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5 mars 2015 4 05 /03 /mars /2015 17:50
NATO conducts Annual Crisis Management Exercise (CMX)


03 Mar. 2015 NATO


NATO to exercise decision-making in crisis – CMX15 to focus on maritime security


Ambassadors on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) are preparing to rehearse Alliance and partner consultation and decision making procedures against the backdrop of a fictitious crisis.


The exercise is designed to test the NAC procedures at the strategic political-military level. It involves civilian and military staffs in Allied capitals, at NATO Headquarters and in both Operations and Transformation Strategic Commands. CMX15 involves no deployed forces. The exercise rehearses decision-making processes using an entirely fictitious scenario.


The scenario for CMX15 consists of a crisis developing between two non-NATO states at distance from Alliance territory. It contains a humanitarian and maritime dimension, with implications for the security of the Allies.


As with previous such exercises, CMX15 will have partner participation. Australia, Finland, Japan, Sweden and Ukraine will participate alongside Allies in the exercise. South Korea, New Zealand and Georgia chose to observe the exercise.


The European Union has been invited to exchange information on the evolving situation, along with the United Nations Department of Political Affairs and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Energy Agency which will also observe the exercise.


Partners will be involved in CMX15 according to Alliance decisions taken in 2011. In 2011, the Alliance renewed the framework that governs relations with partners in operational settings, in order to include partner involvement in planning, exercising and decision-shaping.


CMX15 will take place between 4 and 10 March 2015. This is the Alliance’s 19th Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) since 1992.

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21 novembre 2014 5 21 /11 /novembre /2014 17:50
Presentation of the Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan - SEDE


21-11-2014 SEDE


On 20 November the Subcommittee exchanged views on the forthcoming Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan with Paola Imperiale, Maritime Coordinator at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rudolf Roy, Head of Security Policy and Sanctions Division, EEAS and Beate Gminder, Head of Maritime Policy Mediterranean and Black Sea Unit, DG MARE, European Commission.
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24 juin 2014 2 24 /06 /juin /2014 16:50
Stratégie de Sûreté Maritime de l’Union Européenne adoptée par le Conseil des affaires générales le 24 juin 2014


24.06.2014 consilium.europa.eu


La mer a de l'importance.


La mer est une précieuse source de croissance et de prospérité pour l'Union européenne et ses citoyens. L'UE dépend de l'ouverture, de la protection et de la sûreté des mers et des océans pour son développement économique, ses transports, sa sécurité énergétique, ainsi que pour garantir le libre-échange, le tourisme et le bon état écologique de l'environnement marin.

La majeure partie du commerce tant extérieur qu'intérieur de l'UE se fait par voie maritime. L'UE est le troisième plus gros importateur et le cinquième plus grand producteur de denrées issues de la pêche et de l'aquaculture. Plus de 70 % des frontières extérieures de l'Union sont des frontières maritimes et des centaines de millions de passagers transitent chaque année par les ports européens. La sécurité énergétique de l'Europe est largement tributaire du transport et des infrastructures maritimes. Le développement important des flottes des États membres de l'UE et les infrastructures portuaires adaptées dont elle dispose (par exemple les installations pour le GNL) contribuent au bon fonctionnement du marché énergétique et à la sécurité de l'approvisionnement et donc au bien-être des citoyens européens et à la bonne santé de l'économie européenne dans son ensemble.

L'UE et ses États membres ont donc un intérêt stratégique à ce que les problèmes de sécurité liés à la mer et à la gestion des frontières maritimes soient recensés et traités, et ce dans l'ensemble du domaine maritime mondial. Les citoyens européens attendent des réponses efficaces, notamment au regard des coûts, pour la protection du domaine maritime, y compris les frontières, les ports et les installations offshore, afin de sécuriser le commerce maritime, de faire face aux éventuelles menaces découlant d'activités illégales ou illicites en mer, et d'utiliser au mieux les possibilités qu'offre la mer en termes de croissance et d'emploi, tout en protégeant le milieu marin.

La stratégie de sûreté maritime de l'Union européenne (SSMUE) couvre à la fois les aspects intérieurs et extérieurs de la sûreté maritime de l'Union. Elle constitue un cadre global, contribuant à un domaine maritime mondial stable et sûr, conformément à la stratégie européenne de sécurité (SES), tout en veillant à la cohérence avec d'autres domaines d'action de l'UE, notamment la politique maritime intégrée (PMI) et la stratégie de sécurité intérieure (SSI).

La stratégie a été adoptée au moyen d'un processus global coordonné, dont les principaux jalons sont les conclusions du Conseil du 26 avril 2010, les conclusions du Conseil sur la surveillance maritime intégrée du 23 mai 2011, la déclaration de Limassol du 7 octobre 2012, les conclusions du Conseil européen de décembre 2013 et la communication conjointe de la Commission européenne et de la Haute Représentante du 6 mars 2014.


Télécharger Stratégie de Sûreté Maritime de l’Union Européenne adoptée par le Conseil des affaires générales le 24 juin 2014

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7 mars 2014 5 07 /03 /mars /2014 16:50
European Commission Memo on the EU's Maritime Security Strategy


6/3/2014 EU source: European Commission Ref: EC14-061EN


Summary: 6 March 2014, Brussels - European Commission Memo on the EU's Maritime Security Strategy


Q: Why is the Commission and the High Representative proposing only elements for a strategy?

A: One of the objectives of this process is to ensure that the Member States are fully involved in the development of this strategy. A European Union maritime security strategy cannot be developed without the involvement of Member States since many operational activities are carried out by national authorities. The Commission and the High Representative are therefore looking forward to working closely with Member States in order to deliver a full-fledged strategy. We are confident that the strategy once adopted will represent the views and interests of all stakeholders.


Q: How have Member States been involved so far?

A: The Member States already have provided substantial input through events organised at EU level and through various written contributions. Additionally, the Commission and the European External Action Service organised a stakeholder consultation in June 2013, where Member States expressed their support to the general approach. The intention is that the Joint Communication will serve as a basis for further work on shaping the strategy together with the Member States in the EU Council under the leadership of the Hellenic Presidency.


Q: What would be the purpose of such a strategy?

A: The purpose of an EU Maritime Security Strategy would be to provide a common framework for relevant authorities at national and European levels to develop further their specific policies. The aim of such a strategy would be to protect EU's strategic maritime interests and identify options to do so. Such a framework would provide the context and ensure coherence amongst different sector specific maritime policies and strategies. Most importantly it would significantly strengthen the link between internal and external security aspects of the maritime policy of the EU and civil and military cooperation.


Q: What are the main aims?

A: The main aims of an EU Maritime Security Strategy should be: (1) to identify and articulate the main strategic maritime interests of the EU; (2) to identify and articulate the maritime threats, challenges and risks to the strategic maritime interests of the EU; and (3) to organise the response, i.e. provide the common policy objectives, common principles and areas of common support as the backbone of the joint strategic framework in order to create coherence for the diverse and wide array of sector specific maritime policies and strategies.


Q: Does the EU only have maritime interests or does it also have a maritime responsibility?

A: It is crucial to identify the strategic maritime interests of the European Union. The global maritime domain is of vital importance to the EU and it is multi-layered. It is a crucial domain for free commerce and trade. In addition, seas and oceans are interrelated eco-systems; it is a source of resources; open seas and coastal areas are zones for tourism etc. The EU is a global actor therefore it does not only have interests, it also has to take adequate responsibility. This global responsibility has to be transformed into concrete and specific actions and to promote the respect for international law, human rights and democracy, and rules-based good governance at sea.


Q: What does the term "cross-sectoral" mean?

A: The term 'cross-sectoral' refers to actions or cooperation between different marine or maritime functions. They are still largely organised in isolation of each other and often along national lines. Modern maritime risks and threats are multifaceted and can have implications for all of these sectors involving different policies and instruments. The responses therefore should be adequately integrated and cross-sectoral in their nature. It means finding a common maritime security interest among different functions and aspects concerned.


Q: What are the sectors addressed?

A: Some of the most evident sectors are maritime safety, maritime transport, marine environment protection, fisheries control, customs, border control, law enforcement, defence, research and development and others. A 'joined up' approach to maritime policy, making these sectors work better together, can make the security policy more coherent, effective and cost efficient.


Q: What is the added value of this strategy - what will change compared to the current situation?

A: The added value of a shared strategic framework is that it provides the necessary basis to ensure coherent actions and policy development. It also facilitates the coordination of all efforts and ensures that different policies are 'joined up'. The ambition is that the EU can become more resilient in addressing threats and risks in the maritime domain and as such it would be more capable at safeguarding its values, strategic maritime interests and promoting multilateral cooperation and maritime governance. In essence, the result of the strategy would be that maritime security activities would be much more coordinated than today.

Different policy frameworks have resulted in the European Security Strategy (ESS - 2003) and the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP - 2007), which have been developing separately. Also sector specific legislation is already in place like the maritime transport security legislation - Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security and Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) improving the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States and of the EU Border Agency Frontex at the external borders - Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013), SafeSeaNet, a Union maritime traffic monitoring and information system for EU waters, managed by EU Maritime Transport agency EMSA, or the 3rd Maritime Safety Package.


Q: How will the actions, identified in this strategy, be put in practice?

This depends to a large extent on the opinion of the Member States since many of them would fall under their competence, but already existing examples with joint deployment plans and enhanced information exchange systems can eventually lead to the use of common platforms for surveillance operations. This aspect will however need to be discussed in detail with Member States.


Q: Will such a strategy promote deployment of more naval missions similar to EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA?

A: The use of all possible tools and instruments should be considered when addressing a maritime insecurity situation. Each case requires a full evaluation of the situation in order to identify the best action. In the case of the piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, which gravely endanger shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, the deployment of international naval forces was deemed necessary as local capacities to ensure maritime security were not available.


Q: Why is such an initiative taken now?

A: Already on 26 April 2010 the Council invited the High Representative, together with the Commission and Member States 'to undertake work with a view to preparing options for the possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain'. More recently in December, 2013, the European Council called for "an EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014, on the basis of a Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative, taking into account the opinions of the Member States". This is the direct response to these requests.


Q: What are the next steps?

A: Based on the elements proposed be the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative, an EU Maritime Security Strategy should be elaborated within the appropriate EU Council bodies and be adopted not later than in June 2014.

European Commission Memo on the EU's Maritime Security Strategy

Note RP Defense : on EDA website : Further step taken in the MARSUR network development

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5 juin 2012 2 05 /06 /juin /2012 17:25
The Evolving Maritime Security Environment in East Asia


June 5, 2012 By Michael McDevitt / Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) – defpro.com


Implications for the US-Japan Alliance


Honolulu, Hawaii | The big news from the recently concluded Annual Security Consultative Committee between Japan and the United States, the so-called “2+2 meeting,” was that movement of Marines stationed in Okinawa to Guam was delinked from relocating the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma to a less congested area.


This is a welcome development because it should permit senior officials in both Japan and the United States to focus alliance attention where it belongs: on the most significant security challenge facing the alliance – the ongoing change in the maritime strategic balance in East Asia.


For half a century, the military balance of power in East Asia was unchanged. The continental powers of East Asia, the Soviet Union and “Red” China, were effectively balanced by the offshore presence of the United States and its island and archipelagic allies. Neither side in this balance had the ability to project decisive conventional military power into the realm of the other – the continent was dominated by the continental powers, while the maritime littoral was the province of the maritime powers led by the United States.


This balance began to change about 16 years ago when China had the political motivation and the economic resources to begin to address what has been a historic strategic weakness – its vulnerability to military intervention from the sea. The political motivation for Beijing was provided by fears that newly democratic Taiwan was moving toward de jure independence and the PLA, short of nuclear escalation, was essentially powerless to prevent it, particularly if the United States elected to militarily support such a course of action.




Beijing also had plenty of historic motivation. China’s “Century of Humiliation” started in in the mid-19th century with its defeat in the Opium War by the British, who came from the sea. Over the decades China was repeatedly humiliated by foreign powers that exploited China’s weakness along its maritime approaches. A reading of US Seventh Fleet operations in the Taiwan Straits during the 1950s, when multicarrier Task Forces operated with impunity, overflying Chinese coastal cities, is a vivid reminder of Beijing’s incapacity regarding its seaward approaches.


A combination of factors related to security has combined to form the strategic motivation for a historically unique Chinese defense perimeter that extends hundreds of miles to sea. These factors include: the issue of Taiwan itself, the fact that the vast majority of China’s unresolved security issues are maritime in nature, the reality that its economic development depends upon imports and of raw materials and exports of finished goods that travel mainly by sea, and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that China’s economic center of gravity is located along its Eastern seaboard.




By moving its defenses far to sea, China is effectively undermining the traditional maritime-continental balance that has provided the security and stability that have fueled the Asian economic miracle of the last 30 years. As China improves its defenses, it is making the security situation of the countries that live in the shadow of China worse. It is creating what academics call a “security dilemma” – one country’s defenses become so effective its neighbors fear for their own security.


In 2001, the US Department of Defense began to publicly fret about this situation, characterizing the military problem as “anti-access” and “area denial.” These terms make sense since they accurately describe the desired military objective. The Chinese have also coined a term to describe what they are trying to achieve militarily: PLA strategists refer to it as “counter intervention operations.” In practical terms, this refers to the knitting together of a large submarine force, land-based aircraft carrying anti-ship cruise missiles, and in the near future, ballistic missiles that have the ability to hit moving ships. These capabilities all depend on a very effective ocean surveillance system that can detect and accurately locate approaching naval forces.


Whether we call the PLA’s emerging capability anti-access/area denial (A2AD in the Pentagon’s lexicon) or the “counter invention operations,” the desired strategic outcome is the same – keep US naval and air forces as far away from China as possible. The strategic implication of this for China’s neighbors, many of who depend upon the US to underwrite their security as alliance or strategic partners, is obvious. If “we” get into a confrontation with China, we may not be able to depend upon the United States to be able to support us.


China says that it is only trying to defend itself and redress a historic weakness. Besides, Beijing argues its strategic intentions are clear: China is on a path of peaceful development and is not a threat to its neighbors. I believe that China’s leaders believe this. The trouble is that, as any strategist will argue, intentions can change in an instant; what really matters are the military capabilities that China will possess when its counter-intervention force is completed. Will China be able to defeat US forward deployed forces and prevent additional forces from the United States from reaching East Asia in case of conflict?




This is the third time in the last 75 years that the United States has faced the problem of an Asian power attempting to keep US naval forces at bay. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s General Staff developed a plan for dealing with the US Pacific Fleet known as the “Gradual Attrition Strategy” (Zen Gen Saku Sen). This plan used long-range aircraft and submarines to locate the approaching US Pacific Fleet, and then attack it first with submarines and then land-based naval aviation based on various Japanese Mandate Pacific islands. The hope was that the US fleet would by sufficiently worn down that Japan’s main force could defeat it somewhere in the Philippine Sea. It took the United States 30 months (December 1941 – June 1944) to defeat this strategy.


The second time the US faced a similar A2AD problem was during the last two decades of the Cold War. The Soviets (in both the Atlantic and Pacific) foreshadowed the PLA’s “counter-invention operation” with a concept based on very good ocean surveillance to locate approaching US naval forces and then vector submarines and long range-land based bombers to the attack. Both submarines and bombers were armed with a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles that would be employed in massed raids. Happily, the US never had to face the Soviet anti-access capability in combat. The US Navy response to the massed cruise missile problem was the development of the AEGIS combat system, which remains the gold-standard for dealing with cruise missiles.




The US response to the challenge posed by the PLA’s “counter-intervention operation,” was unveiled in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. It announced that the US Air Force and US Navy had combined to develop a new operational concept known as Air Sea Battle (ASB). ASB aims to counter any anti-access threat in the world, including that posed by China. Details of this concept have for understandable reasons remained highly classified, but recent statements by the heads of the Navy and Air Force have indicated that ASB will focus on three lines of effort: (1) defeating enemy surveillance systems as surveillance is the back-bone of any anti-access system. If you can’t locate an approaching naval force you can’t attack it; (2) destroying enemy launching systems so precision weapons cannot be launched (during the Cold War this was known as shooting at archers not at arrows); and, (3) defeating enemy missiles and other weapons. This means shooting them down, or decoying them away.




It is unlikely that China will halt development of what it considers necessary for its defenses. It is also clear that the United States does not intend to sit idly by and permit the introduction of military capabilities that could deny it access to East Asia in a time of conflict. Thus, it seems likely that for the foreseeable future the region will witness a “military capabilities competition”: as China introduces capabilities that could deny access, the US, probably via the Air Sea Battle concept, will introduce capabilities that will assure access. It will be a period of competing strategic concepts – assured access vs. denied access, complemented by the introduction of military capabilities by both sides necessary to accomplish those ends.


For the US-Japan alliance, the prospect that any maritime operation in the western Pacific will soon be contested in times of conflict creates a new context for the division of roles and missions. Today’s division of labor, characterized as “shield and spear” responsibilities, where Japan is the “shield” defending Japanese home territories, while the US acts as the “spear” that attacks Japan’s attackers needs to be reconsidered. A successful “counter intervention operation” could blunt the US spear. What can Japan do to help prevent that from taking place? This is a serious topic for both strategic and operational discussion.




(Michael McDevitt is a retired US Navy Rear Admiral. For the last 15 years he has been at the Center for Naval Analyses, first as the vice president in charge of strategic studies, and more recently as a senior fellow. His most recent area of focus is maritime security along the Indo-Pacific littoral.)

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