9th December 2014  – by Sven Biscop * - europeangeostrategy.org

Belgium believes in European defence. This belief is shared by political, diplomatic and military decision-makers and public opinion alike. That is a strength, for in the habitual absence of elaborate strategic documents it provides its defence policy with at least some sense of purpose. For Belgium, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance passes through the building of a strong Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the European Union (EU), which de facto is the European pillar of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) but can act autonomously as well. This strong belief is also a weakness however, for a belief is seldom questioned or justified through sound argumentation: one believes and that’s that. As a result ritualistic professions of allegiance continue, but the original purpose of the doctrine tends to be forgotten. Belgium has always been a leading theologian of European defence, playing a key role in developing concepts such as ‘pooling and sharing’, but the discourse is becoming sterile and losing the power to convert the heretic.

Belgium has always been a leading theologian of European defence

Instead an unwarranted trust that miracles will happen has taken shape. Whenever budget cuts are announced, as is the case today, politicians of all colours revert to the same mantra: salvation through European defence. If only we unite our forces with those of our European brethren, we will see the miracle of the multiplication of the capabilities. Alas, this stance overlooks the fact that for them to be multiplied, there have to be some capabilities in the first place. Military marriages tend to be traditional: no dowry, no wedding. Military cooperation takes place where a win-win situation is created and all parties benefit from coordinating or even integrating their capabilities with each other. The more capabilities Belgium scraps from its arsenal, the less attractive it will be for potential partners. For lack of investment Belgium even runs the risk that existing partnerships will unravel; our partners are already eying us suspiciously. The integration of the Dutch and Belgian navies is one of the best examples of far-reaching yet maximally flexible defence cooperation in Europe – but if Belgium cannot replace its two frigates alongside the Netherlands it will be imperilled.

What are needed now are acts of devotion. Before it can expect any miracles, Belgium must be seen to be practising its belief. That cannot be done on alms alone. At the very least, Belgium should maintain its defence budget at the same level, and envisage a long-term investment plan in function of the strategic vision that the defence minister has been tasked to produce. The minimum objective ought to be obvious: to maintain at least one significant capability that can operate across the spectrum, including combat operations, in army, navy and air force. That will give any future Belgian government maximal flexibility. If Belgium abandons this range of capabilities and opts for an entirely non-combatant air force for example, governments when requested to participate in operations may find that they are no longer able even when they are willing. Or worse, for lack of fighter aircraft they may come under pressure to deploy land forces in a risky situation in which they would rather not, if participation in the operation is imperative.

Belgium must be seen to be practising its belief in European defence

Abandoning yet more capabilities will eliminate options for defence cooperation. Vice versa, cooperation is the only way of maintaining a broader range of capabilities. Any future fighter capacity for example can be integrated with a partner or partners to the same extent as the Belgian navy is with that of the Netherlands. Then Belgium will see that miracles can be engineered – if the fee is paid. And the more we are seen to be practising, the more our sermons in favour of European defence will be heard by other, hitherto less convinced members of the congregation. To that end Belgium should also invest in some of the crucial EU-level projects (such as air-to-air refuelling and drones) of the European Defence Agency, an institution that it is keen to promote.

Capabilities must be acquired for a purpose, of course. It is not always clear how to understand the trinity of Belgium’s belief in European defence, and in the Charter of the United Nations (which implies that action must be taken when it is violated), and its strategic culture that is strongly pacifist (which goes for all political parties as well as the public). Yet of late Belgium has participated prominently in the air campaigns over Libya and Iraq, in the naval campaign against piracy, and in the training mission in Mali (though it was conspicuously absent in the Central African Republic). If Belgium can maintain a consistent contribution whenever Europe decides that responsibility must be assumed (including for significant land operations) it appears therefore that even this mystery can be resolved.

This article is part of the “National Perspectives and CSDP” special focus series being published by European Geostrategy. It is the first contribution from a Belgian perspective. Read more about the series. 

* Prof. Sven Biscop is a Senior Editor of European Geostrategy. He is also Director of the ‘Europe in the World Programme’ at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels. He writes here in a personal capacity.

30th November 2014  – by Tom Dyson - europeangeostrategy.org

European defence budgets face a context of long-term fiscal austerity. At the same time, European states are facing an intensity of security challenges unprecedented since the fall of the Soviet Union, including the resurgence of Russia and instability in the Middle East and Africa. In the context of the ‘Asia pivot’ in United States (US) defence and security policy these challenges will necessitate increased European burden-sharing within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as well as the development of greater European military autonomy from the US through the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This fiscal and strategic environment creates a clear imperative for all European militaries to consider how to enhance efficiency in defence spending by pooling and sharing capabilities.

However, the EU’s Ghent Framework and NATO’s Smart Defence have made only limited progress in fostering greater specialisation by national militaries. Where substantial cooperation has occurred, it has taken place on a bi-lateral basis, such as the 2010 Anglo-French Lancaster House Treaties and 2014 Anglo-French Brize-Norton Summit. The downsides of bi-lateralism are evident in the outcomes of defence cuts in Europe which, in the absence of multilateral coordination, are largely leading to specialisation by ‘default’ rather than ‘design’.

The downsides of bi-lateralism are evident in the outcomes of defence cuts in Europe

Britain has traditionally viewed the development of high-end capabilities within the CSDP as anathema, preferring instead to leave higher-intensity operations to NATO. Nevertheless, under the Labour Government (1997-2010) British policy toward the CSDP adopted a broadly pragmatic approach that sought to find common ground with European states, such as France, which sought greater autonomy from the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, Britain was a central actor in the development of key CSDP initiatives such as the 1998 St Malo Accord and the 2003 EU Battlegroups Initiative.

However, the British approach to CSDP under the Conservative-Liberal coalition (2010-present) has become less willing to countenance any measures which may challenge the centrality of NATO to European defence. Hence the United Kingdom (UK) has failed to make use of the opportunities that the EU affords to identify and overcome European capability shortfalls. The urgency of the challenges of austerity and the contemporary security environment now require a return to a more pragmatic approach by the UK that recognises the opportunities for complementarity between the Ghent Framework and Smart Defence.

The June 2015 European Council provides an excellent opportunity for Britain to re-claim its leadership role in European defence and promote greater military specialisation ‘by design’. The first priority of the UK must be to champion the establishment of a European defence review commission. As Nick Witney has highlighted, such a commission must not only re-examine the European Security Strategy that was last updated in 2008, but also the capabilities needed to implement strategy. The ensuing dialogue about European interests and longer-term defence planning will help to decrease the level of uncertainty about the intentions of European states and permit greater coordination of defence cuts.

The June 2015 European Council provides an excellent opportunity for Britain to re-claim its leadership role in European defence

In addition, the June 2015 European Council must form a turning point in Britain’s relationship with the European Defence Agency (EDA). For too long Britain has undermined the work of the EDA by seeking to limit its budget and by pursuing bi-lateral cooperation outside its institutional structures. Britain should use the European Council to outline its intentions for leadership on greater use of the EDA as a means to coordinate specialisation with both large (France and Germany) and smaller European states and to establish clear, coordinated goals for armaments procurement and troop numbers with other European nations.

The sacrifice of a loss of British military autonomy could be minimised by building in redundancies to ensure that a military operation could proceed, should one or more European nations be unable to contribute. A small reduction in national strategic autonomy is favourable to the far greater loss in British power and influence that will ensue if Britain fails to encourage its European partners to coordinate their defence cuts. A consensus amongst the ‘Weimar Five’ about the need for a renewed impetus behind CSDP pooling and sharing initiatives has emerged in recent years. Furthermore, British leadership on pooling and sharing under CSDP would ultimately be welcomed in Washington as it would enhance Europe’s effectiveness in dealing with security challenges within its geopolitical neighbourhood and create capability synergies which would also be of use to NATO. Within such a facilitative context, British leadership on CSDP would be transformative for European defence.

British leadership on CSDP would be transformative for European defence

The re-emergence of British leadership on CSDP will, however, depend on the outcome of the May 2015 UK general election. Should one party emerge with a workable majority, a window of opportunity will emerge to allow British CSDP policy to be driven by its strategic interests rather than the insularity of the UK Independence Party and Tory backbenchers. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review which will follow shortly after the general election would then provide an ideal opportunity to integrate ‘specialisation by design’ into British and European defence policy.

This article is part of the “National Perspectives and CSDP” special focus series being published by European Geostrategy. It is the first contribution from a British perspective. Read more about the series.