5 juin 2015 by DARPA

20 March 2014 by Guy Martin - defenceWeb

The South African National Defence Force is using Port St Johns as a jungle warfare training facility in preparation for the deployment of 850 troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo in May, when they will join the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) tasked with rooting out rebels.

5 South African Infantry (SAI) Battalion will replace 6 South African Infantry Battalion at the end of May under Operation Mistral, marking the unit’s first time in the DRC. The deployment will be for a year – most previous UN deployments were for six months but it is more economical and effective to deploy forces for a year, as less time is spent acclimatising with one deployment per year than two.

6 SAI deployed in May-June last year, joining a battalion sized element from Tanzania and a battalion sized element from Malawi. Lieutenant Colonel Piet Paxton of the SANDF's Joint Operations Division said that, to his mind, the Tanzanian and Malawians have demonstrated good performance in the DRC.

5 SAI started with pre-deployment training and is now busy with mission readiness training. Phase 1 of training was conducted at the Boschoek Training Area between 10 and 22 February and covered shooting, helicopter drills, buddy aid, GPS training and offensive and defensive attacks. Phase 2 started on March 3 in Port St Johns and will end on March 21. It is covering patrols, jungle warfare, water orientation, combat shooting, house clearing and offensive and defensive actions.

Port St Johns was chosen as the ideal spot for jungle warfare training as its dense forests are an almost exact replica of what troops will experience in the DRC. The SANDF’s other more established training facilities focus more on grasslands and savannah scenarios.

Brigadier Gen Mannetjies de Goede, from the SA Army Infantry Formation, said that experiences in the Central African Republic and DRC made the SANDF realise that the battlespace has changed and that the SANDF needs to adapt with it. Training was occurring in silos, he said. Before 6 SAI deployed to the DRC it trained in Grahamstown which does not have forests – current training areas do not cover tropical training hence a request was made to train in Port St Johns. Training in jungle terrain is part of the SANDF’s initiative to improve combat readiness as soldiers will go straight into battle when they arrive in the DRC, de Goede pointed out.

Some combat readiness training was demonstrated to the media on Wednesday, including scenarios with 81 mm mortars, 12.7 mm heavy machineguns and 40 mm grenade launchers. Journalists were taken on a tour of the forest when ‘rebels’ attacked, capturing some and holding them hostage before SANDF troops charged through the foliage and rescued them, firing a good many blank rounds along the way.

However, training has not all been simulated. Whilst conducting urban patrol training in Port St Johns, the 5 SAI soldiers responded to a real life event on March 12. Armed men attempted to rob a cash in transit security crew in the town’s business district. The robbers opened fire at the soldiers, who retaliated. During an hour-long standoff, three armed robbers and a security guard were killed and R21 million was recovered. It appears that the security guard was in plain clothes and was carrying a gun when he was shot. No soldiers were injured in the incident but one bystander was injured by a bullet that tore through his shin. Several weapons were confiscated, including an R-4, an AK-47, a .38 Special revolver and 9 mm handgun.

In addition to training, 5 SAI also engaged in an outreach programme that assisted a place of safety that takes local boys off the street. SANDF personnel voluntarily donated R4 963 to the Eluxolweni initiative, which was used to buy clothes, food and blankets.

5 SAI will be deploying as part of the Force Intervention Brigade, made up of South African, Tanzanian and Malawian troops, and under the direct command of the Monusco Force Commander. The FIB’s offensive mandate is to reduce the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in the eastern DRC and to make space for stabilisation activities. Other objectives are to protect civilians, monitor the arms embargo and support the DRC government. They are also charged with protecting United Nations personnel, facilities and equipment.

The troops of 5 SAI are expected to be engaged in combat operations as soon as they arrive in the DRC as there are still numerous rebel groups active following the withdrawal of the M23, such as the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). Paxton said that there was a lot of action in the DRC last year and he didn’t see this changing in 2014.

At the moment there are various South African elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A special contingent includes aircraft personnel, military police, logisticians, engineers and others. This group is headquartered in Kinshasa and is under command of the UN mission in the DRC (Monusco). The South African aviation unit, which includes Rooivalk combat helicopters and Oryx transport helicopters, is based in Goma. The aviation unit is an operational tool of the Monusco’s force commander, meaning that the helicopters are under UN, not South African, control.

As the FIB supports the DRC government’s armed forces (FARDC), South Africa has also provided training to the FARDC under operation Thebe.

The DRC rotation, expected to take three weeks to complete, is one of the SANDF’s three external deployments. The other two are Operation Copper ensuring maritime security in the Mozambique Channel and Operation Cordite with Unamid in Sudan.

Click here to see the training in action.

03/12/13 Stephan Boonen – MIL.be

Le vice-Premier et ministre de la Défense Pieter De Crem a rendu visite, du 26 au 28 novembre 2013, aux militaires belges détachés au Congo. Au programme : rencontres avec la MONUSCO, l'EUSEC (programme européen qui montre la voie pour une transformation de la Défense congolaise) et entretien avec l'envoyée spéciale des Nations Unies, Madame Mary Robinson. Le ministre a ensuite pris la direction de Kindu où les paras belges ont remis le brevet commando au 323e Bataillon de « l'Unité de Réaction Rapide », marquant, de la sorte, le début des festivités.

photos Malek Azoug >>

Environ 700 militaires congolais ont réussi la formation éprouvante qui était dispensée par 107 paras du 3 Para de Tielen. L'un des instructeurs, le lieutenant Edmond de Frabribeckers explique : « La motivation des Congolais est frappante. Vous devez faire preuve d'énormément de patience et beaucoup répéter, mais cela en vaut la peine. Aujourd'hui, c'est comme si c'était le jour le plus important de leur vie. »

À la fin de la parade, les nouveaux commandos congolais défilent devant leur famille. Celles-ci les arrosent de farine. Pour agrémenter le spectacle, un C-130 largue deux parachutistes arborant les drapeaux belge et congolais.

Le colonel Luc Leclerq est le chef de corps du 3 Para. Il a mené ses hommes tout au long de la mission. Pour lui, il était important « que nous réussissions malgré et grâce aux difficultés rencontrées au début. Pourtant, nous avons finalement livré un produit plus qu'acceptable. » Pour le 3 Para, il s'agissait d'une expérience que l'on ne vit qu'une seule fois dans sa vie. Le colonel Leclerq poursuit : « Pour le 3 Para, c'est un sérieux coup de pouce à l'expérience africaine. Nous dispensons des formations en Afrique depuis 2002. Au début, c'était au Bénin. Actuellement, 306 paras ont travaillé près de deux mois. Pour l'exercice synthèse, 260 Belges étaient présents. Il s'agissait donc du plus grand détachement en opération. »

Après la parade, les militaires congolais se tombent dans les bras. Les para-commandos belges rentrent progressivement en Belgique. Le colonel Leclerq résume : « Cette mission est plus que réussie. Elle dépasse tout sur les plans personnel et multiculturel. Ce bataillon est prêt et équivaut certainement aux autres. »

Vidéo : Wim Cochet

June 10, 2013: Strategy Page

Logistics problems continue to delay the deployment of the UN’s Intervention Brigade. This comes as no surprise. Central Africa in general lacks transportation infrastructure. There are few paved roads.  The intercontinental airports in the national capitals are adequate, but airfields in the hinterland are a very mixed lot. Many airfields in eastern Congo are dirt fields that can only handle small planes (think Cessna) and helicopters.  The UN currently uses Goma’s airport (North Kivu province) as a logistical “airhead” (airfield as a logistics terminal) but it is inadequate.  Everyone knows it needs improvements.  The airport and the city lack sufficient facilities for storing supplies. Experienced military commanders and planners know a combat operation should never rely on one key supply source, and the UN Intervention Brigade has an offensive combat mission. The Goma airport is vulnerable to rebel attack. During the last week of May, M23 rebels repeatedly hit the airport with mortar fire. M23 suspended the attacks so UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon could fly in to Goma for a speech. Media reported that UN personnel said the Secretary General’s very large travelling entourage encountered numerous transportation and logistics problems in eastern Congo.  A second UN-sponsored group was also in the region. According to one official, supporting the two groups proved to be a logistical nightmare. Supporting the Intervention Brigade is far more complicated and there are problems here that may not be solved. This would limit the mobility and effectiveness of the Intervention Brigade. (Austin Bay)

June 9, 2013: M23 said that it had sent a representative to Uganda’s capital, Kampala, to participate in a new round of peace talks with the Congolese government.

June 6, 2013: UN officials in Congo stated that Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s visit to the country and his stop in Goma has had a positive diplomatic outcome. The M23 rebel movement is indicating that it will resume peace negotiations in Uganda after having been suspended since early May.

June 5, 2013: A UN believes that nations involved in the Framework initiative for stabilizing central Africa must be prepared to fight the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group. The FDLR was founded by Rwandan Interahamwe Hutu extremists who organized and participated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  The Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda from Uganda, stopped the genocide and defeated the Interahamwe. Surviving Interahamwe fled into the eastern Congo. The Interahamwe were radical members of the Hutu tribe-dominated National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) which ruled Rwanda from 1975 to 1994. Rwanda has claimed that the FDLR receives support from sources in the Congo. The Rwandan government will not negotiate with the FDLR and that’s why the Intervention Brigade may include the FDLR on its list of targeted militias and rebel groups.

June 3, 2013: The Tanzanian brigadier general who has been designated as commander of the Intervention Brigade, BG James Aloizi Mwakibolwa, said that the brigade will operate as part of the UN Monitoring and Stabilization Mission in Congo (MONUSCO).  Some UN sources now refer to the brigade as MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade. The brigade will be based in North Kivu province and have 3,069 soldiers. Mwakibolwa sees four essential tasks for the unit: neutralizing armed groups; reducing the threat posed to Congolese government authority; providing security for Congolese civilians; and creating space for stabilization activities (UN jargon for establishing secured areas). The brigade will carry out targeted offensive operations in order to neutralize the armed groups. The Congolese Army may or may not participate in the offensive operations conducted by the Intervention Brigade.

June 1, 2013: The South African government said that it supports deployment of the UN’s Intervention Brigade in the eastern Congo but it hopes that Congo and the M23 rebel group will restart peace negotiations. However, South African media are giving a lot of attention to the Intervention Brigade’s peace enforcement mandate – that is UN peacekeeping jargon for an offensive mission.  Senior members of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) political party have also raised the issue of foreign support for some of the rebel militias the brigade will likely confront.  A spokesman did not specifically mention Rwanda but Rwanda has been accused of providing M23 with money, weapons and training. Rwanda denies the accusation.

May 29, 2013: M23 rebels said they are willing to agree to an extended ceasefire. Over the last ten days, M23 and the Congolese Army have engaged in several firefights north of the city of Goma (capital of North Kivu province). An M23 spokesman said that the rebels are positioned near Goma’s airport and they can target the airport very easily because they have fighters on a hill overlooking the airport. M23 also accused allies of the government (likely a pro-government militia) of attacking its fighters while they were securing fresh water supplies. M23 takes its named from the March 23, 2009 peace agreement which was supposed to end the chaotic fighting in North Kivu province. The M23 rebels contend the government broke its side of the agreement. One major M23 criticism is that the rebels did not receive their fair share of positions in the Congolese Army.

May 28, 2013: A civilian group in north Kivu province has accused the Rwandan government of sending four battalions of soldiers into the Congo. The Rwandans allegedly fought a battle near the town of Mutaho (north of Goma, near the airport). Rwanda denied the accusation. Four battalions is a large body of troops and it is very unlikely that a large group of Rwandan soldiers entered the Congo. M23 rebels and Congolese forces have been skirmishing in the area.

The UN reported that a MONUSCO peacekeeping unit from the Indian Army is deployed on the north side of Goma. The unit is supported by armored vehicles.

The UN announced that the deployment of the Intervention Brigade will be delayed.  The UN and contributing nations are experiencing severe logistical difficulties. Diplomats are also saying that South Africa has told them that its military will need more time to fully deploy its troop contingent in part because South Africa is already extensively involved in other peacekeeping operations. South Africa does have a lead contingent on the ground in Goma. Tanzania has a contingent in Goma as well, which is where the brigade headquarters will be. Malawi has committed troops to serve in the brigade. Since 13 South African peacekeepers were killed in the Central African Republic (CAR) earlier this year, a number of South Africans have questioned the Intervention Brigade deployment. The critics argue that South Africa is already doing more than its share of sub-Saharan peacekeeping.

May 23, 2013:  The UN Secretary visited Goma and delivered a speech. He declared that improving security and development must go forward simultaneously in Congo. Before his arrival, M23 said that it would observe a ceasefire.  The rebels demanded that the government sign a ceasefire agreement.

May 22, 2013: UN observers reported more skirmishing around Goma (North Kivu). Two days of shellfire (probably mortar fire) has wounded 15 civilians in Goma.  At least one child was killed by shellfire. The fire came from M23 rebel positions.

The World Bank has promised central Africa $1 billion in aid. Congo will get money for medical services, education and electrical generation projects.

May 20, 2013: At least 19 soldiers and rebel fighters were killed when M23 rebels fought with a pro-government militia group north of Goma. The government said it lost four Congolese Army soldiers and that the rebels lost 15 killed. Observers described the fighting as the heaviest in the area since November 2012.