January 16, 2015:  Strategy Page

South Korea recently sold 120 of its locally designed and made K9 155mm self-propelled howitzers to Poland. South Korea has already sold 350 to Turkey. While superficially similar to the American M-109 the K9 is a heaver (46 tons versus 28 for the M-109), carries more ammo and has twice the range (up to 56 kilometers in part because of a barrel that is a third longer). There is more automation on the K9, so it has a crew of five versus six on the M-109. South Korea thus joins Germany in their effort to build a suitable replacement for the elderly M-109 design.

The United States sought to build a replacement for the M-109 (the 56 ton Crusader) that was very similar to the K9 but was too complex and expensive and the heavier weight was seen as a disadvantage for a country that has to ship its armored vehicles overseas to use them. For South Korea, Turkey and Poland that is not a problem and more heft (and protection for the crew) is an advantage.

One American innovation K9 users will probably adopt is the GPS guided Excalibur shell. This smart shell entered service in 2008 and changed everything. Excalibur has worked very well in combat, and this is radically changing the way artillery operates. Excalibur means 80-90 percent less ammo has to be fired to destroy a target and this results in less wear and tear on SP artillery, less time needed for maintenance, and less time spent replenishing ammo supplies and more time being ready for action.

Because of Excalibur (and other precision munitions) since 2001 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provided very little work for the M-109. The lighter, towed, M777 has proved more useful, especially when using the Excalibur shell. Currently, the army plans to keep newly upgraded versions of the M-109 around until 2050. The army plans to acquire at least 551 upgraded M-109s by 2027, reflecting the impact of the Excalibur shell, and the number of older M-109s that are still fit for service. The M-109 was a solid design, which is pretty clear from how difficult it's been to come up with a replacement. So, in the end, the army replaced the M-109 with another M-109 upgrade and is still seeking a replacement for that.

03.02.2015 BBC Afrique

Les troupes tchadiennes ont lancé mardi une offensive terrestre contre les membres du groupe islamiste Boko Haram dans la ville nigériane de Gamboru, à la frontière camerounaise, dans le Nord-Est du pays.

Ces informations sont confirmées par Mike Omeri, porte-parole nigérian en matière de sécurité nationale, ainsi que par des habitants de la ville qui se sont réfugiés dans une ville camerounaise à la frontière avec le Nigeria.

L'offensive a été lancée par la force multinationale censée lutter contre le groupe, qui se compose de troupes des pays qui bordent le lac Tchad.

L’attaque intervient après deux semaines de frappes aériennes et d’artillerie, et d'échanges de tirs nourris avec les insurgés qui avaient pris la ville il y a plusieurs mois.

L'armée tchadienne avait bombardé lundi pour la troisième journée consécutive des positions du groupe islamiste Boko Haram à Gamboru.

L’insurrection de Boko Haram a longtemps été considérée comme un soulèvement contre le gouvernement nigérian, mais ces derniers mois, ce mouvement s’est transformé en crise régionale, obligeant les pays voisins à coordonner leurs efforts militaires.

De son côté, l’armée nigériane affirme que les insurgés seront combattus sur tous les fronts afin de reprendre les zones sous le contrôle de Boko Haram et mettre fin à l'insurrection.

L'Union africaine a pour sa part lancé un appel pour la création d’une force forte régionale de 7 500 hommes pour combattre Boko Haram.

03 February 2015 by Kim Helfrich - defenceWeb

Last Friday the SA Air Force (SAAF) officially marked its 95th anniversary as part of the annual Air Force Day parade with a flypast of mostly Air Force Museum aircraft taking centre stage due to limited funding and aircraft availability.

Brigadier General Marthie Visser, Director: Corporate Staff Services, said the use almost exclusively of SAAF Museum aircraft was also a great way to showcase the air force’s history.

The issue of funding is a long-running one not only with the air force but also the other arms of service of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF). Taking specifically the airborne arm into account it is pertinent to look at what was recommended by the 1998 Defence Review as far as force design options for the SAAF are concerned.

This was part of a presentation made to the Seriti Commission of Inquiry by SAAF Deputy Chief, Major General Gerald Malinga, during the public hearings into allegations of corruption during the 1998 Arms Deal.

That Review, not to be confused with the current one on which Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence and Military Veterans is seeking public input, recommended 32 medium jet fighters and 16 light fighters for the SAAF.

Instead the SAAF, as part of the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages (SDPP), acquired 26 Gripen jet fighters and 24 Hawk Mk 120 Lead-In Fighter Trainers.

The proposed figure for reconnaissance aircraft in the 1998 Review was 32 made up of 16 light reconnaissance aircraft, six long range maritime patrol aircraft and 10 short range maritime patrol aircraft. Another proposed addition was for a squadron of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

At present the only true reconnaissance aircraft available to the SAAF are the handful of ageing C-47TPs operated by 35 Squadron. 41 Squadron’s 208 Caravans, King Airs and PC-12s can also be used for this tasking but are utilised more in the transport role for both cargo and people.

The 1998 Review said a total of 44 transport aircraft would meet SAAF needs. This presumably included the medium airlift capacity of 28 Squadron’s more than 50 year-old C-130BZs as well as 41 Squadron and 44 Squadron (C-212 Aviocar). At the moment the SAAF has nine C-130BZs, three C212s, 7 C-47TPs, four King Airs, ten Caravans and one PC-12 in its inventory for a total of 34 transport aircraft.

The 1998 Review recommendation of 12 combat support helicopters is currently in service minus one Rooivalk, written off following an accident.

As far as maritime helicopters are concerned, according to the Review Malinga quoted in his presentation to the Seriti Commission called for five aircraft. Currently the SAAF operates four Super Lynx maritime helicopters from AFB Ysterplaat-based 22 Squadron.

The 1998 Review wanted the air force to have 96 transport helicopters. Exact figures are not available but 15, 17, 19 and 22 Squadrons as well as 87 Helicopter Flying School at AFB Bloemspruit operate either Oryx, Agusta A109 and BK-177 or a combination of these types. Approximately 39 Oryx, 29 A109 and six BK-117s are in the inventory for a total of 74 helicopters.

In-flight refuelling and electronic warfare would have seen the SAAF operate five specialist aircraft in these roles if the Review was fully accepted. Today it has zero in-flight refuelling capability, with the electronic warfare and refuelling Boeing 707s retired.

VIP and VVIP transport should by now, in the 1998 Review, have been the responsibility of nine aircraft. 21 Squadron today operates the Boeing BBJ, a pair of ageing Falcons and a Cessna Citation.

Addressing the Air Force Day parade, SAAF Chief, Lieutenant General Zakes Msimang, did not specifically mention acquisitions except when he referred to “capacity building and the enhancement of the air force’s capabilities”.

2 février 2015 Antoine Malo, envoyé spécial à Al-Marj (Libye) - Le Journal du Dimanche

Le général Khalifa Haftar dirige l’opération Dignité, qui vise à éradiquer les djihadistes libyens et les milices islamistes. Rencontre avec un homme de fer qui appelle les Occidentaux à l’aide.

Pour les islamistes libyens, il est l'homme à abattre. Ansar Al-Charia, le groupe djihadiste, lui a promis le même sort que Mouammar Kadhafi. Alors pour rencontrer le général Khalifa Haftar, il faut accepter de suivre certaines règles. À l'entrée du camp où il a établi son QG, on laisse passeport et téléphone portable. Puis, après avoir passé un portique de sécurité, on se plie à une fouille corporelle. Avant de patienter dans une pièce fermée, surveillé par un garde. Il faut dire qu'en juin 2014, le général de 71 ans a échappé de justesse à un attentat à la voiture piégée. L'attaque a tué trois de ses hommes, blessé deux de ses fils. Ces derniers ont quitté la Libye. Lui est resté. De son ton égal, il explique : "Je n'ai pas peur de mourir. Si c'est le prix à payer pour protéger mon pays, alors je suis prêt à le payer."

Suite de l’article

February 3, 2015:  Strategy Page

The Russian Navy is disappearing and press releases and promises are not changing that. For example in 2012 Russia announced that its SSBNs (nuclear powered ballistic missile boats) would resume long range "combat patrols" that year. That didn’t happen. Before 2012 there had been only about ten such patrols a year, each lasting three months or less. Most did not go far from Russian coastal waters and some were not even made by SSBNs.

The problem here is that the Russian Navy has not only shrunk since the end of the Cold War in 1991 but it has also become much less active. Since the 1990s fewer and fewer of their nuclear subs went to sea on combat patrols. Most of the boats going to sea were SSNs (attack subs), not SSBNs. Most of these trips were short range training missions, which often lasted a few days, or just a few hours. But the true measure of a fleet is the "combat patrol" or "deployment." In the U.S. Navy most of these last from 2-6 months. In the last decade U.S. nuclear subs have carried out ten times as many patrols as their Russian counterparts.

Despite lots of effort (fiscal and otherwise) the Russian Navy is not being rebuilt and that means it is fading away. No amount of media razzle dazzle will replace the actual presence of your warships in distant waters. In the last few years the only such appearances have been mainly for show and the few that occurred were heavily covered by the Russian media.

On paper the Russian Navy currently has 270 combat ships (including amphibious and combat support vessels). But only about half of these are in any shape to go to sea. The rest are too old, and usually too poorly maintained for too many years, to leave port. Russian shipyards are terrible at building or repairing ships and efforts to remedy this have so far failed. Thus only about 15 percent of Russian naval vessels are major surface warships or submarines. In comparison the U.S. Navy has 290 warships and about 85 percent can go to sea (the others are being upgraded or repaired.)

In the last decade most of the Russian investment in ships has gone to maintaining submarines or building a few new ones.  Currently, Russia only has 14 SSBN (nuclear ballistic missile sub) boats in service and not all of them have a full load of missiles. Some lack full crews or have key systems in need of repair. Twelve of the SSBNs are Delta IVs, which are overdue for retirement and rarely got to sea. Russia has only 15 modern, 7,000 ton, Akula SSNs (nuclear attack subs) in service. Actually only nine are in service plus another that has been leased to India. The rest are in “reserve” for lack of money and crews. The Akulas began building in the late 1980s and are roughly comparable to the American Los Angeles class. All of the earlier Russian SSNs are trash (by current standards) and most have been decommissioned. The Chinese still have a few SSNs similar to these older Russian designs and when encountered it is surprising to young sailors manning the sonar how loud and easy to find they are.

Currently, the U.S. has 11 of the new, 7,700 ton, Virginia class SSNs in service, two getting ready to enter service and 17 more planned. The mainstay of the American submarine force is still the 6,100 ton Los Angeles-class SSN. Sixty-two of these submarines were built, 40 of which remain in front-line service, making it probably the largest class of nuclear submarines that will ever be built. The Seawolf-class of nuclear attack submarines stopped at three from a planned class of twenty-nine. The 8,600 ton Seawolf was designed as a super-submarine, designed to fight the Soviet Navy at its height. Reportedly, it is quieter going 40 kilometers an hour than the Los Angeles-class submarines are at pier side.

The Cold War spurred an arms race between the Russian and American navies. Thus the peak year for Russian nuclear sub patrols was 1984, when there were 230. That number rapidly declined until, in 2002, there were none. Since the late 1990s, the Russian navy has been hustling to try and reverse this decline. But the navy budget, despite recent increases, is not large enough to build new ships to replace the current Cold War era fleet that is falling apart. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, most of the ship building money has gone into new nuclear subs. Six Akulas have been completed in that time. Two of a new generation of SSBNs, the Borei class were completed but prevented from entering service by continued technical problems with a new ballistic missile and lack of money. The first two Borei class boats ended up costing over two billion dollars each. The ballistic missile for the Borei was just approved in 2014 there won't be enough of them to fill all the Borei silos until 2015 or 2106 (or later).

The Russian admirals made their big mistake in the early 1990s when the dismantling of the Soviet Union left the second largest fleet in the world with only a fraction of its Cold War budget. Rather than immediately retire ninety percent of those ships, Russia tried to keep many of them operational. This consumed most of the navy budget and didn't work. There were too many ships, not enough sailors and not enough money for maintenance or training at sea. By the late 1990s the mighty Soviet fleet was mostly scrap or rusting hulks tied up at crumbling out-of-the way naval bases.

While Western nuclear subs can last for about thirty years Russian models rarely get past twenty. That means two new SSN or SSGN have to be put into service each year to maintain a force of forty Russian boats. Unless the sub construction budget get billions more dollars a year, that is not going to happen. Right now, the priority is on producing a new class of SSBNs (6 more Boreis are planned or under construction). These Boreis are essential because they carry SLBMs that provide a critical (they are much harder to destroy in a first strike than land based missiles) portion of the nuclear deterrent. The rest of the Russian armed forces, like most of the navy, are in sad shape and unable to resist a major invasion. Only the ICBMs and SLBMs guarantee the safety of the state. So the way things are going now, in a decade or two, Russia will end up with a force consisting of a dozen SSNs and a dozen SSBNs.

The current Russian fleet of nuclear subs is tiny and the Russians would rather keep them tied up at dock most of the time. The crews can do a lot of training at dockside, and only go to sea a few times a year to check on their state of training. Given the number of accidents their subs have had in the past decade, the training the crews are getting now is not sufficient. Russia is still building new subs, but very slowly and in spite of incompetence and poor workmanship in the shipyards. The only new surface ships in the last decade have been small (under 2,000 tons) corvette types, good mainly for coastal patrol. Even smaller missile boats are also being built, in small numbers and again only really useful in coastal waters.

The current economic sanctions on Russia (over the attacks on neighbors like Ukraine) and plunging oil prices prevent any progress on halting the further decline of the navy.

January 26, 2015: Strategy Page

The Chinese like to develop a lot of specialized armored vehicles, in part to deal with the very different climates and geography found throughout their vast country. Thus they have a lot of amphibious armored vehicles as well as models equipped to handle marshy ground or deep snow. The latest specialized vehicle is a light tank designed to be more effective in Tibet and nearby provinces with a lot of rough, mountainous terrain. This would include the mountainous jungles on Vietnamese border.

The new tank (nicknamed the ZTQ) replaces the 21 ton Type 62 (WZ131Type 62 (WZ131) that entered service in the 1960s and some are still used as a light reconnaissance tank. The Type 62 looked like a scaled down Russian T-55 (or Chinese clone the Type 59) with much thinner armor (35mm/1.4 inches in the front). This provided protection from most artillery fragments as well as most machine-guns. The Type 62 had a four man crew and an 85mm gun. Over 1,500 were built before production ceased in 1989. There were stories in Chinese media during 2013 indicating that the Type 62 was being retired and some officers were not happy with that.

First seen in 2010, it is believed that the ZTQ entered service in 2014. The tank appears to have a 105mm or 125mm gun, improved armor protection and running gear that is more efficient and easier to maintain. The ZTQ is probably heavier, as in 30 tons or more. Armor design has advanced greatly since the 1960s as have artillery and heavy machine-guns. A closer examination of the ZTQ would probably reveal an armored vehicle with modern armor and other protection. So far China has released very little data on the new light tank. The vehicle is known because cell phone photos have been taken as many of them were shipped to Tibet on railroad flat cars or moved around on tank transporters for tests in different parts of the country. The turrets were often covered with netting to conceal details, although a few other photos have appeared with a clear (but not as detailed) view of the turret. It is of modern design and appears to be equipped with sensors. There appears to be modular armor (reactive or other lightweight types) for parts of the vehicle. Overall the vehicle is most definitely a modern design and the Chinese will probably eventually offer it for export. At that point the details will be revealed.

In 2006 it was believed that the recently introduced ZBD 97 amphibious tank would replace the Type 62. The ZBD 97 is armed with a 30mm autocannon and a 100mm gun/missile launcher in a small turret, plus several 7.62mm machine-guns. The fire control system includes a night sight. The crew of three is accompanied by seven infantrymen (or additional fuel and ammo) in the rear. While the ZBD 97 could replace the Type 62 in some respects, it was basically a scaled up IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle.) The ZBD 97 used license built components of the Russian BMP 3 in a Chinese designed amphibious infantry fighting vehicle chassis.  ZBD 97 was popular with the Chinese marines, but the army wanted a new light tanks. Now they have one.

January 13, 2015: Strategy Page

The Chinese Type 1130 multibarrel autocannon has been confirmed as the final production version of what was previously called the Type 1030. The 1130 has 11 barrels (one more than the 1030) and two magazines carrying over 1280 rounds of ammo. That is enough to engage over 40 targets before needing a reload. Top rate of fire is 10,000 rounds a minute (166 per second). This robotic weapon is radar controlled and, when turned on, automatically fires at incoming targets while under software control. It is similar in function to the U.S. Phalanx. The 1130 has five times more ammo ready-to-fire than the 1030 along with many refinements added during years of development. Because of its size, weight and large power requirements the Type 1130 is only installed on carriers and large destroyers.

This new weapon was first spotted in 2011 when the new Chinese aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (formerly Varyag) was seen with at least two of the then-new “Type 1030” automatic cannon systems. The Type 1030 appeared to be an upgraded (to ten barrels) model of the older Type 730 (seven barrel) and Type 630 (six barrel), close-in anti-missile automatic cannon. All fire 30mm shells at incoming anti-ship missiles, aircraft or anything else deemed a danger to the ship. The 1030 turned out to be still in development and the final version was the 1130.

Also seen on the Liaoning in 2011 were four 18 cell launcher for FL-3000N anti-missile missiles. The FL-3000N is similar to the American RAM anti-missile missile system, except that they come in 24 missile and 18 missile launchers and are less accurate. FL-3000N was only introduced in 2008, and uses smaller missiles than RAM. The FL-3000N missiles have a max range of nine kilometers (about half that for very fast incoming missiles). The 120mm, two meter long missiles use a similar guidance system to RAM, but are not as agile in flight.

Missiles are increasingly preferred over cannon for short range anti-missile defense. Thus over the last decade, the U.S. Navy Phalanx 20mm autocannon anti-missile system has been more frequently replaced by SeaRAM. What's interesting about this is that SeaRAM is basically the Phalanx system, with the 20mm gun replaced with a box of eleven RAM (RIM-116 "Rolling Air Frame") missiles. The Phalanx was developed in the 1970s, and entered service in 1977 (about the same time as the original Russian Type 630).

RAM was developed in the 1980s, and didn't enter service until 1993. RAM has a longer range (7.5 kilometers) than the Phalanx (2-3 kilometers, or 3.5 kilometers for the 30mm weapons) and was originally designed to be aimed using the ship's fire control systems. Phalanx, on the other hand, has its own radar and fire control system and, once turned on, will automatically fire at any incoming missiles. The latest Type 630/730/1130 operate the same way. This is necessary, as some anti-ship missiles travel at over a 500 meters a second. With SeaRAM, you've got a little more time, and can knock down the incoming missile farther from the ship. This is important, because it was feared that a large, very fast anti-ship missile (which the Russians prefer, and sell to foreigners), even when shot up by Phalanx, might still end up having parts of it slam into the target ship. Since SeaRAM has eleven missiles ready to fire, it can also engage several targets at once, something the Phalanx could not do.

The RAM missiles are 127mm in diameter, three meters (9.3 feet) long and weigh 73.6 kg (162 pounds) each. The terminal guidance system is heat seeking. Basically, it uses the rocket motor and warhead from the Sidewinder air-to-air missile, and the guidance system from the Stinger shoulder fired anti-aircraft missile. SeaRAM missiles cost about $450,000 each, which is probably at least 50 percent more than the FL-3000N missiles. SeaRAM is meant to provide protection for combat support ships that normally have no defenses, or at least no combat radars and fire control system. The new LCS will use the SeaRAM as well.

Like most modern carriers, the only weapons carried are anti-missile systems like Type 1130 and FL-3000N, plus some heavy machine-guns (which are often kept inside the ship, and mounted outside only when needed.) However, Russian practice was been to sometimes install long range anti-ship missiles as well. China may also do this with Shi Lang.

February 2, 2015: Strategy Page

ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) was seemingly invincible and unstoppable in mid-2014. In July 2014 ISIL had recently taken control of Mosul (the largest city in northern Iraq) and was advancing on Baghdad, the Kurdish north and the capital of western Iraq (Anbar province).  Similar gains were being made in Syria. All that has changed in the last few months. ISIL still holds the cities of Raqqa (the largest city in eastern Syria) and Mosul in Iraq. But both cities are increasingly rebellious and require a growing number of ISIL gunmen to maintain control.  Now ISIL is in retreat in Iraq and Syria. Sunni tribes in Anbar and western Syria are in open revolt and subject to increasingly savage reprisals by ISIL gunmen (often foreigners, which makes the tribesmen angrier). Half the ISIL leadership has been killed by coalition (Arab, NATO and allied) warplanes since August 2014. This air support and a Iraqi soldiers, Kurdish troops, Shia militias and armed Sunni tribesmen have taken back much of the territory ISIL overran in early 2014. American and other Western troops are rebuilding the Iraqi Army and arming anti-ISIL Sunni tribesmen. Iran is training and sometimes leading Shia militias. In Syria ISIL is getting beaten by Kurds, Syrian soldiers and more Iranian trained Shia militias.

While still bringing in new recruits from outside of Syria and Iraq, ISIL has lost the propaganda war inside those two counties and the Islamic world in general. History often repeats itself and in the case of Iraqi Islamic terrorists there is, for the second time since 2007, a major dip in Islamic terrorist approval ratings because of the brutality of Iraqi Islamic terrorists. Back in 2007 it was the "Al Qaeda In Iraq" leadership that was out of control. At the time opinion polls in Moslem countries showed approval and support of al Qaeda plunging, in some cases to single digits. This came after the 2003 invasion of Iraq when al Qaeda managed to take itself from hero to zero in less than four years. Al Qaeda has since recovered somewhat but that kinder and gentler approach did not last and by 2013 the Iraqi al Qaeda (now ISIL) was again losing popular support. That was quite visible after June 2014 when ISIL seized control of parts of Iraq and promptly slaughtered captured Iraqi soldiers and police, mainly because these men were Shia. Then ISIL declared the parts of Syria and Iraq it controlled were the new Moslem caliphate.

Naturally the ISIL leaders running this new caliphate called on all Moslems to follow them in making the new caliphate work. Most Moslems responded, according to subsequent opinion polls, by expressing greater fear rather than more admiration for Islamic terrorist groups, especially ISIL. This was not a radical change in attitude. Earlier in 2014 al Qaeda leadership condemned ISIL for being completely out of control and not to be trusted or supported. Throughout 2104 opinion polls showed Moslems becoming more hostile to Islamic terrorists, seeing them as a cause for concern not as defenders of Islam. The same thing happened back in 2007. Then as now there continued to be young (teens and twenties) Moslem men who saw all this mindless mayhem as an attraction and kept rushing to join the slaughter (most often of themselves). The Islamic world has not been able to control these violent young men or the older men who encourage and organize this violence.

When al Qaeda could not, in 2007, exercise any real control over the parts (mostly Anbar province in the West) of Iraq they claimed as part of the new Islamic State and that claim was the last straw for many Moslems. The original caliphate came apart because the Islamic world was split by ethnic and national differences and the first caliphate fell apart after a few centuries.  Various rulers have claimed the title over the centuries, but since 1924, when the Turks gave it up (after four centuries), no one of any stature has stepped up and assumed the role. So when al Qaeda "elected" a nobody in 2006 as the emir of the "Islamic State of Iraq", and talked about this being the foundation of the new caliphate, even many pro-al Qaeda Moslems were aghast. The key allies of the Iraqi Islamic terrorists (the Sunni minority of Iraq), battered by increasingly effective American and Iraqi (Shia and Kurd) attacks, dropped their support for al Qaeda and the terrorist organization got stomped to bits by the "surge offensive" a year later. The final insult was delivered by the former Iraqi Sunni Arab allies, who switched sides and sometimes even worked with the Americans (more so than the Shia dominated Iraqi security forces) to hunt down and kill al Qaeda personnel.

Between then and 2013 al Qaeda in Iraq slowly rebuilt and received a major boost in 2011 when the Sunni Arab majority in neighboring Syria rose up against four decades of Shia dictatorship. While the Sunni Arabs are a minority in Iraq (20 percent of the population versus 60 percent Shia) it is quite the opposite in Syria (15 percent Shia and 75 percent Sunni). The Sunnis are most numerous in eastern Syria and western Iraq which the Sunnis see as one entity divided by artificial political boundaries imposed by Turks and the Western nations that replaced the Turks after 1918. This “Sunnistan” is the northernmost concentration of Sunni Arabs and long subjugated by non-Sunni or non-Arab powers. Turks and Persians (the Indo-European Iranians) have long fought over the area, with the Turks largely in charge since the 16th century. The Turks were Sunni and what is now called Iraq has long been, not surprisingly, a center of the long religious battle between Sunni and Shia sects of Islam.

Ever since al Qaeda showed up in the 1990s they were popular to Moslems in proportion to how far away the al Qaeda violence was. Once al Qaeda began killing people nearby Moslems tended to change their mind and actively dislike Islamic terrorists. Thus in 2013 37 percent of Turks were concerned about Islamic terrorism while by 2014it was 50 percent thanks to increased ISIL violence on the Syrian border and some inside Turkey itself. Similar situation further south where 54 percent of the people in Jordan were concerned in 2013 versus 62 percent now. In Lebanon, where the Syrian violence spilled over quickly after 2011 last year 81 percent were concerned in 2013 Islamic terrorism versus over 90 percent today.

The hostility towards al Qaeda in the region has tainted all forms of Islamic radicalism, including the Shia ones (especially Hezbollah in Lebanon). Yet once Islamic terrorism disappears again (as it does regularly) many Moslems will get nostalgic for those legendary warriors seeking to defend Islam. This is a cycle many Moslems would like to break, but so far the cycle of violence persists.

4 February 2015 Frank Gardner – BBC MidEast

Jordan has vowed to avenge the killing of its air force pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh by Islamic State (IS) militants.

This comes after an IS video appeared to show him being burned alive. Jordan confirmed the death, although the video's authenticity is being checked. Officials told reporters a convicted jihadist Jordan had tried to exchange for the pilot would be executed. The 26-year-old pilot was seized when his plane came down in Syria in December during a mission against IS. Mamdouh al-Ameri, a spokesman for the Jordanian armed forces, said on Tuesday that Lt Kasasbeh had "fallen as a martyr". "His blood will not be shed in vain. Our punishment and revenge will be as huge as the loss of the Jordanians." Jordan's King Abdullah: "It is every Jordanian's duty to stand together" The army also promised an "earth-shattering" response to his death.

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