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5 septembre 2012 3 05 /09 /septembre /2012 11:45

RQ-4 Block 10 Global Hawk KQ-X programme

 

September 5, 2012 defense-unmanned.com

(Source: ABC News; issued September 4, 2012)

 

The Australian Defence Force is quietly resurrecting plans to buy seven huge intelligence and surveillance drones that could cost up to $3 billion. The unmanned aerial vehicles will be used for maritime surveillance and intercepting asylum seeker boats.

The decision comes despite claims that the Royal Australian Air Force's top commanders have long opposed the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles because they will put pilots out of a job and threaten RAAF culture.

The $200 million Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk reconnaissance drone is the largest, most expensive unmanned aerial vehicle in the world today.

Its vast wingspan of 39.8 metres can lift the craft to 65,000 feet and stay airborne for 35 hours with a non-stop range of 16,000 kilometres – eclipsing the endurance of similar manned aircraft.

In 2004, the Howard government was so impressed with Global Hawk that plans were announced to buy a fleet of 12 of the spy drones for $1 billion.

But in 2009 the acquisition was cancelled by Labor's Joel Fitzgibbon, who was defence minister at the time.

In May 2010, Opposition Leader Tony Abbott announced a Coalition government would buy three Global Hawks.

Despite this erratic political flight path, the idea of Australian Global Hawks remained in bureaucratic mothballs until July this year, when the latest Defence Capability Plan was quietly released.

Buried in the document were plans to bring forward by three years the acquisition of "high altitude, long endurance" unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The RAAF now wants seven large UAVs flying by 2019. The favoured option is a new, maritime surveillance version of the Global Hawk - the MQ-4C Triton. The estimated cost of the project is between $2 billion and $3 billion.

Triton had a shaky take-off in June 2012, when a demonstration version of the maritime drone crashed just three days before the official unveiling ceremony at Northrop Grumman's Californian factory.

A company spokesman insists the demonstrator that went down was an old, worn-out Global Hawk, bearing little resemblance to the new, improved Triton.

When it takes to the skies for the first time later this year, Triton will appear to be a slightly larger version of its cousin, Global Hawk.

However, leading American intelligence analyst and author Matthew Aid says they are two very different drones.

"Global Hawk was designed for pin-point imagery or eavesdropping on land targets, by over flight, or by flying obliquely up to 450 kilometres off an enemy’s coastline," he said.

"Triton was designed for broad area maritime surveillance – following ships from high altitude."

The US Navy expects to start flying the first of 68 Tritons on order by 2015.

Some will be based on the US territory of Guam to cover the Asia-Pacific region, while another detachment will fly out of Diego Garcia to monitor the Indian Ocean.

In March, the Washington Post reported
that the US is also considering basing Global Hawk/Triton on Australia's Cocos Islands.


The US Navy claims a single Triton 24-hour surveillance mission can cover nearly 7 million square kilometres of ocean – identifying every vessel in one vast sweep of the ocean.

But Mr Aid remains unimpressed. "Triton does not have anywhere near the range or payload capability of the Global Hawk, and from what I can gather its imaging sensors are nowhere near as good," he said.

The Royal Australian Air Force now wants Triton to support a new generation of manned maritime patrol aircraft, the P-8A, which looks like a converted 737 airliner.

Together, these two systems will replace the RAAF's aging fleet of P-3 Orions that have spent decades patrolling the vast expanse of ocean surrounding Australia - about 20 per cent of the world's sea surface.

Capable of being armed with both missiles and torpedos, the 8 P8 Poseidons already on order will also be capable of anti-submarine warfare.

But is Global Hawk/Triton worth the hefty price tag of at least $200 million each?

Andrew Davies of the Canberra-based Australian Strategic Policy Institute is not so sure.

"That's still a question to be answered. It can fly high and fast, but is really expensive. Each UAV plus ground support systems costs about $200 million each - you can buy a P8 for that," he said.

"So they’re not cheap. The question is can you do the job with a cheaper UAV?

"The Mariner is the maritime version of the Reaper (flown in Afghanistan and Pakistan). It flies slower and lower which can be a good thing as it can drop down and take a closer look at asylum boats for instance, with decks covered by tarps.

"The Mariner is much cheaper, priced in the tens of millions."

In 2006 the Mariner was put through its paces in a trial off Australia's North West Shelf. Mariner supporters say it offers 80 per cent of the capability of a Triton for one-tenth of the cost.

That is a powerful argument in Canberra these days, where the Defence budget has just been slashed by $5.5 billion.

Unlike the high flying unarmed Triton, the Mariner is also designed to carry missiles.

Mr Davies says low cost and an armed capability will be a big plus when flying into regional uncertainty. "It's about the Indian Ocean and securing our sea lanes," he said.

"In the Indian Ocean we see growing competition between the navies of China, India and the US. US attention is now pivoting towards this part of the world."

Other experts argue there is a far more urgent, humanitarian task to perform – border protection.

Kym Bergmann, the editor of Asia Pacific Defence Reporter and a former defence industry executive who worked on UAV projects, says Global Hawk should have been in Australian service years ago.

He claims this did not happen because RAAF pilots feared UAVs would threaten their jobs and traditions.

"Early in 2008 the new Labor [Defence] Minister [Joel Fitzgibbon] had some sort of brain snap and made a very dramatic announcement to the effect that the acquisition of Global Hawk was going to be deferred for a decade," he said.

"At the time as a relatively inexperienced minister, he was stampeded by some of the advice that was coming from the Air Force in particular.

"It was because [the RAAF] really preferred the idea of having a manned aircraft. It's because a manned aircraft is flown by guys with moustaches and flying allowances, rather than being operated by hyper intelligent nerds sitting in front of computer terminals, which is essentially how you operate a Global Hawk."

Mr Bergmann claims the RAAF senior commanders dropped their opposition to Global Hawk/Triton only after they were promised the P8 planes that still need pilots to fly them.

"It's been quite a dramatic conversion. They’ve now become enthusiasts for the technology, when in fact for the previous decade they'd done everything that they could to resist it," he said.

He says Australia urgently needs a maritime UAV capability and that Global Hawk/Triton is the drone for the job.

"It's highly likely that we're going to see more asylum seekers coming to Australia, there's going to be the possibility of increased transnational crime, there's going to be the possibility of increased illegal activities," he said.

"The high-resolution cameras and synthetic aperture radars mean that from an altitude of 60,000 feet at a distance of several hundred kilometres, you can use both your radar and your camera to give you crystal clear imagery right down to very, very small boats.
"You can really get down to rowing boat sizes. The quality of the imagery is quite phenomenal."

A growing number of younger RAAF officers now enthusiastically endorse a rapid expansion of the drone fleet. Since 2009 the Air Force has been flying leased, Israeli-owned Heron surveillance drones in support of Australian troops in Afghanistan.

Displaying the zeal of a convert, Wing Commander Jonathan McMullan, an RAAF pilot-turned-drone commander, recently returned from Afghanistan, declared: "The capability? It's like crack cocaine, a drug for our guys involved."

Rise of civilian drones

Tonight on ABC1, “Foreign Correspondent” sounds the alarm on the swarms of private and government drones gathering in American skies and surely bound for the rest of the world.

Some of the drones have live streaming cameras and the ability to carry other payloads, and tens of thousands of them are expected to take to the sky.

But who's at the controls? Potentially, anybody.

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18 juillet 2012 3 18 /07 /juillet /2012 12:43

MIL_JTAC_w_Rover_Al-Udeid_AB_Qatar_lg.jpg

Source defenseindustrydaily.com

 

July 18, 2012: Strategy Page

 

The U.S. Army is upgrading 580 older ROVER (Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver) 3 and 4 units to the ROVER 6 standard. This will cost $41,000 per ROVER unit (which resembles a ruggedized laptop with several small antennae attached). The upgrade enables the older ROVERs to communicate to a lot more different UAVs, targeting pods and other airborne sensors. Upgrading older ROVERs is very popular with the users, who find ROVER extremely helpful in combat, For one thing, the latest model ROVER allows guys on the ground to relay target coordinates to aircraft digitally, along with marks (circles and so on made with a stylus on a touch screen) on an electronic map or photo showing exactly where the friendlies and hostiles are.

 

While ROVER 6 is basically an undated ROVER 4, there is another ROVER that has become very popular with commanders who find themselves and their troops under fire. Since it arrived three years ago ROVER 5, otherwise known as the fifth generation ROVER, was one of the most popular electronic gadgets for these officers. ROVER 5 is a small (14cm/5.5 inch wide) handheld video device that provides the user with UAV video feeds. Each ROVER 5 costs about $35,000 and is the size of a seven inch tablet computer. ROVER is more than three times heavier than a tablet (at 1.6 kg/3.5 pounds). But ROVER can still be hand held, and enables the user to direct the camera on the UAV supplying the video. A stylus is used for this. The additional weight in the ROVER is for all the electronics needed to receive a wide variety of signals and display several different video types, plus a larger battery. ROVER 5s are more often mounted in vehicles, giving convoys a top-down view of the terrain ahead. This has made it more difficult to ambush American troops. Commanders use ROVER 5 to check UAV feeds and their own troops.

 

The basic benefit of ROVER is that it allows troops to view real-time video from a UAV or aircraft overhead. Aircraft with targeting pods (like Litening and Sniper) or surveillance gear (like AC-130 gunships) are much more effective when the guys on the ground have a ROVER unit that can receive that video feed and share it with the airmen above.

 

 This kind of real-time, "common picture", capability makes air power much more effective, and reduces friendly fire incidents. U.S. Special Forces troops and infantry unit commanders use ROVER to obtain a larger view (than their low flying Raven UAVs can provide) of the surrounding area. This ROVER devices use a built in antenna to get the video from overhead UAVs or aircraft. The original ROVER system, as well as the current one, was developed and sent to the troops in record time. So don't let anyone tell you this sort of thing can't happen. However, except in wartime, such rapid technology development usually does not happen.

 

ROVER came to be a decade ago, when a Special Forces soldier, just back from Afghanistan, walked into the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and asked the technical people why his guys could not have a device that would allow them to watch the video being generated by a Predator, AC-130 or other aircraft overhead. In particular, the soldiers wanted the capability of the AC-130 getting video from a Predator that had spotted something the AC-130 was being sent to destroy. Since it was the Special Forces troops on the ground who were running, and fighting, the ground battle, it would help them a lot if they could see the real time video from Predators and combat aircraft. At that time, the video was being viewed by people in the aircraft, or the UAV operators (who were back in the United States, running things via a satellite link.) The ground troops had to ask the air force what could be seen on the video, and there was usually a delay in getting that information. It would be much better for all concerned if the ground troops could see that video in real time.

 

 The air force geeks went to work, and in two weeks had a ROVER prototype that Special Forces personnel could take back to Afghanistan. ROVER 1 was not terribly portable, but the Special Forces could haul it around in a hummer, and see what any Predators overhead were seeing. This proved very useful. A few months later, ROVER 2 appeared which allowed troops to view UAV vids on a laptop computer. By late 2004, ROVER 3, a 5.5 kg (12 pound) unit built to be carried in a backpack, was put into service.

 

 Although ROVER 3s cost $60,000 each, they addressed dozens of suggestions and complaints from the troops who used earlier ROVERs. Some 700 ROVER 3s entered service within a year. They were used in Afghanistan and Iraq, and could grab video feeds from army, marine and air force UAVs and bomber targeting pods (which have great resolution, even when the aircraft are 6,200 meters/20,000 feet up.)

 

 The ROVER 4 appeared in 2005. It allowed users to point and click on targets to be hit. With ROVER 3, the guys on the ground could see what they want bombed, or hit with a missile, but had to talk the bombers to it. This happens often, especially when the target is behind a hill or buildings, preventing the ground troops from using their laser range finders to get a GPS location. With ROVER 4, the bomber pilot, or UAV operator, is looking at the same video as the ground troops, and can confirm that the indicated target is what is to be hit. This is particularly important in urban warfare, where the building next door might be full of innocent civilians.

 

Shortly after ROVER 5 appeared three years ago, Tactical ROVER appeared. This is a 440 gram (one pound) hand held device that uses a variety of display devices (like helmet monocle, laptop, PC or tablet). Tactical ROVER was popular with the Special Forces, who often sneaked into hostile territory on foot, and need to minimize their weight load.

 

 The original ROVER gear was initially operated, mostly, by air force ground controllers. Now there are some 4,000 ROVER units out there, this allows platoon leaders and company commanders access, as well as Special Forces teams and some army or marine ground patrols.

 

 Without the wartime pressure, it would have taken a decade or more to get ROVER to where it got in only a few years. Special Forces frequently get special equipment made, as they have a "mad money" fund just for that sort of thing. But these new ideas do not always travel so quickly to the rest of the army. A decade ago, army planners did not see anything like ROVER being available until the 2020s.

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17 juillet 2012 2 17 /07 /juillet /2012 17:30

GAU-23-30mm-Mk44-Bushmaster-automatic-cannon-ac-130.jpg

 

July 17, 2012: Strategy Page

 

The U.S. Air Force has officially accepted the modified 30mm Mk44 Bushmaster automatic cannon as the GAU-23. For the last three years, modified (and continually tweaked) Mk44s have been operating on a dozen U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunships and, more recently as part of the U.S. Marine Corps Harvest Hawk ("instant gunship" via several pallets of sensors and weapons) version of the KC-130J tanker.

 

The 30mm Bushmaster cannon weighs 157 kg (344 pounds) and fires at 200 or 400 rounds per minute (up to 7 per second). The Bushmaster has 160 rounds available, before needing a reload. That means the gunner has 25-50 seconds worth of ammo, depending on rate of fire used. Each 30mm high explosive/incendiary round weighs about 714 g (25 ounces, depending on type.) The fire control system and night vision sensors, enables the 30mm gunners to accurately hit targets with high explosive shells. Earlier SOCOM AC-130 gunships are armed with a 105mm howitzer, a 25mm and 40mm automatic cannon. But the two smaller caliber guns are being phased out of military service. The air force is now equipping its gunships just with smart bombs and missiles as well as one or two GAU-23s.

 

The big thing with gunships is their sensors, not their weapons. Operating at night, the gunships can see what is going on below, in great detail. Using onboard weapons, gunships can immediately engage targets. But with the appearance of smart bombs (GPS and laser guided), aerial weapons are now capable of taking out just about any target. So gunships can hit targets that were "time sensitive" (had to be hit before they got away), but could also call on smart bombs or laser guided missiles for targets that weren't going anywhere right away. Most of what gunships do in Afghanistan is look for roadside bombs, or the guys who plant them. These gunships want to track back to their base, and then take out an entire roadside bomb operation.

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17 juillet 2012 2 17 /07 /juillet /2012 13:00

AirSeaCyber-concept--Image-defpro.com-.jpg

From an “AirSea” to an “AirSeaCyber” concept?

(Image: defpro.com)

 

July 17, 2012 Honolulu, Hawaii  By Harry J. Kazianis / Pacific Forum CSIS – defpro.com

 

U.S. military must integrate cyber considerations into new AirSea Battle concept

 

In Pacific Forum’s PacNet #41 issue, Mihoko Matsubara correctly asserts that “countering cyber threats demands cooperation among nations, in particular public-private partnerships.” Cyber war has finally made its way onto the radar, and rightly so. Now the United States military must integrate cyber considerations into its new AirSea Battle concept.

 

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that the “next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber-attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems.” If true, cyber must be front and center in any military refocusing to the Asia-Pacific. Any failure to not correctly plan against this lethal form of asymmetric warfare could be a catastrophic mistake.

 

The US seems to be focusing the military component of its widely discussed ‘pivot’ to Asia on China’s growing military capabilities. While neither side seeks confrontation and one hopes none will occur, China’s development of a highly capable Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) battle plan to deter, slow, or deny entry into a contested geographic area or combat zone has been detailed extensively. Cyber war is clearly part of this strategy, with Chinese planners prepared to wage ‘local wars under conditions of informatization,’ or high-intensity, information-centric regional military operations of short duration. Prudent military planners must be prepared to meet this potential threat. Other nations such as North Korea and Iran are also developing A2/AD capabilities with cyber based components that could challenge US or allied interests.

 

In this type of threat environment, the US, along with its allies, should develop its own symmetric and asymmetric counter-strategies. A joint operational concept of AirSea Battle that includes a strong cyber component would give US forces and their allies the best chance to defeat adversary A2/AD forces. Of course, the current Joint Operational Access Concept does make strong mention of cyber operations. However, an even stronger emphasis on cyber warfare is needed. In short, AirSea Battle as an operational concept might already be obsolete and it should be reconstituted as an “AirSeaCyber” concept.

 

If cyber is to become a full-fledged component of AirSea Battle, its conceptualization and integration are crucial. A simple first step must be the recognition that cyberspace is now one of the most important battlefield domains in which the US and allied militaries operate. It is not enough to exercise battlefield dominance in a physical sense with technologically advanced equipment. With vital but vulnerable computer networks, software, and operating systems a potential adversary may choose an asymmetric cyber ‘first-strike’ to damage its opponent’s networked combat capabilities. Enemy forces could attempt to ‘blind’ their opponent by crippling computer and network-centric command and control (C2), battlefield intelligence gathering, and combat capabilities by conducting advanced cyber operations. Simply put: US and allied forces must fully understand and articulate the severity of the threat they face before they can map out any national or multinational strategies.

 

Working with potential cyber allies to identify common threats and working to mitigate possible challenges is crucial. One viable partner in creating effective cyber capabilities is South Korea. Seoul faces a number of problems from a growing North Korean asymmetric threat in a physical sense, as well as multiple challenges in cyberspace. General James Thurman, US Forces Korea Commander, recently noted that “North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber-attacks.” Pyongyang utilizes cyber capabilities “against a variety of targets including military, governmental, educational and commercial institutions.” With the US committed to South Korea’s defense, creating partnerships in cyberspace can only enhance such a relationship. Both sides must look past physical threats and expand their partnership across this new domain of possible conflict.

 

Japan is another possible cyberspace partner. As Matsubara accurately points out, “They [US and Japan] have more to lose. If cyber-attacks and espionage undermine their economies or military capability, larger geostrategic balances may be affected and the negative consequences may spill over to other countries.” Both nations have reported hacking incidents from Chinese-based hackers that have targeted defense-related industries and programs. With Japan and the US partnering on joint projects such as missile defense and F-35 fighter jet, the protection of classified information associated with these programs must be a top priority. As military allies, both must plan for possible regional conflict where cyber warfare could be utilized against them.

 

Sadly, restraints could develop that might hamper such partnerships. One recent example: historical and political tensions have delayed and possibly halted a defense agreement between Japan and South Korea. The pact would have assisted in the direct sharing of sensitive military information concerning North Korea, China, and missile defenses. Presumably, cyber-related information would have been at the center of such sharing. The agreement was supported by Washington, which has been working to reinforce trilateral cooperation with the two countries, as essential Asian allies. With all three nations facing a common challenge from North Korea, such an agreement would have been highly beneficial to all parties.

 

If other nations’ military planners rely heavily on asymmetric warfare strategies, US planners and their allies must also utilize such capabilities in developing their response. Cyber warfare offers proportionally the strongest asymmetric capabilities at the lowest possible cost. Almost all military C2 and deployed weapons systems rely on computer hardware and software. As other nations’ military planners develop networked joint operations to multi-domain warfare, they also open their systems for exploitation by cyber-attack. US and allied technology experts must begin or accelerate long-range studies of possible adversaries’ hardware, software, computer networks, and fiber optic communications. This will allow US and allied cyber commands to deploy malware, viruses, and coordinated strikes on fiber-based communications networks that would launch any enemy offensive or defensive operations. Cyber warfare, if conducted in coordination with standard tactical operations, could be the ultimate cross-domain asymmetric weapon in modern 21st century warfare against any nation that utilizes networked military technologies.

 

Any good operational concept must always attempt to minimize any negative consequences of its implementation. AirSeaCyber presents US policymakers and their allies with a toolkit to deal with the diverse global military challenges of the 21st Century. The inclusion of cyber obviously declares that the US and its allies are prepared to enter a new domain of combat operations. This focus could unnecessarily draw attention to a domain that should be left to ‘fight in the shadows’ to avoid engendering a new battleground with deadly consequences. Some argue that with the use of cyber weapons against Iran to degrade its ability to develop uranium enrichment technology, a dangerous new international norm – operational use of cyber weapons – is upon us.

 

While these arguments have some validity, cyber war, whether against corporations, nation-states, or even individuals, is now part of daily life. To not prepare fully for this eventuality means facing battlefield obsolescence. Any student of history knows the results of preparing for the wars of years past-likely defeat.

 

These are only a sample of capabilities that could be utilized to create a joint operational concept that transition from present AirSea Battle ideas into a more focused AirSeaCyber operational concept. Such notions are compliant with current fiscal realities, utilize modern military technologies, and can leverage existing alliance networks. Any operational concept that will guide US armed forces in the future is obsolete without intense conceptualizations of cyber warfare. Working with allies to develop ties in cyberspace in the Asia-Pacific can only create a strong force multiplier effect and should be considered a top priority.

 

(Harry Kazianis is Assistant Editor for The Diplomat and a non-resident fellow at the Pacific Forum. PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed.)

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13 juillet 2012 5 13 /07 /juillet /2012 12:20

Predator over Afghanistan photo USAF

 

13 July 2012 defenceweb.co.za (Reuters)

 

Having revolutionized warfare for the United States in the last 15 years, unmanned aerial drones are going global as the number of countries building and operating them soars.

 

Until now, such systems have largely been the exclusive purview of the U.S. and a handful of allies. Washington allowed Britain, Italy and Turkey to buy U.S.-built drones and operate them usually alongside U.S. forces, but largely rejected requests from other nations keen to acquire the same capability.

 

But that is quickly changing. U.S. firm General Atomics expects to make its first sales of an unarmed version of its Predator drones this year, with Latin America and the Middle East seen to be particularly fertile markets, Reuters reports.

 

"There has been very considerable international interest," retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Christopher Ames, now director of international strategic development for the company, told Reuters at this week's Farnborough International Airshow.

 

Flanked by video screens showing the firm's products in action in Iraq, Afghanistan and tracking pirates over the Indian Ocean, Ames said their combat record spoke for itself.

 

Not only were human air crew not put at risk, he said, but use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) also offered huge savings in fuel and personnel costs over conventional manned aircraft.

 

"The nations that have been operating with us in coalition... have seen what it can do in practice," he said.. "Their conviction goes beyond what marketing hype can provide."

 

Privately owned San Diego-based General Atomics was one of the pioneers of early drone technology, operating them first in the Balkans in the 1990s. While the Israeli military has long embraced unmanned aircraft, recruiting specialists directly from model aircraft clubs, other air forces including that of the United States were initially distinctly skeptical.

 

But the wars that followed the attacks of September 11, 2001 changed all that. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, U.S. forces have become increasingly reliant on drones ranging from tiny aircraft operated by infantrymen to those that can fly hundreds or even thousands of miles and stay aloft over 24 hours.

 

Under the presidency of Barack Obama in particular, they have often been the weapon of choice for targeted killings of leading al Qaeda militants, as well as a favorite tool for long-range spy flights over potentially unfriendly countries.

 

The winding down of combat operations in Afghanistan may reduce the current level of U.S. drone demand, industry executives say. But the global market, they suspect, is only beginning to hot up.

 

Until now, Washington has remained able to exercise considerable control over even those drones it has sold abroad. Britain's Royal Air Force, for example, bases the pilots flying its drones over Afghanistan at a U.S. air force base in Nevada alongside their U.S. counterparts.

 

That, experts say, cannot last.

 

DRONES PRIDE OF PLACE

 

"In the future, if you're a moderately serious air force... you're going to want to have at least a medium-level endurance drone with the capability to mount reconnaissance and probably deploy weapons," says Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow for aerospace at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies. "It also may or may not be stealthy... We are only at the very beginning of that now."

 

With aircraft such as Predator, the much longer-range Global Hawk built by Northrop Grumman Corp and the top-secret and stealthy Lockheed Martin Sentinel -- one of which crashed and was captured on an apparent mission over Iran last year -- the United States remains by far the leader of the pack.

 

But perhaps inevitably, the gap is closing.

 

At this year's Farnborough Air Show, almost every major international aircraft maker brought with them their own latest drone. Outside its large chalet, Britain's BAE Systems displayed its long-range Taranis stealth UAV prototype in prime position alongside its Hawk trainer -- the aircraft used by the RAF's Red Arrows display team -- as well as a World War Two-era Spitfire.

 

"What we're looking at is effectively jumping straight to the next generation," said Martin Rowe-Wilcocks, BAE head of international business development for future combat air systems. "We're able to look at those systems that are already in service and learn from them."

 

Israel has long sold small unarmed drones to a range of countries, but other producers are also muscling in. Russian news agency RIA Novosti reported in April that Russia hoped to fly its first prototype domestically produced armed drone as soon as 2014.

 

China has made it clear it is interested in building similar systems, and both countries are expected to have done what they can to persuade Tehran to share its captured Sentinel.

 

As demand but also international competition rises, some U.S. firms worry Washington's attempts to slow the spread of drone technology may leave it falling behind.

 

Diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show several countries including United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia asking U.S. officials to buy armed drones but being rebuffed.

 

Washington says its commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a non-binding international agreement designed to limit the spread of long-range precision weaponry, restrict drone export.

 

U.S. FIRMS DISADVANTAGED?

 

Industry leaders warn that could see the U.S. drone sector going the way of its commercial satellite production, effectively strangled by export controls seen as effectively killing its dominance of the sector just as new rivals emerge.

 

"The unmanned area is growing by leaps and bounds," says Marion Blakey, president of the Aerospace Industries Association. "The Missile Technology Control Regime is something that really needs to be addressed because it's disadvantaging U.S. industry."

 

The export-variant Predator, General Atomics says, should deal with some of those concerns. It will have no "hard points" to attach missiles and would be deliberately engineered to make adding new weaponry impossible, it says.

 

Retailing at $3-4 million an item, the unarmed export drone is way cheaper than most equivalent aircraft, Ames said.

 

"There are countries that for a long time have been asking for Predator," he said. "It (the export variant) opens that up to us."

 

Other U.S. defense firms are also investing growing quantities of their own money in new and innovative UAVs. Boeing recently test-flew its prototype "Phantom Eye", a high-altitude drone capable of staying airborne for days at a time.

 

Even if foreign markets remain sometimes off-limits, the Pentagon is seen as still keen to expand the use of drones into new areas. Lockheed Martin says it is investing in unmanned technologies and plans to compete for a future U.S. Navy contract to build a next-generation drone that will operate from aircraft carriers.

 

That contest is also likely to include Northrop Grumman Corp, maker of the X-47B, a U.S. Navy program that is demonstrating some of the initial capabilities that would be packed on the future carrier drones.

 

Officials say Britain is also increasingly interested in naval drones to operate from carriers as well as a range of smaller warships. But BAE's Rowe-Wilcocks says the real growth area will ultimately be the civilian sector.

 

Within a decade or so, he believes unmanned aircraft will routinely operate in European air space, providing surveillance for law enforcement agencies, maritime patrol and a host of other functions.

 

"The test will be whether the public will accept unmanned aircraft overhead in the way they accept those with someone in the cockpit," he says. "At this stage, I think we're more or less there technologically. It is really going to be a regulatory and particularly cultural challenge."

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10 juillet 2012 2 10 /07 /juillet /2012 12:23

The-HEADS-sensor-inside-a-combat-helmet.-Photo-BAE-Systems.jpg

 

The HEADS sensor inside a combat helmet.

Photo BAE Systems

 

10 July 2012 army-technology.com

 

BAE Systems has been awarded a contract modification for the delivery of additional Headborne Energy Analysis and Diagnostic Systems (HEADS) sensors to the US Army, to help determine the effects on the head from impacts during combat-related blast or explosions.

 

The new $16.9m contract extension forms a part of the original five-year contract secured by the company in June 2010 and brings the total value of the deal to approximately $34m.

 

Under the terms of new contract, the company will supply an unspecified number of HEADS Generation II helmet sensors to the army, which already uses more than 20,000 sensors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Don Dutton, BAE Systems protection vice president and general manager, said that the army had an urgent demand for technologies for identification of those in need of medical assistance for potential head and brain injuries sustained during combat operations.

 

''Traumatic brain injuries are known as a signature injury for soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan," he said. "The data collected by HEADS during a traumatic event can be used to develop better protective equipment and for supporting further medical treatment."

 

The HEADS is a small sensor placed inside a combat helmet to help the army and medical practitioners identify and diagnose combat-related traumatic brain injuries (TBI).

"Traumatic brain injuries are known as a signature injury for soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The data collected by HEADS during a traumatic event can be used to develop better protective equipment and for supporting further medical treatment."

 

The sensors enable constant and automatic collection of potentially lifesaving data, such as impact duration, blast pressures, ambient temperature, angular and linear accelerations, as well as the exact times of single or multiple blast events.

 

HEADS Generation II is an upgraded version of the company's HEADS Generation I sensor, featuring a wireless technology for downloading summary data of recorded events, a longer battery life, expanded pressure measurement and angular rate data.

 

Deliveries under the contract are scheduled to take place by the end of January 2013.

 

So far, the company has delivered more than 7,600 HEADS Generation I sensors to the US Army and Marine Corps from late 2007 to 2008.

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10 juillet 2012 2 10 /07 /juillet /2012 11:40

us army logo

 

July 10, 2012 defpro.com

 

PHOENIX | The U.S. Army has ordered thousands of additional helmet sensors that can be used to record the severity of head movements and impacts during a combat-related blast or explosion. The sensors, called Headborne Energy Analysis and Diagnostic Systems (HEADS), are provided by BAE Systems and are revolutionizing the way data is captured, stored and retrieved to determine the effects that improvised explosive devices and other blunt impacts have on a Soldier’s head.

 

Under a new $16.9 million contract, BAE Systems will deliver the HEADS Generation II sensors by January of next year. This order will be in addition to approximately 20,000 sensors that are already in use.

 

“Traumatic Brain Injuries are known as a signature injury for Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan,” said Don Dutton, vice president and general manager of Protection Systems at BAE Systems. “The Army has an urgent demand for technologies that help identify individuals who may be in need of medical assistance for potential head and brain injuries. The data collected by HEADS during a traumatic event can be used to develop better protective equipment and for supporting further medical treatment.”

 

Positioned beneath the crown suspension pad of most combat helmets, HEADS allows the Army and medical practitioners to continuously measure and collect critical and potentially lifesaving data. These include impact duration, blast pressures, ambient temperature, angular and linear accelerations, as well as the exact times of single or multiple blast events. The placement of the sensor inside the helmet ensures that accurate measurements are achieved.

 

From late 2007 and into 2008, BAE Systems delivered more than 7,600 HEADS Generation I sensors to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Then HEADS Generation II was developed, introducing a wireless technology to download summary data of recorded events. Other enhancements to the sensor included a longer battery life, expanded pressure measurement and angular rate data.

 

The latest $16.9 million award is part of a five-year contract awarded in June 2010. This award brings the cumulative value of the contract to approximately $34 million.

 

BAE Systems is a leading provider of Soldier protective and load carrying equipment in the United States, producing a significant portion of the nation’s body armor, tactical vests, combat helmets and load carrying systems. Not only is the company focused on the design, development and production of leading edge survivability products, but its integration of advanced materials into manufacturing, rigorous product testing and field trials support the company’s focus on the men and women who serve in the armed forces.

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9 juillet 2012 1 09 /07 /juillet /2012 07:55

pentagon source defenseWeb

 

Jul. 7, 2012 by ZACHARY FRYER-BIGGS Defense news

 

U.S.-based prime contractors may be looking for ways to cut costs in a difficult defense market, but they’re not skimping on lobbying.

 

The top five U.S. defense contractors increased spending on lobbying by a combined 11.5 percent in the first quarter of 2012 compared to the same quarter in 2011, a review of lobbying disclosure forms by Defense News found.

 

The increase, following a down year in 2011, brought lobbying investment for Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman to a combined total of $15.9 million for the quarter ending March 31. The number represented a new combined high in the four years that all five companies have been filing disclosures.

 

Lobbying disclosure filings are required under the Open Government Act of 2007, with quarterly data available going back only to 2009. The forms represent lobbying on Capitol Hill, as well as the Defense Department and the White House.

 

As spending on lobbying tends to be seasonal, coinciding with the legislative calendar, the review compared only first-quarter numbers from 2009 to 2012. The first quarter of the year includes the annual release of the Pentagon’s budget request to Congress, along with posture hearings on Capitol Hill involving senior military leaders.

 

Northrop Grumman led the charge, increasing its spending by 51 percent compared to 2011, followed by Lockheed Martin, which increased spending by 25 percent.

 

“Northrop got a whole new shop, they cleaned house,” said a lobbyist who has worked with large defense companies. “They moved their headquarters out here so their CEO is much more focused on Washington than he was before.”

 

The company — which moved its headquarters from Los Angeles to Falls Church, Va., in 2011 — would not detail its legislative goals but wrote in an email that it values interaction with government.

 

“As a leader in global security, Northrop Grumman believes it is important that the company participate in the democratic process at the federal, state and local level, to help ensure that support for a strong national defense is well-represented,” the statement said.

 

The lobbying spike is partially attributable to the election year, said Loren Thompson, an industry consultant and chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute, Arlington, Va.

 

“Election years often see a surge in lobbying activity as companies try to posture themselves to be supportive of key legislators,” Thompson said.

 

The last election year for the House of Representatives, 2010, also saw a large increase in spending compared to 2009. Combined first-quarter 2010 spending was $15.5 million, up 18.3 percent from 2009. In 2011, a non-election year, spending fell by 7.9 percent.

 

The ongoing discussion about the future of defense spending and the specter of automatic budget cuts is also leading to interest in lobbying, the companies said.

 

“We’ve never seen a more problematic economic and global security environment in the U.S. and in so many economies around the world,” Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Jennifer Allen wrote in an email. “That means the political leaders around the globe, and especially here at home, are going to have to make some very tough decisions. In this environment, there are many voices being raised, particularly in an election year, and we believe it is critical to have our voice heard on issues that are important to our future.”

 

Lockheed’s first-quarter spending had declined the past two years, before the sizable 2012 increase.

 

While companies may be pointing to larger economic trends, lobbying has been much more focused on individual programs, the defense lobbyist said. Lockheed in particular is likely gearing up for fights about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, he said. “They’re not pushing for general budget lobbying, nobody is; they should be, but they aren’t.”

 

Northrop’s lobbying pattern follows the arc of recent spending decisions. The company increased its spending by 61 percent for the first quarter of 2010, when it was heavily involved in the U.S. Air Force’s competition for a new aerial refueling tanker plane, before announcing in March of that year that the company would bow out.

 

The company’s 2011 spending fell by 35 percent with no major programming decisions on the horizon, and 2012 corresponds with discussion of canceling the Air Force’s Block 30 Global Hawk UAV order, which the Pentagon announced it would do in February.

 

“What happened in 2011, with the passage of the Budget Control Act, the discussion of where defense spending was headed shifted from a program focus to an overall budget focus, which doesn’t lend itself as well to lobbying,” Thompson said.

 

Both Boeing and Raytheon saw small increases in 2012 spending, growing by 1 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

 

“Boeing continually advocates on behalf of its businesses in both the commercial aviation market and the defense market,” Boeing spokesman Marcellus Rolle wrote in an email. “The objective of our lobbying efforts is to strategically and tactically interact with the legislative and executive branches of federal, state and local governments to urge support on issues of interest to Boeing.”

 

General Dynamics was the lone company to decrease spending, likely attributable to the end of an aggressive lobbying campaign for the updated Stryker troop-carrying vehicle for the Army.

 

Raytheon declined to comment for this article, and General Dynamics did not immediately return calls for comment. All three companies that commented emphasized that the companies comply with all lobbying disclosure requirements.

 

The magnitude of the numbers, on average about $3 million per company, pales in comparison to the totals they actually spend advocating for legislative action, Thompson said.

 

“What these numbers show is that government records only capture a portion of the money spent to influence politicians,” he said. “The definition of lobbying is quite precise, and therefore, things that might legitimately be regarded as influencing government policy sometimes do not fall under the category of lobbying for purposes of the law.”

 

Lockheed, like all major defense contractors, has a variety of interactions with government officials, Allen said.

 

“With 82 percent of our company’s sales derived from U.S. government customers, we naturally have interactions with virtually every standing committee in the United States Congress who has oversight authority over the budgets and policies of all federal agencies, and by extension, the products and services that Lockheed Martin provides to them,” she said.

 

As budget pressures increase, lobbying may soon take a hit, the defense lobbyist said. “A lot of the contractors have been reducing the number of consultants that they have, avoiding fee increases, but we haven’t had the fights that we had in previous years.”

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23 juin 2012 6 23 /06 /juin /2012 11:30

CH-53E-Super-Stallion-04-2012

 

June 22, 2012 defpro.com

 

PATUXENT RIVER, Md. | Escorted by military police and with a crowd of onlookers, Hawaii’s first CH-53E Super Stallion containerized flight training device, or CFTD, made its debut recently at Marine Corps Base Hawaii.

 

The CFTD simulator is a self-contained, fully transportable device that arrived via ship at the Port of Honolulu. It was loaded on two tractor trailers and delivered to the Marine Corps base April 9.

 

“The simulator is the first-of-its-kind for the Super Stallion community,” said Capt. John Feeney, Naval Aviation Training Systems program manager, whose office oversaw the development of the device. “With the Marine Corps’ transition from CH-53Ds to the ‘E‘ variant, the CFTD will provide pilots with the capability to complete critical, simulator designated tactical training and readiness (T&R) requirements.”

 

Manned Flight Simulator and J.F. Taylor personnel from Patuxent River, Md., were on-hand to begin the two-week construction process required to install the CFTD.

 

The two halves of the simulator, each comprising an inner and an outer section, were lifted off the tractor trailers and placed on a concrete pad equipped with power connections. The outer sections were vertically lifted to reveal the inner wall surrounding the cockpit, forming a contained “airspace” above the cockpit.

 

Finally, the two halves were joined together to form a fully enclosed apparatus.

 

“Until the CH-53E CFTD is ready for training, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 463 pilots will continue to conduct basic mission skills training in a legacy Weapon Systems Trainer (WST),” said Maj. Kevin Halpin, Marine Aviation Training Systems Site officer-in-charge. “Once the CH-53E CFTD is operational, pilots will increase their combat readiness through completion of T&R training, which preserves CH-53E aircraft flight hours for real-world missions and dramatically reduces cost.”

 

This CFTD fully supports training for CH-53E crew coordination, emergency procedures, aerial refueling, terrain flight, confined area landings and shipboard operations. Training can be conducted in day mode or simulated night environment using night-vision goggles.

 

An enhanced aircrew externals trainer (EAET) that will support enlisted aircrew training is due to arrive late summer. The EAET can be linked with the CFTD to support full aircrew mission rehearsal and proficiency training.

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18 juin 2012 1 18 /06 /juin /2012 17:12
Kenya denies hosting US surveillance aircraft

 

 

18 June 2012 by defenceWeb

 

The Kenyan military has denied that the United States is using its territory or airspace to conduct surveillance flights over Africa, but confirmed the presence of US troops at the Manda Bay naval base.

 

Last week the Washington Post ran a story on US spy flights in Africa and stated that the US military had plans to establish a surveillance base in Kenya, as well as South Sudan. The newspaper went on to say that an engineering battalion of Navy Seabees has been assigned to complete a US$10 million runway upgrade at the Manda Bay naval base.

 

An Africa Command (Africom) spokeswoman said the runway extension was necessary so US C-130 Hercules can land at night and during bad weather. The newspaper said that about 120 US military personnel and contractors are stationed at Manda Bay, which Navy SEALs and other commandos have used as a base from which to conduct raids against Somali pirates and al-Shabaab fighters.

 

The US military in a statement in response to the Washington Post article confirmed that it runs ‘broad ranging’ intelligence operations on the continent and that “the United States routinely works with its African partner nations to counter those who would threaten regional security and stability in Africa.”

 

The US military said it employs its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in Africa “based on security threats of mutual concern.”

 

A spokesman for the Kenyan Defence Forces, Colonel Cyrus Oguna, said he had no knowledge of a US surveillance programme in Kenya. “As far as we are concerned, the US is not using any Kenyan airspace or any bases from where they can be able to launch observation vessels,” Oguna said. “However, I know that we do have bilateral arrangements in terms of sharing information and intelligence to fight terror.”

 

The Washington Post article stated that the United States has established a dozen air bases on the continent since 2007, mainly for surveillance purposes. Most are small operations run out of secluded hangars at African military bases or civilian airports. Surveillance is overseen by US Special Operations forces but relies to a large extent on private military contractors and support from African troops. This allows these operations to fly below the radar. Using Pilatus PC-12 (U-28) surveillance aircraft rather than unmanned aerial vehicles also keeps the profile of these operations low.

 

Africa has emerged as a greater priority for the US government because terrorist groups there have become an increasing threat to US and regional security. The US is concerned about al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), insurgents in Mali, Boko Haram extremists in Nigeria and al Shabaab militia in Somalia. In central Africa, around 100 US special forces are assisting in the hunt for warlord Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

 

The United States has launched air strikes in Somalia and Yemen using unmanned aerial vehicles, but has also deployed F-15E Strike Eagles to Djibouti. However, elsewhere in Africa, military commanders told the Washington Post that their role is generally limited to intelligence gathering and sharing.

 

Some of the bases are in Ethiopia, the Seychelles, Burkina Faso and Uganda. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, is the only permanent US base in Africa. About 2 000 US personnel are deployed there as part of Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, many from the Army National Guard.

 

"It's a great strategic location," US Africa Command chief General Carter Ham told the American Forces Press Service. "It facilitates not only our operations for US Africa Command, but also US Central Command and US Transportation Command. It is a very key hub and important node for us, a good location that allows us to extend our reach in East Africa and partner with the countries of East Africa."

 

Ham asked the US Congress last year to support the command’s efforts to expand its intelligence-gathering capabilities in order to monitor terror threats across Africa. He said the main targets are al-Shabab in Somalia, the Lord’s Resistance Army across central Africa and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the west.

 

In February this year Ham told the House Armed Services Committee that the United States has no plans to seek permanent bases in Africa, and, in the spirit of the new defence strategic guidance, will continue to maintain a "light footprint" on the continent.

 

With no troops directly assigned to it, Africa Command relies heavily on its service components: US Army Africa based in Vicenza, Italy; US Air Forces Africa, at Ramstein Air Base, Germany; US Marine Forces Africa and Special Operations Command Africa, both based in Stuttgart, Germany. Ham said that there are no plans to relocate Africom’s headquarters to the African continent.

 

Ham said he recognizes concerns among some African countries about an increased U.S. presence on the continent, but emphasized that cost alone would preclude the United States from establishing more permanent bases there.

 

Ham told the American Forces Press Service that a safe, secure and stable Africa is in the United States' national interests, and that Africans are best suited to address African security challenges. "Countering the threats posed by al-Qaeda affiliates in East and Northwest Africa remains my number 1 priority," Ham said.

 

But for security to take hold in Africa for the long-term, Ham also recognizes the importance of strengthening African partners' defence capabilities so they can address their own security challenges. He noted ongoing efforts to increase capacity in peacekeeping, maritime security, disaster response and other key areas. The general noted the value of this investment, from "train-the-trainer" sessions conducted at the tactical level to leader development programs that will have positive long-term strategic implications.

 

"We are planting seeds, if you will, and allowing those to develop and grow," he said, noting that it's all being done with no permanently assigned forces and limited forces on the ground.

 

"I think we get a disproportionate positive effect for a relatively small investment," Ham said. "We don't use lots of troops. Generally, our exercises and engagements are pretty small-scale." They typically involve an individual ship, a small group of Marines, Seabees or veterinarians, or a maintenance detachment, he explained.

 

Earlier it was reported that the United States will have 3 000 soldiers serving in Africa next. The US Army last month announced it would deploy a brigade to Africa in 2013 as part of a pilot programme that assigns brigades on a rotational basis to regions around the globe. At least 3 000 soldiers will serve tours across the continent next year, training foreign militaries and aiding locals.

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7 juin 2012 4 07 /06 /juin /2012 11:39

USS Fort Worth crédits LOCKHEED MARTIN

 

07.06.2012 By Galrhan - informationdissemination.net

 

Today's guest is Christopher Cavas, Journalist at Defense News and Navy Times.

"You have covered the Littoral Combat Ship program from inception to present, and know the history of the program as well as anyone. You have written a story on virtually every newsworthy event related to the Littoral Combat Ship from the beginning. You are one of a handful of people outside the Navy and Industry who has both a deep history and familiarity with the program. Some suggest the LCS program should be canceled. Others say the LCS program has merit. What is the Littoral Combat Ship in your words, and what should LCS be looking to the future?"

The Littoral Combat Ship is, in a word, a challenge. A challenge to understand, a challenge to develop, a challenge to build. The program is a challenge to manage, to defend, to get to sea. To train for and crew, to support, to maintain. To develop mission modules for, to perfect and operate dozens of new technologies in those modules, to control those technologies in an operational environment. A challenge to develop a concept of operations for, to convey to the fleet what it should be used for, to keep from being misused.

For a decade now, the program has struggled to explain its purpose. It remains an incomplete story, constantly threatened, continually under attack, and desperately anxious to prove itself. The challenge to validate the program is repeated with every annual budget cycle, inside the Pentagon and to Congress.

The political challenge is constantly repeated as lawmakers come and go. Recently, several politicians relatively new to the program or to Capitol Hill have called for stronger oversight and more government reports.

But LCS has never suffered from a lack of oversight. Questions about the program’s progress were a regular feature of every Navy posture hearing beginning in 2004. The House Armed Services Committee, particularly Seapower subcommittee Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.) and his successor Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.), routinely held LCS hearings featuring not only Navy and industry reps, but all the strongest LCS critics, including government oversight experts from the Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and the Government Accountability Office, along with a host of think tank witnesses (including Bob Work, then a Washington analyst, now, as Navy under secretary, the ship’s cheerleader-in-chief). A series of Pentagon oversight entities constantly reviewed the program’s purpose and performance, usually with strong criticisms and guidance. For years, every budget bill report from the House and Senate appropriations and armed services committees has contained strong language expressing concerns about the program’s performance, even while continuing to support the LCS concept.
 

US Navy Photo

Most of this discussion centered on the two LCS ship designs. Yet the mission modules -- the key to the LCS concept of a platform able to change missions with a swap of equipment -- continue to be a problem area, often poorly articulated by presenters and misunderstood by listeners. LCS discussions still focus on the ships, something perhaps not hard to understand given that the makeup of the mine module has changed, the equipment and the very concept of the anti-submarine module has been fundamentally altered, and the surface module lost its surface-to-surface missile -- the most powerful element it had going. All of this compounded by the fact that none of the modules is in service, or even been operationally demonstrated.
With two ships in commission, another about to be delivered, and more on the way, the LCS is now moving into an entirely new phase, transitioning from a development, acquisition and shipbuilding program into an operational mode. The center of LCS discussion is moving outside Washington to Norfolk and San Diego. Next year it will jump across the world’s largest ocean and drop squarely in Singapore, where the western Pacific press, from a variety of viewpoints, will be taking great notice.

The fleet is only tentatively picking up the LCS drumbeat. Inside the beltway, Work is today the type’s primary champion, staunchly and often emotionally defending and explaining the ship to any and all comers. The Navy’s top leadership and the flags at NAVSEA continue to talk up the program and the Pentagon’s surface directorate is joining in. U.S. Fleet Forces commander Adm. John Harvey in Norfolk has been a key advocate, particularly in his admonitions last year to fleet commanders not to use the ship in roles for which it isn’t intended. Vice Adm. Richard Hunt, commander of naval surface forces in San Diego, now is speaking about the Freedom’s potential to be an effective fleet unit.

But years of over-reaching promises followed by long production delays have eroded confidence among mid-level officers and experienced sailors in the program’s future. O-4s and O-5s, E-7s and E-8s seem to be routinely advising their juniors to bypass LCS and aim for more established programs. O-6s who five years ago were enthusiastic LCS supporters have turned away.

Even the voice of industry has become somewhat muted. Lockheed Martin remains out in front in many LCS promotion efforts, joined now by the Italian firm Fincantieri, which purchased the Marinette Marine shipyard that builds LockMart’s ships. But General Dynamics has gone virtually silent, a consequence of a 2010 decision to split from its Austal USA shipbuilding partner to position itself for future LCS ships, only to see that possibility slip away with yet another Navy change-of-concept for the program’s construction. Austal USA, a small-time operation compared with the GD behemoth, has not come close to matching its former partner’s PR efforts.

Adding to a lack of cohesiveness, both LCS primes still convey a sense of competition, even though the Navy is committed -- for the moment -- to building equal numbers of each type. The “ours is better than theirs” attitude might be good for one or other of the designs, but it is not helping the overall LCS effort.
 

 
US Navy Photo

This is a frustrating time in the program’s development. The two prototype ships have yet to take effective mission modules into action. The adolescent concept is starting to look real -- both LCS ships finally joined together at the beginning of May in San Diego -- but it will still be some time before an LCS is doing something the Navy really needs it to do.

From the mid-2000s when the LCS construction schedule started to slide and zoom up in cost, the program acquired a widely-acknowledged reputation as a troubled (that’s a nice word for it) effort. Navy mismanagement, changing priorities, overzealous and unrealistic expectations, shipyard and contractor inexperience all piled on to give the program an aura of unrelenting chaos. People might not understand what it was, but lots of folks -- particularly on Capitol Hill -- knew it was a mess. It took years for the service to work its way through numerous issues. Many problems remain, but it seems now the worst has been overcome, at least from a programmatic standpoint. In fact, from many aspects -- steady schedule, fixed pricing, stable design, increasing shipbuilding experience -- the LCS program is entering into a new era of maturity.

But widespread negative perceptions remain, and everyone involved in the effort remains challenged to demonstrate it can do what it is supposed to do. Still without any concrete missions accomplished, the LCS continues to be the target of often withering criticisms. The past few months in particular have seen a dramatic rise in the number of negative media stories, followed by attention-craving Congressmen calling for more oversight and more hearings and more reviews.

Problem is, none of these recent negative reports has offered anything new. More information about old problems, in some cases, but no new issues. Eternal hand-wringing about old problems is fun for some, but is it productive? Who is questioning the questioners? Or is it just a familiar tune that everyone’s used to?

Junior lawmakers new to the game or those who never sat on the relevant committees calling for new hearings about things they missed is nothing new. But that they do so is not always related to good oversight -- sometimes it’s just good old-fashioned grandstanding. (Imagine, politicians trying to call attention to themselves!)

Reporters writing shallow or repetitive stories, and editors calling for similar stories because everyone else is doing them, is not good journalism, even when it comes from leading publications. Sometimes it’s an honestly elusive story, sometimes it’s just plain lazy.

Leakers who offer deeper information about situations already reported don’t always have great new stuff, sometimes they just have more stuff.

Think tanks who jump on these reports as indicators of true developments, rather than media and political frenzies, don’t help by granting an aura of learned pretentiousness to the discussions.

Critics who simply don’t like the LCS concept – and aren’t going to change their minds -- aren’t always describing real problems. Sometimes they’re just talking about their personal preferences. Sometimes they just don’t want to take the time to really find out what’s happening, repetitively recycling great rants from yesteryear.

On the other side of the argumentative aisle, Navy leaders describing the LCS as a mature, well-thought out and operationally proven system do the entire effort a disservice by getting ahead of the game. Talking about four ships in Singapore, eight ships in Bahrain, or meaningful contributions to the art of mine sweeping and anti-submarine warfare and surface actions and drug hunting isn’t very helpful when you try and make it sound like you’re out there right now doing that sort of thing.
 

US Navy Photo

With the primary acquisition challenges now dealt with, with the Navy beginning to focus on the effort to get these ships into service, here’s the crux of LCS from here on out: change.

To be sure, there are plans in place for everything the Navy’s planners can think of. But chances are exceptionally high that everything will change as the ships and their crews take them to sea.

LCS is not a done deal. It is not a mature, final design. It does not have a fully proven concept of operations. It is not clear how many sailors should crew the ship, or if a group of manned and unmanned off-board vehicles can be simultaneously and effectively operated, or if those systems will work, or what effect having an LCS with any particular module will truly have on an operation. It is not known whether either of the combat systems will be completely effective (probably not), what specific changes should be made, or how they can be made to both ships. It is not clear which module handling system work efficiently and not break down when you need it. It is not known if the networked communications, computer and control systems will work effectively. It is not known what the final costs will be to buy the modules and operate the ships on a forward-deployed basis. It is not known if the supply, maintenance and parts support systems will be effective. Heck, it is not known if they should begin painting the aluminum superstructures and hulls. It is not known -- well, you get the idea.

Anyone calling for a halt in the program while definitive answers are found to any of these questions is demonstrating a deep absence of understanding what the program is about. That is not the point, sir. Yes, there is a plan, there is a concept, there is a certain direction, but the end result in many cases may well not be what is currently envisioned.

The ships were designed with a main battery unlike anything ever carried by a combatant ship: empty space. Big, empty mission bays ready to accept large containers of equipment and systems, along with flight decks much larger in proportion to other surface fighting ships.

Will some of the mission equipment not work well? Probably. Have something better? No problem. Change it. Bring stuff in and install it, ship stuff out, bring in different stuff.

You can’t do that on other warships. Can’t do it on Arleigh Burke or Zumwalt destroyers, or new British or French or Italian or Chinese or Russian destroyers and frigates. Forget about other 3,200-ton frigates or corvettes, they’re already packed with gear. When those systems age or become obsolescent, the ships will age with them. But an LCS is designed to grow, change and morph over time, adapting to changing requirements and priorities in -- it is hoped -- an efficient and effective manner.

No navy has ever had a ship like this. The Danes tried the modular concept on a much lower level, but the LCS takes the idea significantly further. If it works, it will mean the Navy has gotten a new minesweeper, a new inshore ASW ship, a new brown water surface combatant, a new special operations platform, a new maritime interdiction ship, all in one platform. If it doesn’t work -- well, it won’t be the first time a type of ship entered service and then faded away after a few years. That’s not good, but it certainly happens.

A little history. In 1927, two of the biggest ships in the world were commissioned into the U.S. Navy. The huge aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga dwarfed the fleet’s battleships and represented an enormous investment, particularly in a peacetime Navy that faced no urgent threat. One might have presumed the Navy had really thought out this aircraft-carrier thing, knew how to design the ships, operate the systems and planes, fit them into fleet battle concepts and tactics. But that might be presumptuous.

Many people know that the Navy designation for an aircraft carrier is CV. What many people don’t know is what that originally stood for -- cruiser, heavier-than-air. Those enormous aircraft carriers were cruisers, or scouts. They had eight-inch guns to fight off the other guy’s scouts, and their aircraft were largely intended to scout the enemy so the big battlewagons could move into position.

It was another 16 years or so before the modern concept of an aircraft carrier matured. Years of experimentation, trial-and-error work, technological development, a huge tactical leap demonstrated by a skilled enemy, and the loss in five months of four of the fleet’s seven fleet carriers produced lessons learned that resulted in a combat system far removed from 1927. But many of those matured concepts of 1943, through many technical evolutions, are still at the core of today’s carrier strike group concepts.

Hopefully it won’t take that long, or cost that much in blood and bucks, to mature the LCS concept into an effective naval unit. But the challenge facing today’s Navy is to make the system work, to find its weak points and come up with changes, to find out what it can really do and stay away from what it won’t. To adapt what you’ve got to what you need.

And yes, government testers, oversight committee members, critics and reporters, there won’t be final answers to many of these questions for some time. Get used to it. Roll with it. That’s the idea.

NOTE: All views expressed herein are my own, and are not connected to, nor do they represent in any way, Defense News or Gannett Government Media.

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5 juin 2012 2 05 /06 /juin /2012 07:15
United States curbs on Javelin missile sale cloud Indo-US relationship

 

Jun 05, 2012 Ajai Shukla - business-standard.com

 

New Delhi - A dangerous flashpoint in United States-India relations faces visiting US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, who faces tough questions from Indian officials on Tuesday. The US State Department has slashed India’s request for Javelin anti-tank missiles, offering instead a smaller quantity that Washington sources say is “less than half of what India has requested for.”

 

Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials are furious that Washington, an avowed strategic partner, has pared down India’s requirement of Javelin missiles, even while arguing that defence sales are a cornerstone of the US-Indian strategic relationship.

 

“This (US reduced offer) is a deal killer. Washington will not dictate the quantity of weaponry we need. This will severely damage the prospects of US vendors in future arms contracts,” a South Block official told Business Standard.

 

This unexpected rebuff stems from the US Department of Political-Military Affairs, a State Department office that examines the political fallout of proposed US arms sales. Pol-Mil Affairs, as this department is called, often nixes or curtails arms sales because they might “destabilise the regional military balance.”

 

Neither the US Embassy in New Delhi, nor the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), is prepared to reveal the reason provided by Washington for slashing the Indian request. The Ministry of External Affairs and the MoD have not responded to requests for comments.

 

US Embassy spokesperson, Peter Vrooman, said, “We don’t discuss individual sales. Secretary Panetta looks forward to having an exchange with the Government of India on a broad range of issues.”

 

Andrew Shapiro, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, had told Business Standard, in an exclusive interaction during his visit to New Delhi on April 17, that Washington had cleared the transfer of technology for manufacturing the Javelin missile in India. Given that readiness to transfer high-end technology, the curbs placed by Washington on the missile numbers remain inexplicable.

 

The FGM-148 Javelin, built by US companies Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, is one of the two anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) that the Indian Army is evaluating for its 350-odd infantry battalions. The other is the Spike, built by Israeli company, Rafael. These are both shoulder-launched, “fire-and-forget” ATGMs, which means that they autonomously track their targets after they are fired by a two-man crew.

 

Both missiles are scheduled to come to India for user evaluation trials later this year. However, the Javelin has already impressed the Indian Army. During joint exercises with the US Army, Indian missile crews have fired ten Javelin missiles. All ten hit their targets.

 

The US industry, which has heavy stakes in a successful Javelin sale to India, is sharply critical of the State Department for curtailing the Indian request. “Offering a reduced number of missiles will almost certainly kill the Javelin deal; in fact it seems to almost be designed to be so. It seems as if Hillary Clinton herself remains unconvinced about the India relationship and is trying to set a different tone,” complains an industry member.

 

A key US frustration in the defence relationship has been New Delhi’s refusal to sign three defence cooperation agreements that Washington has pressed for: a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA); and a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). New Delhi believes that signing these agreements would put it overtly in the US camp, diluting its “multi-aligned” foreign policy that emphasises strong relations with multiple foreign powers.

 

There are also growing frustrations in Washington over India’s resistance to allow US “end-user” inspections of weaponry sold to Indian security forces. New Delhi regards end-user monitoring as a violation of sovereignty.

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4 juin 2012 1 04 /06 /juin /2012 16:45

 

 

Jun 4, 2012ASDNews Source : Navistar International Corp.

 

Navistar Defense, LLC today received a contract for $59 million to deliver 1,357 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) net kits for International® MaxxPro® Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) units in Afghanistan. The order from the U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command is considered an urgent buy.

 

RPG nets provide additional protection against the anti-tank weapon of the same name. Navistar previously fielded 970 RPG net kits for the MaxxPro family of vehicles to support Afghan operations. The new kits will be fitted onto MaxxPro units operating in theater.  Delivery is scheduled to begin in August 2012 and be completed by the December 2012.

 

"Five years ago, almost to the day, we received our first MaxxPro contract to support the urgent operational need in Iraq," said Archie Massicotte, president, Navistar Defense. "We always strive to anticipate the needs of our warfighters and deliver on all contracts with the same urgency asked of us in 2007. We are proud to provide integrated solutions, such as the RPG nets, to our Armed Forces and we will continue to develop new solutions to meet the changing needs of the warfighter."

 

Navistar has fielded nine major MRAP variants during the last five years including the MaxxPro Dash Ambulance and the MaxxPro Recovery Vehicle. Earlier this year, the company retrofitted existing vehicles with a rolling chassis to upgrade and ready the fleet for future missions. Navistar is also currently competing for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) 1.1 and Standard Military Pattern (SMP) programs with new vehicle solutions.  These new platforms were developed by leveraging and combining current assets of Navistar and our partners to create cost effective, robust and mature solutions that are available today.

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4 juin 2012 1 04 /06 /juin /2012 12:19

USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) source naval-technology.com

 

2012-06-04 (foxnews.com)

 

A super-stealthy warship that could underpin the U.S. navy’s China strategy will be able to sneak up on coastlines virtually undetected and pound targets with electromagnetic “railguns” right out of a sci-fi movie.

 

But at more than $3 billion a pop, critics say the new DDG-1000 destroyer sucks away funds that could be better used to bolster a thinly stretched conventional fleet. One outspoken admiral in China has scoffed that all it would take to sink the high-tech American ship is an armada of explosive-laden fishing boats.

 

With the first of the new ships set to be delivered in 2014, the stealth destroyer is being heavily promoted by the Pentagon as the most advanced destroyer in history — a silver bullet of stealth. It has been called a perfect fit for what Washington now considers the most strategically important region in the world — Asia and the Pacific.

 

Though it could come in handy elsewhere, like in the Gulf region, its ability to carry out missions both on the high seas and in shallows closer to shore is especially important in Asia because of the region’s many island nations and China’s long Pacific coast.

 

“With its stealth, incredibly capable sonar system, strike capability and lower manning requirements — this is our future,” Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations, said in April after visiting the shipyard in Maine where they are being built.

 

On a visit to a major regional security conference in Singapore that ended Sunday, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the Navy will be deploying 60 percent of its fleet worldwide to the Pacific by 2020, and though he didn’t cite the stealth destroyers he said new high-tech ships will be a big part of its shift.

 

The DDG-1000 and other stealth destroyers of the Zumwalt class feature a wave-piercing hull that leaves almost no wake, electric drive propulsion and advanced sonar and missiles. They are longer and heavier than existing destroyers — but will have half the crew because of automated systems and appear to be little more than a small fishing boat on enemy radar.

 

Down the road, the ship is to be equipped with an electromagnetic railgun, which uses a magnetic field and electric current to fire a projectile at several times the speed of sound.

 

But cost overruns and technical delays have left many defense experts wondering if the whole endeavor was too focused on futuristic technologies for its own good.

 

They point to the problem-ridden F-22 stealth jet fighter, which was hailed as the most advanced fighter ever built but was cut short because of prohibitive costs. Its successor, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, has swelled up into the most expensive procurement program in Defense Department history.

 

“Whether the Navy can afford to buy many DDG-1000s must be balanced against the need for over 300 surface ships to fulfill the various missions that confront it,” said Dean Cheng, a China expert with the Heritage Foundation, a conservative research institute in Washington. “Buying hyperexpensive ships hurts that ability, but buying ships that can’t do the job, or worse can’t survive in the face of the enemy, is even more irresponsible.”

 

The Navy says it’s money well spent. The rise of China has been cited as the best reason for keeping the revolutionary ship afloat, although the specifics of where it will be deployed have yet to be announced. Navy officials also say the technologies developed for the ship will inevitably be used in other vessels in the decades ahead.

 

But the destroyers’ $3.1 billion price tag, which is about twice the cost of the current destroyers and balloons to $7 billion each when research and development is added in, nearly sank it in Congress. Though the Navy originally wanted 32 of them, that was cut to 24, then seven.

 

Now, just three are in the works.

 

“Costs spiraled — surprise, surprise — and the program basically fell in on itself,” said Richard Bitzinger, a security expert at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. “The DDG-1000 was a nice idea for a new modernistic surface combatant, but it contained too many unproven, disruptive technologies.”

 

The U.S. Defense Department is concerned that China is modernizing its navy with a near-term goal of stopping or delaying U.S. intervention in conflicts over disputed territory in the South China Sea or involving Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province.

 

China is now working on building up a credible aircraft carrier capability and developing missiles and submarines that could deny American ships access to crucial sea lanes.

 

The U.S. has a big advantage on the high seas, but improvements in China’s navy could make it harder for U.S. ships to fight in shallower waters, called littorals. The stealth destroyers are designed to do both. In the meantime, the Navy will begin deploying smaller Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore later this year.

 

Officially, China has been quiet on the possible addition of the destroyers to Asian waters.

 

But Rear Adm. Zhang Zhaozhong, an outspoken commentator affiliated with China’s National Defense University, scoffed at the hype surrounding the ship, saying that despite its high-tech design it could be overwhelmed by a swarm of fishing boats laden with explosives. If enough boats were mobilized some could get through to blow a hole in its hull, he said.

 

“It would be a goner,” he said recently on state broadcaster CCTV’s military channel.

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3 juin 2012 7 03 /06 /juin /2012 07:10
US naval base in Bangladesh

 

June 2, 2012 weeklyblitz.net

 

Times Now – a podcast project of leading Indian daily newspaper The Times of India on Friday, June 1, 2012 claimed that the United States' is on the process of stationing its naval base within the Bay of Bengal and US Seventh Fleet is scheduled to be moving towards Bangladesh maritime area within next couple of weeks. The Indian media claims that during the recent Bangladesh tour of the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, Washington formally placed the proposal of using Bangladesh territory for its naval base. US State Department has also confirmed the matter to Times of India. The Indian news media said, "Worried by increasing presence of Chinese naval bases in the South China Sea - America now eyes a counter strategy - as it wants an overall presence in Asia - right from Japan to its Diego Garicia base in the Indian Ocean.

 

"This by parking its seventh fleet in a base in Chittagong giving it both an eye on taking on China and a strategic post in Asia as it pulls out of Afghanistan. The US State Department denying on the record that Hillary Clinton's visits had anything to do with military co-operation.

 

"America's concerns clearly documented in the Pentagon report as they increasingly worried over the string of pearls of Chinese bases across the South China Sea and their naval might spreading all across Asia - putting the America behind. The Bangladeshi Government remaining extremely tight-lipped over the recent developments - as they have internally decided to deny it on record - fearing backlash from their own hardliners.

 

"This move by America could put India on the back foot if the American fleet moves to Bangladesh, all of India's security installations will come under the American scanner. Bangladesh is not willing to comment on record even offering explanation to deny the developments. This Clinton visit a more strategic one than just a friendly one- the Indian establishment caught unawares--as this base could cast a shadow on India's own strategic interests."

 

The US Seventh Fleet:

 

The Seventh Fleet is the United States Navy's permanent forward projection force operating forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan, with units positioned near Japan and South Korea. It is a component force of the United States Pacific Fleet. At present, it is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets, with 50 to 60 ships, 350 aircraft and 60,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. With the support of its Task Force Commanders, it has three major assignments:

 

Joint Task Force command in a natural disaster or joint military operation,

 

Operational command of all naval forces in the region, and

 

Defense of the Korean Peninsula. In 1994, 7th Fleet was assigned the additional responsibility as Commander, Combined Naval Component Command for the defense of South Korea.

 

The Seventh Fleet was formed on 15 March 1943 in Brisbane, Australia, during World War II, under the command of Admiral Arthur S. Chips Carpender. It served in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) under General Souglas MacArthur, and the Seventh Fleet commander also served as commander of Allied naval forces in the SWPA.

 

Most of the ships of the Royal Australian Navy were also part of the fleet from 1943 to 1945 as part of Task Force 74 (formerly the Anzac Squadron). The Seventh Fleet—under Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid—formed a large part of the Allied forces at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history. After the end of the war, the 7th Fleet moved its headquarters to Qingdao, China.

 

Princeton of the United States Third Fleet on fire east of Luzon at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

 

After the war, on 1 January 1947, the Fleet's name was changed to Naval Forces Western Pacific. On 19 August 1949, just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the force was designated as United States Seventh Task Fleet. On 11 February 1950, the force assumed the name United States Seventh Fleet, which it holds today.

 

In late 1948, the 7th Fleet moved its principal base of operations to the Philippines, where the Navy, following the war, had developed new facilities at Subic Bay and an airfield at Sangley Point. Peacetime operations of the Seventh Fleet were under the control of Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur E. Radford, but standing orders provided that, when operating in Japanese waters or in the event of an emergency, control would pass to Commander Naval Forces Far East, which was a component of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's occupation force.

 

Of the 50-60 ships typically assigned to Seventh Fleet, 18 operate from U.S. facilities in Japan and Guam. These forward-deployed units represent the heart of Seventh Fleet. The 18 permanently forward-deployed ships of the U.S. 7th Fleet are the centerpieces of American forward presence in Asia. They are 17 steaming days closer to locations in Asia than their counterparts based in the continental U.S.

 

It would take three to five times the number of rotationally-based ships in the U.S. to equal the same presence and crisis response capability as these 18 forward deployed ships. On any given day, about 50% of Seventh Fleet forces are deployed at sea throughout the area of responsibility.

 

Following the end of the Cold War, the two major military scenarios in which the Seventh Fleet would be used would be in case of conflict in Korea or a conflict between People's Republic of China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait.

 

It was reported on 10 May 2012 that USS Freedom (LCS-1) would be dispatched to Singapore in the northern spring of 2013 for a roughly 10-month deployment.

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30 mai 2012 3 30 /05 /mai /2012 16:52
Lockheed offers high local content Super Hercules to SAAF

 

30 May 2012 by Guy Martin defenceWeb

 

Lockheed Martin is offering its C-130XJ ‘Expandable’ Super Hercules with maximum local content to the South African Air Force (SAAF) to meet its transport and maritime patrol requirements and will bring out an aircraft to Africa Aerospace and Defence in September.

 

Lockheed Martin is making the Air Force aware of its C-130XJ, a base model J variant with J model performance but lower acquisition cost due to less equipment. Plessas said customers did not need all the equipment US Air Force J model Hercules have, hence the creation of the C-130XJ, which can be modified with equipment as and when necessary. As the C-130XJ is slightly lighter than the standard model, it can carry slightly more payload. The XJ is aimed at the export market and, if bought by South Africa, would probably have a significant amount of locally developed and installed equipment.

 

Dennys S Plessas, Vice President Business Development Initiatives at Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, said he thought South Africa would be most interested a C-130XJ with a maximum amount of local content. He said this would create an “African configuration” which could be promoted to other African countries. Plessas said that countries are free to put their own equipment on the C-130, such as India, which added an electro-optical turret and its own communications avionics.

 

Plessas, briefing journalists in Pretoria today, said that Lockheed has been talking to Armscor and the Air Force and making it aware of the C-130J’s capabilities. “The J or the XJ is the answer,” to South Africa’s requirements, Plessas said, as it can carry 95% of South Africa’s mission equipment.

 

He added that the C-130J could provide 90% of the SAAF’s airlift capability (including cargo transport, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, medevac, search and rescue etc). It could also meet 100% of the SAAF’s maritime/border patrol requirements and 100% of its tanking needs, as the KC-130J has successfully refuelled Gripen fighters.

 

The SAAF’s eight C-130BZs are projected to keep flying until 2020, up from the earlier date of 2015, but the Air Force has yet to issue a request for information (RFI) or request for proposals (RFP) for replacements. Lockheed Martin pointed out that the SAAF’s Boeing 707 tankers had been retired in 2007 and that its C-47TP aircraft are 1940s vintage.

 

Until the cancellation of the A400M, the SAAF envisaged a transport trinity with the A400M as the heavy/strategic transport, a C130-type aircraft as a medium airlifter and a third type as a light utility aircraft. The Air Force is currently seeking maritime patrol and transport aircraft as part of Project Saucepan, with Airbus Military showcasing its C295 for this requirement – the company last month flew the aircraft to South Africa as part of an Africa demonstration tour.

 

Lockheed Martin emphasised the importance of maintenance and through life support and said that if South Africa was to acquire the C-130J, more than 50% of maintenance and support infrastructure is already in place as the SAAF flies the C-130BZ while Denel has the only certified C-130 maintenance centre in Africa.

 

Lockheed noted that the C-130J was suited to the South African National Defence Force’s long, hot and high missions. These encompass maritime patrol, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and border patrol, amongst others. There is an increasingly large focus on peacekeeping operations (South Africa has 2 400 personnel deployed) and maritime patrol (Operation Copper is combating pirates off the east coast). Another possibility could be aerial refuelling, as the C-130J can refuel a Gripen in flight.

 

With regard to the rest of Africa, Plessas said that there was a lot of appetite but little funding for the C-130J on the continent, although North African countries had an appetite and some funding. Tunisia in 2010 bought two C-130Js and will receive its first aircraft next year, and its second in 2014. Egypt has issued a letter of request for the C-130J while there is also interest from Libya. Meanwhile, Algeria is refurbishing five C-130s and Nigeria is refurbishing some of its C-130s as well.

 

Plessas said the C-130J was a proven aircraft that caters well to growing demand for air mobility. He said that air forces around the world are struggling to acquire new air mobility capabilities in the face of budget cuts. “Air Forces today have to do more with less and need the flexibility and adaptability of a multipurpose aircraft.” Lockheed claims that due to its roll on/off mission payloads and flexibility the C-130J is right for air forces that cannot afford dedicated aircraft for each role, such as maritime patrol, transport, firefighting etc.

 

To date, 2 403 C-130s of all model shave been delivered to 73 countries around the world, including 248 C-130Js, of 320 J models on order. The C-130J fleet has exceeded 845 000 flying hours, with more than half of that made up by non-US operators.

 

Plessas admitted that the C-130J was more expensive than twin engined aircraft like the C-295 and C-27J but said that based on the aircraft’s tasks, it is the more cost effective solution. He also praised the C-130J’s maintenance and operating requirements, saying the aircraft only requires 1.07 maintenance man hours per flight hour and that aircraft deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq had recorded a 95.8% mission reliability rate, 89.3% operational readiness rate and had a 1.8 hour meantime to repair rate.

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23 mai 2012 3 23 /05 /mai /2012 07:30
CACI Awarded Prime Position on $900 M Multiple-Award Contract to Support JIEDDO

May 22, 2012 ASDNews Source : CACI International Inc.

 

The Wexford Group International, a wholly owned company of CACI International Inc (NYSE: CACI), announced today that it has been selected by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Systems Integration and Management Center (FEDSIM) as one of five prime contractors to support the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) Operations Support (OPS) Services contract. With a ceiling value of $900 million, this five-year (two base years plus three one-year options) indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract positions CACI to accelerate its growth in integrated security solutions. This contract was awarded in the second quarter of CACI's 2012 fiscal year which ended December 31, 2011.

 

JIEDDO leads the Department of Defense's global efforts to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as weapons of strategic influence. IEDs have become the weapon of choice for an overlapping consortium of illicit networks spanning the entire threat continuum, from criminal gangs to terrorists with global reach. The OPS contract provides operational support services to address the counter-IED requirements of combat commanders and troops, delivering rapid, effective solutions designed to disrupt the enemy's effectiveness.

 

CACI's JIEDDO awards demonstrate its position as a premier, global counter-IED company. The Wexford Group, acquired by CACI in 2007, has worked with JIEDDO and its predecessor organizations since 2003. In addition to the OPS award, CACI supports JIEDDO through multiple task orders on the $494 million Comprehensive Support Services contract, awarded in August 2009.

 

Dan Allen, CACI President of U.S. Operations, said, "We have a long and successful history of directly supporting our nation's troops through the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. With the Operations Support Services contract, CACI will continue to leverage our cross-discipline expertise in integrated security solutions to aid JIEDDO in its vital strategy to defeat IEDs."

 

Paul Cofoni, CACI President and Chief Executive Officer, said, "Countering IEDs is a key component of the Department of Defense's counter-terrorism and irregular warfare mission. Through JIEDDO's OPS contract, CACI demonstrates our continued commitment to providing leading-edge solutions that directly align with our nation's highest priorities for military support."

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21 mai 2012 1 21 /05 /mai /2012 17:49
NATO Chicago Summit Declaration

0 May. 2012 NATO

 

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012

 

Press Release (2012) 062

Issued on 20 May. 2012

  1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Chicago to renew our commitment to our vital transatlantic bond; take stock of progress in, and reconfirm our commitment to, our operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere; ensure the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to deal with the full range of threats; and strengthen our wide range of partnerships.
     
  2. Our nations are united in their commitment to the Washington Treaty and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies.  Our 2010 Strategic Concept continues to guide us in fulfilling effectively, and always in accordance with international law, our three essential core tasks – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members.
     
  3. At a time of complex security challenges and financial difficulties, it is more important than ever to make the best use of our resources and to continue to adapt our forces and structures.  We remain committed to our common values, and are determined to ensure NATO’s ability to meet any challenges to our shared security.
     
  4. We pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations serving in NATO-led missions and operations.  We commend them for their professionalism and dedication and acknowledge the invaluable support provided to them by their families and loved ones.  We owe a special debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured during the course of their duties, and we extend our profound sympathy to their families and loved ones.
     
  5. Today we have taken further important steps on the road to a stable and secure Afghanistan and to our goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.  The irreversible transition of full security responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is on track for completion by the end of 2014, as agreed at our Lisbon Summit.  We also recognise in this context the importance of a comprehensive approach and continued improvements in governance and development, as well as a political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration.  We welcome the announcement by President Karzai on the third tranche of provinces that will start transition.  This third tranche means that 75% of Afghanistan’s population will live in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security.  By mid-2013, when the fifth and final tranche of provinces starts transition, we will have reached an important milestone in our Lisbon roadmap, and the ANSF will be in the lead for security nationwide At that milestone, as ISAF shifts from focusing primarily on combat increasingly to the provision of training, advice and assistance to the ANSF, ISAF will be able to ensure that the Afghans have the support they need as they adjust to their new increased responsibility.  We are gradually and responsibly drawing down our forces to complete the ISAF mission by 31 December 2014.
     
  6. By the end of 2014, when the Afghan Authorities will have full security responsibility, the NATO-led combat mission will end.  We will, however, continue to provide strong and long-term political and practical support through our Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan.  NATO is ready to work towards establishing, at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, a new post-2014 mission of a different nature in Afghanistan, to train, advise and assist the ANSF, including the Afghan Special Operations Forces.  This will not be a combat mission.  We task the Council to begin immediately work on the military planning process for the post-ISAF mission.
     
  7. At the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December 2011, the international community made a commitment to support Afghanistan in its Transformation Decade beyond 2014.  NATO will play its part alongside other actors in building sufficient and sustainable Afghan forces capable of providing security for their own country.  In this context, Allies welcome contributions and reaffirm their strong commitment to contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF.  We also call on the international community to commit to this long-term sustainment of the ANSF.   Effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF will build upon existing mechanisms, integrating the efforts of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of the international community.  They will be guided by the principles of flexibility, transparency, accountability, and cost effectiveness, and will include measures against corruption.
     
  8. We reiterate the importance Allies attach to seeing tangible progress by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding its commitments made at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011 to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected.  The forthcoming elections must be conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution.  Their transparency, inclusivity and credibility will also be of paramount importance. Continued progress towards these goals will encourage NATO nations to further provide their support up to and beyond 2014.
     
  9. We also underscore the importance of our shared understanding with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding the full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights.  We recognise also the need for the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict.
     
  10. We also recognise that security and stability in the “Heart of Asia” is interlinked across the region.  The Istanbul Process on regional security and cooperation, which was launched in November 2011, reflects the commitment of Afghanistan and the countries in the region to jointly ensure security, stability and development in a regional context.  The countries in the region, particularly Pakistan, have important roles in ensuring enduring peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and in facilitating the completion of the transition process.  We stand ready to continue dialogue and practical cooperation with relevant regional actors in this regard.  We welcome the progress on transit arrangements with our Central Asian partners and Russia.  NATO continues to work with Pakistan to reopen the ground lines of communication as soon as possible.
     
  11. We look forward to our expanded ISAF meeting tomorrow.
     
  12. The Alliance continues to be fully committed to the stability and security of the strategically important Balkans region.  We reiterate our full support for KFOR, which continues to act carefully, firmly and impartially in accordance with its United Nations mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244.  KFOR will continue to support the development of a peaceful, stable, and multi-ethnic Kosovo. KFOR will also continue to contribute to the maintenance of freedom of movement and ensuring a safe and secure environment for all people in Kosovo, in cooperation with all relevant actors, including the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the EU Special Representative, as agreed, and the Kosovo authorities.  We will maintain KFOR’s robust and credible capability to carry out its mission.  We remain committed to moving towards a smaller, more flexible, deterrent presence, only once the security situation allows.  We welcome the progress made in developing the Kosovo Security Force, under NATO’s supervision and commend it for its readiness and capability to implement its security tasks and responsibilities.  We will continue to look for opportunities to develop NATO’s ongoing role with the Kosovo Security Force. 
     
  13. Last year, through the UN-mandated Operation Unified Protector (OUP), and with the support of the League of Arab States, our Alliance played a crucial role in protecting the civilian population in Libya and in helping save thousands of lives.  We commend the Libyan people for the progress achieved to date on their path towards building a new, free, democratic Libya that fully respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, and encourage them to build on that progress.
     
  14. Our successful operation in Libya showed once more that the Alliance can quickly and effectively conduct complex operations in support of the broader international community.  We have also learned a number of important lessons which we are incorporating into our plans and policies.  With OUP, NATO set new standards of consultation and practical cooperation with partner countries who contributed to our operation, as well as with other international and regional organisations.  In this context, we recognise the value of the Libya Contact Group.
     
  15. The Alliance is also contributing to peace and security through other operations and missions:
     
    • We welcome the extension of the mandate of our counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa, Operation Ocean Shield, for a further two years through to 2014.  The decision to carry out enhanced actions at sea should allow us to be more effective in eroding the operational reach of pirates at sea.  We remain committed to supporting international counter-piracy efforts, including through working together with the EU Operation Atalanta, as agreed, Combined Task Force 151 and other naval forces, and through our ongoing participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.  We encourage the shipping industry to adopt Best Management Practices and other measures proven effective against piracy, in compliance with international law.
       
    • Operation Active Endeavour is our Article 5 maritime operation in the Mediterranean which contributes to the fight against terrorism.  We are reviewing strategic options for the future of this operation.
       
    • We continue to provide the African Union (AU) with operational support, at its request.  We have agreed to extend strategic air and maritime lift support for the AU’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and support the development of the AU’s long-term peacekeeping capabilities, including the African Stand-by Force.  We stand ready to consider further AU requests for NATO training assistance.
       
    • We have successfully concluded the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) which contributed to a more stable Iraq by assisting in the capacity building of Iraq’s security institutions.
       
  16. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, the lack of effective institutional arrangements to protect women, and the continued under-representation of women in peace processes, remain serious impediments to building sustainable peace.  We remain committed to the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related Resolutions which are aimed at protecting and promoting women’s rights, role, and participation in preventing and ending conflict.  In line with the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Policy, the Alliance, together with its partners, has made significant progress in implementing the goals articulated in these Resolutions.  In this regard, we have today endorsed a Strategic Progress Report on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions into NATO-led Operations and Missions, and welcomed Norway’s generous offer to provide a NATO Special Representative for these important issues.  In this context, and to further advance this work, we have tasked the Council to: continue implementing the Policy and the Action Plan; undertake a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO operations and missions; further integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities; and submit a report for our next Summit.   
     
  17. We also remain committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related Resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict.  We note with concern the growing range of threats to children in armed conflict and strongly condemn that they are increasingly subject to recruitment, sexual violence and targeted attacks.  NATO-led operations, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, are taking an active role in preventing, monitoring and responding to violations against children, including through pre-deployment training and a violations alert mechanism.  This approach, based on practical, field-oriented measures, demonstrates NATO’s firm commitment on this issue, as does the recent appointment of a NATO Focal Point for Children and Armed Conflict in charge of maintaining a close dialogue with the UN.  NATO-UN cooperation in this field is creating a set of good practices to be integrated in NATO training modules and taken into account in possible future operations.
     
  18. Our operational experiences have shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security.  We reaffirm our Lisbon Summit decisions on a comprehensive approach.  In order to fulfil these commitments, important work on NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and on stabilisation and reconstruction is ongoing. An appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability has been established, both at the NATO Headquarters and within Allied Command Operations, in accordance with the principles and detailed political guidance we set out at our Summit in Lisbon. 
     
  19. We will continue to enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN in line with the UN-NATO Declaration of September 2008.  We welcome the strengthened cooperation and enhanced liaison between NATO and the UN that has been achieved since our last Summit meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, and which also contributed to the success of OUP.
     
  20. NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO.  Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity; NATO and the EU should continue to work to enhance practical cooperation in operations, broaden political consultations, and cooperate more fully in capability development.  NATO and the EU are working side by side in crisis management operations, in a spirit of mutual reinforcement, and in particular in Afghanistan, Kosovo and fighting piracy.  NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence.  NATO also recognises non-EU Allies’ ongoing concerns and their significant contributions to strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential.   In this context, NATO will work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing; we welcome the efforts of the EU, in particular in the areas of air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance and training.  We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas by European Allies and Partners.  We also encourage the Secretary General to continue his dialogue with the EU High Representative with a view to making our cooperation more effective, and to report to the Council in time for the next Summit. 
     
  21. We continue to work closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation, and in addressing new security threats.  We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.
     
  22. NATO has a wide network of partnership relations.  We highly value all of NATO’s partners and the contributions they make to the work of the Alliance as illustrated through several partnership meetings we are holding here in Chicago.  Partnerships play a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security.  NATO’s partnerships are a key element of Cooperative Security which is one of the core tasks of the Alliance, and the Alliance has developed effective policies in order to enhance its partnerships.  Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, we have pursued cooperation with our Euro-Atlantic partners to build a Europe whole, free and at peace.  For twenty years, our partnerships have facilitated, and provided frameworks for, political dialogue and practical regional cooperation in the fields of security and defence, contribute to advancing our common values, allow us to share expertise and experience, and make a significant contribution to the success of many of our operations and missions.  NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin in April 2011 approved a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy to enhance the effectiveness of NATO’s partnerships.  We will continue to actively pursue its further implementation with a view to strengthening NATO’s partnerships, including by: reinforcing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and our relationships with partners across the globe, while making full use of flexible formats; further developing our political and practical cooperation with partners, including in an operational context; and through increasing partner involvement in training, education, and exercises, including with the NATO Response Force.  We will intensify our efforts to better engage with partners across the globe who can contribute significantly to security, and to reach out to partners concerned, including our newest partner Mongolia, to build trust, increase transparency, and develop political dialogue and practical cooperation.  In this context, we welcome the Joint Political Declaration between Australia and NATO.
     
  23. We appreciate our partners’ significant contributions to our practical cooperation activities and to the different Trust Funds which support our partnership goals.  We welcome the Status Report on Building Integrity and the progress achieved by NATO’s Building Integrity Programme which has made important contributions to promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence sector of interested nations. 
     
  24. We welcome our meeting in Chicago with thirteen partners 1 who have recently made particular political, operational, and financial contributions to NATO-led operations.  This is an example of the enhanced flexibility with which we are addressing partnership issues in a demand and substance-driven way.  Our meeting in Chicago with partners provides us with a unique opportunity to discuss the lessons learned from our cooperation, and to exchange views on the common security challenges we face.  Joint training and exercises will be essential in maintaining our interoperability and interconnectedness with partner forces, including when we are not engaged together in active operations.  We will share ideas generated at this Chicago meeting with all our partners, within the appropriate frameworks, for additional discussion. 
     
  25. In accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to security in the North Atlantic area.  Based on these considerations, we will keep the progress of each of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance under active review, judging each on its own merits.  We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance in accordance with previous decisions taken at the Bucharest, Strasbourg-Kehl, and Lisbon Summits.  We welcome progress made by these four partners and encourage them to continue to implement the necessary decisions and reforms to advance their Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  For our part, we will continue to offer political and practical support to partners that aspire to join the Alliance.  NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security continue to advance stability in Europe more broadly.
     
  26. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2 to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and strongly urge intensified efforts towards that end.  An early solution, and subsequent membership, will contribute to security and stability in the region.  We encourage the negotiations to be pursued without further delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible.  We welcome, and continue to support, the ongoing reform efforts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and encourage continued implementation.  We also encourage its efforts to further build a multi-ethnic society.  We appreciate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s substantial contributions to our operations, as well as its active role in regional cooperation activities.  We value the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s long-standing commitment to the NATO accession process.
     
  27. We welcome the significant progress that Montenegro has made towards NATO membership and its contribution to security in the Western Balkans region and beyond, including through its active role in regional cooperation activities and its participation in ISAF.  We also welcome the increasing public support for NATO membership in Montenegro, and will continue to assist this process.  Montenegro’s active engagement in the MAP process demonstrates firm commitment to join the Alliance.  Montenegro has successfully implemented significant political, economic and defence reforms, and we encourage it to continue on that path so it can draw even closer to the Alliance.  We will keep Montenegro’s progress towards membership under active review.
     
  28. We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We welcome the significant progress that has been made in recent months, including the establishment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers, and the political agreement reached on 9 March 2012 on the registration of immovable defence property as state property.  These developments are a sign of the political will in Bosnia and Herzegovina to move the reform process forward, and we encourage all political actors in the country to continue to work constructively to further implement the reforms necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration.  The political agreement on defence and state properties is an important step towards fulfilment of the condition set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010 for full participation in the MAP process. We welcome the initial steps taken regarding implementation, and we urge the political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to further their efforts to work constructively to implement the agreement without delay in order to start its first MAP cycle as soon as possible.  The Alliance will continue to follow progress in implementation and will provide assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform efforts. We appreciate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s contribution to NATO-led operations and commend its constructive role in regional and international security.
     
  29. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. The NATO-Georgia Commission and Georgia’s Annual National Programme (ANP) have a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit.  We welcome Georgia’s progress since the Bucharest Summit to meet its Euro-Atlantic aspirations through its reforms, implementation of its Annual National Programme, and active political engagement with the Alliance in the NATO-Georgia Commission. In that context, we have agreed to enhance Georgia’s connectivity with the Alliance, including by further strengthening our political dialogue, practical cooperation, and interoperability with Georgia. We continue to encourage and actively support Georgia's ongoing implementation of all necessary reforms, including democratic, electoral, and judicial reforms, as well as security and defence reforms.  We stress the importance of conducting free, fair, and inclusive elections in 2012 and 2013.  We appreciate Georgia’s substantial contribution, in particular as the second largest non-NATO troop contributing nation to ISAF, to Euro-Atlantic security.
     
  30. We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders.  We welcome Georgia’s full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and other unilateral measures to build confidence.  We welcome Georgia’s commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate.  We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states.  We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally-recognised territory of Georgia. 
     
  31. Here in Chicago, our Foreign Ministers are meeting with their counterparts from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, in order to take stock of their individual progress, plan future cooperation, and exchange views with our partners, including on their participation in partnership activities and contributions to operations.  We are grateful to these partners that aspire to NATO membership for the important contributions they are making to NATO-led operations, and which demonstrate their commitment to our shared security goals.
     
  32. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are important for lasting peace and stability.  We are encouraged by the progress being made, including in regional cooperation formats, and will continue to actively support Euro-Atlantic aspirations in this region.  Together, Allies and partners of the region actively contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, including through regional cooperation formats.
     
  33. We continue to support Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.   We welcome Serbia’s progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path.  NATO stands ready to continue to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with Serbia.  We will continue assisting Serbia’s reform efforts, and encourage further work.
     
  34. We call upon Serbia to support further efforts towards the consolidation of peace and stability in Kosovo.  We urge all parties concerned to cooperate fully with KFOR and EULEX in the execution of their respective mandates for which unconditional freedom of movement is necessary.  We urge Belgrade and Pristina to take full advantage of the opportunities offered to promote peace, security, and stability in the region, in particular by the European Union-facilitated dialogue.  We welcome progress made in the European Union-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, including the Agreement on Regional Cooperation and the IBM technical protocol.  Dialogue between them and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region are key for a sustained improvement in security and stability in the Western Balkans.  We call on both parties to implement fully existing agreements, and to move forward on all outstanding issues, including on the conclusion of additional agreements on telecommunications and electricity.  We welcome progress achieved and encourage further efforts aimed at consolidating the rule of law, and other reform efforts, in Kosovo. 
     
  35. An independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.  Marking the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, we welcome Ukraine’s commitment to enhancing political dialogue and interoperability with NATO, as well as its contributions to NATO-led operations and new offers made.  We note the recent elimination of Ukraine’s highly enriched uranium in March 2012, which demonstrates a proven commitment to non-proliferation. Recalling our decisions in relation to Ukraine and our Open Door policy stated at the Bucharest and Lisbon Summits, NATO is ready to continue to develop its cooperation with Ukraine and assist with the implementation of reforms in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP).  Noting the principles and commitments enshrined in the NATO-Ukraine Charter and the ANP, we are concerned by the selective application of justice and what appear to be politically motivated prosecutions, including of leading members of the opposition, and the conditions of their detention.  We encourage Ukraine to address the existing shortcomings of its judicial system to ensure full compliance with the rule of law and the international agreements to which it is a party.  We also encourage Ukraine to ensure free, fair and inclusive Parliamentary elections this autumn.
     
  36. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.  We remain determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration.  We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.
     
  37. This year, we mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.  We welcome important progress in our cooperation with Russia over the years.  At the same time, we differ on specific issues and there is a need to improve trust, reciprocal transparency, and predictability in order to realise the full potential of the NRC.  In this context, we intend to raise with Russia in the NRC Allied concerns about Russia’s stated intentions regarding military deployments close to Alliance borders.  Mindful of the goals, principles and commitments which underpin the NRC, and on this firm basis, we urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia, as mediated by the EU on 12 August and 8 September 2008 3.  We continue to be concerned by the build-up of Russia’s military presence on Georgia’s territory and continue to call on Russia to ensure free access for humanitarian assistance and international observers.
     
  38. NATO and Russia share common security interests and face common challenges and our practical achievements together reflect that reality.  Today, we continue to value the important role of the NRC as a forum for frank and honest political dialogue – including on subjects where we disagree – and for promoting practical cooperation. Our cooperation with Russia on issues related to Afghanistan – notably the two-way transit arrangements offered by Russia in support of ISAF, our joint training of counter narcotics personnel from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan, and the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in support of a key ANSF need – is a sign of our common determination to build peace and stability in that region.  NATO-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation has expanded and all NRC nations will benefit from the lessons to be learned from the first civil-military NRC Counter-Terrorism exercise, and the capabilities available under the NRC aviation counter-terrorism programme which is now operational.  We also note with satisfaction our growing counter-piracy cooperation off the Horn of Africa.  We are committed to, and look forward to, further improving trust and reciprocal transparency in: defence matters; strategy; doctrines; military postures, including of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; military exercises; arms control and disarmament; and we invite Russia to engage with the Alliance in discussing confidence-building measures covering these issues.
     
  39. At a time of unprecedented change in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East, NATO is committed to strengthening and developing partnership relations with countries in the region, with whom we face common security challenges and share the same goals for peace, security and stability. NATO supports the aspirations of the people of the region for democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law – values which underpin the Alliance. 
     
  40. The Libya crisis illustrated the benefits of cooperation with partners from the region.  It also showed the merit of regular consultations between the Alliance and regional organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States.
     
  41. NATO is ready to consult more regularly on security issues of common concern, through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as bilateral consultations and 28+n formats.  We recall our commitment to the MD and the ICI and to the principles that underpin them; the MD and ICI remain two complementary and yet distinct partnership frameworks. We are also ready to consider providing, upon request, support to our partners in the region in such areas as security institution building, defence modernisation, capacity development, and civil-military relations.  Individualised programmes will allow us to focus on agreed priorities for each partner country.  
     
  42. The MD helps to strengthen mutual understanding, political dialogue, practical cooperation and, as appropriate, interoperability.  We welcome the Moroccan-led initiative to develop a new, political framework document for the MD, and look forward to developing it together soon with our MD partners.  We encourage the MD partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO.  The MD remains open to other countries in the region. 
     
  43. We welcome Libya’s stated interest to deepen relations with the Alliance.  We are ready to welcome Libya as a partner, if it so wishes.  In that perspective, the MD is a natural framework for this partnership.  We stand ready, if requested, and on a case-by-case basis, to consider providing assistance to Libya in areas where NATO can add value.  NATO’s activities would focus primarily on security and defence sector reform, while taking into account other international efforts.
     
  44. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation in the ICI.  We warmly welcome the generous offer by the State of Kuwait to host an ICI Regional Centre, which will help us to better understand common security challenges, and discuss how to address them together.  We encourage our ICI partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO.  We remain open to receiving new members in the ICI.
     
  45. We are following the evolution of the Syrian crisis with growing concern and we strongly support the efforts of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, including full implementation of the six-point Annan plan, to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.
     
  46. We welcome progress being made in Iraq.  The NATO Transition Cell now established in Iraq is helping to develop our partnership.
     
  47. With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance.  We welcome the constructive approach in the renewed dialogue on Transnistria in the 5+2 format, and encourage further efforts by all actors involved.  With respect to all these conflicts, we urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats.  We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability.  We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act.  
     
  48. The Black Sea region continues to be important for Euro-Atlantic security.  We welcome the progress in consolidating regional cooperation and ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms, in the spirit of transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness.  We will continue to support, as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.
     
  49. Cyber attacks continue to increase significantly in number and evolve in sophistication and complexity.  We reaffirm the cyber defence commitments made at the Lisbon Summit.  Following Lisbon, last year we adopted a Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and Action Plan, which are now being implemented.  Building on NATO’s existing capabilities, the critical elements of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Full Operational Capability (FOC), including protection of most sites and users, will be in place by the end of 2012.  We have committed to provide the resources and complete the necessary reforms to bring all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection, to ensure that enhanced cyber defence capabilities protect our collective investment in NATO.  We will further integrate cyber defence measures into Alliance structures and procedures and, as individual nations, we remain committed to identifying and delivering national cyber defence capabilities that strengthen Alliance collaboration and interoperability, including through NATO defence planning processes.  We will develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against, and recover from cyber attacks To address the cyber security threats and to improve our common security, we are committed to engage with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with international organisations, inter alia the EU, as agreed, the Council of Europe, the UN and the OSCE, in order to increase concrete cooperation.  We will also take full advantage of the expertise offered by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia.  
     
  50. We continue to be deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery.  Proliferation threatens our shared vision of creating the conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  We share the United Nations Security Council’s serious concern with Iran’s nuclear programme and call upon Iran to fully comply with all its international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors.  We further call upon Iran to cooperate with the international community to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme in compliance with its NPT obligations.  We support the immediate resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means and encourage a sustained process of engagement within the format of the P5+1 and Iran talks.  We are deeply concerned by the proliferation activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and call on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and international obligations, especially by abandoning all activities related to its existing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.  We strongly condemn the launch by the DPRK on 13 April 2012 using ballistic missile technology.  We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT and the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under UNSCR 1977.  We also call on all states to strengthen the security of nuclear materials within their borders, as called for at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.  We will continue to implement NATO’s Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.  We will ensure NATO has the appropriate capabilities, including for planning efforts, training and exercises, to address and respond to CBRN attacks.  
     
  51. Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations can never be tolerated or justified.  We deplore all loss of life from acts of terrorism and extend our sympathies to the victims.  We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism with unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter.  Today we have endorsed NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, and task the Council to prepare an Action Plan to further enhance NATO’s ability to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism by identifying initiatives to enhance our threat awareness, capabilities, and engagement.
     
  52. A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance.  While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations concerned, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security.  Today, we have noted a progress report which outlines the concrete steps taken since our last Summit and describes the way forward to integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO’s policies and activities.  We will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value.  To this end, we will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; develop our competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further develop our outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-by-case basis.  We welcome the offer to establish a NATO-accredited Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania as a contribution to NATO’s efforts in this area.  We task the Council to continue to refine NATO’s role in energy security in accordance with the principles and the guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by the new Strategic Concept as well as the Lisbon decisions.  We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.
     
  53. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.
     
  54. In Lisbon, we called for a review of NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in the evolving international security environment.  We have today approved, and made public, the results of our Deterrence and Defence Posture Review.  NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept.  Consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts. 
     
  55. We will ensure that the Alliance continues to have the capabilities needed to perform the essential core tasks to which we committed ourselves in the Strategic Concept. To that end, we have agreed a separate Chicago Defence Declaration and endorsed the Defence Package for the Chicago Summit, outlining a vision and a clear way forward towards our goal of NATO Forces 2020.
     
  56. We welcome the recent Council decision to continue the NATO Air Policing Mission in the Baltic states, and appreciate the recent commitment by the Baltic states to enhance their host nation support to the participating Allies.  Allies remain committed to contributing to this mission, which is also an example of Smart Defence in practice. This peacetime mission and other Alliance air policing arrangements demonstrate the Alliance’s continued and visible commitment to collective defence and solidarity.
     
  57. The Alliance’s recent operational experiences also show that the ability of NATO forces to act together seamlessly and rapidly is critical to success. We will, therefore, ensure that the Alliance’s forces remain well connected through expanded education, training and exercises.  In line with the Alliance’s commitment to transparency, and in the expectation of reciprocity, these activities are open for partner participation and observation on a case-by-case basis.  In this context, we attach particular importance to next year’s “Steadfast Jazz” exercise for the NATO Response Force which, along with other exercises, will contribute to the ability of NATO forces to operate together anywhere on Alliance territory and in wider crisis management operations. 
     
  58. We continue to be concerned by the increasing threats to our Alliance posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.  At our Summit in Lisbon we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.  Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.
     
  59. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them.  This capability is purely defensive. 
     
  60. We are pleased today to declare that the Alliance has achieved an Interim NATO BMD Capability.  It will provide with immediate effect an operationally significant first step, consistent with our Lisbon decision, offering the maximum coverage within available means, to defend our populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack.  Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability.  Only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for common funding.  Within the context of the NATO BMD capability, Turkey hosts a forward-based early-warning radar. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment.
     
  61. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to this Interim Capability will be ensured.  Given the short flight times of ballistic missiles, the Council agrees the pre-arranged command and control rules and procedures including to take into account the consequences of intercept compatible with coverage and protection requirements.  We have tasked the Council to regularly review the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development, for us by our next Summit.
     
  62. The Alliance remains prepared to engage with third states, on a case by case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness.  Given our shared security interests with Russia, we remain committed to cooperation on missile defence in the spirit of mutual trust and reciprocity, such as the recent NRC Theatre Missile Defence Exercise.  Through ongoing efforts in the NATO-Russia Council, we seek to determine how independent NATO and Russian missile defence systems can work together to enhance European security.  We look forward to establishing the proposed joint NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and the joint Planning Operations Centre to cooperate on missile defence. We propose to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the current respective missile defence capabilities of NATO and Russia. Such concrete missile defence cooperation is the best means to provide Russia with the assurances it seeks regarding NATO’s missile defence plans and capabilities.  In this regard, we today reaffirm that the NATO missile defence in Europe will not undermine strategic stability.  NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities.  NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.  While regretting recurrent Russian statements on possible measures directed against NATO’s missile defence system, we welcome Russia's willingness to continue dialogue with the purpose of finding an agreement on the future framework for missile defence cooperation.
     
  63. We remain committed to conventional arms control.  NATO CFE Allies recall that the decisions taken in November 2011 to cease implementing certain CFE obligations with regard to the Russian Federation are reversible, should the Russian Federation return to full implementation. NATO CFE Allies continue to implement fully their CFE obligations with respect to all other CFE States Parties. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end.
     
  64. At our Summit in Lisbon, we agreed on an ambitious reform programme.  This package of reforms remains essential for guaranteeing the Alliance is responsive and effective in carrying out the ambitious tasks envisioned in our Strategic Concept, the Lisbon Declaration, as well as the Declaration on Defence Capabilities we have adopted today.  To this end:< >NATO Command Structure.  We are implementing a leaner, more effective and affordable NATO Command Structure with its first phase and its package elements being effective during 2012.  The number of subordinate headquarters, as well as the peacetime staffing and establishment, are being significantly reduced and implementation will be complete by 2015.NATO Headquarters.  We have rationalised a number of services between the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS).  The move to the new headquarters in 2016 provides a unique opportunity to achieve more efficient and effective support to the work of the Alliance.  We welcome the ongoing review of the IS, and the forthcoming review of the IMS; we look forward to the continuation of these reforms in line with those being carried out by nations.  An important part of this comprehensive reform will be a review of our priorities and IS and IMS spending to identify activities that are no longer needed, improve efficiency, and achieve savings.  This review will take place with the appropriate involvement of the Military Committee.NATO Agencies.  The consolidation and rationalization of the existing NATO Agencies’ functions and services is underway with new NATO Agencies for Support, Communication & Information, and Procurement, to be stood up on 1 July 2012.  The new Agencies’ executives will work to optimise savings and improvements in effectiveness as the new entities mature over the next two years. Resource Management.  We have achieved solid progress in reforming the management of NATO’s resources in the areas of programming, transparency, accountability, and information management. These reforms are making NATO resource and financial management more efficient, and are helping us to match resources to requirements.  In this context, we will continue to reform our structures and procedures in order to seek greater efficiencies including from better use of our budgets.We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United States as well as the people and City of Chicago.  The decisions we have taken at our Summit in Chicago reinforce our common commitments, our capabilities and our cooperation, and will strengthen the Alliance for the years ahead.

 

  1. Australia, Austria, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates.
  2. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
  3. As complemented by the French President’s letter dated 16 August 2008 and subsequent correspondence on this issue.
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15 mai 2012 2 15 /05 /mai /2012 18:22

asia-pacific source harvard.edu

 

15/05/2012 Par Juliette Morillot - Jeuneafrique.com

 

De l'Inde à la péninsule coréenne, tous les pays, ou presque, redoutent la montée en puissance militaire de la Chine. Du coup, ils accroissent fébrilement leurs arsenaux. Et comptent sur le soutien des États-Unis.

 

« Asia is getting hot », a estimé Hillary Clinton, la secrétaire d'État américaine, le 13 avril en marge du G8 des ministres des Affaires étrangères, à Washington. Une semaine plus tard, le 19 avril, comme pour illustrer la réalité de la course effrénée aux armements à laquelle se livrent les principaux pays de cette région du monde, l'Inde a annoncé le lancement de son premier missile à longue portée, l'Agni-V, capable d'atteindre des cibles distantes de 5 500 km - ce qui met l'ensemble du territoire chinois à portée de frappe nucléaire. Une avancée majeure pour la troisième puissance économique asiatique, qui fait ainsi son entrée dans le club très fermé des pays détenteurs de missiles balistiques à longue portée aux côtés de la Chine, de la Russie, de la France, des États-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et d'Israël.

 

Le 25 avril, le Pakistan a procédé à son tour au lancement d'un missile balistique de moyenne portée, le Shaheen-1A, capable de frapper, comme d'ailleurs le reste de l'arsenal pakistanais, les grandes villes indiennes. Ce test réussi a été pris comme un avertissement par New Delhi, qui, en dépit des récentes tentatives de rapprochement économique, entretient des rapports tendus avec Islamabad (trois guerres ont opposé les deux pays depuis 1947). Côté indien, si les premiers missiles Agni visaient le Pakistan, le surnom des dernières séries IV et V, China Killers, ne laisse aucun doute sur leur objectif. L'Inde en effet n'a pas l'intention de se laisser dépasser par la Chine, dont la puissance militaire et économique inquiète plus que jamais toute la zone Asie-Pacifique.

 

La République populaire affirme régulièrement la nature strictement « pacifique » de sa montée en puissance militaire et soutient que la modernisation de son armée n'est destinée qu'à « défendre » le pays. Il n'empêche : l'augmentation de ses capacités de frappe et la modernisation de son appareil militaire (missiles DF-21D terre-mer anti-porte-avions guidés par satellite, porte-avions, avions furtifs J-20) font trembler les états-majors asiatiques. Tandis que les États-Unis et les puissances européennes désarment depuis des années, le budget chinois de la défense augmente depuis deux décennies au rythme de plus de 10 % par an. Il devrait même doubler d'ici à trois ans. En 2011, la Chine a dépensé 143 milliards de dollars* (108 milliards d'euros) pour sa défense, soit 100 milliards de plus que son rival indien.

 

Bras de fer militaire

 

Parallèlement, un bras de fer militaire plus conventionnel se joue en mer de Chine, où Pékin revendique un grand nombre d'archipels et d'îlots que convoitent également huit pays riverains : Taiwan, les Philippines, la Malaisie, Brunei, l'Indonésie, la Thaïlande, le Cambodge et le Vietnam. Cette zone située entre l'extrémité de la péninsule malaise et le détroit de Taiwan constitue une artère vitale pour le commerce international et l'approvisionnement en pétrole entre l'Asie orientale, le Moyen-Orient et l'Europe. Traversée annuellement par plus de 50 000 navires, soit le triple du trafic du canal de Panamá et le double de celui du canal de Suez, elle recèle en outre d'abondantes richesses offshore - halieutiques, métallurgiques, mais surtout gazières et pétrolières - que la Chine considère comme sa chasse gardée.

 

En 2009, cette dernière avait déjà réussi à dissuader la filiale anglaise de BP de s'installer au Vietnam. Aujourd'hui, elle juge « illégale » la signature, le 5 mars, d'un contrat entre le géant russe Gazprom et la compagnie d'État PetroVietnam en vue de l'exploitation des réserves d'hydrocarbures offshore du bassin de Nam Con Son.

 

 

La mer de Chine devient donc une véritable poudrière que certains spécialistes n'hésitent pas à comparer aux Balkans avant le déclenchement de la Première Guerre mondiale. Le Pentagone lui-même, qui a dévoilé au mois de janvier sa nouvelle stratégie, semble avoir pris conscience, après dix années d'errements en Irak et en Afghanistan, de l'importance cruciale de la région Asie-Pacifique pour la paix et la sécurité. D'où l'urgence d'y accroître la présence militaire américaine afin de lutter contre la prolifération nucléaire (notamment en Corée du Nord) et de garantir la « libre circulation sur les voies de navigation et de commerce ». Et ce par trois moyens principaux : le renforcement de l'armement, le redéploiement des troupes et la multiplication des exercices militaires conjoints avec des pays comme les Philippines, la Corée du Sud ou l'Australie.

 

Les manoeuvres américano-philippines du mois dernier en mer de Chine témoignent de cette nouvelle stratégie. Elles ont eu lieu au lendemain d'un incident naval entre navires philippins et chinois au large du banc de Scarborough, zone maritime que se disputent les deux pays. Ce n'est certes pas le premier incident de ce type - beaucoup d'autres ont eu lieu au large des Philippines, mais aussi du Vietnam et de Taiwan -, mais, en raison de sa durée (plus de trois semaines au moment où ces lignes sont écrites), il prend valeur de test. Les autres nations d'Asie du Sud-Est observent avec attention la capacité des Philippines, seules ou avec l'aide des États-Unis, à tenir tête à Pékin.

 

Si une guerre venait à éclater, les Philippines ne pourraient en effet opposer aux forces navales chinoises qu'une bien maigre flotte : un ancien vaisseau de guerre américain datant de la guerre du Vietnam, quelques patrouilleurs achetés au Royaume-Uni et à la Corée du Sud, une dizaine de navires rescapés de la Seconde Guerre mondiale... C'est bien peu.

 

Même chose dans les airs. Dépourvue d'avions modernes capables de rivaliser avec les appareils chinois basés sur l'île de Hainan, la Navy Air Force philippine cherche à se doter de nouveaux trainer jets sud-coréens. Mais ce qui fait le plus cruellement défaut aux Philippins, ce sont des sous-marins. Car depuis 2005 la Chine s'est dotée de submersibles diesels électriques ultraperfectionnés. Et particulièrement silencieux.

 

"L'enjeu majeur des soixante prochaines années"

 

Même basiques, les sous-marins demeurent en effet difficiles à détecter et à détruire. En 2010, les submersibles nord-coréens avaient démontré leur capacité de nuisance en coulant la corvette sud-coréenne Cheonan (46 victimes). Tous les pays asiatiques ont compris la nécessité d'en acquérir. D'ici à 2015, le Vietnam va acheter quatre submersibles russes ; la Malaisie, deux Scorpène français ; et Singapour, deux Archer et quatre Challenger de la marine suédoise. La Thaïlande négocierait pour sa part avec l'Allemagne l'acquisition d'au moins deux sous-marins. Et l'Indonésie vient de recevoir le premier des quatre qu'elle a commandés à la Corée du Sud.

 

Enfin, devenue le pivot du redéploiement stratégique américain, notamment parce que son éloignement géographique constitue un avantage face aux missiles chinois, l'Australie a resserré ses liens avec les États-Unis. Elle a notamment accepté l'installation sur son territoire de 2 500 marines qui prendront prochainement leurs quartiers à Darwin, dans le nord du pays. À Brisbane, plus au sud, une nouvelle base accueillera navires de guerre et sous-marins de l'US Navy. Quant à la base navale HMAS Stirling, à Perth, dans l'Ouest, qui accueille déjà les six sous-marins Collins australiens, elle sera mise à disposition de la marine et de l'aviation américaines. Enfin, l'archipel des Cocos (ex-îles Keeling), à près de 3 000 km de Perth et 800 km de l'île indonésienne de Java, devrait accueillir prochainement une base aérienne pour les avions de surveillance américains P-8 et les drones Global Hawk.

 

Face à ce réarmement général, les avertissements de Hillary Clinton apparaissent donc plus que fondés. Oui, la zone Asie-Pacifique sera « l'enjeu majeur des soixante prochaines années ». Mais pour les États-Unis, le défi est double. Il leur faut faire preuve de fermeté sur le plan militaire, tout en veillant à ménager les sensibilités. Car la présence de leurs troupes n'est en effet pas toujours vue d'un très bon oeil par les Asiatiques... 

* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri).

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13 mai 2012 7 13 /05 /mai /2012 16:50

interceptor-deltoid-image1.jpg

 

May 13, 2012: STRATEGY PAGE

 

There is a rebellion brewing in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. It's all about the protective vest. This lifesaving bit of equipment has saved thousands of lives in the last two decades, but has, because of political grandstanding and media distortions, become too heavy and restrictive. The troops want lighter body armor, even if it does increase vulnerability to bullets. Marine and army experts point out that the drive (created mainly by politicians and the media) for "better" body armor resulted in heavier and more restrictive (to battlefield mobility) models. This has more than doubled the minimum weight you could carry into combat.

 

Until the 1980s, you could strip down (for actual fighting) to your helmet, weapon (assault rifle and knife), ammo (hanging from webbing on your chest, along with grenades), canteen and first aid kit on your belt, and your combat uniform. Total load was 13-14 kg (about 30 pounds). You could move freely and quickly like this, and you quickly found that speed and agility was a lifesaver in combat. But now the minimum load carried is twice as much (27 kg) and, worse yet, more restrictive.

 

While troops complained about the new protective vests, they valued it in combat. The current generation of vests will stop rifle bullets, a first in the history of warfare. And this was after nearly a century of trying to develop protective vests that were worth the hassle of wearing. It wasn't until the 1980s that it was possible to make truly bullet proof vests using metallic inserts. But the inserts were heavy and so were the vests (about 11.3 kg/25 pounds). Great for SWAT teams, but not much use for the infantry. But in the 1990s, additional research produced lighter bullet proof ceramic materials. By 1999, the U.S. Army began distributing a 7.3 kg (16 pound) "Interceptor" vest that provided fragment and bullet protection. This, plus the 1.5 kg (3.3 pound) Kevlar helmet (available since the 1980s), gave the infantry the best combination of protection and mobility. And just in time.

 

Since the end of the Cold War more of the situations U.S. infantry find themselves in involve lightly armed irregulars who rely more on bullets than bombs. The bullet proof vest eliminates most of the damage done by the 30 percent of wounds that occur in the trunk (of which about 40 percent tend to be fatal without a vest). The Kevlar helmet is also virtually bulletproof but it doesn't cover all of the head (the face and part of the neck is still exposed). Even so, the reduction in deaths is significant. Some 15-20 percent of all wounds are in the head and about 45 percent of them are fatal without a helmet. The Kevlar helmet reduces the deaths by at least half and reduces many wounds to the status of bumps, sprains, and headaches. Half the wounds occur in the arms and legs, but only 5-10 percent of these are fatal and that won't change any time soon. Thus since Vietnam, improved body armor has reduced casualties by more than half. The protective vests used in Vietnam and late in the Korean War reduced casualties by about 25 percent since World War II, so the risk of getting killed or wounded has been cut in half since World War II because of improved body armor. Much better medical care (especially rapid evacuation of casualties by helicopter) has helped change the ratio of dead to wounded from 1:3 during World War II to 1:5 today.

 

The Interceptor vest was an improvement in other ways. It was easier to wear and was cooler in hot climates because you could more easily adjust it to let some air circulate. You could also hang gear from the vest, making it more a piece of clothing. It's still hot to wear the vest in hot weather but if you're expecting a firefight, it's easier to make the decision to wear the vest. You know it will stop bullets. U.S. troops who have fought in Afghanistan and been hit with rifle bullets that would have penetrated earlier vests are already spreading the word throughout the ground combat community. All you have to do is exercise in such a way that you are better able to carry the weight and still be mobile.

 

But as new, and heavier vests were introduced the troops often found themselves with protection, and weight, they did not need. For example, the latest vests will protect you from a hit high-powered rifle fired a close range. That is rare in combat. The latest vests will also protect you from multiple high-powered machine-gun bullet hits. Again, that's rare and an increasing number of soldiers and marines are willing to trade that for less weight and more mobility.

 

The army tried to solve the problem by instituting new training methods that emphasized building muscle and the ability to be agile under all that weight. The new exercises helped somewhat, but moving vigorously with all that weight has led to more musculoskeletal problems, many of them with long term consequences.

 

The enemy has also adapted, knowing that the more heavily encumbered Americans were not as agile or as fast and that could be exploited. The frustration of being slower than your foe often led U.S. troops to exertions that brought on musculoskeletal injuries. The new body armor may protect from bullets and shell fragments but it does nothing for over exuberant troops.

 

So the soldiers and marines are getting louder in their demands for relief from protection they don't need and restrictive protective vests that can get them killed.

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13 mai 2012 7 13 /05 /mai /2012 11:44
F 35 britanniques : what a mess[*] !

 

13 Mai 2012 Jean-Dominique Merchet

 

Le revirement de Londres sur le choix du futur avion de combat F 35, annoncé jeudi dernier, illustre le désarroi dans lequel se trouve la défense britannique. Des finances publiques à sec, des forces armées littérallement lessivée par dix ans de guerres (Irak, Afghanistan), une industrie qui a perdu des pans entiers de ses compétences et, cerise sur le gateau, des politiques, très divisés, qui ne savent pas où ils veulent vraiment aller.

 

En comparaison, la situation française apparait exceptionnellement favorable... mais il n'y a pas lieu de s'en réjouir. Car, volens nolens, le destin de nos pays est lié. Le Royaume-Uni est, pour l'heure, le principal partenaire militaire de la France. Son affaiblissement est au final notre affaiblissement.

 

Revenons au F 35... en sachant bien que ce n'est qu'une étape de plus dans une longue descente aux enfers. Il y en aura d'autres, et elles se décideront d'abord aux Etats-Unis, puisque Londres a fait le choix de s'en remettre à Washington pour équiper son aviation. Et que le programme de F 35 (l'ancien Joint Strike Fighter) de Lockheed n'est pas à proprement parler une réussite. Trop complexe (trois versions très différentes) et trop cher : le dernier rapport du Congrès américain parle de 400 milliards. Ce n'est pas fini, car les avions ne sont toujours pas en service et on ne sait ni quand, ni qui sous quelle forme et en quels nombres ils le seront un jour.

 

En décembre 2006, le gouvernement britannique annonçait sa décision d'acheter 135 F 35 dans sa version B. Cette version est à décollage court et atterrisage vertical (STOVL, en anglais). C'est la version développée spécialement pour l'aviation de l'US Marine Corps et qui doit succèder aux Harriers britanniques.

En octobre 2010, le gouvernement britannique (qui entre temps est devenu conservateur) change de cap. Il est décidé d'acquérir des F 35 mais dans sa version C, celle de l'US Navy. C'est un appareil naval traditionnel conçu pour décoller d'un porte-avions avec une catapulte et y apponter avec un brin d'arrêt (Catobar, en anglais). Moins complexe techniqument, l'appareil est à la fois moins couteux et plus performant en terme de capacités d'emport (carburant ou armement). Il oblige cependant à disposer de porte-avions pouvant le mettre en oeuvre. Le nombre d'appareils que Londres souhaitent acheter est réduit, mais le chiffre exact n'a pas été rendu public. En tout cas, pas 135...

Nouveau contre-ordre, jeudi 10 mai 2012 : le secrétaire à la Défense Philipp Hammond annonce aux Communes que Londres a décidé de revenir à l'achat de la version B (STOVL) ! La justification est la suivante : même si l'avion est moins cher, l'adaptation du futur porte-avions Queen Elizabeth se révèle hors de prix : la facture de l'adaptation a doublée, pour atteindre 2 milliards de livres (2,5 milliards d'euros...) ! Une somme proprement folle. Et l'avion ne sera pas disponible, au mieux, avant 2023, dans douze ans... Passons sur le fait que les Britanniques construisent deux porte-avions, sans savoir que faire de l'un des deux (Prince of Wales) puisqu'il a été jugé trop cher d'arrêter le chantier. Quant au reste de l'aviation britannique, elle repose sur l'Eurofighter Typhoon, qui n'est pas non plus la réussite du siècle, en matière de coûts et de performances...

 

De ce côté-ci de la Manche, on fait grise mine. Le choix de 2010 apparaissait comme la volonté de Londres de se rapprocher du modèle français pour, à terme, envisager un groupe aéronaval commun. Cette perspective s'éloigne, même si l'on avait beaucoup exagéré les possibilités de rapprochement en la matière. En effet, poser un avion sur un porte-avions est une chose, le mettre en oeuvre en est une autre. On a vu des Rafale se poser sur des porte-avions américains et participer à quelques exercices, mais imaginer que les avions français ou britanniques puissent être mis en oeuvre, de manière opérationnelle, à partir de porte-avions de l'un ou l'autre pays est une pure vue de l'esprit. Ne serait-ce que parce qu'il faut tout le soutien mécanique et l'armement des avions : il faut beaucoup de place et beaucoup de monde pour s'en occuper. Où les mettrait-on ? On oublie aussi un peu vite que le F 35 C (Catobar) est plus lourd (plus de 31 tonnes, à pleine charge) et qu'il ne pourrait pas être mis en oeuvre par le Charles de Gaulle. Les Américains développent d'ailleurs, à très grand prix, des catapultes électriques. Bref, on a un peu rêvé, comme on le fait depuis plus dix ans, sur un porte-avions franco-brtiannique. L'annonce de jeudi n'est qu'un douloureux retour au réel.

 

Très réelle aussi, l'inconséquence du choix des pays qui se sont embarqués dans le projet F 35... et qui s'en mordent les doigts. L'avion n'est pas là, il siphonne leurs crédits de recherche-développement et même les Britanniques découvrent qu'ils n'auront pas accès aux codes-sources, les secrets les plus précieux pour un programme de cette complexité. En clair, ils se sont mis entre les mains des Américains et financent la destruction d'une capacité européenne (ou autres, pensons au Canada, au Japon...) de concevoir les futurs avions de combat. Belle réussite !

 

* "Quel b*** ! "... pour les non-anglophones

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12 mai 2012 6 12 /05 /mai /2012 11:55

Air-Sea-Battle-Strategy.jpg

 

May. 11, 2012 By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS– Defense news

 

The Air Sea Battle (ASB) concept initiated by the U.S. Navy and Air Force is an effort to make the most of the combined military capabilities of the U.S. The objectives are to carry out the strategies of U.S. commanders and defeat those of an enemy — traditional goals to be sure, but the ASB concept brings together a much wider matrix intended to match capabilities and threats in more efficient ways.

 

Observers tend to view ASB as aimed at specific threats — China and Iran — while Pentagon leaders insist the concept can be adapted to any adversary. In a May 10 blog post, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert avoided mentioning any specific country, but began with a reference that can quickly be interpreted as aimed at Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf.

 

“There’s been attention recently about closing an international strait using, among other means, mines, fast boats, cruise missiles and mini-subs,” Greenert posted. “These weapons are all elements of what we call an ‘Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2AD)’ strategy.”

 

The attention on Air Sea Battle comes as the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, prepare to meet on May 23 with Iran in Baghdad to discuss security concerns about Iran’s development of nuclear facilities. Without significant guarantees about Iran’s intentions, Israel has been preparing a possible military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, an event, Iran has threatened, that would cause a closure of Hormuz.

 

The ASB concept, Greenert wrote, was developed to defeat A2AD strategies such as the closure of the strait.

“This concept identifies how we will defeat A2AD capabilities such as cyber attack, mines, submarines, cruise and ballistic missiles, and air defense systems and, where applicable, ‘natural access denial’ such as weather, pollution, natural disaster, etc. The concept also describes what we will need to do these operations, especially as the threats improve due to technological advancements,” Greenert posted on his blog.

 

ASB, he explained, relies on tightly coordinated operations that cross operating “domains” — air, land, sea, undersea, space and cyberspace. ASB concepts include submarines hitting air defenses with cruise missiles in support of Air Force bombers; F-22 Air Force stealth fighters taking out enemy cruise missile threats to Navy ships, or a Navy technician confusing an opponent’s radar system so an Air Force UAV can attack an enemy command center.

 

The concept is also being used, Greenert posted, “to guide decisions in procurement, doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel and facilities.”

 

Reflecting the joint outlook at the core of ASB, Greenert also advocated for two key Air Force procurement programs.

“The joint force needs the new Long Range Strike Bomber to provide global reach and stealth as well as the new KC-46 tanker, upon which our patrol aircraft and strike fighters depend,” Greenert wrote. “These investments complement the other capabilities of Air Sea Battle such as the Virginia-class submarines, UAVs, Ford-class aircraft carriers, and long-range weapons.”

 

With Gen. Norton Schwartz, Air Force chief of staff, Greenert will continue his ASB discussion May 16 in a public event at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

 

Greenert’s ASB posting can be read by clicking here.

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11 mai 2012 5 11 /05 /mai /2012 07:35

pentagon source defenseWeb

 

May. 10, 2012 - By MARCUS WEISGERBER Defense News

 

The U.S. Defense Department immediately rejected two military spending plans put forth in the Republican-controlled House that recommend boosting the Pentagon’s 2013 budget as much as $4 billion above its spending request.

 

Many measures — both those approved by the House Armed Services Committee and those proposed by the House Appropriations defense subcommittee — will likely be dead on arrival when the Democrat-controlled Senate makes its military spending recommendations. Democratic leadership has pledged to cap defense spending at the lower levels mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011.

 

“The Department of Defense, and I believe the [Obama] administration, are not going to support additional funds that come at the expense of other critical national security priorities,” Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said at a May 10 news briefing at the Pentagon. “If members try to restore their favorite programs without regard to an overall strategy, the cuts will have to come from areas that could impact overall readiness.”

 

Members of the House Armed Services Committee earlier in the day rejected Pentagon proposals to retire aircraft and ships and added funding for projects such as building a missile interceptor site on the East Coast of the United States.

 

Specifically, the committee’s version of the 2013 defense authorization bill overturned an Air Force proposal to retire all of its Alenia C-27J cargo planes and Northrop Grumman Block 30 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. The panel added $138 million to restart C-27J contracts that the Air Force has not renewed.

 

The committee restored three of the four cruisers that the Navy wants to retire early in 2013, prevented the Army from retiring its C-23 Sherpa cargo planes, and funded A-10 attack jets and F-16 fighters that the Air Force wants to retire.

 

The bill also continues “minimum sustained production” of Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Hercules recovery vehicles. It fully funds the Army Ground Combat Vehicle development program.

 

Panetta argued that the increases recommended by House lawmakers “reverse many of the tough decisions that we reached” through a sweeping military strategy review. Adding to the top line of the Pentagon’s proposed defense budget would “force the kind of tradeoffs that could jeopardize our national defense,” he said.

 

“There’s no free lunch here,” Panetta said. “Every dollar that is added will have to be offset by cuts in national security and if for some reason they do not want to comply with the Budget Control Act, then they would certainly be adding to the deficit, which only puts our national security further at risk.”

 

The House Armed Services Committee, by a 56-5 vote, approved a $554 billion base defense budget and an additional $88.5 billion for operations in Afghanistan. When the Pentagon’s 2013 budget request is scored by the Congressional Budget Office, the House Armed Services Committee recommendation is $4 billion higher.

 

In procurement, the bill funds 50 Boeing AH-64 Apache, 59 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk and 44 Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters; 29 Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, 26 Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and 36 General Atomics MQ-9 Reapers.

 

The Pentagon requested 21 Bell Boeing V-22 aircraft.

 

The panel added 12 Reapers to the Pentagon’s request. The bill authorizes multiyear procurements for up to 10 Virginia-class submarines and 10 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers.

 

Opponents of the East Coast missile defense site say planned European interceptors are more than sufficient and that an additional site would cost about $5 billion over five years to build.

 

Asked about the proposed missile defense site during the briefing, U.S. Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “I don’t see a need beyond what we submitted in the last budget” and the current “suite of ground-based and sea-based interceptors” is sufficient.

 

At the same time, the House Appropriations defense subcommittee chairman C.W. Bill Young, R-Fla., has developed a 2013 defense spending bill that comes in $3.1 billion above the Pentagon’s request.

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10 mai 2012 4 10 /05 /mai /2012 22:25
Londres choisit le F-35B aux dépens de l'entente franco-britannique

 

 

10.05.2012 Le Monde.fr avec AFP

 

Au plan diplomatique, l'une des conséquences du revirement britannique est que les avions français Rafale ne pourront pas se poser sur le pont du "Queen Elizabeth", dépourvu de catapultes.

 

Le choix du F-35B américain pour équiper les porte-avions britanniques, annoncé jeudi 10 mai à Londres, constitue un coup dur pour le concept d'interopérabilité au coeur de l'entente franco-britannique en matière de défense.

 

Le gouvernement britannique hésitait entre deux versions de l'avion de combat fabriqué par la même société américaine Lockheed Martin pour équiper la Royal Navy et la Royal Air Force (RAF): le F-35B à atterrissage et décollage vertical et le F-35C lancé par catapultes. Il a finalement renoncé à se doter du F-35C du fait de "l'augmentation inacceptable [du coût] et des délais" qu'impliquait un tel choix. L'installation d'un système de catapulte et de récupération "cats and traps" sur le pont du Queen Elizabeth, futur porte-avions britannique qui reste à construire d'ici 2020, aurait entraîné un retard de trois ans et un surcoût de 2 milliards de livres (2,5 milliards d'euros) par rapport au devis initial, a plaidé Philip Hammond, l'actuel ministre de la défense du Royaume-Uni au sein du gouvernement de coalition de David Cameron.

 

La coalition des conservateurs et libéraux démocrates avait pourtant, en 2010, préconisé d'adopter le F-35C, plutôt que le F-35B initialement retenu par le précédent gouvernement travailliste. Le premier ministre David Cameron avait à l'époque vanté aux députés l'interopérabilité du F-35C avec les porte-avions français et américains. Jeudi, le porte-parole de l'opposition travailliste pour les affaires de défense, Jim Murphy, a immédiatement dénoncé "l'incompétence" gouvernementale.

 

PAS DE RAFALE SUR LE PONT DU "QUEEN ELIZABETH"

 

Au plan diplomatique, l'une des conséquences du revirement est que les avions français Rafale ne pourront pas se poser sur le pont du Queen Elizabeth, dépourvu de catapultes. Or l'utilisation croisée des porte-avions était au cœur du projet de coopération bilatérale franco-britannique esquissé à Saint-Malo en 1998 et relancé à grand renfort de publicité par David Cameron et le président Nicolas Sarkozy lors de la signature du traité de défense de Lancaster, en novembre 2010.

 

La nécessité du maintien de capacités aéronavales fortes, trente ans après la guerre anglo-argentine aux Malouines, en Atlantique Sud, constitue un argument fort dans le débat en Grande-Bretagne sur les risques réels ou supposés des coupes budgétaires dans le domaine de la défense. Jeudi, Philip Hammond a expliqué : "La décision concernant les porte-avions, prise en 2010, était légitime à l'époque, mais les faits ont changé et nous devons changer notre approche en conséquence. Ce gouvernement ne va pas aveuglément poursuivre des projets sans considération pour l'augmentation des coûts et des délais."

 

"C'est un autre rendez-vous manqué pour des raisons secondaires", a déploré Etienne de Durand, expert auprès de l'Institut français des relations internationales, dans une interview au Financial Times. Le partenariat inédit scellé en 2010 par les deux principales forces militaires européennes prévoit notamment la création d'un corps expéditionnaire commun s'inspirant de la brigade franco-allemande, le partage de laboratoires pour tester leurs arsenaux atomiques et des partenariats industriels sur les drones et les missiles. Le rapprochement exprime un souci commun de mutualisation et de réduction des coûts en période d'austérité.

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6 mai 2012 7 06 /05 /mai /2012 07:25
US House committee presses air force on Global Hawk

26 Apr 2012 By Zach Rosenberg - FG

 

Washington DC - The House Armed Services Committee has made the first move to reverse the US Air Force's controversial decision to retire the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 fleet.

 

The committee's panel on tactical air and land forces passed an amendment that would prevent the USAF from spending taxpayer funds on efforts to retire the RQ-4 Block 30s, an imagery and signals intelligence gathering version of the Global Hawk family.

 

The panel's recommendation signals the beginning of a legislative battle with the Obama administration over the fate of the Block 30 fleet. Three more committees in the House and Senate must still pass separate versions of spending bills for the next fiscal year.

 

The Obama administration submitted a budget request in February that proposes to retire the Block 30 fleet.

 

The Block 30 was built to replace the venerable Lockheed Martin U-2 as a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, but the programme was cancelled after the USAF concluded that it was significantly more expensive to operate than the U-2, and that the Block 30's sensors are inferior to the U-2's current equipment.

 

Since the retirement announcement in January 2012, Northrop has kept a full-court press in an attempt to keep the aircraft in service. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities such as those the Global Hawk provides are among the most demanded services by combat commanders.

 

"Northrop Grumman is pleased that the House Armed Services Committee has proposed a solution that will allow Global Hawk Block 30 assets to continue to provide Combatant Commanders with information essential to national security," says Northrop.

 

Construction of other Global Hawk models, including the Block 40 (carrying a different sensor) and MQ-4C broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS) for the US navy, is unaffected.

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