Overblog
Suivre ce blog Administration + Créer mon blog
13 février 2015 5 13 /02 /février /2015 17:45
Cyberspace: new frontiers for gender violence
 

11 February 2015 by ISS

 

Recent years have seen an important shift in how security is prioritised, with an emphasis on threats in cyberspace. Last year, the Sony Corporation hack drew attention worldwide, challenging perceptions of state governance and security in cyberspace.

The estimated financial cost of cybercrime worldwide exceeds US$445 billion annually. For individuals, the loss of private and sensitive information is particularly concerning, and a recent poll in the United States (US) shows that Americans fear breaches in cyber security more than any other ‘traditional’ crimes.

Africa has not been immune to increased cybercrime either, with countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa fast becoming hubs of cybercrime activity.

 

Read more

Partager cet article
Repost0
19 décembre 2014 5 19 /12 /décembre /2014 07:40
ISS - photo NASA

ISS - photo NASA

 

16 décembre 2014 par Nicolas Laffont – 45eNord.ca

 

L’agence spatiale russe Roscosmos envisage de construire sa propre station spatiale, a déclaré lundi son directeur, Oleg Ostapenko.

 

«Je confirme que nous étudions cette possibilité. C’est une voie de développement possible», a dit Oleg Ostapenko à propos du projet russe, qui entrerait en concurrence avec la Station spatiale internationale (ISS), laboratoire orbital auquel participent 15 pays, dont la Russie, les États-Unis et le Canada.

Washington souhaite que l’ISS soit maintenue en activité au moins jusqu’en 2024, soit quatre ans de plus que ce qui avait été fixé.

La station orbitale russe pourrait devenir un élément de première importance pour les missions russes vers la Lune.

Le directeur de l’agence spatiale russe a indiqué que «ce projet ambitieux nous permettra d’avoir l’œil sur plus de 90% du territoire russe», mais n’a pas dit comment un tel projet serait financé par la Russie, alors que toutes les prévisions laissent penser que le pays va entrer en récession l’année prochaine et que sa crise économique est aggravée par les sanctions occidentales liées au conflit ukrainien.

Avec la crise ukrainienne, Washington s’est montrée clair dès le début que toutes les sanctions qui seraient prises ne concerneraient pas la Station spatiale internationale. Il faut dire que les États-Unis sont dépendants des Russes et de leurs vaisseaux Soyouz pour envoyer leurs astronautes dans l’espace depuis la fin du programme des navettes spatiales en juillet 2011.

Rappelons que la station spatiale Mir, lancée en 1986 à l’époque de l’URSS, est restée en service jusqu’en 2001.

La Chine a développée sa propre station spatiale, Tiangong 1, qui est cependant davantage destinée à valider la technique du rendez-vous spatial automatique. Tiangong 2 et 3 doivent suivre d’ici à 2020, avant une autre station, beaucoup plus grande dans les années 2020.

L’espace, l’ultime frontière!

Partager cet article
Repost0
2 décembre 2014 2 02 /12 /décembre /2014 08:50
Council at Ministerial Level for the European Space Agency (ESA) in Luxembourg on 2 December

 

27 November 2014 ESA - PR N° 43–2014

 

The next Council at Ministerial Level (C/M 14) for the European Space Agency (ESA) takes place in Luxembourg on 2 December. The main topics for decision are reflected in three Resolutions: the Resolution on Europe’s access to space, which recognises the strategic and socio-economic value for Europe to maintain an independent, reliable and affordable access to space for institutional and commercial European customers and underlines the new governance principles related to the exploitation of Europe’s next launcher, Ariane 6, and of the evolution of Vega, Vega-C; the Resolution on Europe’s space exploration strategy, addressing ESA’s three destinations (low-Earth orbit (LEO), Moon and Mars) and, for the LEO destination, in particular the International Space Station (ISS) Programme; and, finally, the Resolution on ESA evolution.

 

Europe's access to space

 

Space activities require independent access to space, so the decision to be taken on Europe’s next-generation launcher is of fundamental importance. Ariane 5, with its roots planted in the Ministerial meeting in 1985, is a remarkable European success story: it has now had more than 60 successful launches in a row, it has secured over 50% of the commercial market for launch services and has generated direct economic benefits in Europe exceeding 50 billion euros.

 

However, the world launch service market is changing rapidly, in both supply and demand.

 

On the supply side, new non-European launch service providers are now present in the commercial market at highly competitive prices, providing a challenge to the cost model of Ariane 5.

 

On the demand side, satellites are also changing. The commercial market, consisting mostly of telecommunication satellites, favours the introduction of electric propulsion, which could reverse the decades-long trend of higher and higher tonnages and will require new orbit injection strategies.

 

At the same time, there is an increasing number of European institutional payloads with the advent in particular of the Galileo and Copernicus constellations, providing a fairly stable market for recurrent launches of medium-sized satellites.

 

In response to these rapid changes, the ESA Executive and European launcher industry have defined a modular Ariane 6 in two configurations to serve the medium and heavy launch segments as from 2020, and a Vega upgraded launch system (Vega C) to serve the small launch segment. Ariane 6 will profit from the best re-use of Ariane 5 Midterm Evolution results and investments and from the common use of a solid rocket motor (P120C) as both first stage of Vega C and strap-on booster for Ariane 6.

 

In Luxembourg, Ministers will therefore be asked to take decisions on the development of Ariane 6 and Vega C which, through modularity and flexibility, will be able to satisfy the European institutional market requirements and to compete on the world-wide market.

 

These development decisions are associated with a new governance of the European launcher sector allocating increased responsibilities to industry and with a decision point by Participating States in 2016 on the continuation of Ariane 6 on the basis of a set of technical and financial criteria, including respective commitments for the exploitation phase.

 

The budget required from Member States for completion of Ariane 6 and Vega C development programme is 3.8 billion  Euro.

 

ISS exploitation and space exploration

 

Within the three destinations of exploration (LEO, Moon, Mars), the operation and utilisation of the International Space Station is an essential element.

 

In addition to the invaluable research activities which are conducted on board the ISS, the Station yields a wealth of experience for ESA and its international partners that will be crucial as we plan the next stages of human exploration.

 

The decisions to be taken in December by Ministers relate to supporting ESA’s ISS exploitation activities for the next three years (to the end of 2017), at a cost of €820 million, as well as supporting its research activities (ELIPS Programme) with additional funding.

 

As a contribution to the ISS common operation costs, ESA is developing NASA’s new Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Service Module, drawing upon the expertise gained with the ATV. Funding to complete the MPCV-ESM development is included in the €820 million to be funded at C/M14.

 

Regarding the “Moon destination”, ESA is proposing preparatory elements of a contribution to Russia’s Luna-Resource Lander (planned for launch in 2019) and Lunar Polar Sample Return (planned for launch in the early 2020s) missions; a full decision on this programme would be sought at the Ministerial in 2016.

 

Regarding the “Mars destination”, ESA’s ambitious ExoMars programme, involving two missions to Mars in 2016 and 2018, is also on the table for further subscription in order to ensure the implementation of the ExoMars programme. In addition, the Mars Robotic Exploration Preparation Programme (MREP-2) is proposed for further subscriptions, allowing for the adequate preparation of future exploration activities, leading to a broad Mars Sample Return mission in which Europe should be involved as a full partner.

 

ESA evolution

 

The third topic on the agenda for Ministers, the Evolution of ESA, focuses on the vision to enable ESA to maintain its role as one of the world-leading space institutions, addressing its key relationships with its partners and its efficiency.

 

The main partners of ESA are: its Member States, the scientific communities, industry, the European Union, European non-Member States and the non-European States. These relationships are intricately interrelated and driven by the common objectives of achieving a competitive European space sector and ensuring maximum return on public investment in space.

 

The previous Ministerial Council in 2012 decided to establish a High-Level Forum involving industry, the Member States and the ESA Executive. This has met twice and made a number of recommend-ations to the ESA Director General. The most important of these is to request that industry be given a greater degree of responsibility in ESA R&D programmes, with a commensurate change in risks and rewards sharing. The Forum also proposed that ESA increase its presence in the development of space services and be prepared to be an economic actor in the upstream space sector.

 

Since 2012, measures have been taken to strengthen ESA’s relationships with its Member States, seeking better coordination and cooperation of space programmes in Europe through the sharing of information on national space-related programmes. Ministers are invited to go further in this area to achieve mutual further benefits.

 

ESA’s relationship with the EU both in programmes and in setting the context in which the European space sector operates is vitally important for Europe. C/M 12 mandated the Director General to elaborate and assess scenarios together with the European Commission for responding to a series of objectives on how this relationship might develop.

 

After intense discussions among delegations of Member States, Ministers are invited to confirm the preference of Member States for a relationship between ESA and the European Union which keeps ESA as an independent, world-class intergovernmental space organisation and makes ESA the long-term partner of choice of the EU for jointly defining and implementing the European Space Policy together with their respective Member States.

 

Following the conclusion of the Ministerial Meeting, the adopted Resolutions will be made public on ESA’s web site.

Partager cet article
Repost0
7 octobre 2014 2 07 /10 /octobre /2014 19:45
ISS: Think Again - Too late to start worrying about the Islamic State in Africa

 

7 October 2014 by Simon Allison, ISS Consultant - defenceWeb



The spectre of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria casts a long shadow. It’s clearly not just the Middle East that is in trouble; both Britain and the United States have been worried enough to dispatch fighter jets to try and contain the Islamist rebels who have carved out huge chunks of territory as their own.

The aerial war has also drawn in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while various radical Islamist groups from India to Indonesia have pledged their support for the rebels. Analysts (including myself in this Institute for Security Studies policy brief) have warned that Africa is particularly vulnerable. The continent’s plethora of existing Islamist groups, coupled with its poor governance track record, make it a relatively ­­easy target.

This, however, is now old news. The Islamic State and its subversive ideology continue to move at a pace that journalists, researchers and policymakers just can’t match. The fact is, Africa isn’t facing a potential threat from the Islamic State, because that threat has already arrived – and is destabilising several African countries.

It began in Nigeria, where Boko Haram has dramatically altered their tactics over the last few months to mirror those of the Islamic State. In addition to their more typical hit-and-run attacks, the group has started to occupy towns and villages in north-eastern Nigeria, and declared that the territory under its control is part of an Islamic Caliphate. (Boko Haram has not explicitly declared allegiance to the Islamic State’s Caliphate, but perhaps this is implied.) Like the Islamic State, Boko Haram is imposing its fundamentalist version of Islam everywhere it goes, forcing residents to observe strict Islamic sharia law or be killed.

Then in Libya, in late July, Islamist militant group Ansar al-Sharia’s battle for control of Benghazi was given a vital boost with the arrival of hundreds of new fighters. These were Libyans who had been fighting under the banner of the Islamic State in Iraq and/or Syria, until ordered home by the Islamic State’s top brass. It is no coincidence that shortly after this decision was reached, Ansar al-Sharia was able to take strategic parts of the city, and declared it to be an Islamic Emirate independent from the rest of Libya.

 

So far, however, the Libyan example – of direct intervention from the Islamic State in an African conflict – is the exception. More prevalent is the copycat model, where African groups have seen the success of the Islamic State and patterned themselves accordingly.

Take, for example, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis – a militant group based in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, which has launched an aggressive campaign of attacks against Egyptian military and government targets. These have been accompanied by a series of brutal beheadings, complete with staged confessions and a slick, albeit gruesome, video. Videoed beheadings, distributed widely over social media, are something of an Islamic State trademark; the high-profile examples of Western journalists and aid workers were certainly not the first such recordings.

Or take the newly formed Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Algeria, thought to be a splinter group from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Jund al-Khilafah is one of the few groups in Africa to openly declare its allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State and self-declared emir, and it too has capitalised on the propaganda value of a recorded execution.

Its first terrorist act as a group was the kidnapping and then beheading of French tourist Hervé Gourdel, although its production values are not quite as slick. The video was noticeably poorer in quality than those typically produced by the Islamic State, and the executioners themselves looked uncomfortable and unskilled.

This might seem like a flippant point. Who cares about production quality when people are being murdered on camera? But it is actually quite revealing. Whereas the Islamic State’s videos are carefully calibrated propaganda efforts, Jund al-Khilafah’s was a sloppy imitation with no obvious purpose except to demonstrate loyalty. It is also even more gruesome, thanks to those inexperienced executioners. This raises important questions for the Islamic State as it seeks to expand. Will it accept allegiances indiscriminately, even if this could damage their brand? Or will it copy the al-Qaeda approach and vet potential allies and partners before allowing them to speak in their name?

So far, the Islamic State’s leader has not given formal recognition to any single group. ‘This might have to change,’ says Jasmine Opperman, Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. ‘Baghdadi will have to respond with some kind of acknowledgement, or he will appear out of control… Baghdadi’s Caliphate wants to create the façade of a worldwide Caliphate. To have the international division [in the areas outside Iraq and Syria] going around beheading seemingly at random, gives the opposite impression.’

In a way, the Islamic State is in danger of becoming a victim of its own success as its influence grows too far and too fast. Africa, however, is in far more danger, and its leaders will need a clear and coherent counter-terrorism strategy in order to counter not just the Islamic State, but also the copycat groups and activities that it has inspired.

Fortunately, such a strategy exists. At an extraordinary meeting of the African Union’s (AU’s) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in September, the PSC adopted a raft of measures aimed at improving both the quality and scale of the continent’s counter-terrorism efforts. These include wholly sensible plans to improve criminal justice systems and border controls; tighten controls on financing for terrorist groups and money-laundering; improve intelligence-sharing and coordination between states; and emphasise the need to uphold the rule of law and protect human rights.

But any strategy is only as good as its implementation, argues Solomon Ayele Dersso, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. If it is going to work, it has to be given precedence over the approach that has been generally favoured by governments participating in the ongoing military campaign against the Islamic State.

‘Implementing the AU instruments and frameworks on counter-terrorism – and doing so promptly and systematically at regional and national levels – is important. However, the bigger issue is the danger and tendency to ride on the international military response against the Islamic State, and expand the application of an exclusively militarised response to situations in Africa, particularly in the context of Libya,’ said Dersso.

For the most vulnerable African countries to have any hope of containing the influence of the Islamic State (Algeria, Libya, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia spring to mind immediately), their governments must adopt and implement the PSC’s recommendations as soon as possible, and hope that the Islamic State’s appeal wanes as its footprint on the continent grows.

The original article can be found here.

Partager cet article
Repost0
27 juin 2014 5 27 /06 /juin /2014 12:45
Re-mapping the Sahel: transnational security challenges and international responses

 

24 June 2014 by Cristina BarriosTobias Koepf - Report - No19 -

 

States – whether classified as strong or fragile – and nations still matter in the Sahel, but local and country dynamics are better understood in the broader regional context.

The report underscores the necessity for a concerted and comprehensive regional approach, whose importance is increasingly confirmed by security threats that do not stop where state borders are drawn. The pertinence of such an approach has been confirmed by the appearance of ‘Sahel Strategy’ documents drawn up by different institutions, including the EU, reflecting a flexibility and a pragmatism in adapting international responses that is much needed.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
13 avril 2014 7 13 /04 /avril /2014 11:35
Afghanistan: the view from the US

 

Alerts - No25 - 11 April 2014 Eva Gross

 

The Afghan presidential election that took place on 5 April marks the first democratic transition of power since current President Hamid Karzai took office. It also represents an important milestone for Afghanistan and for international actors operating in the country since the fall of the Taliban. The elections were of particular significance for the US, with Washington having been the primary driver of international engagement – military and otherwise – in the country for over a decade.

Washington views the Afghan elections from the vantage point of post-Karzai US-Afghan relations but, perhaps more importantly, also against the backdrop of shifting strategic and domestic priorities, which renders Afghanistan less central to the country´s foreign policy than it once was. Still, the election and its outcome promises clarity on the future of US troop strength – and their purpose – in the years to come. This, in turn, will determine the future presence of both NATO and the EU as well.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
11 avril 2014 5 11 /04 /avril /2014 11:50
Defence matters - EU key documents 2013

 

09 April 2014 by EU ISS

 

When European Council President Herman van Rompuy proposed, in December 2012, to ‘launch work on the further development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’ with the commitment to ‘return to this issue in December 2013’, virtually all EU institutions and relevant bodies, departments, agencies and working groups engaged in an exercise that has involved simultaneously taking stock of achievements, assessing shortfalls, and identifying avenues for the future.

The collective mobilisation of the year 2013 has produced a number of dedicated analytical and policy papers – including by independent think tanks and research institutes – that amount to the most systematic survey of European defence in ten years. This pocket-sized compendium collects the official documents generated by all EU institutional actors in preparation of the ‘defence summit’ of 19/20 December 2013 and the Conclusions adopted by the EU Heads of State and Government at the end of the whole process.

 

Download document

 
Partager cet article
Repost0
7 avril 2014 1 07 /04 /avril /2014 20:40
After Crimea: Putin’s balance sheet

 

Alerts - No24 - 04 April 2014 - Nicu Popescu

 

When it comes to foreign policy, Russia is good at sprinting, while the West – and especially the EU – is better at marathons. The use of kinetic military force by Moscow is to a large extent a sign that other, long-term foreign policy means failed in Ukraine: Russian coercive diplomacy – based on sticks (embargoes and sanctions) and carrots (offers of cheaper gas and greater market access) – did not have the desired effect.

Moscow believes it can achieve its goals with rapid bursts of sprinting, and that the West will not quicken its pace in response. In Crimea, the territory was captured in a manner that was both quick and bloodless, with the weak state institutions of Ukraine simply crumbling in the face of Russian aggression. The problem is that other post-Soviet states are equally weak (or even weaker) and although they have successfully withstood periodic Russian embargoes over the last two decades, they are unlikely to be able to resist any form of military action. Worryingly, the option of sending armed, masked men to take over public buildings in a third state is very much on the table – particularly because this has proved not only easy, but also effective – and is therefore dangerously appealing.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
23 mars 2014 7 23 /03 /mars /2014 12:35
East Asia’s security architecture – track two

 

Alerts - No18 - 21 March 2014 Eva Pejsova

 

Although East Asia’s security environment has long been known for its instability, the recent escalation of tensions between China and Japan has been followed with unprecedented concern. Besides the real risk of accidental clashes in the disputed waters due, inter alia, to the disruption of communication channels, the way in which both Beijing and Tokyo have chosen to deal with the crisis is an indication of an emerging shift in strategic thinking that will most likely have an impact on the evolution of the whole region.

As a result, debates on the need to rethink the security architecture in the region have become more frequent. Existing regional security-focused multilateral platforms could indeed contribute to stability in the region and in this context, various informal mechanisms – so-called ‘track-two’ diplomacy – often become invaluable channels for communication and interaction.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
23 mars 2014 7 23 /03 /mars /2014 12:35
Afghanistan: the view from Pakistan

 

Alerts - No12 - 21 February 2014 Eva Gross

 

Pakistan will arguably be the most crucial regional player in post-2014 Afghanistan. Close religious and cultural links notwithstanding, its links to the Taliban give Islamabad considerable leverage and influence over any peace process. However, the protection and support granted to insurgent groups ­operating in Afghanistan over the past decade has had unintended domestic consequences for Pakistan, with the growing number of terrorist attacks now posing a ­significant threat to the country’s internal stability. Failure to reach a political settlement in Kabul is therefore likely to have a spill-over effect that would further weaken Islamabad’s ability to contain extremist groups operating inside Pakistan.

Despite the complexity of US-Pakistan relations, a complete US withdrawal by the end of 2014 – with the concomitant risk of a security vacuum developing along Pakistan’s border – is not in Islamabad’s interest. However, the implications of even a reduced transatlantic footprint are bound to contribute to a reckoning with extremism, and the forces that encourage it, inside Pakistan itself.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
22 mars 2014 6 22 /03 /mars /2014 12:45
Protéger les civils : mission impossible ?

 

Alerts - No11 - 13 February 2014 par Thierry Tardy

 

Les rapports de plusieurs ONG présentes en République centrafricaine ont récemment fait état d’exactions, de crimes et de purification ethnique à l’encontre de populations civiles que les opérations déployées ont du mal à contenir. Sur d’autres terrains, de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) au Darfour ou plus récemment au Sud Soudan, les mêmes questionnements ou critiques ont été formulés à l’endroit d’opérations pourtant mandatées pour assurer la protection des civils.

Celle-ci s’impose en effet à tout acteur externe, avant tout pour des raisons d’ordre éthique. Vingt ans après les drames du Rwanda et de Srebrenica, quelle serait la légitimité d’une opération qui ne serait pas explicitement mandatée pour protéger les populations les plus vulnérables ? Pour autant, de tels objectifs sont-ils réalistes ? Sur le terrain, les obstacles à la protection des civils sont nombreux, et le risque est grand que les attentes créées par des mandats ambitieux soient en pratique souvent déçues.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
21 mars 2014 5 21 /03 /mars /2014 17:35
Afghanistan: the view from China

 

Alerts - No6 - 24 January 2014 Andrew Small

 

2014 is a defining year for China’s relationship with Afghanistan. After more than a decade on the margins of international efforts to shape the country’s future, this summer China will take the diplomatic driving seat as it hosts the Istanbul Ministerial Process, the major regional conclave between Afghanistan and its neighbours, in Tianjin in August.

In anticipation of the drawdown of Western forces, Beijing has been making it clear to both friends and rivals that, unlike the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal, it will not sit on the sidelines and watch the country slide into civil war.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
21 mars 2014 5 21 /03 /mars /2014 17:35
Afghanistan: the view from India

 

Alerts - No1 - 10 January 2014 Eva Gross

 

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to India from 12-15 December 2013 – during which he requested greater defence and security cooperation in the years to come – underscored the close bilateral ties between the two countries. President Karzai’s attempt to enlist regional allies in support of a stable post-2014, post-transition Afghanistan also raises questions about the extent to which Afghanistan’s neighbours are prepared to modify their engagement in the near future.

The bilateral relationship between India and Afghanistan has deep historical and geographical roots. Yet, to date, India’s engagement in Afghanistan has mainly centred on civilian contributions and economic development. This is partly due to Pakistani resistance and fears over India’s growing regional influence. Possible developments in the relationship with Islamabad will therefore have a bearing on India´s future Afghanistan policy – and vice versa.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
21 mars 2014 5 21 /03 /mars /2014 17:30
Arab armies: agents of change? Before and after 2011

 

Chaillot Paper - No131 - 17 March 2014 Florence Gaub

 

Many aspects of the so-called Arab Spring came as a surprise: the mass demonstrations, the toppling of dictatorships, and indeed the timing. One of the most unexpected aspects, however, was the behaviour of the respective military forces. Regarded until 2011 as being unequivocal supporters of the regimes in power, they were expected to crack down on the demonstrators with an iron fist. Decades of military dictatorships, coups d’état and wars had entrenched the notion of Arab armed forces as agents of coercion, not agents of change.

But only one of the Arab militaries confronted with the massive social dislocation unleashed by the Arab Spring behaved in the expected way, i.e. unequivocally standing by the regime and suppressing the uprisings. The others facilitated regime change either actively or passively, and in Egypt assumed an even more direct role. In all cases, the armed forces were, and remain, the kingmakers, whose support is essential for rulers to hold onto, or accede to, power. But what drives these forces? Why do they choose to act, or not act, under certain political conditions? When do they have the capacity to act, and when is it that they do not?

While these questions are fundamental, they relate to the specific circumstances pertaining to the military in the post-2011 environment: how come the armed forces seem to possess the casting vote between secular and Islamist forces on the road to democracy? More puzzlingly, what is it that these forces stand for in the eyes of the populations in their respective countries – if it was modernity in the 1950s and 1960s, what is it today?

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
14 mars 2014 5 14 /03 /mars /2014 13:50
Handle with care: crowd-sourcing and non-proliferation

 

Briefs - No8 - 14 March 2014 Christian Dietrich

 

States do not spread weapons of mass destruction – people do. It takes individual proliferators, collaborators, and the acquiescence of bystanders for sensitive materials to change hands illicitly. Yet, the rigid national and international means deployed to counter proliferation are juxtaposed with the limitless amounts of information people produce in our digitally connected world.

The internet enables over one-third of the global population to gather in virtual, transnational spaces. ‘Netizens’ generate and process knowledge on anything from Wikipedia and cooking recipes to disaster management and counter-terrorism. In various fields, policy makers increasingly appreciate open-source information technology as an asset to feed their decision-making.

However, the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains an underdeveloped notion – particularly in light of its potential promises. Drawing on lessons from other policy areas, it is advisable to contemplate the systematic mining of collective intelligence for information gathering and analysis purposes in countering the spread of WMD.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
14 mars 2014 5 14 /03 /mars /2014 13:50
EU cyber-defence – a work in progress

 

Briefs - No10 - 14 March 2014 Neil Robinson

 

The EU’s cyber defence agenda provides an opportunity to ask questions about what the EU could do in terms of setting security priorities. Furthermore, as a possible area for cooperation, cyber defence shares with military air logistics the peculiarity of being a common capability which does not require explicit war-like conditions to demonstrate its utility.

Indeed, the diversity and complexity of the threat environment – coupled with challenges of attribution – suggests the opposite: military cyber defence capabilities might offer better value for money in peacetime rather than in times of war.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
14 mars 2014 5 14 /03 /mars /2014 13:35
Ukraine: the view from China

 

Alerts - No17 - 14 March 2014 Camille Brugier, Nicu Popescu

With every new major international crisis, it does not take long for diplomats and observers to start wondering ‘what does China think?’. This is also true for the Crimean crisis. A few days into the crisis, the Russian foreign ministry announced that the Chinese and Russians shared ‘broadly coinciding points of view’ on the situation.

Looking to China for reassurance is driven by many factors. The rise of China as a global power is just one. China is often seen as a sort of ‘swing’ power, capable of tipping the political balance between entrenched political warriors whose preferences are already well known. In this sense, China’s reaction is not always predictable. After the 2008 Russia-Georgian war the Chinese maintained a stance of public politeness towards Russia but, in private, were clearly against the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia – thereby helping Central Asian countries resist alleged Russian pressures to recognise the independence of those entities.

Hence the rush by Russia to claim Chinese support for its actions in Ukraine – in a bid to claim greater legitimacy for its military invasion of a post-Soviet state. However, the claim that China is on Russia’s side is spurious.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
7 mars 2014 5 07 /03 /mars /2014 13:50
CSDP: getting third states on board

Briefs - No6 - 07 March 2014 Thierry Tardy

 

The November 2013 Foreign Affairs Council welcomed the ‘valuable contributions and political support of partner countries to CSDP missions and operations’. A few weeks later, a Ukrainian frigate began to patrol within EUNAVFOR Atalanta, and Georgia committed approximately 140 personnel to the recently-established EU operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). In Bosnia, Turkey has long been a major contributor to EUFOR Althea, while countries like Norway or Canada regularly provide civilian personnel to CSDP missions. These countries have all signed a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU, which provides the legal and political basis for such cooperation.

To date, this type of partnership remains limited in scope and has thus been given little visibility. Moreover, whilst the contributions of partner countries may provide targeted responses to EU shortfalls, they can also be problematic for a variety of reasons. Yet third party involvement in CSDP missions can be seen as a means to bolster the overall legitimacy of the EU’s international security role and should be understood in the context of a broader CFSP agenda.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
7 mars 2014 5 07 /03 /mars /2014 12:50
Three scenarios for Ukraine

Alerts - No16 - 07 March 2014 Nicu Popescu

 

In the last two weeks Ukraine has experienced two major shocks. The Ukrainian revolution was one of the most violent transitions to date, and not just in the post-Soviet space. And the Russian military intervention in Crimea arguably constitutes the biggest European security crisis since the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

These events will continue to be accompanied by competing narratives and conflicting propaganda from both inside and outside Ukraine. But what matters now is how to manage the political fall-out from the crisis and draw the right lessons to prevent a recurrence of similar events in the future. A useful way to consider future policy responses is to organise them around possible scenarios. For Ukraine, there may be at least three: a return to the status quo ante, a ‘Transnistrisation’ of Crimea, and a future with more military interventions.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
20 décembre 2013 5 20 /12 /décembre /2013 13:50
European defence – to be continued

 

Alerts - No44 - 20 December 2013 Antonio Missiroli

 

Fifteen years after the Franco-British St Malo Declaration, ten after the release of the European Security Strategy, and five after the review of its implementation and the last discussion on defence matters among the EU heads of state and government, the European Council has just brought to a (preliminary) conclusion a policy debate that was long overdue. 

Considering the current unfavourable political context – one of fiscal austerity and budgetary cuts, turmoil in the Union’s neighbourhood (and beyond), and military intervention fatigue in Europe and the wider ‘West’ – the text agreed by the EU leaders on 19 December can be considered a major step forward, also because it indicates a way forward, with explicit deadlines and responsibilities for reviewing, researching, and reporting. EU citizens, officials in Brussels and the capitals as well as our allies and partners will not have to wait another lustrum for the next milestone in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
20 décembre 2013 5 20 /12 /décembre /2013 13:30
Reforming Arab security sectors

 

Briefs - No48 - 19 December 2013 Florence Gaub

 

In 2011, Arab security forces, long suspected to be inextricably linked to their respective regimes, once again became decisive political agents in their own right: agents of change, agents of repression and, in some cases, both.

Their facilitation or suppression of democratic transitions has sparked a long-overdue debate on security sector reform in the Arab world. What are the main features of security sectors in the region? What are the main obstacles to reform? And why is this debate taking place only now?

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
20 décembre 2013 5 20 /12 /décembre /2013 13:20
Peacebuilding in 3D: EU and US approaches

 

Chaillot Paper - No130 - 19 December 2013 Eva Gross

Giving peace a chance has always been a difficult challenge. Making peace, preserving peace – but now, especially, building peace – represents one of the most important and demanding objectives of any foreign policy aimed at bringing about a safer world. Today, an increasingly complex global security environment requires a flexible and multifaceted approach to address the symptoms as well as the causes of conflict. Peacebuilding is a broad but useful concept that captures the variety but also the spectrum of measures available to international actors in pursuit of sustainable peace.

Engagement in various post-conflict settings over the past decade has led individual countries and organisations to work on enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of their respective instruments. This has involved efforts at improving coordination of capabilities as well as building up civilian tools and capacities so as to strengthen diplomacy and development alongside defence. Depending on the setting, such an alignment of the so-called ‘3Ds’ has been alternatively referred to as a ‘comprehensive’ or ‘whole-of-government’ approach, and its operationalisation has been conditioned by existing organisational structures, available resources, and strategic cultures.

This Chaillot Paper concerns itself with the ‘comprehensiveness’ of peacebuilding and, within that, its civilian dimension. It represents an exercise in mapping and comparing developments across the Atlantic regarding the combination of policy instruments for peacebuilding, and especially the development and association of civilian ones to the more ‘traditional’ tools of power, starting with the military ones. Both Brussels and Washington have made efforts at implementing a comprehensive (in the case of the EU) and whole-of-government (in the case of the US) approach to better align their respective instruments.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
22 novembre 2013 5 22 /11 /novembre /2013 13:50
Brief: What EU citizens think about European defence

Briefs - No43 - 22 November 2013 - by Olivier de France

 

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the ‘end of history’ was nigh – and Europe stood squarely on the right side of it. The times have changed, alas. Today policymakers in the EU expend much of their energy on parrying short-term economic shocks, which have rocked the European boat in ways that seemed unthinkable before. There is a lingering sense that a narrative has unravelled, yet to be convincingly replaced.

 

Countries face a strategic landscape that shifts faster than their perception of it perhaps allows. There are no tangible conventional threats and no enemies at Europe’s gates, but an array of risks and threats that are harder to predict and increasingly more complex. The changing environment requires the ability to bring a panoply of instruments to bear on a range of different problems. Europe prides itself on its ability to do this. Since the European Security Strategy called for a ‘comprehensive approach’ in 2003, the EU has endeavoured to conduct its external action in a flexible, integrated and multilateral way.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
8 novembre 2013 5 08 /11 /novembre /2013 17:50
CSDP between internal constraints and external challenges

Report No17 - 06 November 2013 - edited by Eva Gross, Anand Menon

 

Improving Europe’s military and civilian capabilities in a shifting security environment represents a major challenge for the EU and its member states. For one thing, European countries are having to contend with a climate of economic austerity that makes arguments in favour of investment in defence less convincing than they may (or may not) have been in more affluent times; second, broader geopolitical and strategic trends point towards Europeans assuming greater responsibility for their own security and the protection of European interests abroad; finally, the changing nature of conflict and projections concerning the coming decades call for a recalibration of the EU’s approach and appropriate instruments for its engagement in conflicts in its neighbourhood and beyond.

 

This report is the outcome of a conference held together with King's College London in September 2013 entitled 'CSDP between internal constraints and external challenges: the road ahead'.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0
8 novembre 2013 5 08 /11 /novembre /2013 17:45
République centrafricaine : défis humanitaires, politiques et sécuritaires

Briefs - No37 - 25 October 2013 par Cristina Barrios

 

 

« La République Centrafricaine (RCA) est en ­risque de somalisation », ont remarqué la Commissaire européenne chargée de la Coopération internationale, de l’aide humanitaire et de la réaction aux crises, Kristalina Georgieva, et le président français, François Hollande lors de réunions à l’ONU en septembre dernier.

 

En effet, ce qui restait de l’autorité du président François Bozizé, des Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA), et des services publics minimaux s’est effondré suite au coup d’Etat de mars 2013, lorsque la rébellion Séléka (une coalition amorphe composée de quatre factions principales regroupant environ 20 000 hommes armés, dont beaucoup sont originaires du Tchad et du Soudan) a porté Michel Djotodia au pouvoir et a laissé le pays à la merci des bandits et des groupes armés.

 

Download document

Partager cet article
Repost0

Présentation

  • : RP Defense
  • : Web review defence industry - Revue du web industrie de défense - company information - news in France, Europe and elsewhere ...
  • Contact

Recherche

Articles Récents

Categories