armor. Much better medical care (especially rapid evacuation of casualties by helicopter) has helped change the ratio of dead to wounded from 1:3 during World War II to 1:5 today.

The Interceptor vest was an improvement in other ways. It was easier to wear and was cooler in hot climates because you could more easily adjust it to let some air circulate. You could also hang gear from the vest, making it more a piece of clothing. It's still hot to wear the vest in hot weather but if you're expecting a firefight, it's easier to make the decision to wear the vest. You know it will stop bullets. U.S. troops who have fought in Afghanistan and been hit with rifle bullets that would have penetrated earlier vests are already spreading the word throughout the ground combat community. All you have to do is exercise in such a way that you are better able to carry the weight and still be mobile.

But as new, and heavier vests were introduced the troops often found themselves with protection, and weight, they did not need. For example, the latest vests will protect you from a hit high-powered rifle fired a close range. That is rare in combat. The latest vests will also protect you from multiple high-powered machine-gun bullet hits. Again, that's rare and an increasing number of soldiers and marines are willing to trade that for less weight and more mobility.

The army tried to solve the problem by instituting new training methods that emphasized building muscle and the ability to be agile under all that weight. The new exercises helped somewhat, but moving vigorously with all that weight has led to more musculoskeletal problems, many of them with long term consequences.

The enemy has also adapted, knowing that the more heavily encumbered Americans were not as agile or as fast and that could be exploited. The frustration of being slower than your foe often led U.S. troops to exertions that brought on musculoskeletal injuries. The new body armor may protect from bullets and shell fragments but it does nothing for over exuberant troops.

So the soldiers and marines are getting louder in their demands for relief from protection they don't need and restrictive protective vests that can get them killed.