Global Amphibious Warfare Programme Investment and the 'Battle for Access'

The UK MoD has replaced its Vikings with Warthogs

(Broncos), amphibious-capablevehicles. Image: BFBS

09/28/2011 Contributor:  Richard de Silva - defenceiq.com

Recent years have seen a spike in the number of global militaries either acquiring or beginning to develop new amphibious vehicles. Included in the European table are Italy, France, Spain and Turkey, while moving eastward, Japan, China, Australia and the Republic of Korea are all proud owners of modernised amphibious programmes.

Add to that list the UK’s decision to replace its Vikings with Warthogs (Broncos), amphibious-capable vehicles that have reportedly intimidated insurgents in Afghanistan with their combined speed and size so much so that Taliban commanders are said to have ordered their men to cease fire.

Justifying amphibious requirements

At the start of the year, former US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates ruffled the feathers of the Marine Corps in his decision to scrap the development of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, citing scepticism that amphibious operations are deserving of such high budgets. The EFV programme has been mercifully replaced by the Assault Amphibian Vehicle Service Life Extension programme, the Marine Personnel Carrier and the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, but the original slight prompted a challenge from proponents to justify these assets and their future use.

As those global developments demonstrate, there is something of a consensus that Gates’ views on the importance of the field overlooked some key factors, of which at least two may present the cornerstone of thought on the matter.

The first is that the nature of future conflicts is, as always, unpredictable. In fact, if we are to base the statistical likelihood of an accurate estimate of this yet-to-occur violence on history’s own intelligence efforts, we can assume that our predictions will most likely be wrong.

Expeditionary forces must be prepared for all types of warfare in the quest to succeed in the “battle for access”. The term is taken directly from the US Joint Force Command in its assessment of the joint operational environment last year, and refers to the dire possibility of forces being cut off from bases, assets, or support – essentially preventing the warfighter from even entering theatre.

While Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated little resistance in this fashion, we are emerging into an age of warfare in which cyber attacks, electronic strikes, and irregular tactics may play a role in crippling forces before they can act or react to a situation that requires their involvement.

Civil applications of amphib technology

The other element is in the use of expeditionary forces in the rescue and aid of those hit by natural disasters and political crises. Amphibious vehicles, such as the Bronco and the AAV-7A1 and associated task forces, have been invaluable in the humanitarian relief following the likes of the civil disintegration in Somalia in 1992, the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, 2005’s hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, and the earthquake that impacted Fukushima this year, to name a few major operations.

While not a product of warfare, these humanitarian actions can be held up as fine examples of the benefit of an amphibious fleet in the event that a coastal civilian population is targeted during a conflict and requires immediate attention.

It is from both these angles that one could reason the benefits of investing into amphibious platforms as an ongoing necessity, but given the evolution of warfare, must be repositioned by considering the joint environment as a whole.

Based on the insight of Robert O. Work, Undersecretary of the US Navy, initial landing forces should continue to form part of the tapestry of an amphibious assault, supported in full by air, sea, and full-scale land invasion. However, it will be the domain of these landing forces to target an adversary’s vulnerable points – those offering less resistance – while the task of neutralising hard threats, including networks, radar, and anti-air systems, should be performed solely by long-range missiles fired from beyond the horizon or above the clouds.

Once inserted onto land, it is up to these amphibious troops to not only traverse terrain that has little indigenous infrastructure, but to also establish the foothold components of a new infrastructure and network for the arriving forces. Such a task can expedite the course of attack, preventing costly time delays and heavily restricting an adversary’s opportunity to gather and mobilise a defensive line.

Amphibious forces of today and tomorrow are not the same kettle of fish that they once were, and there is perhaps a tangible sense of misunderstanding even among top brass as to their place in a modern military. As Director of the USMC Warfighting Lab Col (ret) Vince Goulding explains: “It’s not Saving Private Ryan anymore.”

Yet, with some critical and ongoing re-analysis of the way in which such units have been strategically employed – and how they potentially could be – there is no doubt in the minds of many that an amphibious force is vital to keep on the bench.