16 décembre 2014 par Nicolas Laffont – 45eNord.ca

L’agence spatiale russe Roscosmos envisage de construire sa propre station spatiale, a déclaré lundi son directeur, Oleg Ostapenko.

«Je confirme que nous étudions cette possibilité. C’est une voie de développement possible», a dit Oleg Ostapenko à propos du projet russe, qui entrerait en concurrence avec la Station spatiale internationale (ISS), laboratoire orbital auquel participent 15 pays, dont la Russie, les États-Unis et le Canada.

Washington souhaite que l’ISS soit maintenue en activité au moins jusqu’en 2024, soit quatre ans de plus que ce qui avait été fixé.

La station orbitale russe pourrait devenir un élément de première importance pour les missions russes vers la Lune.

Le directeur de l’agence spatiale russe a indiqué que «ce projet ambitieux nous permettra d’avoir l’œil sur plus de 90% du territoire russe», mais n’a pas dit comment un tel projet serait financé par la Russie, alors que toutes les prévisions laissent penser que le pays va entrer en récession l’année prochaine et que sa crise économique est aggravée par les sanctions occidentales liées au conflit ukrainien.

Avec la crise ukrainienne, Washington s’est montrée clair dès le début que toutes les sanctions qui seraient prises ne concerneraient pas la Station spatiale internationale. Il faut dire que les États-Unis sont dépendants des Russes et de leurs vaisseaux Soyouz pour envoyer leurs astronautes dans l’espace depuis la fin du programme des navettes spatiales en juillet 2011.

Rappelons que la station spatiale Mir, lancée en 1986 à l’époque de l’URSS, est restée en service jusqu’en 2001.

La Chine a développée sa propre station spatiale, Tiangong 1, qui est cependant davantage destinée à valider la technique du rendez-vous spatial automatique. Tiangong 2 et 3 doivent suivre d’ici à 2020, avant une autre station, beaucoup plus grande dans les années 2020.

L’espace, l’ultime frontière!

7 October 2014 by Simon Allison, ISS Consultant - defenceWeb

The spectre of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria casts a long shadow. It’s clearly not just the Middle East that is in trouble; both Britain and the United States have been worried enough to dispatch fighter jets to try and contain the Islamist rebels who have carved out huge chunks of territory as their own.

The aerial war has also drawn in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while various radical Islamist groups from India to Indonesia have pledged their support for the rebels. Analysts (including myself in this Institute for Security Studies policy brief) have warned that Africa is particularly vulnerable. The continent’s plethora of existing Islamist groups, coupled with its poor governance track record, make it a relatively ­­easy target.

This, however, is now old news. The Islamic State and its subversive ideology continue to move at a pace that journalists, researchers and policymakers just can’t match. The fact is, Africa isn’t facing a potential threat from the Islamic State, because that threat has already arrived – and is destabilising several African countries.

It began in Nigeria, where Boko Haram has dramatically altered their tactics over the last few months to mirror those of the Islamic State. In addition to their more typical hit-and-run attacks, the group has started to occupy towns and villages in north-eastern Nigeria, and declared that the territory under its control is part of an Islamic Caliphate. (Boko Haram has not explicitly declared allegiance to the Islamic State’s Caliphate, but perhaps this is implied.) Like the Islamic State, Boko Haram is imposing its fundamentalist version of Islam everywhere it goes, forcing residents to observe strict Islamic sharia law or be killed.

Then in Libya, in late July, Islamist militant group Ansar al-Sharia’s battle for control of Benghazi was given a vital boost with the arrival of hundreds of new fighters. These were Libyans who had been fighting under the banner of the Islamic State in Iraq and/or Syria, until ordered home by the Islamic State’s top brass. It is no coincidence that shortly after this decision was reached, Ansar al-Sharia was able to take strategic parts of the city, and declared it to be an Islamic Emirate independent from the rest of Libya.

So far, however, the Libyan example – of direct intervention from the Islamic State in an African conflict – is the exception. More prevalent is the copycat model, where African groups have seen the success of the Islamic State and patterned themselves accordingly.

Take, for example, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis – a militant group based in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, which has launched an aggressive campaign of attacks against Egyptian military and government targets. These have been accompanied by a series of brutal beheadings, complete with staged confessions and a slick, albeit gruesome, video. Videoed beheadings, distributed widely over social media, are something of an Islamic State trademark; the high-profile examples of Western journalists and aid workers were certainly not the first such recordings.

Or take the newly formed Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Algeria, thought to be a splinter group from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Jund al-Khilafah is one of the few groups in Africa to openly declare its allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State and self-declared emir, and it too has capitalised on the propaganda value of a recorded execution.

Its first terrorist act as a group was the kidnapping and then beheading of French tourist Hervé Gourdel, although its production values are not quite as slick. The video was noticeably poorer in quality than those typically produced by the Islamic State, and the executioners themselves looked uncomfortable and unskilled.

This might seem like a flippant point. Who cares about production quality when people are being murdered on camera? But it is actually quite revealing. Whereas the Islamic State’s videos are carefully calibrated propaganda efforts, Jund al-Khilafah’s was a sloppy imitation with no obvious purpose except to demonstrate loyalty. It is also even more gruesome, thanks to those inexperienced executioners. This raises important questions for the Islamic State as it seeks to expand. Will it accept allegiances indiscriminately, even if this could damage their brand? Or will it copy the al-Qaeda approach and vet potential allies and partners before allowing them to speak in their name?

So far, the Islamic State’s leader has not given formal recognition to any single group. ‘This might have to change,’ says Jasmine Opperman, Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. ‘Baghdadi will have to respond with some kind of acknowledgement, or he will appear out of control… Baghdadi’s Caliphate wants to create the façade of a worldwide Caliphate. To have the international division [in the areas outside Iraq and Syria] going around beheading seemingly at random, gives the opposite impression.’

In a way, the Islamic State is in danger of becoming a victim of its own success as its influence grows too far and too fast. Africa, however, is in far more danger, and its leaders will need a clear and coherent counter-terrorism strategy in order to counter not just the Islamic State, but also the copycat groups and activities that it has inspired.

Fortunately, such a strategy exists. At an extraordinary meeting of the African Union’s (AU’s) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in September, the PSC adopted a raft of measures aimed at improving both the quality and scale of the continent’s counter-terrorism efforts. These include wholly sensible plans to improve criminal justice systems and border controls; tighten controls on financing for terrorist groups and money-laundering; improve intelligence-sharing and coordination between states; and emphasise the need to uphold the rule of law and protect human rights.

But any strategy is only as good as its implementation, argues Solomon Ayele Dersso, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. If it is going to work, it has to be given precedence over the approach that has been generally favoured by governments participating in the ongoing military campaign against the Islamic State.

‘Implementing the AU instruments and frameworks on counter-terrorism – and doing so promptly and systematically at regional and national levels – is important. However, the bigger issue is the danger and tendency to ride on the international military response against the Islamic State, and expand the application of an exclusively militarised response to situations in Africa, particularly in the context of Libya,’ said Dersso.

For the most vulnerable African countries to have any hope of containing the influence of the Islamic State (Algeria, Libya, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia spring to mind immediately), their governments must adopt and implement the PSC’s recommendations as soon as possible, and hope that the Islamic State’s appeal wanes as its footprint on the continent grows.

The original article can be found here.

The Afghan presidential election that took place on 5 April marks the first democratic transition of power since current President Hamid Karzai took office. It also represents an important milestone for Afghanistan and for international actors operating in the country since the fall of the Taliban. The elections were of particular significance for the US, with Washington having been the primary driver of international engagement – military and otherwise – in the country for over a decade.

Washington views the Afghan elections from the vantage point of post-Karzai US-Afghan relations but, perhaps more importantly, also against the backdrop of shifting strategic and domestic priorities, which renders Afghanistan less central to the country´s foreign policy than it once was. Still, the election and its outcome promises clarity on the future of US troop strength – and their purpose – in the years to come. This, in turn, will determine the future presence of both NATO and the EU as well.

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When it comes to foreign policy, Russia is good at sprinting, while the West – and especially the EU – is better at marathons. The use of kinetic military force by Moscow is to a large extent a sign that other, long-term foreign policy means failed in Ukraine: Russian coercive diplomacy – based on sticks (embargoes and sanctions) and carrots (offers of cheaper gas and greater market access) – did not have the desired effect.

Moscow believes it can achieve its goals with rapid bursts of sprinting, and that the West will not quicken its pace in response. In Crimea, the territory was captured in a manner that was both quick and bloodless, with the weak state institutions of Ukraine simply crumbling in the face of Russian aggression. The problem is that other post-Soviet states are equally weak (or even weaker) and although they have successfully withstood periodic Russian embargoes over the last two decades, they are unlikely to be able to resist any form of military action. Worryingly, the option of sending armed, masked men to take over public buildings in a third state is very much on the table – particularly because this has proved not only easy, but also effective – and is therefore dangerously appealing.

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Pakistan will arguably be the most crucial regional player in post-2014 Afghanistan. Close religious and cultural links notwithstanding, its links to the Taliban give Islamabad considerable leverage and influence over any peace process. However, the protection and support granted to insurgent groups ­operating in Afghanistan over the past decade has had unintended domestic consequences for Pakistan, with the growing number of terrorist attacks now posing a ­significant threat to the country’s internal stability. Failure to reach a political settlement in Kabul is therefore likely to have a spill-over effect that would further weaken Islamabad’s ability to contain extremist groups operating inside Pakistan.

Despite the complexity of US-Pakistan relations, a complete US withdrawal by the end of 2014 – with the concomitant risk of a security vacuum developing along Pakistan’s border – is not in Islamabad’s interest. However, the implications of even a reduced transatlantic footprint are bound to contribute to a reckoning with extremism, and the forces that encourage it, inside Pakistan itself.

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2014 is a defining year for China’s relationship with Afghanistan. After more than a decade on the margins of international efforts to shape the country’s future, this summer China will take the diplomatic driving seat as it hosts the Istanbul Ministerial Process, the major regional conclave between Afghanistan and its neighbours, in Tianjin in August.

In anticipation of the drawdown of Western forces, Beijing has been making it clear to both friends and rivals that, unlike the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal, it will not sit on the sidelines and watch the country slide into civil war.

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Many aspects of the so-called Arab Spring came as a surprise: the mass demonstrations, the toppling of dictatorships, and indeed the timing. One of the most unexpected aspects, however, was the behaviour of the respective military forces. Regarded until 2011 as being unequivocal supporters of the regimes in power, they were expected to crack down on the demonstrators with an iron fist. Decades of military dictatorships, coups d’état and wars had entrenched the notion of Arab armed forces as agents of coercion, not agents of change.

But only one of the Arab militaries confronted with the massive social dislocation unleashed by the Arab Spring behaved in the expected way, i.e. unequivocally standing by the regime and suppressing the uprisings. The others facilitated regime change either actively or passively, and in Egypt assumed an even more direct role. In all cases, the armed forces were, and remain, the kingmakers, whose support is essential for rulers to hold onto, or accede to, power. But what drives these forces? Why do they choose to act, or not act, under certain political conditions? When do they have the capacity to act, and when is it that they do not?

While these questions are fundamental, they relate to the specific circumstances pertaining to the military in the post-2011 environment: how come the armed forces seem to possess the casting vote between secular and Islamist forces on the road to democracy? More puzzlingly, what is it that these forces stand for in the eyes of the populations in their respective countries – if it was modernity in the 1950s and 1960s, what is it today?

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The EU’s cyber defence agenda provides an opportunity to ask questions about what the EU could do in terms of setting security priorities. Furthermore, as a possible area for cooperation, cyber defence shares with military air logistics the peculiarity of being a common capability which does not require explicit war-like conditions to demonstrate its utility.

Indeed, the diversity and complexity of the threat environment – coupled with challenges of attribution – suggests the opposite: military cyber defence capabilities might offer better value for money in peacetime rather than in times of war.

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The November 2013 Foreign Affairs Council welcomed the ‘valuable contributions and political support of partner countries to CSDP missions and operations’. A few weeks later, a Ukrainian frigate began to patrol within EUNAVFOR Atalanta, and Georgia committed approximately 140 personnel to the recently-established EU operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). In Bosnia, Turkey has long been a major contributor to EUFOR Althea, while countries like Norway or Canada regularly provide civilian personnel to CSDP missions. These countries have all signed a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU, which provides the legal and political basis for such cooperation.

To date, this type of partnership remains limited in scope and has thus been given little visibility. Moreover, whilst the contributions of partner countries may provide targeted responses to EU shortfalls, they can also be problematic for a variety of reasons. Yet third party involvement in CSDP missions can be seen as a means to bolster the overall legitimacy of the EU’s international security role and should be understood in the context of a broader CFSP agenda.

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Fifteen years after the Franco-British St Malo Declaration, ten after the release of the European Security Strategy, and five after the review of its implementation and the last discussion on defence matters among the EU heads of state and government, the European Council has just brought to a (preliminary) conclusion a policy debate that was long overdue. 

Considering the current unfavourable political context – one of fiscal austerity and budgetary cuts, turmoil in the Union’s neighbourhood (and beyond), and military intervention fatigue in Europe and the wider ‘West’ – the text agreed by the EU leaders on 19 December can be considered a major step forward, also because it indicates a way forward, with explicit deadlines and responsibilities for reviewing, researching, and reporting. EU citizens, officials in Brussels and the capitals as well as our allies and partners will not have to wait another lustrum for the next milestone in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

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Giving peace a chance has always been a difficult challenge. Making peace, preserving peace – but now, especially, building peace – represents one of the most important and demanding objectives of any foreign policy aimed at bringing about a safer world. Today, an increasingly complex global security environment requires a flexible and multifaceted approach to address the symptoms as well as the causes of conflict. Peacebuilding is a broad but useful concept that captures the variety but also the spectrum of measures available to international actors in pursuit of sustainable peace.

Engagement in various post-conflict settings over the past decade has led individual countries and organisations to work on enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of their respective instruments. This has involved efforts at improving coordination of capabilities as well as building up civilian tools and capacities so as to strengthen diplomacy and development alongside defence. Depending on the setting, such an alignment of the so-called ‘3Ds’ has been alternatively referred to as a ‘comprehensive’ or ‘whole-of-government’ approach, and its operationalisation has been conditioned by existing organisational structures, available resources, and strategic cultures.

This Chaillot Paper concerns itself with the ‘comprehensiveness’ of peacebuilding and, within that, its civilian dimension. It represents an exercise in mapping and comparing developments across the Atlantic regarding the combination of policy instruments for peacebuilding, and especially the development and association of civilian ones to the more ‘traditional’ tools of power, starting with the military ones. Both Brussels and Washington have made efforts at implementing a comprehensive (in the case of the EU) and whole-of-government (in the case of the US) approach to better align their respective instruments.

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Improving Europe’s military and civilian capabilities in a shifting security environment represents a major challenge for the EU and its member states. For one thing, European countries are having to contend with a climate of economic austerity that makes arguments in favour of investment in defence less convincing than they may (or may not) have been in more affluent times; second, broader geopolitical and strategic trends point towards Europeans assuming greater responsibility for their own security and the protection of European interests abroad; finally, the changing nature of conflict and projections concerning the coming decades call for a recalibration of the EU’s approach and appropriate instruments for its engagement in conflicts in its neighbourhood and beyond.

This report is the outcome of a conference held together with King's College London in September 2013 entitled 'CSDP between internal constraints and external challenges: the road ahead'.

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